[sacw] SACW #2 | 25 August 02 India - Pakistan in the War on Terrorism Pt. 2 [Radhika Desai]

[Harsh Kapoor]

South Asia Citizens Wire #2 | 25 August 2002

__________________________

#1.

[ The following article has being posted in 2 parts. Part one was=20
posted in SACW 24 August 2002 and the remaining and conclusive part=20
is carried below]

[Part 2]

EPW Special Article
August 17, 2002

Tryst with Fate - India and Pakistan in the War on Terrorism

Radhika Desai

[...]
India's stance towards Pakistan has been based on an increasingly=20
explicit analogy with Israel's equation with the Palestinian=20
Authority and lately, of course, that between the US and Afghanistan.=20
As such it contains several slightly differing scenarios which have=20
one element in common: diminution or elimination of Pakistan's=20
'stateness', whether with the installation of a friendly regime in=20
Islamabad with, crucially, a military unable to take on India, or the=20
complete dissolution of the military-dominated Pakistan state=20
authority and the subjection of its peoples and territories to a=20
protectorate under joint Indo-US supervision. For many in official=20
Indian circles, this would involve the welcome prospect of India=20
playing the central role in the US's Afghan and generally west and=20
central Asian strategy which has hitherto fallen upon Pakistan.

Indian capacities to achieve this aim - diplomatic and military - can=20
be doubted as Indian misadventures in Sri Lanka since 1987 remind us=20
all too clearly. It is unclear that the US would find the demise or=20
diminution of the Pakistan state palatable. India's importance to the=20
US - whether against China or Russia or Iran - can be doubted since=20
the potential threat each of these may represent to US global=20
dominance has been exaggerated. Ironically, however, this may well be=20
seen to increase India's urgency to, in effect, present the US with a=20
regional fait accompli. The pursuit of this goal itself will=20
bring violence and suffering on an unimaginable scale.

South Asia's current dangerous conjuncture is deeply tied up with the=20
war on terrorism, which in turn will have a determining effect on=20
India's chances of success in its ill-advised enterprise. It is=20
important to take a brief look at the defining features of this new=20
stage of (not so) 'Pax Americana'.

II
War on Terrorism and the New World Order

Sudden cataclysmic events often appear to be turning points of=20
history. The US administration would construe September 11 as an=20
unforeseen event that changed the face of world politics, and the=20
goals of US foreign policy. However, such events are usually no more=20
than a bolt of lightning which illuminates, momentarily, a usually=20
dark landscape. Or they quicken the pace of changes already in train.=20
The terrorist attacks of September 11, whose even more violent=20
aftermath has not yet ended if events in the west and south Asia are=20
anything to go by, can be seen as a bolt of lightning or a fast-paced=20
accelerator. After all the liberal and democratic hyperbole of 1990s,=20
the war on terrorism, with the 'axis of evil' succeeding the largely=20
abandoned hunt for Osama bin Laden, promises to be the actual shape=20
of the new world order. Like the 'containment of Communism', and the=20
defence of 'democracy' and 'human rights', the terrorist threat is=20
the latest veil, all too thin, over America's real motives and goals.=20
Theologically named "Operation Infinite Justice", it inaugurated a=20
new age of America's intra-mundane activism.

To be sure, the war on terrorism constitutes the pursuit of US=20
geopolitical goals in a new register - with the speed and scale of=20
military aggression, past and promised, reaching new heights.=20
President Bush Jr was commended for the restraint he showed in=20
postponing the moment of retaliation for three whole weeks and for=20
his attempts to build up an 'international coalition' against=20
terrorism. Rather than restraint, it was an acknowledgement, on the=20
part of even the US administration, whose native impulses were=20
betrayed by the original 'Wild West' rhetoric, that US unilateralism=20
has always been a bogey. At times, equally useful to US purposes in=20
legitimising, however thinly, its necessary reliance in allies, local=20
and international, and for its allies, who seek to maximise their=20
options and resources within the generally accepted framework of 'Pax=20
Americana'.

Not being based on outright political rule, US imperialism in the=20
Americas after the1870s and the world over in the 20th century, has=20
always worked with allies - local elites and militaries, and states=20
in the regional and global states systems. It seeks to subordinate=20
the rest of the world economically and financially to its purposes=20
and institutions. US military and diplomatic strategy have worked to=20
secure and further the web of such organic relationships which both=20
link and subordinate the rest of the world to its overwhelming=20
economic power, by extension, to its rich citizens and powerful=20
corporations ever since it emerged as the world's largest economy in=20
the early 20th century.

Pax Americana has undergone important shifts with changing political=20
and economic conditions. After the second world war, containing=20
communism required the US state and capital to 'think for the world',=20
pursuing a strategy which contributed to world economic growth=20
in general, and that of western Europe and east Asia in particular.=20
The Bretton Woods institutions, designed before the US's long-term=20
global strategy had become clear even to itself, were based on=20
financial repression: "Money capital had to confine its=20
royalty-seeking operations to those activities which its nation state=20
would allow".5 This regime functioned well for the US as long as it=20
remained the world's credit. It successfully exported capital to=20
western Europe and east Asia. However, by the late 1960s,=20
overcapacity6 created by this 'altruistic' strategy combined with a=20
slowdown of productivity growth in industry7 to slow down growth=20
worldwide. The USs imperial imperatives - financing the Vietnam war,=20
in particular - soon outstripped its native economic and financial=20
resources. The Bretton Woods system of fixed exchange rates, a gold=20
standard and financial repression were transformed over the next=20
decade into a 'Dollar-Wall Street Regime' in which "the basis of=20
American hegemony was being shifted from one of direct power over=20
other states to a more market-based or 'structural' form of power.8=20=20

The US went from being the world's creditor to its greatest debtor.=20
Two important moves during the 1970s laid the basis of the new=20
imperial order: US-sponsored oil price increases intended to curb the=20
competing European and east Asian economies,9 and the liberation of=20
US (and later UK) private banks from financial repression by nation=20
states. This gave them a commanding position in the emerging, and=20
soon exploding, world financial markets centred around the US dollar.=20
Euro and petro-dollars were recycled through these banks, creating=20
the foundation of US global financial dominance under new conditions.=20
These dual moves of the Nixon administration "gave Washington more=20
leverage than ever at a time when American relative economic weight=20
in the capitalist world had substantially declined and at a time when=20
the productive systems of the advanced capitalist economies were=20
entering a long period of stagnation".10 It was now clearer than=20
ever before that US global policy aimed not at the expansion and=20
defence of the capitalist order in any secular sense, not at=20
resolving the long-term slowdown in growth, in which, by all=20
accounts, the world economy still remains, but at the expansion of=20
its own influence in it. Indeed, by the 1980s, the pursuit of the=20
latter was increasingly at divergence from the attainment of the=20
former.

Whereas until 1980 the metropolitan core of the world economy=20
registered the relative advance of Europe and east Asia at the=20
expense of the US, since then the US economy has grown, initially at=20
the expense of Europe and, starting in the mid-1990s, at the expense=20
of east Asia as well. US growth in this period has been financed by=20
its competitors' trade surpluses with it: the US-dominated world=20
financial system is the mechanism through which the rest of the=20
world, chiefly east Asia and the third world, has lent the US funds=20
to purchase their imports, thus fuelling investment in the US economy=20
and by US corporations abroad.11=20=20

The neo-liberal 'counter-revolution' in economic policy, launched by=20
the US and the UK in the early 1980s, and the chiefly financial=20
globalisation that went with it, was instead clearly designed to=20
increase the power of US private financial institutions. While=20
critical attention has tended to focus on the depredations of=20
financial dominance in a largely secular sense, its effects on=20
reordering the control of world production power has been less=20
noticed. Its deflationary effect on the rest of the world economy=20
served to increase the relative productive position of the US. At the=20
same time, US-dominated world financial markets served to siphon=20
capital from around the world into its decade-long investment boom, a=20
move which further increased the US's relative productive dominance=20
both among the metropolitan economies, and in the world in general.=20
However, the success of this strategy even for the US remains open to=20
question. On the one hand it is still unclear that the core sector=20
identified by the US - information and communications technology - is=20
able to yield productivity increases, which would make investment in=20
general synonymous with investment in this technology.12 On the=20
other, potentially more decisive hand, the economic architecture of=20
this phase of US expansion may be self contradictory: "=8Ato the extent=20
that the US successfully diverts capital to its own expansion, it=20
brings down the world market into which it must sell...(while)=8A to=20
the extent that other advanced countries set in place effective=20
counter-measures, the US is unable to finance its expansion."13 An=20
accompanying countervailing strategy has been "the drive to open up=20
the jurisdictions of the east and south-east Asian political=20
economies in ways that will enable core capitals to capture economic=20
assets within them and thus ensure that stream of value generated in=20
these societies become the property of the possessing classes of the=20
US and other OECD states=8Athis drive is not simply one sided plunder=20
by the dominant states but has real appeal to the propertied classes=20
of the dominated states. For they can take advantage of the free=20
movement of capital enforced by the US and its allies to transfer=20
their assets into metropolitan financial centres and live as rentiers=20
rather than risking their capital in hazardous development strategies=20
locally."14=20=20

The attempt by the US to recover its dominance - financial and, if=20
possible, productive - from its low point 30 years ago has been=20
accompanied by a vast military build-up. "Washington's military=20
budget currently accounts for over a third of world expenditure on=20
arms, and is larger than the next nine powers put together. The=20
Pentagon's weapons systems are in a league of their own. The US=20
enjoys an unchallengeable military predominance over any combination=20
of hostile states for the foreseeable future."15 Any political or=20
military challenge to this US-dominated order, which its allies serve=20
to entrench locally, would have to be an economic one as well and=20
would have to involve an alliance of subordinate powers, something=20
which seems rather remote today either in Europe or in Asia.

Still the US must today pursue its goals on the basis of a much=20
reduced relative economic dominance (today it accounts for about a=20
quarter of world GNP, as opposed to almost half at the end of the=20
second world war). The recent period of US global policy has achieved=20
'unstable expansion', distinct from the 'hegemonic expansion' which=20
preceded it: "in a hegemonic expansion, the expansion of the leading=20
nation is a condition for the expansion of the other advanced=20
nations. In an unstable expansion, the expansion of the leading=20
nation is an obstacle to the expansion of the other nations."16 Like=20
that other declining hegemon, Britain in the late 19th century, the=20
US today can be expected to pursue two objectives: "(i) harnessing=20
and subordinating the labour and wealth of these territories to the=20
expansion of its own capital, effectively providing a privileged zone=20
in which to locate its capital (ii) excluding its otherwise more=20
productive rivals from these advantages."17=20

Moreover, a predominantly financial globalisation as a strategy for=20
the expansion of US control over the world economy may have seen its=20
end. The loss of value on world financial markets in the wake of the=20
attacks is only the latest in a long series which began in the late=20
1990s and included the crises of east and south-east Asia and the=20
bursting of the dot-com bubble, not to mention the collapse of that=20
mascot of the new economy of finance, commerce and trading, Enron.=20
Instead we may be witnessing now a drive by the US for more directly=20
productive dominance-Kyoto, the Asian steel war and the current war=20
for the control of oil are examples. In contrast to merely financial=20
control, this strategy requires control of territories, populations=20
and infrastructure, and greater violence naturally goes with it.

Well before September 11 the economies of the US-led western world=20
seemed poised for the first generalised economic downturn since the=20
early 1980s. Despite recent attempts to talk-up the economic=20
situation, the underlying trend seems not to have improved beyond a=20
limited increase in consumer spending, focused on housing in=20
particular as investors seek investment outlets more secure than=20
financial instruments. But, the general deflationary bias is still=20
paramount, with interest rate increases at the slightest increase in=20
economic activity.

The position of the third world in this scenario is deeply=20
contradictory. While "periods of instability and confusion in the=20
world economy are precisely those periods which also allow for some=20
autonomous industrialisation in what has been called the third=20
world",18 today the US state has effectively promoted the=20
transnationalisation of its corporations in a way which increases=20
their ability to control larger and larger proportions of world=20
production. Their link with the US state is not thereby=20
diminished: "employees of US multinationals working overseas are=20
subject to US taxation, and new techniques are being developed to=20
ensure that total world profits of the corporations for which they=20
work are brought within the reach of the IRS".19 In this set-up,=20
prospects of any autonomous industrialisation can be much less=20
sanguinely contemplated today.

The collapse of communism is essential to globalisation: all regions=20
of the world were now open to global capitalism, neither communism=20
nor national capitalisms were options. If the US may celebrate the=20
destruction of the very means to address inequality within and=20
between nations, it must also be willing to be blamed for the=20
existing misfortunes in it. In this world, there is no outside, no=20
Communist bloc, to which to consign the delinquent. The 'axis of=20
evil' is too small and insignificant to be any substitute. No state=20
may rule without eliciting the consent of its subjects, however=20
minimal or enthusiastic. The US superstate must work to ensure a=20
sufficiently wide base of support in the world community of citizens=20
and states. This may be more difficult to procure under current=20
conditions.

In the main theatre of war on terrorism, the third world, there is=20
much evidence of the instability of US strategy. During the gulf war=20
a decade ago, the last major war of a bipolar world, Muslim states of=20
the west Asia, north Africa and Asia were divided enough so that the=20
diplomatic and military support of enough of them was ensured almost=20
automatically. Since then, as witness to the irresponsibility of the=20
US, Iraq, Sudan, Afghanistan - no longer moved by any fear of=20
communism, nor by any realistic expectation of economic 'altruism' on=20
the part of the US, public opinion even in close long-standing allies=20
like Saudi Arabia, has acquired a distinctly anti-American flavour.=20
While uniformly outraged by the attacks of September 11 - the largest=20
single terrorist attack anywhere since the beginnings of contemporary=20
terrorism some three decades ago, it has been deeply critical of, and=20
opposed to, the notion of 'collateral damage'. It was the moment of=20
moderate Muslim opinion, putting the widespread equation of=20
fanaticism with Islam in question. The US had to climb down from its=20
initial sabre-rattling rhetoric of "if you are not with us, you are=20
against us" in a "battle of good vs evil', and accept the less than=20
fulsome support even among many traditional allies as even the most=20
autocratic governments of the west Asia counted the political cost of=20
deeply unpopular actions. Careful and complex coalition building=20
among variously enthusiastic allies each of whom is making its own=20
asymmetrical contributions to the global war against terrorism has=20
become, in this situation, a must.

An editorial writer for The Washington Post writing in foreign=20
affairs recently, exhorted the US to wake up to its imperial=20
vocation, accept its 'rich man's burden' at a time when "the rich=20
world increasingly realises that its interests are threatened by=20
chaos". "Now US foreign policy must once again respond to=20
circumstance - this time to the growing danger of failed states...By=20
launching his war on terrorism the president has at least=20
acknowledged the urgency of the threat...The logic of neo-imperialism=20
is too compelling for the Bush administration to resist."20 Like=20
Caesar's reluctance, the myth of US isolationism has long served to=20
legitimise US imperialism and is here being refurbished for new=20
times: the US must accept the expense, difficulty and danger involved=20
in its imperial role and pursue it with allies in the OECD, bypassing=20
UN irritants. Even pared down thus, it promises to be harder than=20
before.

US interests in Afghanistan, in particular the oil pipelines which=20
would tap the oil wealth of central Asia, played a role in US=20
policies and actions in the region both before and since September=20
11. The 'great game' in this part of the world was once about=20
Russia's push for warm water ports. Now the great game concerns=20
pipelines and Russia, suffering territorial and demographic=20
shrinkage, economic collapse and financial dependence, has been=20
recast from an imperial power into a largely subordinate ally of the=20
US under the soberly realistic president Putin.21 In the current=20
heightening tensions in south Asia, with a much diminished Russia on=20
one flank, China's pro-US moves and Iran quarantined under the 'axis=20
of evil' doctrine, and with vastly increased US military presence in=20
central and west Asia, the pursuit of US strategic interests in the=20
region faces few obstacles. India and Pakistan both of whom declared=20
early their support for the US war on terrorism, competing for a=20
favoured place under the American sun; desperately and abjectly on=20
the Indian side and aggressively and ambitiously on the other.

III
Historical Evolution of the South Asian Conflict

The nature and roots of the Hindu-Muslim divide in south Asia are=20
bewilderingly complex and hotly contested, not least because its=20
mid-20th century outcome was partition and the creation of Hindu and=20
Muslim majority states, each with an official version of history.=20
Unhelpfully, these official versions focus on the rhetoric of the=20
negotiating positions of the Congress and the Muslim League - of=20
united India and of Pakistan and the two-nation theory - missing the=20
fact that the real dispute was about the terms of the relationship=20
between the two parties in independent India, and between the elite=20
social forces each represented.

Since the 1960s, scholarly research has shed much light on the=20
origins and character of the underlying problem, both before and=20
since independence and partition 22 , substantially correcting the=20
official and nationalist versions of history. Colonial exploitation=20
of the divides between Hindu and Muslim elites, central to the=20
Congress and Indian rejection of the 'two-nation' theory, certainly=20
played an important role. But that would not have worked if there had=20
been nothing to exploit in the first place.23 Divides between=20
emerging Hindu and Muslin elites in colonial India were growing at=20
least since the late 19th century. The problem was recognised in the=20
early Congress, but after some initial attempts to address it, it=20
remained neglected.24 From the 1920s onwards, as Gandhi infused=20
religion into nationalist discourse, notwithstanding his commitment=20
to a communal unity of sorts, matters only became more complicated.=20
The record of Congress provincial governments formed under the 1935=20
government of India Act made this amply clear.

After two and a half years of Congress rule, Muslims were profoundly=20
embittered by instances (very difficult for the most part to prove,=20
but nevertheless symptomatic of the atmosphere that prevailed) of the=20
continued oppression of Muslim minorities in the Congress provinces.=20
Side by side was the growing realisation of the importance,from their=20
point of view, of the Congress claim to be the sole mouthpiece of=20
Indian opinion and the sole party to negotiate with the raj, and an=20
anxiety to secure their own position before their bargaining capacity=20
with the 'Pax Britannica' deteriorated further. The result was, of=20
course, seen in the consolidation of the Muslim League, the=20
crystallisation of Muslim demands, and the pitching of those demands=20
on a very much higher level.25=20=20

Unable to make its politics genuinely secular, the Congress's claim=20
to represent secularism and the nation as a whole could be and was=20
doubted. Important sections of its leadership supported the beliefs=20
and practices, and even some personnel, of the Hindu Right. Its=20
political rhetoric was for the most part couched in an idiom which=20
was implicitly Hindu and indeed often equated India with Hindu. Its=20
stance on representing the nation as a whole evaded one central fact:=20
"...Muslim grievances existed, and ...it was exceedingly difficult to=20
dissipate them by any process of reasoning".26=20=20

Jinnah and the Muslim League, for their part, engaged in=20
short-sighted negotiating strategies, designed more with an eye to=20
making immediate gains in the process of negotiation with little=20
attention to the viability of its outcomes. In asserting their=20
"two-nation theory" they overlooked the many Islams of India -=20
Punjabi or Bengali, Kashmiri or Mapillah. They were also mistaken in=20
believing that "Hindus and Muslims constitute exclusive, autonomous=20
entities, with no common points of contact or association, and that=20
religious loyalty takes precedence over...tangible inter-social=20
connections, cross-cultural exchanges and shared material=20
interests".27 Moreover, there were many different configurations of=20
economic and political power between Hindu and Muslim groups. These=20
naturally became more contested in the course of retarded development=20
or underdevelopment which colonialism facilitated. National Hindu and=20
Muslim identities were forged precisely by agglomerating these=20
otherwise disparate ambitions and grievances along religious lines.

Partition was also an exclusively elite driven process, the result of=20
negotiations between a retreating colonial government, and the=20
leaderships of the Congress and the Muslim League, essentially,=20
differing combinations of landlord and capitalist power which the=20
retarded development of capitalism on the colonised subcontinent had=20
managed to produce. No popular mandate legitimised partition and the=20
successor states of British India. "[N]ever before in south Asian=20
history have so few divided somany, so needlessly",as Mushirul Hasan=20
memorably put it. However, rather than becoming a point of political=20
and constitutional critique, this fact has licensed the celebration=20
of a never fully specified assumption of the immunity of the=20
sub-continent's masses, if not its elites, to the incubus of=20
communalism. This assumption has been unravelling for the better part=20
of three decades now. Communal riots re-emerged as part of the=20
political landscape of India in the late 1960s. They have mounted in=20
intensity, particularly in tandem with the rise of Hindutva.

The colonial notion of an endemic conflict between Hindus and Muslims=20
was as wrong as it was instrumental. However, the notionof=20
a'syncretic culture'so beloved of south Asian secularists was also=20
only partial. South Asians share languages, cuisines, high cultures=20
of poetry, music, painting and architecture, and what not across=20
religious boundaries. One feels deeply the senselessness of the=20
partition in the company of south Asians of the other country, a=20
scene re-enacted countless times every day. There is also a long=20
history of inter-communal conviviality, with its often elaborate=20
morals and manners. But these worked as much to smooth these=20
interactions as to build, tend and mend the clear identities of and=20
boundaries between the communities. There existed a more=20
authentically non-communal popular culture in which groups found it=20
hard to identify themselves clearly as either Hindu or Muslim. But=20
what is often forgotten is that it was not a 'syncretic', 'composite'=20
or ecumenical culture, but a pre-communal, even pre-religious one.=20
Social historians are well aware of the phenomenon that religious=20
identity tends to become more important, particularly materially so,=20
only with a certain elevation above the labouring classes. Indeed,=20
most religions in their purest form tend to have rules and strictures=20
which rural workers find hard to abide by. Nationalists of every=20
stripe in British India acknowledged that communal identities and=20
conflicts were a matter of and for the elites - whether it was the=20
irreligious Jinnah, mobilising his Muslim constituency, or Nehru,=20
blaming communal disturbances on the cynical competition of local=20
elites. This dynamic is integral to capitalist development in the=20
subcontinent. As groups within both religious communities have=20
enriched themselves, the space for and imperatives of communal=20
mobilisation have increased correspondingly.

Contrary to the official versions of history, recent historical=20
research traces the root cause of partition in the inability or=20
refusal of the predominantly high-caste Hindu Congress leadership to=20
consider the decentralisation of power in the new Indian state to be=20
a price worth paying for unity. If the Congress leadership was able,=20
at the time, to look more secular than Jinnah and the Muslim League,=20
it was because its opposition to decentralisation was directed as=20
much to keeping middle-caste Hindu regional leaderships of the Hindu=20
majority areas subordinated, in their place within the Congress=20
'system', as it was against granting legitimacy to the claims of the=20
Muslim League about the condition and fate of south Asia's Muslims in=20
a centralised and united India.

Eventually, partition was negotiated with astonishing haste, it being=20
unclear up to, and beyond, the formal announcement and execution of=20
partition, what the territorial shape of the two new states would be.=20
The two formally equal states were actually vastly asymmetrical in=20
their resources and power. Pakistan ended up with an unwieldy, and,=20
in comparison to the stance of the Muslim League,an inadequate=20
territory, a weak economy with little industry, and a truncated=20
administration and army. India, on the other hand, emerged more=20
secure, territorially vast, economically sound, administratively=20
stable, also inheriting the international personality of British=20
India.28 This contrast is conveniently ignored in India.

But perhaps this result was not entirely unforeseen by the Congress=20
leadership. Nehru, e g, and other Congress leaders seemed to consider=20
partition both inevitable and temporary. In his deeply respectful and=20
sympathetic biography of Nehru, the late S Gopal records:

Jawaharlal (Nehru) and Patel had come to the conclusion that there=20
was no alternative to at least temporary partition. Various=20
psychological tensions seemed to them to have developed among the=20
Indian people, and especially among the Muslims, and these could not=20
be resolved by reason or dealt with by force. To insist on the=20
maintenance of the Indian union could only mean continuing=20
trouble...So Jawaharlal and the Congress, while rejecting the=20
two-nation theory, agreed to the separation of those parts of the=20
country which wished to break away. Indeed, that might make it easier=20
for reason and the compulsion of logic to ultimately prevail. There=20
were some subjects like defence which, even after partition, would=20
not of choice but of necessity have to be looked after in common and=20
this might lead gradually back to a reintegration of India. "I have=20
no doubt whatever that sooner or later India will have to function as=20
a unified country. Perhaps the best way to reach that stage is to go=20
through some kind of partition now".29=20=20
In a summary treatment of Indian decolonisation, R F Holland=20
articulates this point with admirable clarity, if with much less=20
sympathy and respect for the aims and motives of the Congress=20
leadership:

.... the Congress evaluation of the Cabinet Mission Plan was not=20
based on glib enthusiasm about the principle of a Centre a la Cripps,=20
but on whether the powers attributed to it would be sufficient to=20
crush Jinnah and his quasi-Pakistan before it got into its stride. In=20
this sense the Plan fell short of Congress needs on two crucial=20
fronts: control of the army and taxation. Indeed, for the Congress, a=20
weak Centre which did not have clear authority in the military and=20
fiscal fields was worse than no Centre at all, since a real Pakistan,=20
left to its meagre and disorganised resources, might quickly break-up=20
altogether, and leave Congress to impose its will at last. ...Thus=20
for Nehru, partition was not a "final' defeat at all, but yet another=20
gambit, albeit one imposed by events, in a game which would not end=20
simply because the green crescent flag flew over government buildings=20
in Karachi. It was only a decade after 1947, when the Pakistani=20
state, for all its internal problems, showed its ability to survive=20
as a state, that the definitive character of partition became=20
painfully obvious to its larger southern neighbour.30=20=20

Indeed, Pakistan's formative weakness began to evince a rather=20
different dynamic than Nehru and the Congress had expected, and=20
within months of partition and independence, India and Pakistan=20
experienced their first war, over Kashmir, which has remained a=20
central bone of contention between the two states ever since, and=20
which lies at the root of the present armed standoff.

IV
Dispute over Kashmir

Kashmir is more than a territorial dispute its roots run deep down to=20
the very foundations and constitutive ideologies of India as well as=20
Pakistan. As the Muslim majority successor state of British India,=20
Pakistan claimed it in accordance with one principle of the=20
partition, i e, the religion of the majority of the population. India=20
claimed Kashmir as a princely state over which British paramountcy=20
had lapsed and whose Maharaja had been 'persuaded' to abandon his=20
delusions of independence to join the Indian union in 1948. Thus,=20
India's claims to it followed another principle of the same untidy=20
and, in the case of Kashmir, fatefully contradictory, scheme for the=20
division of territory - since the ruler's choice was the basis upon=20
which hundreds of princely states were integrated into the successor=20
states.

Two months after partition, taking advantage of a tribal rebellion in=20
Pooch, Pakistan sponsored an invasion of Pathan 'irregulars' and Army=20
personnel who were supported by a majority of Muslim troops of the=20
Jammu and Kashmir state forces stationed there.31 Indian forces=20
dispatched after Maharaja Hari Singh signed the Instrument of=20
Accession managed to stay the invaders, and a ceasefire was declared.=20
Pakistan remained in possession of Azad Kashmir, Gilgit, Hunza and=20
Baltistan. Pakistan's claims to Kashmir were central to its founding=20
ideology as a state for the Muslims of the subcontinent. Vulnerable=20
even in 1947, with a third of British India's Muslims remaining in=20
India; the 1971 dismembermentof Pakistan made this argument even more=20
threadbare. But it enjoyed a vitality that only the last remaining=20
shred of a raison d'etat can in a state as riven by regional=20
tensions, and as plagued by the inability of any political force to=20
acquire a genuinely popular base, as Pakistan. India's claims on=20
Kashmir are central to its self image as a 'secular' nation, with a=20
substantial Muslim minority nation-wide enjoying religious freedoms=20
and claiming to democratically govern a Muslim-majority state.

India lost a significant part of eastern Jammu and Kashmir state to=20
China in the 1962 border war and in 1963, Pakistan conceded part of=20
north-western Kashmir to China as part of a mutual defence=20
understanding. This occupation of sparsely populated territory was=20
not, however, as decisive in the creation of the present Kashmir=20
conundrum as was Indian state policy. The centrality of Kashmir to=20
India's secularism has been inversely proportional to the health of=20
democracy there: "The singular political tragedy of Kashmir's=20
politics was the failure of local and national political leaderships=20
to permit the development of an honest political opposition".32 The=20
National Conference was the political force which India sponsored in=20
Jammu and Kashmir. Originally a party of opposition to Maharaja Hari=20
Singh, it advocated and implemented progressive policies such as land=20
reform and widespread of education. However, it monopolised politics=20
in Kashmir, accusing potential opposition of Islamism in order to=20
marginalise it with the agreement of the central government. State=20
repression and frustrated aspirations were beginning to fuel the=20
independence movement and the turning point came in the 1987=20
elections so widely seen as being rigged and they became the main=20
impetus for the rise of a movement for Kashmiri independence from=20
India. From this point on, the suffering of the inhabitants of the=20
valley began to rise steeply. The Indian state's intensified=20
repression was justified by the untenable theory that all militancy=20
was Pakistan-sponsored.While Pakistan did support parts of the=20
insurgency throughout the 1990s and beyond, ironically undermining=20
significantly the legitimacy of the movement for independence.

Indo-Pakistan Relations, 1947-1998

The present impasse between India and Pakistan over Kashmir is not=20
only a result of specifically Hindu nationalist policies. While they=20
were behind Pokhran and Kargil and seem to be engaged in mortgaging=20
the security of the country for electoral gain today; even as the=20
BJP-led government's own adventurism has increased the temperature of=20
the Indo-Pakistan relationship significantly, a longer historical=20
view of the relations between the two states in general and over=20
Kashmir is necessary.

The earliest years of Indian independence reveal the ambitions of=20
India's foreign policy. Nehru's advocacy of Afro-Asian unity and=20
non-alignment were the form in which independent India's leaders gave=20
their conviction that India's destiny was among the great nations of=20
the world. These ambitions were generally pursued diplomatically and=20
politically, military expenditure being kept down for developmental=20
priorities. But there were political ambiguities in India's stance:=20
high-principled rhetoric always sat uncomfortably with the mundane=20
tasks of fostering dependent capitalist development.

The Indo-China war of 1962, in which India was humiliatingly=20
defeated, marked the apogee and end of this phase of foreign policy -=20
India now adopted more openly 'realist' stances abroad and abandoned=20
the small substance of its 'socialistic' pattern at home. Military=20
expenditure increased and India became one of the countries of the=20
world spending the highest proportions of the budget on the military.=20
It won three wars with Pakistan - 1965, 1971 and 1998.

India's economic growth was slow but sure: steady, albeit dependent,=20
capitalist development in India expanded the capitalist class=20
enormously, created a huge consuming class and, with the deft=20
management of progressive 'liberalisation' dating back to the 1960s,=20
its political leadership ensured its overall (albeit, intensely=20
competitive) cohesion - across regions, ethnicities and sectors=20
(though not, across castes and crucially, across religious=20
communities33 ). The chief reflection of this on foreign policy was,=20
on the one hand to increase India's economic links with metropolitan=20
capital and, on the other, to project Indian capital on the regional=20
and third world stage as a sub-imperialist power, economically,=20
politically and militarily. Particularly since the fall of the USSR=20
India has become increasingly eager for closer relations,=20
economically and militarily, with the US while doing what it can to=20
maintain and increase its bargaining power in that relationship. This=20
overall reorientation of India's foreign policy reflects a=20
cross-party consensus, while styles may differ according to political=20
and personal temperaments.34=20

India's dominance in south Asia rests on an alignment between its=20
concept of 'domestic' or 'internal' security (which has, as one of=20
its cardinal components, implacable opposition to popular movements=20
that seek in any fundamental way to alter the class base of political=20
power of the post-colonial state) and of 'regional' security in line=20
with the concept of 'global' security acceptable to the imperialist=20
powers (under the leadership of the US). Shedding its craving for=20
'autonomy' in international relations, it has worked to qualify=20
itself as a suitable regional 'gendarme'to which the long-term global=20
interests of the US and its metropolitan allies in the area, and the=20
economic interests of the national and international bourgeoisie, can=20
be safely entrusted.

Pakistan, meanwhile, showed no immediate signs of disintegrating. But=20
its formative imbalances had two crucial consequences. The=20
uncomfortable demographic fact of a Bengali majority made democracy=20
unpalatable to the Punjabi-dominated Pakistan state, laying the basis=20
for the predominance of the military in the Pakistan state, while the=20
need to counter India led the Pakistan military and civilian=20
leadership early into the arms of the US even though the motivations=20
of the two parties were at considerable variance with one another.

By early 1951American policy-makers had made up their minds that the=20
Persian-Iraq sector could not be defended without help from=20
Pakistan...The early managers of the Pakistani state were prepared to=20
deal with the Americans even though their motives in forging a=20
special relationship with the US had more to do with a desire to=20
acquire a better military balance in relation to India than from=20
fears of communist inroads into the Islamic heartlands of the east=20
Asia.35=20

The US, though preferring India as an ally, found itself compelled to=20
rely on Pakistan in its anti-communist ventures in the region but=20
always forbore any interference in Pakistan's south Asian concerns.=20
By the early 1950s, a US regional strategy with Pakistan as its=20
lynchpin was in place.

There followed a series of treaties and military arrangements to put=20
the new military strategy into effect. It was based on Pakistan=20
undertaking to provide a mercenary army to assist the US and its=20
allies in the region...The US would provide military aid to equip=20
Pakistani forces for the purpose, but exclusively for the performance=20
of that role on US behalf ...Pakistan's ruling junta tried to justify=20
the alliance before the Pakistani people on the ground that it was to=20
provide protection for Pakistan against India. That was a blatant=20
lie...The US, anxious to ally Indian suspicions and concerns,=20
declared from the outset and from the highest levels, publicly and=20
formally, that Pakistan would never be allowed to use the military=20
aid and material against India.36=20

After the 1962 Indo-China war, India became a recipient of US=20
military aid as part of the US's east Asian strategy. The Pakistan=20
military, meanwhile, finding itself cut adrift by the US given its=20
own internal troubles and instability (the Ayub coup in October 1958)=20
now feared India's increasing military mightand made "a desperate bid=20
in 1965 for wresting Kashmir from Indian hands by military force=20
before it was too late".37 Pakistan lost the war, faced a suspension=20
of US military supplies and aid, and sought an alliance with China=20
while attempting to keep US goodwill. "In 1969, under Yahya Khan, it=20
played an intermediary role in the negotiations which led to the=20
resumption of [the] US diplomatic relationship with China".38 And in=20
the 1970s it began to create and strengthen military and economic=20
ties with west Asian countries. The westward turn fed Islamic=20
ideology in Pakistan and, the Iranian revolution and the Soviet entry=20
into Afghanistan, led to its renewed centrality in US policy in west=20
and central Asia, and the resumption of US military aid. The stake=20
was central Asian oil and pipelines and, with Iran as a route closed=20
off, a pro-US and stable government in Afghanistan became the goal.=20
It was the instability of the Hekmatiyar regime, which prompted the=20
US and Pakistan to back the Taliban, but their unpredictability in=20
turn made US and Pakistan policy towards them uncertain since 1994.

By all accounts, Pakistan was caught in a potentially=20
self-destructive vice by the mid-1990s.The alternation of largely=20
rudderless, politically rootless and corrupt democratic governments,=20
the loose canon of the Taliban in Afghanistan, their ideological=20
impact on Pakistan society and politics and the diplomatic costs of=20
supporting such an oppressive regime were all a consequence of the=20
Pakistan's renewed role in US strategy in the region.

V
The Present Situation

Since 1998 a very particular Indian strategy of engagement with=20
Pakistan has emerged. It involves a surface rhetoric and practice of=20
a diplomacy of talks and summits with Pakistan. Its underlying=20
purpose is to make the most political capital of India's liberal=20
democratic set-up, in contrast to Pakistan's hapless tendency to=20
military dictatorship, and more ominously, have it reviled as a=20
'rogue state' by the 'international community', in practice, the US.=20
Since September 11 the strategy enjoys the added option of having it=20
dismissed, instead, as a 'failed' one. Call it arrogance or hubris of=20
virtue, if you will. Since the BJP first formed a government in 1998=20
there has been a spate of visits, talks and summitry, from the prime=20
minister's bus trip to Lahore to the recent failed Agra Summit. Each=20
with less planning for peace than before; India's engagement in these=20
has concentrated on precisely the 'optics', an enterprise of which=20
the press in India appears to be an active, if not equal, partner.=20
Needless to say, the globally dominant discourse which demonises the=20
Islamic world has been employed with much success by the Indian=20
government and media in these 'optical' ventures. It is clear both=20
from the tone of statements from Indian government sources and the=20
established media (not to mention the numerous platforms, local and=20
national, organised by or connected with the Sangh parivar), and from=20
the new diplomatic closeness which India has sought with Israel=20
recently, turning back on the leading role which India used to play=20
in supporting the Palestinian cause internationally, that the present=20
Indian government sees India, and would like others to see her, as=20
positioned between Pakistan and the US in much the same way as Israel=20
is between the Palestinian Authority and the US. Analogously, the=20
target is the legitimacy and possibly the very existence of Pakistan=20
state authority.

Already before September 11, the BJP-led Indian government had sought=20
to redefine the Kashmir problem from a territorial dispute into a=20
'terrorism problem', involving a 'rogue state'. As the Agra Summit=20
approached, the overall political, cultural and ideological=20
atmosphere in the country was charged with anti-Pakistan and=20
anti-Muslim sentiment with films of this theme and import proving=20
box-office hits, while the media, seemed to be engaged in an ominous=20
and superficial celebration of south Asia's common cultural heritage.=20
To anyone sensitive to the former, the latter could not fail to seem,=20
ominously like laying the ideological groundwork for an 'Anschluss'.

There was, underlying the summit, no strategy for normalising=20
relations between India and Pakistan or for seeking a peaceful end to=20
the Kashmir problem, a problem whose chief victims are the Kashmiris=20
themselves, and Kashmir's justly famed culture of religious=20
coexistence. Inevitably the Agra Summit between Musharraf and=20
Vajpayee failed. (That it could not do otherwise was, if one bore=20
these realities in mind, so obvious that the extent of the media hype=20
surrounding it, and the additional verbiage with which the media=20
helped the government to cloak the failure, never sounded emptier and=20
the fact remained that the president leaving in the dead of night,=20
without a formal farewell after working into the late hours to come=20
up with no more than a mutually face saving statement promising=20
little more than further talks, is a failed summit if there ever was=20
one!).

The present Indian government has no solutions for Kashmir, only=20
increased state repression in the name of counter-terror and the=20
ideological legitimation of this strategy. If, as an added bonus, the=20
multiple pressures on Pakistan state and society - an illegitimate=20
military dictatorship, and a legitimacy hastily assumed Islamic=20
militancy, economic disorganisation and centripetal regional=20
pressures, not unwittingly compounded by India's own diplomatic and=20
military pressures, to name only the most obvious - leave it with no=20
alternative but to open itself up to foreign, and this will mean,=20
necessarily, given the US methods of unstable hegemony, Indo-US=20
economic and political collaboration, there are many in India who=20
would be eager to take up the opportunities and others in Pakistan=20
who will, with various degrees of enthusiasm, offer them. Undoubtedly=20
this will require a substantial diminution of Pakistan state power,=20
before realising any dream of south Asian unity in a nightmare=20
reality. But this, if it ever comes, is a long and probably bloody=20
way off. The only certainty is that along this way lie India and=20
Pakistan's fates, not their destinies.

Notes

[This paper has benefited from criticism and encouragement from=20
Gregory Blue, Colin Leys Achin Vanaik, Jayant Lele and Gregory=20
Elliott. Jayati Ghosh provided key sources just when I needed them. I=20
warmly thank them all while remaining responsible for all the faults=20
that remain.]

1 Malini Parthasarthy's interview with president Musharraf (The=20
Hindu, April 1, 2002) reveals a level of clarity in the president's=20
perception of his country's situation which is surely a product of=20
the very complexity and intensity of the pressures facing the=20
Pakistan state.
2 Achin Vanaik, 'India's Politics of Brinkmanship on Kashmir',=20
Foreign Policy in Focus, January 9, 2002.
3 Loc cit.
4 Mohammad Ayoob, 'South Asia's Dangers and US Foreign Policy',=20
Orbis, Winter 2001, Vol 45, No 1.
5 Gowan, The Global Gamble, Verso, London, 1999, p 17
6 Robert Brenner, 'The Economics of Global Turbulence', New Left=20
Review 229, May-June 1998.
7 Alain Lipietz, Towards a New Economic Order, Oxford University=20
Press, Oxford, 1992.
8 Eric Hellenier, 'Explaining the Globalisation of Financial=20
Markets', Review of International Political Economy, 2, 2, Spring=20
1995.
9 Peter Gowan, op cit, p 21.
10 Ibid, p 24.
11 Alan Freeman, 'Europe, the UK and the Global Economy', paper=20
presented at the Fifth International Conference in Economics=20
organised by the Economic Research Centre (ERC) of the Middle East=20
Technical University (METU) in Ankara, September 11-13, 2001, mimeo.
12 Ibid, p 19.
13 Ibid, p 19.
14 Peter Gowan, 'After America?' New Left Review 13, January-February=20
2002, pp 139-40.
15 Ibid, p 136.
16 Freeman, op cit, p 18.
17 Loc cit.
18 Jayati Ghosh. 'Globalisation and Economic Depression' mimeo.
19 Peter Gowan, 2002, op cit, p 142.
20 Sebastian Mallaby, 'The Reluctant Imperialist: Terrorism, Failed=20
States and the Case for American Empire', Foreign Affairs, March,=20
April 2002, p 6.
21 Georgi Derlungian, 'Recasting Russia', New Left Review 12 (n s),=20
November-December 2001.
22 Chief among these scholars would be Mushirul Hasan and Ayesha=20
Jalal. Asim Roy's path- breaking essay, 'The High Politics of India's=20
Partition', Modern Asian Studies, Vol 24, No 2, 1990, reprinted in M=20
Hasan, India's Partition: Process, Mobilisation and Strategy, Oxford=20
University Press, New Delhi, 1993, is also an important landmark.
23 See in particular, Sandra Frietag, Collective Action and=20
Community: Public Arenas and the Emergence of Communalism
in North India, Oxford University Press, New Delhi, 1990; Chris=20
Bayly, 'The Pre-History of Communalism', Modern Asian Studies,=20
Vol 19, No 2 2, 1985, 177-203. 24 P C Upadhayaya, 'The Politics of=20
Indian Secularism', Modern Asian Studies, Vol 26, October 1992.
25 Mushirul Hasan, 'Introduction' in Hasan (ed), op cit, pp 25-26.
26 Ibid, pp 25-26.
27 Ibid, p 33.
28 See Ayesha Jalal, Democracy and Authoritarianism in South Asia,=20
Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 1992, Chapter 1 for a succinct=20
contrast between the two resulting states.
29 S Gopal, Jawaharlal Nehru: A Biography, Vol 1, Jonathan Cape,=20
London, 1975, p 343, quoting Nehru to K P S Menon, April 29, 1947.
30 R F Holland, European Decolonisation, 1918-81, Macmillan London,=20
1985, p 76-77.
31 Sumit Ganguly, The Crisis in Kashmir: Protents of War, Hopes of=20
Peace, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 1997, pp 9-10.
32 Ibid, p 38.
33 Mushirul Hasan, Legacy of a Divided Nation: India's Muslims since=20
Independence, Oxford University Press, New Delhi, 1997.
34 T V Satyamurthy, 'India's International Role: Economic Dependence=20
and Non-Alingment' in Satyamurthy (ed), State and Nation in the=20
Context of Social Change, Oxford University Press, New Delhi, 1994, p=20
169.
35 Jalal, op cit, pp 37-38.
36 Hamza Alavi, 'Pakistan-US Military Alliance', Economic and=20
Political Weekly, June 20 1998, p 1554.
37 Ibid, p 1555.
38 Ibid, p 1556.

=A9 Copyright 2001 The Economic and Political Weekly. All rights reserved.

[ continues from SACW 24 Aug 2002]

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