[sacw] SACW #2. | 29 Jan. 02

[Harsh Kapoor]

South Asia Citizens Wire - Dispatch #2. | 29 January 2002

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#1. India: Political obscenity
The attempt to put up Bajrang Dal activist Dara Singh, the man=20
identified as the man who led the mob that burnt alive Leprosy worker=20
Graham Stuart Staines and his sons=92 Timothy and Phillip in Orissa in=20
January 1999, from the Ghaziabad Assembly constituency of Uttar=20
Pradesh, is a political obscenity that marks low ebb in the annals of=20
parliamentary democracy and secularism in India. The returning=20
officer rejected the nomination on a technicality, but the national,=20
outrage continues at the blot on the system.
(John Dayal)
#2. Anxieties of Hindu Right in Everyday Realm (Charu Gupta)
#3. Religious Radicals Facing Backlash in Pakistan
Families Bitter Over Fate of Recruits to Taliban Cause; Young Men=20
Were 'Betrayed by the Mullahs' (Doug Struck)

________________________

#1.

26 Jan 2002

Political obscenity

The attempt to put up Bajrang Dal activist Dara Singh, the man=20
identified as the man who led the mob that burnt alive Leprosy worker=20
Graham Stuart Staines and his sons=92 Timothy and Phillip in Orissa in=20
January 1999, from the Ghaziabad Assembly constituency of Uttar=20
Pradesh, is a political obscenity that marks low ebb in the annals of=20
parliamentary democracy and secularism in India. The returning=20
officer rejected the nomination on a technicality, but the national,=20
outrage continues at the blot on the system.

By John Dayal

It was the small print of the Election Commission=92s technical manual=20
on holding of elections under the Representation of Peoples Act that=20
possibly saved the electoral system of India=92s parliamentary=20
democracy from shame last week. The district magistrate of Ghaziabad,=20
a small town which is almost a suburb of the national capital of New=20
Delhi, rejected the nomination papers of a man called Dara Singh,=20
currently in a prison in Orissa, saying that the persons who had=20
nominated Dara was not personally present to file the papers. If the=20
man had been present in the court room Dara Singh would have become=20
one of the thousand of aspirants, many with a criminal record, who=20
aspire to become law makers in state assemblies and parliament,=20
hoping to make a killing, financially, or to wash off a murder they=20
may have committed on their way to the top. There was a chance he may=20
have won.

One of the most intriguing part of the entire drama is that the top=20
leadership of the major parties chose to keep quite about Dara=20
Singh=92s nomination to fight the election. Perhaps it would have been=20
difficult for all of them, not excluding Prime Minister Atal Behari=20
Vajpayee=92s Bharatiya Janata Dal, to condemn the political obscenity=20
that Dara=92s nomination represented. Perhaps they knew that they too =96=20
certainly the BJP and possibly many of the others =96 would ultimately=20
use slogans and campaign points similar to those that Dara=92s=20
nomination represented. I am not saying that the BJP was backing=20
Dara=92s nomination, but their silence confirms their own communal=20
agenda.

In case people have forgotten, Dara Singh is the man who has been=20
identified as the leader of the killer mob that in the middle of the=20
night of 22nd January 1999 surrounded a village and burnt alive=20
Australian missionary Graham Stuart Staines and his young sons=20
timothy and Phillip as they slept in their jeep. Earlier, he had=20
killed a Muslim trader Rehman, and soon thereafter, his gang murdered=20
Catholic priest Father Arul Das. Dara Singh was a worker of the=20
Bajrang Dal and an electoral campaigner of the BJP, a self-proclaimed=20
defender of Hinduism and the cow.

President K R Narayanan called the Staines murder a black mark on=20
Indian civilization. The entire world condemned it. The Union Home=20
minister, Lal Krishan Advani however thought it fit to exonerate the=20
Bajrang Dal of all culpability saying he knew the group and it was=20
innocent. Eventually, Dara Singh was arrested, but not before the=20
fundamentalist elements had thoroughly communalized the tribal belts=20
of Orissa and had raised a so-called Sena in his defence. The police=20
themselves were less than harsh on Dara, merrily allowing him to talk=20
to television crews on his way to court and others treating him much=20
like a political prisoner and not the murderer that is.

Eminent jurist and Supreme court lawyer Rajeev Dhawan put the issue=20
in some perspective in an anguished piece in The Hindu when he wrote,=20
and I quote: Like the destruction of the Babri Masjid in 1992, the=20
murder of a missionary in 1999 must give us pause. Communal history,=20
now being officially written into children's textbooks, is being=20
reinforced by intrigue, murder and mayhem. An effort is being made to=20
redesign India as a powder keg to blow up its unique and unparalleled=20
history. But, India's electoral politics knows no limits. Those=20
accused of committing ghastly communal crimes are being rewarded as=20
politicians. How do we honour Staines' memory? One way is to remember=20
his death as a ghastly monument of contemporary history. The other=20
way is to reward the alleged goondas and goons by inducting them as=20
politicians. After the Staines' murder, the Justice Wadhwa Committee=20
examined these events and expressed anguish, but refused to take a=20
conclusive view on the political links between the alleged=20
perpetrators of the murder and the various communal outfits, which=20
are friends of the BJP. Justice Wadhwa's report has been criticised.=20
But the story does not end there. After the Staines' murder, Dara=20
Singh and others were accused of the crime. But humility does not=20
come easily to those accused of communal crimes and a new=20
organisation called the Dara Sena (Dara's Army) was created to=20
protect the faith. Dara Singh himself has been socially elevated as a=20
Dharma Rakshak (defender of the faith). Even though in custody, his=20
message is clear. He wants to make a transition from rabid=20
communalism into politics to stand for elections in Uttar Pradesh.=20
Some members of the VHP applaud this. The script of the link between=20
politics and the murder, which had eluded Justice Wadhwa, is now=20
being written as future communal history. Where do these political=20
links take us? Why Dara Singh? Why Uttar Pradesh? The battle for=20
Uttar Pradesh is the biggest electoral war in the Assembly elections.=20
With over 140 million people, the State is greater in demographic=20
size than most countries of the world. The BJP desperately needs to=20
win there because it rules only in the smaller States such as=20
Uttaranchal and Himachal Pradesh. The trump card of the BJP and its=20
allies in the State is Ayodhya. At the Kumbh Mela in 2001, the=20
Ayodhya campaign to build a temple on the site of the Babri Masjid=20
was reinforced following Mr. Vajpayee's "Musings from Kumarakom".=20
Since then, there have been vast preparations amidst weak protests.=20
The construction of the proposed Ayodhya temple will commence on=20
March 12. By clever interpolations, it is made out that Mr. Vajpayee=20
opposes what the VHP proposes to dispose. Into this enters Dara Singh=20
- the dharma rakshak. His proposed presence in this election=20
underlines the worst of Indian politics. It has both political and=20
social implications. Politically, the communal factor is set ablaze.=20
Socially, people like Dara Singh are set up as an example to ordinary=20
people as the heroes of our times. This is done unashamedly.=94

In New Delhi and later in Lucknow, the All India Christian Council=20
called upon political leaders to denounce the Dara nomination. At the=20
Lucknow Press Conference, senior journalists asked why so much was=20
being made of the nomination, for after all had not the female dacoit=20
Phoolan Devi won a seat in Parliament before being gunned down, and=20
had not, at another level Mr. Lal Krishan Advani himself been member=20
of the Central government though indicted in the demolition of the=20
Babri Masjid. It was a clever interpolation, though all three cases=20
spelt the weakness of the democratic system to prevent criminality=20
from overwhelming the electoral procedures.

Dhawan comments: =93Politicians claim refuge in the law. Their=20
effective defence is that the law permits them to nominate communal=20
thugs and goondas as candidates for elections as long as such thugs=20
and goondas have not been convicted of a disqualificatory crime. No=20
doubt Section 8 of the Representation of the People Act, 1951=20
disqualifies those guilty of listed socio-economic crimes and=20
offences punished with more than 2 years imprisonment. This means=20
that a person may be accused of hundreds of murders and even=20
chargesheeted for them, but he will not be disqualified as long as he=20
has not been convicted of the crime. The Law Commission's report on=20
electoral reforms (1999) says that those chargesheeted by a court=20
should also be disqualified. This solution is not perfect but may=20
merit consideration in the face of the rising tide of the=20
criminalisation of politics. But what if the law permits accused=20
goondas, thugs and murderers to fight elections? Surely the high=20
command in India's political parties should not be looking at legal=20
loopholes but for opportunities to develop and sustain healthy=20
constitutional practices. There is a distinction between mere=20
legality, constitutional validity and constitutional practice. The=20
law may permit certain things, which though constitutionally valid=20
are nevertheless not sound as constitutional practice."

That Dara Singh=92s jumping into the fray had a design much bigger than=20
merely getting him a rent-free legislator=92s flat in his home state of=20
Uttar Pradesh was obvious from the hype that surrounded the=20
announcement by the Manuvadi Krantikari Morcha that was the official=20
platform for the killer to join national politics. Announcing Dara's=20
candidature at a function in NOIDA, Delhi=92s posh industrial and=20
residential suburb, Morcha president R K Bhardwaj said Dara Singh "is=20
not a criminal. He was merely driven to defend Hindu religion from=20
Christian and Islamic terrorism. The function was also attended by=20
the Dara Singh Bachao Samiti convenor, Mukesh Jain. Jain described=20
Dara as a "great revolutionary" and "Hindu dharma rakshak (protector=20
of Hinduism). Dara is like Robin Hood, har dil aziz (everyone's=20
darling). He did what even the government could not do - check=20
Christian terrorism in India. Bhardwaj and other members of the Dara=20
support structure launched a virulent and poisonous assault on=20
Christianity, Islam, and missionaries, justifying all of Dara's=20
actions.

The police in Orissa obliged as Dara explained his own candidature to=20
television crews saying the Dharmarakhyaka Sri Dara Sena has been set=20
up specially to defend him in public and help him win. The KMM has=20
just one objective: to re-convert all Muslims, Christians etc, and=20
bring them back to the Hindutva fold.

Although there have been no mass murders of Christians since 1999,=20
the political rhetoric and the ground action of the Hindutva Parivar=20
has increased manifold, and not just in states where the BJP and its=20
allies are in power such as Orissa and Gujarat. States where the=20
Congress rules, and these include Karnataka, Rajasthan and Madhya=20
Pradesh, have seen an acidic rise in the Sangh=92s activities against=20
minorities in general and Christians in particular.

Thee recent developments have been the RSS mass meeting in Jhabua,=20
the district in Madhya Pradesh where Catholic nuns were gang raped=20
three years ago, the distribution of sharp Trishul-like weapons in=20
Rajasthan and the twin declaration of opening 3.5 village temples in=20
Madhya Pradesh and an equal number of one-teacher Sangh schools in=20
the tribal belt in the next one year or so.

The Indian Express correspondent, Yogesh Vajpayee, wrote a report=20
that shook the nation and the Indian Church. The Page One report=20
narrated the RSS project to baptised the tribals into its ideology=20
and its version of the Hindu faith. =93What is quite apparently an=20
orchestrated anti-Christian campaign will culminate in a Hindu Sangam=20
in Jhabua on January 16. RSS chief of Indore region Anila Daga claims=20
that such devalayas have already been set up in 60 per cent of the=20
homes. ''Our activists have stepped up their propaganda war to expose=20
the real nature of Christian missionaries,'' he asserts.

Vajpayee said Madhya Pradesh home minister Mahendra Baudh had visited=20
Jhabua a month back and threatened to ban the Hindu Sangam but it had=20
little effect. The RSS remained undaunted. Apart from circulating=20
pamphlets explaining how ''foreign missionaries coming from thousands=20
of kilometres away are converting people through fraud'', it started=20
a quiz programme for school children. The purpose, according to Daga,=20
is ''to test their awareness about the threats to Hindu society''.=20
Sample the questions: What is the reason for the fall in Hindu=20
population in certain areas? Why do Hindus and not Muslims embrace=20
other faiths? and do the foreign missionaries commit a crime when=20
they force conversion on tribals?

The Express said the RSS campaign came in the wake of recent attacks=20
on Churches and missionaries in Jhabua, Dhar, Indore and Ujjain=20
districts of the Malwa-Nimar region. ''The rape of four nuns in=20
Jhabua may not have been the handiwork of any RSS outfit but=20
investigations into these recent attacks show that there is a pattern=20
behind them,=92=92 said a senior MP police official. The area has=20
witnessed several clashes and attacks during the past six months,=94 he=20
points out.

In Jhabua there have been half-a-dozen attacks on Churches and=20
Christian institutions since last August and the virus seems to be=20
spreading to other districts. A group of hooligans assaulted four=20
Christian youths near Himmatgarh village in the neighbouring Dhar=20
district last September. Unidentified persons intercepted the victims=20
at night when they were returning from a village where they had=20
screened a film on Christ. In August, a 30-year-old Nun of Aradhana=20
Sadan - a school-cum-hospital run by the Sisters of the Adoration of=20
Blessed Sacrament - was shot at and injured in Ujjain. Last December,=20
five armed men had raided a Church in Dultaria village in Rajgarh=20
district and assaulted Catholic priests and nuns before looting Rs=20
358,000, ornaments and other valuables. The next month armed=20
hooligans forced their way into the home of 60-year-old priest C=20
Alphonse in Gwalior and attacked him with sticks and rods. In yet=20
another recent incident, miscreants demolished a small chapel=20
belonging to Pentecostal Christian mission in Gopalpura village of=20
Jhabua. During a visit by Congress President Sonia Gandhi to Indore=20
last year, activists of the Sanskritik Jagaran Manch had attacked=20
three Churches a few hours before she was to open an orphanage run by=20
missionaries.

The fears of Christian groups seemed justified when RSS supreme=20
Kupahalli Sudershan in his speeches at Jhabua came down heavily on=20
the Church. He certainly has learnt nothing from his so called=20
dialogue with Church groups in recent months.

After the "Hindu Sangam" organised by the RSS under the aegis of its=20
frontal organisation, Sewa Bharati, Sudhir Singh of the Times of=20
India reported that nearly two lakh adivasis, hands lifted in air,=20
intoned an oath to save the honour of the Hindu religion, and, if=20
necessary, fight for its cause with tan, man, dhan at the resolution=20
passed, in the presence of RSS sarsangachalak K S Sudershan, also=20
made it amply clear that anyone trying to induce a Hindu to change=20
his faith by dangling the carrot of economic betterment, or threats,=20
was "criminal" under the Madhya Pradesh Freedom of Religion Act 1960.=20
The collector's office said there were 119 buses, 331 trucks, 614=20
jeeps, 131 tractors, and 1,431 two-wheelers, bringing people to the=20
rally. A glider went about showering petals from the heavens.

Singh wrote: Since the "Sangam" had been conceived with the specific=20
objective of restoring adivasi faith in simple, honest, muscular=20
Hindutva, the good Lord Hanuman being its most potent symbol, most=20
speakers confined their speeches to the evil of conversion, and the=20
innate openness and all-embracing aspect of Hinduism. Sudershan said=20
the massive turnout was the fruit of three-years labour during which=20
342 single-teacher schools had been set up by the Sewa Bharati. Quite=20
apart from organising Ganesh "visarjan" at 22 places, 3,500=20
"dharmveers" (pracharaks) worked round-the-clock in the 2,455=20
villages of Jhabua. Statuettes of Hanuman had been installed in three=20
lakh homes, and a locket of the monkey god put around the neck of 28=20
lakh tribals.

There is an early warning for all secular groups at what is happening=20
in Jhabua and the tribal belt of India, in the juxtaposition of the=20
tribal devals in enforced sanskriticised Hinduism, the opening of the=20
one-teacher Ekal schools or shishu mandirs whose teachers are trained=20
RSS cadres and whose curricula and text books are beyond the pail of=20
any social or administrative review, and the final presence of lakh=20
and lacks of murderous weapons masquerading as religious trishuls.

The Sangh Parivar is neither coy nor apologetic about its actions and=20
about its plans. The dialogues with some Christian groups have not=20
made it more reasonable. If anything, it has become the bolder after=20
assessing the divisions in the church and among the minorities in=20
general.

It will not hesitate from violence, if anyone where to confront it,=20
or if someone were to bid bold to challenge its agenda.

The onus is on the state governments, and finally on the Central government=
.

Box item:

EKAL VIDYALAYAS
RSS pracharak run one-teacher schools.
(site:=20
<http://www.ekalvidya.org/movement.shtml>http://www.ekalvidya.org/movement.=
shtml)

Ekal Vidyalaya is a unique concept that is bringing non-formal=20
education to the doorstep of a village, where children are offered=20
five years of schooling free.
The Class: An Ekal Vidyalaya class has around 30-40 children in the=20
age group of 4-15 years, and is often conducted under the shade of=20
the biggest tree. All the study material is provided free of cost to=20
the students.
The Teacher: The teachers are locally educated youths (who have=20
passed class 8 or 9) and are specially trained for the purpose, and=20
become key figures and catalysts of change and character building for=20
the entire village.
The Curriculum: The curriculum has been developed by a panel of=20
educationists in consultation with villagers. Besides imparting basic=20
alphabetic and numeric knowledge, great emphasis is placed on health=20
and hygiene, character building, moral values and sanskaars. Other=20
skills for the development of the entire community are also imparted.
The Cost: The entire setup operates on a shoe-string budget, and it=20
only costs $365 (Rs. 15,000) to run an Ekal Vidyalaya for a whole=20
year.

Statewise Details Of Existing Schools=20

State Aug - 01 Mar - 02 Aug - 02

North East 660 690 960
West Bengal 325 325 540
Orissa 510 510 600
Bihar 270 450 450
Jharkhand 720 970 1060
Uttar Pradesh 420 715 1150
North Zone 120 450 600
Rajasthan 240 480 780
Gujarat 300 390 570
Maharashtra 450 630 930
Madhya Pradesh 1140 2370 2880
Chhatisgarh 660 1260 1530
Andhra Pradesh 540 1000 1080
Karnataka 60 240 360
Tamil Nadu 180 240 270
Kerala 90 180 240
Total 6685 11100 14000

They started with 6,685 in August of 2001
They hope to have 111,001 of them by March of 2002
And 140,000 by August of 2002

______

#2.

Economic and Political Weekly
January 19 , 2002
Commentary

ANXIETIES OF HINDU RIGHT IN EVERYDAY REALM

The attempts by the activists of the Vishwa Hindu Parishad and the=20
Hindu Jagran Manch of Kotdwar, a town in Uttaranchal, to forcefully=20
stop Hindu women from visiting Muslim male tailors illustrate the=20
inclination of the Hindu communalists to propagate the image of the=20
sexually charged, lustful Muslim male, violating the pure body of the=20
Hindu woman. The VHP is trying to operate in both the private and the=20
public domain, attempting to monopolise the field of everyday=20
representation.
by Charu Gupta

In the campaigns and discourses of the Hindu Right in India, gender=20
has become an important means of defining and contributing to sharper=20
divisions between Hindus and Muslims and has critically intersected=20
with assertions of patriarchy and community identity. This phenomenon=20
has been observed across the globe among fundamentalist, racial and=20
communal groups. What concerns me here are the attempts that are=20
being made by the Hindu Right, especially to keep Hindu women away=20
from Muslim men and from symbols, customs and occupations perceived=20
as 'Muslim', and the fantasies and cultural discourses surrounding=20
daily interactions between Hindu women and Muslim men. What is also=20
significant here is the extension of this control over women to the=20
realm of everyday. Not only any intimate liaison but even day-to-day=20
contact with Muslims is perceived as a serious threat, leading to a=20
new set of instructions for Hindu women. Further, it has also become=20
another way to attack the 'Other'.

It is in this context that attempts by the activists of the Vishwa=20
Hindu Parishad and the Hindu Jagran Manch of Kotdwar, a town in=20
Uttaranchal, to forcefully stop Hindu women from visiting Muslim male=20
tailors (The Indian Express, Delhi, November 16, 2001, p 1) need to=20
be seen.

Communalism has usually been linked to violence. However,=20
'spectacular' moments of strife do not tell us the full story of=20
communal antagonisms. Conflicts are often generated from the=20
frictions of everyday life. Michel de Certeau highlights the=20
importance of everyday life and practices, like reading, talking,=20
walking and cooking, which should not be treated as merely an obscure=20
background of social activity. Agnes Heller argues that a person's=20
everyday life consists in a reproduction of a current society; it=20
reflects the socialisation of nature and the degree and manner of its=20
humanisation. Further, larger public arenas tend to be more=20
impersonal or notional, while the everyday is more personal and=20
interactive, and therefore, possibly, more pervasive. Larger=20
collectivities are also easier to disparage and protest against=20
because of their visibility, while daily individual interaction is=20
more hidden and muted and thus more difficult to control. The realm=20
of the everyday is also crucial from a gender perspective, as women=20
are ubiquitous and often play a central role in this arena. And=20
communal assertions find their expression in everyday life, as well=20
as in organised politics and religion. Especially at a time, when the=20
BJP is in power, both at the centre and in UP, riots and violence may=20
lead to a law and order problem and a debunking of the government. It=20
is much 'safer' for the Hindu Right to continue with its communal=20
agenda in the realm of the everyday.

Through its recent campaign of attacking Muslim tailors, the VHP is=20
attempting to outlaw spheres of Hindu-Muslim interaction. The targets=20
of attack also include beauticians, barbers and hairdressers. There=20
are around 20 tailors and 30 beauty parlours in this town of Pauri=20
Garhwal. The tailors are predominantly Muslim. Further, Arif Siddiqui=20
runs three beauty parlours in the town. In the month of October last=20
year, the local police registered an anonymous complaint from a=20
woman, alleging harassment by Siddiqui, who was then detained by=20
police for three days. However, the address given by the complainant=20
turned out to be fictitious. The 'complaint', though, was pretext=20
enough for Bajrang Dal and Hindu Jagran Manch activists to ransack=20
Siddiqui's parlours. These are attempts to divide people on communal=20
lines and extend occupational divisions along religious affiliations.

Moreover, they signify endeavours to terrorise Muslims engaged in=20
tailoring and other vocations and to demonise the 'Other', a part of=20
identity politics. Attack on Muslims in any form provides the Hindu=20
Right a common reference point, significant for larger mobilisation.=20
The attack on tailors, critically associated with women's bodies,=20
reiterates certain cultural stereotypes of the Muslim male, like=20
their 'lack of character', lecherous and lustful behaviour, which are=20
constantly at work at the unconscious level.

It is to the Hindu women that this campaign mainly addresses itself,=20
due to the very nature of targets. However, this also reveals an=20
anxiety about the particular relationship of women to the everyday=20
arena, and a fear that they are deciding many aspects of their lives=20
on their own. Exchanges with vegetable-sellers, bargaining for=20
commodities of everyday use, shopping for everyday use items, getting=20
their clothes stitched, going to beauty parlours, are domains in=20
which women play an important role, expressing as it does a part of=20
their daily material and social life. Women's day-to-day lives -=20
their forms of entertainment, cultural practices, religious feelings,=20
the people from whom they buy objects of daily consumption, to whom=20
they visit for their clothes - are coming under the scrutiny of the=20
Hindu Right.

Implicit in the attack on Muslim male tailors and beauticians is also=20
the fear of Hindu women losing control of their sexuality and falling=20
to Muslim male desires. An economic and social boycott is intended to=20
facilitate the isolation of Hindu women from Muslims and to reduce=20
the anxieties of Hindu men. Thus, Hindu women's lives, experiences=20
and identities are made a matter of instruction by men. A new=20
language is employed for women vis-a-vis Muslims, telling them how to=20
move, whom to talk to, where to go, and what to do. Various places of=20
possible contact between Hindu women and Muslim men, public and=20
private, are coming under this ambit.

Women are being particularly instructed not to let Muslim tailors=20
take their measurements, and instead hand over their own clothes as=20
measurements. Or, if they must visit the tailor, be accompanied by a=20
woman escort. Tailors have been ordered to paste these instructions=20
at their places of work. Beauticians, barbers and hairdressers have=20
been told to employ only female staff.

These injunctions send multiple messages. They endorse the=20
vulnerability of the Hindu woman and the strength of the Hindu man,=20
who is reasserting his power over her. They construct notions of=20
decency, propriety and dharma; they reveal a growing suspicion of any=20
aspect of the cultural, social and economic life of Hindu women,=20
which is perceived to be outside the control of the Hindu community.=20
Women have competence in everyday life. They exercise social=20
influence through the family and outside the home, through their=20
nurturing power and social networks, through their endurance and=20
flexibility, and through sexual relations. Thus, women's practices=20
are attacked in the name of religion. There is a desire to spread=20
norms of female seclusion, especially from Muslim men, in order to=20
create a single Hindu standard and community.

The Hindu Right's focus on Muslim male tailors and beauticians also=20
reveals their anxieties about Hindu masculinity and patriarchy. It is=20
the popularity of Muslim tailors and their reach over women that has=20
to be stopped. Women, seen as icons and carriers of faith, have to be=20
weaned away from their 'corrupt' practices. In the eyes of the Hindu=20
Right, going to Muslim tailors has implications for the sexuality of=20
Hindu women, Hindu men and Muslim tailors. Implicit here is the fear=20
of a sensuous 'play' between the tailor and the body of the woman,=20
and her private, secret alliance with the tailor. The power of the=20
tailor to determine women's dressing sense is seen as a threat.=20
Muslim tailors are also being attacked because women's body is=20
identified as a sign of purity, and for any Muslim to touch it, even=20
for the sake of taking measurements, is seen as dangerous. The=20
campaign combines 'negative' portrayals of Muslims, with fears of=20
women's agency. There is an attempt to shift the basis of activity of=20
Hindu women and replace it with Hindu tailors, preferably that too=20
female, partially legitimising relations only between Hindus.

The campaign and attack illustrates the aptitude shown by the Hindu=20
communalists to propagate the image of the goonda, sexually charged,=20
lustful Muslim male, violating the pure body of the Hindu woman. The=20
VHP is trying to operate in both the private and the public domain,=20
attempting to monopolise the field of everyday representation. These=20
instructions affirm the agenda of religious and community=20
distinctiveness by means of social and economic separation. And=20
equally, they mark another assault over women's relatively autonomous=20
spaces.

______

#3.

The Washington Post
Monday, January 28, 2002; Page A14

RELIGIOUS RADICALS FACING BACKLASH IN PAKISTAN
FAMILIES BITTER OVER FATE OF RECRUITS TO TALIBAN CAUSE; YOUNG MEN=20
WERE 'BETRAYED BY THE MULLAHS'
By Doug Struck
Washington Post Foreign Service

CHAKDARA, Pakistan -- The trucks rumbled through this dusty town in=20
late October with a harvest of men reaped from the fervor of the=20
countryside. Others rushed from shops and fields to clamber aboard,=20
eager to trade the poverty of their lives for the honor of being a=20
hero -- or martyr -- in Afghanistan's holy war.
Some say 5,000 joined the caravan; others say twice that. Wives and=20
fathers sent them willingly. Ata Ur Rahman, 28, was among them.
Three months later, Rahman is languishing in a squalid jail in=20
Afghanistan while his family laments its enthusiasm. "He was betrayed=20
by the mullahs who took him," spat his younger brother, Sayed Ur=20
Rahman.
Their anger reflects a widespread disillusionment with religious=20
leaders who rallied Pakistanis to the side of the Taliban, and a=20
souring of the Islamic militancy that had produced volunteers for the=20
cause and threatened to undermine the Pakistani government's support=20
for the United States.

Interviews with people in villages and cities, and with analysts,=20
officials, mullahs and journalists indicate that the Taliban's=20
lopsided defeat in Afghanistan and the abandonment of its Pakistani=20
followers -- scores of whom were rounded up following the Taliban's=20
collapse -- have dealt a blow to religious radicals here, who have=20
lost much of their public support.
"The Taliban lost their credibility when they didn't stand and die=20
for their cause. They just fled and left the foreigners there to die.=20
People here who lost youngsters in Afghanistan feel misled," said=20
Shireen Mazari, head of the Institute of Strategic Studies, a think=20
tank in the capital, Islamabad.

"There is a lot of anger. The people who went just were sent in=20
chaos," agreed Ahmad Shah, the imam, or religious leader, of a tiny=20
farming village in Pakistan's North-West Frontier Province.

Pakistan's president, Gen. Pervez Musharraf, has seized on this shift=20
in mood to crack down on Muslim radicalism in his country, a move=20
that observers here say would have been much more difficult a few=20
months ago. His campaign still faces troublesome opposition from a=20
strong minority of strident mullahs and their followers.
Some here argue that radical Islam never had a large following in=20
Pakistan, as shown by the low turnouts at anti-government=20
demonstrations in October. They say the influence of mullahs has been=20
exaggerated by 25 years of government policy that gave religious=20
figures disproportionate power.

But they agree that a decade-long souring of relations with the=20
United States and the lure of a bold Islamic cause in Afghanistan=20
produced a sympathetic swell of support here for the Taliban. And the=20
mosques' call to jihad, or holy war, was a clarion for volunteers=20
from the poor countryside and tribal areas of Pakistan.
"In the early days of the war, there was a tremendous movement to=20
Islam. The liberals were looking for caves to hide in," chortled=20
Hamid Gul, a conservative former Pakistani intelligence chief who had=20
directed clandestine support to the Taliban to help bring it to power=20
in the 1990s.

But the enthusiasm for the movement waned when the Taliban and its=20
Pakistani supporters were defeated, he acknowledged in an interview.
"It became clear that the Americans were so ruthless, they would=20
spare nothing" in their bombardment, he said. "The movement that was=20
picking up in the world suddenly collapsed."

That movement was most visible here in the recruitment caravans=20
organized by Sufi Mohammad, a religious party leader who drew much of=20
his support from hardscrabble villages tucked in creases of the=20
mountains rising in northern Pakistan beyond this town.

The government tried -- halfheartedly, complained the Americans -- to=20
stop Sufi Mohammad's trucks full of fired-up volunteers from crossing=20
into Afghanistan in the early weeks of the war. But thousands=20
breached the porous border with him. A smaller number of volunteers=20
-- no one knows how much smaller -- have limped back into Pakistan,=20
leaving behind the dead and captured.
Sufi Mohammad was arrested at the border. The government says he will=20
be charged with entering Afghanistan illegally; others say he sought=20
arrest to avoid being lynched by angry families of his former=20
followers
"Sufi Mohammad let down the people," said Khisda Rahman, 35, in=20
Chakdara. "He took all these guys and now they are dead or in prison.=20
But he ran away and came back. People are asking why he didn't=20
sacrifice himself."
When Sufi Mohammad organized the convoys that passed through=20
Chakdara, "the whole town was celebrating," Rahman said. "Now they=20
are sad they did. They will never follow him again."

In Gulibagh, a tiny village of 80 mud houses surrounded by vegetable=20
and wheat fields, the father of Abdul Saleem, 23, said he learned of=20
the death of his son from a newspaper. After sneaking away from home=20
to join the jihad, the young man was killed by a missile strike on a=20
bus full of volunteers.

Abdul Saleem's identity card shows a baby-faced man with a fringe of=20
a beard. A few weeks after he left home, his parents got a letter=20
from him: "I have completed my training and I am now going to the=20
front line," he said. On the folded, lined school paper, he had=20
written: "We will be buried in the mountains and ice will be my=20
dress."
"We didn't know he went," said his father, Ziarat Gul, 60, a man with=20
a creased face and rough hands from a life of prodding the earth for=20
succor. "We are religious people and we think he has gone for a good=20
cause. But if you ask me my feelings on the death of a son -- if you=20
are a father, you can imagine. There are no words."
"It wasn't a proper jihad. It was a mess," scoffed Qari Saqib Shah, a=20
teacher at a nearby religious school. Shah's 21-year-old nephew was=20
killed -- not gloriously in battle, but riding with other volunteers=20
in a bus that was struck by a missile near Mazar-e Sharif, he said.=20
"People went to Afghanistan with no proper training, no strategy, no=20
supplies, no food, not even proper accommodations."

But there still is a "seething discontent, an anger at America" in=20
Pakistan, said Khurshid Ahmad, a leader of the Jamiat-i-Islami=20
religious party.
This claim is key to understanding the appeal of the Taliban cause=20
for a broader spectrum of Pakistanis, even those who would not=20
volunteer to fight or even embrace the austere brand of Islam=20
practiced by the Taliban, argues Najam Sethi, editor of Friday Times,=20
a weekly paper based in Lahore.

"The people are not terribly pro-Taliban, but they are=20
anti-American," he said. "People feel Americans abandoned Pakistan,=20
and we became the most sanctioned country in the world. So they hoped=20
the Americans would find themselves in another Vietnam," and cheered=20
the Taliban.

With the Taliban defeated, that attitude has been replaced by "a=20
heavy dose of realism," he said. "The people quickly retreated into=20
their cynical sense, saying, 'Oh yes, America is a superpower and it=20
was foolish to go up against the superpower.' "
The success of Musharraf's crackdown on radical mosques and religious=20
schools, say observers here, will depend on the ebb and flow of=20
anti-Americanism, religious fervor, moderation and realism.

"Somebody had to teach the United States a lesson," said Abdul Aziz,=20
the mullah of a mosque in the center of Islamabad who said he still=20
preaches in support of the Taliban. "America is the main terrorist.=20
They look down on everyone else."
But an imam at a mosque not far away brushes aside a question about=20
continued support for the movement in Afghanistan.
"That issue should be forgotten," said Qazi Zain Ul Abideen. "The=20
Taliban government is dead and buried. Islam says we should not speak=20
ill of the dead."
Musharraf insists he is tapping the majority vein of moderation in=20
Pakistan by pursuing his crackdown.

"Whatever extremists are here are a very small minority," agreed=20
Khalid Ulmar, an army officer-turned-historian. "All religions have=20
their extremists, but this is not an extremist country. I can listen=20
to Jennifer Lopez and still be a Muslim."
Mazari, the head of the think tank, said Musharraf cleverly resisted=20
ordering a heavy-handed clampdown on the October demonstrations=20
called by religious groups opposed to his decision to support the=20
U.S. war campaign.
"Musharraf allowed the demonstrations to go ahead, and the low=20
turnout showed the people didn't support" the extremists, she said.=20
"The numbers in the demonstrations just went down and down, and then=20
petered out."
Many here said Musharraf correctly judged that Pakistanis were weary=20
of both the international complications brought to Pakistan by=20
radical Islam and the deadly gunplay that has often accompanied=20
disputes between radical factions in the country.
"Musharraf is right that people were sick of all this violence,"=20
Sethi said. "They are sick and tired of being portrayed in the=20
Western media as a 'goner' country, with all the negative images of a=20
radical, fundamentalist country."
"People say, yes, well look what happened to Afghanistan," he said.=20
"We don't want that."

=A9 2002 The Washington Post Company

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