[sacw] SACW (20 Dec. 01)

[Harsh Kapoor]

South Asia Citizens Wire 20 December 2001
http://www.mnet.fr/aiindex

------------------------------------------

#1. WAR OR PEACE: Why war is no option (Praful Bidwai)
#2. Pakistan rethink over support of militants (Syed Saleem Shahzad)
#3. 110 Pakistani Taliban airlifted to India
#4. Book Review: 'Prejudice and Pride' - School Histories of the=20
Freedom Struggle in India and Pakistan
#5. India: Statement of Concerned Citizens on bombing on Parliament
#6. Pakistan / Book Review: Holy Profane by Qaisra Shahraz
#7. India Pakistan Arms Race & Militarisation Watch (IPARMW) # 56
#8. Afghanistan: Kabul's Lost Women - Many Abducted by Taliban Still Missin=
g
#9. India: Flood of proposals for dowry protester

________________________

#1.

The Hindustan Times (India)
20 December 2001

WAR OR PEACE: Why war is no option
Praful Bidwai

Following the official statements on the culprits and suspects in the=20
grisly Parliament House attack, the public must ask two basic=20
questions: Whodunit? And cui bono (who benefits?). The honest answer=20
to the first is: We still don't know; clinching evidence is yet to=20
emerge.

The indirect, circumstantial, evidence available generally points to=20
some Pakistan-backed Kashmiri tanzeem (militant group/movement). But=20
that's a long distance away from rigorously logical, legally tenable,=20
proof.

The official case has more holes than a piece of gruyere cheese. Its=20
first statement (Jaswant Singh's) held the Lashkar-e-Tayyeba (LeT)=20
responsible for December 13. But the Delhi police investigation, the=20
only one to unearth specific clues, named the Jaish-e-Mohammed (JeM).=20
Home Minister Advani lifted the police account, but for good measure,=20
also blamed the LeT. Now, anyone who knows anything about Kashmir=20
knows the two are disparate, competing, organisations, with=20
distinctly different genealogies and ideological affiliations.

The Jaish-e-Mohammed was founded last year by Masood Azhar, freed in=20
the IC-814 hostage exchange. Its birth followed Azhar's split from=20
Harkat-ul Mujahideen (which changed its name from Harkat-ul Ansar in=20
1995, after it was proscribed by the US for kidnapping westerners).=20
The JeM's roots are solidly Deobandi. Ideologically, it is affiliated=20
to the Jamiat-ul-Ulema-i-Pakistan, which was also the main=20
inspiration for the Taliban.

The LeT was established in 1987 by Hafeez Mohammed Saeed, a Gujjar=20
and former theology professor strongly influenced by the=20
ultra-orthodox Saudi Arabian Wahhabi school. The LeT is the only=20
Kashmiri group in the Al-Qaeda network.

It shot to fame with its suicide-bomber (fidayeen) attacks, like the=20
audacious 1999 action on Badamibagh cantonment. The LeT is run by=20
Markaz-Dawatul-Irshad which defines its compass in trans-Kashmir=20
terms - unlike the JeM.

The JeM's headquarters is in Sindh, at Binori, a Karachi suburb. The=20
LeT is run from Muridke, near Lahore in Punjab. Both were patronised=20
by Pakistan's Inter-Services Intelligence. But the two have never=20
done a joint operation in the Valley, according to knowledgeable=20
Kashmiris. Would they do one in New Delhi? Or was the LeT's name=20
tagged on because it is already on a US watchlist and easy to brand a=20
pariah?

The government has a lot of explaining to do. So far, it hasn't even=20
disclosed the specific identities of the five (or was it six?)=20
attackers, nor their organisational affiliations. They are all=20
purportedly Pakistani. But the arrested suspects like Syed Geelani=20
are all Indian.

Their mutual links must be carefully investigated and continually=20
established. It won't do to present a 10-month old meeting with Ghazi=20
Baba as adequate evidence. Different accounts of the sequence of=20
events, personal locations, and explosives used (RDX, according to=20
early reports, and crude ammonium nitrate, according to police) have=20
to be reconciled.

Cui bono? It is far too easily assumed that an official Pakistani=20
agency is behind the attack (eg ISI). Yet, however official=20
dishonourable Islamabad's intentions - as indeed they are, on past=20
evidence - it makes little political sense for Pervez Musharraf to up=20
the ante via the Parliament attack, just when he is under American=20
surveillance and orders to clean up terrorist bases.

Barring an arcane US-Pakistan conspiracy, the most plausible=20
explanation is either that some militant group acting solo, or an=20
agency not fully under Musharraf's control, masterminded the=20
operation. It was conducted remarkably amateurishly by tanzeem=20
standards. In either case, the appropriate riposte can't be based on=20
assumption of Islamabad's direct culpability. If December 13 has=20
weakened Musharraf, an open-ended, untargeted response would damage=20
India.

In plain truth, December 13 was neither an act of war nor a casus=20
belli, or rationale for war. India can only demean itself by=20
militarily aping Israel or Washington - which three months down the=20
line is still presenting 'clinching' evidence against the Al-Qaeda.

This doesn't argue that India should minimise or condone the gravity=20
of December 13, let alone do nothing. There are many options between=20
inaction and armed attacks on terrorist training camps (most of=20
which, the armed services chiefs are quoted as saying, are "no more=20
than drill squares and firing ranges", located "deep inside Pakistan=20
territory").

It is easy enough to invent punitive diplomatic steps such as=20
recalling ambassadors, or pruning mission sizes. But they all assume=20
Islamabad's guilt - before it's proved. They are also liable to be=20
seen as expressions of India's frustration, and will damage=20
longer-term India-Pakistan reconciliation. After all, the two have to=20
live with each other. India would be equally ill-advised to rely on=20
Washington's 'friendly' intervention - as Vajpayee insists on doing.=20
This won't be impartial, but guided by narrow US self-interest.

The first logical, dignified, mature step would be to take the issue=20
to the UN Security Council, and demand that Pakistan take verifiable=20
action against terrorist groups within its borders, in keeping with=20
Resolution 1373 - on pain of sanctions.

Secondly, New Delhi must overcome its allergy towards an=20
International Criminal Court, which is about to come into being. Its=20
argument against this worldwide criminal jurisprudence forum, sorely=20
needed to keep pace with crime itself, is based on an unconscionably=20
narrow idea of national sovereignty. And thirdly, we must begin=20
sorting out the mess in Kashmir, by resuming the ceasefire and=20
dialogue process, besides fully respecting human rights.

It would be utterly suicidal for India to launch military action -=20
'hot pursuit', 'surgical' attacks on training camps, or brief forays=20
across the LoC. Besides being legally dubious, such adventurism=20
gravely risks heightened conflict, leading to war, with possible=20
escalation to the nuclear level. Nuclear wars can't be won and=20
mustn't be fought.

India committed a grave blunder by crossing the Nuclear Rubicon in=20
1998. It further compounded the mistake by indulging in reckless=20
nuclear threat-mongering during and after Kargil. It must now reverse=20
the damage it inflicted on its own security in going down the=20
slippery nuclear slope.

Doing this means fighting our ultra-nationalists' pathological=20
nuclear addiction and discarding New Delhi's pitiably pusillanimous=20
stand on Washington's flagrant assault on the Anti-Ballistic Missile=20
treaty in order to launch the 'Star Wars'-style National Missile=20
Defence. NMD spells a Second Nuclear Age, no less.

______

#2.

Asia Times
December 20, 2001

Pakistan rethink over support of militants
By Syed Saleem Shahzad
KARACHI - Last week's attack on the Indian parliament building in New=20
Delhi - widely blamed on terrorists trained in Pakistan - is the=20
latest turn of events to add to Islamabad's troubles.
Pakistan now has an essentially unfriendly neighbor across the 1,300=20
kilometers of the border its shares with Afghanistan, and most of the=20
military and strategic objectives that caused the United States to=20
woo Islamabad in the war against terrorism have been achieved.
Immediately after the attack in New Delhi, in which five terrorists=20
and eight Indian security force members died, the Indian government=20
blamed Kashmiri militants. Subsequently, it has pointed the finger at=20
the Pakistani-based Lashkar-i-Taiba (Army of the Pure) as responsible=20
for the attack, with Indian Home Minister L K Advani on Tuesday=20
repeating the accusation in parliament.
India has now given Pakistan a deadline of a few days to close down=20
the offices of the Lashkar-i-Taiba as well as the Jaish-i-Mohammed,=20
another militant group, and warned of "dire consequences" if it does=20
not. Delhi says that these two groups are based in Pakistan and=20
receive training and support from the country's intelligence service,=20
the Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI). Islamabad denies this, saying=20
that India has provided no evidence to support its allegations, and=20
says that it "will not be intimidated".
India has seized the opportunity launch a diplomatic initiative to=20
push its contention that the separatist struggle being waged in=20
Kashmir is actually terrorism. The Jaish-e-Mohammad and=20
Lashkar-e-Taiba are Islamic groups fighting to separate the mostly=20
Muslim region of Kashmir from India.
Following India's warning, the Pakistani military leadership under=20
President General Pervez Musharraf called urgent meetings at which it=20
was concluded that Pakistan would not bow down to the Indian demands=20
as such a move would demoralize the military struggle in Kashmir,=20
which has engaged several thousand Indian forces in the Kashmiri=20
Valley. Musharraf has also warned that any "adventurism" on the part=20
of india in response to the attacks would be firmly resisted.
However, sources say that Pakistan's strategic planners are concerned=20
over how the United States will react to this hard line as Washington=20
has already branded the Jaish-i-Mohammed and the group from which it=20
separated, the Harkatul Mujahideen, as terrorist organizations, and=20
many US publications, thanks to Indian lobbyists in America, are=20
promoting the idea that these organizations have strong links with=20
Osama bin Laden's Al-Qaeda terror network.
So, once again, just as it was urged by the United States to turn its=20
back on the Taliban in Afghanistan, which it had nurtured over the=20
years, Pakistan is caught between the devil and the deep blue sea=20
over how it handles the militant groups in the country.
While the war in Afghanistan was still raging, the United States was=20
prepared to let Pakistan, its frontline ally, handle the militant=20
organizations as it saw fit. The situation might be different now=20
with Pakistan's usefulness exhausted.
The US has succeeded in having an acceptable interim leadership=20
installed in Kabul, it has fostered strong relations in the Pashtun=20
belt in the east of Afghanistan and its forces have established a=20
strong presence in the Central Asian republics. Within Afghanistan,=20
they have secured key airports, so they no longer need Pakistani=20
airbases, a key reason for courting Musharraf in the first place.
Indeed, the US is likely now to turn on Pakistan, forcing it to take=20
action against senior Taliban leaders - possibly including bin Laden=20
- who are thought to be sheltering in the semi-autonomous Pakistani=20
tribal areas. And there will be pressure to take action against=20
pro-Taliban leaders in the tribal belt to nip any possible revival of=20
the Taliban movement in the bud.
All of this could force Islamabad to rethink its Kashmir policy. The=20
Kashmiri struggle was connected to the Afghan war against the Soviets=20
of 1979-89 in that the struggle for an independent state was=20
converted into a jihad so that foreign mujahideen fighters would join=20
locals in trying to force India to give Kashmiris the right to=20
self-determination.
This policy could now backfire on Pakistan. The Kashmiri uprising in=20
Indian Kashmir began in 1989. The ISI, then under the command of=20
General Akhtar Abdur Rehman, started making a case for a Kashmiri=20
jihad in the mid-1980s. Rehman was subsequently elevated to the=20
position of chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Committee. He died=20
in an air crash that also killed military dictator General Zia=20
ul-Haq, on August 17, 1988.
Kashmiris have been fighting for self-determination ever since the=20
partition of British India in 1947, when, despite the fact of a=20
majority Muslim population, the region was incorporated into India=20
with the permission of the maharajah of the state. The rulers of=20
princely states had been given the choice to freely accede to either=20
India or Pakistan, or to remain independent.
After skirmishes in previous years, heavy fighting broke out again in=20
1965 between India and Pakistan over Kashmir. A ceasefire was=20
established in September 1965. Indian prime minister Lal Bhadur=20
Shastri and Pakistani president M Ayub Khan signed the Tashkent=20
agreement on January 1, 1966. They resolved to try to end the dispute=20
by peaceful means. However, it was at this time that the Kashmiri=20
leadership decided that they would fight for their own fate, with one=20
possible option being an independent state ruled by Kashmiris,=20
whether they be Sikhs, Hindus or Muslims.
Rehman subsequently prepared the grounds to convert this struggle=20
into a jihad. The leadership of the Jamu Kashmir Libration Front were=20
declared traitors in Pakistan, and the ISI promoted the=20
Jamaat-i-Islami, which had a strong network in Indian Kashmir, to be=20
the main force for the Kashmir jihad.
Thus, the plan was that as soon as the Afghan jihad had successfully=20
seen off the Soviets, mujahideen would pour into Kashmir, and as with=20
Afghanistan, Islamic countries would lend their support. Rehman did=20
not survive to see his plans come to fruition though. He was=20
succeeded as head of the ISI by Hamid Gul, who adopted the same=20
policy approach.
During the Afghan resistance struggle, three Pakistani-based militant=20
organizations fought alongside Afghan groups - the Al-Badr, the=20
Harkatul Mujahideen and the Markaz-i-Dawat-u-Irshad. Al Badr was an=20
off-shoot of the Jamaat-i-Islami Pakistan, the premier fundamentalist=20
party in the country and the real force behind the Afghan resistance=20
movement. The Harkatul Mujahideen was affiliated with Islamic=20
seminaries of the Deobandi school of thought, and the=20
Markaz-i-Dawat-u-Irshad was connected with the wahabi school of=20
thought.
All three of these organizations were given a role to promote a=20
militant struggle in Kashmir, with the Al-Badr playing a pivotal=20
role. Initially, the Jamaat-i-Islami helped fire the spirit of the=20
Kashmir jihad among youths, who were then sent to Afghanistan for=20
training and fighting experience.
The Al-Badr organized their training at Khost. Later, the youths were=20
organized under the banner of the Hizbul Mujahideen, which was a=20
purely Kashmiri-based militant organization ideologically affiliated=20
with the Jamaat-i-Islami, and which wanted Kashmir's accession into=20
Pakistan. This proved to be a successful formula and laid the=20
foundations for the struggle that continues today.
However, the Harkatul Mujahideen failed to attract mass support in=20
Kashmir Islamic seminaries and thus was unable to organize an=20
effective indigenous movement. The Harkat, therefore, continued to=20
train Pakistani youths to send to Kashmir, and its chief is a=20
Pakistani. Because of its Pakistani flavor and its vocal opposition=20
to the US presence in Pakistan, the US listed it as a terrorist=20
organization.
Before this declaration, it had renamed itself the Harkatul Ansar. As=20
a result, the US banned the "Harktul Ansar". So, soon after the US=20
announcement, it reverted to the Harkatul Mujahideen and continued=20
its operations. A breakaway faction of the Harkat is the=20
Jaish-i-Mohammed, which is also included on the US terror list.
Splits also occurred in the Markaz-i-Dawat-u-Irshad, leading to the=20
establishment of the Lashkar-i-Taiba. The purpose was to get=20
financial aid from Saudi Arabia because the Lashkar came from the=20
wahabi school of thought. But since there are almost no wahabi=20
influences in Kashmir, they have failed to organize an indigenous=20
movement and are seen as foreign infiltrators.
Now, the Jaish-i-Mohammed and the Lashkar-i-Taiba have been thrust=20
into the limelight. Clearly, they are not indiginous movements, and=20
their senior leaders are all Pakistani. In the past, when these=20
objections were raised, the Pakistani government took a strong stand=20
that a jihad is a part of Islam, and any Muslim wanting to join in=20
one could not be stopped by Pakistan.
Given recent events, though, Pakistan will find it difficult to stick=20
with this policy.

______

#3.

The News International (Pakistan)
20 December 2001

110 Pakistani Taliban airlifted to India

ISLAMABAD: Two top Pakistani officials claimed Wednesday that=20
Afghanistan's northern alliance handed over 110 detained Pakistani=20
Muslim militants to India and that Pakistan's archrival then=20
airlifted them to New Delhi for interrogation. Indian officials said=20
they had no information on the allegation.

The Pakistani officials, who spoke only on condition of anonymity,=20
accused India of planning to use the Pakistanis who fought with Osama=20
bin Laden's al-Qaida network to defame its neighbour. [...].

Full Text at:=20
http://jang.com.pk/thenews/dec2001-daily/20-12-2001/main/main3.htm

______

#4.

Book Review

Name of the book: 'Prejudice and Pride' - School Histories
of the Freedom Struggle in India and Pakistan
Author: Krishna Kumar
Publisher: Viking Penguin, New Delhi
Year: 2001
Pages: 274
ISBN: 0-67-004913-1
Price: Rs. 395
Reviewed by: Yoginder Sikand

The education system plays a crucial role in the
socialization of the young, instilling in them values
and norms deemed essential for the making of =EBgood=ED
citizens. Of all subjects taught at school history is
perhaps the most important in this regard, for the way
in which the past is represented moulds the way in
which a state wishes to direct its own future and that
of its citizens. As such, then, history writing is an
eminently political project. Certain incidents are
deliberately highlighted in history curricula, others
knowingly ignored, and facts are given various
interpretations to suit the political purposes of the
state. History syllabi are thus terrains of political
contestation which states seek to control to fashion
citizens in their own image.
No more apparent is this contested domain of history
writing more apparent than in India and Pakistan,
where a shared history is subjected to diverse, indeed
mutually opposed, interpretations to suit different
political agendas. In this fascinating and pioneering
study, Krishna Kumar, noted Indian educationist,
compares the divergent ways in which Indian and
Pakistani text-books represent a common period of the
history of the two countries=F3the century leading to
the independence of India from British rule in 1947
and the consequent creation of the two sovereign and
independent republics of India and Pakistan.
Kumar shows how the imperatives of state-building in
both countries have moulded the ways in which this
crucial period in the history of South Asia is
represented in the school text books used in India and
Pakistan. Thus, for instance, the 1857 Revolt against
the British, seen in both countries as the First War
of Independence, is described as a Muslim-led struggle
in Pakistani books and as a joint Hindu-Muslim
enterprise in their Indian counterparts. Similarly,
key figures in the period after the revolt, leading up
to 1947, are described differently. Sayyed Ahmad Khan
is shown as an educationist and social reformer in
Indian text-books, and as an ardent champion of Muslim
nationalism in Pakistani books. Gandhi is attributed
with a quasi-divine status in Indian books, while in
Pakistani books he is presented as a crafty and wily
=EBHindu=ED leader, vehemently opposed to the Muslims.
Likewise in the case of Jinnah, who is presented as a
devilish tyrant in the one and a fervent champion of
Muslim rights, in the other.
History-writing in both countries, writes Kumar, is
deeply flawed, and pays little attention to the
child=EDs own capabilities of understanding, promoting,
in place of comprehension and the development of
critical reasoning, a blind conformism. History is
seen as essentially the work of individual =EBgreat=ED
men, while the broader social, economic and political
processes and contexts are ignored. Common people are
deemed to possess no history of their own, or at least
no history worth mentioning or studying. =EBHindus=ED and
=EBMuslims=ED are seen as the major actors in the
historical process, they being described as two neatly
separated, clearly defined and homogenous communities.
The considerable overlaps between the two categories
are generally ignored. So, too, are the internal
differences within each =EBcommunity=ED=F3of caste, class,
region and gender. So defined, Hindus and Muslims are
seen as inherently opposed to each other.
Consequently, the history of South Asia comes to be
written in terms of perennial Hindu-Muslim antagonism.
Kumar ends this fascinating study with a forceful
plea for a new way of writing the history of our part
of the world, fashioning it into a tool for peace,
dialogue and reconciliation between the peoples of
India and Pakistan. With governments in both
countries seeking to mould the school system to stoke
the fires of religious hatred and national chauvinism,
this appeal could hardly have come at a more
appropriate time.
______

#5

Date: Wed, 19 Dec 2001 19:58:38 +0530 (IST)

From
Dr. Ram Puniyani
EKTA, Committee for Communal Amity
B-64, IIT, Qurts, Powai Mumbai 400076(Ph.5723522) [India}

Madam/Sir

The dastardly attack by terrorists on the Parliament has to be condemned
in no uncertain terms. In the aftermath of this some disturbing utterances
are being made to cross over LoC [Line of Control] to attack the=20
militant bases across the
border, to unleash a war a la Israel or US. This is very dangerous trend
of thought, as the analogy does not hold water. The Nuclear weapon states
cannot talk of war in such an irresponsible manner. Also it involves
deeper and more complex dynamics as far as our region is concerned.
Logistically a lone aggression by India in the region is not going to get
any support from other International powers. Pakistan, equipped with
Nuclear weapons cannot be attacked with the same ease as US aggression on
Afghanistan or Israel attack on Palestine.

While there are no easy solutions to the problem, we need to approach
United Nations and bring Pakistan to discussion table. This latter process
can be an ongoing process and should be looked at as the ground to sort
out misunderstandings and promote dialogue for peace. In the medium term
the strengthening of Democratic process in the region and working towards
a Confederation of Asian countries, strengthening of Non Aligned Movement
and deepening of SAARC should not be looked at as the Utopia but
something, which we have to strive for on the urgent basis. It can really
eliminate the symptom of terrorism in the region in the long run. Also the
deeper role of Imperialist powers in controlling the oil wealth in the
region and promoting terrorism indirectly also needs to be given a serious
attention. War does not solve the problems; it postpones them to a latter
date in more severe forms.

Sincerely

Anand Patwardhan(EKTA)
Asghar Ali Engineer(CSSS)
Aurobindo Ghosh(Journalist)
Beena Sharma(SAMVAD)
Brahma Prakash(Lawyer)
Chris Fernandes(AICU)
Dolphy D'souza(AICC)
Feroze Mithiborwala(MIT)
Jatin Deasi(PIPFD)
Jaya Velankar(CNDP)
Lavy D'Costa(BCS)
Neelima Sharma (Actress)
Ram Puniyani(EKTA)
Shamsul Islam(Delhi Uni.)
Suma Jossan(Film Maker)
Teesta Setalvad(Communalism Combat)
Wilfred D'Costa(INSAF)

______

#6.

Newsline (Pakistan)
December 2001
Book

Holy Profane
In the interior of Sindh, love has little to do with marriage, and=20
marriage sometimes has nothing to do with two individuals, as=20
demonstrated by the Holy Woman ..

By Muneeza Shamsie

As a Pakistani-born writer in Britain, Qaisra Shahraz has=20
written extensively about cultural conflicts in Britain and village=20
life in Pakistan in her short stories. Her first novel, The Holy=20
Woman, takes a look at changing realities in a Pakistani village, as=20
well as the tussle between modernity and tradition in a feudal=20
family. At the heart of her romantic story is the ancient and cruel=20
custom of marrying a daughter to the Quran, for the sake of keeping=20
property in the family. Qaisra Shahraz has used this in a most=20
unusual way, to give her imagination full rein and spin a good yarn.

The main protagonist is Zarri Bano, the beautiful and=20
intelligent daughter of Habib, a landlord in Sindh, but at 27 she=20
is still unmarried, having refused many proposals. The attraction=20
between her and Sikander Din, a prospective suitor who comes from=20
Karachi, is instant, as is her possessive father's hostility to him.=20
Shortly afterwards, Zarri Bano goes to stay with Sikander's family in=20
Karachi. Her feudal grandfather is outraged. He considers this a=20
slight on her honour and izzat . But Zarri Bano's mother argues=20
that "it is good for her to get to know Sikander and his family=20
before she marries him." Whether the daughter-in-law of a=20
landowning patriarch would answer back in this manner, let alone=20
permit her daughter to stay in a distant city, under the same roof as=20
a prospective suitor, remains a moot point, particularly in the light=20
of what follows.

This difficulty over details, nuances and innuendoes, occurs in=20
other parts of the narrative too and is common to the writing of many=20
expatriate writers, particularly those for whom the emotional=20
landscape of Pakistan is a form of reclamation. This might not=20
affect the gist of Qaisra Shahraz's narrative, or its psychological=20
truth, but it does unsettle the Pakistani reader for whom the=20
accuracy of such information is essential to characterisation.

The Holy Woman has many vivid descriptions of palatial=20
villas, dusty villages, rural customs and westernised urban=20
sophistication, which conjure up many beautiful, colourful and=20
contrasting images of Pakistan. The great strength of this novel is=20
the portrayal of the heroine, Zarri Bano. She does not only dominate=20
the narrative, but holds it together. Zarri Bano's only brother=20
Jafar dies and her father - determined to thwart her marriage to=20
Sikander, and ensure that the property remains in the family - falls=20
back upon an ancient family custom, despite his wife's entreaties.=20
He names Zarri Bano his heiress, which means she must be wed to the=20
Quran and assume the title of the holy woman - the Shahzadi ibadat.=20
One of the most interesting scenes in the book is that of the=20
heartbroken Zarri Bano dressing herself up for this wedding in all=20
the traditional finery of a bride and then, as an act of rebellion,=20
chopping off her hair, changing into simple garments and going down=20
for her marriage celebrations, draped in a black burqa, to the horror=20
of her family.

>From that point, Zarri Bano becomes increasingly alienated=20
from her relatives, particularly her father. She learns to fight=20
back and suppress her emotions for Sikander, even when his subsequent=20
marriage means that the two of them must encounter each other quite=20
often socially. She proceeds to find freedom and empowerment through=20
religion. More than that, she realises that as a wife and mother,=20
she would always have a secondary role to her husband, but as=20
Shahzadi ibadat, she can be someone in her own right. She becomes a=20
religious scholar. She goes to Cairo to study Islam. She visits=20
many other countries including India and Britain and brings other=20
Muslim women closer to the message of the Quran. But when the=20
opportunity for a happy marriage comes her way, she is assailed with=20
such guilt at the buried passion and feelings that surface, that she=20
is ashamed and afraid. And it is this spectrum of emotions, as well=20
as her treatment of religion and the veil, which makes Qaisra=20
Shahraz's sensitive portrayal of Zarri Bano so fascinating.=20

Qaisra Shahraz also shows very clearly how little control most=20
women have over their lives in Pakistan and how easily they are=20
morally blackmailed. She also brings out the many social customs,=20
the malicious and sly innuendoes which are used to emasculate women=20
and throw aspersions on their chastity.

As a foil to the privileged Zarri Bano's life, Qaisra Shahraz=20
tells a secondary story, about the village of Chiragpur. The=20
housekeeper's highly educated daughter, Firdaus, becomes the=20
headmistress of a large local school. Khawar, the zamindar's son is=20
determined to marry her, but Firdaus, dogged by class prejudices, is=20
faced with the enmity of Khawar's proud and bitter mother, the=20
widowed Chaudhrani Kaneez.=20

Qaisra Shahraz has now completed a sequel, Typhoon, set in Chiragpu=
r.

[The Holy Woman is published by Black Amber Book (www.blackamber.com)
ISBN:1-901969-03-7 ]

______

#7.

India Pakistan Arms Race & Militarisation Watch (IPARMW) # 56
19 December 2001
http://groups.yahoo.com/group/IPARMW/message/67

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#8.

Washington Post
Wednesday, December 19, 2001; Page A19

Kabul's Lost Women
Many Abducted by Taliban Still Missing

By Kevin Sullivan
Washington Post Foreign Service

KABUL, Afghanistan -- Eight Taliban fighters kicked in the front door=20
at dinnertime. They beat Shabnam's mother and grandmother, according=20
to her relatives. Then they hustled the 9-year-old girl into a pickup=20
truck, loot for their commanding officer.

That was August 1997. Shabnam, who would be 13 now, is still not home. [...=
]

Full text at :=20
http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/articles/A62604-2001Dec18.html

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#9.
South China Morning Post
Thursday, December 20, 2001
INDIA
Flood of proposals for dowry protester

S. N. M. ABDI in Calcutta

Khusnahar Bibi has been flooded with marriage proposals and=20
job offers after she stopped her parents marrying her off against her=20
wishes by writing a letter to a Calcutta newspaper.
"I am overwhelmed by the support and solidarity shown by countless=20
Muslims, Hindus and Christians from all parts of India," said the=20
22-year-old Muslim university graduate.
"There are so many letters and I haven't found the time to open and=20
read each one of them."
Earlier this month, Ms Bibi sent an SOS to a Bengali daily, Aajkal,=20
saying her parents were not only forcing her to marry a man she did=20
not know, but had also agreed to pay him a dowry of 150,000 rupees=20
(HK$24,500).
Her unprecedented letter created a furore in the predominantly Muslim=20
area of Natibpur, 40km from Calcutta, and the would-be bridegroom's=20
family immediately called off the marriage.
Angered by Ms Bibi's remarks in the letter about arranged marriages,=20
dowry, religious fanaticism and the suppression of women in=20
male-dominated Muslim society, conservative Muslims threatened to=20
kill her, forcing the administration to deploy armed policemen to=20
guard her against any attack. "Initially, I was very scared by the=20
threats to punish me for challenging Muslim customs. I was also=20
wrongly accused of insulting Islam. Now the tide has turned in my=20
favour," she said. But round-the-clock security is still firmly in=20
place because Ms Bibi has refused to apologise for the letter,=20
insisting that dowry is both un-Islamic and banned in India.
"All that I had demanded was the freedom to choose a liberal,=20
educated Muslim - who will not demand a dowry - as my life partner,"=20
she said.
"There are many Muslim men who have sent wedding proposals without a=20
dowry after the publication of my letter. I am shortlisting them with=20
the help of my father, uncles and brothers. And Allah [God] willing,=20
I will soon be a happily married woman."
The owner of a ceramic manufacturing firm in Pondicherry has offered=20
jobs to Ms Bibi and the man she chooses to marry. "Such women are=20
rare and they deserve society's unstinted support and encouragement,"=20
said managing director G. N. Naidu.
All over India, parents were still forced to "beg, borrow or steal"=20
to marry off their daughters, said Ms Bibi. But most women were=20
afraid to challenge the centuries-old practice.

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