[sacw] SACW #1 | 30 April. 02

[Harsh Kapoor]

South Asia Citizens Wire Dispatch #1. | 30 April 2002
http://www.mnet.fr

ANNOUNCEMENT: Please note that regular SACW dispatches will be=20
interrupted between May 1 - May 14, 2002.

__________________________

A. Sri Lanka: Prospects after Prabhakaran's media conference=20
(Jayadeva Uyangoda)
B. India:
#1. Global Flak Over Gujarat - Injured innocence won't do (Praful Bidwai)
#2. ' It is the beginning of the end of India of our dreams'.=20
Resolution adopted on 26th April 2002 at a public event in [ New=20
Delhi]
#3. Gujarat Officials Took Part in Anti-Muslim Violence - Report by=20
Human Rights Watch
#4. Hindu leaders silently supporting rightwing British party (B Sanjay Sur=
i)
#5. Donations for riot victims
#6. VHS copy of Aftershocks : The Rough Guide to Democracy

__________________________

A: Sri Lanka

Daily News (Colombo), Saturday 27th April 2002

PROSPECTS AFTER PRABHAKARAN'S MEDIA CONFERENCE
by Jayadeva Uyangoda
Head, Dept. of Political Science and Public Policy, University of Colombo

Mr. Velupillai Prabhakaran's meeting with the media on April 10 has=20
generated a great deal of negative response in Colombo. Judging=20
particularly by the way in which some opposition politicians and=20
Sinhalese nationalist intellectuals are trying to articulate an=20
emerging scenario of apocalypse, the Sinhalese polity may run the=20
risk of once again losing the grip of another rare moment for=20
reconciliation and peace with the Sri Lankan Tamil polity.
The ruling UNP's measured and wise response to Prabhakaran's peace=20
offensive, backed by the overwhelming desire of the Sri Lankan masses=20
for peace, constitutes the main defense against a possible lapse back=20
into political chaos and war, as we experienced in the late 1980s.
Yet, the Ranil Wickremesinghe administration will have to manage the=20
'peace process', the emerging resistance to it as well as the new=20
contradictions that may develop on the way with patience, prudence=20
and courage. Peace in war, of course, requires courage more than the=20
modern warfare does. Before we forget it all in the midst of the=20
strong political emotions Mr. Prabhakaran provoked in our minds=20
through his two-hour long TV appearance, it may be useful for us to=20
recall the main political points he and his political advisor made in=20
that mega media event.
De-proscription of the LTTE is a precondition for the LTTE's=20
participation at any negotiations. In the proposed Bangkok talks, the=20
LTTE's focus will be entirely on creating an interim administrative=20
set up for the North-East. The LTTE leader does not believe that the=20
theme of a political solution to the ethnic conflict should be in the=20
negotiation agenda, at present or in the near future.
Neither does he think that the present Ranil Wickremesinghe=20
administration has the political capacity to resolve the conflict as=20
such. The LTTE, under new circumstances, is willing to re-consider=20
its separatist goal as well as the armed struggle, yet it has not yet=20
found suitable objective conditions to give up either.
However, the LTTE entered the present peace process on its own, well=20
before September 11, 2001, in order to allow conditions conducive for=20
peace to emerge as well as to demonstrate its own commitment to=20
peace. The task of offering to the Tamil people an alternative to the=20
separate state is the responsibility of the Sri Lankan government.
However, for such an alternative to be credible, it should be based=20
on three 'core principles', namely, Tamil nationhood, the concept of=20
Tamil Homeland and the right of the Tamil people for=20
self-determination.
Now, how should one look at these points in order to discover=20
constructive possibilities for peace, and for treating Mr.=20
Prabhakaran as a potential ally in the quest for a political=20
settlement to the ethnic conflict? However slim such chances may=20
appear to be, peace-makers have no option but to seize them, work on=20
them and eventually expand them.
While assessing the core political message Mr. Prabhakaran delivered=20
on April 10, it is also important to recognize two crucial aspects of=20
the context in which the LTTE leader explicated his positions on a=20
variety of issues, as posed to him by journalists.
Firstly, for the LTTE, this is a press conference before the=20
commencement of negotiations with the Colombo government. No=20
negotiating party is likely to announce any significant concessions,=20
unless there are strategic reasons, while making preparations for a=20
fresh round of negotiations with the adversary.

Pre-negotiation

But, in a classic case of pre-negotiation behavior, the LTTE leader=20
demanded from the government a significant measure of concession; the=20
de-proscription of his movement. But at the same time, he kept the=20
window for negotiation open. It is indeed surprising that Mr.=20
Prabhakaran did not make any other hard bargaining demand to extract=20
more concessions from the government.
Secondly, the LTTE has not entered the peace process as a militarily=20
vanquished guerilla entity, or from a position of military weakness.=20
On the contrary, the LTTE leader initiated the present negotiation=20
process after a series of military victories and from a position of=20
military strength vis a vis the Sri Lankan state.
No doubt, the present world configuration against terrorism - or=20
non-state political actors - would have reinforced Mr. Prabhakaran's=20
earlier decision to explore a political settlement.
Against this backdrop, two observations on what Mr. Prabhakaran said=20
at the press conference may be made:
It is quite rare, and therefore interesting, that a militarily=20
unvanquished secessionist movement is actively seeking an alternative=20
to their separate state goal.
Similarly, it is quite significant that at a pre-negotiation press=20
conference, the movement's leadership has strongly hinted at the=20
framework of such an alternative - internal self-determination as=20
autonomy. The acknowledgement of this new political reality should=20
constitute the most useful point, from where Colombo's post-April 10=20
politics with regard to the ethnic conflict should begin.
In Colombo, there are fears currently being expressed in almost=20
apocalyptic terms by some that Prabhakaran is out to play his usual=20
game of deception in much greater scale this time than he did in the=20
past. The point these committed critics of the LTTE are making is=20
that the LTTE by means of peace talks and through the interim=20
administration is out to achieve what they have so far failed=20
militarily, namely establishing its absolute hegemony, both political=20
and military, over the entire North-East.
In a protracted ethnic conflict which has seen many negotiation=20
efforts ending in disaster, such prognoses of catastrophe cannot be=20
easily discounted.
However, that is only a negative way of looking at the window of=20
opportunity for peace available in Sri Lanka at present. A positive=20
and constructive response would begin by recognizing that there is=20
now a real opportunity to launch an interim process, which is=20
essentially political, in the North-East with the LTTE's active=20
participation in it. This approach will enable us to view the interim=20
administration as an interim process that may lead to creating=20
conditions for an eventual de-linking of the ethnic conflict from war=20
and violence.
Mr. Prabhakaran's insistence of an interim administration for the=20
North-East, viewed from the perspective of an interim process, is not=20
actually a bad one.
It offers a valuable opportunity for constructive political=20
engagement with the LTTE and it is up to the Sinhalese polity to=20
recognize it as such. As contemporary research findings of many=20
global conflicts tell us, protracted ethno-political conflicts, like=20
the one we have in Sri Lanka, are 'unending conflicts'.
They are marked by what Fen Osler Hampson - in Nurturing Peace: Why=20
Peace Settlements Succeed or Fail (1996) - has recently called=20
self-sustaining patterns of hostility and violence. Getting the=20
parties to the negotiating table and building momentum towards an=20
agreement are enormously difficult exercises in such conflicts.
Even if one is lucky enough to secure an agreement, an even greater=20
challenge is to translate the agreement into a concrete package of=20
mutual commitments and undertakings aimed at ending violence while=20
the political order is restored.
This challenge is sharper and greater in ethnic conflicts where the=20
question of state power is contested through a secessionist=20
insurrection.
Researchers now argue that 'separatist wars' are a special type of=20
civil war that has no definite ending or termination as such. The=20
most feasible way to handle them is through interim processes, of=20
course through trial and error, so that the militarized conflict is=20
transformed into a political mode that requires no violence and war.=20
A positive response? The Colombo government should view the LTTE's=20
interest in an interim set up in a positive light. One crucial task=20
of the Ranil Wickremesinghe administration in Colombo is to nurture a=20
continuous process of political engagement with the LTTE.
It will minimize the chances of returning to all out war, as in the=20
past, in case the present ceasefire agreement breaks down. It will=20
have other benefits for the LTTE too that are relevant to the entire=20
peace process. Assuming that the LTTE is liable and willing to be=20
locked in a continuous process of political engagement with the=20
Colombo government, their running the North-East interim=20
administration will have many opportunities for the rebel movement to=20
transform itself into a relatively autonomous, not separate,=20
component of the Sri Lankan State.
The interim administration would ideally be a training ground for the=20
LTTE cadres in administrative matters that require direct links with,=20
and accountability to, the people of diverse ethnic and social=20
backgrounds. The best and the surest way to transform a guerrilla=20
movement into a political entity is to entrust them with the=20
responsibility of administering everyday needs of a civilian=20
population.
The LTTE leaders will learn that administering vast civilian=20
populations in two huge provinces is qualitatively different from=20
running guerilla training camps or managing refugee communities=20
living on international humanitarian aid. They will be confronted=20
with such mundane challenges as economic development, service=20
delivery, creating employment opportunities, dealing with crime and=20
corruption in accordance with the rule of law, listening to public=20
petitions and of course running a political party.
There will also be such inescapable issues to deal with as democracy,=20
pluralism, human rights, multi-culturalism, accountability, public=20
scrutiny of political action and the standards of political behavior=20
in line with civility and the rule of law.
Meanwhile, the question of the LTTE's military capacity to undermine=20
the Sri Lankan State remains to be addressed along with the interim=20
administrative set up. There is no way at present for the Sri Lankan=20
State to make ineffective or inoperable the LTTE's awesome military=20
machine.
In its negotiations, the LTTE is highly unlikely to agree to the=20
latter's dismantling.
As a politico-military entity, the LTTE differs from the IRA that=20
agreed to de-commission its weapons. The LTTE has over the years=20
built up its own armed forces, almost like the coercive apparatus of=20
a quasi State. In any peace deal, the LTTE would insist on measures=20
that incorporate its state apparatus into the legitimate structures=20
of the state.
It is advisable for the Wickremesinghe administration not to take up=20
this extremely tricky issue during the early stages of negotiation.=20
Instead, the government should look for innovative interim=20
arrangements that can address the question of the LTTE's military=20
power.
There are many forms of regional autonomy, or internal self-rule,=20
that can be brought into our political constitutional imagination=20
when grappling with this question. The concept of 'shared=20
sovereignty' would offer a less objectionable, and state-of-the-art,=20
way out from this complex dilemma.
In the institutional designing phase of negotiations, it may not be=20
wise to ignore the existing military realities on the ground. Indeed,=20
in dealing with realities of the counter-state military power of a=20
secessionist group, there is no better option than designing and=20
building new political institutions that can go parallel with=20
military power and eventually take over the entire process.
The point is that asking the LTTE to dissolve its armed forces as a=20
pre-condition for settlement may not be an option.
Among the limited choices available for the State is the setting up=20
of an institutional arrangement for the LTTE's military apparatus to=20
be linked to the Sri Lankan State structure through the interim=20
administration.
Meanwhile, one way to shape the emerging trajectories of Sri Lanka's=20
ethnic conflict, while tackling the question of the LTTE's military=20
power, is to work towards creating new structures of political power=20
in the North-East that will be available to the LTTE as a political=20
entity, yet will not require the services of the LTTE's coercive=20
apparatus. In this sense, the coming period of conflict=20
transformation in Sri Lanka could ideally be one of both political=20
imagination and constitutional innovation.

Security guarantees

Finally, why do the LTTE leadership appear to be so keen on=20
normalizing their relationship with India? One may adduce many=20
reasons, but there is no harm in speculating that they are in fact=20
looking for 'security guarantees' for Mr. Prabhakaran in an event of=20
a peace deal.
A useful insight we can derive from the 'realist' school of conflict=20
management is that in armed conflicts parties are confronted with=20
security dilemmas.
A peace settlement needs to address them in the form of credible=20
security guarantees. Otherwise, as Professor Stephen Stedman argued=20
in his study of the civil war in Zimbabwe (Peace Making in Civil War=20
- 1991), the 'fear of settlement' can set in, forcing the rebels to=20
unilaterally withdraw from the peace process.
Foremost among the security guarantees which the LTTE will seek in=20
the future is its leader's safety and immunity from prosecution,=20
particularly with regard to the Rajiv Gandhi assassination.
If we interpret the LTTE leadership's present campaign to normalize=20
relations with India as a quest for obtaining security guarantees for=20
Mr. Velupillai Prabhakaran, we can also see that the LTTE's current=20
shift to the political path has something more political in it than=20
what its critics would like to imagine.
Many people appear to consider Velupillai Prabhakaran essentially as=20
a murderer, a fascist and hardcore terrorist. There was a time when=20
the Sri Lankan State also engaged with him exclusively on those=20
terms. Although political parties out of power would want to=20
continually deal with the LTTE leader in that uncompromising spirit,=20
the State, or the political party that runs that state, might not=20
find any irresistible reason to do so in the present conjuncture of=20
Sri Lanka's conflict.
If the LTTE is viewed primarily as an unreformable terrorist entity,=20
the only way to deal with the LTTE is continuing war. A state in=20
severe economic crisis can hardly make that choice.
But if the State wants to engage the LTTE politically and=20
constructively, then dealing with the LTTE and its leadership should=20
be on political terms that require dialogue and eventual trust. The=20
fear of a settlement process and of its unpredictable trajectories=20
will not help the State either.

o o o

B: India

#1.

[29 April 2002]

Global Flak Over Gujarat - Injured innocence won't do

By Praful Bidwai

Eight weeks after Godhra, Gujarat continues to burn. As the world=20
recoils in horror at that human catastrophe-which is almost as bad as=20
that in progress in Palestine-India's ministry of external affairs=20
(MEA) has launched a campaign to snub foreign missions for their=20
"interference" in the country's "internal affairs". India, said the=20
MEA spokesperson on April 22, "does not appreciate interference =85=20
including utilisation of the Indian media by foreign leaders =85 to=20
make public statements in order to pander to their domestic lobbies".
The MEA's statement was issued in response to innocuous remarks by=20
visiting foreign minister Erkki Tuomioja of Finland, the European=20
Union's smallest member. This itself reveals a certain lack of=20
self-confidence within the MEA. Earlier, it chose not to respond to=20
the remarks of US assistant secretary of state Christina Rocca,=20
calling the Gujarat situation "horrible". Nor did it comment on a far=20
more damning British High Commission report, which describes the=20
Gujarat violence as "pre-planned". The report substantially=20
corroborates the work of Indian citizens=92 fact-finding groups.=20
Since April 22, the German, Dutch and Canadian governments have also=20
produced reports or made statements of concern. The MEA has=20
tendentiously accused them of "playing a partisan role" and=20
"injecting themselves" into India's internal debate. And now Prime=20
Minister Vajpayee too has joined the MEA in telling the world India=20
"needs no lessons in secularism": ancient India had it all!

The Vajpayee government=92s attitude is wholly misguided. It attributes=20
foul motives "pandering to domestic lobbies" to perfectly=20
understandable expressions of distress at the butchery in Gujarat,=20
and its devastating impact on India's global standing. One can=20
understand such a characterisation of, say, Pakistan whose regime may=20
seek legitimation by taking up the issue of communalism in India.

But it is absurd to claim that powerful anti-Indian "domestic=20
lobbies" are at work in Finland, the Netherlands, Canada or Germany.=20
When the European Union expresses concern at the killing of European=20
citizens of Indian origin in Gujarat, that is "interference". But=20
when New Delhi strongly deplores mistreatment of people of Indian=20
origin in Fiji, Uganda, France or the US, or condemns ethnic killings=20
in Rwanda or Bosnia, that is not "interference"!

The MEA fails to appreciate just how disastrous Gujarat's impact on=20
global consciousness has been. In this millennium, the world has seen=20
no long-term state-sponsored butchery of one religious group=20
comparable to Gujarat. Somalia, Rwanda and Kosovo occasioned external=20
armed intervention precisely because millions of people worldwide=20
were shocked by the events there. Today, Gujarat claims for India=20
more space in Western newspapers than any other event, including the=20
1998 nuclear tests, Kargil, or elections.
The MEA is also patronising and censorious towards the Indian media=20
when it accuses it of being "used" by foreign embassies. As the Delhi=20
Union of Journalists says, the MEA statement constitutes a "menacing=20
threat to the media that they should refrain from interviewing people=20
who are critical of the government". Surely, this is close to=20
censorship.

The MEA=92s original Gujarat strategy was to get its diplomats to=20
defend the indefensible by trotting out half-truths about how "the=20
riots" (a misnomer for targeted state-sponsored killing of one group)=20
were fully brought under "control" by mid-March, how periodic=20
violence is part of "the complexities of a multicultural society"=20
(rather than a threat to multiculturalism from Hindutva), and on how=20
the Vajpayee government remains firm on "secularism" (after violating=20
all its premises, repeatedly rubbishing the idea of a composite=20
culture, and shielding India's Milosevic).

That laughable strategy failed. So the MEA decided to "Modify"=20
itself-using the very arguments that the Gujarat chief minister has=20
put out in expensive half-page advertisements in all major newspapers=20
about "normalcy" returning to Gujarat-when thousands of traumatised=20
children can't even take their Class X and XII examinations, and some=20
write them wearing oxygen masks (on account of health damage suffered=20
during the violence). The day the ads appeared, fresh violence in=20
Gujarat killed 28. Meanwhile, Hindutva mobs have attacked refugee=20
camps right outside the Ahmedabad police commissioner's office.
Let's face it. Gujarat has severely damaged India's credibility as a=20
plural, multicultural, tolerant society-one of the few in the Third=20
World attempting to build a rule-of-law secular democracy. Most=20
former foreign secretaries rarely agree, but now three of them have=20
said that the Gujarat violence has cast doubts on India's pleas about=20
Pakistan-sponsored terrorism. Pakistani's argument that India=20
mistreats its Muslims and Christians has gained some acceptability.=20
This weakens India's stance on Kashmir.
Although much of our media is not underlining the connection between=20
today's anti-Muslim pogrom and the post-1997 anti-Christian violence=20
in Gujarat and Orissa by Hindutva forces, many Western diplomats are=20
doing so. The world will not fail to note that these very forces are=20
in power in New Delhi-increasingly, in bitter contention with all=20
others.

Gujarat's impact on the economy too will be terrible. Global ratings=20
companies like Standard & Poor, Fitch, and Moody's are taking note=20
that "rising political and social tensions could have a detrimental=20
effect on [India's] sovereign ratings to the extent that they impede=20
economic and social development and distract policy-making from=20
economic priorities" such as macro-economic stabilisation,=20
balance-of-payments, domestic investment intentions, and=20
foreign-investor confidence.

A Hongkong-based firm, Political and Economic Risk Consultancy, has=20
surveyed more than 1,000 foreign businessmen in 13 Asian countries=20
querying them on their perception of external threats to the business=20
environment. Its "most notable" finding is that "India was the only=20
country where such risks were perceived to be very high". Already,=20
foreign portfolio investment flows have fallen by 81 percent within=20
the past month-thanks to Gujarat.
Not to be underestimated is the likely effect of the Gujarat fallout=20
on the two million-plus Indians living in 50-odd Muslim majority=20
countries from Morocco to Indonesia. Their security, and their social=20
and religious rights, are likely to be affected-as has happened in=20
Kuwait with the closure of its sole gurudwara. India's main sources=20
of oil and gas are located in the West Asian countries. These states=92=20
hostility could affect energy flows into India. New Delhi's=20
pro-Israel stand on Palestine has already disappointed, even=20
embittered, them.

That makes it imperative that India does not adopt sanctimonious,=20
holier-than-thou, postures on Gujarat, or feign an air of injured=20
innocence. Mr Vajpayee=92s Goa speech was heard all over the world by=20
people to whom words like "Hindu right-wing BJP" and even "VHP" and=20
"RSS" are no longer alien. A more honest, wise and credible Indian=20
strategy would be to come clean and tell the world, and our own=20
people, that Gujarat is a disaster, but we'll try to rectify matters=20
by punishing the guilty-and then actually proceed to punish the=20
culprits. This means that the Centre will have to stop defending Mr=20
Modi. It must impose President's Rule on Gujarat for a spell of time,=20
hand over law-and-order to the Army and appoint as the Governor's=20
advisers people of impeccable integrity and experience, chosen=20
through all-party consultations.
If the Vajpayee government fails to do this, it could soon find=20
itself in the international dock-literally. Many European and=20
American nationals of Indian origin are preparing to sue Modi & Co in=20
foreign courts which increasingly accept universal jurisdiction in=20
respect of serious crimes. After Somalia and Rwanda, and after the=20
Pinochet case in which a Spanish magistrate in 1998 secured=20
extradition of the Chilean dictator for mass murder and=20
"disappearances" 25 years earlier, there is tremendous global=20
receptivity to the idea that there must be no impunity across=20
national boundaries for those guilty of genocide and crimes against=20
humanity. "Sovereignty" is no defence. Hence the special UN-sponsored=20
tribunals for the former Yugoslavia and Rwanda.

Even more important, some countries, e.g. Belgium, have recently=20
passed laws based on universal jurisdiction. In some others (e.g.=20
Austria, Australia, Canada, Denmark, France, Germany, Italy, Senegal,=20
Spain, Switzerland, UK), prosecutors have successfully investigated=20
and completed cases involving heinous crimes committed abroad. So far=20
as civil litigation goes-including compensation for loss of life,=20
injury and damage to property-it can be instituted in many states,=20
including the US, under the Alien Torts statute, which was used to=20
pursue dictators like Radovan Karadzic and Ferdinand Marcos.

Not to be underrated is the International Criminal Court, which will=20
have inherent global jurisdiction in respect of genocide, war crimes=20
and crimes against humanity. On April 11, the ICC received more=20
ratifications than it needs. The court will formally be born on July=20
1despite dogged opposition from the US, India, and to an extent,=20
China. It will provide an important forum for international criminal=20
prosecution.
The international arm of the law has become long-more than 3=20
centuries after the Treaty of Westphalia bestowed absolute=20
sovereignty on nation-states. India can try to escape that arm, but=20
only by damaging its credibility. It will be deeply embarrassing for=20
India to be seen to be mulishly opposing worthy litigation. New Delhi=20
can avert this distasteful prospect only if it promptly launches=20
prosecution of those responsible for the Gujarat carnage.-end-

_____

#2.

RESOLUTION ADOPTED ON 26TH APRIL 2002 [ NEW DELHI]

What has happened in Gujarat is nothing short of a state =96sponsored
pogrom against the minority community. It is the beginning of the end of
India of our dreams.

* We appeal to the leaders of political parties, in particular the allies
of NDA to come out clearly on the side of India, take an unambiguous
stand in defence of secular democracy, censure the Central Government
and the Government of Gujarat and put an end to the nefarious and
destructive designs of the "Hindutava" forces.

* To this end, they must insist on the immediate removal of Narendra
Modi from Chief Ministership, on the recall of the present Governor of
Gujarat, and on bringing Gujarat under the President's Rule.
*We demand that independent CBI investigation should be initiated as
advised by the NHRC without delay.
* We demand that the Government of India set up a Judicial Inquiry
Commission on the lines of the Jagmohan Reddy Commission.
*We demand that all those guilty of perpetrating the horrendous crimes
in Gujarat, whether through direct participation, direction or
encouragement or through criminal negligence or inaction, are punished
under the law of the land, irrespective of the positions held by them.
*We demand that the relief and rehabilitation of the victims of the
pogrom be placed under the control and supervision of an independent
committee of eminent citizens not holding any position under the
government. Relief and rehabilitation must include medical aid and
psychiatric care and holding of school examinations at a later date for
the victims.
* We demand that in the states ruled by democratic and secular forces,
immediate action be taken to ban the RSS, VHP and Bajrang Dal and other
similar fascist outfits.
* We believe that extensive and continuing intervention in Gujarat is
essential at different levels=97cultural, educational, social and
political. We dedicate ourselves to the task of restoring sanity and
amity in our society in Gujarat and elsewhere.

Signed:
S.P. Shukla IAS (Retd) Former Finance Secretary and Member of Planning
Commission.
K.S. Subramanian IPS (Retd.) Former Director General of Police Tripura
Kei N. Daruwala IPS (Retd)
Justice A.M.Ahmadi Former Chief Justice, Supreme Court of India
Prof. Yash Pal former Chairman, University Grants Commission
Harsh Mander IAS
M.S.Farooqi Former IG CRPF
Vishva Bandhu Gupta
Dr. Mira Shiva, VHAI
Prof. Ghanshyam Shah (JNU)
Prof. Aditya Mukherji (JNU)
Prof. Mridula Mukherji (JNU)
Chanderjit Yadav, former Member of Parlament
Prof. Manoranjan Mohanty (Delhi University)
Prof Sumit Sarakar (Delhi University)
Prof. Tanika Sarkar (JNU)
Malathi Subramanian, Principal, Daulat Ram College
Prof. Rajeev Bharagav (Delhi University)
Prof. Satish Saberwal
D.R.Goyal
DR. Kamal Mitra Chenoy (JNU)
Prof. Gulshan Dietl (JNU)
Upendra Vajpai
Mary Scaria Justice Peace Commission
Seema Mustafa

And 100 others

_____

#3.

INDIA: GUJARAT OFFICIALS TOOK PART IN ANTI-MUSLIM VIOLENCE
New Report Documents Complicity of the State Government
(New York, April 30, 2002) - State officials of Gujarat, India were=20
directly involved in the killings of hundreds of Muslims since=20
February 27 and are now engineering a massive cover-up of the state's=20
role in the violence, Human Rights Watch charged in a new report=20
released today.
----------------------------------------------------
'WE HAVE NO ORDERS TO SAVE YOU': STATE PARTICIPATION AND COMPLICITY=20
IN COMMUNAL VIOLENCE IN GUJARAT is available online at:=20
http://hrw.org/reports/2002/india/

_____

#4.

HINDU LEADERS SILENTLY SUPPORTING RIGHTWING BRITISH PARTY
B Sanjay Suri, Indo-Asian News Service
London, Apr 28 (IANS) Several Hindu leaders have begun silently supporting
the far-right British National Party in local elections in towns hit by rac=
e
riots last year.
Rioting in Bradford, Oldham and Burnley towns, the worst that Britain has
seen in 20 years, had led to continuing clashes between white youths and
Pakistanis and Bangladeshis on the other, but did not involve any youths of
Indian origin.
The BNP has since then made a policy shift from opposing all immigrants to
opposing Muslim immigrants.
The BNP has set up an Ethnic Liaison Committee to launch a joint effort wit=
h
Sikhs and Hindus. Sikh and Hindu leaders in the area are believed to have
given their support to a Campaign Against Islam launched by the BNP.
The BNP has been distributing CDs and audio tapes of its policies which
include a warning to the British people by someone who describes himself as
Sikh and who talks of his father hacked to death by mobs during the
partition of the Indian subcontinent in 1947.
Several leaders have warned that the BNP is using Hindu and Sikh leaders fo=
r
tactical purposes and has not given up its anti-immigrant policies.
Continuing talks between BNP leader Nick Griffin and Hindu and Sikh leaders
since then is now finding expression in the local elections due May 2,
according to both BNP leaders and Hindu leaders.
"We have had the support of Hindus and Sikhs before and now we have that
support again," a leader at the BNP campaign office told IANS.

The support earlier came in a by-election in Burnley in November 2001 when
the BNP took 19 percent of the vote in Trinity Ward and 23 percent of the
vote in Lower House ward.
Hindu leaders have stopped short of boasting of the alliance with the BNP
publicly. But Hasmukh Shah, one of the most influential Hindu leaders in
north England, was reported to have met Griffin about that time.

Several other leaders within the Indian community warned against any deal
with rightwing racists.
The BNP's Burnley organiser, local accountant Steve Smith, said after the
by-election results: "Our rapidly rising vote shows that it's only a matter
of time before we win in Burnley. Just over a couple of years ago we only
had two members in the town; now we're getting more than one in five votes.=
"

--Indo-Asian News Service

_____

#5.

The Times of India
DONATIONS FOR RIOT VICTIMS
TIMES NEWS NETWORK [ MONDAY, APRIL 29, 2002 10:56:16 PM ]
NEW DELHI: The Press Institute of India has appealed to the people to=20
contribute genereously to the victims of Gujarat violence. On Monday,=20
the PII said: ''Violence in Gujarat has dealt a body blow not only to=20
its direct victims, but also to the image of India as a composite and=20
pluralist society. ''
PII has appealed to Indians, ''to demonstrate to the people of=20
Gujarat and the workd that we care, that we stand behind them, and=20
that we will help to rebuild not only their homes and livelihoods.''
The cheques can be send to: Aman Ekta Manch: C/O Jagori, C-54, South=20
Extension Part II, New Delhi-110048/Citizen's Initiative: Opposite=20
St. Xavier's School, Navrangpura, Ahmedabad-380009/Action Aid India=20
Society, Action Aid, 71, Uday Park, New Delhi-110049. (TNN)

_____

#6.

Date: Sun, 28 Apr 2002 23:24:05 +0530
From: Rakesh Sharma <actmedia@b...>
Subject: VHS copy of Aftershocks : The Rough Guide to Democracy

I am enclosing some information about a film I made during March 2001=20
- February 2002. It deals with Development/ Displacement,=20
Environment, Peoples' Rights and Democracy. The film has won several=20
international awards and has been invited to many film festivals.
It is an independent self-financed film, made without any grant,=20
contribution or funding. I am now attempting to recover part of the=20
costs by selling VHS copies. I am likely to use the money for my next=20
film and to continue documenting the story of the 2 villages featured=20
in the film . Please let me know whether you would be interested in=20
buying one or more copies of the film [ Rs 1500 plus postage ( Rs 100=20
)or US $ 30 plus postage ( $5)]. For activists/ students, the copies=20
are available at a discount. Information about the film is enclosed=20
below. Please help by circulating it to those who may be interested.
Rakesh Sharma
Aftershocks -The Rough Guide to Democracy India 66 minutes=20
2002
Awards : Le Prix de la Presse politique award for the best film at=20
the 16th Fribourg International film festival in Switzerland (March=20
2002). Bronze for best documentary feature, Big Muddy film fest=20
(USA), April 2002, John Michaels memorial award, Big Muddy film fest=20
(USA).
Festivals: Indian Premiere at Mumbai International film festival on=20
Feb 9, 2002 by MIFF and Indian Documentary Producers' Association.=20
Other festivals include the 26th Hongkong International Film Festival=20
(April 2002), the Calcutta Festival of Social Cinema(Feb 2002).....

SYNOPSIS=20
On January 26, 2001, Kutch (Gujarat, India) was devastated by a=20
massive earthquake. Over 20,000 people died and tens of thousands of=20
homes were destroyed. Bhuj, Anjar, Rapar and Bhachau, the most=20
severely affected areas, received attention from many international=20
relief agencies, national and international media, even personal=20
visits from Prime Minister Vajpayee and Citizen Clinton.
This film is set in Julrai and Umarsar, two villages in Lakhpat, near=20
the India Pakistan border, close to the Gujarat coast, and too far=20
away from Bhuj to be in focus. Umarsar is an upper caste Durbar=20
village, while Julrai's entire population comprises low class=20
Rabbaris, semi-nomadic shepherds, who began to settle down into=20
permanent villages only in the last couple of hundred years. The two=20
villages have nothing in common except that both were almost totally=20
destroyed during the quake and both are sitting on top of lignite=20
reserves. The Government-controlled Gujarat Mineral Development=20
Corporation has a monopoly over any mining activity in the region.=20
GMDC is likely to be privatised completely over the next few years;=20
26% of its shares were sold to corporates, financial institutions and=20
investors in 1997-98.
This film traces the story of GMDC's attempts to acquire the two=20
villages. Eight weeks after the quake, on March 26, 2001, our camera=20
accidentally bumps into the GMDC acquisition survey team in Umarasar.=20
Over the next few months, the film moves in and out of Julrai,=20
Umarsar and the GMDC's existing lignite mines and probes the=20
processes of displacement and resettlement.
Did GMDC succeed in exploiting the earthquake as a God-sent=20
opportunity to hasten the acquisition? How did the obviously=20
vulnerable quake-affected people of Julrai and Umarsar deal with it?=20
What was the role of the state government machinery, entrusted with=20
the welfare of its calamity affected people? How have the existing=20
mines and the power plant affected the lives of the people living=20
nearby? Have the Executive, the Judiciary and the Legislative taken=20
note of this human impact before they paved the way for the new mines=20
and the new power plant? The film is a hitchiker's journey through=20
the labyrinthine universe of Democracy, as it exists in its lowest=20
unit level - the Indian village.
This 68 minute film has been shot and edited entirely on Digital=20
Video -miniDV ( Sony TRV900 and MatroxRT2500-Adobe Premiere).=20
Languages spoken by the people include Kutchi, Gujarati, Hindi and=20
English. The film has been subtitled in English.

--=20
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