[sacw] SACW | 09 Jan. 02

[Harsh Kapoor]

South Asia Citizens Wire | 9 January 2002

------------------------------------------

#1. Pakistan India War Clouds (M. B. Naqvi)
#2. Bangladesh Hindus - Victims of growing Muslim extremism (Amnesty=20
International)
#3. Pawns in the power game - Bangla Hindus became an inevitable=20
target, since in popular perception, they are seen as a vote bank for=20
the Awami League (Hameeda Hossain)
#4. The media in Pakistan: a new era? (Beena Sarwar)
#5. January 2002 issue of the-south-asian is out (URL=20
<http://www.the-south-asian.com>www.the-south-asian.com)

________________________

#1.
Pakistan-India : 'the govts in both countries do not consciously want war. =
But
they may not have full control over the forces that have been generated.'
M. B. Naqvi
Karachi January 8:

Now that the SAARC's Kathmandu Summit is behind us with all its
significant and protocol utterances, three main conclusions can be drawn
among others: first that the SAARC Summit did take place was a gain in
itself. But that it was held after nearly three years rather than remain
the yearly event bespeaks its vulnerability to India-Pakistan relations.
As it happens, SAARC, and with it the whole idea of regional cooperation
and integration, remains hostage to these relations that have always
described a roller coaster course.

Secondly, the Indian Prime Minister has put his foot down on the
Musharraf idea that bilateral issues be brought within the ambit of
SAARC Charter; no bilateral matter will be allowed to be raised in it.
Thus the wishes of the people of the seven countries that the SARRC
should produce results that other regional cooperation organisations
have produced will remain elusive.

Thirdly, although there were informal and rather preliminary discussions
that did take place between the Foreign Ministers of India and Pakistan
and the two Summiteers during the Summit, no breakthrough was achieved.
Obviously the two sides are sticking to their guns in both the literal
sense and figuratively. Animosity as usual is the outcome.

For South Asia the issue of issues is whether or not India and Pakistan
will allow free trade and close regional cooperation in economics to
begin with. Their Kashmir dispute, other secondary or derivative
disputes and bad blood are a solid and huge hurdle that SAARC remains
unable to overcome. Thus the SAARC looks like remaining a stunted growth
that might even wither away if the relations between the two largest
states of the region do not improve. Is this the issue of issues?

Superficially yes. At a deeper level, it is possible to argue that the
main problem facing South Asia is political. In an ambience created by
extreme poverty of the masses, their widespread illiteracy and social
backwardness, the politics that has flourished has been, in the name of
nation building, based on a malignant kind of nationalism in many of the
seven states. Malignant? One terms is so because of two main
characteristics.

It is primarily xenophobic and militant. This combination becomes lethal
when it is remembered that the societies are traditional and rigid
where, contrary to the fib promoted by respective publicists,
intolerance is a dominant attitude and tendency. And this intolerance
manifests itself in most fields of politics, culture and religion. This
is what puts states in perpetual disputes and encourages a politics that
leaves the basic human problems of the society unattended, while the
ideological and political clashes with neighbours occupy all the
energies of the governments. Indeed this politics flourishes because of
the narrow social and political backwardness which preempts of all
people friendly politics. That is why the ruling ideologies can be
termed as a malignant kind of nationalism.

However, the Indians and the Pakistanis are back to square one of the
last month or so with its high military tension. Although a slight
easing of the situation was noted by this correspondent earlier than
many others, no one should be complacent even today that the danger of a
war breaking out by accidental escalation has passed. True, the
government leaders in both countries do not consciously want war. But
they may not have full control over the forces that have been generated.

The experts one believes in say that the danger of a nuclear war has
been underestimated by many people on both sides of the divide. While it
is entirely possible that, thanks to innate good sense on both sides,
there might be no use of nuclear weapons at all, the possibility cannot
be ruled out. The situation is too fluid and emotionally charged --- on
both sides. Some think that the danger of a nuclear exchange(s) might
even have increased and it is more fearful than is ordinarily supposed.
They think that the only meaningful use of this dread weapon in the
special conditions of the Subcontinent can only be a preemptive strike
by either of the two sides. For, no side can afford to let the other
strike first and then it would bestir itself to retaliate. Flexible
responses are too theoretical and ignore the passions that wars
intensify. Thus, while there may actually be no strong likelihood seen
of this happening, but, if its use has at all to take place, the two
sides might race to be the first.

All of it underlines the gravity of the situation with its manifold ugly
possibilities. The task for all people of good sense and goodwill for
the common people of both countries is to prevent this unnecessary and
ruinous war. Ordinarily all wars should be prevented because they solve
no problem. There is no reason to suppose that the fourth or fifth war
between India and Pakistan will produce any final or satisfying results;
on the contrary, it may produce grievous losses for both if a nuclear
exchange does take place. Even otherwise no lasting solution to any
problem, difficult or easy, is ever produced by a war. After every war,
the two sides have still to sit down and negotiate some kind of a
settlement. It is true that if the war is clearly decisive, the
settlement might be to the advantage of the winner. But if it remains
inconclusive in the sense of no side suffering a clear or decisive
defeat, no advantage can be in store for either side --- for a variety
of reasons. In which case the whole expense and effort would be a waste
of time, energy and money. If this be true, as seems likely, why not
negotiate now and try to compromise?

It is unlikely that those who have taken the situation to this height of
tension and inimical passions will be easily willing to sit down and
compromise. The immediate likelihood of reduction in tension, despite
the common knowledge that at least the Prime Minister of India and the
President of Pakistan do not want war and would prefer peace, things are
likely to remain much the same as they have been during the last one
month. Cynics say that tensions will begin dissipating from the middle
of February next. At any rate, neither side seems to have strong enough
will to fight while neither side feels strong enough need to make any
serious concession --- at least as of now. Peace is likely to continue
to hang by a slander thread. Fear of the consequences of war and some
residual good sense might prevent disaster, possibly for both.

Insofar as poor SAARC is concerned, what is clear is that it has no
future so long as India and Pakistan cannot compose their differences.
So long as politics in India and in Pakistan remains what it has been, a
relationship of friendship and cooperation can be ruled out. With that
the SAARC hopes can get thrown out of the window. Why India-Pakistan
relations cannot improve is predicated on the politics of antagonism
they seem to love. This is at bottom based on religious intolerance and
extremism. Even if they are fake extremists, on either side, their
militant outlook yield narrow political objectives. For much the same
reason, the solution of the problems between India and Pakistan would
remain hard to find. They can be termed in the current ambience
virtually insoluble and the ambience shows no sign of changing. It is
only a basic change in politics that can make the problems quite easily
soluble. If the methodology of a people-to-people reconciliation is
adopted and the political and economic priorities are shifted from a
misconceived national security, as is being conceived by the two
governments today, to the goal of doing something concrete, on the
requisite scale required, to eradicate poverty and to begin improving
the actual living conditions of the people, the whole ambience in the
Subcontinent can begin to change. But it must be admitted that, despite
being a possibility, it is a distant one.

The immediate task for the two governments for selfish reasons remains
to bring down the political temperature and to begin military
withdrawals from the forward positions on the borders. That will be
difficult for Vajpayee in the absence of Pakistan demonstratively
providing satisfaction on the Indian demands. It is true that Musharraf
government has embarked on rounding up major activists of some of the
extremist religious parties. But it is not related to what the Indians
call cross-border terrorism. Those being arrested are associated with
parties that indulge in sectarian violence inside the country. That they
have their soulmates among the Jihadis and in some cases there is an
overlap is true enough. But, on the whole the Kashmir Jihad is not being
wound down; apparently Pakistan government seems to have no intention of
interfering with what has been going on --- certainly not without some
quid pro quo. That is the crux of the current deadlock between the two
countries.

The Indians hope that the Americans and the rest of the major western
countries will put enough pressure on Pakistan to stop =91all cross-border
terrorism=92 may not be as realistic as may have been supposed. Doubtless
India is a major attraction for all western countries and its importance
cannot be underrated. But it is still inconceivable that the west will
ignore all the other facts about Kashmir dispute and will help in India
getting all it wants. Despite all sympathy and support that India would
continue to receive, it might not be a 100 per cent endorsement from the
west.

It does look as if Pakistan would be under tremendous pressure ---
indeed it already is --- to wind down Kashmir jihad which is what the
west regards as terrorism, quite the way Indians see it. But they would
also want India to be more flexible politically and make concessions.
What concessions and how many of them and on what scale are questions
that will depend on a variety of factors over which little can be said
with any certainty. Whether India would be flexible and regard a
solution that is less than 100 per cent satisfactory to it as acceptable
is hard to say. But if that proposition is not acceptable, then the
alternative would be the continuation of the present series of tensions
and more or less political collisions that cannot promote peace,
stability and progress even if there is no war.

Both governments face tough choices. Indeed both are required to make
concessions from their maximal positions and accept some compromises.
Having gone too far it would involve some loss of face on both sides,
more on Pakistan's side than on India. But some retreat from the exposed
forward positions is necessary and seems inevitable.

_____

#2.

Communalism Combat (Mumbai, India)
December 2001
Cover Story

Bangla Hindus

Victims of growing Muslim extremism

AMNESTY INTERNATIONAL

Full Text at: http://www.sabrang.com/cc/current/cover.htm

_____

#3.

Communalism Combat (Mumbai, India)
December 2001
Cover Story

Pawns in the power game

Bangla Hindus became an inevitable target, since in popular=20
perception, they are seen as a vote bank for the Awami League

BY HAMEEDA HOSSAIN

Elections to the national parliament in Bangladesh were announced for=20
October 1, 2001. As the country
moved closer to the polls, the national print media, in September,=20
reported an escalation in political violence between the two major=20
contenders to power, the Awami League and the Bangladesh Nationalist=20
Party.

Some of these reports also mentioned incidents of violence against=20
and intimidation of Hindu voters in particular constituencies.=20
Quoting victims, the reports noted that gangs of young men had=20
threatened Hindus to stay away from the polls. Perhaps taking note of=20
these warning signals, the chief adviser to the caretaker government=20
addressed a press conference on September 17, giving a reassurance=20
that adequate protection would be provided for minorities and women=20
to exercise their right to vote.

A correct diagnosis of this outburst of violence would not ascribe it=20
simply to communal tendencies within the community, even though the=20
main target was a single community. Given the uniformity of behaviour=20
and the nature of the violence perpetrated by gangs of young men, we=20
need to situate it in the growing political confrontation between the=20
two major parties in the last decade, second, as a symptom of=20
majoritarian populism and third, to materialist expectations.

We also need to question how the political and social framework has=20
encouraged discrimination and even marginalisation of vulnerable=20
groups. Where responses by the state and political parties have been=20
ineffective, can protests by socially conscious groups, support to=20
the victims or legal redress act as a sufficient deterrent against=20
the violation of constitutional and human rights of vulnerable=20
communities?

Anatomy of violence

Violence in the political culture of Bangladesh has been raised as a=20
matter of serious concern by the media and all concerned citizens'=20
groups. The two main contenders for power, the Awami League and the=20
Bangladesh Nationalist Party, have openly maintained armed cadres to=20
settle personal and political conflicts. Therefore, violence and=20
intimidation have not been uncommon in election campaigns. But 270=20
political killings in the run up to the 2001 elections exceeded by=20
all counts the violence in previous elections.

The media drew attention to attacks on individuals and property of=20
Hindus, damage to their places and objects of worship, incidents of=20
rape, looting of houses and extortion. Newspaper scans suggested that=20
80 incidents occurred between 15 to 30 September, 131 in the first=20
fifteen days in October and 119 in the latter half of October. This=20
was out of a total of 64,000 villages that make up Bangladesh and=20
appeared to be concentrated in the south west of Bangladesh, in the=20
border divisions of Khulna and Borishal, as well as in Dhaka,=20
Chittagong and Rajshahi.

Although it abated in November, stories of extortion continued to=20
filter through, leading to internal displacement of some families, or=20
their temporary migration to West Bengal, as reported by a BBC=20
correspondent.

While the Hindu community suffered from a high sense of insecurity=20
and exclusion, the lawless methods used to control votes, or to=20
deprive citizens of their rights to participation shocked sensible,=20
liberal opinion in Bangladesh. The blatant manifestation of a gang=20
culture that spelt intolerance was seen as a danger signal for social=20
stability, and not just for one community.

Background to elections in 2001

Since Bangladesh emerged from military rule in 1991, three elections=20
have been held to the national Parliament. A broad based popular=20
movement had succeeded in reviving "parliamentary democracy". The=20
main form of participation was through elections, which have=20
generally excited considerable public interest. Voting trends show=20
that the two major parties have achieved a close balance in electoral=20
strength. A marginal difference of 2 to 3 per cent in votes has led=20
alternately to victory of the Bangladesh Nationalist Party in 1991=20
and 2001 and to the Awami League in 1996.

This indicates that each party can rely upon a distinct and reliable=20
constituency. Each party, therefore, stands to gain by even a slight=20
shift in the voting pattern. This can be achieved by two strategies:=20
through an alliance with other vote catchers, or by deterring=20
supporters of rival parties, particularly from vulnerable groups or=20
communities, from going to the polls.

In preparation for each election, major political parties have used=20
public campaigns to persuade voters. It is also not uncommon for them=20
to use force or intimidation to prevent obvious opponents or=20
undecided voters to stay away from the polls. In each election, there=20
is a degree of unfair practice, such as false voting, deterring=20
voters from going to the polls, over expenditure and so on. But since=20
winning is so important, more serious but less visible violations of=20
election rules and code of conduct are also resorted to.

The stake in state power is essential for political survival.=20
Preparations for elections therefore take on the semblance of combat,=20
as public smear campaigns and resort to muscle and money degenerate=20
into armed confrontation. Over the years, each major party has=20
nurtured party 'cadres' or 'activists', whose 'militancy' is brought=20
into play to win elections.

Because of these undemocratic tendencies, and the tendency of the=20
ruling party to manipulate results, an innovative system of a=20
caretaker government was instituted by a constitutional amendment in=20
1996. The immediately retired Chief Justice is appointed as the chief=20
adviser, at the conclusion of the term of the previous government,=20
main responsibility for him and his cabinet of advisers being to hold=20
elections within 90 days. This system was introduced in 1991, after=20
the fall of General Ershad, and has now become a constitutional=20
requirement.

Notwithstanding these arrangements adopted by Parliament, after each=20
election the losing party has rejected the polls as being unfair.=20
This is why the loser usually renounces election results as being=20
manipulated and tries to find means to delegitimise the results. This=20
was the case in 1991, in 1996 and in 2001. Each ruling party has also=20
tried to ensure its return to power through bureaucratic=20
manipulations, use of public resources and facilities.

Intimidation of voters is also resorted to in some constituencies.=20
While political candidates take to the hustings to woo voters, the=20
party cadres find more militant and sometimes devious ways to pursue=20
victory for their candidate. One of these is to immobilise the rival=20
vote banks.

The Hindus became an inevitable target, since in popular perception,=20
they are seen as a vote bank for the Awami League. In many cases,=20
both the victims and witnesses have identified bands of young armed=20
men, between the ages of 15 to 30 years, armed and riding on Hondas,=20
as responsible for the attacks. The administration remained passive.=20
Where the police are required to maintain law and order, they=20
remained passive on the plea that no complaints were filed with them.=20
Particularly after the election results became clear on October 2,=20
the gangs acquired greater impunity.

The projection of majoritarian symbols in appealing for votes was=20
seen to isolate the voters by religion and may have made easy targets=20
of the Hindu community. In one or two incidents, some ethnic=20
communities were also victimised. Earlier constitutional amendments=20
had already tended to divide Bangladesh by religious affiliation.=20
Thus the Fifth Amendment to the Constitution, adopted in 1977=20
eliminated the principle of secularism, and the Eighth Amendment made=20
Islam a state religion.

These had encouraged communalism and discouraged pluralism, which=20
should have influenced social and political discourse in Bangladesh.=20
The incidents of extortion and looting would suggest that the gangs=20
were also propelled by materialistic temptations and that this could=20
have been an easy sop for those who helped swing the votes.

State and political response

The media highlighted early signals of the violence reported by their=20
district correspondents. The election commission had earlier=20
identified 177 violence prone constituencies, 70 high-risk=20
constituencies and 53 risk free constituencies. The army, which had=20
been called in on September 18 to assist the civil administration in=20
maintaining peace during the elections in the districts of Feni,=20
Munshiganj and Bhola, was withdrawn, perhaps unwisely, immediately=20
after the polls were completed.

The prognostications of violence were abundantly clear. Nevertheless,=20
effective directions by the caretaker government to prevent the=20
situation from degenerating into wide scale violence were missing.=20
The government controlled electronic media could have been put to=20
more imaginative use. Members of the government did not feel obliged=20
to visit the concerned areas, which could have helped in the social=20
mobilisation of concerned citizens in the community and alerted the=20
local administration.

Political response has been totally short-sighted and guided by=20
assertion of brute strength on the one hand and evasion of=20
responsibilities towards the voters. A sensitive response called for=20
elected representatives of both parties to make visible efforts in=20
their constituencies to maintain peace. The situation demanded that=20
the ruling party representatives rein in their gangs, and reach out=20
to the losers so that both sides could come together to maintain=20
peace and come to the aid of the Hindu community, who were the main=20
victims.

The winning candidates from both parties, however, were not to be=20
found in their constituencies, but were in Dhaka, as soon as results=20
were announced. Candidates from the ruling party were there,=20
allegedly to firm up their benefits and privileges. Winning=20
candidates from the Awami League were also in Dhaka, preparing to=20
protest the violence. As a result, the Hindu community were left in=20
greater fear and insecurity.

Voting has become a high-risk right for ordinary citizens to=20
exercise. Gains of an electoral victory, or capitalizsing on=20
electoral losses became short-term objectives. More serious political=20
concern would have led the winning party to take special ameliorative=20
measures. There was nothing to prevent the leaders of the incumbent=20
party to visit the sites or to issue reassuring statements even=20
before they were sworn in. The opposition party too would have done=20
well to stand by its voters.

The new government was sworn in on October 11. And, instead of=20
containing the disaster, cover up attempts were resorted to. The home=20
minister, after a helicopter trip over Ramshil in Gopalganj, where=20
many of the Hindus from Aghailjhora and Gournadi in Borishal, had=20
taken shelter on open grounds, claimed that the stories of violence=20
against Hindus were contrived or exaggerated, and were a conspiracy=20
against the new government.

The Prime Minister, soon after her swearing in had gone to Saudi=20
Arabia, and upon her return on October 15 said that her government=20
would instruct the Bangladesh Rifles and police to act immediately=20
against the violators and to maintain law and order. It is not clear=20
if any such action was taken but subsequently the Prime Minister also=20
made references to 'conspiracy' and 'exaggerated stories'.

The Durga Puja, the largest Hindu festival was held on October 22. It=20
usually draws a large number of devotees. This year it was a subdued=20
event. The government ministers made public statements asking the=20
Hindus to celebrate the event and assuring them of protection. But as=20
a mark of protest, there was no music and no lights; black banners=20
were hung along the mandaps. While the mandaps were crowded with=20
devotees and visitors in the cities, there were reports of extortion=20
and breaking of idols from some villages.

As pressure grew for action by the government and even diplomatic=20
representatives expressed their concern, on November 8 the=20
government, appointed a four-member commission constituted by=20
secretaries, to investigate the incidents. This was a closed=20
committee that has not announced any schedule for submission of its=20
report or to meet with victims.

Instead, sporadic news items have appeared in the press, in which a=20
few Hindus are reported to have denied the violence. This would=20
suggest that bureaucratic manipulations are directed at covering up=20
rather than redressing the wrongs or repairing the damage.

The Awami League lost the elections but gained 40 per cent of the=20
votes, which was high enough for them to retain confidence in their=20
support throughout the country. However, they, too, were not on the=20
scene, even in those constituencies where some of them had won with a=20
massive majority. It was only a few weeks later that Awami League=20
leaders starting touring the affected areas, providing sympathy and=20
protesting the atrocities. If the two parties had acted with concern=20
for citizens and had acted in time, the Hindu community would not=20
have become hostage to party vandals.

Citizens' Protests

The media provided early warning signals, and through both their=20
columns and editorials, counselled restraint and reason and called=20
for action by the government and political leaders. An exception was=20
the right wing media, which blacked out the news. Many citizens'=20
groups, human rights and women's rights activists, both in Dhaka and=20
in the local communities, voiced immediate protests.

Organisations such as Sommilito Samajik Andolon, Bangladesh Mohila=20
Porishod, Nari Pokkhyo, Citizens' Voice, Association for Community=20
Development and many other informal groups started visiting the=20
sites, to meet with the victims and provide moral and other support.=20
Recently, these independent initiatives have led to the formation of=20
a 51-member National Citizen's Committee convened by Dr Anisuzaman, a=20
well-known and senior member of the University of Dhaka.

The testimonies they have documented, of incidents in Bhola,=20
Bagerhat, Borishal and Chittagong, among many other places, provide=20
convincing evidence of administrative lapses and political failures,=20
which have cynically used voters but have offered no security to=20
citizens. Evidence also points to the uncontrolled operation of party=20
cadres, whose newly acquired impunity endangers civil life and civic=20
values in Bangladesh.

Two murders in Chittagong in November, one of a college principal and=20
the other of a temple devotee in Mireserai, provide more stark=20
evidence. In the first case, a case was filed and two college=20
colleagues, reported to be members of the Jamaat-i-Islami, a=20
fundamentalist party, (two of whose members sit in the Cabinet), have=20
been detained for questioning. In the second instance, the=20
perpetrators have been identified.

Following these incidents, and realising the victims' constraints in=20
taking legal action because of fear and intimidation, Ain-o-Salish=20
Kendro (ASK) filed a public interest litigation in the High Court on=20
November 24 to ask for a proper investigation into the incidents, on=20
why action was not taken against the perpetrators, and to provide=20
compensation to the victims.

The High Court issued a rule nisi on 27 November, asking the=20
government of Bangladesh to explain within four weeks why it should=20
not be asked to take proper steps to protect the country's religious=20
minorities from terrorist attacks and harassment. The court further=20
asked the government to investigate into the attacks on religious=20
minorities and to submit a report on the matter by January 15.

Because there had been no public announcement by the government=20
regarding arrangements for a public enquiry, ASK once again wrote to=20
the Ministry of Home Affairs, to make the schedule of enquiry public=20
so that victims and concerned witnesses could record their=20
testimonies. These accounts would provide a fuller picture of the=20
victimisation and marginal-isation of minorities, which has been=20
brought about through the prevailing politics of vendetta and vote=20
capturing.

The government will no doubt try to muster administrative=20
explanations, but the independent enquiries being conducted by=20
different organisations will provide important evidence. And the=20
support given by different groups should help build the confidence of=20
the Hindu community which has been sadly shattered by recent events.

Legal cases, such as this one, take a long time to conclude but they=20
are an important means of establishing the evidence of particular=20
incidents as well as creating a general environment. By seeking=20
justice against violence, this case is an important signal that=20
minorities are equal citizens of Bangladesh and are entitled to full=20
rights and protection under the Constitution. Nor, indeed, should any=20
persons with affiliations based on religion, ethnicity or gender be=20
disenfranchised or used as electoral fodder by political parties.=20
Because their exclusion would spell disaster for society itself, as=20
it would subvert its democratic aspirations. It is important for all,=20
irrespective of political affiliation, to work towards pluralism and=20
effective democratic participation, if citizenship is to have any=20
meaning in Bangladesh.=20

(The writer is director research at Ain-o-Salish Kendro (ASK) in=20
Dhaka and a member of the bureau of South Asians for Human Rights, a=20
recently formed regional human rights organisation. The views=20
expressed in this article are those of the author alone).=20

_____

#4.

12 December 2001
The media in Pakistan: a new era?
Beena Sarwar

The pressures of international crisis on Pakistan have had=20
paradoxical effects on the country's media. Although self-serving=20
rumours freely circulate and religious militants try to police the=20
press, a space of debate about hitherto restricted subjects - the=20
country's Afghan and Kashmiri policies - has opened up. But will it=20
survive the glare of war?

For many Pakistanis, one of the positive outcomes of 11 September has=20
been a change in the country's 'Afghan policy'. In the era of=20
military dictator, General Zia ul Haq (1977-88), the media was=20
severely restricted in its ability to report accurately from or about=20
its north-western neighbour. The print media, at least, fought these=20
restrictions with the limited weapons at their disposal: the=20
restrictive official directives that landed on editors' tables would=20
sometimes lead to newspapers printing blank spaces on their pages - a=20
symbolic gesture of protest against the censorship they were unable=20
to resist. There was no such rebellion in the ranks of the electronic=20
media, which was under direct government control.

The ways of censorship

In the past, even supposedly democratic governments have used various=20
means to control the press, through tax cases, withholding newsprint=20
(which is imported through government channels) or pulling out=20
official tenders, notices and advertisements (which the smaller=20
newspapers rely on for revenue). In 1998, when the country's largest=20
publication house, the Jang Group, tried to break Pakistan=20
Television's monopoly on news and current affairs by planning a=20
satellite channel, it became clear how far the government would go to=20
stop this. The democratically elected but dictatorially inclined=20
Nawaz Sharif accused the Group of tax evasion, revived old tax cases,=20
and withheld newsprint, forcing the Group to reduce the size of some=20
of its daily papers from twenty-four to eight pages. Sharif's=20
henchmen personally pressurised the Group's owner to support the=20
government on various policy issues and fire, or at least sideline,=20
several journalists (this writer included). He refused, but the=20
stand-off ended only after the idea of the satellite channel was=20
quietly dropped. It is only now being revived.

An easing of these restrictions have led to the launch earlier this=20
year of two other satellite channels which have begun quietly running=20
current affairs talk shows since 11 September, although they have not=20
yet begun news programmes. Although the present military government=20
is reportedly not thrilled about these developments, its response is=20
cautious resignation rather than hostile vendetta; perhaps present=20
geo-political realities leave it with little choice.

Rumours and riots

Since the Zia era, successive governments have encouraged or allowed=20
the media to promote the militant religious point of view, putting=20
progressive forces on the defensive. In the immediate post-11=20
September period, US President George Bush and the US intelligence=20
agencies' indictment of Osama bin Laden was seen in Pakistan as an=20
attempt to scapegoat Islam. In this atmosphere, the circulation of=20
two truly global rumours (both circulated the world via email,=20
origins unknown) gained widespread acceptance.

The first rumour related to the information that four thousand=20
Israelis/Jews were absent from work at the WTC on 11 September. This=20
news was prominently published, for example, in the Urdu language=20
daily Jurrat of Karachi on 24 September, in a 'special edition'=20
banner headlined Usama vs Bush. A four column strap line in the=20
bottom half of this page asked: "Why were four thousand Jews absent=20
from the World Trade Centre?" The headline below it read: "The USA=20
should reflect on the role of Israel."

The second rumour was that CNN had passed off 1991 footage of=20
celebrating Palestinians as current. Even the respected English=20
language daily Dawn prominently published the email that started this=20
rumour (ostensibly from a Brazilian student called Marcio A.V.=20
Carvalho) as a letter to the editor titled "CNN using 1991 footage",=20
on 21 September. Dawn also took this rumour to be fact, in an=20
editorial ("Why this media circus", 25 September). The editorial's=20
last paragraph starts: "On Monday night, the BBC broadcast a=20
particularly vicious attack on Pakistan in its special broadcast to=20
South Asia, with the talkshow host putting words in the=20
venom-spilling mouth of the Indian Home Minister. Earlier, the CNN=20
had flashed images of Palestinians celebrating the 11 September=20
terrorist attacks on America within hours of the mayhem in New York=20
and Washington. The only problem was that the footage dated back to=20
the Iraqi attack on Kuwait in 1991. These are only two of the many=20
recent examples of the western media's insensitivity=8A"

CNN's denials were confirmed by an independent investigation by=20
London-based Iranian filmmaker Taghi Amirani; corrective emails were=20
subsequently circulated - but no newspaper here printed them. So the=20
rumours continue to circulate. At a recent seminar in Kathmandu for=20
political journalists covering political violence, an Indian=20
television reporter also talked about the CNN 'fraud'. She had not=20
come across CNN's denial, or Amirani's investigation.

Opposition to the 'war' was under-reported in the Pakistani as well=20
as the Western media, while extremist, right-wing groups were given=20
space and time out of proportion to their popularity, support and=20
numbers. Bearded mullahs make good 'copy' although they have never=20
obtained more than seven per cent of the seats in any national=20
election. Footage of a demonstration in Peshawar was broadcast=20
several times a day for three or four days running on CNN. How much=20
is the media complicit in providing them with the publicity they=20
crave, how much of what they do is for that publicity? Sean Langan,=20
the British journalist who was in Peshawar in September, told a=20
gathering back in the UK that as soon the cameras were turned off,=20
the same fierce, bearded men who had appeared ready to kill him=20
earlier, chatted amicably, asking, "You're from London? How about a=20
cup of tea then?"

The appeal to emotions based on nationalism, religion, security and=20
identity would be considerably hampered if people could see the full=20
picture, as Todd Gitlin pointed out in his 1980 book, The Whole World=20
is Watching.

Religious militants in retreat?

The Pakistan army's involvement in supporting the Taliban has only=20
recently ended - and that too when the President, General Musharraf,=20
threatened the officers of the intelligence agencies who were still=20
involved, post-11 September, in aiding the Taliban. This involvement=20
is still treated with caution in the Pakistani media. Television=20
doesn't touch it at all, while some newspapers may mention it, but=20
citing sources like the New York Times or the BBC. And for the first=20
time, reports critical of the government's Kashmir policy are=20
beginning to be evident in the papers, which have of necessity also=20
been cautious about reporting on the misdeeds of militant groups in=20
Pakistan.

The government has also, until recently, turned a blind eye to their=20
attacks, for example, on development-related non-government=20
organisations in Pakistan's North West Frontier Province and=20
Balochistan, which border the tribal areas and Afghanistan. Many of=20
these NGOs are working for women's and girls' education, and=20
micro-credit schemes, all of which are anathema to the jehadis=20
(militants). At an emergency meeting of some NGOs in Peshawar on 8=20
October following attacks on three girls' schools, participants=20
accused attackers of settling scores with the NGOs in the guise of=20
protests against the US attack on Afghanistan.

These attacks have stopped since the arrests in early November of=20
several religious leaders - according to a newspaper editor, at their=20
own request as they feared reprisals from the parents of the boys=20
they sent off to fight and be killed in Afghanistan. In an emotional=20
appeal, one of these leaders, the Jamaat-e-Islami's Qazi Hussain=20
Ahmed warned that after Afghanistan, the next targets would be=20
Kashmir and Palestine. The appeal appeared in a newspaper=20
advertisement (30 November) asking for the people of Pakistan to=20
unite against the country's "cowardly and pro-Western rulers".=20
Calling for donations to the cause of the oppressed of Afghanistan,=20
Kashmir and Palestine, Ahmed also asks for a show of unity with these=20
causes every Wednesday and Friday. Although these demonstrations=20
petered out some time ago, the influence of the Jamaat is evident in=20
the prominent display of the advertisement in the powerful (and=20
pragmatic) Urdu-language daily Jang (whose reported print run is more=20
than the combined circulation of all the other papers combined).

Freedom and its limits

Since the government's about-turn on the Afghan policy and the=20
subsequent rout of the Taliban, there has been open criticism of its=20
previous pro-Taliban policy, on television as well as in newspapers.=20
Guests appearing in the sometimes live talk shows and interviews, on=20
the satellite channels as well as PTV, are critical of Pakistan's=20
intelligence agencies as well as the Taliban. However, the press in=20
general remains relatively cautious in staying within the limits=20
imposed by religious groups, fearful of their track record for=20
violence.

Religious sensibilities are brittle and easily offended. Journalists=20
usually take complaints in their stride but also - to be safe -=20
promptly print apologies, as happened in two recent cases with The=20
News (Jang Group). One complaint was about a (western) syndicated=20
cartoon on the leisure page, which drew attention to the word 'g-o-d'=20
spelled backwards. A female caller threatened to take the matter to=20
the Jamaat-e-Islami. There was a similar reaction to a joke printed=20
in a children's magazine, also published by The News, in which a=20
little boy asks his mother if God lives in the bathroom, since every=20
morning Daddy banged on the bathroom door yelling, "Oh God, are you=20
still in there?" The newspaper has also had complaints from readers=20
upset at what they call its 'anti-Taliban' policies. As these=20
examples indicate, the path to a free media in Pakistan has some way=20
to go.

_____

#5.

The January issue of the-south-asian is out (URL=20
<http://www.the-south-asian.com>www.the-south-asian.com) . The=20
contents of the issue are: Pakistani Literature - Evolution and=20
Trends; VS Naipauls's Nobel Lecture 'Two Worlds"; South Asian Art -a=20
shared cutural frontier; Rare photographs of Indian nobility from the=20
Lafayette Gallery; The Jullundur Brigade - a story of an association=20
of 'blood brothers in arms' from India, Pakistan and UK; India and=20
China - major global players in IT by 2025; Foreign Investors in=20
South Asia; Muzaffar Ali; Shandur Polo Festival; Chogan- the original=20
game of polo; India's blue-chip polo; 'Knock at Every Alien Door' -=20
the first part of a serialisation of an unpublished novel by Joseph=20
Harris (an account of his time in India in 1944 as a US army=20
officer); and the Boston South Asian Peace March Jan 5, 2002.

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