[sacw] SACW #1 | 28 Feb. 02

[Harsh Kapoor]

South Asia Citizens Wire - Dispatch #1 | 28 February 2002

------------------------------------------

#1. Battle for Pakistan's Soul (M. B. Naqvi)
#2. India: 2 Op-Eds
- Fires of fanaticism (Times of India)
- Check the insanity (Hindustan Times
#3. Asiapeace Statement to Musharraf re the Murder of Daniel Pearl ...
#4. India: Golden Age Hallucinations - Indian civilisation derives=20
from no utopian ideal; it was founded on, and as, a crossroads=20
(Sanjay Subrahmanyam)
#5. Decoding 11/9 (Rajmohan Gandhi)

________________________

#1.

Battle for Pakistan's Soul

By M. B. Naqvi

In a manner of speaking the American and the Indian authorities are
locked in a fierce battle with what should be called Islamic extremism
in Pakistan. Whether there is any co-ordination between the two is not
known with certainty, though there should be one. Insofar as the US is
concerned, it has more or less achieved the extermination of Taliban
rule and has seriously weakened their influence in Afghanistan. They
used their military power for the purpose. They hoped that Taliban
influence and of their ilk in Pakistan would also be weakened. But, on
the whole, they are engaged with Pakistan for achieving much the same
end through deft diplomacy. The Indian government enters the battle with
the complaint about cross-border terrorism from the same quarter.

Both the US and India have achieved initial success. The coercive
persuasion brought around General Pervez Musharraf on the side of
American war on terrorism. The General ditched his Taliban friends
pronto, though in stages. Later when the Taliban power collapsed, the
American attention switched to Pakistan because most of the fleeing
Taliban and their Al-Qaeda guests could only hope to hide in Pakistan=92s
Pushtoon belt. The same diplomacy was employed to convince the Pakistani
generals that they are sitting on a volcano represented by Islamic
extremists particularly the Jihadis. Musharraf government has to move
decisively and fast. Without that neither the task of the Americans to
arrest their fugitives nor the Pakistani regime=92s security can be worth
a wager. Musharraf saw the point quickly and made the Jan 12 speech.
Probably he meant what he said. Has the military regime as a whole been
converted to this view?

President K.R. Narayanan=92s Feb 25 address to the Indian Parliament
showed that the Indian part of the Indo-US alliance is not convinced
that the Pakistani regime is actually implementing the Musharraf speech
of Jan 12 --- certainly not in full or in its true spirit. Hence the New
Delhi decision not to de-escalate military tensions with Pakistan
arising from massing of Indian Army on Pakistan=92s border in an attack
mode. Indians seem disappointed that Kashmir Jihad has not become
attenuated or lost some of its ferocity which would have been the
logical result of the change in Pakistan=92s Afghan policy and certainly
Musharraf=92s Jan 12 speech. Insofar as India=92s use of coercive diplomacy
is concerned, it has produced few results. True, Pakistan foreign
office continues to appeal to every foreign government to come and
mediate with India to withdraw forces from the border and start talking
with Islamabad =96 mainly and seriously on Kashmir. To think that Pakistan
is bleating like a lost sheep would be a mistake. Its is an obvious and
logical stance in the given situation. Besides, it wins brownie points
with foreigners. The Pakistan establishment remains buoyant and
self-confident vis-=E0-vis India: its nuclear deterrent remains a
deterrent. There is little evidence that Pakistan has stopped making the
sharp distinction between terrorism and a freedom fight. Jihadis
fighting in Indian-controlled Kashmir are regarded as freedom fighters;
Pakistan accepts no responsibility for their actions in Kashmir; it
however feels bound to give them moral and political support. The
Indians might raise ask: is President Musharraf himself implementing his
Jan 12 speech in all its implications that bear on Kashmir? One can
almost hear the South Block drawing the attention of the Americans to
the Pakistani failure to extend the logic of its policies in Afghanistan
to Kashmir. As far as India is concerned, it finds no substantial change
in Pakistan=92s Kashmir policy after September 11 except for minor
deceleration that might also be a result of the weather.

Pakistan certainly regards Indian territory as almost out of bounds for
the Jihadis; any action there is terrorism pure and simple. Indians have
not put the Pakistani government to test on its claim to be ready to
cooperate with India in curbing terrorism on its territory that has
roots elsewhere (Pakistan). But then Kashmir (Valley) is not Indian
territory for Pakistan; it is a disputed area. This is still the state
of the play in substance between Islamabad and New Delhi as it was
before September 11, except for minor changes for American benefit.

Insofar as India actually seems to be concerned with the insurgency
inside Kashmir and its spillovers, its interest does not extend to
Islamic extremism per se; it does not actually encounter it in India.
That has some thing to do with recent Indian history. But in Pakistan,
the growth of Islamic extremism has been a linear, especially since
1980s =96 thanks to the American aid, advice and expediencies. The
particular version of extremism that the Americans are fighting is no
doubt a recent growth of the last four decades or more. It might be
necessary for Indians to take note of the roots of the Jihadi problem.
The fundamental assumptions on which great theoretical edifices have
been built have existed all along. Islam is a living religion and it is
a many splendoured reality. Prof. Mohammad Majeeb=92s Islam is one
version, particularly relevant to the Subcontinent. But, without
belying the reality of Sufi origins of Indian Islam, the fact has to be
faced that elsewhere the Islamic reality is materially different because
it has other facets. The pure orthodoxies have produced the basis on
which the socalled Militant Islam stands, in its many versions.

The point is that the various faces of terrorism, all Islamic for
American purposes, have a firm foundation in Islam=92s various
orthodoxies; various Militancies have grown powerful in response to
external challenges =96 Israel=92s power and its conduct have shaped the
various militant movements and organisations in the Arab world. In
Pakistan, the situation was entirely different. The challenge here was
internal: here was a country created in the name of Islam and where
power resided in the hands of West oriented social elites. Maulana Abul
Aala Maudoodi, as keen a scholar as he was ambitious and aware of what
is happening in the rest of the world, created a new Islamic ideology
for a new Islamic Revolution. This Revolution was in fact a reaction to
the Russian Revolution and was intended to blunt the appeal of communism
for Muslim youth in India. It stood on the firm foundation of the main
Sunni orthodoxy (Hanafi School of Deoband variety). The Jamaat-e-Islami
founded in 1941 saw its road to power open in Pakistan with its slogan
of a pure Islamic state -- a new model for the rest of the world to
follow. Later a concrete Model came into being: Iran=92s Ayotullah Khomeni
created a Shia version of an Islamic state. The success of the Iranian
Revolution came easily because their social elites had nothing to offer
except a superficial modernism that was bereft of values. In Pakistan
the pro-west social elites were more clever: they stole the clothes of
Islamicists and shouted Islamic slogans even more stridently than the
Mullahs, if also without meaning anything thereby. But later the made-in
America Jihad of the 1980s in Afghanistan created yet another challenge
and opportunity for Islamic orthodoxy. A new and more puritan version of
Islamic Revolution, even more orthodox and rigid, was evolved; it was
the Taliban Movement. It was a joint enterprise of American CIA,
Pakistan=92s ISI and the Jamiat-i-Ulema-i-Islam in its various splinters.
They produced a fierce Jihadi culture that is as inflexible, narrow
minded and largely ignorant but fiercely militant as the Taliban were in
Afghanistan. Indians have also to understand the sources of their
militant before they can fully and adequately fight them. Whether anyone
believes it or not, the fact is that a purely military approach in
fighting terrorism, a la America, is not enough. The phenomenon as a
whole needs to be extirpated from its roots upward and that will need a
great intellectual effort of reinterpreting Islam in newer terms and
here there has to be international cooperation. The military may
certainly have a role to play. But it cannot be the main one, if higher
end have to be achieved.

But immediate issues have also to be attended. The current impasse
between India and Pakistan, basically over Kashmir, has to be tackled.
It would seem that a minimum degree of cooperation between the countries
would be necessary. Talking of cooperation between Indian and Pakistani
governments and that too over intangible matters today would be seen as
wildly unrealistic. Two things can be said. First being content with
treating symptoms and leaving the causes alone may not be as realistic
as it may appear. Secondly if any importance is attached to the
underlying causes of the phenomenon of terrorism, let the two government
be realistic about the approach to be adopted by all means. Let them
take the current facts as they are and find out seriously whether any
scope actually exists for agreements on some principles that may lead to
an amicable settlement of discard and disputes.

At one level of crude reality, there is perhaps no scope: Indian
government, being in possession of the main areas that it values in
Kashmir stands for no change in the basic situation on the ground, come
what may. Pakistan rulers remain adamant that there should be a basic
change on the ground, no matter what it takes. Both being confident of
their own strength are inflexible. Thus there is no hope of any
settlement. But is this conclusion acceptable to over one billion men
and women in South Asia?

But both governments are members of the same international Alliance.
Both lay claims to believing in democracy and its values. If so,
democratic values should be relied upon for earnestly and honestly
seeking a democratic settlement of Kashmir and other problems between
the two countries. In theory this should be possible. It will not be
best to recommend the intervention of the alliance or its leader, the
US, being made responsible for finding a via media and imposing it, in
one way or another, on both sides. A democratic settlement means
reliance on democratic values, i.e. the people as both the methodology
and for determining the end solution. The primary means all the peoples,
seeking, finding or producing some kind of a consensus over contentious
subjects over sufficient time. One such a consensus has been evolved,
the people will know how to make the governments to implement it. If
realism is important and it is, let us be clear: the governments, as
constituted, cannot arrive at a settlement in current conditions. Let
them, then, freeze the Kashmir issue for a long enough time, say a
generation, without actively prosecuting either side=92s plans or tactics.
Let the common people in the meantime freely interact, trade and
economically cooperate in the whole region. Over a period new trends
can be expected to emerge. For the present, given the virtual
impossibility of finding a commonly acceptable solution to current
problems by the governments, let hope be hitched to the forces of
history and the peoples=92 own geniuses.

______

#2.

The Times of India
FEBRUARY 27, 2002

Our opinion: Fires of fanaticism

No words are strong enough to condemn the horrific early-morning=20
attack on a train in Godhra district of Gujarat on Wednesday in=20
which, at last count, more than 30 Kar Sevaks returning from Ayodhya=20
were allegedly burnt alive. While the perpetrators of this dastardly=20
act of savagery must be swiftly brought to justice, utmost vigilance=20
is required to ensure that the call of law and order is not allowed=20
to degenerate into a witchhunt against any particular community.=20
Beyond this immediate response, however, there is need to look at the=20
larger political context which might have provided the unfortunate=20
spark for the attack. In the last few weeks, the VHP and its=20
affiliates have systematically upped the ante on the Ram Mandir=20
issue, demanding that the Centre unilaterally hand over the disputed=20
Babri masjid site to them so that they can begin construction of the=20
temple. Even as the fires of religious passion have been deliberately=20
re-ignited, the Centre has allowed itself to vacillate on the issue.=20
There are those who have read in this curiously inert approach an=20
element of interested ambiguity, particularly in view of the assembly=20
polls in UP. On Tuesday, almost two months after the crisis first=20
erupted, the Central government held its first all-party meeting to=20
discuss the situation arising from the VHP's avowed plans to defy the=20
law. Thankfully, the prime minister delivered an uncompromising=20
message at the meeting: pending an amicable settlement to the Ayodhya=20
issue, whether in court or outside, the status quo would be=20
maintained at all cost. The point of concern, however, is that the=20
Centre's resolve was not backed by a clear action plan. In other=20
words, the nation is today faced with a situation which is remarkably=20
similar to the one that prevailed in 1992.
The Centre's first responsibility today is to stamp out the fire.=20
For, we know only too well from experience that the smallest spark is=20
often enough to start a communal conflagration. In this case, there=20
is already the tinder-box called Ayodhya, filled to overflowing with=20
tens of thousands of emotionally-charged karsevaks. It is of no small=20
significance that this assemblage has gathered in the temple town=20
with a single-point agenda: To start construction of the Ram temple=20
on March 15. Fed on passionate rhetoric about the temple, it is=20
anybody's guess how they will react to news about an attack on their=20
fellow karsevaks. The worry is all the more, given the background of=20
December 6, 1992 . The immediate thing to do is to post security=20
personnel at Karsevakpuram, the specially created enclave for the=20
karsevaks. Secondly, tempers must not be allowed to get out of hand.=20
In other words, an outright ban on rabble-rousing by any organisation=20
or individuals bent on creating mischief. The worst provocation=20
cannot justify retaliatory violence, and indeed, preservation of law=20
and order must be the sole consideration before the Centre. The=20
disputed Ramjanmabhoomi-Babri Masjid site as well as the 67 acres of=20
acquired territory need to be further strengthened against possible=20
breach of security and minorities living in Ayodhya afforded full=20
protection.

o o o

The Hindustan Times February 28, 2002 | Editorial

Check the insanity

The portents are ominous, as the outbreak of violence in Gujarat has=20
shown. While the government at the Centre, demoralised by the UP=20
verdict, sat twiddling its thumbs, its fraternal allies in the Sangh=20
parivar seem to have succeeded in their objective of lighting the=20
communal fuse.

A number of innocent people have already died and more may suffer if=20
the Centre, even now, doesn't step in to stop the insanity unleashed=20
by the VHP. Right from the time when this outfit of Hindu fanatics=20
announced its provocative plan to begin the construction of the=20
temple in Ayodhya, it was known that trouble was brewing. But the BJP=20
at the Centre, perhaps hoping that the VHP's belligerence will=20
consolidate the Hindu vote behind it, did nothing more than mouth=20
pious platitudes. There was no deviation from this pointless routine=20
even at the all-party meeting, where the ritual pronouncements of=20
adhering to the judicial verdict or settling the dispute through=20
negotiations were reiterated.

Such advice is meant for those who are prepared to listen to reason.=20
But outfits like the VHP and the Bajrang Dal have always made it=20
abundantly clear that they care two hoots for the law of the land and=20
thrive on spreading the communal poison. To allow them, therefore, to=20
mobilise hundreds of people in the vicinity of Ayodhya with the=20
avowed intention of building the temple was tantamount to playing=20
with fire. As a member of the same saffron brotherhood, the BJP=20
leaders should have been aware of the extent to which these bigots=20
can go. What is more, the shocking events of December 6, 1992, should=20
have forewarned them against allowing such a gathering while the=20
example of L.K. Advani's 1990 rath yatra should have shown how=20
violence can erupt along the route travelled by the so-called kar=20
sevaks.

Now the worst that was feared has happened in Gujarat. The communal=20
conflagration can spread like wild fire unless preventive arrests are=20
immediately made and the government makes it absolutely clear that it=20
will crack down on the miscreants wherever they create trouble. If=20
ever the POTO needed to be used, it is against these 'terrorists' who=20
have openly hurled defiance at the law of the land.

______

#3.

26 February, 2002

President General Pervez Musharraf
Islamic Republic of Pakistan
Islamabad
Pakistan.

Dear Sir,
On behalf of 114 intellectuals, human rights and peace activists,=20
academics and cultural workers spread across the globe, I wish to=20
convey to you our concern over the recent brutal murder of Wall=20
Street Journal reporter Daniel Pearl on Pakistani territory at the=20
hands of blood-thirsty terrorists. It has shocked many well-wishers=20
of Pakistan and we hope that the involved culprits will soon be=20
brought to justice.

Sincerely,
Dr Ishtiaq Ahmed
Moderator Asiapeace
Associate Professor
Department of Political Science
Stockholm University
Sweden.
Ishtiaq.Ahmed@s...

Members and Friends of Asiapeace Condemn the Barbaric Murder of Daniel Pear=
l

We are shocked and deeply saddened to learn of Wall Street Journal=20
reporter Daniel Pearl's murder by his captors, who sent a video-tape=20
to the Pakistani authorities in Karachi showing the ghastly details=20
of the abominable murder.

Daniel Pearl was taken hostage on 23 January 2002 in Karachi by a=20
group of extremists who accused him of being a CIA and Mossad agent=20
working against the interests of Islam and Pakistan. Many Pakistani=20
and foreign journalists contradicted such allegations and confirmed=20
that he was an honest, sympathetic and dedicated investigator in the=20
best traditions of responsible journalism. Asiapeace forwarded these=20
messages via electronic mail and also issued a most powerful appeal=20
prepared by Dr Maqsood Choudhary, who knew Pearl well, to his captors=20
to release him. We were all agreed that under no circumstance can=20
taking of hostages be justified and therefore he should be released.

Alas our supplications and that of many other concerned individuals=20
and organizations proved futile. His killers remained unmoved and=20
carried out their crime in cold blood. Since Asiapeace is a forum for=20
people who freely express their views on many controversial issues we=20
feel especially concerned about the safety of writers, thinkers and=20
opinion-builders in Pakistan.

Even though the Government of Pakistan has decided to unlink itself=20
from the militant groups who for a long time had been receiving its=20
protection and patronage and has now sincerely begun to dismantle=20
their bases it is quite clear that the drive against such elements is=20
far from successful.

We hope that Govt. of Pakistan will spare no effort to track down and=20
arrest the perpetrators of this heinous crime, and bring the=20
criminals to justice swiftly. We also feel that it must take more=20
concerted measures to purge Pakistan of extremists within the state=20
machinery and supplant terrorist mind-sets, deriving from a flawed=20
interpretation of religion, with tolerant cultural and ethical values=20
through education based on pluralism and rationalism.

We would like to convey our deepest condolences to Daniel Pearl's=20
relatives, friends and colleagues, and especially to Marianne Pearl=20
who is expecting their first child soon. May, Pearl have a new life=20
in his posthumous child.

ooo

Dr Maqsood Choudhary writes:

Dear Ishtiaq,

I was on my way to home from college when I heard the sad news of=20
Danny. I am sad, because I lost a great friend, and ashamed, because=20
the killers were my own people. Danny was just at the wrong place at=20
the wrong time. May be I am too naive to understand the undercurrents=20
of Islam. Oh Danny, poor Danny! How sad! What a beautiful person you=20
were, and how inspiring were your ideas. What difference you would=20
have made, had you been given a chance to live. What was your sin?=20
Yes, you were a pearl, a real pearl, a true pearl. The one you find=20
somewhere deep in the oceans. It is very difficult for me to express=20
my grievance.

You were only an innocent journalist who was just doing his job. Your=20
fault was that you had very strong professional ethics. I won't call=20
it missionary zeal as I do not believe in that crap. Nobody had the=20
right to take your life. Somebody has to put on leash these religious=20
dogs.

Thank you Zia! What a hypocrite you were and what a legacy you have=20
left behind?

My heart goes out to Mrs. Pearl and the one who will be coming to=20
this world in May/June. Can someone understand the agony through=20
which he/she has to live as a fatherless child? Can someone=20
understand the pain that your killers have caused to the elder=20
Pearls? You damn soldiers of God.

Good bye Danny, Good-bye my friend! You were great in every sense of=20
the term and will be remembered as long as your friends are around.=20
That includes the people from the land where you died helplessly.=20
What a pain you must have gone through? Sorry Danny, I am so sorry, I=20
could not do anything for you.

May you rest in peace!

Maqsood

P.S: As a protest, I have decided to not to participate in any=20
festivities of the Eid! Which Eid and what Eid? Should I pray=20
alongside those who kill innocent people?

ASIAPEACE co-signatories:

Ishtiaq Ahmed
+
113 other co -signatories

_____

#4.

Outlook | 20 August 2001

Golden Age Hallucinations
Indian civilisation derives from no utopian ideal; it was founded on,=20
and as, a crossroads
SANJAY SUBRAHMANYAM

Two radically different conceptions of India have informed=20
discussions amongst both academics and normal human beings in the=20
past decade or so, and it is the tension between these two=20
conceptions that I wish to treat here. On the one hand, we have the=20
view that 'India' as we know it was invented in the not-too-distant=20
past, probably by the British, or perhaps by Indians and Britons=20
acting together in the period of colonial rule. This is what we may=20
call the constructivist approach, one that from its academic origins=20
has percolated to other parts of elite Indian society which have=20
willy-nilly absorbed the best and the worst of post-modernist=20
gobbledygook by now. There is of course some truth to the notion that=20
the idea of India altered significantly in the 19th and 20th=20
centuries, but one may legitimately doubt whether the whole thing was=20
made up in recent times as a sheer act of will.
The second view, which is radically opposed to the first, and which=20
today finds more extensive political expression than academic=20
support, is the idea that some very stable and autarchic notion of=20
India has been around for a very long time, indeed from the time when=20
a classical Indian civilisation put down its roots in the=20
Indo-Gangetic plain.
This is a view that sees Indian society in terms of three (or=20
two-and-a-half) phases: a formative one, ending at the close of the=20
first millennium of the Christian era; a second phase of confusion=20
and decline that is roughly coterminous with Islamic rule, and then a=20
third-which may yet be incomplete-of resurgence and a return to the=20
roots. We

Geographically ambiguous, if one view of Hind excluded the=20
south and Deccan, another espoused that Indonesia, Thailand, Cambodia=20
and even Yemen belonged to it.

can all identify the crudest versions of the latter view in the=20
writings of the ideologues of the rss or their Neanderthal=20
counterparts elsewhere, including rabble-rousing European journalists=20
in India, but the problem is that this view is far more widely shared=20
than one often suspects.
Some thoughts on 'India' as a term may be useful to set the stage.=20
The word itself derives, most of us know, from the medieval Arabic=20
term 'Hind', which is itself a deformation of the far older and far=20
more limited 'Sind'. When one reads the Arabophone encyclopaedists=20
and geographers writing in medieval times, it soon becomes clear=20
though that they are quite ambiguous as to the limits of 'al-Hind'.=20
Of the core areas, there is little doubt: everyone includes the=20
Indo-Gangetic plain from the Punjab to Bengal. But the status of the=20
peninsula is already less clear, and we know that as late as the 15th=20
and 16th centuries, 'Hind' and 'Hindustan' sometimes did not include=20
the Deccan and areas south of it. If this minimal view exists, there=20
were also other writers who thought in medieval times that Indonesia,=20
Thailand, Cambodia and (in a few odd cases) even Yemen all belonged=20
to Hind. All in all, we have three major geographical categories that=20
stand out in these materials: Hind, Sin (or China) and Ajam (the=20
Persian-speaking area). The problem was that the borders of the three=20
were not unambiguous.
What of people in the Indian subcontinent? Did they have some=20
definite notions of the limits of their identity? Once again, matters=20
are far from clear. One measure could be the limits of the spread of=20
Sanskrit or of Brahmanic culture, but both of these take us far into=20
Central Asia on the one hand, and Southeast Asia on the other. Nor do=20
the epics, and the limits of their spread, prove particularly=20
helpful. It is true that the partisans of a theory of 'Greater India'=20
wished in the 1930s and 1940s to make grandiose claims on this basis=20
for the extended limits of Indian sovereignty, but such claims could=20
be equally made then by India's neighbours using very similar sorts=20
of evidence.

It may nevertheless be useful to reflect a little bit on the 'Greater=20
India' thesis, and its corollary, namely the idea of the=20
'Indianisation' of cultures elsewhere. At the heart of the matter is=20
the notion that at some distant point in the past, say about AD 500,=20
the concept of 'Indian civilisation' had already been perfected.=20
Everything of any importance was in place: social structure,=20
philosophy, the major literary works. Then, we can imagine the=20
process of 'Indianisation' as the transportation of these elements to=20
distant lands such as Cambodia or Champa, to be transplanted in more=20
or less fertile soil.
But little in the history of Southeast Asia actually provides much=20
comfort to this view. At the same time, we must ask ourselves whether=20
it is really convincing to think of an Indian 'civilisation' that had=20
been perfected as long ago as the Gupta dynasty. Many writers in the=20
20th century of course have held to this view. These include some of=20
the best-known Western Orientalists such as A.
L. Basham or Madeleine Biardeau. But the protagonists of this=20
position also include writers from V.S. Naipaul to Pandit Jawaharlal=20
Nehru, whose Discovery of India is quite remarkable from this point=20
of view. The central idea here is of India-as-civilisation, and it=20
very soon becomes the same as a notion of closed India. Indian=20
civilisation is portrayed as self-sufficient

All we have real access to in our past is that which goes=20
back five or six centuries. Beyond that, we have intellectual=20
constructions, wishful thinking-little in everyday life.

and homeostatic, and it can only export culture, but never really be=20
influenced by the outside save in a negative sense. Somewhat=20
paradoxically, in view of his later reputation as an apostle of=20
secularism, Nehru seems by and large to have accepted a very negative=20
view of Islam. This is why he portrays the situation in India after=20
AD 1200 in negative terms, as the decline and atrophy of an=20
already-perfect civilisation. Writing more recently, Naipaul draws=20
upon similar images, adding to it a dash of the 'Clash of=20
Civilisations' thesis: the fault-line between Islam and Hinduism=20
(which can be read as 'Indian civilisation') passes for him through=20
the heart of the subcontinent.
One of the examples that Naipaul chooses to illustrate his sad tale=20
of medieval decline is the fate of the imperial state of Vijayanagara=20
in the Deccan, portrayed by him as one of the last bastions of Hindu=20
civilisation that held out against the Muslim invader. Now, most=20
historians of Vijayanagara today would see matters rather=20
differently. They would point to the dependence of Vijayanagara on=20
Muslim military specialists and horse-traders, Portuguese firearms,=20
and an imperial ideology that was based not on ancient precepts but=20
newly-formulated sectarian ideas from the 14th and 15th centuries. In=20
terms of court ritual, fiscal structure and imperial style,=20
Vijayanagara shares far more with the Bahmani sultanate and its=20
successors at Bijapur and Golconda, than with the Pallavas and=20
Cholas. Politically, the rulers of Vijayanagara were as often allied=20
to these sultanates as opposed to them, while amongst their major=20
rivals and enemies were the Gajapati rulers of Orissa. In order to=20
understand this, however, we need to see India not as a civilisation=20
but as a crossroads, as a space open to external influences rather=20
than a simple exporter of culture to its neighbours.
Where did this misunderstanding arise, and since when has=20
Vijayanagara been seen as a Hindu kingdom struggling against Muslim=20
enemies? One part of the answer lies with the Portuguese in the 16th=20
century.

Looking for help against the Muslim rulers of peninsular India, they=20
thought the 'Gentile' kings of Vijayanagara were their natural=20
friends.By the middle years of the 16th century, they had partially=20
given up this illusion, but some parts of it persisted into the views=20
of later writers, including those from Holland and France. It may be=20
useful at this point to insist on one fact. It is clear that most of=20
these writers were not liars or prevaricators; they did not simply=20
make up things about India. What they did, however, was selectively=20
read Indian society, and produce an image of it that was often based=20
on true elements, but which had been shorn of their real context.=20
Still, several centuries after the arrival of Vasco da Gama on Indian=20
shores, there was no single dominant idea of India in writings by=20
Westerners: several contradictory views existed depending on whether=20
one wrote from Madurai or Agra, whether one was Protestant or=20
Catholic, whether one knew Persian or Sanskrit, and so on. However,=20
by the late 18th and early 19th centuries, a new homogeneity can be=20
found in views of what India was. This picture, produced by Western=20
Orientalists and their Indian assistants, tended to focus on Sanskrit=20
as the true source of Indian culture (demoting Persian in the=20
process), and there was also a search for an Indian Golden Age.=20
Minority voices contested this view, but they were few and far=20
between. Indian popular culture was also largely set aside in favour=20
of an obsession with high culture.
It is remarkable that both Indian reformers and neo-traditionalists=20
of the 19th century bought into this view, and a strange complicity=20
came to exist between these two apparently opposed strands. The epoch=20
from the 12th to the 18th centuries was portrayed in dark hues, and=20
if some felt Westernisation was the antidote to the malady, others=20
proposed a return to the real roots of Indian civilisation. But what=20
was this pristine culture to which a return was proposed? Carnatic=20
music played on the violin (an 18th-century import from Europe), or=20
dances performed to the texts of Kshetrayya that came precisely from=20
this period! In north India, ultra-purists insisted that Dhrupad=20
should be favoured over Khayal, and invented a bogus Vedic genealogy=20
for the former, forgetting that it was heavily influenced by Mughal=20
court culture. As for devotional religion such as we know it today in=20
India, most of it is the product of the period from the 14th century=20
onwards, whether in Maharashtra, Punjab or Bengal.
This takes me to an observation of the poet and literary critic=20
Velcheru Narayana Rao, who has often argued that all we have real=20
access to in our past is that part which goes back five or six=20
centuries. Beyond that, we have intellectual constructions and=20
wishful thinking, but little that exists in our everyday life that=20
connects us instinctively to things that are so distant from us in=20
time. So, ancient India is not a reality for us in the same way as=20
medieval India, and it can never achieve the same status. Further,=20
this intermediate past is one which we can only think through in=20
terms of the idea of a crossroads, where not only did regions and=20
regional cultures influence one another, but things came and went=20
from far more distant lands, whether Europe, Central Asia, Iran and=20
the Ottoman empire, or Southeast Asia and East Africa. It will do us=20
no good to pretend that these processes of exchange were not linked=20
to violence. Empires were built, and cities sacked; religious sites=20
were desecrated, and political opponents were massacred. This was the=20
way it was in our part of the world, just as it was in medieval Iran,=20
the Germany of the Thirty Years' War, or the empire of the Incas.But=20
this is the only past we have, and we had best make as good a job as=20
we ca
To take the example of the Indian connection to Africa, this is one=20
that has been really neglected. On the one hand it is linked to the=20
Indian Ocean slave trade, since Africans were brought as slaves to=20
serve in the states of medieval India; but on the other, it is linked=20
to the complex history of western Indian merchant communities who=20
profited from Africa and the African trade. The point to be made is=20
that it will simply not do to always portray Indians and Indian=20
society as victims of the greed and depredations of others, while=20
conveniently whitewashing those parts of our own past that do not=20
suit us today. In a similar vein, the relations between Indian=20
traders and moneylenders and peasants in Central Asia were often=20
exploitative ones, a fact that partly explains the resentment against=20
them in the early years of the 20th century.
Some of my Indian intellectual friends believe it is their task to=20
use history in order to demonstrate the illegitimacy of Indian=20
nationalism. This is not my view, nor do I believe that historians=20
are really up to this task. The point I wish to make instead is that=20
we have by now come to terms in surprising measure with a truly=20
traumatic period in our not-too-distant past, namely that of about=20
two centuries of British colonial rule. No one really questions the=20
existence of key institutions that the British left behind in India;=20
there is no current proposal to dismantle the railway network or blow=20
up the city of Kolkata simply because they were created under=20
colonial rule. The same holds for the status of the English language,=20
which has if anything grown stronger in India in the last three=20
decades. But it would be truly bizarre if the price to be paid for=20
this acceptance of the legacy of colonial rule were to be the=20
transfer of nationalist resentment onto the earlier period, in order=20
to cast the blame for everything that is wrong with Indian society=20
today on medieval invaders from Central and West Asia. True, all=20
nationalisms seem to need negative stereotypes in order to shore up=20
their self-images. But a national culture that does not have the=20
confidence to declare that, like all other national cultures, it too=20
is a hybrid, a crossroads, a mixture of elements derived from chance=20
encounters and unforeseen consequences, can only take the path to=20
xenophobia and cultural paranoia. A last suggestion: if cultural=20
cleansing is to start in India, we might begin by returning the khaki=20
shorts to their place of origin.
(Author of the critically-acclaimed The Career and Legend of Vasco da=20
Gama, Cambridge, Paris-based Sanjay Subrahmanyam's next book is A=20
History of the World Between 1350-1715.)

______

#5.

The Hindustan Times February 28, 2002
=20=20=09=20
Decoding 11/9
by Rajmohan Gandhi

Some striking and well-circulated reactions notwithstanding=20
(including from Salman Rushdie and Arundhati Roy), it is legitimate=20
to ask whether the meanings that September 11 held for humanity have=20
been fully unveiled - whether the fiery message written five months=20
ago across the Manhattan skyline has been decoded.

Several interpretations, linked or conflicting, were announced. It=20
was seen as the launching of a war on America; a trigger for a global=20
war on terrorism; as evidence of Islam's flawed character; as proof=20
of American vulnerability, or of heavenly displeasure at American=20
policies; as a bell asking the world to line up on the good or the=20
evil side.

Many presented 11/9 as a justification for toughness. Asking others=20
to draw lessons if they must, hawks drew their guns, and faxed orders=20
for more. In the US and elsewhere, including in South Asia, they saw=20
11/9 as a call to arms, not to consciences or to thought; and also as=20
an opportunity to cement alliances and isolate adversaries.

Dissenting from some prestigious western and non-western voices,=20
Rushdie argued that 11/9 was about Islam. President Bush and Premier=20
Blair, among many others, might seek to separate Islam from=20
terrorism, but Rushdie saw an unmistakable link between the failure=20
of Muslim nations and anti-American terrorism. In a recent New York=20
Times article, Rushdie has claimed that even if terrorism dies down,=20
anti-Americanism is unlikely to abate. "It has become too useful a=20
smoke-screen for Muslim nations' many defects - their corruption,=20
their incompetence, their oppression of their citizens, their=20
economic, scientific and cultural stagnation. America-hating has=20
become a badge of identity, making possible a chest-beating,=20
flag-burning rhetoric of word and deed that makes men feel good."

In a sharp phrase that she knew would hurt Americans at the time, yet=20
expressing a thought she could not withhold, Arundhati Roy said that=20
some US reactions to 11/9 betrayed a wish to "usurp the whole world's=20
sorrow to mourn and avenge only their own". She added: "The September=20
11 attacks were a monstrous calling card from a world gone horribly=20
wrong. The message may have been written by Osama bin Laden (who=20
knows?) and delivered by his couriers, but
it could well have been signed by the ghosts of the victims of=20
America's old wars."

The contrast between Rushdie's diagnosis, that shame and envy drove=20
the 11/9 attackers, and that of Roy, that the attackers' rage had=20
much to do with what the US had done and not done, summarises a=20
polarisation noticeable across the world, although there may be some=20
subscribing to both explanations.

Many on either side of this divide agree on a third explanation, that=20
religion is what ignites the confrontation, that God is the devil in=20
the 11/9 story and in the unfinished story of 'Islam-and-the-West'.

The common diagnosis is as follows. In the West as in the Muslim=20
world and elsewhere, religion gives power to men whose minds are=20
small but whose egos and ambitions are large. It enables some to=20
mesmerise others. It induces, in some disciples, the readiness to be=20
killed. It makes torpedoes out of humans and missiles out of=20
aircraft. It can enable the portrayal of the desire to dominate other=20
nations as a longing to illuminate or civilise lesser breeds. It=20
packages hate as divine duty, destruction as a short cut to paradise.=20
Across the divide, it provides a divine sanction for ever-widening=20
attacks of retaliation. In short, God is the devil. [...]

full text at: http://www.hindustantimes.com/nonfram/280202/detide01.asp

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