[sacw] SACW #1 (20 Nov. 01)

Harsh Kapoor aiindex@mnet.fr
Tue, 20 Nov 2001 01:24:39 +0100


South Asia Citizens Wire | Dispatch #1.
20 November 2001
http://www.mnet.fr/aiindex

------------------------------------------

#1. A three front situation (M. B. Naqvi)
#2. The Nazims' nizam (Ardeshir Cowasjee)
#3. Letter to New York Times
Re "In Pakistan, It's Jihad 101," by Thomas L. Friedman (Omar Noman)
#4. Before They Can Build a Nation, Afghans Need a National Identity=20
(dilip Hiro)
#5. Don't Let the Fanatics Make a Play for Power Again (Peter Tomsen)
#6. Success Depends on the Return of the Educated Class (Mohammed Qabool)
________________________

#1.

Date: Mon, 19 Nov 2001 11:31:44 +0500

A three front situation
By M. B. Naqvi

The military regime has to fight on three fronts --- fortunately not
militarily. Pakistan=92s western borders with Afghanistan have after the
collapse of Taliban power suddenly become overly sensitive with all
manner of uncertainties and possibilities. Many of Taliban activists,
leading members of their hierarchy, from Mulla Omar down, and above all
the Al-Qaeda=92s Chief and its other members may head for Pakistan through
the porous border. The anti-Taliban coalition is sure to infer this and
once it loses hope of finding Osama and his close associates, it will
press for starting an armed search inside Pakistan. That will create a
first-rate crisis because it is sure to involve American and British
soldiers and detectives in sensitive area from where thousands of
volunteers went to fight along side Taliban.

In the east relations with India have been traditionally bad and they
have gotten even worse thanks to Kashmir Jehad. Danger of actual
hostilities breaking out is not absent. The Indians seem to be
contemplating to make hot pursuit forays into AJK, which would be
tantamount to an attack on Pakistan, in accordance with oft-repeated
stance of this country. Earlier it was thought that since both countries
have acquired nuclear weapons they will not make war because of mutual
deterrence. Lately the Indian Defence establishment has adumbrated a new
doctrine: =91nuclear weapons of one country deter the nuclear weapons of
the other; scope for armed clash with conventional weapons exists=92. It
is through this opening that India thinks it can punish Pakistan for its
perceived role in cross-border terrorism in Kashmir.

While Pakistan has become a member of the anti-Taliban coalition it does
not seem to impress India. For, the deeper and longer-term nature of
Indo-American partnership seems to override other considerations; indeed
the likelihood of Americans turning their attention to terrorism in
Kashmir as the Indians are urging is troubling enough. The subject
occasion many uncertainties and should be treated as, again, a major
crisis. At any rate, even if an all out war does not break out, India
promises to keep up heavy diplomatic pressures on this country.

In addition, there is a third and far more complex front: domestic
politics. It is bristling with ugly possibilities. Press has been full
of reports about a possible deal with the PPP chief Benazir Bhutto. A
deal of sorts has been all but visible between Gen. Pervez Musharraf and
the Like Minded Muslim Leaguers all along. The military regime had all
but outmanoeuvred the ARD, except for two factors: continued allegiance
of 35 or so MNAs and many Senators to Mr. Nawaz Sharif and secondly
there is the Army=92s mind set: it regards these two top leaders as too
corrupt who have to be kept out of the new politics the military regime
has come to devise. President Musharraf=92s statements about his
Presidency only signify that the Army wishes him to stay as an all
powerful President indefinitely. It looked uncommonly like an assurance
to White House that come what may the Army will not relinquish its
power, though it may repeat the charade of democracy as it did in 1985
to 1999.

Doubtless the generals, especially Gen. Musharraf, as President and
COAS, are supremely confident that they can safely handle all
situations. Insofar as the nation=92s overall problems and challenges are
concerned, there never was a period when there were so many dangers on
all these three fronts. In fact, these are serious Crises and they have
become only worse with the passage of time because successive
governments, usually in deference to generals, never seriously tried to
resolve them or prevent assuming the present dimensions. Today a
purposeful examination of these Crises is necessary. Few can underplay
the importance of what might happen on either side of Afghanistan=92s
borders with Pakistan or along the LOC with India. All Pakistanis are
justifiably anxious and apprehensive about both sets of possibilities.
But one point must be heavily underscored: crises on, along or across
the borders result from the internal policies of this country and
tackling them requires, at bottom, changes in domestic policy
orientation. Foreign policy is always a result and in many ways
extension of domestic policy orientation, only secondarily influenced by
foreign countries. We should, therefore focus sharply on domestic policy
orientation in order to adequately resolve the Crises across the
borders.

The primary crisis at home takes the shape of an explosive polarisation
between the pro-Taliban religious parties and the government which by
making a U turn in its Afghan policy has enraged the former. It is not
really a new crisis; it has been with us from the early years of
independence. It is all about Pakistanis=92 perception of themselves based
on the reasons that forced partition on India. Original Muslim League
leadership --- all of it non-religious in the sense of being
non-orthodox --- wanted division for basically non-religious purposes:
to make economic progress with a human face and where Muslims will be
free from perceived Hindu tyranny. Which is how Quaid-i-Azam=92s
leadership could unite all Indian Muslims, which no orthodox Maulvi
could.

But with Pakistan becoming a fact, the religiously-oriented politicians
like Syed Ataullah Shah Bukhari and Maulana Abul Alaa Maududi argued
that since Muslim League used the name of Islam during Pakistan
Movement, Pakistan will have to be an orthodox Islamic State. Few ML
government leaders paid attention to this while Quaid-i-Azam lived. But
with the passage of time, factionalism inside ML and Liaquat Ali Khan
government=92s inability to resolve the constitution-making deadlock led
to a sordid tussle for power between Punjab and Bengal groups inside the
Constituent Assembly. That resulted in power being cornered by a
bureaucratic-military coterie and authoritarian rulers found the Islamic
State idea useful. It came handy in for condemning Bengalis=92 and other
regionalists demands for autonomy as mere provincialism.

But Liaquat government had tried to be clever by half in getting an
ambiguous Objectives Resolution passed, thinking that religious lobby=92s
demands could be appeased by it while the normal ML types (modernists)
can go on ruling --- using Islamic rhetoric as an icing on a basically
secular cake. That Resolution strengthened the case for an Islamic
dispensation for Pakistan and the rest was done by the successive
dictators=92 need for acquiring a semblance of legitimacy by being ever
more shrill about Islam while actually running a Martial Law or its
surrogate regimes that were entirely secular, if also anti-democratic.
Anyway, eventually the religious lobby found Taliban to be a good
Islamic Model and are now working for a Taliban-like Islamic
dispensation for Pakistan, perhaps sans their excesses or rigidities.
How dangerous it would be if Pakistan becomes something like the
Taliban=92s Afghanistan is obvious. But this lobby is in fully cry.
Today=92s one-man regime is required to cope with this challenge also.
What the regime does not realise is that preventing strikes or
containing street demonstrations is not meeting the challenge; a proper
and more democratic alternative is necessarily required. This is however
beyond the ken of generals.

This is not the only explosive controversy in Pakistan. The country
fought a civil war and was dismembered (1971) on the issue of
Centre-Province relations. It has been the issue of issues since.
Regional nationalists are determined not to go on living under too
powerful a centre; they want a genuine federation that gives adequate
power to the provinces that coincide with perceived nationalities=92
homelands --- or none at all. It is as explosive now as it was in 1950s
and 1960s. Military=92s interventions have only added to the exasperation
of those demanding regional (and local) autonomy: the latter being the
prerequisites of justice. The official devolution plan and
democratic-seeming local bodies are not seen as enough compensation for
the loss of genuine democracy.

There are two other issues that have found no solution: disparity in
incomes and opportunities between the rich and the poor, including in
the development among regions. It is significant that Authority does not
give, after 1971, separate GDP figures for provinces or regional per
capita incomes. Why? the poor are entitled to ask: who owns Pakistan and
why? The second issue is one of foreign policy. Ever since Oct. 1953
when Gen. Ayub Khan signed an agreement with Pentagon for military aid
--- behind the back of the Parliament, Cabinet and certainly the people
--- Pakistan=92s foreign policy of aligning with the US has been
controversial. It is now time to assess what did the country again or
lose. All the gains are to be seen in the prosperity of the elite
classes, including the generals. What did the less well to do classes
get is rapidly growing poverty, high taxes and equally rapidly rising
debt servicing burdens, the weight of which falls heavily on the poor.
The continuation of this policy orientation, especially after the
restoration of Pak-American alliance, is now at issue: who will gain and
who will lose?

Majority of Pakistanis is poor and deprived of equal rights. They want
equality. This mean equal sharing in politics too: let all Pakistanis be
equal stakeholders in the Pakistan Limited. Foreign aid received in the
name of the people should actually benefit the poor as it does the rich,
reducing disparities. This demand has four facets: (i) a more
egalitarian distribution of incomes; and (ii) state=92s firm and legal
obligation to eradicate poverty and not merely alleviation; (iii) it
must be made the first charge on the national budget through a statutory
social security no matter how small the initial compensation; and (iv)
no region should noticeably lag behind others.

How is the military regime going to cope with this troubling situation
on its two borders and the grim potentialities of domestic
polarisations, made worse by frequent military dictatorships. It says it
can handle it all by itself, though it is trying to employ some pliable
politicians for PR purposes. They will have privileges and perks but no
power. They will take most of the flak. The people shall have only one
role: to stay laid back, watching the compulsions of history play
themselves out under the expert supervision of generals.

______

#2.

DAWN (Pakistan)
18 November 2001

The Nazims' nizam
By Ardeshir Cowasjee

What must be repeated endlessly, for as long as what remains of=20
Jinnah's Pakistan exists, and bear repetition ad infinitum is one=20
well known sentence from Mohammad Ali Jinnah's momentous speech - his=20
creed - delivered on August 11, 1947: "The first duty of a government=20
is to maintain law and order so that the life, property and religious=20
beliefs of its subjects are fully protected by the state."
Now, we all know the famous section in the Pakistan Penal Code,=20
Section 295 (c). In 1986, the Criminal Law (Amendment Act, III) was=20
passed by the hand-picked pious members of champion-of-Islam General=20
Zia-ul-Haq's Majlis-i-Shoora headed by Mohammed Khan Junejo and it=20
added Section 295(C) to Section 295 of the PPC.
This is a weapon designed to be used for personal vengeance, a weapon=20
with which scores can be settled, a weapon to be employed for=20
personal gain. It reads: "Whoever by words, either spoken or written,=20
or by visible representation, or by imputation, innuendo, or=20
insinuation, directly or indirectly, defiles the sacred name of the=20
Holy Prophet Muhammad (peace by upon him) shall be punished with=20
death, or imprisonment for life, and shall be liable to fine."
In April 2000, Chief Executive (as he then simply was) General Pervez=20
Musharraf instructed National Security Council member Attiya=20
Inayatullah to organize a seminar on human rights. He very correctly=20
there made a reference to the blasphemy laws, realizing the criminal=20
abuse they arouse and in an effort to prevent such abuse he announced=20
his intention of amending the laws so that prior to the registration=20
of an FIR, a deputy commissioner (now a Nazim) would be required to=20
make investigations as to the veracity of the charge - a mere token=20
change in the law but nevertheless a step in the right direction=20
approved by the external world and by the sane and balanced=20
internally. Some days later, for no good reason other than fear, he=20
retreated and told the nation that such an amendment was not=20
possible. Now, fortunately for the nation and the country, he and his=20
officers have far less fear of the bigots and the=20
religion-manipulating mischief makers. We are progressing.
Many of us know how our textile mills are harassed. They print=20
designs sent by their buyers abroad - Japanese, French, Chinese,=20
Taiwanese, American, Irish, and many others - and the mischief making=20
manipulators when they wish to not only extort but to make wicked=20
mischief manage to perceive in any design they may choose to set=20
their eyes upon a squiggle or a line which they interpret as 'Allah'=20
or 'Mohammad'. They then literally terrorize the mill owners with=20
threats of exposure, reports to the police, the mullahs, the=20
authorities, etc., unless substantial sums are paid up. These=20
terrorists also recruit and bribe the more irresponsible=20
inexperienced members of our press who are wont to print alarming=20
reports intended to instigate and arouse the public. Remember how=20
some time ago, one of these 'religious' extortionists even managed to=20
read the word 'Allah' in the 'Nike' sign, which is plastered all over=20
what is worn by a large number of our public, and shown on our=20
hoardings and television advertisements.
The latest mill victim is Yunus Textile Mills of Landhi, owned and=20
managed by the brothers Yunus, their family, and shareholders. The=20
group owns many industries and is counted as one of the top exporters=20
of Pakistan.
The owners are deeply and truly religious, followers of Islam in its=20
correct and original form, and their philanthropy is well known.
On October 23, Nazim Mohammad Shahid of Landhi sent a written=20
complaint to the senior superintendent of police of the Malir and=20
also informed the local Urdu press that he had heard that Yunus=20
Textile Mills was printing cloth with a design in which can be=20
detected the words 'Allah' and 'Mohammad'. According to his report to=20
the police, this had caused much resentment in the area and=20
consequent unrest among the locals. He asked that preventative=20
measures be immediately taken to quell the alleged but imaginary=20
discontent.
The Nazim then telephoned the mill and asked the manager to come to=20
his office and give his explanation to members of the press who had=20
gathered there. Before the manager could leave the mill a team of=20
four reporters and a photographer arrived in his office from a local=20
Urdu daily. They had been informed by the Nazim that defamatory=20
material had been printed by the mill, and that he had made efforts=20
to contact the mill management without success. They alleged that the=20
entire locality was up in arms against the outrage and that the law=20
and order situation was getting out of hand.
The manager told them that no such inflammatory material had ever=20
been printed in his mill, and that he, his workers and the owners=20
were God-fearing Muslims who, knowing the current trend, strictly and=20
conscientiously avoid printing any material which could be deemed to=20
be even vaguely objectionable or hurt anyone's feelings. The press=20
team declared they were satisfied.
As soon as they left, the representatives of the mill management went=20
to see the Landhi Nazim and told him what they had told the press.=20
The Nazim assured them that he too was satisfied and would see that a=20
clarification of the matter was printed in the press.
The next day, October 24, the same newspaper whose reporters had=20
earlier visited the mill manager's statement and also printed the=20
original version of the Nazim together with his photograph and=20
photographs of the samples of two pieces of cloth which he had given=20
them. The report was most provocative and was obviously made=20
inflammatory with intent.
On October 25, Abdul Qadir Mandokhel of Quetta claiming to be an=20
advocate and the chairman of the 'Mandokhel Welfare Organization'=20
went to see City Nazim at the KMC head office and complained to him=20
that Yunus Textile Mills had printed objectionable material.
Nazim Naimatullah asked Mandokhel to lodge his complaint with the=20
executive district officer, Syed Mahmood Shah. He did so. Mahmood=20
Shah, who is in charge of the promotion of industry in this city,=20
then organised a raiding party comprising Mandokhel, Dr Laeeq, a=20
medical doctor in charge of medicine quality control, Mubarak Shah,=20
Laeeq's deputy, Ahsan Mirza, the assistant district officer,=20
Inspector Sabir Sipra, the Station House Officer of the KMC police=20
station in charge of encroachment removals, three 'police constables,=20
Amir Jalai of a Urdu daily newspaper, and his photographer, and Hafiz=20
Abdul Rais, the Sindh representative of Mandokhel's office. They=20
forcibly entered the mill premises and one of the godowns. The mill=20
security staff resisted but were taken care of by the uniformed=20
policemen.
The management raised objections against the unnecessarily=20
stronghanded behaviour of the raiding team and suggested they sit=20
down and discuss the matter. The mill administrator made it quite=20
clear that in the contentious design there was no possible way that=20
the words 'Allah' or 'Mohammad' could be perceived, even by the most=20
twisted mind, and he gave them a sample of the cloth. The raiders=20
left saying they would investigate further.
During the discussions, the man Mandokhel threatened to have the mill=20
sealed, the culprits charged with blasphemy, and then hanged.
On October 26, Mandokhel filed FIR 390/01 in the Qaidabad police=20
station, on which is noted in Urdu, loosely translated here: I, Duty=20
Officer, Sub Inspector Zulfikar Haider, confirm that I have a written=20
word for word report regarding crimes which have been committed under=20
Sections 295 (b) and 295 (c). Therefore a case has been filed against=20
the mill owner of Yunus Textile Mills, Mohammad Ali, and Director=20
Technical Tanvir Ahmad Siddiqui and all other persons involved in the=20
FIR lodged for further investigation by SHO Shujaat Hussain.
President General Musharraf and the nation have gone to war against=20
the world of terrorism. Must we suffer this evil at home?

=A9 The DAWN Group of Newspapers, 2001

______

#3.

The New York Times
November 19, 2001
Letters to the Editor
At an Islamic School in Pakistan

Re "In Pakistan, It's Jihad 101," by Thomas L. Friedman (column, Nov. 13):

The United States needs to fundamentally restructure its support to=20
Pakistan. The starting point has to be education, along with revival=20
of an open democratic system. After receiving billions of dollars in=20
aid, Pakistan has one of the worst literacy rates in the world and=20
the second largest population growth rate in Asia.

Too many aid agencies have accepted feeble excuses for delaying=20
mandatory primary education. There is an educational apartheid in=20
Pakistan, with the privileged going to private schools while most=20
others have virtually no options. The Islamic schools known as=20
madrasas have filled this vacuum. Saudi financing for these dangerous=20
schools must be stopped, and Pakistan's government given the fiscal=20
space to take them over and put a modern curriculum into effect.
OMAR NOMAN
New York, Nov. 14, 2001
The writer is deputy director, human development report office, United Nati=
ons.

______

#4.

The Washington Post
Before They Can Build a Nation, Afghans Need a National Identity

_____Up For Grabs_____
For the third time in 10 years, control of Afghanistan is at stake.=20
What will bring peace and stability? Four writers, all with firsthand=20
knowledge of the country, make the case for how the bloodshed and=20
repression of the past can be left behind.

Of the more than 26 million people across the 250,000 square miles of=20
Afghanistan, the major ethnic groups are:

PASHTUN Afghanistan's largest single ethnic group; 40 percent of the=20
population.
TAJIK Second-largest group; about 25 percent of the population; part=20
of the Northern Alliance.
HAZARA About 19 percent of the population; a religious minority that=20
opposes the Taliban. Part of the Northern Alliance.
UZBEK About 8 percent of the population; part of the Northern Alliance.
OTHER
Turkmen, who live in the Wakhan corridor; Nuristanis, who live in the=20
remote mountains northeast of Kabul along the Pakistan border; Chahar=20
Aimaq, who live west of the Hazarajat; Baluchi nomads, who are mostly=20
in exile

Sources: Jane's, Facts on File
-----------------------------------------

By Dilip Hiro
Sunday, November 18, 2001; Page B02

Last Monday, U.N. representatives of eight key nations (Afghanistan's=20
six neighbors and the United States and Russia) called for the swift=20
establishment of a "broad-based government" in that war-torn Islamic=20
emirate. If the group had been talking about any other state, the=20
members undoubtedly would have called for a "national unity=20
government." Their chosen term highlights the magnitude of the=20
problem facing the international community: the absence in=20
Afghanistan of nationalism -- of a shared feeling among its citizens=20
of belonging to one nation. The predicament is compounded by the=20
country's geography, history and economics, which have blocked its=20
progress from tribalism to the modern concept of a multiethnic=20
nation-state.

Afghanistan's mountainous terrain has created small, isolated -- and=20
suspicious -- communities. As an Afghan proverb has it, "My brother=20
and I against my cousin; and my cousin, my brother and I against the=20
rest of the world." Dependent on a system of medieval subsistence=20
farming, these communities (with the exception of those who grow=20
poppies for opium) produce very little surplus for trade or any other=20
commercial exchange; and apart from the residents of a few large=20
cities, Afghans have scant contact with their government, either at a=20
local or a national level. Today, theirs is the least governed=20
country in the world.

An abiding characteristic of such peasant societies is feuding -- the=20
perennial settling of scores, from father to son, from son to=20
grandson. Such behavior, which shapes inter-ethnic relations as well=20
as inter-tribal relations within each such group, is a major barrier=20
to engendering tolerant, harmonious feelings in a multiethnic nation.

Instead, each of the four ethnic groups of this landlocked country=20
looks across national frontiers to draw sustenance from neighboring=20
fellow ethnics. Thus Tajik-Afghans focus on Tajikistan (with the=20
ethnic Tajik Jamiat-e-Islami party of former Afghan president=20
Burhanuddin Rabbani taking shelter there until recently);=20
Uzbek-Afghans look to Uzbekistan; Pashtun-Afghans to fellow Pashtuns=20
in Pakistan; and Hazara-Afghans, who belong to the minority Shia=20
sect, to Shia-majority Iran.

It was czarist Russia and imperial Britain, the 19th-century=20
superpowers engaged in the Great Game in Central Asia, who delineated=20
the final boundaries of modern Afghanistan in 1895, creating a buffer=20
state between Russia and British India. Keen to protect its=20
much-prized Indian Empire, Britain wanted to ensure that it did not=20
share a border with Russia. That led to the carving out of the Wakhan=20
corridor -- a tongue protruding from Afghanistan's northeast corner=20
that gives the country a short common border with China.

Being the officially agreed-upon buffer between two great powers=20
meant that Afghanistan continued to maintain its independence -- one=20
of the few non-European countries to do so during the era of European=20
imperialism. In retrospect, lack of European colonization is an=20
important factor in holding up the Afghans' progress toward modern=20
nation-statehood. By contrast, the Indians and Vietnamese, whose=20
countries were colonized by Britain and France respectively,=20
developed a strong sense of nationhood in opposition to their=20
imperialist masters over many decades. Had Afghanistan's inhabitants=20
been ruled by a foreign power, they likely would have submerged their=20
tribal and ethnic identities into an overarching national identity to=20
expel the imperialists from their soil.

In the 1980s, the Soviet military intervention in Afghanistan created=20
a situation analogous to occupation by an imperialist power. The=20
Afghan mujaheddin rallied round the twin slogans of nationalism and=20
Islam in their armed struggle against European atheists, the Soviet=20
communists -- but that lasted a mere decade. During that short period=20
their sprouting nationalism never grew strong enough to subordinate=20
the centuries-old tribal-ethnic loyalties. Once the Soviets left in=20
1989, the nationalist element in the mujaheddin ranks evaporated. And=20
Islam, which had all along been taken for granted in Afghan life,=20
proved inadequate to hold the four major ethnic groups together. In=20
1992, traditional rivalries came to the fore, culminating in a civil=20
war along ethnic lines.

It is worth recalling that among those who got fed up with such=20
internecine fighting among Afghans -- all of them staunch Muslims --=20
was none other than Osama bin Laden. In disgust, he returned to his=20
Saudi home.

Against this backdrop, the chances of a broad-based government for=20
Afghanistan -- one that can be cobbled together by the U.N. sponsored=20
group -- holding together for any meaningful length of time seem slim.

Dilip Hiro is the author of "Between Marx and Muhammad: The Changing=20
Face of Central Asia" (HarperCollins).

=A9 2001 The Washington Post Company

______

#5.

The Washington Post
Don't Let the Fanatics Make a Play for Power Again

By Peter Tomsen
Sunday, November 18, 2001; Page B03

For the third time in little more than a decade, a window of=20
opportunity for a lasting peace process has opened in Afghanistan.=20
But that window will close before progress can be made if we allow=20
history to repeat itself -- as it already appears in danger of doing.

Opportunities for a revival of Afghan self-rule and democratic=20
development were missed in the late 1980s and early '90s for one=20
principal reason: Pakistani,Iranian and Saudi support of Muslim=20
extremists. Fanatics such as Burhanuddin Rabbani, Gulbuddin=20
Hekmatyar, Yunis Khalis and Abdurrab Rasul Sayyaf -- all virulently=20
anti-Western and well out of the mainstream of Afghan politics --=20
moved into the vacuum left by the departing Soviets and Afghan=20
communists. All had been chosen as Afghan leaders during the war with=20
the Soviets -- not by Afghans, but by Pakistan's military dictator at=20
the time, Mohammed Zia ul-Haq. At a 1992 meeting in Peshawar,=20
Pakistan's military intelligence arranged for Rabbani to replace=20
ousted communist leader Najibullah as "president" of Afghanistan.=20
During Rabbani's four years in power before the Taliban seized=20
control, he methodically stymied efforts by the U.N. and moderate=20
Afghans to convene a large Afghan gathering to choose a legitimate=20
leader.

Today, Rabbani and the other extremist politicians created by=20
Pakistan are reemerging from the post-Taliban fog -- to pose, once=20
again, the biggest obstacle to a U.N.-assisted, broad-based Afghan=20
political settlement process.

Rabbani, who unexpectedly returned to the capital yesterday in a=20
convoy of jeeps, is as responsible as the Taliban for the past=20
decade's death and destruction in Afghanistan. Ominously, last week=20
he sent a delegation of personal followers -- all Afghan radicals --=20
to Pakistan for talks with Pakistan's military intelligence and with=20
Hekmatyar's son-in-law, who runs Hekmatyar's anti-Western=20
Hezb-i-Islami party's operations in Pakistan. Khalis has been=20
selected to preside over the post-Taliban Jalalabad governing council=20
in the Pashtun south. (Taliban leaderMohammad Omar had been a member=20
of Khalis's party during the Soviet-Afghan war.) Sayyaf, an extreme=20
fundamentalist Muslim of the radical Saudi Wahhabi sect, has declared=20
his opposition to the loya jirga, or Grand Assembly, as the=20
broad-based method of choosing a legitimate Afghan leadership.

Rabbani recently maneuvered within the fractured Northern Alliance=20
leadership council to block implementation of a Northern Alliance=20
agreement with exiled Afghan King Mohammed Zahir Shah to convene a=20
broad-based Afghan meeting in Turkey. Iran, which has an allergy to=20
kings, is likely to join Pakistan in undercutting any peace=20
initiative using the former monarch as a moderate, unifying figure in=20
a peace process. Meanwhile, Pakistani spokesmen, starting with=20
President Pervez Musharraf during his U.S. visit, are calling for a=20
"Southern Alliance" of Pashtuns to balance the predominantly=20
Tajik-Hazara-Uzbek Northern Alliance. This would only help=20
precipitate a fresh war in Afghanistan.

The good news is that the Muslim extremists championed by Pakistan,=20
Iran and Saudi Arabia over the past 22 years have been discredited=20
among the great majority of Afghans. Powerful moderates, such as=20
Ismael Khan in the west and Haji Qader in the east, oppose the=20
extremists. Some new Afghan leaders, including Hamid Karzai, the=20
prominent Pashtun tribal chief in the south, and Hussein Anwari and=20
Yunus Qanuni in the Northern Alliance, are pressing for a nationalist=20
approach, inclusive rather than exclusive, moderate rather than=20
radical.

The international community should consider revoking Rabbani's=20
Islamic State of Afghanistan status as the legitimate government of=20
Afghanistan, entitled to Afghanistan's seat at the U.N. The U.N.=20
could use the "empty seat" model it used for Cambodia in the 1980s to=20
pressure the Northern Alliance to support a broad-based political=20
settlement process. And the international community should continue=20
to press the Northern Alliance to permit a multilateral security=20
force to enter Kabul, to further weaken the alliance's attempt to=20
occupy the catbird seat during the settlement process.

It is not too late to stop a drift into yet another Afghan civil war.=20
But the international community must move much more quickly and=20
decisively to engage the Northern Alliance and the other post-Taliban=20
Afghan centers of power in the west, south and east. U.N. Special=20
Representative Lakhdar Brahimi should immediately travel to=20
Afghanistan and present a concrete road map for an internal consensus=20
to the Afghan groups that have recently liberated their areas. The=20
success of an intra-Afghan settlement process will ultimately depend=20
on Afghans in Afghanistan, not on Afghans abroad in Rome, Pakistan,=20
Iran or Saudi Arabia.

Peter Tomsen, U.S. special envoy and ambassador to the Afghan=20
resistance from 1989 to 1992, is ambassador-in-residence at the=20
University of Nebraska at Omaha.

_____

#6.

The Washington Post
Success Depends on the Return of the Educated Class

By Mohammed Qabool
Sunday, November 18, 2001; Page B03

For Afghans, only the formation of a stable, democratic government=20
can justify the U.S. airstrikes and current instability. And the=20
possibility of creating such a government rests not in the hands of=20
regional powers or in a council of tribal leaders, but in the hands=20
of Afghanistan's own intellectuals, academics and business people.=20
Unless these educated Afghans, who either are in exile or have been=20
marginalized throughout the years of civil strife, are brought=20
promptly into the political process, the changes of the past week=20
will likely amount to no more than the beginning of a new phase in=20
the vicious cycle of war and violence.

For all the talk about the need for a broad-based government, no one=20
has put forward a concrete definition of what that would mean.=20
Various foreign powers -- from Pakistan to Iran and Uzbekistan -- add=20
to the confusion by promoting their favored individuals and ethnic=20
groups to be the main representatives of the Afghan population.

The core of the problem is the lack of an alternative national=20
leadership. Mohammed Zahir Shah, the former king, is the only=20
individual able to play a central role in reviving state structures.=20
But he commands no organized political or military force, so his role=20
could only be symbolic and temporary.

With civil war in the past and the possibility of civil war in the=20
future, Afghanistan's educated class has long been dismissed as=20
having no practical role to play. Yet such an approach is=20
shortsighted. These people are vital to the reconstruction of the=20
country, and would be the driving force in any effort to move toward=20
peace and democracy.

For a country that is by many measures so backward, Afghanistan was,=20
until the early '90s, home to a large educated population. Many=20
gained valuable experience in government during the Soviet era of the=20
'80s. They worked in the government bureaucracy and in specialized=20
institutions.

Drawn from all ethnic groups and from rural as well as urban=20
backgrounds, educated Afghans learned to replace tribal loyalties=20
with higher ideals. Many fled, as I did, when the mujaheddin gained=20
power in 1992, but they have not forgotten their homeland. Once=20
assured of their safety, many of the men and women who settled in the=20
republics of the former Soviet Union, and in Iran, Pakistan and=20
India, for example, would undoubtedly return to commit their=20
knowledge and experience to reconstruction. That is a process that=20
would attract ambitious and skilled individuals.

They are the best hope for Afghanistan's "silent majority" -- for=20
those who have for years endured the burden of hardship and=20
misfortune. Some doubt talk of democracy in a land riven by decades=20
of war. But in fact it is the habit of ignoring the will of the=20
people that has culminated in the Afghan catastrophe. Much of what=20
outsiders claim to know about the country is hearsay -- and will=20
remain so until each man and, above all, each woman is given a vote.

All of this requires the political determination, financial=20
generosity and military support of the international community in=20
standing behind those Afghan individuals and groups who are committed=20
to democracy.

The conceptual flaw in most discussions of a post-Taliban settlement=20
has been the assumption that groups that have long made war will now=20
make peace. War is their way of life. They understand that they will=20
have no role in a peaceful environment. As one Afghan businessman=20
said, referring to the four years of mujaheddin rule before the=20
Taliban took control in 1996, "People are praying that God saves them=20
from the Taliban, but not at the cost of bringing back the others."

There is good reason to fear the return of "the others." As soon as=20
the Taliban menace and U.S. military pressure recede, these groups --=20
including members of the Northern Alliance -- may well turn on each=20
other. Alternatively, they may confront the U.S. forces in the name=20
of fighting an army of occupation, or defending Islam. Of course the=20
armed groups must continue to be taken into account, particularly in=20
the ongoing military campaign. But it is vital to help the militias=20
shed their weapons and transform themselves into political parties.

To escape their past, the people of Afghanistan need a new cause to=20
fight for. That idea is democracy, which many of us remember from the=20
last decade of Zahir Shah's reign, when he instituted a system of=20
constitutional monarchy. When each man and woman has a vote, we may=20
be surprised about what we learn from them about Afghanistan. The=20
country's educated classes are the best hope of bringing that about.

Mohammed Qabool was publisher and editor of the Kabul newspaper=20
Nawa-e'Sobh (Voice of Morning) in 1991 when it was closed by=20
then-Afghan President Najibullah. He has been living in London for=20
the past seven years. He has written on this topic for the Institute=20
for War & Peace Reporting (www.iwpr.net).

=A9 2001 The Washington Post Company

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