[sacw] SACW (24 Dec. 01)

[Harsh Kapoor]

South Asia Citizens Wire | 24 December 2001
http://www.mnet.fr/aiindex

------------------------------------------

#1. India's gung-ho former diplomat & hawk S.K. Singh peddling=20
scrapping of the Indus Basin Waters Treaty between India and Pakistan
#2. Is India Pakistan war eminent? (Farooq Tariq)
#3. Pak army always committed to war with India (Rehan Ansari)
#4. India Pakistan Arms Race & Militarisation Watch (IPARMW) # 57 23=20
December 2001
#5. India: Merits of inaction - Sometimes not doing anything is the=20
best strategic course (Kanti Bajpai)
#6. Averting yet another war - A view from Pakistan (Imtiaz Alam)
#7. India: The thin saffron line (Amulya Ganguli)

________________________

#1.

[ Sources name India's gung-ho former diplomat & hawk S.K. Singh as=20
the man peddling scrapping of the Indus Basin Waters Treaty between=20
India and Pakistan. Let us hope hope some sense will prevail and that=20
the more cool headed will control the hot heads in India (and their=20
counter parts in Pakistan)]
- - -

The Hindu
Monday, Dec 24, 2001
Pak. military to review situation
By B. Muralidhar Reddy

ISLAMABAD, DEC. 23.
[...]

Indus treaty
The former Pakistan Finance Minister and prominent intellectual, Dr.=20
Mubashir Hasan, has expressed shock over reports that India is=20
contemplating scrapping of the Indus Treaty. ``It would be construed=20
as an act of war by the other party if India or Pakistan make any=20
attempt to violate the provisions of the Indus Basin Waters Treaty=20
between the two countries''.

He referred to reports attributed to some former Indian diplomats=20
about the possibility of India taking such an action in the next=20
phase and said that certain influential elements in New Delhi have=20
been promoting the idea.

``Such suggestions can only come out of diseased minds, blinded by=20
feelings of hate and intolerance, who do not understand the=20
implications of what they are proposing.''

_____

#2.

Is India Pakistan war eminent?
By: Farooq Tariq
General secretary
Labour party Pakistan

The =ECBush war on terrorism=EE has taken a new turn. It is possible that=20
a real war could erupt between the two nuclear powers, Pakistan and=20
India. It is not going to be one way traffic as was the case of=20
American Afghanistan war. It is going to be a war, full of blood, not=20
seen many years by the world, on both sides. Minor border clashes=20
have already taken place and the air force of the both countries is=20
on high alert. There have been reports of massive army presence on=20
the borders on both sides.

The spokespersons of the governments of both countries are speaking=20
the war language. Initial steps like recalling the Indian Ambassador,=20
suspension of the only =ECFriendship=EE bus service and four times weekly=20
train between Delhi and Lahore have been suspended by the Indian=20
government.

Vajpai and Nawaz Sharif governments during 1998 initiated the bus=20
service as a token gesture of newly found friendship after they both=20
met at Lahore. The bus service was not even suspended during the 28=20
days Kargil war between India and Pakistan during June 1998.

This is in response to a terrorist attack on Indian parliament on=20
13th December by armed men in which 14 were killed. The Indian=20
government claimed that this was an attempt by the Inter Services=20
Intelligence (ISI) of Pakistan to wipe out the whole political=20
leadership of India. The Indian parliament was in session when the=20
attack took place. Failed in its ambitions to enter the parliament=20
building, the attackers were intercepted outside the building by the=20
Indian guards. Six of them were killed on the spot plus the five=20
terrorists.

Pakistan government and Pakistan media in their usual demagogy tried=20
to blame the Indian Intelligence service RAW that it has engineered a=20
plot against Pakistan. That, under the excuse of this attack, India=20
will call on the international community to declare Pakistan as a=20
state harboring terrorism. The military spokesman of Pakistan warned=20
India of dire consequences if Pakistan attacked militarily. India=20
government termed this attitude as non-serious. There were=20
hysterical calls by the India main stream media to take actions not=20
in word but in real actions against the Pakistani State. This is to=20
teach them a lesson.

The Pakistani newspapers have reported on 23rd December that Indian=20
government is also calling for the scrapping of Indus Water Treaty=20
and suspensions of over flight facilities to Pakistani civilian=20
planes. The Indian home minister Advani has already spoken on=20
crossing the border lines and the prime minister Vajpai has declared=20
that all option are open to the Indian government. He spoke of=20
taking the diplomatic efforts first and then discusses the=20
possibilities of other options open to India. On the contrary general=20
Musharaf who is on a five days visit to China at this time have=20
termed the Indian response as arrogant and knee-jerk.

The Indus Water Treaty of 1960 governs the distribution of water from=20
the Indus River and its tributaries between India and Pakistan. If=20
this treaty were scrapped, it would not only starve the Punjab and=20
Sind Province of Pakistan but Pakistan as whole and Afghanistan. The=20
both provinces are heavily dependent on canal irrigation system=20
coming out of these rivers. Because of the ongoing climate changes=20
there has been a draught conditions for the last many years in arid=20
areas of Punjab. The food requirements of Pakistan mainly met out=20
the canal-irrigated areas of Punjab and Sind. The two provinces=20
constitute over 80 percent of total population of Pakistan.

The governments of Both India and Pakistan are on a road to disaster.=20
It is likely that the both governments will go further than the=20
economic and other sanctions against each other. These are the first=20
steps on the road to a real war. Both countries have gone to war=20
against each other several times in the past. The last limited war=20
was in 1998.

The mad politicians of India and military regime of Pakistan were on=20
the same side with the =ECinternational community=EE during the Afghan=20
American war. Now they both blame each other of harboring terrorism=20
via armed religious fundamentalist on the question of Kashmir.

They want to take the American road to score their points. War is the=20
only solutions, that is the conclusions these mad rulers are drawing=20
after the events of last three months. American war on Afghanistan=20
has brought no peace or no relive from the so-called terrorists. On=20
the contrary, it has increased the danger of the world peace. The=20
world is closer to a nuclear war than ever before in the history.

With the threat of a new war between India and Pakistan, all the=20
claims of the US imperialism have been proved false. They claimed=20
that by bombing Afghanistan and taking the power out of the hands of=20
Talban would help to curb the menace of terrorism. The attack on=20
Indian parliament, the failed attempt to blast it self on air on 23rd=20
December, the killing of the brother of Interior minister of Pakistan=20
on 22nd December at Karachi and the ongoing armed conflict in=20
Palestine shows that terrorism will not stop by state sponsored=20
terrorism.

US may have =ECwon=EE the war and may be very pleased by Talban departure=20
from power but the dangers of terrorist attacks have not gone. In=20
fact, it has promoted the philosophy of war and war politics. The=20
departure of Talban is by no mean an end of religious fanaticism.=20
According to one survey, published today by Pakistani press, despite=20
the fact, that Talban have not lived to its words of fight till the=20
end, they still enjoy the support of 43 percent of Pakistan=20
population.=20=20

The other bitter reality is that none of the Talban main leadership=20
have been arrested or killed despite the rain of bombs on the main=20
basis of the Talban. It has emerged now that Talban left the power=20
with full consent of the American supported Karazai on the promise=20
that none of them will be arrested or killed. Karazai has so for=20
lived unto his promise. The main reasons could be the ethnic conflict=20
within Afghanistan and Hamid Karazai still wanted to use the support=20
of Pushtoon Talban in case he has problems with the other Uzbak,=20
Hazara and Tajik nationalist leaders.

The strategy of Americans in Afghanistan could be compared with its=20
strategy just after their victory in the Gulf War. US Imperialism=20
helped defeated Sadam to remain in power and helped him to curb the=20
popular uprising of Shia Muslims. At the time, they wanted to stop=20
another Iran. Now they have bowed down to the internal conflicts and=20
contradictions.

But this strategy has not helped to curb the religious fundamentalists.

Despite the fact, that Pakistan military regime has helped the=20
Americans in their war efforts but they still hold the Kashmir policy=20
as earlier. The religious fundamentalist groups are openly organizing=20
their activities in Pakistan. None of the camps of the religious=20
fundamentalists have been closed. They have not been banned from=20
recruiting the unemployed youth from working class backgrounds. It is=20
business as usual. But it can not go very long.

The military regime has to change its policy towards these so-called=20
Mujahidin organizations that are eager to go for an all out war with=20
the Indian Government. The Indian government social basis rests on=20
Hindu Chauvinism. It needs such excuses to whip up the Hindi=20
nationalism. Now it precisely does that. It is not a war against=20
terrorism. If that is the case, it should not indulge in gross=20
violation of human rights in Kashmir. The Kashmiries want=20
independence. The religious fundamentalists want to turn this=20
national struggle into a religious struggle. Part of ISI of Pakistan=20
is helping these religious fundamentalists to achieve this goal.

General Musharaf is particularly in difficult position. He has=20
publicly defended the Kashmir policy many times. He had to leave the=20
much-publicized Agra Summit in August this year just for this very=20
reason. Indian Prime Minister Vajpai was not accepting the centrality=20
of Kashmir issue at the time. Vajpai offered to open the borders,=20
more trade relations and other economic measure to bring the two=20
countries more close to each other. But general Musharaf rejected all=20
these offers and told point blank that until the Kashmir issue is not=20
resolved, there will be no long lasting friendship.

Indian ruling class under Vajpai would not accept any solution of=20
Kashmir that will hurt their social basis. So they refused and the=20
Agra Summit failed.

Only a month later, after 11th September, General Musharaf took a U=20
turns about its government policy to support the Talban and decided=20
to side with Americans. It was a another contradiction by Musharaf=20
regime. On one side they were helping the Kashmir Mujahidin in their=20
holy war against Indian occupation of Kashmir. On the other side,=20
they were supporting Americans against the Talban.

Who has carried the present attack on Indian parliament? India says=20
it is Muslim fundamentalist from Lashkar Tayaba (Holy Army) and Jaish=20
Mohammed (Prophet Mohammed=EDs Army). General Musharaf asks the proof=20
of that. It is just like the Talban were asking the proof to hand=20
Osama to Americans. After the war in Afghanistan, the morality of=20
providing proofs of any incident has become irrelevant. It is more of=20
the interests and priorities of a certain country that guide their=20
strategy and no need of any real proofs.

Pakistan and Indian working class has to act and act decisively in=20
the present situation. They have to act now. They have to reject the=20
excuse of their rulers to go for the war. There is no excuse to=20
start a war. They have to say no to the war, yes to the peace. The=20
need for a peace movement in the Indian subcontinent is for greater=20
at present than any other time in the history.

The real losers in the war between India and Pakistan will be=20
ordinary citizens of both countries. They have to pay the price of=20
the war. The rich and the capitalist will make money out of war and=20
the workers will pay not only dearly with cash but with their lives=20
as well. They have no safe place or any money to leave the country.=20

The Indian and Pakistan economies are no more than $400 Dollars per=20
capita. They both have almost one fifth of the world population. They=20
both have more than 70 percent of the world poor. The economic impact=20
of this war will be disastrous for both. Pakistan economy is already=20
on the verge of economic collapse despite all the claims of=20
international help. The Afghan war has already ruined the Pakistan=20
economy. A war between India and Pakistan will role back the standard=20
of livings of the masses to an unprecedented level.

The war between India and Pakistan has become a real possibility. It=20
can only be avoided if General Musharaf take another U turn on his=20
policy towards Kashmir. If he does not, he may loose the power and=20
his life as well. No ruler of Pakistan has voluntarily left the power.

The Indian ruling class is all out for war. It can start from border=20
clashes but can quickly spread all over the borders. The American=20
Imperialism may not be in favor of such a war. But the circumstances=20
can be out of their control. They have created a mess by attacking on=20
Afghanistan. Every problem should be solved by waging a war, is the=20
lesson Americans has taught.

A strong peace movement on both sides can have a decisive influence=20
to change the war hysteria. Labour Party Pakistan will be in the=20
forefront and will initiate this peace movement in Pakistan.=20

FOR MORE INFORMATION ABOUT LABOUR PARTY PAKISTAN
Visit: www.labourpakistan.org

_____

#3.

Chalomumbai.com
PAK ARMY ALWAYS COMMITTED TO WAR WITH INDIA
By: Rehan Ansari

December 20,2001
Early this year in Qasbah Colony, Karachi, I saw a poster that=20
proclaimed, "Shahadat Conference". Its central image was of a masked=20
man holding a machine gun, the background red, as in the afterglow of=20
an explosion. Along the margins of the poster were photographs of=20
martyrs, all the faces were young, some ridiculously so. The poster=20
also had a date for the conference and promised a "telephonic"=20
address from Syed Ali Geelani. It was placed on the outside wall of a=20
house that served as a school.
I was standing in a narrow lane of houses when I saw this poster. The=20
lane was on a hill. As I looked further up the lane, over the=20
rooftops following the phone lines, towards the hillside, I saw a=20
sign that commanded the community - it said 'Jaish-e-Muhammad'.
Qasbah Colony is next to the site area where the heavy industries of=20
Karachi are located. It is one of the colonies that houses the=20
industrial workforce. I had gotten there along broken roads, open=20
sewers and open-air trash burnings. In the entire area I saw only one=20
building that said it was a government-run educational institution.
I wonder if any of the $1 billion that Washington promised Islamabad=20
for the defanging of the madarsas, will make it to Qasbah Colony. I=20
wonder if the most obvious signs of violence will be removed. For=20
once I would like Barkha Dutt and her Star TV crew to cover Kashmir=20
from Qasbah Colony, Karachi.
I find myself writing the same thing in response to the attack on New=20
Delhi as what I wrote when Kargil happened.
It is not useful for the indignant Indian to point a finger at who it=20
is in Pakistan that is responsible for the Kargil war or the attack=20
on the Parliament. One has to have a compassionate understanding of=20
each of the players for figuring out the unfolding drama. After all,=20
for the players, it is a rozi roti ka masla.
In the case of Kargil it was the army, the Sharifs, the Lashkars, and=20
the public opinion that were the Pakistani factors. Now it is the=20
army and the Lashkars. Public opinion is only important if it comes=20
out as mass anarchy.
This should take the edge off the indignation of the Indian: many=20
things Indian, the public statements of the Indian establishment, the=20
media, the Indian military budget and the Indian nuclear policy=20
directly influence the Pakistani players.
Nawaz Sharif campaigned for peace in the last election, the only=20
prime minister to have done so. He was vociferous about trade with=20
India. In two years, the number of his office items on the trade list=20
between Pakistan and India grew substantially, according to a report=20
by the Karachi Chamber of Commerce.
It is a provocative question whether Sharif was a reluctant tester of=20
the nuclear device. It is also a question whether he was behind=20
Kargil or Kargil happened behind his back. This is not a matter of=20
ancient history: the office of the prime minister may soon come back=20
to Pakistan.
The Pakistani army is, and has always been, committed to a war with=20
India. That is its raison d' etre. It was not raised to fight China,=20
Iran, or Afghanistan. The Indian establishment has a lot of say in=20
the development of the Pakistan army. The Pakistan military strains=20
for the achievement of parity with India.
The last couple of years the Pakistani military budget has not grown=20
in real terms. The country is unable to borrow more. The Pakistanis=20
would not have exploded the nuclear device if the Indians had not. So=20
will they match India, if it reduces its military activities.
However, now that Islamabad has followed in the footsteps of New=20
Delhi, it has the confidence of the first use of a nuclear device.=20
However, neither is there a dearth of officers, ex and serving, in=20
Lahore or Rawalpindi, who in their war gaming, play nuclear tactical=20
strikes as end game.
The Lashkars may be the only Pakistani element that is unaffected by=20
Indian attitudes and policies. Javed Nasir, ex-chief of Inter-Service=20
Intelligence (ISI), is on record for saying the Lashkars may be=20
coordinated by the ISI but they have a mind of their own. Good luck=20
trying to disarm them.
Remember Sharif accused one of these Lashkars for an attempted=20
assassination in early 1999. All of them, and the Jamaat, issued=20
statements of intolerance towards a roll back policy on Kashmir back=20
when the Pakistanis sued for peace over Kargil. They are saying the=20
same things now with the Taliban having been crushed. These Lashkars=20
are a product of the mobilisation that the Americans organised to=20
fight the first Afghan war. The Americans did not subsequently=20
demobilise this army.
Ayaz Amir of The Dawn and Tariq Ali in London are a few of the=20
writers who have called Pakistan a used American condom. The business=20
end of the condom is now speaking up.
I shudder at the thought of what the Lashkars may be up to, if they=20
remain the army that they are and have no Kashmir cause.

_____

#4.

India Pakistan Arms Race & Militarisation Watch (IPARMW) # 57
23 December 2001

http://groups.yahoo.com/group/IPARMW/message/68

_____

#5.

The Indian Express
24 December 2001
MERITS OF INACTION

INDIA HAS SIX MILITARY OPTIONS, NOT ONE IS PROMISING

KANTI BAJPAI

Sometimes not doing anything is the best strategic course. In India,=20
we have lost sight of this and have become enthralled by the cult of=20
''action''. The BJP is the party most at fault here. They have made=20
decisiveness and boldness the watchword of both their domestic and=20
foreign policies. The party's spokesmen love to tell you that they=20
are doers, that they put into action what others would like to do but=20
do not have the ''courage'' to do. Domestically, the Ram Janambhoomi=20
campaign is the best example of this approach. In external policy,=20
the nuclear tests were part of the cult of action.
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Let's stop drawing parallels with the US action in Afghanistan. The=20
US faces a ragtag Afghan militia. We face the fifth biggest army in=20
the world with nuclear weapons at its disposal
------------------------------------------------------------------------

The BJP of course is not all to blame. The party reflects broader=20
trends and desires as much as it makes them. The Indian political=20
class as a whole has become increasingly aggressive and chippy over=20
the years. Its imagination is suffused with thoughts, on the one=20
hand, of India as a great economic and military power, and, on the=20
other hand, with the panic that it is a weak, reactive country. India=20
seems to possess all the raw materials of a big, unassailable power;=20
yet its neighbours, and particularly Pakistan, seem to be under-awed=20
by its huge presence. This disjuncture between power and effect is=20
gnawing at Indians constantly, and it has driven us into a fragile,=20
politically-conservative mood that was unimaginable a decade ago.

The events of December 13 have put the BJP in a quandary. It is=20
increasingly hoist on its own political petard. Having projected and=20
popularised itself as a party that will make India strong and that=20
will take hard, systematic decisions to advance India's interests, it=20
finds itself in a spot. In private, it knows that India has few if=20
any credible military or diplomatic options. But having risen to=20
power on the cult of action, it is under tremendous pressure ''to do=20
something''. It is paying the price of its political immaturity;=20
worse, the country as a whole is in danger of paying for the party's=20
shortsightedness and the overheated imagination of our political=20
class which has itself come to revere the cult of action.

The fact of the matter is that after December 13, India has few if=20
any options. Militarily, there are only six choices. India could use=20
its aircraft to bomb training camps in PoK or Pakistan.=20
Alternatively, it could rain down artillery fire on the camps. A=20
third choice is to send in special forces to attack these facilities=20
on the ground. Fourth, the government could order a large-scale=20
ground attack to slice off a chunk of PoK as a warning to Pakistan.=20
Fifth, it could stage a real hot pursuit incident along the LoC, push=20
a small force across the Line after retreating militants, and in the=20
ensuing firefight inflict some damage on Pakistani army units and=20
installations. Finally, we could subvert Pakistan from within and do=20
a ''Kashmir'' on them.

None of these options is promising. The Indian air force lacks the=20
precision-guided munitions and reconnaissance capability to hit the=20
camps from a great distance. It would probably have to fly in low=20
instead, which would make it susceptible to ground fire. The camps=20
are almost certainly out of the range of artillery fire. It is also=20
unlikely that we have accurate intelligence on camp locations for an=20
effective artillery response. A special forces attack could become a=20
disaster if the Pakistanis and militants are up and ready for them,=20
as they will be from now on. And a large-scale military assault in=20
PoK will have to deal with bad terrain and with very strong Pakistani=20
defences. If the attack goes badly, the pressure to escalate, under=20
the shadow of nuclear weapons, will be intense. A hot pursuit strike=20
is the least likely to go wrong because it is such a modest option=20
and because Indian forces can choose the time and location of the=20
attack to suit themselves. Given its modesty, though, it is hard to=20
see what it would achieve. Last, subverting Pakistan is not only=20
morally objectionable and diplomatically fraught, it is also useless=20
in a country already convulsed by and yet curiously indifferent to=20
internal violence.

Diplomatically, India has done most of what it could reasonably do.=20
It has demanded that the Pakistanis take action against the=20
Lashkar-e-Toiba. It has accused Islamabad of being implicated in the=20
attack on Parliament. It has also recalled its high commissioner and=20
terminated the Samjhauta Express and the bus service to and from=20
Pakistan. India could go further. It could reduce the size of the=20
Pakistani high commission, stop all trade, shut down Pakistani=20
flights and overflights, and so on. These are mostly symbolic steps=20
and will not hurt Pakistan materially. They will make the Indian=20
public feel better, but they will not change Islamabad's behaviour.

India has presented some evidence to the influential powers. It has=20
tried to galvanise the Americans into twisting President Musharraf's=20
hands. President Bush's statement on December 21 was notable for=20
branding the Lashkar a global (as opposed to a mere regional)=20
terrorist threat. This means that the US is more likely to act=20
against it. The US's problem remains that it needs Musharraf in the=20
unfinished war against Osama bin Laden, Al-Qaeda, Mullah Omar and the=20
Taliban. In the circumstances, it is hard to see what New Delhi can=20
get Washington to do beyond what it is already doing.

The NDA government has positioned itself as a hyper-rational,=20
energetic defender of India's interests and has created expectations=20
which it cannot fulfill. The attack on India's Parliament was=20
sensational and could have been catastrophic if it had succeeded. If=20
the terrorists had entered the main portals, there would have been=20
carnage, in which case no one could have stopped the dogs of war.=20
Fortunately, the attack was a palpable failure. The government should=20
capitalise on the failure to cool things down. It should conduct a=20
quick and convincing investigation. It should punish the guilty. It=20
should improve security measures and its intelligence capabilities.=20
Above all, it must do the one thing that is in its hands and that is=20
to get something going with Kashmiris. It must turn its attention to=20
three crucial things in Kashmir: a free and fair election next year;=20
autonomy talks; and a process of reconciliation with ordinary=20
Kashmiris.

Not everything is the responsibility of the government. The Indian=20
public has responsibilities also. We must stop baying for blood and=20
pushing this rather ramshackle, disorganised government into extreme=20
actions. Let's stop drawing parallels with the US action in=20
Afghanistan. The US faces a ragtag Afghan militia without nuclear=20
weapons. We face the fifth biggest army in the world with nuclear=20
weapons at its disposal. Nor is the Israeli example a good one. Every=20
Israeli reprisal is met with counter-reprisals. Surely that cannot be=20
our ambition in respect of Kashmir. We must act with restraint. All=20
counter-terrorism campaigns are campaigns of patience. Shaming our=20
government into action can only lead to disaster. We must learn to=20
sit on our hands sometimes and allow prudence and time to take their=20
course.

_____

#6.

The News International December 24, 2001
AVERTING YET ANOTHER WAR

Imtiaz Alam
The security situation in the subcontinent is deteriorating to new=20
highs with each passing day. The armed forces have been put on high=20
alert and moved closer to the borders amid a warlike atmosphere. New=20
Delhi has recalled its high commissioner while declaring to sever=20
road and rail links with Pakistan. India is being refrained, at the=20
moment, from going to war by the international calls for restraint=20
and a nuclear deterrence. But what will happen, if the terrorists=20
struck again as they did on December 13, or the situation on the=20
borders spun out of control?

What is exceptionally dangerous about the situation is that India is=20
erroneously implicating the Musharraf administration, ostensibly to=20
pressurise him, in the terrorist attack on the Indian Parliament.=20
Well aware of the continuing US pressure on Pakistan to reign in the=20
extremist elements and exploiting the December 13 agent provocateurs'=20
act, the hawks in the Vajpayee government, more for domestic=20
consideration and their pathological aversion to Pakistan, are=20
drumming up war hysteria. Factors of miscalculation, this time more=20
on the Indian side, are at full play that had led to the1965 war and=20
the Kargil conflict.

The Indian establishment took longer time in overcoming its Kargil=20
hangover and continued to nurse deeper suspicions about the 'captain=20
of the Kargil boys', despite a fundamental, albeit gradual,=20
transformation in the disposition of the Chief of the Army Staff=20
(COAS) into a full-fledged Chief Executive and the President of the=20
country faced with bigger challenges than purely security matters.=20
Until and after the Agra summit, it thought that the hawks are in=20
control and not the COAS-President, General Pervez Musharraf. After=20
September 11, New Delhi, again, miscalculated that General Musharraf=20
will not be able to get over the Taliban baggage, providing India the=20
historic opportunity to make a joint front with the US-led coalition=20
and settle scores with its neighbour by clubbing Pakistan with the=20
harbours of terrorists.

But General Musharraf embarrassed and disappointed the Indian=20
leadership by abandoning Taliban and joining the international=20
coalition in its war against terrorism. Thanks to over-fixation with=20
certain self-pleasing assumptions, the Indian leadership failed to=20
appreciate Pakistan's role and most pivotal strategic contribution to=20
the war against terrorism. It could not and is still not able to=20
precisely estimate the reversal of Pakistan's Taliban-centred Afghan=20
policy and its overall and very serious implications for the=20
internationalist jihadi outfits and religious extremist here. Many=20
among the jihadi elements, true to their universal commitment of=20
faith, broke with the Pakistani establishment and joined hands with=20
their comrades in Afghanistan, without being restrained by the=20
imperatives of nationhood.

While Pakistan passes through a process of de-Talibanisation, Indian=20
hawks and Hindu revivalists vehemently seek to make demands that in=20
fact strengthen their counterparts here - the Islamic extremists. As=20
an emerging power, or in the image of it, India analogously seeks=20
encouragement from the US hegemon acting in 'self-defence' against=20
the sovereign nations in its war against the terrorists it once=20
created. Impressed by the Zionist annexationism, the=20
Hindu-nationalist revivalists wrongly perceive Pakistan as, perhaps,=20
yet another Gaza strip. Encouraged by the US demand that Pakistan ban=20
the activities of Lashkar-i-Taiba and Jaish-i-Mohammed, and also by=20
the US suggestion that India has a right to take steps it deems fit=20
for its security, the Indian establishment is over-playing its cards.

New Delhi is overlooking the fact how General Musharraf is being=20
trusted and appreciated by the US in its war against terrorism. At=20
the fag end of the war in Afghanistan, it impatiently feels that=20
Pakistan is now a spent cartridge in the war against terrorism. The=20
Bush administration has clearly indicated that there is no evidence=20
of the involvement of the Musharraf administration in the terrorist=20
attack on the Indian Parliament. However, the US has been asking, and=20
more so after December 13, Islamabad to nab the two jihadi outfits=20
and other extremists while keeping Pakistan on board.

On the other hand, engaged on the western front against the escaping=20
terrorists, Pakistan is faced with an increasing threat on its major=20
eastern front - an unenviable situation for any military leadership.=20
The question, then, arises why should anyone with a least concern for=20
Pakistan's security invite trouble for his own country, except a=20
lunatic or a frustrated rogue element of the al-Qaeda sorts, keen to=20
push Pakistan on the brink of war with India in a desperate need to=20
have some room to manoeuvre? Yet there are elements of miscalculation=20
one can identify in Rawalpindi's assessment.

Satisfied with its rewarding role in the war against terrorism, it=20
thought that it has been absolved of the stigma and will not be=20
required to take follow-up steps as far as that will hurt certain=20
elements in its Kashmir policy. The reversal of the jihadi politics=20
had to be complete and as the US has been making it abundantly clear.=20
When Pakistan decided to join the coalition against terrorism it=20
should have known that it would not come to an end at the other side=20
of the Durand Line and the jihadis, for once in their inflated=20
apprehensions, were right on this count to an extent. By placing=20
Ummah Tameer-i-Nau on the terrorist list and accusing Lashkar-i-Taiba=20
of attacking Indian Parliament the Bush administration has brought=20
Musharraf administration under tremendous pressure. Jasih-i-Mohammed=20
and Harkat-ul-Mujahideen were already on the wanted list of terrorist=20
outfits.

Much before the December 13 terrorism, which Pakistan has rightly=20
condemned, Islamabad was inclined to gradually reign in the=20
extremists after the religious-right's backlash had exhausted.=20
However, the attack on Indian Parliament snatched time from General=20
Musharraf to squeeze the extremist space. If General Musharraf wants=20
to ward off international pressure and puncture Indian offensive, he=20
will have to take some measures against those rogue element who have=20
gone berserk and want to fish in troubled waters. Pakistan is=20
required to take concrete measures under the Security Council=20
resolutions. It has ceased the accounts of Ummah Tameer-i-Nau and is=20
being asked to take steps against, at least, two militant outfits.

Given the higher expectations of exaggerated rewards for its role in=20
the war against terrorism, Rawalpindi had miscalculated that India=20
will become too easy a loser on the Kashmir front and the world will=20
deliver it Kashmir on a platter. No doubt, the international=20
community is much more inclined to favour some way in addressing the=20
aspirations of the Kashmiri people. But, unfortunately and=20
despicably, it is not ready to give the right to the suppressed=20
indigenous people to take-up arms against the annexationists. The=20
militant Palestinians are being forced to abandon a course that hurts=20
civilians and the Hamas had learnt it after strengthening the=20
Zionists and weakening their own Palestinian authority. So should the=20
militants engaged in the Kashmir struggle, before they cause an=20
irreparable damage to the Kashmir cause and push Pakistan into a=20
dangerous twin-front situation that India is trying to impose and=20
Rawalpindi would like to avert.

Assumptions that the possibility of another war with India is just an=20
Indian ploy, since it is not possible with nuclear deterrence, is so=20
dangerous that it can put Pakistan's nuclear assets in danger as=20
well. If a localised war in Kargil could be fought, why cannot a=20
limited war again take place with a danger of its escalation into a=20
full war and possibly ending up with a nuclear exchange? Present=20
escalation of tension to most dangerous proportions can spin into a=20
full war and Pakistan must engage international community, by=20
responding to its advice, to push India back from a dangerous=20
standoff.

If Pakistan is to benefit from its coalition with the US-led=20
coalition, and put India on defensive and pre-empt its efforts to run=20
away with the Kashmir question on the pretext of 'terrorism', then it=20
will have to recalibrate various elements of its Kashmir policy and=20
take it out of the lingering shadows of Taliban and jihadis. The=20
Kashmir question should revert back to the legitimate premise of=20
indigenous freedom struggle fought by the Kashmiris for the=20
Kashmiris. The foreign elements will have to be given a break since=20
they are harming the Kashmiris' struggle for their=20
self-determination. The hour of truth has arrived and we should again=20
guard Pakistan first.

The writer is a staff member

______

#7.

The Hindustan Times Monday, December 24, 2001

THE THIN SAFFRON LINE
Amulya Ganguli

'Indeed, UP is becoming almost a foreign land for me. I do not fit in=20
there. The UP Congress Committee, with which I have been associated=20
for 35 years, now functions in a manner which amazes me. Its voice is=20
not the voice of the Congress I have known, but something which I=20
have opposed for the greater part of my life.

"Purushottamdas Tandon, for whom I have the greatest affection and=20
respect, is continually delivering speeches which seem to me to be=20
opposed to the basic principles of the Congress... communalism has=20
invaded the minds and hearts of those who were pillars of the=20
Congress in the past. It is a creeping paralysis and the patient does=20
not even realise it."

Thus Nehru, in a sad mood. But Tandon wasn't a lone ranger in=20
Congress politics. Throughout the party's history, only a thin line=20
has divided it from the communal camp. One of its stalwarts, Madan=20
Mohan Malaviya, was president of the Hindu Mahasabha in 1923.

After a communal outbreak in Allahabad in 1924, when Purushottamdas=20
Tandon was going round the various localities along with some Muslims=20
to restore peace, "they were received with a volley of foul abuse by=20
the Malaviyas", according to the district magistrate, "and told that=20
if... the Mohammedans had not been in the company of Srijut=20
Purushottamdas, they would have been killed..."

It is really Malaviya who should be the Sangh parivar's hero instead=20
of Sardar Patel. Malaviya's ally in the Hindu Mahasabha was Lala=20
Lajpat Rai, who became the communal outfit's president in 1925. David=20
Page, in his book Prelude to Partition, says that "Lajpat Rai was the=20
leading Punjabi swarajist, but after his return from Europe in 1924=20
his activities had become increasingly communal.

He had campaigned against the Congress leadership on the Mahasabha=20
platform... Had (Motilal) Nehru put the secular image of the Congress=20
first, he would have withdrawn his support from Lajpat Rai... This he=20
did not do... He realised... that the Congress stood little chance of=20
success without an electoral adjustment with the Hindu Sabha."

Clearly, the Congress has a long history of compromising with=20
principles. It is hardly surprising, therefore, that so many=20
Congressmen - K.C. Pant, Arun Nehru, Mamata Banerjee, Naresh Agarwal=20
(now at a loose end), the late Rangarajan Kumaramangalam - had little=20
difficulty in crossing over to the saffron camp.

However, Motilal Nehru did have his misgivings. In a letter to his=20
son, he wrote: "It was simply beyond me to meet the kind of=20
propaganda started against me under the auspices of the Malaviya-Lala=20
(Lajpat Rai) gang. Publicly I was denounced as an anti-Hindu... that=20
I was a beef-eater..."

The harbouring of a communal attitude by a section of senior leaders=20
is not the only negative feature of the Congress of the time. There=20
was social conservatism, too. As a result, the kind of retrogressive=20
viewpoint exhibited by Madhya Pradesh Chief Minister Digvijay Singh=20
when he spoke in favour of astrology also has a long history. Tilak,=20
for instance, was an opponent of the Age of Consent Bill, accusing=20
those who supported it of having "ceased to be Hindus".

He also opposed inoculation against the plague by writing in the=20
Kesari in 1901 that the idea that "many infectious diseases occurred=20
when some sort of very small germs enter the body is only about 25=20
years old... " Tilak is also known for having started the Ganapati=20
festivals in Maharashtra to wean away the Hindus from participating=20
in the Muharram processions.

The Congress, then, had its share of bigots and obscurantists. In a=20
way, Tilak, Lala Lajpat Rai and Madan Mohan Malaviya are the true=20
progenitors of the Hindutva lobby. If they had failed to influence=20
their party in a major way, it was because, mercifully, the Congress=20
also had enlightened, forward-looking leaders like Gokhale (who said=20
"Mr Tilak has a matchless capacity for intrigue and he is not=20
burdened with an exacting conscience") apart from Gandhi, Motilal and=20
Jawaharlal Nehru.

It was because of them, and notably because of Gandhi, the Man of the=20
Millennium, that the Congress became virtually a generic name for=20
Asian and African parties fighting colonialism. Otherwise, the=20
Congress might have been the Hindu version of the Muslim League -=20
like the BJP - and India would have been a replica of today's=20
Pakistan and Afghanistan, an outpost of medievalism, sunk in=20
superstition and religious fanaticism.

It wasn't only against colonialism that the Congress waged its war.=20
It was also against obscurantism and in favour of social=20
emancipation. The Congress carried on in the political field the work=20
of Rammohun Roy, M.G. Ranade and Pandita Ramabai in the social field.

That is why the annual meetings of the Indian Social Conference were=20
held in the pandals erected by the Congress for its annual sessions.=20
The huge influence which the Congress exercised over the Indian=20
people was the result of its progressive vision, free of=20
narrow-minded sectarianism and informed by admiration for science,=20
reflected mainly in the vision of Jawaharlal Nehru.

The origin of its decline, evident again in the statements of=20
Digvijay Singh and A.K. Antony on astrology and the colour saffron,=20
can be traced not only to the deterioration in the calibre of its=20
leaders, but also to the abandonment of the ideals with which it was=20
once associated. The two are related, of course. Average leaders=20
cannot propagate high ideals. Secularism was the first to suffer,=20
partly because of short-sighted expediency and partly because of lack=20
of conviction about its intrinsic value.

Examples include Indira Gandhi's cultivation of the Hindu votes which=20
made K.R. Malkani say that in the Jammu elections of 1983, the "BJP=20
candidates may have been defeated, but the BJP platform has won".=20
Echoes of Malaviya! Indira Gandhi's grouse against the Muslims=20
stemmed from their desertion of the Congress in 1977. Then Rajiv=20
Gandhi acquiesced in the unlocking of the Babri masjid gates and=20
Narasimha Rao in the mosque's demolition.

Arguably, since the Congress has accommodated elements from across=20
the entire political spectrum - from Sardar Patel on the right to=20
Acharya Narendra Deva on the left - and has always allowed free play=20
of opinion (except during the Emergency), there is also a tradition=20
in the Congress of articulating views which may not strictly adhere=20
to the party line. What was acceptable, however, when the party had=20
an overwhelming presence on the political scene and could direct the=20
political debate is no longer feasible today.

At a time when the Congress is no more than a shadow of its former=20
self and when the country is facing a serious challenge from fascist=20
and revivalist forces, represented by the Sangh parivar, there is=20
need to be far more focused in ideological terms even if the=20
Congress' typically diffuse 'platform' character militates against=20
it. A thoughtless word in favour of astrology or in praise of the=20
colour saffron will only enthuse those in the Hindu Right who will=20
exploit these to buttress their majoritarian campaign against a=20
multicultural society.

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