[sacw] SACW | 28 Jan. 02

[Harsh Kapoor]

South Asia Citizens Wire | 28 January 2002

------------------------------------------

#1. Pakistan-India: continuing military tension and an obvious=20
intensification of
the nuclear and missile arms race (M.B. Naqvi)
#2. Lonely Voice of Peace In Warring Pakistan (Mohamad Bazzi)
#3. Open Letter to General Parvez Musharraf on Freedom of Religion in Pakis=
tan
#4. India: People for Peace - Statement
#5. Indian Patriotism Gets a Bollywood Makeover (Somini Sengupta)
#6. India: The biggest gamble in history (Ramachandra Guha)
#7. The new issue of AKHBAR is online
#8. Book review: India's Failure in the North-East (Sanjib Baruah)

________________________

#1.

Pakistan- India: continuing military tension and an obvious intensification=
of
the nuclear and missile arms race
M.B. Naqvi
Karachi January 26:

Despite the continuing military tension and an obvious intensification of
the nuclear and missile arms race symbolised by Agni missile's test firing
on Friday, a powerful voice for continued peace was raised on Saturday in
Islamabad: Gen. Tommy Franks, the US Central Command Chief, made two
points: first, since the US is already in Pakistan, using its air space as
well as bases, he ruled out a breach of peace between India and Pakistan as
being likely and secondly the Pakistan-US military cooperation has been
resumed and is likely to be enhanced in days to come.=20

Pakistani sources have interpreted it as powerful US support for their
stances regarding the immediate necessity of de-escalation and resolution
of problems through negotiations. The formal position articulated by Maj.
Gen. Rashid Qureshi, the Presidential spokesman, is that Pakistan is ready
to face any eventuality but it would prefer peace. In reply to a question
concerning the state of Pakistani nuclear deterrent, he said Pakistan's
deterrent, both nuclear and conventional is in place and is deterring.

There is a certain amount of pressure from the more gung-ho types that
Pakistan should give a tit for tat reply to India's testing of Agni
missile. Whether Pakistan is also going to test its own missiles is not
clear. Foreign office has merely said that we are not in a race with India;
should there be a technical requirement for testing in our ongoing missile
programme, we shall. But Pakistan is not likely to do so as a reply to any
Indian action. In view of the pressure from jingoistic circles no one
should be surprised if Pakistan does test a missile or two within a week or
so. There is indeed a speculative news story in the press that says some
circles believe a reply to India is due and that it would have to fire at
least two missiles just to show that Pakistan is not sleeping or lagging
behind.

In some way it is a situation remniscent of May 1998 after which India had
tested five nuclear devices and Pakistan was weighing the cost and benefits
of giving a tit-for-tat reply. Should history be repeated, few would be
surprised, though the change at the top in Islamabad may have made a
difference.

The implications of Gen. Tommy Franks' latest observations in Islamabad
should be read against the background of what is going on in South Asia.
The kind of ill will and mistrust that subsist between the Indian and
Pakistani governments cannot but continue to cause heavy distortions in the
civilian priorities. For one thing, the arms races of all kinds can only go
on being intensified. The extra expenditure required by the large-scale
tamasha (for political effect) on the borders would enhance budget deficits
on both sides. The daily expenditure that India must be incurring would
approach something between Rs.50 to 80 crore per day just by virtue of
keeping the forces on the borders in net additional expenditures. If the
wear and tear of the machinery of various kinds during these manoeuvres is
taken into account, the additional expenditure would be manifold. Similar
expenditure must be being borne by Pakistan also, though on a reduced
scale. For one thing, Pakistan forces do not have to traverse large
distances to reach the border. Secondly they are fewer in number. But
still, compared to the available resource base in the economy, whatever
expenditure is being incurred by Islamabad is simply too much. Both sides
need to stop this trend over what can only be an expensive passing show ---
if the war is not really an option.

_____

#2.

Newsday January 24, 2002

Lonely Voice of Peace In Warring Pakistan

By Mohamad Bazzi
STAFF CORRESPONDENT

Islamabad, Pakistan - Pervez Hoodbhoy, one of only five nuclear physicists
in Pakistan, says his country should abandon its nuclear weapons. And that
idea - in a nation obsessed with military security and its powerful=20
rival, India -
is regarded by many as treason.=20

For years, Hoodbhoy has been a lonely voice in Pakistan, arguing for peace
with India, nuclear disarmament, demilitarization and an end to religious
extremism. He is a leading figure in a small, politically marginalized peac=
e
movement whose activists have been beaten, threatened with death and
subjected to government restrictions.=20

Hoodbhoy, who was never involved in his country's nuclear weapons program,
has spent 27 years teaching at Quaid-i-Azam University in Islamabad - and
stirring dissent. In essays and speeches, he has criticized his government'=
s
military spending and its support for militants fighting Indian rule=20
in Kashmir.=20

"For the past 10 years, I've been arguing that Pakistan's desire to bleed I=
ndia
to death in Kashmir is a fantasy," said Hoodbhoy, 51, a soft-spoken MIT
graduate. "It's the fantasy of generals who live comfortable lives and use
these poor souls fired by religious fervor as cannon fodder in Kashmir. Our
government and military have created a Frankenstein to support a perpetual
state of war with India."=20

His friends compare him to the American academic and dissident, Noam
Chomsky. "He's an intellectual rabble-rouser and a peacenik," said
Rukhsana Siddiqui, chairwoman of the international relations department at
Quaid-i-Azam.=20

Hoodbhoy began his anti-war activities in the United States, as a student a=
t
Massachusetts Institute of Technology in the late 1960s. He attended rallie=
s
of Students for a Democratic Society and was deeply affected by the anti-
Vietnam war movement.=20

Pakistan's peace movement has existed for nearly two decades, and was
energized in May 1998, when Pakistan tested its first nuclear weapons
weeks after India exploded its own devices. About 1,000 activists scattered
throughout the country's major cities banded together as the Pakistan Peace
Coalition. Members of the group hold annual conventions with Indian peace
activists, alternating the meetings between India and Pakistan.=20

Pakistan's pacifists face a formidable task spreading their message in a
country of 140 million people, where the literacy rate hovers around 25
percent and the vast majority of the population lives in poverty. But the
activists are undaunted.=20

"All peace movements start out small," said A.H. Nayyar, a senior fellow at
the Sustainable Development Policy Institute in Islamabad and a leading
peace advocate. "It's only at great turning points that the society begins =
to
change and movements grow to huge numbers."=20

For Hoodbhoy, the turning point came in 1994, when two masked gunmen
dragged a neighbor out of his home and shot him in the neck. The friend, a
fellow professor, died in the back seat of Hoodbhoy's car as he drove the
bleeding man to the hospital. The killing came amid Pakistan's sectarian
warfare, and Hoodbhoy's colleague belonged to the Ahmadi sect of Islam,
whose members are considered heretical and are persecuted by other
Muslims.=20

"His only fault was that he was born into the wrong sect," said Hoodbhoy, h=
is
eyes welling at the memory. "It's one thing to have a statistic in the
newspapers and quite another to have someone die in your car. It took a lon=
g
time to get those bloodstains out."=20

The pacifists' views have made them targets of persecution by the Pakistani
government and Islamic militant groups. Nayyar was attacked in 1998 by two
militants at a news conference in which he condemned nuclear testing. He
was hospitalized for several days. Pakistani newspapers ran articles saying
Nayyar and the other activists were traitors who should be publicly hanged.=
=20

Hoodbhoy has been barred from appearing on state-owned television, from
lecturing at the National Defense University, and, at times, from leaving t=
he
country. Islamic militant groups have held demonstrations outside his offic=
e
and issued death threats against him.=20

But Hoodbhoy continues to dissent. He points out that Pakistan spends
about $3 billion a year - nearly a third of the state budget - on its milit=
ary,
dwarfing what is spent on education, health, welfare or infrastructure and
severely reducing economic growth.=20

"The army has impoverished this country by taking a huge chunk of the
national budget for itself," he said. "And it has not allowed democracy to
grow on this soil."=20

Despite an entrenched military culture in a state that has been ruled by th=
e
army for 28 of its 54 years, Hoodbhoy does not despair. "It's pointless to =
give
up hope," he said. "What do you do without it?"=20

_____

#3.

Open Letter to General Parvez Musharraf on Freedom of Religion in Pakistan

We the members of Pakistanis for Peace and Alternative Development -=20
[PPAD] - an international group of scholars, professionals and=20
activists welcome the act to abolish separate electorates for=20
Religious Minorities in Pakistan. We see it as a small first step=20
towards eradicating the causes of incipient religious fascism that=20
has plagued Pakistan in the past decades and threatens to completely=20
undo the State.

In fact the notion of a "Religious Minority" itself opens the door of=20
potential abuse of the citizens considered to be members of a=20
minority. A Nation State does not have the prerogative to control the=20
religious beliefs of an individual. Such measures only encourage=20
hypocrisy and superficiality in matters of belief which remain the=20
prerogative of an individuals' conscience and very individual and=20
private inner quests. We believe that all citizens of Pakistan ought=20
to enjoy the same rights and privileges regardless of religion, race,=20
ethnic origin, gender or sexual orientation.

Having dissolved separate electorates for religious minorities it is=20
equally important to undo the Blasphemy Law, a vestige of the British=20
Common Law which then was completely abused by the Muslim fanatics.=20
The Blasphemy Law flies in the face of both the teachings of the=20
Quran (Sura 2: Verse 256) and the UN convention on the freedom of=20
belief and conscience. It promotes and condones an intolerance that=20
is completely out of step with the current international community's=20
value of religious freedom and inter-religious harmony from which=20
Muslims as minorities in Western countries have greatly benefited.

Moreover the requirement to make a declaration of one's belief on the=20
application forms for the National Identity cards and passports is a=20
disturbing and telltale sign of religious fascism which is=20
reminiscent of the intimidating and humiliating imposition of=20
identifying marks on the clothing of religious minorities. Since=20
religious belief is a private matter of individual conscience the=20
application forms for National Identity cards and passports ought to=20
be revised to exclude the clauses that pertain to religious matters.

Dr. Ghazala Anwar (University of Canterbury, World Council of Muslims=20
for Inter-faith Relations - WCMIR, New Zealand)
Mr Cecil Choudhary (College Principal, Pakistan)
Nazeer A Chaudhry (Business, USA)
Owais Hasin (Architect, Pakistan)
Prof. Hassan Gardezi (Professor Emeritus, Sociology, Canada)
Prof. Bilal Hashmi (Department of Sociology, Professor Emeritus,=20
Eastern Washington University, USA)
Mr Ayyub Malik (Architect, Urban Planner and Writer, London, UK)
Dr Babar Mumtaz (Reader, University College London, UK)
Prof A H Nayyar (Quaid-i-Azam University, Pakistan)
Dr. Ahmed Shibli (Science, Technology and Development, UK)

_____

#4.

Date: Fri, 25 Jan 2002

People for Peace Statement

People for Peace welcome the latest statement made by President=20
Pervez Musharraf of Pakistan offering to work with India for=20
immediate denuclearisation of the South Asian region. Both during the=20
Kargil conflict, and more recently after December 13, we were=20
witnesses to the extraordinary spectacle of senior figures on both=20
sides engaging in the most irresponsible forms of nuclear=20
brinkmanship. By turning down Gen. Musharraf's offer of removing=20
altogether the danger of nuclear conflict between India and Pakistan,=20
the Indian government exposes the hollowness of its supposed=20
commitment to nuclear disarmament and makes it clear to the people of=20
South Asia and the world that it is the principal obstacle to=20
removing the nuclear shadow from this part of the world. New Delhi=20
must revoke its rejection and respond positively and immediately to=20
this proposal.

Following Gen. Musharraf's speech of January 12, 2002 in which he=20
proposed many measures for the internal reform of Pakistan and also=20
for building a better relationship with India, the United Nations=20
Secretary-General Kofi Annan has urged the Indian government to=20
reciprocate positively. Hence, the citizens of India demand that=20
communication links like the Samjhauta Express, Delhi-Lahore bus, etc=20
be resumed without any delay.

The citizens of India also demand from their leaders that they carry=20
out much needed internal reforms to weaken and eventually eradicate=20
the forces of communalism, caste discrimination and nationalist=20
jingoism. Failure to move in this direction can destroy the secular=20
and democratic fabric of our country.=20

Programme of Action

Peoplefor Peace will launch a programme to build pressure on the=20
government to eschew war and speak for peace. On 30th (Wednesday)=20
January, the Martyr's Day a candle light procession has been=20
organized at the Raj Ghat at 5.00 pm. A Peoples' Court has been=20
planned for the second week of February. A one-day National=20
Consultation on "Peace Process between India and Pakistan" has also=20
been planned for the third week of February. CivilSociety groups in=20
Pakistan have also been contacted for organizing similar programmes=20
on the same day.

Nirmala Deshpande, Prakash Louis, Syeda Hameed, John Dayal,=20
Bhuvneshwar, Joseph Ghatia, Somen Chakraborty, etc.

People for Peace
C/O Indian Social Institute
Lodi Road, New Delhi 110003 Tel: 4625015, 4622379
Prakash Louis
Executive Director
Email: prakash@u... / prakashlouis@h...

______

#5.

The New York Times
January 27, 2002

Indian Patriotism Gets a Bollywood Makeover
By SOMINI SENGUPTA

http://www.nytimes.com/2002/01/27/international/asia/27BOMB.html

______

#6.

The Hindu
Sunday, Jan 27, 2002
Magazine

The biggest gamble in history
It is 50 years since the country's first general election - an act of=20
faith without parallel. The world, most parts of which were in=20
turmoil, watched as a newly independent country, with numerous=20
problems, chose to move straight into universal adult franchise.=20
Intriguingly, the polls were to coincide with a general election in=20
the U.K.. In the first of a two-part article, noted historian=20
RAMACHANDRA GUHA highlights the features of a unique exercise in=20
social organisation, paying tribute to the organisers and looking at=20
the politicians who mattered.=20
http://www.hinduonnet.com/thehindu/mag/stories/2002012700550100.htm

______

#7.

The new issue of AKHBAR, your window on South Asia, is online. It can=20
be accessed at:

http://www.indowindow.com/akhbar/

The contents of this issue include:
His Master's Voice: 'Just' and 'Unjust' Warmongering in South Asia

also:
Terrorism and Imperialism: Prabhat Patnaik analyses the present juncture
Globalisation and Survival Issues: SK Mishra on the Ugly Face of=20
Economic Reforms in India
Feature: "Concern for Afghan Women is a New Great Game" says=20
Cassandra Balchin; and Beena Sarwar on Women's Freedom, also with=20
reference to Afghan women
Culture and History: KN Panikkar outlines An Agenda for Cultural Action
Media: IA Rehman on 'Enemy Images on Pakistan Television', and Irfan=20
Husain on Indian media and Indo-Pak rivalry
Education: Vijender Sharma on 'WTO, GATS and the Future of Higher=20
Education in India'
Review: Latest FAO report is reviewed by TK Rajalakshmi

______

#8.

The Book Review (New Delhi) Vol. 26 (1)
January 2002 (Silver Jubilee Special Issue) , pp. 36-37.

India's Failure in the North-East

Sanjib Baruah

The Periphery Strikes Back: Challenges to the Nation-State in Assam=20
and Nagaland

By Udayon Misra
Indian Institute of Advanced Study, Shimla, 2000, pp. xi+276, Rs. 400.00

There was a time when most writers on Indian politics were rather=20
smug about the virtues of India's consensual and accommodative=20
political culture. In those early days of Indian democracy, it=20
seemed that the mix of sub-continental cultural values and the rules=20
of political democracy were fostering a political culture of=20
bargaining, compromise and conciliation that could even tame=20
separatist movements and convert them into democratic political=20
parties. This na=EFve view eventually gave way to an engagement with=20
the reality of another face of Indian democracy: authoritarian=20
propensities that threatened basic democratic norms. India flirted=20
with authoritarian rule in the mid 1970s, and in certain parts of the=20
country going through separatist insurgencies, the human rights=20
situation have borne little resemblance to textbook ideas about=20
democratic rights and liberties.

Despite this uneven record, the tendency to pat ourselves on our=20
backs has remained a seductive lure among many writers on Indian=20
politics. Witness, for instance, the argument often made that=20
Indian federalism is almost self-propelling. We are told that India=20
is becoming more and more federal as time goes, not because of=20
deliberate design, but through the invisible hand of democratic=20
politics. To those living in northeast India, however, this=20
smugness had always seemed off the mark. Those writers might as well=20
be writing about another country. After all, even during the prime=20
ministership of Jawaharlal Nehru - the golden age of Indian liberal=20
democracy and federalism -- the Nagas had already experienced=20
"atrocities committed on the ordinary folk by the security forces,"=20
which included "the burning of villages, the destruction of=20
churches, torture and rape" (p. 36).

Misra's book is a serious indictment of nation-building in=20
north-east India. Indeed, as Misra suggests, the category=20
'North-east India' itself may be part of the problem. It is easy for=20
many mainland Indians to think of the region as being inhabited by=20
peoples who all look alike or share a common set of problems. But=20
the peoples of the region have complex and diverse histories and=20
cultures. Misra narrates a telling episode that took place in the=20
International Film Festival of India held in Delhi in 1996. The=20
Indian panorama section of the festival included an Assamese, a Bodo=20
and a Manipuri film. While other Indian and international=20
film-makers were given the opportunity to meet the press=20
individually, when it came to these three films, the bureaucrats at=20
the Indian Press Information Bureau organized a single session for=20
film-makers from the north-east. Understandably, the film-makers=20
stayed away. The Assamese filmmaker, Bhabendranath Saikia, later=20
explained, that while on many issues it may be reasonable to talk=20
about the northeast as a region, it could not be done in the context=20
of film-making. "We often use the term South India, " said Saikia,=20
"but does it mean that we club together Kerela and Tamilnadu or Adoor=20
Gopalakrishnan and Mani Ratnam?" (pp. 2-3)

While Misra does not avoid using the term `north-east,' he sets out=20
to examine the independentist ideas and practices among the Assamese=20
and the Nagas. According to Misra, while these independentist=20
movements may look "decimated" from time to time, they "continue to=20
hold centre-stage in the politics of the region." (p. 185). He=20
contrasts the independentist politics of the Assamese -- a people=20
with a long history of interaction with the Indian mainland -- with=20
that of the historically isolated Naga people. Misra, however, does=20
not consistently hold on to these bi-focal lenses. His arguments=20
are familiar and his sources are not all new. But given mainland=20
India's incurable attention-deficit-disorder vis-=E0-vis this region,=20
these arguments - especially when written in English for a pan-Indian=20
readership -- bear repeating.=20

Nation-builders will not find much to cheer about in Misra's account.=20
For fifty years, every trick in their bag has been tried in some=20
parts of the region including localized military states of siege,=20
enabled by laws that give extraordinary powers to the armed forces;=20
regrouping villages in order to isolate militants from their=20
supporters (a tactic borrowed from British colonial counterinsurgency=20
in Malaya, according to Indian defense expert Rajesh Gopalan);=20
creating new states to marginalize old insurgencies or preempt new=20
ones; holding elections in order to create stakeholders in the=20
pan-Indian dispensation; development projects with ample scope for=20
the leakage of funds; and open indulgence of official corruption.=20
Since the challenges of the two cases are different, so have been the=20
precise mix of responses. These tactics, of course, have not ended=20
separatist politics. But they have significantly changed the reality=20
on the ground.=20=20=20

In Nagaland, for instance, the army actions and the village=20
regroupings in particular, wrought havoc to the traditional=20
institutions that were the foundation of the Naga independence=20
movement led by A.Z. Phizo. The formation of the state of Nagaland=20
opened up the possibilities of "sharing the fruits of power" that=20
gave rise of "tribalism" - competition over the share of the=20
resources among tribes that come under the Naga rubric. As rivalry=20
between "tribes" became important, Phizo's "ideal tribal utopia"=20
lost its charm. (pp. 52-55) "More than half the battle in Nagaland,"=20
according to Misra, was "won by market forces." (p.158). However,=20
market forces, is perhaps a misnomer since a major component is the=20
perquisites of elected office shared among politicians and their=20
clients - over-ground as well as underground - that are heavily=20
subsidized by the Indian state. Indeed if market reformers were to=20
rein in Indian budgetary allocations to the northeast, this=20
instrument of nation-building might unravel.

But why does the Naga insurgency persist? Misra mentions a number of=20
factors. He believes that many political players find it profitable=20
to continue the insurgency. For elected state governments of=20
Nagaland, the insurgency is an excuse to get more resources from New=20
Delhi. Over-ground Naga politicians may not want competition from=20
the leaders of the underground, which would happen if the latter=20
ended the insurgency and staked claims to elected office. The ability=20
of the National Socialist Council of Nagalim (NSCN) to run a virtual=20
parallel government, especially in remote areas, enables it to=20
continue recruiting cadres. And the human rights violations by=20
security forces during counterinsurgency operations help the=20
militants extend their base by creating sympathy for their side.

Misra's account of independentist politics in Assam emphasizes the=20
continuities between the ideas held by the first generation of=20
leaders of the Indian National Congress in Assam, of a pan-Indian=20
federation with powerful autonomous states, and the independentist=20
ideas of the United Liberation Front of Assam (ULFA). At the time of=20
India's independence, Assamese leaders, both in the Indian=20
Constituent Assembly and outside, advocated a far stronger form of=20
federalism than what the rest of India was prepared to have.

Drawing on the important research done by scholars such as historian=20
Nirode K. Barooah and political scientist Girin Phukan, Misra=20
summarizes the positions of major Assamese public intellectuals and=20
Congress leaders at the time of Indian independence. The poet and=20
nationalist leader Ambikagiri Roychoudhury, for instance, wanted to=20
see India become a multinational federal state with dual citizenship.=20
Assamese members of the Constituent Assembly argued for giving states=20
much broader powers. Among their proposals were: (a) giving states=20
the right to legislate on immigration, (b) making citizenship matters=20
a part of the concurrent list, (c) leaving residual powers to the=20
states, and not to the Centre, (d) limiting central power over=20
subjects in the concurrent list, (e) not giving the Centre the=20
power to unilaterally redraw state boundaries, (f) making state=20
governorship an elected office, and (g) giving a much larger share of=20
the excise and export duties on tea and petroleum to the producing=20
states.

Assam, of course, had important stakes in all these issues, and these=20
positions were ironed out in debates in the Assamese public sphere as=20
India prepared for its postcolonial future. At that time, no other=20
issue separated Assamese leaders from the all-India Congress leaders=20
more than the question of where to settle the refugees of partition.=20
Large-scale immigration from East Bengal that had already begun to=20
significantly change Assam's demography, was an explosive political=20
issue in Assam by the 1940s. Leaders of the Assam Congress therefore=20
wanted fewer refugees to be settled in Assam, and it was this concern=20
that led them to assert state prerogatives on matters of citizenship=20
and immigration. But the response of the national leaders was=20
patronizing and dismissive. Jawaharlal Nehru, for instance,=20
sarcastically noted in a message to Assam's chief minister Gopi Nath=20
Bordoloi: "I suppose one of these days we might be asked for the=20
independence for Assam." (p. 113). As the controversy over how many=20
refugees were to be settled in Assam continued, Deputy Prime=20
Minister Sardar Vallabbhai Patel called Bordoloi's successor Bisnuram=20
Medhi "a narrow and parochial person" (p. 115). The idea of Assam's=20
independence, of course, did not remain a joke for long, and nor=20
could the label of `parochialism' smother the desire for independence=20
among a younger generation of Assamese.

Of course, in the Constituent Assembly, the Assamese proposals for a=20
federation with strong autonomous states failed. Later when "the=20
overall socio-economic situation in the state reached a crisis point"=20
primarily as a result of continuous migration from the region that is=20
now Bangladesh - over which Assam exercised no control -- what were=20
once ideas about autonomy within a federal India became repackaged as=20
a demand for independence. The United Liberation Front of Assam=20
(ULFA), as Misra puts it, was not "yet another insurgent outfit"=20
but it articulated "an idea which has long been embedded in Assamese=20
psyche" (p. 143). Even after easy military defeat in the hands of the=20
Indian army, a high death toll in actual and fake encounters with=20
security forces, and the defection of a large numbers of militants,=20
ULFA, according to Misra, continues to draw sympathy especially in=20
the rural areas. While ULFA's policies and programs have been=20
challenged, its ranks have not declined, it has been "expanding at=20
an alarming rate" (p. 147)

The ideas that shape Misra's approach to the subject come from=20
diverse sources. However, one intellectual influence is strikingly=20
absent. Misra makes no reference to Benedict Anderson's work that so=20
dominates the contemporary discussion of nations and nationalism. The=20
literature inspired by Anderson's Imagined Communities looks at=20
national communities as social constructions - as acts of=20
imagination. Rather than being concerned only with what is=20
historically true or untrue, these poststructuralist scholars are=20
interested in the way the past is claimed, and reclaimed. Misra, on=20
the other hand, gets quite agitated by what is true or false in=20
history. Independentist intellectuals in Assam, he complains, have=20
tried to "re-read, re-interpret and even re-create history in order=20
to build up a theoretical base that Assam had always been a free=20
nation" (p. 62). He even objects to their "intentionally" failing to=20
see that some ancient kingdoms in Assam were "very much part of the=20
civilization of northern India." (p.94).

Poststructuralist scholars would have found such rewriting of history=20
quite fascinating, precisely because of the reinterpretation that=20
Misra derides. It is significant that Misra calls the authors of=20
these ideas ideologues, rather than intellectuals. But can someone=20
trying to explain dissident independentist thought and practice,=20
really afford to go by his intellectual tastes and political=20
preferences alone, in deciding who is an ideologue and who is an=20
intellectual? Aren't the authors of some of the widely-read Assamese=20
texts that Misra cites a type of Gramscian organic intellectuals that=20
Indian Marxists or the nation-building establishment may not like?

What then is to be done? Misra alludes to "decentralization of powers=20
and a radical restructuring of Centre-state relations" as a solution.=20
(p. 161).=20
But since some of these words have become clich=E9s in Indian political=20
discourse, there is need for more elaboration. Misra rightly=20
observes that "in a country whose politics is dominated and=20
virtually charted by the big states like Uttar Pradesh and Madhya=20
Pradesh, just one or two Naga members in the Lok Sabha would=20
naturally feel isolated and insecure." (p. 162). But surely, the=20
answer to such insecurity lies in very concrete ways of reforming our=20
representative institutions, and not in psycho-therapy and more=20
pleas to the rest of India to understand the north-east.

Only a constitutional system that gives representation to states qua=20
states, e.g. by strengthening the position of the Rajya Sabha as a=20
territorial chamber or, giving states stronger constitutional=20
safeguards against incursions into their prerogatives by the Indian=20
parliament, can resist the tyranny of the majority that the Naga=20
parliamentarian faces. But there is no evidence that India intends to=20
engage in such efforts at genuine federation-building. The National=20
Commission to review the Constitution, for instance, is not even=20
expected to venture into controversial areas like making the Rajya=20
Sabha a meaningful territorial chamber, changing the terms of=20
royalty-sharing for natural resources, making Governorship an=20
elected office, or consider the idea of dual citizenship - the kind=20
of federalization that might respond meaningfully to the northeastern=20
predicament.=20

When Misra writes in a celebratory tone about "the contribution of=20
the northeastern region towards a radical re-orientation of the very=20
idea of Indian nationalism" (p. 156), it is hard to see whether he=20
sees this contribution as an accomplished fact, or is it mere wishful=20
thinking. Taking political ideas that grow out of the northeastern=20
political landscape seriously, will not come easily to Indian=20
intellectuals and political leaders. The region, after all, is seen=20
as a "periphery" in Misra's own words.=20

Another obstacle to redesigning Indian federalism to take into=20
account the particular predicament of north-eastern states is the=20
reservation that mainstream Indian public opinion seems to have about=20
giving an unequal level of autonomy to particular states. The=20
syndrome perhaps can be best described as Kashmir-envy. The endless=20
controversy over Article 370 underscores our unwillingness to live=20
with one state having more autonomy than others, even though in this=20
case, Jammu and Kashmir's exceptional autonomy was built into the=20
terms under which the princely state had agreed to be a part of=20
India. Nation-builders of all hue seem to suffer from Kashmir-envy,=20
as evidenced by the relentless efforts since 1953 by the Indian=20
parliament to dilute the autonomy that was granted by Article 370 of=20
the Constitution, which had confirmed the terms of J & K's instrument=20
of accession. Yet by all indication, policies shaped by our Kashmir=20
envy has only made the situation in J & K progressively worse.

But differential levels of autonomy for particular units are a=20
feature common to many polities. Indeed, Daniel Elazar, one of the=20
most distinguished scholars of federalism, has a word for such=20
special arrangements: federacy. The virtue of federacy arrangements=20
is exactly what seems to threaten most Indians: it does not require=20
that the special arrangements fit with the constitutional=20
architecture of the larger polity. Apart from the special status of=20
J & K as embodied in (the much weakened) Article 370, the term=20
federacy can also describe the special circumstance which enable some=20
northeastern states to control the entry of Indian citizens into=20
their states, thanks to the colonial-era Inner Line, and the=20
provisions of the Sixth Schedule, which restrict the Indian citizen's=20
right to own property in certain northeastern states. These=20
provisions, of course, have not aroused the same sort of controversy=20
as Article 370. We appear to be relatively free from our=20
Kashmir-envy, when federacy arrangements are slipped in by the=20
back-door.

Rather than having second thoughts about them - the way we have in=20
the case of Article 370 - we will have to find a way to live with=20
these de facto federacy arrangements, and become comfortable enough=20
to discuss them and to try to improve on them. But that would=20
requires us to get out of the smug talk of the self-propelling=20
nature of Indian federalism.

Only a bold new project of genuine federation-building that takes our=20
complex multinational history seriously - and framed as an=20
alternative to nation-building - can become a viable alternative to=20
independentist thought that captures the hearts and minds of so many=20
young people in India's troubled northeast.

Sanjib Baruah is Professor of Political Studies at Bard College,=20
Annandale-on-Hudson, New York. He is the author of India Against=20
Itself: Assam and the Politics of Nationality, Oxford India Paperback=20
series (reviewed by S.K. Chaube in The Book Review, April 2000)

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