[sacw] SACW #1 (08 January. 02)

[Harsh Kapoor]

South Asia Citizens Wire - Dispatch #1 | 8 January 2002

------------------------------------------
#1. Bush's South Asia Strategy: Keep Terrorism as the Villain (David E. San=
ger)
#2. Pakistan's Madrassahs: Ensuring a System of Education not Jihad,"=20
(P.W. Singer)
#3. Make Peace not War (Kamal Mitra Chenoy)
#4. 'South Asia can't afford N-war'
#5. Rival Armies Are 'Eyeball To Eyeball' in Tense Kashmir (Mark Landler)
#6. San Francisco Rally For Peace In South Asia (Ras H. Siddiqui)
#7. Radio Documentary: The Other War In South Asia: India & Pakistan=20
Battle Over Kashmir
#8. A Face-Off With Nuclear Stakes (Joshua Hammer)
#9. Looking Down the Barrel (Anthony Spaeth)

________________________

#1.

The New York Times
January 7, 2002
NEWS ANALYSIS
http://www.nytimes.com/2002/01/07/international/asia/07PREX.html

Bush's South Asia Strategy: Keep Terrorism as the Villain

By DAVID E. SANGER

WACO, Tex., Jan. 6 - In the three weeks since a deadly attack on the=20
Indian Parliament, President Bush and his foreign policy team have=20
scrambled to avoid war in South Asia with a simple formula: in daily=20
phone calls to both sides, they have tried to reframe the conflict as=20
a battle over terrorism, not territory.

They have carefully offered no opinion on the question of who should=20
control Kashmir, an emotionally explosive issue in both countries.=20
They have not volunteered to oversee negotiations, a role the United=20
States has played so often in the Middle East and elsewhere.

Instead, they have acted as if the Islamic extremist groups accused=20
of carrying out the assault were stateless terrorists similar to Al=20
Qaeda and perhaps linked to it - and that they threaten the stability=20
of Pakistan, where they are based, as surely as they threaten India.

It is partly a convenient fiction. President Bush has made no public=20
mention of the fact that the terrorist groups he says must be crushed=20
have often acted as a surrogate for Pakistan's intelligence service.

Yet so far the strategy appears to have worked, or at least bought=20
some time for the opponents, who met this weekend at a tense summit=20
meeting in Nepal.

The president's aides here and in Washington say they believe that=20
their constant barrage of telephone calls to India and Pakistan=20
probably prevented a rapid escalation of the conflict into a war=20
between two hot- headed nuclear powers.

"We decided early on that the purpose now is not to solve Kashmir; it=20
is to defuse the crisis," one senior administration official in=20
Washington said the other day.

Another added, "The question is how long will that work - how long=20
can you keep both sides from making a big mistake?"

At the core of the strategy has been constant pressure on Mr. Bush's=20
new ally, Gen. Pervez Musharraf of Pakistan. At the urging of=20
Secretary of State Colin L. Powell, Condoleezza Rice, the national=20
security adviser, and then the president himself, who called from his=20
ranch, Mr. Musharraf has begun a roundup of the leaders of the=20
Islamic groups suspected in the attacks, and a few who are not=20
suspected. The administration's thinking was that each round of=20
arrests makes it more difficult for India to justify an attack that=20
would almost certainly turn into war.

Mr. Bush, describing his conversations with Prime Minister Atal=20
Behari Vajpayee of India, said last week that, "while I understood=20
his anger," he should "give us all a chance to work with President=20
Musharraf to bring the terrorists to justice."

"Terror is terror," Mr. Bush said, before buying a cheeseburger in=20
the small gas station and deli near his ranch, "and the fact that the=20
Pakistani president is after terrorists is a good sign."

The Indians were suspicious of the strategy. They had been outraged=20
at Mr. Bush's characterization of the two main terrorist groups=20
operating in Kashmir as "stateless," which they saw as a crude pander=20
to Mr. Musharraf. And they noted that despite repeated acts of=20
terrorism in the last few years, Lashkar-e-Taiba, or the Army of the=20
Pure, and Jaish-e- Muhammad, or the Army of Muhammad, were never=20
placed on the State Department's list of terrorist groups. The=20
administration belatedly remedied that on Dec. 27, more than two=20
weeks after the attack on the Parliament.

Now Indian officials say they want "guarantees" from the United=20
States that Pakistan would wipe out the groups. Administration=20
officials say they have heard no such request, and they doubt they=20
could offer such a guarantee anyway.

But they can continue to pressure General Musharraf, who by all=20
accounts has so far offered little resistance to the American call=20
for a crackdown, perhaps seeing an opportunity to consolidate his own=20
power.

While General Musharraf has long identified himself with the Kashmir=20
issue, American officials were betting that he was nervous about the=20
Islamic radicals in his midst and the terror groups' brewing anger=20
about Pakistan's decision to side with the United States in the war=20
against the Taliban and Al Qaeda.

"The unspoken part of this deal," said one White House official, "is=20
that Musharraf has a brief window of opportunity to act against these=20
guys before they threaten him. And he's feeling a lot stronger than=20
he did a few months ago." But in many conversations with senior=20
American officials, General Musharraf expressed growing alarm about=20
the size of the Indian military buildup on his border.

Defusing a crisis of this magnitude is not what the Bush=20
administration envisioned when it came to power. All last spring and=20
summer, the president and his aides focused on India, not Pakistan.=20
While Mr. Bush's team has few charitable comments about Clinton-era=20
diplomacy, they saw an opportunity to build on Mr. Clinton's courting=20
of Indian leaders, and the strengthening of economic ties.

In contrast, they saw little potential in building a relationship=20
with Pakistan: its support of the Taliban, its proliferation of=20
missile technology and its constant dalliance with economic default=20
made it seem, in the words of one American diplomat, "only a few=20
shades better than North Korea." Hard-liners in the Pentagon,=20
moreover, thought a tilt toward India would help in the containment=20
of China, India's other great rival.

Sept. 11 changed all those calculations. Now Washington finds itself,=20
to India's distress, with an equal interest in both countries. But it=20
does not yet have a strategy to meet that new reality.

Assuming that the current crisis can be defused, officials say Mr.=20
Bush must begin to address both the substance of the Kashmir dispute=20
and the threat posed by both countries' nuclear arsenals. Eventually,=20
that will require creating some kind of arms control framework that=20
gives officials in Islamabad, New Delhi and the rest of the world=20
some assurance that a firefight over the Line of Control does not=20
risk rapid escalation into a nuclear exchange.

But for now the Bush administration is starting small. On Friday,=20
Secretary Powell suggested that he was ready to send an American=20
envoy to the region. That envoy may be Secretary Powell himself, or=20
his deputy, Richard Armitage, or Richard Haass, who heads the State=20
Department's policy planning operations and has long experience in=20
defusing past India-Pakistan crises.

The hope is that the envoy will convince both sides to pull back=20
their troops, reducing the chance of an inadvertent disaster. They=20
are mindful, they say, of the warning from Brig. Muhammad Yaqub, the=20
Pakistani Army's commander in Kashmir, who told a reporter the other=20
day, "When you've got two armies standing eyeball to eyeball, even a=20
little accident can lead to a chain reaction."

_____

#2.

"Pakistan's Madrassahs: Ensuring a System of Education not Jihad,"
Analysis Paper #14, by P.W. Singer (Jan. 2002)
http://www.brookings.edu/views/papers/singer/20020103.htm

_____

#3.

Economic Times, (India) 2nd January, 2002.

Make Peace not War

The 13th December attack on Parliament has enraged public opinion and=20
shocked the world. Pakistan's hand is yet to be proven, especially=20
since the timing could not have been more embarrassing for it. But=20
since both the Lashkar-e-Taiyaba and Jaish-e-Mohammed are based and=20
trained in Pakistan, the demand for military retaliation by the=20
Vajpayee government and the sangh brigade was only to be expected.=20
The post-Kargil scenario had worked electorally for the BJP and=20
allies before, so once again war would be good politics, now that=20
proxy voting for the military is on.

War should always be an avoidable option. Nothing short of a full=20
scale war would destroy the bases and training camps which are well=20
inside Pakistan. Given Pakistan's formidable air force and India's=20
lack of smart bombs, 'surgical' air strikes are out of the question.=20
A full scale war is not only wholly unwarranted and internationally=20
unacceptable, but could escalate into a nuclear exchange. We should=20
not forget that during Kargil, nuclear threats were exchanged 13=20
times.

The US, including President George Bush, the EU and the G-8 including=20
President Putin have called for restraint and are clearly against=20
punitive Indian military action. The international coalition has yet=20
to stabilize the interim Afghan government. Thousands of their troops=20
are in Afghanistan and Pakistan. Pakistani air bases, support and=20
their troops guarding the Afghan border against Al Qaeda escapees,=20
are playing a crucial role. The last thing the coalition wants is the=20
weakening of the Musharraf regime, a transfer of the Pakistani troops=20
to the Indian border, or any threat, even indirect, to its own=20
troops. Indian military action would thus be internationally=20
condemned including in the UN Security Council with the permanent=20
members then all aligned against India. This would provide the US and=20
others sufficient reason to intervene in Kashmir, with this=20
internationalisation of the Kashmir conflict being just what Pakistan=20
has tried for so long, and failed to achieve.

But there is an even more fundamental argument against military=20
action. Terrorism in Kashmir is not merely a Pakistani creation.=20
Pakistan has tried since 1947 to destabilise the Valley. The=20
militancy which started in 1989-90 is the consequence of the=20
blatantly rigged elections of 1987 and the events that followed, in=20
which Kashmiris like Syed Salahuddin, the Muslim United Front=20
candidate, and now the leader of the Hizbul Mujahiddin, and his=20
counting agent Yasin Malik, later leader of the Jammu & Kashmir=20
Liberation Front [JKLF] and the Hurriyet Conference, took to the gun.=20
The militancy in Kashmir, therefore, is largely a product of=20
political alienation consequent on perceived malgovernance by India=20
and its believed client regimes in the Valley.

Political alienation can only be tackled politically, foremost by=20
dialogue. But the Vajpayee government is not even willing to discuss=20
the State Autonomy report prepared by its ally the National=20
Conference, and overwhelmingly passed by the State Assembly. It has=20
not made any sincere effort to talk with the Hurriyet Conference. The=20
refusal to talk with Pakistan is scarcely new. The rejection of=20
dialogue started well before December 13th, shortly after the aborted=20
Agra talks. According to informed observers, the failure was due not=20
so much to the Pakistanis, but a revolt against Vajpayee in the sangh=20
brigade.

Now there is much talk about war, but hardly any talk about talks.=20
Can we resolve the Kashmir issue with Pakistan including cross border=20
terrorism without dialogue with President Musharraf? The official=20
argument is a vicious circle: no talks until terrorism stops; but=20
terrorism will not stop without talks; so terrorism continues, no=20
talks; and so on. This shortsighted circular logic can only lead to a=20
continuation of militancy, a prolonging of Kashmir's tragedy, and the=20
ever present possibility of a war which will solve nothing, and prove=20
a human and political disaster.

Politicians are taking people for a ride. They, particularly scam=20
tainted ones, are willing to fight till the last soldier. Because the=20
coming Assembly elections will be critical for the longevity of the=20
Vajpayee regime, both the NDA and its rivals, excluding the Left, are=20
making bellicose noises. Guns are pointed towards Pakistan, but=20
politicians are focussed on UP and Punjab. Warmongering must stop. We=20
must make peace, not war.

Dr. Kamal Mitra Chenoy
Associate Professor,
School of International Studies,
Jawaharlal Nehru University,
New Delhi-110067

Tel: 6177492/ 6164330

Mailing Address:
Res: 158, Uttrakhand, Jawaharlal Nehru University, New Delhi, 110067.

_____

#4.

DAWN
07 January 2002
'South Asia can't afford N-war'

LAHORE, Jan 6: The South Asian Fraternity organized a peace walk here=20
on Sunday in the wake of the Indo-Pakistan border tension. The walk=20
started from Nasser Bagh's gate No 1 and terminated peacefully at=20
gate No 2.
Dr Mubashar Hassan, Dr Anwar Sajjad, Munir Niazi, Madiha Gohar,=20
Shujaat Hashmi, Dr Ajmal Niazi, Ashraf Saleemi, Saleem Qureshi and=20
Farrukh Suhail Goindi were prominent among the participants.
They were carrying banners and placards inscribed with slogans like=20
'We want peace not war; No to war; No to terrorism; fight against=20
war'.
Speaking to the participants in the walk, Dr Mubashar Hassan said=20
that South Asia needed peace and prosperity and the people of this=20
region can not afford nuclear war. He said that we all condemn the=20
incident of September 11 at the World Trade Centre and the Pentagon.
He appreciated President Gen Pervez Musharraf for his bold handshake=20
with Indian Prime Minister Atal Behari Vajpayee at the Saarc=20
Summit.-APP

_____

#5.

International Herald Tribune
Asia/Pacific
7 January 2002

Rival Armies Are 'Eyeball To Eyeball' in Tense Kashmir

Mark Landler New York Times Service
Monday, January 7, 2002

CHAKOTHI, Pakistan As the leaders of Pakistan and India exchanged a=20
stiff handshake in Nepal over the weekend, their troops pointed=20
machine guns at each other across a rugged ravine here, in the=20
disputed region of Kashmir.
.
Diplomatic nuances mean little to the soldiers who patrol this=20
jittery outpost along the Line of Control, a cease-fire line that=20
serves as a de facto border between the Indian and=20
Pakistani-controlled parts of Kashmir.
.
"When you've got two armies standing eyeball to eyeball, even a=20
little accident can lead to a chain reaction that nobody can=20
control," said Brigadier Mohammed Yaqub, the Pakistani Army's=20
commander in this region.
.
"Every day, we are getting closer to a situation that nobody can=20
control," he said, squinting across the ravine.
.
Bullets have whistled across this line almost every night since Dec.=20
13, when gunmen attacked the Indian Parliament in New Dehli,=20
resulting in 14 deaths, including the five assailants. India blamed=20
Pakistan-backed militants for the attack, and the two countries have=20
edged perilously close to war.
.
If there is a conflict, it is likely to start here, in the mountain=20
canyons of Kashmir. Machine-gun nests and artillery batteries nestle=20
among the fir trees, beneath snow-capped peaks. They are controlled=20
by soldiers who sometimes behave as though war has already broken out.
.
On Friday, close by this post, Indian troops fired several shots at=20
their Pakistani counterparts, Brigadier Yaqub said. He said that his=20
soldiers had not returned fire and that he did not know the motive=20
for the attack. More often, the Pakistanis do fire back, and there=20
are casualties on both sides.
.
"We are taking all the defensive measures required to defend our=20
country," Brigadier Yaqub said at a briefing organized by the=20
military for foreign journalists. Pakistan's goal in taking=20
journalists to the Line of Control seemed to be to correct a=20
perceived disadvantage in its public relations campaign about=20
Kashmir. The Indian government attributes the violence in the region=20
to terrorist groups, which it says are financed and armed by=20
Pakistan's intelligence service.
.
Pakistan denies this, though it acknowledges giving moral support to=20
the insurgents. It refers to them as freedom fighters. "There are no=20
terrorist groups on our side," Brigadier Yaqub said. Brigadier Yaqub=20
said 50,000 people had been forced out of their border homes since=20
1998 by Indian harassment.
.
At a refugee camp near Muzaffarabad, the capital of=20
Pakistan-administered Kashmir, some residents expressed frustration=20
that the dispute over Kashmir seemed further from resolution than=20
ever. "I am angry at the Indian government and the whole world," said=20
Chawdry Mirza, 60, who fled his home in 1994 because of the violence.
.
The farmers at Chakothi, however, do not seem fazed by the standoff.=20
On Saturday, some could be seen tending their fields, terraced green=20
plots that step down to a fast-moving river. Across the water, the=20
helmets of Indian soldiers peeked over the stone walls of their=20
lookout posts. Neither side is retreating from its positions, and=20
those have not changed much in decades Indeed, in some ways, the Line=20
of Control seems like a Cold War relic. For example, Indian and=20
Pakistani troops maintain a telephone hot line that crosses the=20
border near Chakothi.
.
The line, which was instituted to head off an accidental=20
confrontation, has never been used. But once a month, it is checked=20
by soldiers from each side, Brigadier Yaqub said.
.
After a date is set by both sides, Indian and Pakistani soldiers=20
raise white flags and march cautiously to the middle of a wooden=20
footbridge that spans the border. There, he said, "they check the=20
line, exchange a cup of tea, talk about cricket and movies, and then=20
go back."

______

#6.

News from Bangladesh
San Francisco Rally For Peace In South Asia

By Ras H. Siddiqui

The event may have been a small beginning. But it got more attention=20
then many other Indian and Pakistani gatherings do in Northern=20
California. And if the multitudes walking past the intersection of=20
Powell and Market streets in San Francisco on Saturday, January 5th=20
2002 may have noticed, it was a couple of hundred Pakistanis and=20
Indians and their local friends making a very important statement and=20
sending a simple message. That is: "We do not want another war in=20
South Asia. We want peace".

A peace rally is one way that Americans of South Asian origins can=20
show their concern for the current buildup of rhetoric and border=20
hostilities between India and Pakistan, two countries that possess=20
nuclear weapons. And frankly, for us here in the United States, it is=20
possibly the only thing that we could do, besides praying for sanity=20
to prevail in a very volatile part of the world.

America in general is currently busy with the war in Afghanistan. But=20
when I received an email from Khawaja Ashraf, current Vice President=20
of the Pakistani American Congress, (a group that remains politically=20
active in Washington) to attend a meeting last week to hold this=20
rally, like any concerned Pakistani-American, I had to attend.

To raise a common India-Pakistan voice for peace at a time when=20
chances of war breaking out in that region appear to be quite high,=20
should be the primary goal of the South Asian "Desi" community here=20
in America and all over the world.

This family event drew a number of Pakistani, Kashmiri, Muslim and=20
Sikh Americans. The participation from the local Hindu community was=20
disappointing here but one hopes that they will follow the Sikhs and=20
join us at a future rally for the same cause not only here in=20
Northern California but all over the United States. And to do that we=20
also need to tone down the rhetoric and ensure that any event that we=20
do have in future is focused on the goal of peace and what we as a=20
region share in common instead of making it another attempt to=20
project our differences.

A number of speakers addressed the rally in English, Urdu and=20
Punjabi. Dr. Khawaja Ashraf, Jahangir Hamdani and Asim Mughal briefed=20
the local media on the concerns of the Pakistani-American community.=20
Afzal Jadoon, Naubahar Ali and Attorney Javed Ellahie gave their=20
views and on behalf of the Sikh community Satnam Singh Chahal=20
presented a strong case for pursuing peace.

After 2 hours San Francisco Urdu poet Javaid Sayed lead the=20
procession from the Powell and Market Street intersection to the=20
offices of The San Francisco Chronicle newspaper where a resolution=20
"Stop Is Before It Starts" was presented to the newspaper editorial=20
staff. The resolution urged the United Nations Secretary General Kofi=20
Annan to intervene momentarily under Article 99 of the U.N. Charter=20
to prevent this war.

In conclusion it was heartening to see the involvement of the Sikh=20
community and that of our Pakistan-American women and children at=20
this rally. The PAWPC (Pakistani Americans War Prevention Committee)=20
and the Pakistani American Congress planned and carried out this=20
event, but one must point out its message is universal. Nobody wants=20
a war between countries armed with nuclear weapons. One hopes that=20
the Hindu community will join us next time or will invite us to a=20
peace rally in the near future too.

And finally if people in the governments of India and Pakistan are=20
reading this message (loud and clear), we the people of South Asian=20
descent living in the United States do not want war to be the vehicle=20
to decide the future of Kashmir or any other South Asian problem.

______

#7.

Free Speech Radio News
Friday, November 23, 2001
SPECIAL REPORT

THE OTHER WAR IN SOUTH ASIA: INDIA AND PAKISTAN BATTLE OVER KASHMIR

Kashmir, described recently by a US official as one of the most=20
dangerous places in the world, has re-emerged on the international=20
radar after the events of September 11. Indo-Pakistani tensions are=20
high with war-like rhetoric on both sides and reports of daily=20
cross-border shelling. U S and Western delegations have made visit=20
after visit to the sub-continent to prevent Kashmir from erupting=20
into another war between India and Pakistan as they pursue their=20
crusade against Afghanistan and Al Qaida. One third of Kashmir is=20
under Pakistan, while the rest is administered by India. New Delhi=20
accuses Islamabad of sponsoring cross border terrorism - Pakistan=20
says it only provides moral support to the legitimate freedom=20
struggle in Kashmir. More than 50,000 people have died since 1989=20
when an armed struggle for independence began in India's only Muslim=20
majority state. The Kashmiri people have paid a heavy price for the=20
right to self-determination - there have been too many deaths, too=20
many children orphaned, too many women widowed. Many feel that they=20
are caught between the guns of the Indian security forces and those=20
of the militants, a pawn in the power game between Delhi and=20
Islamabad. 12 years of conflict have sapped the life force of the=20
people of Kashmir, the cradle of Sufi Islam in India. They want the=20
guns to fall silent and the and the right to live in dignity and=20
security. Sputnik Kilambi reports from Srinagar, Kashmir.

Listen to RealAudio:=20
http://www.savepacifica.net/strike/news/RealAudio.php?date=3D20011123

______

#9.

Newsweek
January 14, 2002

Two Pakistani men hug after bidding farewell to Indian relatives in=20
December; cross-border train and bus service was suspended on Jan. 1

A Face-Off With Nuclear Stakes
How India is using Bush's war on terror to force Pakistan's hand

By Joshua Hammer
NEWSWEEK INTERNATIONAL
Jan. 14 issue - Hassan Dil is getting ready to move into his=20
backyard bunker. A retired, half-blind schoolteacher from the border=20
village of Golkot in Indian-controlled Kashmir, Dil is in the direct=20
line of fire of Pakistani soldiers perched in the Himalayan peaks=20
just three kilometers to the south. During the last skirmish between=20
Pakistan and India three years ago, a Pakistani artillery shell=20
slammed into a nearby garden, blowing Dil's neighbor to pieces.
=20=20=09=20
NOW, WITH THE THREAT of another conflict looming, the teacher is=20
taking no chances. The only question is whether the backyard shelter=20
Dil built with a $400 government grant will protect him and his=20
family from radioactive fallout, should it come to that. Squinting=20
across terraced rice fields toward a snowy massif that marks the=20
border, Dil, 56, says: "We pray that both sides keep talking."
For now, both sides are. The danger is that in India today, as=20
elsewhere, the hard-liners rule. Taking a cue from George W. Bush's=20
uncompromising war on terror, New Delhi is demanding that the=20
Pakistani president, Gen. Pervez Musharraf, cease once and for all=20
his nation's support for "cross-border terror" groups that have=20
helped Pakistan wage a fight over the disputed province of Kashmir=20
against its much larger neighbor. After a deadly Dec. 13 attack on=20
the Indian Parliament, New Delhi threatened to invade Pakistan to=20
root out the militants unless Musharraf quashed them himself. That=20
has led to a tense military standoff between the two nuclear powers=20
in the past two weeks, driving thousands of people from their homes.=20
India has severed rail and air links to Pakistan and massed tens of=20
thousands of troops on the 1,800-mile border-the heaviest military=20
buildup since the 1971 Indo-Pakistani war. Pakistan, which denied any=20
involvement in the attack, moved thousands of its soldiers eyeball to=20
eyeball with its Indian enemy and announced that "it was prepared for=20
war."

* From the origins of the India-Pakistan rivalry to its modern=20
nuclear reality.=20=20=20=20=20=20=20
PERILS AND PROMISE
The confrontation has highlighted both the perils-and the=20
promise-of the new global crusade against terror. Since the September=20
11 terrorist attacks and the U.S. military campaign against Al Qaeda=20
and the Taliban, U.S. allies such as India and Israel are seizing the=20
opportunity to step up their own wars against Islamic militancy. Last=20
month Israeli Prime Minister Ariel Sharon marshaled international=20
pressure along with military action to force Palestinian leader Yasir=20
Arafat to crack down on the radical Hamas and Islamic Jihad=20
movements. Now Indian Prime Minister Atal Behari Vajpayee hopes a=20
similar mix of threat and diplomacy will force his Pakistani=20
counterparts to rein in the Islamic militants who have been=20
assaulting Indian-ruled Kashmir-and other parts of India-with=20
increasing frequency. "This is just like the Israelis upping the=20
ante," says Shireen Mazari, director general of the Institute for=20
Strategic Studies in Islamabad, "The [Indians] want to change the=20
parameters of the Kashmir issue."
But the strategy could backfire-disastrously. And U.S.=20
officials find themselves reluctantly cast as mediators-or at least=20
conveyers of messages-between the two governments. The Bush=20
administration fears India will overplay its hand by continuing to=20
make public demands that it knows will be rejected. "We have to hope=20
the Indians don't respond in a ham-handed manner. They can be=20
ham-handed," says a senior U.S. official. India has said that it has=20
solid evidence linking the bombers to their Pakistani backers but has=20
refused to share any data with the United States-or, apparently, with=20
Pakistan. Bush offered to help, and to send FBI agents to assist=20
India's investigation. "They turned down the president's offer," says=20
the U.S. official. India's ultimatum could destabilize or even bring=20
down Musharraf, who faces still formidable opposition from radical=20
Islamists. Or the war of words could escalate into an armed conflict=20
between two bitter enemies whose arsenals are stocked with dozens of=20
nukes. "Any mistake can ignite a fuse and start a war," says one=20
military analyst in New Delhi.
India-Pakistan & Beyond
Bush administration officials are also worried for more=20
selfish reasons. They are concerned that India's brinkmanship could=20
force Pakistan to ship tens of thousands of troops away from the=20
Afghanistan frontier. That would make it easier for fleeing members=20
of Al Qaeda to vanish into the rugged mountains of Pakistan-and=20
possibly into Kashmir (so far Pakistan has left those troops in=20
place).
=20=20=20=20=20=20=20=20
A STIFF HANDSHAKE
Last week the threat of war seemed to recede a bit. In the=20
first indication that India's pressure tactics may be working,=20
Musharraf rounded up hundreds of members of Islamic militant groups=20
active in Kashmir and agreed to withdraw support from two=20
"nonindigenous" groups, Lashkar-e-Taiba and Jaish-e-Muhammad. And at=20
a meeting of South Asian nations in Nepal on Saturday, the Pakistani=20
leader shook hands with a stiff but receptive Vajpayee, pledging his=20
"genuine and sincere friendship." Reportedly, Musharraf agreed as=20
well to dismantle the units of Pakistan's military intelligence that=20
provide support for Pakistan-based rebels. But when Vajpayee demanded=20
that Pakistan hand over 20 alleged terrorists, Musharraf refused,=20
insisting that they would be prosecuted in Pakistani courts. At the=20
same time, Islamic guerrillas showed no signs of easing their deadly=20
secessionist campaign. Rebels killed an Indian policeman in a grenade=20
attack in the heart of Srinagar, the Kashmiri capital; India charged=20
that Lashkar-e-Taiba threatened, in an e-mail to the country's=20
interior minister, to blow up the Taj Mahal. A spokesman for the=20
rebel group called the report "a lie."

India is gambling with an existential issue that goes back to the=20
modern roots of both nations. After the 1947 partition of India and=20
Pakistan, the maharajah of Kashmir, a Hindu, waffled on whether his=20
predominantly Muslim state should join India or Pakistan. Pakistan=20
dispatched troops to occupy Kashmir-triggering an Indian invasion and=20
a U.N.-brokered ceasefire that established a so-called Line of=20
Control dividing Pakistani rule from Indian rule. Each side has=20
refused to relinquish its claim to the territory. In 1989 secular=20
Kashmiri groups launched a violent independence struggle. Pakistan=20
later backed them, hoping to exploit the movement to achieve its own=20
goal of controlling Kashmir. Indeed, the anti-India "jihad" for=20
Kashmir has been the greatest unifying force in Pakistani politics in=20
recent years.
So Musharraf is risking his reputation, possibly even his=20
life, in cracking down. But the Pakistani president is playing for=20
bigger stakes now. He wants to abandon the semi-isolation his nation=20
has endured since the cold war, turning it into an economic basket=20
case. "He knows that if Pakistan is a home to all sorts of extremist=20
groups, then it's going to remain without a future," said one Western=20
diplomat in Islamabad. A Bush official adds that "if ever he is going=20
to move, the time is now."
Musharraf has told U.S. officials he will make a major speech=20
shortly in which he will discuss why extremists are dangerous to=20
Pakistan, even while pledging Pakistan will not abandon Kashmir.=20
"What we have to hope," says one worried U.S. official, "is that the=20
Indians don't raise the bar."

With Scott Johnson in Islamabad and Roy Gutman in Washington
=A9 2002 Newsweek, Inc.

_____

Time.com
January 7, 2002
http://www.time.com/time/world/article/0,8599,190848,00.html

Looking Down the Barrel
India and Pakistan rev up their militaries, raising fears of a new=20
war between nuclear-armed enemies
BY ANTHONY SPAETH/NEW DELHI
TAUSEFF MUSTAFA/AFP
The Indian Border Security Force patrols the increasingly fortified frontie=
r

Sunday, Jan. 06, 2002
Kirat Chand lives on one of the hottest spots on the globe, the=20
disputed border between India and Pakistan in Kashmir. Life is never=20
tranquil in his Galar village. Troops on either side continually take=20
potshots at each other. These days the situation is nothing less than=20
explosive. On Dec. 23, Pakistan lobbed an 81-mm mortar into Chand's=20
courtyard, the first time such heavy ordnance has been used in the=20
area since 1971. The mortar landed in mud and failed to detonate. Now=20
army engineers are trying to extricate it, whacking around the shell=20
with heavy pickaxes. "If that thing had burst," says Chand, observing=20
from a few feet away, "nothing would have survived."

In the final weeks of 2001, the entire subcontinent became an=20
unexploded bomb. The antagonistic neighbors geared up their war=20
machines to a level not seen in 30 years. Colossus India ranged tanks=20
and troops in strike formations along the border, deployed warships=20
in the Arabian Sea and moved medium-range missiles-capable of=20
carrying nuclear warheads-closer to Pakistan. A plan was publicized=20
to pull camouflage tarps over the stately Taj Mahal to protect it=20
from air raids. Vulnerable Pakistan moved troops and hardware from=20
its border with Afghanistan, where they were supposed to be stopping=20
fleeing al-Qaeda and Taliban fighters, to its Indian border, although=20
it did so without publicity. Both countries have said explicitly over=20
the past month that they were ready to go to war. It would be their=20
fourth major conflict in a half-century. And this time each side is=20
nuclear armed.

Would it come to war? The Bush Administration worked desperately to=20
head off that possibility, with Secretary of State Colin Powell at=20
one point camping in his office to work the phones to Islamabad and=20
New Delhi. The last thing Washington needs as it strives to complete=20
its goals in Afghanistan is a separate, new war in the region. That=20
would distract Pakistan, whose cooperation is essential to the=20
American strategy in Afghanistan, as well as complicate the fortunes=20
of its leader, Pervez Musharraf, who has proved a handy partner to=20
the U.S.

At the same time, the U.S. war against terrorism has actually helped=20
set the stage for a new conflagration on the subcontinent. The=20
proximate cause of the current tensions was the outrageous Dec. 13=20
attack on the Indian Parliament complex in New Delhi by suspected=20
Muslim rebels who India claims were tied to Pakistan. India's=20
response to the assault was conditioned by America's reaction to=20
Sept. 11. Indian Prime Minister Atal Behari Vajpayee immediately=20
equated the attack to the Sept. 11 devastation in the U.S., blamed=20
Pakistan for backing terrorists, demanded that Musharraf crack down=20
on them and made plain that the alternative was war. Late last week=20
the two leaders met at a regional conference in Kathmandu and even=20
shook hands-significant in tense times-but they were still far from=20
resolving the crisis. Musharraf talked of distinctions between=20
terrorists and freedom fighters, while Vajpayee said he would welcome=20
friendship as long as Pakistan prevented terrorists from "mindless=20
violence" in India.

The Sept. 11 comparison has been strenuously promoted by India. "Dec.=20
13" is now accepted parlance among Indian politicians and=20
journalists, even if the analogy is a stretch; 14 people, including=20
the five attackers, were killed that day, and despite the apparent=20
intentions of the assailants, the Parliament was left standing.=20
Still, in the post-Sept. 11 environment, India finds itself on a new=20
moral plateau. Its government has vehemently protested Pakistan's=20
active support of armed insurgents-which is well known, even if=20
Islamabad has denied it. In the past, the world paid little=20
attention; it seemed to be a Hatfield and McCoy situation. The U.S.=20
war on terrorism changed that. "It's a different world now," Indian=20
Defense Minister George Fernandes told Time. "Sept. 11 made the U.S.=20
realize the damage that a couple of terrorists can cause." While=20
fearful that New Delhi's military maneuvers would set off a new war,=20
Washington-to avoid hypocrisy-had to mute its protest. Though feeling=20
protective toward its new pal Musharraf, Washington pressed him to=20
rein in the militants.

So far, Musharraf is doing just that, buying what Washington assesses=20
will be a cooling-off period of several weeks. "We now have a=20
breathing space," says a senior Bush Administration official.=20
However, it remains unclear whether Musharraf's actions will appease=20
India sufficiently to reverse the escalation toward war. Clearly,=20
neither side wants to unleash its ultimate arsenals. "Nobody is going=20
to use the weapon," says Fernandes. But, notes a State Department=20
official, "it's a question of unintended consequences. You never knew=20
where it would end up, and you always knew they had nuclear weapons."

New fighting over Kashmir, which both India and Pakistan lay claim=20
to, has loomed as a possible complication in America's battle against=20
terrorism ever since President Bush declared war. Until then, the=20
U.S. gave Pakistan the cold shoulder, in punishment for its 1998=20
nuclear test, and snubbed its leader, Musharraf, who came to power in=20
a coup. Now, suddenly in need of Pakistan as a staging ground for the=20
war in Afghanistan, the U.S. was embracing the country and offering=20
$600 million in aid, a figure that will reach $1 billion by the end=20
of the year. Mostly Hindu India, which has been at odds with mostly=20
Muslim Pakistan since the departing British partitioned the=20
subcontinent into the two countries in 1947, grew fearful that the=20
U.S., which had been growing closer to India, would now tilt toward=20
Pakistan. Then, on Oct. 1, Muslim extremists attacked the state=20
legislature building in Srinagar, in Indian-controlled Kashmir,=20
killing 38 people. In mid-October, while Secretary Powell was=20
visiting Islamabad, the Indians shelled Pakistani army positions in=20
Kashmir, breaking a 10-month cease-fire and reminding the U.S. that=20
India would not be ignored.

Next came the Dec. 13 rampage. At 11:40 that day, one of the=20
Toontown-type sedans used by Indian bigwigs got through the=20
Parliament gates in New Delhi because it had an official-looking=20
light on top and a home ministry decal on the windshield. Five=20
militants got out and started firing assault rifles and grenades as=20
they moved toward three separate entrances of the structure. None got=20
inside; one man, who was wired with explosives, detonated himself=20
near the main gate, through which he could have reached the chamber=20
filled with legislators. After some 20 minutes of gunfire, all five=20
militants were dead, along with eight paramilitary security guards=20
and a gardener who was caught in the crossfire.

The suicide mission wasn't terribly sophisticated. The windshield=20
decal that gave the terrorists access to the compound was anything=20
but official. It read, in fractured English: "No body allows to stop=20
this car. India is very bad country and we hate india we want to=20
destroy india ... brother bush he is also a very bad person he will=20
be next target." Once the carnage was over, the government recovered=20
the terrorists' cell phones, with records of recent calls to Kashmir=20
and Pakistan. Arrests in New Delhi and Kashmir came up with some=20
alleged collaborators.

The police put an alleged accomplice, Mohammad Afzal, in front of=20
television cameras, where he admitted helping the terrorists reach=20
New Delhi from India-controlled Kashmir. New Delhi announced it was=20
fully satisfied that Pakistan was behind the plot, though evidence=20
was scant. In Islamabad the expected hot denials had an unmistakable=20
timbre of truth. In the wake of Sept. 11, such an assault on India=20
was probably the worst thing that could happen to Musharraf & Co. The=20
general turned President condemned the attack. But it hardly mattered=20
what Musharraf said. India already realized that the attack on=20
Parliament, though similar to suicidal assaults of the past in more=20
remote reaches, could alter the goalposts of its conflict with=20
Pakistan-thanks to Sept. 11.

For 12 years India has been trying to put down an independence=20
insurgency in the part of Kashmir it holds. Its official line is that=20
the insurgency is fueled by Pakistan, not by the Kashmiri people-that=20
it is a proxy war. The world has disregarded that argument, knowing=20
India was stubbornly ignoring its own problems with the mostly Muslim=20
Kashmiris, who have revived a call for a plebiscite that the U.N.=20
promised them in 1949 to determine whether they would be part of=20
India or part of Pakistan.

Pakistan, on its side, did aid the insurgency, although it claimed it=20
gave only moral and political support. One thing it never denied was=20
that militants were based on its soil, many in Pakistan-controlled=20
Kashmir. That's a dangerous claim in the post-Sept. 11 world. It=20
means you are harboring terrorists, just as the Taliban harbored=20
al-Qaeda. "America must ensure that those who are part of the war on=20
terrorism are themselves not guilty of providing a safe haven to=20
terrorists," proclaims hard-line Indian Home Minister L.K. Advani,=20
referring to Pakistan.

New Delhi has withdrawn its top diplomat from Pakistan, canceled=20
train and bus service across the border and widely publicized its=20
troop and hardware movements, always threatening to go further. "The=20
mood of the nation is to hit back," says Sahib Singh Verma, a senior=20
leader of the ruling Bharatiya Janata Party. Indians were instructed=20
by the media what the logical escalation of pressure would be:=20
limited air strikes, sorties across the border to hit terrorist=20
camps, perhaps an abrogation of a 41-year-old treaty that would deny=20
Pakistan vital waters from rivers that originate in India. After=20
that: all-out war.

Militarily, Musharraf could do nothing but match India's escalation,=20
moving troops to the 1,800-mile border and ordering retaliatory=20
shelling across the Line of Control in Kashmir. Politically, he was=20
being pushed to the wall. For more than 50 years, Pakistan has been=20
dedicated to "liberating" Kashmir from India, and Musharraf has gone=20
further than most in pursuing that goal. As army chief of staff, he=20
ran Pakistan's six-week (unsuccessful) battle for the sparsely=20
inhabited mountains of Kargil in Indian-controlled Kashmir. Most=20
Pakistan watchers knew that Pakistan would have to change its Kashmir=20
policy after Sept. 11. "We hoped they'd have longer," says a Western=20
diplomat in Islamabad.

To turn away from the Kashmiri rebels, especially under pressure from=20
India, was a lot to ask of a Pakistani leader. It was hard enough for=20
Musharraf, under U.S. pressure, to abandon the Taliban, whom Pakistan=20
had supported before Sept. 11. But the Kashmir cause is much closer=20
to the hearts of Pakistanis, who partly define themselves through=20
their opposition to India. Anyway, Musharraf had few options. "If he=20
didn't give the appearance of responding to Indian concerns, he might=20
have a war on his hands, and it would be a war he'd lose," notes=20
Robert Hathaway, director of the Asia program at the Woodrow Wilson=20
Center, a Washington think tank.

Musharraf started slowly, banning the two organizations that India=20
linked to the Dec. 13 attack, Jaish-e-Muhammad and Lashkar-e-Taiba,=20
and freezing their bank accounts. Then, under U.S. pressure, he had=20
the groups' leaders, 22 of their henchmen and more than 100 other=20
extremists arrested in the name of domestic security, and instructed=20
his intelligence agency to scale back its support of insurgents going=20
into Kashmir.

In fact, since Musharraf took over the country in a bloodless coup in=20
1999, he has wanted to crack down on the country's extremist=20
religious groups, which often feed people into militant=20
organizations, including those fighting for Kashmir. It's not a task=20
for the fainthearted. Three weeks ago, the brother of Pakistan=20
Interior Minister Moinuddin Haider was gunned down in the port city=20
of Karachi because, police believe, Haider was outspoken against=20
fanatical religious groups.

On Dec. 25, Musharraf gave a speech against "wicked, bigoted"=20
religious extremism, saying it could lead "to our own internal=20
destruction." But even if he had his own reasons, once India demanded=20
a crackdown, it became politically dicey for Musharraf to pull it=20
off. "The shriller the Indians, the more difficult it is for=20
Pakistan," notes a Western diplomat in Islamabad. Still, Musharraf's=20
crackdown against the militants has at least impressed Washington.=20
"It's real, and it's going to continue," says a senior State=20
Department official.

The U.S. has been intensely involved in mediating the dispute.=20
Because Washington is friendlier with both India and Pakistan than=20
ever before, its role has been elevated beyond recognition. In the=20
three weeks after Dec. 13, Powell phoned Musharraf four times and=20
Indian Foreign Minister Jaswant Singh three times, pleading with both=20
sides to "slow down" their escalation toward war. President Bush=20
called Musharraf and Vajpayee as well. Along the way, Powell pleaded=20
with Musharraf to act more forcefully against the militants. Then, in=20
every call to Singh, he emphasized what Musharraf was doing.

As the situation evolved, Powell got into the details of the army=20
maneuvers. Noting that the Pakistanis were acting against the=20
militants, Powell told Singh, "You need to reciprocate." He asked=20
that India halt its soldiers at their assembly points instead of=20
transporting them to the front lines; late last week New Delhi=20
announced it would do just that. For Washington, which still needs=20
Pakistan's assistance in hunting down al-Qaeda's Osama bin Laden and=20
the Taliban's Mullah Mohammed Omar, the stakes are enormous. "A war=20
between India and Pakistan would make the conflict in Afghanistan an=20
afterthought," says Hathaway. "You could kiss goodbye any hopes for=20
capturing Osama bin Laden."

Of course, on the ground in Kashmir, the stakes are high and=20
personal. On both sides of the Line of Control, people are fleeing=20
border villages in fear of war. They aren't the only ones on the=20
move. At this time of year, Muzaffarabad, the capital of=20
Pakistan-controlled Kashmir, is usually teeming with teenagers in=20
camouflage jackets who have arrived from Pakistan proper for winter=20
training as jihadis. But the young radicals these days are sullenly=20
waiting for buses, headed not for war but for home. Militant groups=20
confirm that they have been told by the Pakistani government to wind=20
up their operations, at least for now, and to evict "guest=20
mujahedin," non-Kashmiri volunteers. The biggest training camp in=20
Muzaffarabad, run by the now banned Lashkar-e-Taiba, is quiet, as are=20
its sister facilities not far away. "People no longer sleep at the=20
camps," says a Kashmiri militant in Aath Maqam, a village near the=20
Line of Control. "There is a fear of attack by India." In the past=20
couple of weeks, pro-jihad flags and posters that lined the streets=20
have been hauled in or scrubbed away.

Commanders of the insurgency insist that despite Pakistan's=20
crackdown, they can continue sending infiltrators across the loc,=20
which has many secret passages. "We know we cannot operate fully=20
without government help. But we can carry on. Instead of 10, we can=20
send two people into India now," says a Lashkar militant. But without=20
the help Pakistan once offered, life will become tougher for the=20
militants. They will face two enemy forces-one Pakistani, the other=20
Indian.

If war between India and Pakistan is averted, the countries will=20
still have plenty of challenges between them-and on their own.=20
Musharraf will have to explain to his people his crackdown on=20
terrorism, which he used to call by a more glorified name. Lots of=20
those people lived for the jihad that is now under such attack. "When=20
I was a child, my mother wanted me to get settled in London," says=20
Abu Haroon, 28, returned to Pakistan after two years fighting in=20
Kashmir. "But I opted for jihad after one of my friends died in=20
India. I abandoned my education and don't know anything else than to=20
fight and die over there." Haroon is a walking metaphor for his=20
nation. Pakistan's main moral purpose for decades has been to stand=20
up to India, and Kashmir has been its principal platform.

India has its own worries. The indigenous militants in Kashmir now=20
think they have a fighting chance-and they're as bloodthirsty as=20
their visiting colleagues-at forcing India to start addressing=20
decades of grievances. Given the stakes of a new India- Pakistan war,=20
the rest of the world, especially Washington, might now become=20
involved in untangling the Kashmir mess, a notion India has long=20
abhorred. Which goes to show that when the world starts changing, no=20
one knows where it's going to stop.

-Reported by Hannah Bloch and Syed Talat Hussain/Islamabad, Meenakshi=20
Ganguly/Galar, Ghulam Hasnain/ Muzaffarabad, Yusuf Jameel/Srinagar,=20
Sankarshan Thakur/New Delhi and Douglas Waller/Washington

_/_/_/_/_/_/_/_/_/_/_/_/_/_/_/_/_/_/_/_/_/_/_/_/_/_/_/_/_/

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