[sacw] SACW | 13 Sept. 02

[Harsh Kapoor]

South Asia Citizens Wire | 13 September 2002

__________________________

#1. Sri Lanka / UK: Interview with Nirmala Rajasingam
#2. [ Kashmir Elections] Flawed, yes; 'farce', no (Praful Bidwai)
#3. Kashmir: time for honesty (Khalid Hasan)
#4. Pakistan: Statement Investigation into the Death of Omar Asghar Khan
#5. India: A concurring judgment at the Supreme court of India offers=20
"A word of caution on imparting 'religious education'"
#6. Book Review: Categories of difference - Beyond Turk and Hindu:=20
Rethinking Religious Identities in Islamicate South Asia Edited by=20
David Gilmartin and Bruce B. Lawrence (Lakshmi Subramanian)
#7. VHP cooks up a treat for riot accused (Radha Sharma)

__________________________

#1.

Lines Magazine
August 2002

lines co-editor, Ahilan Kadirgamar interviewed activist-intellectual=20
[... ] Nirmala Rajasingam in London. [...] Nirmala Rajasingam was an=20
activist in Sri Lanka who became an active supporter of the LTTE=B9s=20
political wing in the early stages of the Tamil militant movement.=20
She was also active in Tamil drama and the Tamil literary circles.=20
She went to prison in 1982 charged with harbouring wounded Tiger=20
militants. Nirmala Rajasingam broke jail two years later, but left=20
the LTTE soon after that and migrated to the UK in 1986. She is the=20
sister of Rajani Thiranagama, leading human rights activist and=20
co-founder of the University Teachers for Human Rights (Jaffna).=20
Rajani Thiranagama was assassinated by the LTTE in 1989.

[...].

Interview with Nirmala Rajasingam

AK: You returned after your university education in the US and got=20
immersed in activist politics in Jaffna. Some years later you were in=20
the UK. Having lived in Sri Lanka, the US and UK, what do you think=20
of the Black identity and its influence on Black struggles.

NR: I think the idea of a Black identity, was inspired by the Civil=20
Rights movement in the US. Unfortunately, now Black is identified=20
with people of African origin only, but it didn=B9t used to be that=20
way. It was used as a political term of people of color uniting to=20
fight racism. I might call myself a Black British person, but I won=B9t=20
because I am a Sri Lankan national, but my nieces might, but their=20
generation is also changing due to the experiments of=20
multiculturalism. It was a failure because it divided the Black=20
community into its constituent parts.. into Jamaican or Punjabi or=20
Sri Lankan Tamil and so on, rather than build up Black unity.. But=20
you know, there are young Asians who would like to call themselves=20
Black, but the African youth will say =B3You are not Black, you are=20
Asian. We are Black. Similarly, there are young Asians who will say=20
=B3We are not Black, we are Asian.=B2. So it has all become diluted and=20
depoliticized. And now because of all this multiculturalism nonsense,=20
all these funding agencies have been funding individual ethnic=20
communities and their interest groups. Hence you have ethnic=20
communities, or even more frighteningly they are called =8Cfaith=20
communities=B9 now. But even now, activist Asians call themselves=20
Black, preferring a political identity.

AK: The Sri Lankan immigrants in the sixties and seventies, the=20
professionals, how did they relate to such a Black Identity?

NR: Oh, they would never want to be called Black, ever. They wouldn=B9t=20
want anything to do with people of African origin and anything to do=20
with the identity Black. I haven=B9t met many of that generation that=20
I am comfortable with. I have to sometimes be apologetic to my Black=20
friends, about the backwardness of my community. Even the Tamil=20
Nationalist activists, without thinking would use the word =8CKaapili=B9,=20
I just cringe when I hear that word you know. Because they don=B9t mix=20
or meet with Black people. My daughter has friends who are Black,=20
both boys and girls, and Tamil women in my neighbourhood will come=20
and tell me, "is your daughter hanging around with Kaapili boys=8A" I=20
have on occasion had to tell Tamil friends visiting me, "If you are=20
going to use words like =8CKaapili=B9 I will have to show the door to=20
you." It is not any different from if your friends started talking=20
about =8CNalavan=B9 and =8CPallan=B9.

AK: You mentioned how Black is a political color. But do you see that=20
Black identity as overwhelmingly male?

NR: Actually, now, wherever you go, the activists are overwhelmingly=20
women. But unfortunately, the communities are so hopelessly divided.=20
They are mostly organizing along ethnic lines. And the so-called=20
community leaders, those that are recognized as leaders even in the=20
Tamil community, they are of dubious backgrounds. These are the kind=20
of people that the State and the local governments encouraged. They=20
are very reactionary. Asian women activists have lots of problems=20
with these leaders. I belong to a group called, South Asia=20
Solidarity Group which has a long track record of working on issues=20
affecting people in the Subcontinent and issues surrounding racism=20
and workers rights in the UK. I also belong to an organization=20
called Asian Women Unite, which is a coalition of many Asian=20
women=B9s groups working on issues affecting women, such as domestic=20
violence, forced marriages, mental health issues, the impact of=20
religion on family and culture and state provisions of services to=20
Asian women etc.. One of the issues that we are concerned about is=20
the government=B9s proposal to expand and proliferate the number of=20
Single Faith Schools.

To answer your question, about men it sometimes becomes a problem.=20
Women in our groups sometimes have difficulty working with male=20
activists as they are very macho and at the same time very=20
uninteresting=8A.. I get bored talking to some of them in five minutes.=20
I haven=B9t been able to work closely with men, I find it much easier=20
to work with women. Yes, it isn=B9t a problem to the extent that I=20
don=B9t work politically with men. And I haven=B9t missed them!

AK: How has the Sri Lankan community engaged with politics in=20
Britain? Have they gotten involved in politics here or have they only=20
worked primarily as an Eelam lobby?

NR: The Tamil community has lots of community organizations. A few=20
people get together and form themselves into an organization and they=20
get funding for a computer a phone line and so on. Then they get=20
funded to give basic advice on basic rights to services =8A The LTTE=20
has sought to dominate such groups. Some of them have tried to=20
survive independently. These organizations do lobby with the Home=20
Office or with the Members of Parliament and the government on=20
immigration issues, but their concern is only about Tamil refugees.=20
There may be one or two individuals who are involved in campaigns=20
for the rights of refugees in general. You wont see them at one=20
anti-racist or anti war demo, or a Palestine demo or anything of=20
interest outside the Tamil community. Some years ago, a Tamil=20
refugee Sashidaran Panchatcharam, was beaten to death on a very=20
public road, in the early evening by racists in Newham. Newham=20
Monitoring Project, which was an organization campaigning on race=20
issues in that area organized a campaign. Myself and literally a=20
handful of progressive Tamils, and frankly I must say that the few=20
Tamils who became involved had dissenting views on Tamil=20
nationalism=8A became involved with the campaign surrounding his=20
murder. When we went to the demo in Newham, we were the only=20
Tamils there. The boy was beaten to death with cricket bats, and the=20
family would not show up because they were frightened. Now Newham is=20
full of Tamils, and there is also a history of racist attacks there.=20
Many young Tamils there at that time must have experienced some kind=20
of racial violence. It was a Saturday, and there were so many=20
Tamils out shopping and as the demo went by they would stand around=20
watching us from the streets but would not join us. It is also our=20
fault for not organizing enough. But you know, he was one of our own,=20
and they wouldn=B9t come join us. The Newham Monitoring Project had=20
done a lot of publicity=8A.The demo for this murdered Tamil boy was=20
strong, with people from all backgrounds =8A... White, Black and Asian=20
and only the Tamils were not there. Those few of us who went there=20
felt so small. I suppose partly because our successive political=20
leaders in Sri Lanka never got people involved in political protests=20
and so on. Now in protests here as in protests in Sri Lanka, the LTTE=20
will organize for its own demos, commandeer the crowds , organize=20
buses and ship people to the demo=8A

AK: Could you talk a little bit about how politics has changed here=20
in the UK in the post Sept 11th environment, especially in terms of=20
the repression of immigrants.

NR: There has been all this anti-terrorist legislation. A whole new=20
anti-Islamic phobia has been whipped up. The government is also=20
targeting refugees and bringing in new asylum legislation. All Asians=20
are perceived now as Islamic, not that we should care about that. The=20
resistance to such repression has come from the anti-war movement,=20
which is a coalition of diverse groups. Anti-war demonstrations have=20
been quite frequent and there has been a lot of support expressed for=20
the Palestinians as well, so those things are happening, but its not=20
reported in the press. This is not a Black coalition but an anti-war=20
coalition but the black presence at these demos is substantial.=20
The state is whipping up fear among ordinary people, but at the same=20
time the government is also confused about all this. While on the one=20
hand they want to curb the growth of Islamic mosques and activity, on=20
the other hand they are encouraging single faith schools. As you are=20
aware before Sept 11th, there were all these riots in Bradford and=20
Oldham between Asian youth and BNP =AD Neo-Nazi gangs which involved=20
local White youth. There were big clashes. It was finally=20
established that the cause of the riots was long term segregation,=20
local authority policies to keep White and Asian neighborhoods=20
separate. If they had gone to school together and done things=20
together perhaps there wouldn=B9t have been this level of animosity.=20
These were mill and factory towns that had decayed and there was a=20
lot of deprivation unemployment and poverty. And then there were the=20
discriminatory policies of the local authorities to keep the Asians=20
segregated from the whites=8A.. Even after this the government is=20
pushing ahead with the idea of single faith schools =8Awhich will=20
cause more division =8A. On the one hand they want to close down the=20
Madrassas on the other hand they want to allow the religious leaders=20
to open new single faith schools. Organisations like the VHP are=20
also making a bid to open Hindu schools. . Sometimes, you find=20
local government funding going to these dubious groups. You can=B9t=20
avoid the links between what is going on in India and Pakistan and=20
indeed Sri Lanka and here. And amidst all of this=8A progressive=20
Asians especially women activists are fighting these very elements=20
within our communities=8A and at the same time the government and the=20
local authorities which encourage and fund them in the name of=20
=8Cmulticulturalism=B9 and rights of =8Cethnic groups=B9 and =8Cfaith=20
communities=B9.=A0

AK: What is the difference between politics of your generation your childre=
n?

NR: My children will probably be concerned about politics here. They=20
think it is terrible that Ammamma and Paatta have to live in the war.=20
Once in a while they sit up and listen to stories of what goes on=20
back home, but that=B9s about it. Their main focus is on problems=20
here. They are interested in issues of race, class and gender here.=20
But my children may have a different experience from children of=20
Tamil families that do not engage in local politics at all, but only=20
talk about politics back home. You find that in some of these expat=20
families, their children do cultural programs to fund raise for the=20
Tigers.

AK: You were involved in theater in Sri Lanka, what do you see as the=20
role of cultural production in the immigrant community.

NR: Right now they are so involved with what goes on back home, in=20
terms of the war and so on. But the second generation will become=20
more established as British Asians. So, the cultural umbilical chord=20
may be cut=8A In our meetings and events I see other Asian young=20
people=B9s presence and them taking part in a common British Asian=20
culture and identity. The Tamil community still tries to maintain=20
its separateness I believe.. There is an attempt by families i.e.=20
first generation Tamil immigrant families to keep their children away=20
from it=8A They are even segregated from the rest of the Asian=20
community. It is very funny. Even in Sri Lanka many Tamil women=20
would wear Punjabi outfits nowadays, but here when I have worn one,=20
other Tamil women have said =B3Cheee, why are you dressing like a=20
Paki.?=B2 I do not want my children to grow up imprisoned within a=20
cultural diet of jaded Bharatha natyam Arangetrams on the weekends.=20
Why should they hold onto this very narrow experience that is now=20
being peddled in London as =8CTamil culture=B9?

_____

#2.

The News International
Thursday September 12, 2002

Flawed, yes; 'farce', no *

Praful Bidwai

Are the elections to the Jammu and Kashmir Assembly a mere "farce"=20
because the All-Party Hurriyat Conference is not participating in=20
them? Are they a "sham", as many Pakistanis think, whose sole purpose=20
is to put the BJP's "favourite", the Farooq-Omar Abdullah-led=20
National Conference, back into power? Or, are they, as US deputy=20
secretary of state Richard Armitage says, something on which India is=20
"focused like a laser", whose relatively violence-free conduct would=20
lead to some "sort of dialogue" on Kashmir between New Delhi and=20
Islamabad? Is the election campaign taking place, as Doordarshan=20
would like Indians to believe, in an "upbeat" climate, in which=20
"lasting peace" is "evident"?

The truth is more nuanced and complex than either proposition=20
suggests. For one, despite the abnormal situation in Kashmir=BD the=20
elections are likely to be considerably more free and fair than many=20
previous contests, although they will not be truly "inclusive" (of=20
all currents of opinion). For another, it is far from clear that the=20
National Conference (NC) will win them; it faces significant (real,=20
not sham) opposition not just in Jammu (37 seats out of a total of=20
87), but also its core-support area, the Kashmir Valley (46 seats).=20
And for a third, the elections might throw up a new, non-NC political=20
combination which is potentially far more representative of the=20
popular will than the Hurriyat.

Consider the evidence on the ground. There is remarkably keen popular=20
interest in the elections in north Kashmir, where the first of four=20
phases of polling is due to take place. The interest level is higher=20
than seen in any election in 30 years, barring 1987. Candidates are=20
drawing 8,000 to 10,000-strong crowds.

"Election fever" is spreading to other areas, especially villages.=20
Even in the main cities, there are only "islands" of anti-election=20
sentiment. Every correspondent in the Valley worth his/her salt notes=20
this and says voter turnout could be 40 percent or more unless there=20
is violence and intimidation.

It is this change in the popular mood that impelled the People's=20
Conference led by Sajjad and Bilal, sons of the assassinated leader=20
Abdul Ghani Lone, to put up "dummy" or "rebel" candidates, defying=20
the Hurriyat. These candidates swear by "azadi".

However, so afraid is the Hurriyat of courting popular disapproval,=20
even anger, by punishing this move, that it dared not suspend/expel=20
the Lones. After three long meetings of its executive, general=20
council, and working committee, it was forced to reach an awkward=20
"compromise" under which the PC only technically suspended the=20
"rebels".

The Hurriyat has refused to participate in the elections despite the=20
efforts of the Ram Jethmalani-led NGO, the Kashmir Committee. But it=20
has not demanded, nor will actually campaign for, a boycott.

Major differences were aired during the Hurriyat's internal meetings,=20
reported in the media. While anti-election "hardliners" like Abdul=20
Ghani Bhat wanted disciplinary action against Sajjad Lone, the=20
Jamaat-i-Islami and Awami Action Committee led by Mirwaiz Umar Farooq=20
strongly supported him.

These, with the PC, are the only groups within the Hurriyat with a=20
political base and organisational structure. Most other Hurriyat=20
constituents, barring the J&K Liberation Front, are minuscule=20
factions formed around individuals. (The JKLF was "neutralised" into=20
declaring a unilateral "ceasefire" in 1994 with both Indian and=20
Pakistani agencies hunting it down).

The ground-level change is reinforced by external factors. The=20
Hurriyat has been under tremendous pressure from Western diplomats to=20
show it is serious about "democratic processes". It was told to=20
contest the elections by Lisa Curtis from the US State Department's=20
South Asia desk.

The pressure has impelled the Hurriyat to send a delegation to the=20
Kashmir Committee in New Delhi and issue a "climbdown" joint=20
statement, agreeing that "all concerned parties must rise above their=20
traditional positions, abandon extreme stands and show the necessary=20
flexibility and realism to reach an acceptable, honourable and=20
durable solution". The 23-party conglomerate wants "a structured=20
dialogue", including one "across the borders".

Hurriyat leaders link the external pressure to the home situation.=20
Privately, they confess they are afraid to acknowledge the popular=20
mood and soften the anti-election stand unless it is guaranteed that=20
pro-Pakistan militants will not gun them down. A first warning has=20
already been sounded. On September 6, an independent candidate from=20
Handwara was killed, allegedly by jihadi militants.

Many Hurriyat leaders believe that it won't be easy for them to claim=20
the elections are a "fraud" when a highly credible Election=20
Commission headed by JM Lyngdoh is conducting them. Nor can they=20
proclaim themselves the "true" representatives of the Kashmiri people=20
without demonstrating they have any real support or even=20
well-worked-out political positions, barring "negative" ones opposing=20
elections.

Some Hurriyat sympathisers think the group has made a "big mistake"=20
by not participating in the elections; by not even putting up "dummy"=20
candidates, it may have "missed the bus".

None of this argues that everything is hunky-dory in J&K. Far from=20
it. The electoral rolls have not been properly revised on the basis=20
of household surveys. There are anomalies -- e.g. inclusion of Akbar=20
Jahan, Sheikh Abdullah's late, lamented widow! Voter identity cards=20
(not mandatory for elections in India) have led to harassment of=20
innocent people by the police who insist such cards are the only=20
valid identity document.

New Delhi has done little to instil confidence among the Kashmiris.=20
Utter incoherence marks its policies, including use of multiple=20
interlocutors, manipulation by intelligence agencies, unconscionable=20
fudging of the "autonomy" issue. This right is enshrined in India's=20
Constitution, but the government only concedes "devolution", a favour=20
that can be withdrawn at will.

Kashmiris are yet to see the beginning of the fulfilment of=20
Vajpayee's Independence Day promise to "make amends" for "mistakes"=20
in Kashmir. "Azadi" (freedom, autonomy, independence, sovereignty,=20
not necessarily merger with Pakistan) remains the Valley's dominant=20
sentiment.

What explains the change of mood? The people are exhausted with=20
externally sponsored militant violence, as well as state repression.=20
September 11's aftermath and the increasing illegitimacy of=20
Talibanist Islam have convinced many that there is no future in=20
jihad-based anti-pluralist politics. Many Kashmiris probably see a=20
new J&K political dispensation as a refuge from the growing=20
confrontation involving India, Pakistan and militant groups, as each=20
jockeys for advantage in the new situation created by the US=20
military's entry into South Asia.

There are local and mundane considerations too. The NC faces a huge=20
incumbency disadvantage. It is widely seen as corrupt, unresponsive=20
to people, and thoroughly opportunist. Many Kashmiris will vote just=20
to oust it.

The state's economy is battered beyond belief, with agriculture and=20
horticulture in deep crisis and three lakh educated unemployed.=20
Kashmir only has 11,200 business establishments today, a 32 percent=20
drop from 1989. In 1989, almost 50,000 tourists visited the Valley=20
per day. Today, only 200 do.

People's genuine short-term grievances about water, roads, hostels=20
and jobs are driving them to short-term choices -- and the=20
ballot-box. The polls might return many "rebels", who could join=20
hands with smaller groups like Mufti Syed's People's Democratic Party=20
against the NC. Many Kashmiris, who long for a return to less violent=20
life and for ordinary decencies, will express their wishes by voting.=20
It would be churlish to call that "a farce".

* Note: This article was was written before the assassination of=20
Jammu and Kashmir Law Minister Mushtaq Ahmed Lone

______

#3.

The Friday Times
September 13 - 19, 2002 - Vol. XIV, No. 29

Kashmir: time for honesty

Khalid Hasan =A0

There is a quiz on Kashmir. Supposing next week or next month or next=20
year, India is forced or persuaded to implement the UN Security=20
Council resolutions on Kashmir, will Pakistan also implement them,=20
considering that for nearly 53 years, these resolutions have formed=20
the bedrock of its foreign policy? There is only one condition for=20
taking part in this quiz. The answers have to be honest, uninfluenced=20
by prejudice, history or self-interest.

Assuming that India agrees to the full acceptance and total=20
implementation of the UN resolutions, the ball will land in=20
Pakistan=B9s court. Will Pakistan be prepared to pull out every single=20
soldier now stationed on its side of the Line ofControl? Will=20
Pakistan agree to the expulsion or, if need be, extirpation of the=20
Islamic fighting groups which continue to operate freely with the=20
permission or connivance of the official authority in Azad Kashmir?

Will Pakistan be prepared to accept that the Northern Areas are an=20
integral part of the former princely state of Jammu and Kashmir as it=20
stood on August 14, 1947? Will Pakistan agree to the holding of the=20
plebiscite that it demands in the entire state, only 64 percent of=20
whose population is Muslim, 33 percent being Hindu and three percent=20
Buddhist? While the UN resolutions offer only two choices =AD India or=20
Pakistan =AD will Pakistan be prepared to accept what has come to be=20
known as the Third Option, in the event that the people of the state=20
demand independence?

The answers to all these questions, frankly, are in the negative. The=20
great tragedy of Kashmir is that neither on the Indian side nor on=20
ours, have the people, whose welfare and happiness both governments=20
claim to want, been associated with any of the decisions that affect=20
their fate. Not once have they been made part of discussions between=20
the two governments involving Kashmir=B9s future. No Kashmiri was ever=20
involved in the decision-making process as the two governments and=20
their representatives wrestled each other at the United Nations=20
through the 1950s and the subsequent decade. There was no one to=20
represent the Kashmiris at Tashkent in 1966 and there was no one to=20
speak for them at Simla in 1972.

In the last ten to fifteen years, various attempts have been made by=20
Kashmiri politicians from both sides of the Line of Control, which=20
they prefer to call by its UN-given name of the Ceasefire Line, to=20
meet in India, Pakistan or a third country. These attempts have=20
failed to come to anything, as such direct interaction has been found=20
as unacceptable in New Delhi as in Islamabad. Whereas India can take=20
shelter behind the legal fiction that Kashmir is an integral part of=20
the Union and the Kashmiris are Indian citizens who are not free to=20
negotiate in any other capacity, Pakistan has no such legal shelter=20
because it officially maintains that the entire state of Jammu and=20
Kashmir is a disputed territory and its future dispensation remains=20
to be decided in accordance with the wishes of its people.

While India=B9s despicable Kashmir policy is there for the world to=20
see, it is only fair to examine objectively what Pakistan=B9s policy=20
towards the part of the state called Azad Jammu and Kashmir has been.=20
All other things Azad Kashmir may well be, but =B3azad=B2it is not, never=20
has been, and, by all indications, never will be. In the early days=20
of Pakistan, it was the notorious Ministry of Kashmir Affairs that=20
administered Azad Kashmir. The Ministry was then headed by an officer=20
of the rank of a joint secretary. The president of Azad Kashmir took=20
his orders from this bureaucrat or one of his juniors.

Often, when the president came to Rawalpindi, he was by design made=20
to wait for humiliatingly long periods before being admitted to the=20
presence of his exalted highness. The prototype of this arrogant=20
office was the late Amanullah Khan Niazi who considered Azad Kashmir=20
his fiefdom and all who lived there as his=B3rayyaya=B2. When he visited=20
Azad Kashmir, it was like the Viceroy visiting a subjugated=20
territory. The one man who took on Niazi was punished. Divested of=20
his office of president, he was thrown into jail for daring to do the=20
unthinkable. The man was KH Khurshid who had been the Quaid-e-Azam=B9s=20
private secretary through the crucial years of the Pakistan Movement,=20
1944-47. He was also the first inmate of the infamous Dalai Camp.

To this day, the two key officials in Azad Kashmir, the Chief=20
Secretary and the Inspector General of Police, are =B3lent officers=B2=20
from Pakistan. Once they get posted to Azad Kashmir, they are raised=20
several notches in pay and status for overseeing the =B3natives=B2. The=20
Azad Kashmiris cannot obviously be trusted with positions of such=20
high responsibility. Pakistan=B9s intelligence agencies, the ISI, the=20
Military Intelligence, the Intelligence Bureau and others that we=20
know not of, have heavy and intrusive presence in Azad Kashmir. No=20
one dares cross their path, except at his own peril. The Azad Kashmir=20
government is no government since it has little internal autonomy. If=20
the president or prime minister of Azad Kashmir wants to proceed=20
abroad, he cannot do so without the permission of the government in=20
Islamabad. Even the statements he makes at such friendly forums, such=20
as the OIC, have to be drafted and cleared by officials from=20
Islamabad. If he falls out of line, he can be required to offer an=20
explanation in writing. I once was asked to draft one such=20
=B3explanation=B2 by Sardar Abdul Qayyum Khan, these days the chairman of=20
the so-called Kashmir Committee.

For some years now, and especially since General Pervez Musharraf=20
took power, the affairs of Azad Kashmir have been overseen by the=20
General Officer Commanding of the Pakistan Army=B9s 12th Division based=20
at Murree. He exercises vice-regal control. These days even such=20
minor matters as postings of officials have to be cleared by Murree.=20
One of the most blatant instances of this overlordship of Azad=20
Kashmir =AD much of whose territory wasliberated from the Maharaja=B9s=20
rule by the locals without outside help =AD was the imposition of=20
Sardar Anwar Khan, an unknown Pakistani army general, as president.=20
He was retired from the army and within a week he had been =B3chosen=B2=20
by the majority party in the Azad Kashmir assembly as president. The=20
only thing Azad Kashmiri about him was that, like General Abdul Aziz,=20
he came from Azad Kashmir=B9s Suddhan tribe. He has since assumed much=20
of the executive authority to which he should have no claim, being a=20
figurehead under the constitution. In September, it will be he and=20
not the elected Prime Minister of Azad Kashmir, Sardar Sikandar=20
Hayat, who will be representing the people of Azad Kashmir in New=20
York at the OIC foreign ministers=B9 Kashmir contact group meeting.

Those who subverted a political movement for self-determination into=20
a murderous religious war and reduced a liberation struggle into what=20
the rest of the world sees as terrorism will have to answer one day=20
for having laid to waste the sacrifices of the Kashmiri people,=20
dating back to that fateful morning in July 1931 in Srinagar when 21=20
peaceful men were shot dead by the Maharaja=B9s police.

______

#4.

Full Text of a Statement by Mr. Gohar Zaman Khan, a former Inspector=20
General of Police in Pakistan
about an Investigation into the Death of Omar Asghar Khan In Karachi=20
On 25 June 2002 was released to the Press in Pakistan on 12=20
September. This document available to all on the SACW list. Should=20
you want a copy send a request to <aiindex@m...>

______

#5.

The Hindu
Sep 13, 2002

A word of caution on imparting 'religious education'

By Our Legal Correspondent

NEW DELHI Sept. 12. The Supreme Court has cautioned the Government to=20
maintain a constant vigil on the part of those imparting religious=20
education from the primary stage to the higher level, otherwise=20
``there is a potent danger of religious education being perverted by=20
educational authorities whosoever may be in power by imparting=20
`religious instructions' in which they have faith and belief''.=20
Justice D.M. Dharmadhikari, in his separate but concurring judgment,=20
said that educationists should ensure that in teaching religions,=20
there was a possibility for indoctrination or brain-washing of the=20
children and thus curbing their inquisitiveness and free-thinking in=20
the name of religion.

Religious education, therefore, even if permitted to be imparted=20
should consist of ``understanding the child as he is without imposing=20
upon him an ideal of what we think he should be,'' the judge added.

Tracing Indian history, the judge said: ``the lives of Indian people=20
have been enriched by integration of various religions and that is=20
the strength of this nation. Whatever kind of people came to India=20
either for shelter or as aggressors, India has tried to accept the=20
best part of their religions. As a result, composite culture=20
gradually developed in India and enriched the lives of Indians. This=20
happened in India because of the capacity of Indians to assimilate=20
thoughts of different religions. This process should continue for the=20
betterment of multi-religious society which is India''. The judge=20
further said that `religious education' could be permitted based on=20
`religious pluralism' even in the State-run institutions in which=20
`religious instructions' were forbidden under Article 28 (1) of the=20
Constitution.

He, therefore, made it clear that Article 28 (1) did not prohibit the=20
introduction of study of religions in the State educational=20
institutions, including those wholly or partly aided by the States.

The judge, however, said ``the experiment is delicate and difficult=20
but if undertaken sincerely and in good faith for creating peace and=20
harmony in society is not to be thwarted on the ground that it is=20
against the concept of `secularism' as narrowly understood to mean=20
neutrality of State towards all religions and bereft of positive=20
approach towards all religions''.

The judge was of the view that the real meaning of secularism in the=20
language of Gandhiji was `sarva-dharma- sambhav' meaning equal=20
treatment and respect for all religions, but ``we have misunderstood=20
the meaning as `sarva - dharma - sam - abhav' meaning negation of all=20
religions. The result of this has been that we do not allow our=20
students even touch our religious books''.

He said that ``it is ultimately for Parliament to take a decision on=20
the national education policy one way or the other. It is not the=20
province of the court to decide on the good or bad points. We have=20
not found anything in the educational policy or the curriculum which=20
is against the Constitution''.

In his separate judgment, Justice Sema said that side stepping of=20
such an important Advisory Board as Central Advisory Board of=20
Education (CABE) which had been in existence since 1935 on the plea=20
of non-reconstitution of nominated members was not proper. He,=20
therefore, directed the Centre to consider filling the vacancies of=20
the nominated members of the CABE for seeking its opinion on the=20
curriculum as expeditiously as possible and in any case, before the=20
next academic session. This would not, however, mean that the NCFSE=20
2000 published by NCERT was illegal.

______

#6.

The Telegraph
13 September, 2002

MIRROR IMAGE - Forging a Muslim identity in south Asia

Categories of difference
Beyond Turk and Hindu: Rethinking Religious Identities in Islamicate=20
South Asia Edited by David Gilmartin and Bruce B. Lawrence, India=20
Research Press, Rs 595

The articulation of any form of identity is replete with tensions and=20
riddled with paradoxes. The issue of religious identities, especially=20
when encased in a structure of received difference like that of=20
Hindu-Muslim, is even more complex. For here, we have a range of=20
protagonists from the politician to the rabble-rouser, from the=20
ideologue to the historian, setting about defining identities as=20
fixed categories of opposition and difference or of affinity and=20
accommodation. For south Asia, the problems have been compounded=20
given the reality of communal tensions and polarization and of a=20
confused conceptual armoury of definition and explanation of=20
inter-community exchanges. Recall for instance the persistent refrain=20
of irreconcilable difference between two opposing religious systems=20
or of the so-called elements of syncretism and synthesis that marked=20
the everyday social communication and cultural practices of the two=20
communities. In both cases, adhering to the universality of Ram and=20
Rahim or to the never-to-be-reconciled difference between Turk and=20
Hindu has remained the dominant feature of the construction of Muslim=20
identity in south Asia.

The book prefers to take an alternative position, what the editors=20
choose to call contrarian. It attempts, through a range of essays=20
dealing with discrete aspects of Muslim presence and participation in=20
local life in the subcontinent, to make a case for a dynamic Muslim=20
identity that is related closely to local imperatives. The emerging=20
identity located its referential terms within both the larger=20
intellectual framework of the Islamicate as well as within the more=20
immediate and particular milieu in which it operated. Identities were=20
thus not entirely bound entities for they drew from a repertoire of=20
diverse sources of language and meaning as well as of local realities=20
and contingencies. In this was implicit a tactical deployment of=20
rhetoric, ritual and practice that emphasized difference and sameness=20
alternately to facilitate an ongoing constitution of identity.

The first section deals with literary genres and architectural forms,=20
the essays focussing on the tactics employed to create and=20
consolidate religious identities in a specific context. The practice=20
of the satyapir cult in Bengal and the expressive articulation of a=20
Tamil Muslim identity through the medium of a literary convention,=20
the Cirappuranam, is taken up by Tony Stewart and Vasudha Narayanan=20
respectively. Stewart argues that the satyapir cult, widely prevalent=20
in Bengal, was not so much an expression of syncretism as a product=20
of complex negotiation with imperatives of the immediate material=20
context. Satyapir in his Indic and Islamic representations embodied=20
the virtues of pragmatism in a hostile world. For both religious=20
hierarchies, the deity had a special niche =8B as a metaphor for=20
getting by in a tough world. So with all the differences in=20
description borrowed at random from a larger repertoire of myth and=20
legend, the deity satisfied similar needs of the community of=20
followers whose orientations were strikingly complementary. The same=20
equivalence was clear in the Tamil Muslim society =8B a region where=20
the Islamic presence had very different ramifications and dimensions=20
in contrast to northern India. The melding of a distinctly Tamil=20
Muslim identity, pioneered largely by traders, reflected the=20
complexities of the negotiation. One important device used by the=20
latter was the adoption of Tamil literary conventions in putting=20
forward a framework for Muslim identity and religious participation=20
in a world that was both Tamil and Muslim.

The second section deals largely with Sufi tazkiras and biographies.=20
The third section deals with the functions of the state in redefining=20
general and particular identities. Richard Eaton=B9s essay stands out=20
in this section as he proceeds to talk about the polemics of temple=20
destruction that Muslim states adopted. Much of the contemporary=20
evidence on temple destruction, Eaton argues, is based on Elliot and=20
Dowson=B9s work that was written partly to validate British rule in=20
India and to thereby de-legitimize Muslim rule. A selective use of=20
this work, backed by fragmentary epigraphic evidence, has enabled=20
Hindu nationalists to inflate the myth of Muslim fanaticism and=20
obfuscate the more complex processes of negotiation between religion=20
and the ruling state.

Eaton thus locates the problem within the larger context of state=20
power and its need to adopt certain strategies to buttress its newly=20
acquired authority. The rhetoric of temple desecration was one such=20
strategy in the early period of Muslim rule. Temples were not just=20
sources of huge wealth, a major consideration in the initial Islamic=20
onslaught, they were recognized as the most important sites for the=20
contestation of kingly authority. Thus whether temples were destroyed=20
or not in counts of hundreds and thousands, the rhetoric of temple=20
destruction was in full evidence. Eaton points out that most of the=20
acts of temple destruction occurred at the cutting edge of moving=20
military frontiers and that they were almost never directed at the=20
people The target was the enemy king and the image that displayed his=20
state deity. Royal temples were charged political monuments and=20
therefore were vulnerable to outside attacks, Muslim or otherwise.=20
Equally, there was a strong movement towards temple patronage under=20
the imperial Mughals, a feature that was as constitutive of=20
state-building as destruction was.

This volume emphasizes the point that there was not one fixed=20
identity but that it continuously configured and reconfigured in=20
response to changing local conditions. However, it is also a fact=20
that most of the case studies refer to shatter zones, where the=20
Islamic frontier was necessarily changing and different.

LAKSHMI SUBRAMANIAN

______

#7.

The Times of India
VHP cooks up a treat for riot accused
RADHA SHARMA
TIMES NEWS NETWORK=A0[ THURSDAY, SEPTEMBER 12, 2002=A0=A011:34:43 PM ]
http://timesofindia.indiatimes.com/articleshow.asp?art_id=3D21998732

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