[sacw] SACW #1 | 4 Oct. 02

[Harsh Kapoor]

South Asia Citizens Wire #1 | 4 October 2002

__________________________

#1. Fatal Friendships - Pakistan and America four decades and four=20
dictators later (Pervez Hoodbhoy)
#2. Pakistan: Institutions, individuals and the national crisis - The=20
Zia regime (1977-1989)
(Dr Akmal Hussain)
#3. India: The textbook case (Rajeev Dhavan)
#4. India: Secularism must reign in Gandhi's homeland (Kuldip Nayar)
#5. India: Sexual harassment: Tightrope walk to justice (Radhika Chopra)

__________________________

#1.

Courtesy: INSAF Bulletin [6] October 1, 2002
International South Asia Forum
Secretarial office: 2520 Lionel Groulx #13, Montreal, QC, Canada H3J=20
1J8 (Tel. 514 939-2522)
(e-mail; insaf@i... or visit our website http://www.insaf.net)

Fatal Friendships - Pakistan and America four decades and four dictators la=
ter
by Pervez Hoodbhoy

Appearing at a press conference in military uniform in late August,=20
General Pervez Musharraf declared he would remain president and army=20
chief for the next five years, would have the right to name the heads=20
of the three military services, and emphasized no parliament could=20
overturn his 29 amendments to Pakistan=B9s constitution. "This is part=20
of the Constitution," he declared, waving his hand in the air. "I am=20
hereby making it part of the Constitution." Convinced of his sagacity=20
and goodwill, Musharraf says he does not want to rule, but must=20
because no one else can reform Pakistan. "Democratic dictatorship",=20
he says, is what the country needs.

The reaction in Washington was mild =AD no talk of regime change here.=20
"He's still tight with us in the war against terror, and that's what=20
I appreciate," Bush told reporters while visiting Squires Mountain in=20
Oregon. "He understands that we've got to keep al-Qaida on the run.=20
... And I appreciate his strong support."

Indeed, squeamishness has never afflicted America=B9s Pakistan policy.=20
As Deng Xiaoping once famously declared "it doesn=B9t matter whether=20
the cat is black or white so long as it catches mice". Today=20
America=B9s mouse-catcher is flying high.

General Musharraf is the fourth Pakistani general in forty years to=20
seize power. In 1965, General Ayub Khan =AD a staunch anti-communist =AD=20
brought to his nation the dubious distinction of being, in John=20
Foster Dulles=B9s words, America=B9s "most allied ally". Then, in 1971=20
Richard Nixon rallied to the defence of General Yahya Khan, who had=20
ran amok and led the country into a catastrophic civil war. But it=20
was the coup of 1977 by General Zia ul Haq which was to have the most=20
profound influence, not only upon Pakistan but all over the world.=20
Zia brought a messianic zeal to redefine Pakistan as an Islamic state=20
run by Sharia (Islamic Law) and Islamicize its institutions. The US=20
was not enthusiastic, but then the Soviets walked into Afghanistan in=20
1979.

>From the early 80=B9s onwards, Pakistan was to be the hub of a thriving=20
global jihad industry. Financed for a decade by the US and Saudi=20
Arabia, American strategy to drive the Evil Empire out of Afghanistan=20
required marshalling the forces of Islam from Algeria and Morocco to=20
Egypt and Saudi Arabia. The Pakistan Army participated=20
enthusiastically =AD "Islam, Pakistan, Jihad" were soon emblazoned on=20
banners at recruitment centers, beards proliferated, promotions went=20
with piety, and few could be seen to miss Friday prayers. A new ethos=20
was in creation; this was to be an army not just for Pakistan, but to=20
fight the enemies of Islam everywhere.

After the Soviet Union withdrew, and then self-destructed, jihad went=20
into temporary limbo. But, like any military-industrial complex, it=20
too found excellent reasons for not doing away with itself.=20
Fortunately for those initially recruited by the CIA and Pakistan=B9s=20
secret agencies, the Pakistan Army still had plenty of use for jihad.=20
It wanted "strategic depth" (a friendly backyard) for itself in=20
Afghanistan, and sought to wrest Kashmir from Indian occupation=20
without all-out war. Both required setting up a complex=20
infrastructure of Islamic militant groups which freely roamed the=20
country, but whose existence could be officially denied. Some were=20
closely connected with Al-Qaida and the Taliban.

Then came 9/11. Faced by a United States bent upon bloody vengeance,=20
Pakistan=B9s military establishment scurried to join the US-led=20
coalition and take up arms against its former creation, the Taliban=20
and their Amir-ul-Momineen (leader of the pious, Mullah Omar). Osama=20
T-shirts disappeared from bazaars in Peshawar. This straightforward=20
betrayal was resisted only by a few senior officers with an Islamic=20
bent. They were quickly rendered irrelevant. General Musharraf knew=20
the alternative. In all likelihood the Americans would "have done an=20
Iraq on Pakistan", as one highly placed member of the foreign=20
ministry conceded to me in the week after September 11. He was=20
probably right.

Today, the Pakistan Army's jihad philosophy lies buried under the=20
rubble of the World Trade Centre. The Pakistan Army has taken upon=20
itself a brand new role. The transition has not been painless. Bloody=20
encounters with Al-Qaida, beginning after Tora Bora, have exposed=20
internal contradictions. As casualties mount, and hostile tribal=20
reaction to joint US/Pakistani search-and-destroy operations on the=20
western border increases, officers and men are asking: why?

Inevitably the anger - visible or otherwise - at having to fight=20
America's war against Al-Qaida and the Taliban focuses on Musharraf,=20
a man who received high praise from the United Jihad Council after=20
secret incursions and battles fought against India around Kargil in=20
Kashmir two years ago. Musharraf's successful coup was warmly=20
welcomed by right-wing religious groups in Pakistan. But today he=20
lives in mortal danger, aware that he is silently stalked by the=20
forces that once sided with him.

To be sure, Musharraf claims a reform agenda and the Americans are=20
happy to believe him. But he is no Gorbachev, nor is he a Kamal=20
Ataturk. All of his attempts at reform arose under international=20
pressure. Feeble at best, Musharraf's reforms invariably avoid the=20
type of structural changes Pakistan needs to break out of its=20
recurring, worsening crisis.

In fifteen years, Pakistan=B9s population will exceed that of the=20
United States. The economy, which as grown at around 3% only in=20
recent years, is hopelessly incapable of providing jobs to the=20
exploding population. The education system =AD which cannot offer any=20
school for 4 out of 10 children and only poor quality schools to the=20
rest =AD contributes directly to the growth of madrassas promoting=20
jihad and militarism. The problems are vastly compounded by a huge=20
military establishment.

All countries have armies, but in Pakistan things are reversed. Here=20
it is the army that has a country. Defence expenditures consume=20
between one-third and one-half of the national budget. Over the=20
decades, senior military officers have been transformed into powerful=20
landlords through grants of choice agricultural lands and real=20
estate. Many, if not most, public corporations are headed by retired=20
officers.

Given General Musharraf's diminishing domestic popularity some here=20
worry about his survival But a real threat "from the street" seems=20
impossible. Pakistan's public, disillusioned by Benazir Bhutto's and=20
Nawaz Sharif's kleptocratic regimes, is far too wretched and=20
ambivalent to rise up. Even heavily armed militant groups are no=20
match for the state's firepower. While intrigues and coups are always=20
possible, Musharraf's survival is likely because he won't touch the=20
enormous powers and privileges of the institution he heads: the=20
Pakistani military.

Pakistan=B9s stability =AD and Musharraf=B9s political and physical=20
survival =AD have now become contingent upon US support. Ironically,=20
fate has yoked his survival to George W. Bush, who could not recall=20
the name of this Pakistani leader at the time of the US presidential=20
elections. Indeed, after Pakistan was declared a US ally, all earlier=20
sanctions were lifted, and international financial institutions=20
rescheduled debts and gave new loans. Currently foreign exchange=20
reserves are a 700% higher than before 9/11. However, this by itself=20
does not indicate that the economy has improved =AD manufacturing has=20
steadily decreased in the past year and fear of instability has=20
resulted in essentially zero foreign direct investment.

True, General Musharraf is not a religious fanatic and, unlike his=20
predecessor General Zia, has not exercised brute repression. It is=20
also true that his sudden removal =AD or possible assassination =AD would=20
be disastrous in a situation where Islamic militant groups wait in=20
the shadows. But Pakistan=B9s army is part of the country=B9s problem; it=20
cannot be a solution. It must relinquish control over civilian=20
institutions, cut back its budget, and move Pakistan away from=20
militarism and war. The US must realize that its support to=20
Pakistan=B9s former dictators =AD all for reasons of expediency =AD=20
ultimately boomeranged. But shall it learn from history? (Pervez=20
Hoodbhoy is professor of physics at Quaid-e-Azam University,=20
Islamabad.)

_____

#2.

The Daily Times
October 03, 2002

Institutions, individuals and the national crisis
The Zia regime (1977-1989)
Dr Akmal Hussain

The mobilisation of these narrow identities involved a psychic=20
disconnection from the well-springs of universal human brotherhood=20
within the Islamic tradition. Its liberating elements of rationality=20
and love were replaced by bigotry and hatred
Each regime that came to power sought to legitimise itself through an=20
explicit ideology: The Ayub regime propounded the philosophy of=20
modernisation and economic development. The Bhutto regime donned the=20
mantle of redeeming the poor through socialism. General Zia-ul-Haq=20
having come to power through a coup d=B9=E9tat, sought to perpetuate=20
military rule in the garb of a coercive and obscurantist version of=20
Islamic ideology.
In the absence of popular legitimacy, the Zia regime used terror for=20
the first time in Pakistan=B9s history as a conscious policy of the=20
government. President Zia ul Haq publicly stated: =B3Martial law should=20
be based on fear=B2. In the same vein, Brigadier Malik wrote: =B3Terror=20
struck into the hearts of enemies is not only a means, it is the end=20
itself=B2 (Quoted by Omar Noman in his book The Political Economy of=20
Pakistan). In pursuit of this policy, the democratic constitution of=20
1973 was set aside and draconian measures of military courts,=20
arbitrary arrests, amputation of hands and public lashing were=20
introduced.
Pakistan=B9s society, by and large, was historically characterised by=20
cultural diversity, democratic aspirations and a religious=20
perspective rooted in tolerance and humanism. This was one of the=20
reasons why the founding father, Quaid-e-Azam Muhammad Ali Jinnah,=20
conceived of Pakistan as a democratic and pluralistic polity with=20
religious belief to be a matter concerning the individual rather than=20
the state.
=B3You may belong to any religion or caste or creed =8B that has nothing=20
to do with the business of the state.... We are starting with this=20
fundamental principle that we are all citizens and equal citizens of=20
one state.... Now, I think we should keep that in front of us as our=20
ideal and you will find that in the course of time Hindus would cease=20
to be Hindus and Muslims would cease to be Muslims, not in the=20
religious sense, because that is the personal faith of each=20
individual but in the political sense as citizens of the state.=B2
General Zia in attempting to restructure such a state and society=20
into a theocracy, undertook two kinds of initiatives: First, measures=20
designed to subordinate to executive authority, institutions of state=20
and civil society such as the judiciary and the press, which if=20
allowed to function independently could check governmental power. In=20
the case of the judiciary its essential powers to scrutinise the=20
legality of martial law or the orders of military courts were=20
abolished. The judicial protection against arbitrary detention of a=20
citizen embodied in the right to habeas corpus was eliminated for the=20
first time in Pakistan.
In the case of the press, Zia gave a pithy statement of Martial Law=20
Policy with respect to the press: =B3Democracy means freedom of the=20
press, Martial Law its very negation=B2. In the pursuit of this policy,=20
press control measures were introduced. The government constituted=20
committees at the district level to ensure that articles repugnant to=20
the ideology of Pakistan were not published. Those members of the=20
press who had refused to acquiesce faced state repression. A number=20
of newspapers were banned and journalists were arrested and given=20
flogging sentences by military courts.
The second set of measures towards a theocratic state sought to=20
inculcate obscurantist views and induced a narrowing of the citizens=B9=20
mind. It involved a suspension of the sensibility of love and reason=20
underlying the religious tradition embodied in Pakistan=B9s folk=20
culture.
In the absence of a popular mandate, Zia claimed that his mission to=20
bring an =B3Islamic Order=B2 in Pakistan had a divine sanction: =B3I have a=
=20
mission given by God to bring Islamic Order to Pakistan=B2. Advocacy=20
for a theocratic social order was conducted through the state=20
controlled television and press. Furthermore the State undertook to=20
physically intervene in controlling individual behaviour with respect=20
to the practice of religion. In August 1984, for example, the=20
Nizam-e-Salat Campaign was launched through the appointment of=20
100,000 =B3Prayer Wardens=B2 for rural and urban localities. The task of=20
these state functionaries was to monitor religious activities of=20
individuals and to seek their compliance in religious practices.
The institutional roots of =B3Islamic Fundamentalism=B2 were laid when=20
government funds were provided for establishing mosque schools=20
(madrassas) in small towns and rural areas which led to the rapid=20
growth of militant religious organisations. This social process which=20
later came to be known as =B3Islamic Fundamentalism=B2 was catalysed by=20
the Afghan war.
As Zia moved towards the construction of a theocratic state and=20
brutalised civil society, his isolation from the people as a whole=20
was matched by increased external support. He sought political,=20
economic and military support from the US by offering to play the=20
role of a front-line state in the Afghan guerrilla war against the=20
occupying Soviet army. Accordingly, Pakistan obtained a package of=20
US$3.2 billion in financial loans and relatively sophisticated=20
military hardware. Moreover, with support from the US, Pakistan was=20
able to get additional fiscal space by getting its foreign debt=20
rescheduled, and getting increased private foreign capital inflows.=20
These official and private capital inflows played an important role=20
in stimulating macro economic growth in this period. For example, GDP=20
growth rate increased from 5% per annum during the Bhutto regime to=20
6.6% per annum during the Zia regime. Foreign capital inflows also=20
helped establish a political constituency both within the=20
institutions of the state and in the conservative sections of the=20
urban middle classes, for a theocratic form of military dictatorship.
As the Zia regime engaged in a proxy war, some of the militant=20
religious groups together with their associated madrassas were=20
provided with official funds, training and weapons to conduct=20
guerrilla operations in Afghanistan. While they helped fight the war=20
in Afghanistan, the religious militant groups were able to enlarge=20
the political space within Pakistan=B9s society and some of the=20
institutions of the State.
>From 1987 onwards, sectarian violence mushroomed in the Punjab=20
province (which till then had been relatively peaceful) and later=20
spread across the country. The phenomenon of large-scale sectarian=20
violence conducted by well armed and trained cadres was closely=20
associated with the rapid growth of Deeni Madrassas (=B3religious=B2=20
schools). Historically, such schools basically imparted religious=20
knowledge. In the late 1980s, however, a new kind of Deeni Madrassa=20
emerged, which engaged in systematic indoctrination in a narrow=20
sectarian identity, and inculcated hatred and violence against other=20
sects.
In 1998, there were 3,393 Deeni Madrassas in the Punjab alone and 67%=20
had emerged during the Zia regime and after. Between 1979 and 1994,=20
many of the madrassas were receiving financial grants from Zakat=20
funds. According to an official report of the police department, most=20
of the madrassas were in fact providing religious education. Yet as=20
many as 42% of them were actively promoting sectarian violence=20
through a well-conceived indoctrination process. The students,=20
predominantly from poor families, were given free food and lodging=20
during their term at the madrassas. As poverty increased in the=20
1990s, the burgeoning madrassas provided a growing number of=20
unemployed and impoverished youths with the security of food, shelter=20
and an emotionally charged identity: a personality that felt=20
fulfilled through violence against the other.
As the new kind of sectarian madrassas emerged and grew during the=20
Zia regime so did sectarian violence. The number of sectarian=20
killings increased from 22 during 1987-89 to 166 during 1993-95. Thus=20
violence against the other became both the expression and the emblem=20
of the narrowed identity.
The mobilisation of these narrow identities involved a psychic=20
disconnection from the well-springs of universal human brotherhood=20
within the Islamic tradition. Its liberating elements of rationality=20
and love were replaced in the narrowed psyche by bigotry and hatred.=20
Violence against the =B3other=B2 became an emblem of membership within=20
these identities. Thus, civil society divorced from its universal=20
human values began to lose its cohesion and stability.
Dr Hussain is a leading economist and author and co-author of many=20
books. This is the fifth article of a 7-part series

_____

#3

The Hindu
Friday, Oct 04, 2002
Opinion - Leader Page Articles =A0=A0=A0

The textbook case

By Rajeev Dhavan

The textbook judgment is a cry from the judicial heart over declining=20
social values. But, the solution blessed by the Court subverts the=20
Constitution's secular basis.

THE SUPREME Court has always claimed to respond to the felt=20
necessities of the times. This has not invariably been the case.=20
Today, judges define what the Constitution is. Jawaharlal Nehru was=20
right when he said that the Constitution has been "kidnapped and=20
purloined" by the judicial process. The judicial process is far from=20
perfect. There are times when the Court has been hopelessly wrong and=20
admitted its mistake. The textbook case was heard quickly, amidst=20
great controversy and with volumes of relevant and irrelevant=20
material. It requires reconsideration. The textbook case raised two=20
fundamental issues.

The first is the issue of secularism that Article 28 specifically=20
prohibits the Government from teaching religious education through=20
its schools or those maintained by it or allowing the compulsory=20
teaching of religion by grant-aided schools. What the Government=20
cannot do directly, it cannot do indirectly through its Ministry or=20
the NCERT (the National Council of Educational Research and Training).

The second is the issue of federalism. Education is a Union and State=20
responsibility. State schools and schools in States are to teach=20
these new curricula, syllabi and textbooks. If the Union launches a=20
new education policy, should the States be consulted? How? Through=20
the NCERT =8B a private body with a public profile =8B from whose meeting=20
State representatives walked out? Or through the official medium of=20
consultation =8B CABE (the Central Advisory Board of Education) =8B which=20
has existed for this purpose since 1926 =8B at least 1935 =8B but not=20
recently been re-constituted? Before the Sarkaria Commission (1988),=20
most States wanted CABE as a permanent mechanism of consultation=20
between the Union and the States. This federal issue is made further=20
significant because Justice Cheema dissented in favour of the=20
essentiality of CABE as a mechanism of federal consultation. On this,=20
the majority judges (Justices M.B. Shah and Dharmadhikari) did not=20
agree.

Now, where has the Court gone wrong? The one obvious area where the=20
Court has gone wrong is not just that it has placed the NCERT in the=20
position of an official body but treated it as a substitute for CABE=20
and federal consultation. This is wholly contrary to its own decision=20
in the NCERT case (1991, 4 SCC 578) in which the Council successfully=20
argued that it was a private body and not state within the meaning of=20
Article 12 of the Constitution and in respect of fundamental rights.=20
How, then, did the Supreme Court ignore its own the NCERT decision of=20
1991? It does not matter if the 1991 decision was of two judges?=20
Surely, the NCERT knew its defence of 1991. It should have told the=20
Court that it was a private body. Instead, it went along with the=20
Court making the NCERT the official federal basis of all educational=20
change. In fact, the Court said: "There is nothing in either the=20
Constitution of the NCERT or in any Rule, Regulation or Executive=20
Order to suggest that the NCERT is structurally `subordinate' or=20
inferior to any other body in the field." This is amazing. A body=20
declared to be private in 1991 has been declared to co-equal =8B if not=20
superior =8B to all in 2002 without the earlier ruling being examined.=20
For this reason alone, this judgment of 2002 is wrong and proceeds on=20
the wrong fundamental assumption.

The textbook case judgment responds to the Court's great and genuine=20
concern about the decline in values in `modern' life. But the Court's=20
answer that some version of religion is the answer is an intuition=20
that cannot be exercised so as to run contrary to the secularism of a=20
multicultural society; and in particular Article 28 of the=20
Constitution. In fact, Justice Shah forcefully declares: "Religion is=20
the foundation for value base(d) survival of human beings in a=20
civilised society." Which religion? What aspects? The much-debated=20
provisions of the Constitution on the Government not preaching or=20
teaching religion specifically interdicts religious education. And =8B=20
if now =8B religion is to be the basis of the resurrection of values,=20
how is it to be achieved? Government reports =8B and more prominently=20
the judgments in this case =8B give considerable support to Hindu=20
motifs. Justice Shah's judgment in particular refers to an earlier=20
Andhra religious endowment case which treated Hindu concept of dharma=20
as ubiquitous. But, dharma is not a secular but Hindu concept which=20
held together a society to defend concepts of casteism,=20
untouchability, inequality and gender injustice. Can such a central=20
concept be reified out of existence? In the past, the Supreme Court=20
has elaborated Hindu concepts as secular ones. Justice=20
Gajendragadkar's judgment in the Swaminarayan case (1966) which=20
expanded the meaning of `Hindu' to make it meaninglessly wide and=20
Justice Verma's judgment on `Hindutva' (1994) suggesting that it=20
meant `Indianness' have been justly criticised. This judgment goes=20
further to suggest that a reified Hinduism can and should be taught=20
as the basis of India's moral revival? But, will the syllabi teach of=20
an abstract `dharma'? Or will students also be taught of the social=20
horrors which were cloaked by `dharma' and which have been found=20
abhorrent by the Constitution?

In the textbook case under review, the judges support a distinction=20
between `religious education' and `education about religion'. But, if=20
this distinction is to be seriously treated, `education about=20
religion' can only mean to teach both the goodness and the badness of=20
religion. That is not what is intended by either NCERT syllabi,=20
curricula or texts or the Supreme Court judgment. There can be no=20
quarrel with Justice Shah's view that "knowledge, like the sun=20
(should) shine for all". Teaching knowledge and teaching reified=20
religion are two entirely distinct exercises. Ambedkar rightly told=20
the Constituent Assembly that the State cannot teach all religions.=20
The State is not a super theologician for synthesising all faiths.

Nor is it helpful for the Court to rely on either the Teaching=20
Sanskrit case (1994) or the DAV College Minority Education case=20
(1971) on teaching the life of Indian saints. In the textbook case,=20
the answer to the deep anxiety of the judges about the decline of=20
moral values appears to be: revive values through education about=20
religion being taught in schools because religion is a "major source=20
of value generation". This is what the Constitution specifically=20
prohibited the Union and the States from doing.

The problem relating to educational federalism is no less critical.=20
The NCERT was declared a private body in 1992. It now has high=20
constitutional authority. States viewed it otherwise. State Ministers=20
walked out of the crucial curricula meeting. This flawed the entire=20
consultative exercise even if a majority vote of those remaining=20
blessed the NCERT's endeavour. The fact that the S.B. Chavan=20
Committee made similar proposals to Parliament is also of no great=20
significance if we bear in mind that the Supreme Court has struck=20
down many legislations passed by both Houses on grounds of=20
constitutionality. This brings us back to CABE =8B the consultative=20
machinery for seven decades. It was not constituted. In a field as=20
delicate as this, constituting CABE or its equivalent was absolutely=20
necessary. The failure to do so is the failure of adequate=20
consultation which though not mandated by statute arises from=20
constitutional principles.

The textbook case judgment is a cry from the judicial heart over=20
declining social values. But, the solution blessed by the Court=20
subverts the Constitution's secular basis. To borrow Gandhiji's=20
phrase about the Privy Council, in this case, the Court has committed=20
`egregious blunders'. Without overruling its own earlier decision on=20
NCERT being a private body, it has been accorded the Council a deep=20
significance in 2002. The Court turns to religion as a saviour. The=20
Constitution looks to its secularism. The result: a deep=20
misunderstanding.

_____

#4.

Gulf News
September 30, 2002

Secularism must reign in Gandhi's homeland
New Delhi=A0|=A0Kuldip Nayar=A0|=A030-09-2002

The name Gujarat sounds almost like a cliche Long use has also worn=20
out the expression "the land of Mahatma Gandhi." But there is nothing=20
phoney about it. However distant the Gujaratis may go from what he=20
practised and preached, they would still be from the land of Mahatma=20
Gandhi and measured by the standards the Father of the Nation had set.

This is their pride as well as shame. Outsiders expect too much from=20
them and do not understand how the state has been taken over by=20
consumerism and jingoism.

About a week before Gandhi's birth anniversary on October 2, I went=20
back to Ahmedabad. I wanted to see how "normal" the state was after=20
the orgy of bloodshed and crime some seven months before (1,100=20
people killed and 150,000 ousted from their homes).

More than that, I wanted to know if the pang of guilt had begun to=20
melt the heart of any part of the Gujarati community, whether there=20
was any soul-searching.

Regretfully, I found little evidence of that except among the Jains.=20
There is no repentance. What sounded strange at times was the=20
loud-voiced defence as if many were feeling embarrassed for all that=20
had happened and were making an effort to cover up. Some even=20
admitted this in private.

But I am sure their number will dwindle drastically after the=20
Swaminarayan Temple incident on September 24.

But the attack by the militants should not come as a surprise to=20
Deputy Prime Minister L.K. Advani as the Intelligence Bureau had=20
warned that such an incident could happen.

There can be two reasons for the attack. One, the militants may have=20
done it to foul up the atmosphere in the state, which was beginning=20
to improve. Another reason could be that it was meant as an "act of=20
revenge" for the Gujarat carnage.

Something like this happened in Mumbai in 1993 after a spate of=20
communal riots following the demolition of the Babri masjid. And to=20
cap it all, chief minister Narendra Modi is trying his best to see=20
that normalcy doesn't return.

Even the Intelligence Bureau reported to Advani that Modi's speeches=20
could inflame "communal passion" between Hindus and Muslims. But the=20
Home Ministry has hardly taken any notice of it. It is the most=20
despicable attack, purposely carried out in Advani's constituency.

The Swaminarayan Temple incident is bound to help the Bharatiya=20
Janata Party (BJP) which has been steadily losing support because of=20
the economic hardships the state is facing.

In fact, the strong reaction to the carnage worldwide has touched the=20
Gujarati intelligentsia to the quick. Businessmen, lawyers and=20
technocrats were keen to convey that they were not the type of people=20
the country had come to believe them to be.

"We have been pushed to a situation in which we have no choice except=20
to support even a person like Modi," said an editor of a leading=20
Gujarati daily. "You ignore him. The Gujaratis would take no time to=20
drop him."

Politics in Gujarat now revolves around Modi. He sees to it that it=20
stays that way. He brings in Muslims and Pakistan in his speeches=20
purposely so as to play upon the feelings of Hindus.

No political party, not even the Congress, has tried to propagate or=20
practice the secular ethos. The Muslims are included in different=20
electoral strategies, not in developmental targets.

Even Shankarsinh Vaghela, Modi's main opponent, would like to play=20
the soft saffron card but has been strictly told by the Congress high=20
command not to do so.

Ahmedabad is normal in the sense that buses ply, people move around=20
and stores are reasonably crowded. But you can feel that something is=20
missing from the place: the semblance of togetherness.

The city is too polarised and too divided. Even liberal Muslims are=20
moving to the Muslim localities for security reasons. There is some=20
sort of economic boycott going on. For example, the upper middle=20
class Hindus have stopped sending their vehicles to the Muslim-owned=20
garages.

The urban areas are more contaminated than the rural areas. Some=20
Muslims cannot return to their homes because Hindus do not want them.=20
Or they want them on conditions which the Muslims find too=20
humiliating.

Some such 5,000 Muslims are still in camps. Others have moved to=20
their relations and friends. Many have just left the state=20
altogether. The entire Chilya community (Momin) which had a chain of=20
small, cheap hotels in the state have migrated to Hyderabad.

The Islamic Relief Committee has all the figures, locality-wise, and=20
other details of the migration. "They had no choice," many Muslims=20
told me.

The government has closed the camps, without making any alternative=20
arrangements. Even the compensation has not been paid to more than 20=20
per cent of the victims. And what has been paid is a pittance, from=20
Rs50 to Rs500.

The insurance companies have not settled any claim involving a large=20
amount. The prime minister's assistance of Rs150 crore has not been=20
utilised properly, according to official sources. But the Muslims=20
complain that a sizeable portion of the money has gone to the pockets=20
of politicians and bureaucrats.

Muslims regret their loss. "We have only 4.8 per cent of Gujarat's=20
business," some of them told me. At a rough guess, the state has=20
already lost more than Rs10 billion in the aftermath of the carnage.

There is further loss of 80 per cent daily in the sales tax and=20
octroi [municipal customs duty] collections. Whatever brave posture=20
it may adopt, the BJP high command is worried over the economic=20
straits in which the state has plunged.

Politically, the Muslims do not count much for the BJP. On its own,=20
the community can bag two seats and influence another four to five in=20
a 188-member house.

The Sangh parivar [family] has been busy destroying the country's=20
secular base for a long time. It has now succeeded in demolishing the=20
secular ethos that Gandhi and Sardar Patel built up. One can see the=20
debris of destruction. There is no social contact between the two=20
communities. For two decades Gujarat has been following the Gandhian=20
philosophy.

The manner in which Gujarat was forging ahead economically showed=20
that the state had realised that religion alone could not deliver the=20
goods.

Economic empowerment was also necessary. It looked as if it had found=20
a way to reconcile the two. But then came the BJP. It played the=20
Hindu card and sponsored communal riots to polarise the society. The=20
party saw to it that the police would not interfere to enforce law=20
and order.

The BJP and Modi seem to believe that by sustaining the divide=20
between Hindus and Muslims they can win the coming state elections.=20
The Sangh Parivar is trying to arrange the gaurav yatras [marches]=20
till the polls so as to keep Hindu chauvinism on a high note.

When I visited Ahmedabad, 55 per cent of the 182 seats looked like=20
going to the BJP. The recent incident may increase the number by 40=20
seats. But it is possible that the land of Gandhi may wake up to the=20
Gandhi's message after partition.

At a time of bitter religious tension, Gandhi's prayer meetings=20
became a defiant symbol of tolerance and secular approach.

The fundamentalists are determined to destroy India's secular=20
credentials. The people should accept the challenge by following=20
Gandhi's message which was moral, humanist and cosmopolitan.

This comment is by Kuldip Nayar, a former Indian High Commissioner to=20
the UK and a Rajya Sabha MP.

_____

#5.

Magazine / The Hindu
Sunday, Sep 29, 2002

Sexual harassment: Tightrope walk to justice

The belief that sexual harassment is a case of `misinterpreted=20
signals' is very strong. Often, the first thing a victim is asked is=20
how long she has known the perpetrator, and why she took so long to=20
come forward with the complaint. Her irresolution is used, or=20
misused, to disbelieve her, and to doubt whether the incident=20
happened, says RADHIKA CHOPRA, highlighting the key issue of response.

SOON after an incident of alleged rape on the campus of Delhi=20
University in the last week of July came another incident of=20
molestation and sexual harassment. On August 4, a police constable=20
sexually harassed a student. In the latter case, we know a few=20
things. First, the student was harassed near the gates of a=20
university campus hostel. Second, we know who the perpetrator was.=20
Most significantly, the student went across to a police patrol car in=20
the vicinity to report the incident. But the police refused to=20
register her complaint.

Undeterred, she went to the station house officer at the university=20
police station, and insisted on filing a formal complaint. She also=20
demanded that her complaint be registered =8B as a First Information=20
Report (FIR).

The two incidents are linked in terms of timing, and the way the=20
established facts of the second case allow us to decipher elements of=20
the first. From the tenor of the newspaper reports, in the incident=20
of harassment, it appears that the student provided the information=20
herself. Now consider the reports about the rape. A close reading of=20
newspaper reports makes it seem that the only source of information=20
available is the police. But there are people in Delhi University who=20
know that the victim was raped earlier, and that this was a second=20
rape. However, the newspapers (or the police) tell us that the=20
earlier rape in April was not reported, and there is no FIR or=20
complaint.

This "non-reporting" of the first rape is being interpreted in a=20
variety of ways. The most appalling one casts doubts on whether the=20
second rape happened at all. This rests on the principal "fact" that=20
the girl did not file a complaint the first time. A second is that=20
the police may well have refused to believe her. And she, in her=20
traumatised state, did not go all the way up the procrastinating=20
hierarchy within the hostile space of the police station and insist=20
on her complaint being recorded. The likelihood of this scenario is=20
given credence by the dismissive behaviour of the police in=20
connection with the second case.

At this point, we cannot be certain how and when the first case=20
happened. The victim is reluctant to make herself the object of=20
public enquiry. Her right to do this must be unconditionally=20
respected. But an issue that must be tackled =8B with or without her=20
account =8B is whether molestation remains "unreported" in this, or in=20
any other case. First, we need to understand that abuse is not=20
followed by complete silence from the victim. This is a myth. Those=20
who have sat on committees to examine reported and registered=20
complaints of harassment or molestation know and understand that the=20
victim does, in fact, break the silence almost immediately.

What is the nature of the "information"? First, it is unlikely to be=20
a complaint. It is also highly unlikely that the victim will rush off=20
to make a formal complaint and go through all the processes entailed=20
in the formal record of rape or sexual harassment. In some senses,=20
the student who insisted on filing a complaint within minutes of=20
being harassed by the constable is an exception, not the rule. A=20
formal complaint is usually a "climatic" event and is preceded by the=20
victim sharing the information with friends, or relatives. And then,=20
perhaps, with colleagues or those in positions of some formal (though=20
not necessarily legal) authority.

Only then is the complainant finally registered as a formal case in=20
available forums =8B employers, heads of institutions, the police, and=20
so on. However, most people treat this as the "first complaint". This=20
interpretation is a mistake because it takes no cognisance of the=20
earlier attempts to make the abuse known.

In almost every case of sexual harassment, there is a history to the=20
abuse that needs to be uncovered. This is essential because neither=20
the abuse nor the "complaint" is a one-off event. Abuse and=20
"complaint" =8B by way of sharing experience or trauma with friends =8B=20
are a continuous pattern of behaviour that happen over a period of=20
time.

The reason the victim does not share her trauma immediately=20
(sometimes not even with close friends) is because she also=20
participates in the common perception of abusive behaviour =8B he=20
misread the signals; or he will stop when he realises "no means no";=20
and so on. She will possibly adopt a series of soft stances that=20
will, in all likelihood, go against her.

The belief that abuse is a case of misinterpreted signals is very=20
strong. Often the first thing a victim is asked is how long she has=20
known the perpetrator, and why she took so long to come forward with=20
the complaint. Her irresolution is used or misused to disbelieve her,=20
and to cast doubts on whether the incident happened.

Understanding the nature of complaints has come through a process of=20
engagement with issues that swamp sexual harassment. The Delhi=20
University Forum Against Sexual Harassment (FASH) is one group that=20
has addressed these questions.

At the most practical level, FASH has been struggling to get the=20
University to institute a policy against sexual harassment in=20
consonance with the 1997 Supreme Court guidelines. Members of FASH=20
have sat on committees, both within and outside the University, which=20
have examined cases of harassment.

FASH has also been battling an insidious war with the attitude that=20
sees formal =8B and hence actionable =8B complaints as a "weapon" in the=20
hands of women who, in all irresponsibility, will misuse it. I know=20
of no case of sexual harassment or rape, on which the first public=20
response hasn't been a curled lip of disbelief.

Unfortunately for women, there are not many groups like FASH. Also=20
there are not many people who think that the ability to walk to work=20
safely is as critical and substantitive a right as the right to vote.=20
Walking safe on a public street may seem a small freedom, but as the=20
two cases demonstrate, it has enormous consequences for women.

Women's Features Service
_/_/_/_/_/_/_/_/_/_/_/_/_/_/_/_/_/_/_/_/_/_/_/_/_/_/_/_/_/

SACW is an informal, independent & non-profit citizens wire service run by
South Asia Citizens Web (http://www.mnet.fr/aiindex) since 1996.
To subscribe send a blank message to:
<act-subscribe@yahoogroups.com> / To unsubscribe send a blank
message to: <act-unsubscribe@yahoogroups.com>
________________________________________
DISCLAIMER: Opinions expressed in materials carried in the posts do not
necessarily reflect the views of SACW compilers.
\\|//\\|//\\|//\\|//\\|//\\|//\\|//\\|//\\|//\\|//|//\\|//|//\\|//|//\\|//|
--=20