[sacw] SACW | 24 Oct. 02

[Harsh Kapoor]

South Asia Citizens Wire | 24 October 2002

__________________________

#1. Pakistan: The two kinds of politics (M B Naqvi)
#2. Pakistan - India: Enlarging the silver lining (Praful Bidwai)
#3. Kashmir=B9s Psychic Toll (Jeffrey Bartholet)
#4. Book Review: 'Hindutva Demystified' by Virendra Prakash (V.=20
Krishna Ananth)
#5. Documentary Film in Hindi: 'Aakrosh' [ on the venom of=20
communalism in Gujarat , India]

__________________________

#1.

=A0The News International (Pakistan)
Wednesday October 23, 2002

The two kinds of politics

M B Naqvi

There are two types of politicians in Pakistan. The first comprises=20
those who are broadly satisfied with the way Pakistan's polity and=20
economy are organised. This group also includes those who are unhappy=20
with one particular detail -- the way the Army generals intrude,=20
overthrow civilian governments and begin recasting political=20
institutions for longer life to the dictator of the day -- despite=20
being adequately satisfied, or unconcerned, with the social=20
structures work. But a majority is too opportunistic to question the=20
generals' right to rule; they all seek to share power with the=20
military.

There are other kinds of politicians and intellectuals who are deeply=20
distressed by the results that the polity and economy are delivering.=20
They want a radical enough change in both politics and economy. They=20
want to reorient these to achieve results that add to the rights and=20
privileges of the people. They aim to end today's unsatisfactory=20
conditions. The criteria these people use must be explained. They do=20
not recognize anyone's right to rule over the state without obtaining=20
freely given consent by the people and that applies to all assorted=20
despots, generals included. Many of them are thoroughgoing democrats=20
who want to go as far as humanly possible to have a participatory=20
system in which the common voter plays an increasing role in decision=20
making and in the execution of policies.

A word more about this category. Their primary value is human being=20
and his freedoms -- to become what he wants to, to do what he wishes=20
to and speak and act the way he thinks necessary. Human rights=20
presuppose that no human being can be left to starve; his right to=20
gainful employment -- failing which some social security assistance=20
-- must be accepted as a legal responsibility by the state, without=20
any abridgement of all other human rights. This has nothing to do=20
with the old debate between socialism and capitalism. The latter=20
ensures this right even in smaller countries like Denmark, Norway,=20
Sweden or Netherlands, let alone the larger ones. It is time that=20
Pakistani capitalism, in its democratic version, should do the same.=20
This paradigm shift is now overdue.

But one look at the newly elected mob in Islamabad and one's heart=20
sinks. Most of them are extraordinary quiet about any issue that=20
might need discussion or consultation with people. With exemplary=20
single-mindedness they are looking for what they can get in the quest=20
for power. The only people who have mentioned any issues being=20
involved are MMA and Nawabzada Nasrullah Khan (ARD) of current=20
concern. MMA is no mean player in the power grabbing game, though.=20
But one credit cannot be denied to them that they have raised=20
questions regarding the oath, constitutional amendments, the=20
President's election and the need to abolish NSC.

One endorses Pakistan Bar Council's view that politician should not=20
go to the courts on these issues. One says so not because the Judges,=20
who have taken oath on PCO, are unlikely to upheld the other=20
position. One's reason is different. These questions go to the heart=20
of the political system: if you want a basic change in the current=20
political set up -- given by a General on the strength of the Army --=20
it is the job of an elected Parliament to do the right thing. The=20
courts have no locus standi.

Politicians do need to be flexible -- and even pragmatic. But=20
pragmatism needs to be distinguished from opportunism. Those who=20
belong to elite classes and are fully satisfied with the way the=20
society renders unto them both cash and respect, can be left alone to=20
remain engaged in the struggle for power and be happy with the crumbs=20
that fall from Gen Musharraf's table. Their highest aim can only be=20
to share power without disturbing any major institution or policies.

People of goodwill need to engage themselves with those who (i) may=20
be socially conservative but desire political institutions of a=20
formal parliamentary democracy and (ii) are radical enough democrats=20
who believe in human rights as an ideal or as the primary value and=20
who are prepared to go some way in adding economic and social rights=20
to political ones with the aim of intellectual enlightenment and=20
cultural enrichment. If necessary they have to reorder their=20
priorities and to perceive that no progress is possible in extending=20
and deepening democracy or taking democratic precepts to the economic=20
sphere until the Army's hold on the society is broken. It has to be=20
made to transfer power to the elected people.

There is no use going on about the electoral malpractices. No=20
election, other than that of 1970, has been free from the=20
ministrations of intelligence agencies. So long as Army sits at the=20
top of the social structure, it will manipulate elections -- to=20
ensure victory of opportunists, toadies and turncoats. An election=20
has been held so recently. We have to make do with the results that=20
have been handed down. One shall deal with the larger significance of=20
MMA's rise separately. Right now there is one large question: what to=20
do about these results? In practice, the groups that participated=20
have already tacitly, and many have explicitly, accepted them. The=20
purist idea of rejecting them was never even considered. So all of us=20
have to see what is possible.

Insofar as MMA is concerned, well, it is a fact of life; it is going=20
to control NWFP and Balochistan provinces. It has been elected mainly=20
on an anti-American vote. It does not like the way the current=20
campaign against al-Qaeda and top Taliban leaders is being conducted.=20
Either MMA will pipe down and it shall agree to serve under the=20
Musharraf Presidency after all concerned have sorted out the issues=20
MMA has raised. Or, a Crisis might be caused in both=20
Pakistan-American relations over the question of inducting a civilian=20
government that might demand true transfer of power from the Army and=20
end of American bases. We do not yet know how would the Americans=20
react. That could be a 1971-like situation also; the possibilities=20
are not pleasant to contemplate.

The government and MMA constituents know each other rather well after=20
having cooperated all these many years. MMA leadership comprises=20
politicians that possess much this-worldly savvy. The Yankies are=20
also no strangers to the MMA heavyweights. All of us will be watching=20
how they and President sort out political and foreign policy issues.=20
MMA ought not to preempt our attention from the main issues.

PPP appears to be talking with two voices: there is a faction that=20
does talk of issues and echoes what the Nawabzada says. But the other=20
luminaries are more narrowly fixated on a share, any share, in power=20
certain personal questions. PML(N) does come through as being=20
genuinely concerned with issues. But then, its numbers are so few=20
that a big role is not possible for them to play; they can play a far=20
more useful role on the opposition benches if only PPPP's leaders do=20
not fall for a small share in power, if at all.

If the PML(QA) can rough-hew an alliance with MMA -- and the "issues"=20
do not intrude -- President Musharraf can then look forward to a long=20
inning. Needless to say the power struggle among half a dozen=20
PMs-to-be can scarcely be settled without a Presidential wink and nod=20
for one of them. Small parties -- PTI, PAT, TI and Millat Party --=20
pose no problem; the "issues" had been settled for them on Aug 21.=20
Only MQM remains. On the question of engaging in power struggle it is=20
second to none. But its Chief has been articulating a politics that=20
cannot permit participation in any likely government. But the more=20
knowledgeable say that its leadership knows the art and craft of=20
making two qualitatively different ends meet and indeed co-exist. The=20
otherwise anxious PML(QA) leaders appear to be sure that NA parties,=20
MQM, SDA, PML(F) and a few others will join them in making a=20
government with MMA -- a so-called national government that might=20
even include PPPP. Issues be damned.

One more word about MMA. Administrative force majeure to keep them=20
out, with or without foreign advice, will -- apart from being=20
arbitrary and unwise -- open floodgates to subversion and=20
multifarious trouble. Democracy sustained by rule of law is nothing=20
if not a broad-based club where pluralism rules supreme. Democratic=20
norms demand that whoever has been declared elected shall get what=20
his numbers entitle him to. Some extremists and some Americans are=20
sure to tar MMA with the brush of extremism and terror supporters.=20
Antidote to terrorism and extremism is not what Bush and Ashcroft in=20
their panic are doing in the US: it is more genuine democratic=20
freedoms. These are to be supported by good and efficient policing=20
within the four walls of law. If democracy cannot defend itself=20
democratically, it loses its right to survive. Violating democratic=20
precepts and practices will be disastrous. That should be in nobody's=20
mind.

National government idea has been conceived as a means of fudging the=20
"issues" and being ready to take one's (infinitesimal) share of power=20
from the all powerful President, behind whom looms the Army, though=20
he has yet to get the Americans off his hair.

_____

#2.

The News International
Thursday October 24, 2002

Enlarging the silver lining

Praful Bidwai

The results of Pakistan's elections come as a comprehensive=20
disappointment to liberal and secular-minded Indians just as they=20
represent a massive setback to the democratisation prospect in=20
Pakistan itself.

To start with, the ground-rules of the whole exercise were severely=20
rewritten by President Pervez Musharraf even before it began. This=20
made a grotesque mockery of the very function of elections as an=20
instrument of expression of the popular will. The mockery was further=20
compounded by the exclusion of the leaders of the two biggest=20
political parties, and by the doubts cast over the powers of the=20
legislatures to be elected.

Worse, the government's shady agencies egregiously messed with=20
political parties, promoting favourites and discouraging adversaries,=20
and thus further damaging the election process's credibility. Since=20
then, nothing -- including campaigning restrictions, low turnout and=20
(independent observers' reports of) rigging and ballot-tampering --=20
has salvaged that credibility.

On top of this come the results which reveal a badly fractured=20
popular mandate, but which nevertheless show that the=20
Islamic-communal jihadi parties comprising the Mutthahida=20
Majlis-e-Amal doubled their vote over the seven percent "barrier"=20
which many had hoped (and some confidently forecast) they would never=20
cross.

In my view, the MMA's emergence as the National Assembly's third=20
largest group -- besides its likely leadership of governments in two=20
provinces -- is the elections' single most retrograde or negative=20
outcome. This is so not so much because Islamic extremism is as=20
socially malign, ideologically distasteful and politically dangerous=20
as, say, Hindutva -- which it is--, but primarily because of why the=20
MMA rose to such prominence and what it is likely to do. There are=20
five reasons for this view.

First, the MMA's ascendancy is rooted in "negative" factors like the=20
growing anti-US popular sentiment over the past year, especially in=20
the provinces bordering Afghanistan, and the space created by popular=20
disillusionment with "normal" political parties whose monumentally=20
corrupt and unresponsive leaders have twice proved a letdown.

But above all, that ascendancy is a tribute to years of malgovernance=20
and the deep crisis in which "normal" democratic politics finds=20
itself in Pakistan on account of its inability to acknowledge and=20
address the elementary concerns of the mass of the population, and=20
vent them in policies -- however obliquely or imperfectly.

Second, the fundos' support has grown on account of a "positive"=20
factor: ethnic-religious "identity politics". This, regrettably,=20
brings to fruition some of the darkest prophesies of the critics=20
(including myself) of the post-9/11 Bush Doctrine and the US's=20
disastrously militarist approach to "terrorism". The worst forecast=20
was that America's open-ended "anti-terrorist" crusade would end up=20
strengthening the forces of religious extremism, especially in the=20
Muslim world. Predictable as this might have been, it is a retrograde=20
development.

Third, the MMA is set to push Pakistan's society and politics=20
backwards. If it shares power in a Federal coalition, it will=20
certainly impose some elements of its agenda upon its allies. It is=20
already talking about banning co-education, releasing pro-Taliban=20
extremists like the Jaish-e-Mohammed's Masood Azhar and former=20
Lashkar-e-Toiba chief Hafiz Muhammad Saeed, and making Friday the=20
weekly holiday. Even if it is excluded from the next government, the=20
MMA will wield considerable influence given the PML(Q)'s severe=20
credibility crisis, the PPPP's weakness, and its own clout in the=20
NWFP and Balochistan.

Fourth, the MMA's ascendancy will be seen by India's religious bigots=20
as their own vindication, and a signal for hardening their political=20
stance. Nothing feeds extremism in one country of the subcontinent as=20
strongly as Right-wing extremism in the other. The MMA will also=20
encourage India's "secular" hawks to paint Pakistan in dark hues, as=20
a society obsessed with Islam and incapable of throwing up a=20
democratic culture.

Such perceptions could subvert or slow down moves towards badly=20
needed reconciliation and d=C8tente -- to our collective detriment.

Finally, the MMA will confront Musharraf with new challenges -- and=20
(ironically!) opportunities. On the one hand, allowing the MMA to=20
join a coalition government risks incurring US displeasure. On the=20
other, he cannot keep it out without inviting grave charges of=20
subverting democracy. This "Algerian" dilemma doesn't auger well for=20
Pakistan's health.

If Musharraf chooses to be super-devious, he could use the MMA's=20
existence as a bargaining counter vis-a-vis the US. He could cite it=20
as a potential threat to US plans for this region -- to highlight the=20
military's indispensability for Pakistan. Alternatively, he could use=20
the MMA as an excuse

for his failure to deliver on his own

promises to rein in extremists and prevent cross-border infiltration.=20
After all, nothing sells in Washington like the "compulsions" of an=20
ally, especially one in "democratising" mode.

This is, admittedly, a grim picture. The only silver lining to the=20
proverbial dark cloud has now appeared -- India's de-escalation and=20
demobilisation from the border, euphemistically called=20
"redeployment". This has been long overdue. Keeping 700,000 troops on=20
high alert for 10 months has proved -- as many critics, and in=20
particular the peace movement had argued -- counter-productive, and=20
drained away anything between Rs 5,000 crores and Rs 8,000 crores=20
from the exchequer, which means from the social sector.

Atal Behari Vajpayee took the decision to demobilise partly under=20
external (largely US pressure), partly because the armed forces were=20
fed up, because the build-up was unlinked to a clear political=20
objective, and because nothing tangible would be achieved by=20
prolonging the "coercive diplomacy" with some nuclear brinkmanship=20
thrown in (duly reciprocated by Pakistan).

The demobilisation opens a window of opportunity for quick resumption=20
of diplomatic relations and an India-Pakistan dialogue. There is=20
fairly widespread support for this, including from the Congress and=20
the Left. The Congress demands that air and surface links be restored.

There is pressure from the West for a dialogue on Kashmir too. As an=20
unabashedly pro-US analyst puts it: "Washington does not want to get=20
embroiled every other year in defusing a nuclear crisis between the=20
subcontinent's nuclear rivals. It would rather make a sustained=20
effort now to see if India and Pakistan can find ways to resolve the=20
Kashmir dispute and normalise bilateral relations."

One might not agree with the assessment that India has made "an=20
important political leap" and now recognises "it needs the=20
cooperation of the international community in pressing the Pakistani=20
Army to discard the instruments of extremism and terrorism". But the=20
mood among India's policy-makers is already a far cry from the=20
cowboy-style belligerence of a year, or even a few months, ago.

Today, Vajpayee for his own domestic reasons might want to promote a=20
dialogue. He is beleaguered by his increasingly strident Right-wing=20
sangh parivar colleagues, who have escalated their hate campaign=20
against the religious minorities and Dalits.

Any agenda to counter them, assuming Vajpayee has the stomach to do=20
so, must logically involve restoration of diplomatic relations and=20
reconciliation.

Whatever Musharraf and Vajpayee do, it is the interests of Indian and=20
Pakistani citizens to enlarge the silver lining. Militarism,=20
chauvinistic nationalism, religious extremism and nuclearism feed=20
upon one another in unique ways in South Asia. People-to-people=20
contacts and state-level detente are the best way of taking the sting=20
out of that toxic nexus. They are also the only way of saving the=20
democratisation process from fundamentalists of all kinds.

_____

#3

http://www.msnbc.com/news/819414.asp

Newsweek
Web Exclusive

Kashmir=B9s Psychic Toll
More than 60,000 people have died in the conflict. Many more bear the=20
mental scars

By Jeffrey Bartholet

Oct. 9 [2002]=8B =A0Zohur Ahmed Dar had no reason to fear when he went to=20
his neighborhood mosque one night late last year. But after an=20
evening of prayer and ritual to celebrate the day the prophet=20
Mohammed received revelations from God, Dar never made it back home.

RIDING HIS MOTOR SCOOTER through the dark streets of Srinagar=8Bthe=20
summer capital of the disputed, Indian-ruled region of Kashmir=8BDar=20
was attacked by =B3unidentified gunmen=B2 wearing masks. They shot Dar in=20
the back and left him for dead. Taken to hospital, he survived for=20
two days, then succumbed to his wounds.
The psychological shock from that single event=8Bone of some=20
60,000 killings in 13 years of conflict in Kashmir=8Bcontinues to eat=20
away at Dar=B9s family and friends. His 30-year-old wife, Salima Bano,=20
was probably hurt most. For two months after the killing, the mother=20
of three couldn=B9t stand to be in a well-lit place, or to hear=20
people=B9s voices. Now she=B9s recovering, but slowly. Sitting on a stool=20
in the Government Hospital for Psychiatric Diseases in Srinagar, Bano=20
explains that she came to get more Sertaline, a Prozac-like drug she=20
can=B9t really afford but desperately needs. As she explains why=8Bthe=20
bad dreams, the sense of dread=8Bshe breaks into sobs, and wipes away=20
tears with the edge of her black head scarf. =B3If I stop the medicine,=20
I feel it again,=B2 she says.
The Valley of Kashmir, nestled beneath the white-topped=20
Himalayan mountains, was once regarded as a thin-aired Eden, far from=20
the troubles of the world. But the current conflict=8Bpitting ruthless=20
Islamic militants, many of them foreign jihadists, against Indian=20
security forces=8Bhas made a shambles of Kashmiri society. Islamic=20
terrorists kidnap and kill people they regard as enemies, sometimes=20
chopping off their heads. The Indian security forces, which operate=20
largely above the law, have a long record of torture and=20
extrajudicial killings against people they suspect of being=20
militants. In addition to massacres and murders, hundreds and perhaps=20
thousands of people have simply =B3disappeared.=B2 Yet along with the=20
dead, the wounded and the missing are countless others who have lost=20
their peace of mind, or their sanity.
=B3I=B9ve seen many patients who have not actually had anything=20
happen to them. But if they hear a sudden knock at night, they will=20
become very frightened. They suffer from panic attacks, night tremors=20
and insomnia.=B2
=8B DR. ARSHAD HUSSAIN
Psychiatrist =A0Case loads at the Government Hospital=20
for Psychiatric Diseases are soaring. In the late 1980s,=20
psychiatrists treated 1,700 to 2,000 cases a year at the facility,=20
which has room for 100 inpatients. (Doctors reserve beds only for=20
people who might do harm to themselves or others.) Already this year,=20
they have treated 48,000. Some of the increase can be attributed to=20
factors unrelated to the conflict, but pervasive violence in Kashmir=20
has had both direct and indirect effects. =B3I=B9ve seen many patients=20
who have not actually had anything happen to them,=B2 says Dr. Arshad=20
Hussain, 28, a psychiatrist at the hospital. =B3But if they hear a=20
sudden knock at night, they will become very frightened. They suffer=20
from panic attacks, night tremors and insomnia.=B2
Attackers are often classified as =B3unidentified.=B2 Dar=B9s wife=
,=20
for instance, has no idea if his killing was political or criminal.=20
(The killers took some money Dar was carrying.) =B3There are so many=20
people who are just walking somewhere and get killed=8Bin a shooting,=20
or a grenade attack or abducted by =8Cunidentified persons=B9,=B2 says=20
Shazia Kawos, 27, a social worker and counselor who has been working=20
on a project for widows and orphans since 1998.
The creaky door of Hussain=B9s office swings open and closed=20
throughout the day. Patients sit on one of four chairs, one missing a=20
back and others missing armrests, in a cement room lit by a bare=20
bulb. When he wants some privacy, Hussain asks someone to twist a=20
bent nail that serves as a lock on the door. =B3One woman I treated,=20
whose brother was killed by =8Cunidentified gunmen,=B9 was OK after two=20
or three sessions,=B2 he recalls. =B3Then there are others who never get=20
better. One elderly man of 60 years lost his son in a crossfire=20
incident. Eventually, we lost him.=B2

The elderly man kept re-experiencing his son=B9s death in his thoughts=20
and his dreams, and lost interest in life. =B3He was a government=20
employee who was very religious before the event happened,=B2 Hussain=20
recalls. =B3But his faith in God was shaken.=B2 After more than two years=20
of treatment, including counseling and various drug regimens, the man=20
stopped coming and was never heard from again. =B3I don=B9t know what=20
happened,=B2 Hussain says, ignoring the screams of a violent patient=20
erupting in anger in the hallway outside his office.
Hussain doesn=B9t discuss politics with his patients or anyone=20
else. It=B9s safer that way, and he doesn=B9t really care to know the=20
source of violence in any particular case; it doesn=B9t help to cure=20
the survivors, who often don=B9t know who the killers were anyway. The=20
general absence of knowledge and justice, however, may add to a=20
pervasive sense in Kashmir that life is tenuous and unpredictable and=20
that much of what happens is senseless.
Drug abuse is also rising. Young men and women can buy=20
opiates and anti-anxiety drugs without prescriptions from licensed=20
and unlicensed medical shops. Other people ingest wood polish to get=20
high. =B3Friends of mine are codeine addicts,=B2 says Hussain. He learned=20
of his friends=B9 addictions after one of his old schoolmates=8B=B2the=20
gentlest boy of my class=B2=8Bbecame hooked on codeine and sedatives and=20
sought help. The addict then gave the names of other friends who had=20
also become hooked.
=B3One was from a family that was involved in the tourist=20
business,=B2 Hussain explains. The young man had planned to take over=20
the business when he was old enough, but now tourist houseboats stand=20
empty, and none but the most intrepid visitors come to the fabled=20
Kashmir Valley. The young man has no future, or at least not the one=20
for which he planned. =B3For every person who comes in, we usually find=20
a whole family that is suffering,=B2 says Hussain. =B3That person becomes=20
an index case for us.=B2 Many of those cases begin, says Hussain, with=20
=B3a traumatic event that they don=B9t have the human capacity to=20
comprehend.=B2
=A0
=A9 2002 Newsweek, Inc.
=A0
_____

#4.

The Hindu
Tuesday, Oct 22, 2002
Book Review

Evolution of an ideology

HINDUTVA DEMYSTIFIED: Virendra Prakash; Virgo Publications, L-67A,=20
Malviya Nagar, New Delhi-110017. Rs. 295.

A STRIKING feature of the political discourse during the past decade=20
or so is that it is no longer possible to take liberal values for=20
granted. The impact of this can be seen in the manner in which=20
Hindutva, the ideological core of the Sangh Parivar, has come to be=20
naturally associated with the Hindu faith.

In other words, it is no longer safe to presume that the distinction=20
between the two need not be elaborated, at least among the=20
intelligentsia. The systematic campaign, carried out by various Sangh=20
Parivar outfits over the years has indeed been successful. The=20
indicator of this is the extent to which Indian nationalism has been=20
redefined as if it is a notion based on some notions of culture.

The author of the book under review has done a good job by raising=20
such fundamental issues (that were hitherto taken for granted) and=20
has explained how Hindutva has nothing to do with Hinduism as it has=20
been practised over the centuries. He establishes, in a systematic=20
manner, how Hindutva and its proponents (the Sangh Parivar outfits)=20
are not only forces that are inimical to the social and political=20
fabric that makes the Indian nation but are also peddlers of a point=20
of view that is inimical to the basic spirit of Hinduism.

After tracing the origin of the word Hindutva (as distinct from=20
Hinduism) from within the context of how Veer Damodar Savarkar drew=20
the distinction in his work Hindutva (the point that the Hindus=20
constitute a nation bound by a common culture, history, language,=20
country and a religion) the author explains as to how this is indeed=20
inimical to Hinduism as such.

He also explains this very premise as follows: "It might seem=20
preposterous that an individual, however learned or eminent, be=20
allowed to arrogate to himself the high-priesthood of the Hindu=20
`Church' and assume the authority of laying down the criterion for=20
becoming, or being barred from remaining a Hindu." But then, as the=20
author laments, "so long as a sufficient number of people can be=20
persuaded to accept, or mislead into believing in, the justifiability=20
of the prescribed conditions, an alternate `Church' gets founded.''

He stresses and explains so convincingly, that this is what Savarkar=20
succeeded in achieving and makes the point that Savarkar could=20
complete his project - founding the `Church' of Hindutva through his=20
most favoured disciple, Keshav Baliram Hedgewar.

After having explained this, using simple language and the popular=20
notions, he exposes how the Hindutva project is as much opposed to=20
all that was egalitarian about the freedom movement, more=20
particularly the values internalised by the emerging nation during=20
the Gandhian era.

The meticulous manner in which he deals with the context in which=20
Hedgewar came up with the need to save the Hindu faith - the=20
emergence of movements across India in the midst of the freedom=20
struggle and as part of the rural reconstruction programme set=20
rolling by Gandhiji into which was integrated the campaign against=20
untouchability =8B is not just convincing but also exposes the core of=20
the Hindutva campaign of what it is.

Prakash conveys so clearly that the core of the Hindutva campaign is=20
about ensuring the perpetuation of the Brahmanical social order and=20
in doing this, he manages to weave the position adopted by several=20
Sangh Parivar outfits towards the recommendations of the Mandal=20
Commission and places them in the larger context of statements by=20
Savarkar, Hedgewar and Golwalkar at various points of time.

His brief foray into the political discourse of Uttar Pradesh and=20
Bihar - the cradle of the Vedic civilisation - in this context are=20
indeed impressive and should convince anyone (who is not a convert to=20
the Hindutva `Church') of the implications of allowing such a=20
campaign to be carried out in the name of a simple clash of ideas.

Then there is a chapter where the author deals with in detail the=20
contextual setting in which Savarkar and his disciples offer their=20
ideas and conjure up images of the Hindu faith being in danger =8B the=20
years after the mutiny of 1857 until the non-cooperation and the=20
political process that was initiated post-1920 when denominational=20
identities were beginning to vanish in the political discourse.

He also conveys as to how the idea vended by the Sangh since then had=20
nothing to do with the reality. It is, indeed, a useful insight not=20
just in terms of the history of the Sangh but also in terms of the=20
campaign by the Sangh Parivar outfits to this day.

The book, indeed, is a useful addition and the fact that the author=20
does not let himself be carried away by terms and expressions used=20
exclusively in academic works on the subject =8B he refrains from using=20
any of the jargons, not even the popular ones =8B makes it very=20
relevant.

V. KRISHNA ANANTH

_____

#7.

Date: Wed, 23 Oct 2002 12:02:18 +0100 (BST)
From: ramesh pimple
Subject: gujarat film

Dear Friends,

Today Gujarat is at crossroad with venom of
communalism deeply rooted and population is presently
divided on communal line and at this stage you will
find very few Gujarati Hindus standing by for the
principles of secularism and peaceful co-existence and
communal harmony.

Geeta Chawda, maker of this film is coming from lower
middle class conservative family of Baroda, coming
from working class family, herself is highly religious
person and amateur cameraperson.

She was working with us as an office assistant when we
were doing Lok Adalat, a mock trial of cases on human
rights violation and oppression for TARA Gujarathi
channel, it was 2001, a massive earthquake hit the
Kutch and Ahmedabad. On hearing the news we were
looking for someone to go to Kutch immediately, but no
one was prepared as mild and strong earthquake were
still hitting Kutch and the forecast was made for
another big quake, she took the camera without knowing
how to operate it and went to Kutch the same night
when quake struck Gujarat, she saw death and
destructions and came back as a totally changed
person.

Death and Destruction again hit Gujarat on 27th Feb
2002, it was man made, she took the camera and started
moving in riot-hit areas, camps, saw the naked brutal
face of human world and decided to make a film. The
only question she used to raise - Why women and
children are made victims? maimed, raped, killed, why
them? If men want to fight battle for religion, they
should go in an open ground outside the city and
fight. Very innocent way of looking at the situation.
We discouraged her but she went ahead and shot 18 hrs.
of footage, invested her meager saving from P.F., we
knew who will buy the cassette and who will fund
produce it.

She went ahead and made this small film with
determination, it is a small film made by small people
for small people, so please expect and also don=92t
expect much from it. The film is dedicated to her
mother Maniben who was Mother India to her.

Myself, Yusuf Mehta, Fatima helped her in post
production stage and told her not to show horrifying
footage of burnt dead bodies, raped women and hacked
children to death, rest is hers.

We make earnest appeal to buy and promote this VCD or
VHS cassette in all way possible.

The VCD was released to the public by Shobha De,
columnist, and Prakash Shah, convener of Lok Sangharsh
Samittee-Ahmedabad on 16th October at the Press Club
and everybody found it very touching and a well made
film.

This VCD is so effective that it can be shown to
Basti's, villages, children's, women's, youth and all
sections of the population and those hardcore
Hindutvawadis will also have to consent that whatever
happened in Gujarat was a wrong deed. This film is
very powerful, emotional and touching.

Name of the short film : "Aakrosh"
Language : Hindi
Duration : 20 mins.
Mode : VCD and VHS
Rate : Rs. 200 /- per VCD or VHS cassette.
Discount Rate for Bulk Booking : Negotiable
Payment Terms : Advance Payment through cheque or
draft
in favour of Manima Creations,=A0=A0=A0=A0
Ahmedabad.

Contact Address
Ahmedabad : Flat No.72, Bldg. "H", Management=A0
Enclave, Vastrapur, Ahmedabad. Pin =96 15,=A0=A0=A0
Tel No. (079) 6351923

Baroda : Ms. Kashmira
402, Darpan Bldg., R.C.Dutt Road,=A0=A0=A0
Baroda - 390 005. Tel: (0265) 343474

Mumbai : Mr. R.N.Pimple
Flat No. 002, Ground Floor, Parasrampuria Tower No. 6,
Lokhandwala, Oshiwara, Mumbai =96 400 053. Tel: (022)
6358302

Mobile No.
Geeta Chawda : 9821633426
Ramesh Pimple : 9821109295

E-mail Address : pmiright@y...

Sponsorship & Branding or
sole right : We are looking for it as
Geeta Chawda=A0=A0
needs to recover her hard earned money.

We appeal to you again to support Geeta Chawda and the
cause.=A0

_/_/_/_/_/_/_/_/_/_/_/_/_/_/_/_/_/_/_/_/_/_/_/_/_/_/_/_/_/

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