[sacw] SACW #1 (19 Dec. 01)

[Harsh Kapoor]

South Asia Citizens Wire | 19 December 2001
http://www.mnet.fr/aiindex

------------------------------------------

#1. Pakistan: Jihadi newspapers offer a disturbing insight into the=20
medieval mindset of their parent organisations. (Naziha Syed Ali)
#2. India Press statement by Coalition for Nuclear Disarmament and Peace (C=
NDP)
#3. 9/11 versus 12/13 -- The "Engineered" Threat
#4. Washington Diarist - All for One (Sarah Wildman)
#5. Forthcoming Books from Kali for Women:
- Which is My Country? - women writing on the partition of India
Alok Bhalla, Urvashi Butalia & Ritu Menon
- The Nation and the RSS- gendered discourse, gendered action
Paola Bacchetta

________________________

#1.

Newsline (Pakistan)
December 2001

A Call To Arms

Jihadi newspapers offer a disturbing insight into the medieval=20
mindset of their parent organisations.

By Naziha Syed Ali

The image is ripe with metaphorical suggestions=8A a collage=20
of a Kalashnikov and two lurid red and orange roses against a=20
backdrop of a flowing river over which flies a fighter jet. The=20
image is emblazoned with the message "Rise! Rise, you who yearn for=20
heaven!" This is the cover of a recent issue of the fortnightly=20
Jaish Muhammad, one of several jihadi publications brought out from=20
Karachi that urge Muslims to join their co-religionists in fighting=20
"holy wars" in various parts of the world, such as Chechnya, Kashmir=20
and, of course, Afghanistan.=20=20=20=20

Among these, the best-selling publication is=20
Dharb-i-Mumin , a weekly newspaper brought out in Urdu and English by=20
the Al-Rasheed Trust (whose accounts were recently frozen by the=20
State Bank of Pakistan for allegedly funding terrorist activities)=20
and a group of jihadi organisations. The paper has an estimated=20
readership of between one-and-a-half to two lakhs. Next is=20
Jaish-e-Muhammad - also in Urdu and English - with an estimated=20
readership of one lakh, rather good going for a fortnightly that saw=20
the light of day only after its chief editor, Maulana Masood Azhar,=20
was released from an Indian prison less than two years ago in=20
exchange for the lives of passengers aboard the Air India jet which=20
was hijacked to Kathmandu in December 1999. In a recent editorial,=20
Jaish-e- Muhammad adopts a defiantly nonchalant stance to the fact=20
of its parent organisation, the Jaish-e-Muhammad party, being=20
officially categorised a terrorist group by the west. "Definitely,=20
this is a matter of delight and a medal for us that Almightly Allah's=20
enemies are troubled by us and they are giving the testimony of our=20
Jihad....In this battle the winners are the Muslims only if they are=20
faithful to their religion. Today the Taliban movement has reached=20
the infidel annoying stage and is busy in the war=8A Jaish-e-Muhammad=20
(Sallalahu alaihi wasallam) has also reached the infidel annoying=20
stage in a short period." Judging by his copious contributions to=20
various jihadi publications in which he fulminates against the=20
"infidel" forces, Maulana Masood Azhar is obviously putting his pen=20
where his mouth is.=20

Some of the other jihadi publications of note are Islam=20
Daily , which is also brought out by the Al-Rasheed Trust, and the=20
Al-Hilal newspaper, the mouthpiece of the Harkatul Mujahideen, the=20
Pakistani organisation deemed one of the most active on the warfront=20
in Afghanistan.=20

Since the US strikes on Afghanistan began on October 6,=20
these publications have seen increased sales of approximately 25 per=20
cent and more, according to several newspaper vendors and=20
wholesalers. One vendor on Bunder Road in Karachi claimed that each=20
day he sells about 40 copies of Islam Daily , up from 25 prior to the=20
war. Another states that Dharb-i-Mumin is selling at the rate of 75=20
copies a day compared to 35 copies until about two months ago. The=20
English edition of the latter reportedly has an extremely low=20
readership.

The content of these publications is a mixture of a call=20
to arms, eulogies to those who have embraced "shahadat" (martyrdom)=20
and morale-boosting news items for well-wishers of the mujahideen.=20
In the process, news tends to undergo a makeover and re-emerge with=20
an optimistic spin on it. Thus, the fall of Taloqan and=20
Mazar-i-Sharif in the November 14 issue of Islam Daily are described=20
as tactical withdrawals by the Taliban, an interpretation=20
consistently adhered to in other newspapers of the same ilk. In the=20
Dharb-i-Mumin issue of November 15-21, a headline announces,=20
"Taliban more stable than ever," conveniently overlooking the fact=20
that the Northern Alliance troops had entered Kabul on November 13=20
without any resistance from the Taliban forces after establishing=20
their hold - barring pockets of resistance here and there - over=20
Mazar-i-Sharif, Bamiyan, Taloqan, Herat and Jalalabad in a week that=20
marked a turning point in the Taliban's fortunes. Some news reports=20
are blatantly concocted, such as the one in the latest issue of=20
Dharb-i-Mumin titled "5000 armed, veiled women express desire to=20
take part in jihad." This seminal event, which would have drawn the=20
international media, notwithstanding its prejudices, like bees to=20
nectar had it been true, is said to have taken place in Bajaur=20
agency. The article also reports that "When it was said during=20
speeches that a time could come when women also have to come out in=20
the battlefield for the protection of Islam, certain armed ladies=20
present at the gathering resorted to heavy firing by Kalashnikovs to=20
announce their willingness."=20

The few strains of reliable reportage are lost in an=20
avalanche of tedious, verbose and jingoistic rhetoric. Death,=20
crusaders, infidels, Zionists, Muslims, jihad, shahadat=8A these are=20
some of the key words used like the staccato beat of a war drum=20
through the text. A medieval worldview that divides people on the=20
basis of religion (Muslims are further sifted into "good" and "bad"=20
categories) forms the cornerstone of editorial policy and rambling=20
accounts of famous historical battles from which Muslims emerged as=20
victors, such as the battle of Badr, are offered as inspiration to=20
the latter-day mujahid.=20=20

The narrow vision notwithstanding, there is a fair amount=20
of creative licence in terms of language. The writers are no=20
strangers to the art of the mixed metaphor. "When the clamours of=20
Jaish arose in the prisons of infidelity, then the typical Hindu=20
grain seller became sleepless," reads an excerpt from an issue of=20
Jaish-e-Muhammad . The universal villain, the one that embodies the=20
entire "infidel" race, is the US, denounced in various colourful=20
phrases - "the global terrorist, the murderer of millions,=20
Aids-stricken America" and "crusading monsters" - being some of the=20
choice ones. President Bush, of course, is "the chieftain of the=20
crusaders."

The publications carry quotes from the Quran and Hadith=20
that reinforce the importance of jihad as a pillar of the faith and=20
emphasise Islam's superiority to other religions. One recent=20
example: "You (Muslims) are the best of peoples ever raised up for=20
mankind. You enjoin good and forbid evil and believe in Allah.=20
[3:10]"=20=20

The tendency to consign followers of other religions to=20
hell upon their death while the mujahideen and even ordinary Muslim=20
civilians invariably embrace martyrdom seems to be one of the basic=20
principles of editorial policy. Muslims opposing the Taliban are=20
also given short shrift. In an issue of Dharb-i-Mumin , a report on=20
the execution of Abdul Haq, the mujahideen commander who was seeking=20
to create a rift in the Taliban ranks, reads, "His interest in=20
becoming a warrior and crusader led him to the gallows of death." In=20
the paper's latest issue, the bete noire is the Uzbek commander=20
General Dostum, who is denounced through several colour photographs=20
that are evidence, claim the editors, of his immoral lifestyle. One=20
image shows the plush, crystal-bedecked interior of a large room with=20
a swimming pool as its centrepiece. An excerpt from the caption:=20
"After ridding the Afghan people of debauched and licentious=20
elements, the Taliban had provided them a sincere and people-friendly=20
government." While the first half of the statement cannot be denied,=20
describing the Taliban as "people-friendly" might be rather an=20
overstatement. Another photograph shows a crate of vodka ostensibly=20
seized from Dostum's stronghold when the Taliban captured=20
Mazar-i-Sharif five years ago. The last photograph is that of=20
musical intruments, also allegedly "found in General Dostum's royal=20
residence" by the Taliban. The caption to this photograph reads,=20
"The Taliban had revived the Prophetic practice of smashing musical=20
instruments. After taking control of Mazar-i-Sharif and Kabul, the=20
Northern Alliance celebrated its devilish success by singing songs=20
and playing music."

The affinity of the jihadi organisations with the=20
austere, harsh brand of Islam practiced by the Taliban is clearly=20
obvious from the pictures used in their publications. As in=20
newspapers during the Taliban-era in Afghanistan, no representation=20
of living creatures, human or otherwise, is allowed, a stricture that=20
sometimes results in ingenious manoeuvring with computer technology.=20
A depiction of a protest rally against the US bombing of Afghanistan=20
for instance, shows part of a hand holding open a copy of the Quran=20
in the foreground against a backdrop of several placards merging into=20
each other. However, photos of shrouded corpses, at least of=20
non-Muslims, are apparently kosher. Maps and images/illustrations of=20
the US arsenal, including aircraft carriers and cluster bombs,=20
accompany several articles. Recent issues have also been replete=20
with photographs of the jewellery and cash donated for Afghan=20
refugees, particularly in the four-page colour section of=20
Dharb-i-Mumin which is printed on expensive art paper. The=20
Al-Rasheed Trust, which prints the paper, collects donations, in cash=20
and kind, for the Afghans. Religious and ideological symbols are=20
also employed to dramatic effect. The November issue of=20
Banat-i-Ayesha , a monthly jihadi magazine for women brought out by=20
Jaish-e-Mohammad, depicts the cross, the star of David and=20
communism's sickle and scythe lying in ruins, bathed in rays of light=20
emanating from the copy of the Holy Quran. Meanwhile, to drive its=20
point home, each page of Jaish-e-Muhammad displays the picture of two=20
crossed Kalashnikovs. There can be no more succint statement of=20
intent than that.

______

#2.

Date: Tue, 18 Dec 2001 21:21:14 +0500

From: ACHIN VANAIK
Subject: press statement by cndp, India

Press Release

The Coalition for Nuclear Disarmament and Peace (CNDP) calls on the Indian
government to exercise the maximum restraint in the wake of the deplorable
December 13 attacks on Parliament, the symbol of our democracy. While every
effort must be made to trace those responsible and to bring them to justice
through due process of law, there is no warrant whatsoever to carry out
military actions across the border against Pakistan. Acts of war carried
out officially by armies and states are not a justified or sober response
to acts of terrorism carried out by individuals or groups. Such a reaction
only pits nations and peoples against one another when the need today is to
avoid precisely such escalation of tensions and hostilities in South Asia,
especially after the unjustified US assault on Afghanistan. In a situation
where both countries possess nuclear weapons such military escalation is
fraught with unacceptable risks.

The CNDP also expresses its deep dismay at the Indian government's silence
regarding the US announcement of a six-month notice period after which it
will withdraw from the 1972 Anti-Ballistic Missile (ABM) Treaty. Such US
action will guarantee the advent of a new and more dangerous nuclear and
conventional arms race since it aims to give the US an ever-expanding
'advantage' over its nuclear rivals, as well as future military dominance
over space itself. The longer the Indian government remains silent the more
suspicion there will be that New Delhi might rescind its previous support
to the ABM Treaty, thereby suggesting a willingness to sacrifice both
principle and prudence in order to appease Washington.

______

#3.

From: "Y.S."
Sent: Monday, December 17, 2001 9:31 PM
Subject: Re: 9/11 versus 12/13

9/11 versus 12/13 -- The "Engineered" Threat

As the investigations into the December 13 terrorist attack in the Indian
parliament reveal more and more names of individuals and terrorist outfits
involved, some interesting observations have been made - not by the media -
but by individuals in general. One doesn't wish to ridicule the situation,
but one can't help but gawk at the compelling similarities between the
"protocols" that followed the 9/11 attack on WTC and our own 12/13 attack,
especially the way these have been portrayed in the media.
=B7 George Bush addressed the nation soon after the WTC attack. So did our =
own
Prime Ministerji, promptly.
=B7 Colin Powell and others in the US vowed to retaliate immediately for th=
e
9/11 attacks. So did our Advaniji, the day the terrorists struck. If you ha=
d
noticed
their language - it had been so identical. In the past, there had been
terrorist
attacks in India, but we never talked of a "war".
=B7 The media in India started playing up the War-Against-Terrorism card on
December 13, the same way, as did CNN and FoxNews after September 11.
=B7 Not to mention the dipping of the graphs at the Mumbai Stock Exchange o=
n
12/13, as they did on the NYSE after 9/11.
=B7 Intricate details about the way the terrorists may have prepared for th=
e
WTC attacks, started appearing in the media - where they got the pilot
training, where they stayed etc., especially how, the night before, they
indulged themselves in dining and partying with bare-breasted women in the
US, since it was their last night. Our newspapers gave the details of the
lavish dinner our guys had had at the old Delhi's Karim Hotel the night
before.
=B7 The guys who performed the WTC attacks, we are told, utilized the Inter=
net
to communicate with other members as well as for retrieving vital
information. Our folks, we are told, "downloaded the Parliament's parking
sticker from an official government's website" to be able to drive their ca=
r
into the parliament. (So much for the Parliament's security).
=B7 And finally just like the Americans we had to find someone responsible =
for
the attacks. Two Kashmiri/Pakistani groups (LeT, and JeM) have been found
guilty. Interestingly, just like Osama bin Ladin, we have to find one
mastermind who gave the orders to conduct the raid. And we have found him
too. It is a man called Ghazi Baba, the commander of Jaish-e Muhammad, base=
d
in Bhawalpur near Lahore.
=B7 As the US asked Afghanistan to hand over Osama (or else.), we have also
made our demand to Pakistan, which in turn has asked us to provide the proo=
f
(as did Afgahnistan). We have the proof, we keep saying, but are reluctant
in providing it.
=B7 Hence, it seems, this Ghazi Baba may become the enemy number one for th=
e
Indian government, and a hide-and-seek game may start soon on the hills of
Bhawalpur.

Whether the above similarities are sheer coincidence or our obsession to be
like our big brother, is anybody's guess. But they also make some of think
twice about the claims being made by some organizations in Kashmir and
Pakistan that this attack on the parliament (like others in the past) was
"engineered" to achieve many desired results.

There are many other irregualrities that one may ponder over. Such as the
mystery over who called in the army to the parliament soon after the
attacks. If the defence minister did it, then was he authorized to do so
without consulting the PM. Or the fact that no terrorist organization has s=
o
far taken responsibility of the act. Or the fact that the Delhi University
lecturer AR Geelani has been arrested simply becasue the evening before the
event he was heard telling the supervisor of his Ph.D. thesis over phone
that "his work is in its final shape".

What the citizens of this country deserve is a fair investigation and
analysis of the events by the authorities, and the media, and not just a hy=
pe
to start a war against terrorism, and nab innocent people.

______

#4.

The New Republic
Dec. 24, 2001

WASHINGTON DIARIST
All for One

By Sarah Wildman
SARAH WILDMAN is an assistant editor at TNR.

Amardeep Singh, a slight 30-year-old with a neat turban and large, dark
eyes, is very, very angry about the Indian government's treatment of his
fellow Sikhs in Punjab. Though his parents were both born in Northern
India, he asks not to be called "IndianAmerican." He doesn't like
references to "historical enmity" in the subcontinent, because for him
those enmities are "very real and very present." He founded the Sikh
Coalition, an organization that educates Americans about Sikhism. But
Singh doesn't only consider himself a Sikh; he consciously labels himself
"South Asian." In the United States, he says, "South Asians share common
characteristics, culture, and interests."

Singh's dual commitments illustrate a strange post-September 11 paradox.
While the war on terrorism has inflamed religious and national divisions
on the subcontinent (so much so that the press paints apocalyptic
scenarios of regional nuclear war), in the United States it has probably
done more to unify America's disparate South Asian communities than any
event since the mass migration that brought them to these shores in large
numbers three decades ago. Since 9/11, Pakistanis, Bangladeshis, Nepalis,
Sri Lankans, and Indians have felt the sting of hundreds of hate crimes
and thousands of ugly comments. Describing this backlash, the media has
increasingly used the label "South Asian," providing the term a legitimacy
it hadn't enjoyed before. The concept of South Asianness "has taken off,"
says Madhulika Khandelwal, an Asian American Studies professor at the
University of Massachusetts who studies Indian immigrants in the United
States. Because, to American bigots, Pakistanis, Indians, Bangladeshis,
Muslims, Hindus, and Sikhs all look the same--brown--many victims are
deciding they have a lot more in common than they had previously realized.

The term "South Asian" has always appealed to people in trouble. Among the
first to embrace it were women battling domestic abuse. Purvi Shah, a
board member for Sakhi, a Manhattan-based organization that gives
emotional, educational, and legal support to South Asian women fighting
domestic violence, calls the label "strategic": "We felt that, despite our
national differences, there were cultural and historical similarities that
we wanted to tap into in terms of combating violence." Taxi drivers in New
York also rallied behind the South Asian banner early on: In May 1998,
just after India and Pakistan tested their nuclear weapons, sending
regional tensions through the roof, New York cab drivers held a major
strike. The New York Taxi Workers Alliance--a major player in the
strike--is at least 60 percent South Asian. "We organize across
ethnicities in the industry, not at the expense of ethnic identities or
differences," explains staff organizer Bhairavi Desai. "The larger base of
solidarity is among issues of class, as taxi drivers."

The label Desi, or South Asian, has also gained a foothold among the
Indian-American second generation. The Indian immigrants who came to the
United States in the mid-1960s tended to settle and socialize within their
specific linguistic and regional groups. Their children are less inclined
to segregate themselves. Debasish Mishra, 28, the child of immigrants from
Orissa, works for SAALT, which only recently changed its name from Indian
American Leadership Center to South Asian American Leaders of Tomorrow.
The "issues that affect the Indian-American community domestically are not
so different from those affecting Pakistani- or Bangladeshi-Americans,"
Mishra explains. "So there was no point in being so parochial."

To be sure, a handful of vocal Hindus reject the South Asian moniker,
challenging the supposed commonalities between Hindus and Muslims in the
United States. Ramesh Rao, a professor at Truman State University in
Missouri, tells me the "whole South Asian business is junk" and "some kind
of P.C." thing. (He also says: "Saying Islam is a religion of peace is
classic monotheistic marketing.") When Rajiv Malhotra, who runs the
Infinity Foundation, an organization that gives grants to projects that
focus on Indian identity, learned that I was writing on this topic, he
sent an e-mail to his friends asking them to contact me. They called for
days, leaving messages about how they are Indian first and South Asian
never. "A lot of Hindus have suddenly started realizing they better stand
up and differentiate themselves from Muslims or Arabs," said Malhotra, as
though to do so would end the backlash.

But the people who called at malhotra's behest were all first-generation.
And while their assertion that "South Asian" stems from American victim
politics may be largely true--it is also true that September 11 has made
South Asians feel more victimized, more political, and more American than
ever before. "The fact that I could be a target--that really brings people
together, that shared vulnerability," says Khandelwal of UMass. "When I
walk down the street ... [people] say, `Here's another brown guy,'" argues
Sreenath Sreenivasan, a professor at the Columbia School of Journalism.
"In this country," he says, "you need to build coalitions."

Those coalitions are not without costs. While embracing the term South
Asian may give Americans of Indian, Pakistani, and Bangladeshi descent
greater influence over domestic politics, it will likely decrease their
influence over foreign policy. Latino organizations generally avoid
foreign policy, since their Mexican, Puerto Rican, and Cuban members don't
see eye to eye on questions like sanctions against Havana. Similarly,
Asian American groups that include immigrants from Korea, Taiwan, and
mainland China often find themselves divided--and therefore silent--on
questions like arms sales to Taipei. The newly emerging South Asian
organizations are equally constrained. "I think that we have to learn to
separate India/Pakistan politics from Indian American identity," explains
Columbia's Sreenivasan. "What happens in Kashmir is the baggage we bring
from the subcontinent." The website of the South Asian Journalists
Association, which he co-founded, notes that the group does not "take
stands on the politics of South Asia." Their agenda is here at home.

"South Asian," then, a term critics deride as the product of political
correctness, may in fact be a sign of accelerating assimilation
(especially compared to the less P.C. but even more avid separatism of
Hindu nationalists). "What you're seeing is not only a movement to stand
up for our civil rights but also a movement to ensure that the larger
society knows that we are Americans," says Kris Kolluri, an Indian
immigrant and senior policy adviser to House Minority Leader Dick
Gephardt. "Many of us [are] immigrants, but we profess our love to the
United States as strongly or stronger than our love for where we came
from." In this case, hyphenated identity ("South Asian-American") may be
less a step away from unmodified Americanness than a step toward it. The
bigots, who in patriotism's name have sought to make South Asian
immigrants feel unwelcome, may have actually made them more American than
ever before.

SARAH WILDMAN is an assistant editor at TNR.

______

#5.

Forthcoming from Kali for Women (India)
http://www.kalibooks.com/

Which is My Country?
women writing on the partition of India

ALOK BHALLA, URVASHI BUTALIA & RITU MENON

These three volumes of fiction, non-fiction and archival material on=20
the Partition bring together a wealth of writing in English, as well=20
as translations from Urdu, Hindi, Sindhi, Punjabi, Bangla, Kannada=20
and Malayalam, written by women from both sides of the India-Pakistan=20
border. English stories included here are by Atiya Hossain, Bapsi=20
Sidhwa and Nisha da Cunha, as well as extracts from well-known texts=20
like A Heart Divided.

Bangla writings are by Mahashweta Devi, Pratibha Basu, Jyotirmoyee=20
Devi and others. Krishna Sobti and Rajee Seth from Hindi are included=20
here along with Amrita Pritam, Dalip Kaur Tiwana and Ajeet Cour, from=20
Punjabi. Translations from the Urdu include fiction by Jamila Hashmi,=20
Hajira Masroor, Khadija Mastur, Ismat Chughtai, Qurratulain Hyder and=20
others.

The non-fictional texts offer excerpts from the writings of Veena=20
Das, Urvashi Butalia, Ritu Menon and Kamla Bhasin, as well as=20
interviews with many women closely involved with the aftermath of=20
Partition. Their value as historical testimonies of the time is=20
unquestionable.

Archival material includes Legislative Assembly Debates, Proceedings=20
of the Partition Council, treaties, legislation and ordinances on=20
women, and private papers and official records on rehabilitation and=20
resettlement.

ALOK BHALLA, Professor of English at CIEFL, Hyderabad, has edited=20
three volumes of stories on the Partition of India.

URVASHI BUTALIA, publisher and activist, is the author of The Other=20
Side of Silence:Voices from the Partition of India.

RITU MENON is a publisher, and has written widely on women and=20
violence and women and fundamentalism. She is the author (with Kamla=20
Bhasin) of Borders & Boundaries: Women in India's Partition.

o o o o

The Nation and the RSS
gendered discourse, gendered action

PAOLA BACCHETTA

This book critically examines the discourse and actions of India's=20
most expansive Hindu nationalist organisation, the Rashtriya=20
Swayamsewak Sangh (RSS) and its women's wing, the Rashtriya Sevika=20
Samiti, from a gender-comparative perspective. The author analyses=20
the RSS and Samiti publications-books, pamphlets, newspaper articles,=20
posters, comic books-from 1989 to the present, as well as RSS=20
participation in two major events: the Shah Bano case of 1984 and the=20
demolition of the Babri Masjid in December 1992.

Bacchetta argues that Hindu nationalist men and women define the=20
'Hindu nation' and the ideal identities of Hindu nationalist citizens=20
and their Others (Muslims), differently. To construct their ideology,=20
Hindu nationalist men and women make selective, gender-differentiated=20
use of elements from sacred Sanskrit texts, 19th century Orientalism=20
and western theories of nationalism.

Hindu nationalists claim they promote 'traditional' values (chastity,=20
spirituality); yet, they strategically use sexuality to provoke=20
emotions and channel them into violence against Indian minorities.=20
Finally, when Hindu nationalist men and women participate in the same=20
actions, they do so on the basis of gender differential narratives=20
and for gender differential reasons.

PAOLA BACCHETTA is Assistant Professor in the Departments of=20
Geography and Women's Studies at the University of Kentucky, USA. She=20
has published numerous articles on Hindu nationalism, gender and=20
sexuality and is currently co-editing a book on right-wing women=20
across the globe.

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