[sacw] SACW | 26 Dec. 02

[Harsh Kapoor]

South Asia Citizens Wire | 26 December 2002

__________________________

#1. Publication announcement: Continuity and Change: Socio-Political=20
and Institutional Change in Pakistan, edited by S Akbar Zaidi
#2. The Jihad International, Kashmir and Secularization (Vijay Prashad)
#3. Message from Gail Omvedt
#4. The rise of Modi (Kancha Ilaiah)
#5. Gujarat Riots in the Light of the History of Communal Violence=20
(Asghar Ali Engineer)
#6. Hindutva Fascism (N.Muthu Mohan)

__________________________

#1.

Continuity and Change: Socio-Political and Institutional Change in=20
Pakistan, edited by S Akbar Zaidi, has just been published by City=20
Press, Karachi.

The articles in this book were all commissioned exclusivley for, and=20
first published in, one of South Asia's most prestigious social=20
science journals, the Economic and Political Weekly, Mumabi, in=20
November 2002. The papers reproduced here are written by most of=20
Pakistan's best known social scientists, all of whom have selected a=20
theme of their own choosing, which deals with some aspect of=20
Pakistan's social, political and institutional change and transition.=20
There are, broadly, four main themes which constitute this=20
collection. Of the thirteen articles in this book, three deal with=20
issues of history, Partition and the history and politics of the=20
nature of changing relations between India and Pakistan; two articles=20
discuss the causes for the lack of democracy in Pakistan and a third=20
examines the nature and signficance of the election results of=20
October 2002; two papers examine economic developments in recent=20
years, with one looking at the relationship between the IMF, the=20
World Bank and the Government of Pakistan, while the other examines=20
the nature of Pakistan's politial economy of defence. The final five=20
papers examine the nature of change in society and in institutions in=20
the country, by looking at changing relationships of Pakistan's elite=20
to the State; demographic, particularly urban change; examining the=20
relationship between language and ideology; the meddling of=20
international donors in 'softer' areas, like the legal system; and,=20
with the role of the civil service in Pakistan.

Perhaps the single most important theme which runs through most of=20
the papers, relates to the omnipresent and severely deleterious=20
intrusive role of Pakistan's military, which has been a constant=20
hindrance to effective social change, democracy, development and to=20
progress.

Contributors: Hamza Alavi, Mubarak Ali, Reza Ali, Aly Ercelawn and M=20
Nauman, Arif Hasan, Ayesha Jalal, Shahid Kardar, Shahrukh Rafi Khan,=20
Tariq Rahman, Ayesha Siddiqa-Agha, Mohammad Waseem, and S Akbar Zaidi

Continuity and Change: Socio-Political and Institutional Dynamics in=20
Pakistan, ISBN 969-8380-64-7, City Press Karachi, 2003. email:=20
cp@c...

_____

#2.

Counterpunch.org

The Jihad International, Kashmir and Secularization.

Vijay Prashad.

On the night of 19 December 2002, a group of men entered the home of=20
Mohammed Sadiq in Hast village, Rajouri district, in the Indian state=20
of Jammu and Kashmir. They killed his twenty-year old daughter Nosen=20
Kousar. They then went down the road to Khalid Ahmed's house and=20
killed his twenty-two year old daughter Tahira Parveen. After=20
beheading her, they proceeded to Mohammed Rafiq's home and killed=20
Shehnaaz Akhtar, another young woman. Finally, they went to the home=20
of Jan Begam, a forty-three year old woman, and beheaded her.

By most indications, the unidentified men belong to an outfit called=20
the Lashkar-e-Jabbar (the "Army of the Great") because the LeJ had=20
placed posters around Rajouri demanding that Muslim women adhere to=20
the Taliban's dress code and that teachers at schools wear the formal=20
sherwani. Accounts from Hast indicate that these women did not adhere=20
to the "rules" and therefore faced "retribution" from the LeJ.

The LeJ made its debut in Kashmir in August 2001. On 7 August,=20
unidentified LeJ members doused two schoolteachers in Srinagar with=20
acid and on 8 August, an armed LeJ member went into a Srinagar girls'=20
school to demand that all the students report to class dressed in=20
accordance with "Islamic tradition." The LeJ then issued a deadline=20
in September for the implementation of the dress codes, that is the=20
wearing of burqas by Muslim women, of duppatas by Hindu women and=20
"suitable" clothes by men. The LeJ, a marginal outfit, had an=20
enormous impact with these acts of terror: the Kashmiri newspapers=20
reported a jump in burqa use among working-class women (from five=20
percent a few years ago to thirty percent as 2001 ended).

Little outrage is evoked for these acts of terror against these=20
women, mainly peasants or else from among the dispossessed urban=20
dwellers. The Indian government, run by the Hindutva Right,=20
concentrated on those victims of terror who are mainly Hindu, so that=20
it could run in the recent state elections in Gujarat on an=20
anti-Muslim ticket (and win, as it did). Chief Minister Narendra Modi=20
of Gujarat should give Trent Lott lessons in coded language and in=20
his aggressive ability to remain in control despite his brazen=20
anti-Muslim remarks. During his election campaign, Modi asked his=20
audience, "You decide whether there should be a Diwali in Gujarat or=20
whether firecrackers should burst in Pakistan," intimating that the=20
choice was between the majority Hindu community or India's neighbor=20
Pakistan, and not between his right-wing BJP and the generally=20
opportunistic Congress Party. When what the late Pakistani=20
intellectual Eqbal Ahmed called, the "Jihad International" kills "its=20
own," there is silence from those who claim to be at the forefront of=20
the anti-terror campaign.

Mention a problem in Kashmir and people roll their eyes. Behind those=20
eyes lie thoughts, at worst, of ageless conflict perhaps rooted in=20
the inferior genetic inheritance of the region or, at best, of the=20
problems that came from its disputed transition to India in the late=20
1940s. While the former merits no response, to the latter one can say=20
that history moves on and while the transfer of power still plagues=20
the rhetoric on both sides of the Indo-Pak border, the more=20
substantial issues stem from the economic and political devastation=20
visited upon Jammu and Kashmir in the aftermath of the death of its=20
popular leader, Sheikh Mohammed Abdullah on 8 September 1982.=20
Abdullah's death put into disarray the mild form of stability=20
constituted by his political skill, the relatively careful governance=20
from New Delhi and the inferiority of the Pakistani army. All this=20
was to change in the two decades since then, and it comes to us in at=20
least five phases:

=85 1983-88, marked by the political venality both of Indira Gandhi's=20
Congress Party and the Sheikh's son, Farooq Abdullah (who had taken=20
charge of the National Conference, the main political party in the=20
state).
=85 1988-91, characterized by the upsurge of young Kashmiris for azaadi=20
(independence) manifested in the Jammu and Kashmir Liberation Front.
=85 1991-93, distinguished by Pakistan's usurpation of the revolt=20
through the offices of the Hizbul Mujahideen and other pro-Pakistan=20
organizations.
=85 1993-2001, in which a proxy war took place between=20
Pakistani-trained and supported mehmeen mujahidin (foreign, mainly=20
Afghani Arab type mercenaries) and the Indian forces whose interlude=20
was the Kargil war of 1999.
=85 2001-present, in which the Fifth Afghan War put pressure on=20
Pakistan to back-off from its support of the mercenaries, in which a=20
united front that supports a political solution took power in Jammu=20
and Kashmir after a reasonably fair election to dismiss the=20
Hindutva-supported government, and in which the army and the=20
secessionists face a barrage from the Jihad International that has=20
shifted its operations from southern Afghanistan to Kashmir (as=20
elsewhere).

LeJ is the symptom of the recent phase, the detritus of the Fifth=20
Afghan War. When they appeared from the shadows in 2001, even the=20
main militant, terrorist outfits condemned them. The Lashkar-e-Tayeba=20
and the Hizbul Mujahideen, both famous for their ruthless acts of=20
violence against civilians, joined with the All Party Hurriyat=20
Conference, the united political front of the secessionists formed=20
under US auspices in 1992-93, to distance themselves from the acts of=20
these Taliban-like outfits. Islam, said the Hurriyat in its=20
statement, does not enforce dress codes (the Hurriyat's constituents=20
include the Jamiat Ulema-e-Islam Kashmir and the Jamaat-e-Islami,=20
both outfits that are aware of at least most versions of the faith).=20
These are not peaceful organizations themselves. On 6 December 2002,=20
the Indian Army's general S. Padmanabhan said that infiltration=20
across the India-Pakistan border declined by "about 43-44 percent."=20
The next day, out of bravado, Abu Hamza of the Lashkar-e-Tayeba said,=20
"We have a lot of fidayeen [suicide squads] who will attack army and=20
other paramilitary installations in north Kashmir during Ramzan."=20
Nothing here on the Taliban-like acts of the LeJ, even as the=20
Lashkar-e-Tayeba took responsibility for the hits on army posts, and=20
as innocents died in an attack on a temple.

The only organization that welcomed the LeJ was the=20
Dukhtaran-e-Millat, an all-woman group, formed in 1987 to demand the=20
unity of Kashmir with Pakistan. In 1989, the DeM joined the popular=20
insurgency that erupted in the Kashmir valley against the role of its=20
venal political class and the Indian army. But, it exceeded the=20
general political line of then secular groups like the Jammu and=20
Kashmir Liberation Front with its demand, in May 1993 that women take=20
to the veil. In Al Safa, the DeM took out a full-page advertisement=20
that women observe an "Islamic Code of Conduct," mainly the use of=20
the Iranian-style Makina and to abjure all forms of body decoration.

Led by a self-proclaimed orthodox Muslim and a feminist, Ayesha=20
Andrabi (who is now underground), the DeM and the LeJ are linked to=20
the Jihad International. The government of India claims that the DeM=20
is linked financially to the Jamait-ul-Mujahideen, a group that was=20
once called the Green Army (who killed the highly respected Mirwaiz=20
Maulvi Farooq in 1990) and that is openly a subsidiary of the=20
Pakistan government's Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI) unit (formed=20
to facilitate US maneuvers in Afghanistan during the 1980s).=20
Andrabi's husband, Qasim Faktu, is a senior Jamait-ul-Mujahideen=20
operative. LeJ, the Indian government believes, is linked to the=20
Haqqania Madrassa, named for Jalaluddin Haqqania, veteran of the=20
Afghan wars and founder in 1993 of the Harkat-ul-Ansar (a hard-core=20
terrorist group that operates in Kashmir now as=20
Harkat-ul-Mujahideen). The Madrassa is based in Pakistan and is=20
funded by the oil money that sustains many such operations.

We are back to Afghanistan. As Eqbal Ahmed wrote in 1988,=20
"Afghanistan threatens to become a metaphor for the future." More=20
than a decade later, we should change "metaphor" with "portent."

The LeJ emerged not only because of the routine problem of Kashmir,=20
but also because of the interventions of the US and the Saudis in the=20
region from the late 1970s onward. It would be best to see them as=20
one more of those members of the Jihad International Inc. set up by=20
the US and the Saudis to push the Soviets out of Afghanistan as well=20
as to contain the spread of the Iranian revolution. The anti-Left=20
pressure in Afghanistan allowed the most virulently offensive forms=20
of Islamic reaction to take control of the Pashtun region, once the=20
home of a broad socialist movement led by Khan Abdul Ghaffar Khan=20
(the "Frontier Gandhi") and his Khudai Khidmatgars ("Soldiers of=20
God"). When the Frontier Gandhi died on 20 January 1988 at the age of=20
ninety-eight, both the sides in the Afghan War stopped their barrage=20
so that his body could be buried in Jalalabad. An honorable man had=20
died whose Gandhian visions had been erased by sectarianism and,=20
toward the end of his life, by the Cold War. The infusion of the=20
Jihad International into Afghanistan's south meant that first the=20
brigand Gulbuddin Hekmatyar's Hizb-i-Islami and later the Taliban ran=20
a series of camps in the Khost region that trained the jihadis who=20
went to Kashmir in the early 1990s (particularly with the fall of the=20
Najibullah government in Kabul, 1992). By 1992-93, when the US and=20
the Saudis lost interest in Afghanistan, these camps, according to=20
journalist Manoj Joshi, became "privatized." The Pakistani military,=20
mainly the ISI, "left it to various fanatical religious groups=20
(instead of recruiting officers), who would do a better job through=20
their mix of religious propaganda and monetary inducement. With some=20
exceptions, the camps, too, were privatized and run in areas of=20
Afghanistan where there was no state authority or which were under=20
the control of factions loyal to Pakistan." Jalaluddin Haqqani's=20
Harkat took charge of the Al Badr I and II camps at Yawar in=20
Afganistan's Khost province. The camps operated until August 1998,=20
when they were destroyed by the US cruise missile attack in reprisal=20
against the Kenya and Tanzania terrorist acts by al-Qai'da.

The LeJ is the progeny of this history of barbarity whose originators=20
include the Saudis, the CIA, the Pakistani establishment (who=20
underwent their own form of Islamization under General Zia in the=20
1980s and then as recently as 1998 with Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif's=20
15th Amendment or Shariat Bill), and the Rightist Afghans (such as=20
Hekmatyar, Badruddin Rabbani and Ahmed Shah Masoud). The LeJ is not=20
motivated entirely by the Hindutva Right government in New Delhi,=20
because its principle victims are those within Islam who do not=20
follow its view of the world. Its Islam provides cover for the=20
authoritarian regimes of the Gulf (such as the House of Saud, but=20
also the various Gulf emirates) in much the same way that Hindutva=20
provides a pseudo-nationalist cover for the Indian ruling class'=20
accommodation with imperialism. The LeJ is the repellent face of=20
contemporary religious politics.

Liberals will tell us that there are many Islams, just as there are=20
many faces of Christianity (neither Bernard Law nor Jerry Falwell=20
speak for us, they say), or that there are many Hindus (not just=20
Narendra Modi), many Buddhists (not just the Sinhala monks who egged=20
on mobs to kill Tamils in 1983). But this is an inadequate approach=20
to these acts of barbarity: we must continue to demand the=20
secularization of society, indeed demand that religion in the modern=20
age must conform to the basic norms of equality and democracy. In a=20
strong book from 1997 (Furies of Indian Communalism, Verso),=20
journalist Achin Vanaik argued that religious systems must "learn=20
their place in the new dispensation" of the modern. Religions "have=20
no inherent dynamic leading them to endorse or practically reinforce=20
modern principles of pluralism and democracy. The world religions are=20
historically shaped entities bearing the marks of that shaping. But=20
this does not mean they are incompatible with these modern=20
principles." Quite the contrary, the secularist must engage with=20
religious systems, not to show their "inherently tolerant" nature=20
(which is an essentialist claim), but to fight to make them=20
democratic and pluralistic if they are to be relevant in our modern=20
future.

Anything less gives legitimacy to those who speak of faith as they=20
destroy the shallow trenches of human progress. It is the voice of=20
faith that killed the women of Hast. Even as we raise our voices=20
against that barbarity, we must renew our call for the broader=20
secularization of society.

_____

#3.

[ Letter from Gail Omvedt ]

o o o

Date: 25 Dec 2002 02:35:28 -0000

Dear [...] and friends,

"The worst thing to fear is fear itself" -- I have also been very=20
disturbed by the Gujarat election outcome, but I am most disgusted=20
with Congress -- they took a "soft Hindutva" policy -- using Hindutva=20
rhetoric, going around after the Gaurav Yatra and cleansing it with=20
cowdung, not putting up Muslim candidates, sidelining from election=20
campaigning the one Congress politician most identified with Dalits=20
and minorities, having a different manifesto in Gujarati than their=20
one in English and so on. No wonder Gujaratis would feel they are=20
really "pseudo"-secularists, and decide that a hard honest (to his=20
fascist principles!) Hindutva leader was better than a soft dishonest=20
one.

The worst danger now is that all the progressive forces will think=20
the Hindutva wave is growing so much that they have to hide their=20
heads, play it soft, go slow, etc etc.

now is the time to fight, as far as I'm concerned. If Congress had=20
been true to its principles, limited though they may be, in Gujarat,=20
they might have lost anyway, but it would have been an honourable=20
defeat and they might have laid more foundation for changing the=20
current poisoned political culture in Gujarat.

We should salute the brave Muslims of Gujarat who voted in 90% levels=20
in spite of open threats, as well as Dalit activists -- some of=20
whome, I know, came from the US to campaign in Gujarat, as well as=20
Christian NGOs who have helped to spread the word -- yes, outside=20
pressure helps. It forced and is forcing the BJP govt to go a little=20
slower because they know the face of Gujarat and india is being=20
blackened in the world.

Cheers and happy new year,

Gail

_____

#4.

The Hindu
Thursday, Dec 26, 2002
Opinion - Leader Page Articles=20=20=20=20

The rise of Modi
By Kancha Ilaiah

The BJP made serious efforts, much more than other parties, to=20
include and accommodate the OBCs so as to provide Hindutva its muscle=20
power.

NARENDRA MODI'S victory with a two-thirds majority in Gujarat has=20
signalled the emergence of a strong, independent OBC (Other backward=20
Class) leader in the BJP. Earlier, two independent OBC leaders -=20
Laloo Prasad Yadav and Mulayam Singh Yadav - had emerged from the=20
fold of socialist politics in Bihar and Uttar Pradesh. But that was=20
in the context of the Yadavs emerging as landed gentry with some=20
socio-economic capital.

The others who became Chief Ministers in the Congress and the BJP=20
were not independent leaders. In the BJP, Kalyan Singh tried to=20
emerge as an independent leader but the Parivar structures did not=20
allow him to do so. For a long time no independent OBC leader was=20
allowed to emerge from within the Parivar. Only Atal Behari Vajpayee=20
and L. K. Advani were allowed that autonomous space as they had=20
social and economic clout around them.

Mr. Modi, member of a Backward Caste that has little socio-economic=20
clout in Gujarat, used the Parivar policy of attacking the=20
deliberately constructed enemy - Muslims - with a more organised=20
network than that of the Parivar's Brahmin leaders. He has become a=20
bigger hero than Mr. Advani by mobilising muscle power better than=20
Mr. Advani did in 1992. He seems to have realised that only the=20
weapon of violence - not sacrifice - can make an individual a hero=20
and that the social value of Dharma is assigned to the victorious,=20
not the sufferer.

Ever since the Hindutva network began to organise caste-ridden Indian=20
society into a religious- nationalist social force, one of its main=20
problems was how to bring the Sudras/OBCs into its fold without=20
giving them equal rights in the spiritual realm. To achieve it, the=20
Hindutva ideologues constructed an imaginary nationalist goal and=20
asked the otherwise uneducated OBCs to participate in nation-building=20
without granting them a share in the national wealth. This was=20
necessary because the caste system was undercutting the social base=20
of the Hindu religion as the Dalits and even some OBCs were embracing=20
other religions. For political and social consolidation of the=20
Brahminical ideology such a task was deemed necessary. The Mandal=20
agenda of the OBCs, initiated by forces outside the Hindutva network,=20
was seen as a plan to undercut Hindu nationalism and the=20
consolidation of forces towards majoritarianism.

The Sangh Parivar successfully organised a large section of OBCs (not=20
as many Dalits) because neither the Congress, which had been in power=20
for several decades, nor the communists, who were talking about=20
socialism, had granted any visible socio-political place in their=20
party structures to the OBCs. In the general environment of=20
Anglicised Brahminism dominating all political formations, a majority=20
of the OBCs were getting attracted to the Parivar network which spoke=20
the native idiom and promised a dream land of Hindu Rashtra if the=20
Muslims were driven out of India. In that crucial period, V.P Singh=20
and the small OBC lobby around him planned the Mandal agenda that=20
disturbed every organised party but the BJP more. The BJP then raised=20
the Mandir-Masjid issue as a diversionary tactic. For the OBCs in the=20
Sangh Parivar it was an occasion where they could use their only=20
asset - muscle power - against the constructed enemy, Muslims.

When the Sangh Parivar needed mass muscle power it had to turn to the=20
OBCs within and it was in this situation that Mr. Advani with the=20
help of Hindutva theoreticians such as Govindacharya worked out a=20
mediating language of social engineering for advancing Hindutva. The=20
Advani faction assigned some leadership roles to the OBCs. Mr. Kalyan=20
Singh and Vinay Katiyar from Uttar Pradesh, Uma Bharti from Madhya=20
Pradesh, Mr. Modi from Gujarat and so on got some positions in the=20
Sangh Parivar. By then, the political ambitions of OBC leaders=20
everywhere were whetted, but without a vision for the socio-spiritual=20
transformation of Indian society. This was aided and abetted by the=20
environment created by the Bahujan Samaj Party's Kanshi Ram with the=20
"our votes for our seats" slogan.

The BJP made serious efforts, much more than other parties, to=20
include and accommodate the

OBCs so as to provide Hindutva its muscle power. The secularists and=20
communists remained more backward in this strategy than the Hindutva=20
forces. The illiterate OBC masses did not understand the whole debate=20
of secularism, socialism and communalism in relation to their own=20
lives. They understood the Mandal discourse because it gave them some=20
jobs. The communists promised heaven but no OBC was getting a visible=20
place in those theory-centred organisations at the national and=20
regional level. For such a social mass, the Parivar had a practical=20
solution: participate in muscle power mobilisation and get the=20
benefits. After the Babri demolition campaign the OBCs began getting=20
the recognition within Hindu Brahminic civil society they had craved=20
for long.

Those wanting to be leaders in the Sangh Parivar had only to abuse=20
Muslims in the fiercest language possible. Mr. Modi and Ms. Bharti=20
could do that well. In the Congress, one needed sophisticated=20
education and the ability to speak the nuanced language of secularism=20
to become a national leader. The P. V. Narasimha Rao period was the=20
real Brahminic period of the Congress in which all OBC leaders with=20
some stature were systematically set aside. The communists did not=20
nurture a single OBC leader and even after the Mandal period they=20
sought only alliances with leaders such as Mr. Mulayam Singh and Mr.=20
Laloo Yadav with all the necessary care to see that their theory=20
remained "pure". Now, for the average educated OBC the Hindutva party=20
became the easy option.

However, it was not as if the temple-centered Hindu priestly class=20
that had been giving full support to leaders such as Mr. Vajpayee and=20
Murli Manohar Joshi was not uneasy with the new visibility of the=20
OBCs. It was. Now, Mr. Modi has emerged as the hero of the OBCs=20
within Parivar; he could even ignore Mr. Vajpayee and set his own=20
agenda. For the first time an OBC leader had become praiseworthy for=20
the Brahmin and other upper caste leaders and was in full command of=20
Gujarat - the mini Hindu Rashtra. How did he do that? By deploying=20
the muscle power of the OBCs under his command and asking the upper=20
caste leaders of the BJP to simply supervise his command structure in=20
attacking the imaginary enemy, constructed by the very same Brahminic=20
theoreticians, in real, physical terms.

The media, busy retaining the secular image of India, did not realise=20
how an average OBC viewed the rise of such a leader. His cutouts were=20
bigger than those of Mr. Vajpayee or Mr. Advani. In this atmosphere,=20
a section of upper castes - particularly Brahmins and Baniyas -=20
seemed to have moved towards the Congress but the OBCs seemed to have=20
voted en masse for their new hero. If Mr. Katiyar repeats this in=20
Uttar Pradesh we will have one more hero, perhaps at the cost of more=20
lives there.

There is a lesson here for the secularists and the communists. As=20
Hinduism did not allow Dalits to get into temples they began to move=20
towards Islam, Christianity and Buddhism. If the secularists and the=20
communists do not allow the OBCs to grow in their organisations Mr.=20
Modi will become their national leader and their Prime Ministerial=20
candidate too. And in such a situation, feeble OBC voices like mine=20
will be drowned.

_____

#5.

Gujarat Riots in the Light of the History of Communal Violence

The frequency with which communal holocausts have been taking place=20
in india shows that there is something fundamentally wrong with our=20
political system as well as our secular governance. The carnage in=20
Gujarat did not occur suddenly and simply in reaction to what=20
happened in Godhra. the sangh parivar politically thrived only=20
through hate politics, opposing everything that went in favour of=20
minorities. Over the years it has created a mindset among the Hindus,=20
who question not only the loyalty of minorities towards India but=20
also consider them fundamentalist and fanatical, and the Hindus as=20
liberal and secular. Asghar Ali Engineer
[...]

[The full text of the above paper is available to all interested.=20
Should you require a copy send a request to <aiindex@m...> ]

_____

#6.

[ I enclose a paper I submitted in the Anti-Fascist conference=20
organised by the Progressive Writers' Union at Calicut on 22=20
Dec.2002. I shall be happy if you make use of the article.
Thanking you,
Dr.N.Muthu Mohan]

HINDUTVA FASCISM

1. In the international, as well as in the all India politics,=20
religious re-constructions are done ambitiously. The political=20
liberalism and the debate for socialism and for an egalitarian=20
society are thrown backwards and Hindutva politics has been proposed=20
in their place. The religious re-constructions are being done, I=20
think, throughout the 20th century. Freudism, Existentialism, a few=20
brands of Anthropological studies too have contributed much to the=20
reawakening of religion in 20th century. Freudism criticized the=20
rationality of humans and insisted that humans are basically=20
irrational beings. The subconscious is the determining realm of=20
humans, it maintained. Existentialism continued this theme and=20
characterized the human condition as an absurd one, unpredictable by=20
any rational means. In took the humans to the un-returnable boundary=20
situations and tried to make the human measurement thoroughly=20
autonomous. Anthropological theories too contributed to the study of=20
tribal religions and tried to make religiosity an inalienable feature=20
of all humans at all times. The entire 20th century had acted against=20
rationalism, science, technology, democracy and socialism. This is=20
not to say that there is nothing wrong in science, technology or in=20
democracy. But the slogan of humanization has ultimately given birth=20
to revival of religiosity in a fundamental and massive way. The=20
agenda of Socialism or Capitalism has been pushed backwards. The=20
question of socialism is not merely a question of a social set up. It=20
is a question about the philosophy of labor. It is an issue about the=20
self-dignity of labor and the working men and women. It is a matter=20
of self-respect of the oppressed people. It is a question about=20
philosophical and moral legitimacy of struggles for social and=20
economic justice. It is a question about the ethics of labor and=20
justice. It is in contrast to such a philosophy of labor, today the=20
religious re-constructions are being done.

2. The Hindutva forces are showing a majoritarian face. They show=20
themselves representing the biggest majority religion in India,=20
namely Hinduism. This they are doing when they are really a political=20
minority even as per the calculation of Parliament numbers. But the=20
jargon of Hinduism renders them an immediate look that they are=20
speaking for the majority. The appearance of "For the majority" also=20
gives them the status of "By the majority". This is a tested strategy=20
of the Hitlerite Fascists in Germany. The Fascists once spoke for the=20
great German race! So, automatically it was assumed that the entire=20
German race was behind them. The Political minority has been=20
transformed into a socio-psychological majority. This is the strategy=20
to get rid of the alliances they have at present. Togadia says that=20
in 1989 the BJP was an untouchable party, even in 1996 the NDA=20
coalition treated the Hindutva ideology as the untouchable policy and=20
now things are set right that the NDA must accept Hindutva as its=20
ideology. Togadia has declared death sentence to all the secularists=20
and anti-Hindutva forces. This is above all a message, even warning=20
to their own allies. What does this mean? Togadia is informing his=20
coalition partners either to accept Hindutva whole-sale or to leave=20
away from the NDA alliance. The death sentence he is passing is not=20
only to the Communists and the Congressmen but also to his own=20
partners. Speaking for the majority makes to believe the majority=20
that the State is in favor of them and in return they have to be with=20
the state. This makes the otherwise unstable state into a stable one.=20
Now the state with this majority support mustered can go for=20
privatization, abolition of reservation and abolition of labor laws=20
etc. In this way, the cheated is not only the minorities, but above=20
all the workers, peasants and middle classes of the majority itself.=20
The majority is thus cheated to a political play.

3. In the present phase of Hindutva politics, a new phenomenon is=20
coming to the forefront namely the regional versions of Hindutva. For=20
a long time, only Bal Thakaray was that lonely leader who represented=20
this brand of regional Hindutva. Kalyan Singh after the demolition of=20
the Babri Masjid became a hero in Uttarpradesh. Now we have Narender=20
Modi in Gujrat who had experimented the Muslim genocide. In the=20
South, Ms.Jayalalitha is trying to outplay L.K.Advani by enacting of=20
the anti-conversion bill in Tamilnadu. Her opponent in local=20
politics, Karunanithi had a strategy to have alliance with the BJP by=20
which he thought of keeping the latter under his control in local=20
politics. But, Jayalalitha had gone a step further that she can=20
substitute BJP in Tamil nadu by being more radical than the BJP in=20
cornering the Muslims and Christians. If there is a vote bank for BJP=20
in Tamilnadu, it seems that there is, let it come over to ADMK=20
directly without the mediation or blessing of BJP. This is an=20
extremely bad phenomenon because the regional cultures always played=20
a progressive role in Indian politics to contain the all India=20
slogans of Hindutva. Now the tide is in the opposite direction. The=20
Hindutva is winning over the regional constituencies. The Akalis, the=20
Telugu Desam, the DMK and the Assam Gana Parishad can not ignore this=20
disturbing development. To a more democratic regional politics, the=20
BJP is posing an alternative Hindutva regional politics.

4. Under the chilling politics of Hindutva, when every one is=20
compelled to think about religious identities, a silent=20
counter-revolution is master minded and enacted, that is a=20
counter-revolution of abolishing the public sector and the=20
reservation policy. A ministry is working full-time for de-investment=20
with Arun Shourie, the worst anti-Communist as its leader. All labor=20
laws are being thrown out. The education system and the syllabi are=20
drastically changed. The entire social history is rewritten. With the=20
abolition of public sector, the reservation of jobs too is thrown=20
out. All subsidies to manure, electricity for farming and the PDS are=20
crushed to death. The democratic rights of the minorities are=20
curtailed. Thus, a good number of arrangements in favor of workers,=20
peasants, rural masses, the oppressed communities and the minorities=20
that were functioning for the last fifty years are abolished. This is=20
really a counter-revolution. Whatever was done by hard struggles by=20
the Communists and socialists of all brands have started now to be=20
defeated. Whatever was done by Ambedkar by his presence in the=20
Constitution committee in favor of the downtrodden and oppressed are=20
repealed today. This is really a counter-revolution.

All the achievements towards economic justice, social justice and=20
political justice are challenged now. This is the counter-revolution.=20
We fear that this may continue for the coming 10 years. After 10=20
years we shall be writing the history that there was a dark period=20
worst than the emergency period that is the Hindutva period.

5. Under the leadership of Hindutva, India is reaching to its=20
Zero-point of Modernity. What do I mean? In 1947-1950, there=20
prevailed a situation in India where the wounds of partition of India=20
was alive, the issue of winning over the hundreds of Samasthans was=20
continuing, the killing of Mahatma Gandhi exposed the Hindutva forces=20
too. The leaders of India with their modernist hopes of democracy and=20
Socialism etc, included Dr.Ambedkar into the Constitution committee=20
so that the Dalits and backwards did not raise a revolt in the free=20
India. What is the situation today? The stigma on Hindutva of killing=20
Gandhi is forgotten. No more the partition threat is alive. No more=20
the Hindutva forces are to be tolerant to Backward and Dalit forces=20
of India. No more the modernist ideals of democracy and Socialism are=20
inspiring. This is the situation of Zero- Modernity. The ideals of=20
modernity such as democracy, socialism, secularism and distributive=20
and compensatory justice are in defeat. The Hindutva forces openly=20
call for a zero-modernity politics. Throw away all those ideals! Let=20
us play the traditional caste-feudal oppressive politics. The Dalits=20
and the minorities will be taught a lesson now. The communists and=20
secularists will be taught a lesson now. The backward communities=20
should join either with the upper castes or with the lower castes.=20
The militant Brahmanism is coming up in colors. It marches. It is an=20
open caste Brahmanic politics. The arrangement that was existing=20
during these years of 1947-1990 is only provisional, now let us=20
return to our own politics. This is the politics of zero-modernity!

6. The Hindutva politicians claim that it is the cultural nationalism=20
that they are representing. It seems that they read Antonio Gramsci=20
better than the Marxists themselves. Anyhow, what is the type of=20
cultural nationalism do they represent? The term culture usually=20
refers to the existence of shared values. We are not against India to=20
share some common values and thus to become really a community. But=20
what our history says? who was and is really against shared common=20
values? Who was trying to build a community and who was against=20
building a community? Who was responsible for those cultural barriers=20
that are so stubbornly built and so vigilantly safeguarded? I mean=20
the vast Varna and caste that was built among the people of India. It=20
is the Brahmanic religion in ancient India, either out of its=20
superiority complex or due an ethnic fear that it would be lost in=20
India went for building rigid endogamic barriers between the ancient=20
tribes of India. It is the Brahmanic religion in ancient India that=20
proposed different worship forms to different people, rigidified the=20
compartmental cultural traits, different food habits, different=20
dressing patterns. It is the Brahmanic religion that contributed=20
massively to build a non-communicative system in Indian history. It=20
made the Indian society into a system of thousand unmixing=20
communities. It hierarchically ordered the communities, eternally=20
made some into high and some other low, some other even untouchable.=20
Think about the usual definition of religion! A religion is that=20
takes the message of God to maximum number of people. A religion is=20
that which spreads the message of God to all the directions of the=20
globe. But, what about the definition of the Vedic religion? It is=20
exactly the opposite! The vedic tradition consciously built barriers=20
so that the sacred message they were having did not reach others.=20
They made it their exclusive property. The endogamy and varna system=20
were aimed to do this. The vedic tradition even formulated=20
punishments if anyone tried to learn their religion. Is it a religion=20
or an anti-religion? It never binds the people together only divides=20
the people. How can you call it a religion? It was least interested=20
in the divine message but was perfectly interested in safeguarding=20
the social hierarchy, the social non-communication. Its purpose was=20
not to build a community, but to construct a non-community. The=20
entire history of religions of India is a permanent struggle for and=20
against this system of non-communication. Buddha, Mahavira, the=20
Charvakas, the Siddhas, Guru Nanak. Kabir, the Sufis, Sri Narayana=20
Guru, Vaikunda Samy, Ayyankali and so many others fought against the=20
system. Mostly it was not a question of religion, but was the=20
question of caste that was fought by these saints. There is also the=20
presence of Folk religiosity among the majority of the people who=20
were not allowed into the portals of high culture. No attempt was=20
taken from above to change this order. Only the lower strata were=20
fighting their struggle against the order and often their attempts=20
defeated by the upper. If this is the real situation, how to talk=20
about the common culture and shared values?

7. Now a days the Hindutva people are talking about conversions and=20
they propose that conversions are to be banned. The Jayalalitha=20
Government in Tamilnadu had made an emergency bill to ban=20
conversions. There are so many things involved in the question of=20
conversions. First of all, the nomenclature of conversion needs to be=20
problematized. In the recent history of India, only during the census=20
taking process of 1861-1881, the religious identities were registered=20
in documents. The British had an easy way of doing this by naming the=20
non-Christians and non-Muslims as Hindus. But, this nomenclature was=20
contested by various social groups. The Sikhs, the Jains, the=20
Buddhists, the Kabir panthis appealed to the British Government that=20
they should not be named as Hindus. The Dalits of various parts of=20
India claimed that they should be named as adhdharmis (in Punjab),=20
adhi Dravidas (in Tamilnadu) etc. Iyothee dasa Pandithar, a dalit=20
leader in Tamilnadu appealed to the Government that the dalits be=20
included under Buddhism. Can it be called conversion? The Government=20
did not respond positively to all the appeals. The people who=20
followed various folk religious belief-systems did not appeal to the=20
Government and they were just included under the title Hindus. How=20
much it is correct? Who created that term Hindus for them? How could=20
they be named by somebody else? When you don't share a common temple,=20
don't share a common worship, don't have a common food habit and=20
other cultural aspects how all those people could given a common=20
nomenclature? During the entire 19th century the Brahmanic=20
intelligentia did agree to the term Hindu. They were experimenting=20
with the terms Brahmo, Aryas etc. Even that was not accepted by=20
orthodox Brahmans. Only at the dawn of 20th century, when the Indian=20
political leaders understood the significance of Majority in the=20
colonial modernist politics, they came down to agree the term Hindus.=20
So, the term is not a religious term, but a political term. The term=20
was coined and appropriated by a group of people who came to=20
understand the significance of a majorititarian mask in the current=20
power politics.

8. The brahmanic leaders even today are not ready to back into their=20
history and get rid of the religious barriers they had erected.=20
Hindutva is not self-critical to its past. Today's Kanchi=20
Sankaracharya says that Vedas are taught by people of all castes in=20
the colleges and Universities and he reminds that the Brahmins should=20
not forget that the vedas were heard first by the Brahmanic rishis.=20
He refuses to call the Tamil Muruga by the name Muruga and prefers to=20
call him Subramanya due to the reason the name Subramanya means Subh=20
to the Brahmanas, welfare to the Brahmanas. The Kanchi Sankaracharya=20
recently made a statement about women that the women going for public=20
works are of suspicious character. A few days before in Madras the=20
same swamy made a statement that the Dalits remain impure that is why=20
they are not allowed into the temples. These episodes again prove=20
that the present Hindutva continues to be caste-ridden and male=20
chauvinist as it was all through its history.

Dr. N. Muthu Mohan
Reader and Head
Guru Nanak Devji Chair
Madurai Kamaraj University
Madurai - 625 021.

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