South Asia Citizens Wire | Dispatch #1.
11 November 2001
http://www.mnet.fr/aiindex
------------------------------------------
#1. Dividing Afghanistan, not a good idea (M B Naqvi)
#2. An Interview With Tariq Ali (La Jornada)
#3. Blair's Jihad (Gita Saghal)
#4. The Making of Afghanistan (Pankaj Mishra)
#5. Interpreting Islam to the west (Dr Manzur Ejaz)
________________________
#1.
The News International (Pakistan)
Saturday November 10, 2001
Dividing Afghanistan, not a good idea
By M B Naqvi
Comment
LAHORE: Latest to lend his name to the idea of dividing Afghanistan=20
along ethnic lines is Lakhdar Brahimi, the UN Representative for=20
Afghanistan, though he seems to be distancing from it now. Even=20
otherwise indications were mounting that perhaps major powers were=20
thinking of dividing the country between a predominantly non-Pushtoon=20
north and a Pushtoon south.
The Pakistan government continues to fervently proclaim its faith in=20
a united and multi-ethnic Afghanistan and regards its unity and=20
integrity as vital to Pakistan. It is advocating a future government=20
to be multi-ethnic; it should be devised by the Afghans themselves;=20
it should also be representative; it ought not to be imposed from=20
outside; and it should keep the country united. This look like all=20
the parts of a human body lying separately without there being any=20
known formula to remake a human body whole. As has been seen=20
repeatedly, the US as the leader of the international coalition=20
against terrorism has disregarded whatever Pakistan has been saying=20
and goes right ahead doing what it thinks is necessary. Therefore not=20
much importance can be attached to the formal view of the Pakistan=20
government because the decisive factors are beyond its competence.
The first thing to be said is that while the idea of keeping=20
Afghanistan united can, in theory at least, be supported by all=20
Afghans, north, south, east and west. True, implementing it has been=20
all but impossible during the last 9 years after Dr. Najibullah=EDs=20
government was no more. But if the objective becomes the recognition=20
of the necessity, Afghanistan will have to remain divided, the=20
practical consequences of which would hard to control for anyone:=20
Afghans or outsiders. It must be recognised that as of now the=20
Afghans do not look likely to keep their country united in any=20
meaningful sense and what seems likely is an endless vista of civil=20
wars and strife with renewed vigour after the dissolution of the=20
Taliban regime.
The only chance for keeping Afghanistan united now is for the=20
international community to produce enough peace enforcers to go in=20
and become a government that would create an administration restore=20
or create physical infrastructure of the country and kick start the=20
economy by infusion of international capital and politically to hold=20
the fort in a neutral manner. It must rule for a given period of=20
years under a mandate from United Nations Trusteeship Council for at=20
least 5 to 7 years during which it will endeavour to disarm the=20
various Afghan militias and brigand groups. It is important that the=20
entire new administration as also the peace enforcers should be drawn=20
from small third world countries with no reliance on personnel from=20
OECD member nations. At the end of the period, during which civil=20
liberties would be available to all Afghans, the administration will=20
hold the election. Whoever wins it will form the government and lead=20
the process for making a constitution.
Outsiders should have no role other than this enabling one. What the=20
elected representatives of Afghanistan do with their freedom and what=20
sort of constitution they make should be left to them. It may be that=20
this is not practical --- largely because the Americans may not wish=20
to let go the control over Afghanistan. Another reasons making for=20
impracticability is the amount of money to be raised for this UN=20
operation. It has to be in the region of $ 8 to 10 billion for five=20
years; in addition the funds for survival of the economy may have to=20
be provided from multilateral agencies and big power institutions=20
like European Central Bank or Exim Bank of the US or so on (without=20
excessively relying on anyone country). But for these two=20
difficulties, the plan is eminently feasible and no major Afghan=20
interest other than of the brigands can really object. At any rate,=20
this is the only way the Afghans can be kept united and hopefully=20
become peaceful.
Let's see what happens if no one listens to the idea of an=20
international peace enforcing mission in Afghanistan and, one way or=20
another, people ultimately opt for a two-way division of the country.=20
Inevitably it will have to be on ethnic lines, as noted earlier. In=20
view of the last 10 years of civil war, it should not be difficult to=20
see what would happen to ethnic minorities in the two entities=20
envisaged. The northern entity would have a quite strong Pushtoon=20
minority while no one ethnic entity may be in a comfortable majority.=20
How would it function in an ambience in which all the accent is to be=20
on ethnicity? The workability of the northern entity would be in=20
grave doubt.
It is true that the overwhelming Pushtoon majority in the south can=20
and perhaps would make it workable enough to start with. But the=20
problem of minorities, both of the ethnic kind and of sectarian=20
nature, would be hard one after all that has happened during the last=20
10 years. The rest of the world is doing no favour to the Afghans=20
future by emphasising the purely ethnic factor. The greater the=20
emphasis on it the more difficult it would be for other ethnicities=20
that happen to be in a minority to submit and go on living honourably=20
and safely in a new state with the majority of another ethnic group.
It would seem like a bonanza to the Pushtoon chauvinists both inside=20
Afghanistan and in Pakistan. There are some short-sighted Pakistani=20
strategists who would actually welcome this development thinking that=20
they are acquiring, hopefully permanently, a friendly state in nearby=20
Afghanistan that matters a lot to them. In their perception, it will=20
remain friendly and is likely to have rulers, with a political=20
manoeuvring or two by Islamabad, who will be Pakistan friendly=20
commanders and other groups. While this is theoretically possible,=20
the question has to be asked: is it likely to remain so for any=20
length of time even if it initially comes to pass. Pakistanis have to=20
think seriously on the subject without presuppositions.
There will be troubles galore for the new state and for its conceited=20
Pakistani promoters and patrons. To begin with, there is Iran that=20
claims a whole area as its sphere of influence. In this indeterminate=20
zone there are Persian-speaking people around Herat. Iran will object=20
its incorporation in either of the two states. Then there are the=20
problems posed by Hazrajat in the middle of the country peopled by=20
the sectarian minority of Shias. They are not adjacent to the area of=20
Iranian influence. But Iran would keep agitating about the way these=20
people are treated because most of them are Persian-speaking too. The=20
past experience of the Shias about various militias that conquered=20
them at different times is most unhappy and these militias included=20
both members of the Northern Alliance of today and the Pushtoon=20
Taliban themselves. At any rate, it would be a perpetual trouble=20
spot. The politics after a semblance of peace has been established=20
would remain dominated by ethnicity factor as a dominant one at least=20
initially, while the perpetual sectarian divide will continue to=20
trouble the polity to be.
A hard question has also to be asked. Will a new Pushtoon state in=20
Afghanistan remain for Pakistan? Who cannot see there will be=20
irresistible pulls and pushes for a merger of NWFP and that new state=20
is likely to be called Pushtoonistan or Pukhtoonkhawa. Supposing the=20
merger does take place what happens to Pakistan? After all, such a=20
merger will be the most natural thing in the world and that will=20
include not only NWFP but the whole northern belt of Balochistan.=20
Would the new state be an independent and sovereign one in its right,=20
while Pakistan will be the rump of the areas left out? Some can even=20
revive the old idea of a federation between Pakistan and the new=20
Pushtoon State of Afghanistan.
With Pushtoon chauvinism rampant, would it not want to be independent=20
of the Punjabis and Sindhis whom they look upon with some contempt?=20
But what would the purely Baloch part of Balochistan province will=20
then be thinking? Would they not revive the idea of a greater=20
Balochistan that is also independent and sovereign or go Sindh and=20
face a future?
Would Iran not support and promote that idea of greater Balochistan=20
hoping that its zone of active influence would expand and take in the=20
independent greater Balochistan, even if it does not become initially=20
a part of either Iran or Pakistan. But what about the Iranian part=20
Balochistan people? The whole prospect is confusing and full of=20
potentialities for interminable conflicts between Pakistan and Iran=20
as well as for each Balochistan area. May be that independence of=20
Balochistan might not be resistible and the remaining parts of=20
Pakistan would only be Punjab and Sindh. Is even this Pakistan a=20
likely prospect?
The process of Balkanisation, once it starts, is generally hard to=20
limit. The relationship of Sindh and Balochistan will have to be=20
looked at in the emerging climate of opinion created by so many=20
secessions and mergers of new entities. Although geography (Indus=20
Valley) seems to suggest a natural grouping of Sindh and Punjab, but=20
look at the hard facts of Pakistan politics during the last 54 years,=20
especially after 1971. The leitmotif of the politics has been=20
struggle against Punjabi domination and regional nationalisms. The=20
distrust of Punjabi intentions and opinions in Sindh is almost=20
pathological; no Sindhi trusts the Punjabis to play fair. Once NWFP=20
and Balochistan are not there the prospect of Punjab domination will=20
become even more forbidding, indeed alarming. For all anyone knows,=20
the Sindhis might not wish to be part of a small Pakistan that has=20
only them and the Punjabis in it.
All the reasons that have been adduced for keeping Afghanistan united=20
apply with much greater force to Pakistan itself. For, all the=20
multiethnic character of Afghanistan, the wish of all Afghan groups=20
to stay united in a single Afghanistan state cannot be mistaken. It=20
would be hard to see a similar trend in Pakistan. The Pakistan state=20
is far more brittle and its history has created suspicions and deep=20
ethnic cleavages that keeping it united is now predicated on=20
economically new national priorities that put people=EDs welfare above=20
the hocus pocus of Ideology and national security. What can unite the=20
people has now to be clearly delineated and emphasised. The ambiguous=20
sloganeering will not do. Nations do not survive on euphemisms,=20
rhetoric and pretensions.
People have to see that national unity will actually promote their=20
material and cultural welfare as also their human freedoms. Mere=20
sentimental wish for unity and sermons about it are not the best=20
course to adopt. The process of Balkanisation has to be dammed first=20
and then its motivating factors to be deflected through giving scope=20
for their substantive fulfilment of natural and basic needs without=20
encroaching upon political unity of a multiethnic plural society.=20
This whole process called Balkanisation needs to be prevented through=20
accommodating the natural desires of ethnic entities for free=20
expression and their desire to develop their language, literature and=20
culture without opposition from any quarter.
This is not the sentimental attachment to an old idea of Pakistan.=20
Pakistan has remained a fact of life for 54 years. True, its promises=20
have not been realised and people have not received what was their=20
due. But just imagine what happens when the process of Balkanisation=20
begins: a government with its coercive apparatus starts to suppress=20
right and left without doing anything coherent. But the impact of=20
political troubles on the people is always bad and they suffer all=20
manner of harm and hurt.
Balkanisation is never in the people's interests. Since the=20
Subcontinent is so closely inter-linked and has ethnic overlaps of=20
all kinds, a Balkanisation of Pakistan would also spark off a=20
Balkanisation of India. That would release tremendously forces, all=20
for the evil. There is the communal poison and religious hatred=20
blighting both India and Pakistan. In a period of turmoil these=20
forces will play havoc everywhere. It is much better to preserve the=20
political unity of Pakistan and India by transforming politics into a=20
more people-friendly kind.
______
#2.
Counterpunch.org
November 9, 2001
Q and A on the War
An Interview With Tariq Ali
By La Jornada
Q.: How would you characterize the current conflict? Is it a "clash=20
of civilizations", a "New Holy War", a national liberation struggle,=20
a conflict between the Arab oil elite and the dollar elite, or none=20
of the above?
Tariq Ali: None of the above. It is a crude war of revenge. A=20
powerful animal temporarily blinded, by a bee sting, lashes out in a=20
crazy way. This is exactly what is happening. The United States and=20
Blair, their military confederate in Britain, had no clear idea of=20
what they were doing. They assumed that the Taliban would crumble=20
within a week or two. They were wrong. They hoped that Pakistan,=20
which had created the Taliban, might be able to split them, but=20
instead the Taliban split the Pakistan Army. Two Generals had to be=20
sacked by Gen. Musharraf. The former King of Afghanistan continues to=20
cool his heels in Rome. The Northern Alliance can't take Kabul=20
without US ground troops. If these are sent there will be losses.=20
Ultimately of course the West could capture the cities, cut the=20
Taliban supply lines and seal them off from Pakistan. Difficult, but=20
not impossible. However it can't be done without troops. Perhaps the=20
US could throw German, Italian and British soldiers on the ground=20
while they continue to fight from the air. Then the Europeans could=20
take the casualties. Whatever happens the end-result will be more=20
chaos, not less. More terrorism, not less. Meanwhile the United=20
States continues to B52 the poorest country in the world. There are=20
already heavy civilian casualties.
Q.: What would you say is at stake in this war? What is the center of=20
the dispute: access to gas and water in the Middle East,=20
establishment of hegemony in the Islamic world, assuring a permanent=20
U.S. presence in the region, or none of the above?
Tariq Ali: I really don't believe that this war was begun for=20
economic gain. We, on the left, are always quick to look for the=20
economic reasons and usually we're right, but not this time. I think=20
the war was basically a response to domestic pressure after the=20
events of September 11. There were choices to be made. The US could=20
have decided to treat this for what it was: a criminal act and not an=20
act of war. They chose war. Obviously they will use it to strengthen=20
and assert US global hegemony on all three fronts: political,=20
military and economic, but first they have to get out of the=20
situation they're in.
Q.: How would you explain the emergence of Islamic fundamentalism, or=20
what other authors have called "political Islam"?
Tariq Ali: The seeds of Islamism were sown by the United States=20
during the Cold War. From the 50s to the 90s of the last century they=20
supported the bulwark of religion against the Communist enemy. When=20
the Cold War ended the groups they had supported began to get=20
restless. They're funding and, in some cases, arms supplies had been=20
cut off. Then came the Gulf War or the Second Oil War as I call it.=20
Most of the Islamists chose this moment to break definitively with=20
the West and garbed themselves in nationalist clothes. All over the=20
world there is a big vacuum. In the Arab world this vacuum is the=20
loss of both radical nationalism and communism. The Islamists=20
consciously chose to fill the vacuum. In Algeria, Egypt and Pakistan,=20
a number of important ex-Maoist leaders converted to Islam. From Mao=20
to Allah was not as big a jump as you might think! The people denied=20
secular openings began to respond. The West doesn't like to think=20
about this seriously, but Osama has become a cult figure and not just=20
in the Muslim world. When people feel disempowered, bitter, and angry=20
and when traditional politicians are interchangeable in the sense=20
that they are all in the service of market fundamentalism, then a=20
sensational deed like September 11 has a very big impact.
Q.: How would you assess the risk that the current conflict could=20
destabilize Pakistan? Could this situation lead to a greater presence=20
of radical Islam in that country's secret service and military forces?
Tariq Ali: Yes. In Pakistan the religious fundamentalism was=20
state-sponsored. It started in a big way during the years of the Zia=20
dictatorship (1977-89). Its aim was to marginalize secular politics=20
and destroy all radical alternatives. But this also made the=20
fundamentalists very unpopular. In three general elections that=20
followed the death of Zia, the religious parties got under 4 percent=20
of the vote....less than they get in Israel. Rejected by the people=20
they decided to infiltrate the state apparatus. Their exact strength=20
is unquantifiable at the moment, but they have cells in the Army and=20
at every level. They are clever. They will not strike till they are=20
sure of victory. The events in Afghanistan are playing into their=20
hands.
Q.: What consequences do you predict of the current conflict?
What scenarios do you see for the future?
Tariq Ali: As I said above, the West could take Afghanistan and hand=20
it over to people they favor. I don't believe in the 'invincibility'=20
of Afghanistan. The main reason the Russians were defeated was=20
because the religious groups, not to mention Osama and his gang, were=20
backed to the hilt by the United States. Pakistan was the proxy they=20
used to ensure the defeat of Moscow. Without US weaponry, money,=20
food, bribes the Russians could have held on. So if Pakistan is=20
persuaded to cut off the Taliban they could be isolated and defeated=20
militarily. But what then? Since the West organized the defeat of all=20
secular forces in the country, there is very little left in the way=20
of a democratic base of any sort. So there will be continuos trouble.=20
Who will police the new state? Pakistan? Iran? India? Russia? All of=20
them? Or a semi-permanent NATO-protectorate with Turkish troops? To=20
pose these questions is to show that the US is really in a no-win=20
situation. And the cassus belli of this war, Osama Bin Laden? Where=20
is he? Will he be found? If not what will they do? I think the war is=20
reaching a critical point. The snow will start falling on the Pamir=20
mountains very soon, making ground war virtually impossible. Then=20
what? Tactical nuclear weapons? The US population and Blair might=20
support their use, but I think it would split the EU and enrage the=20
rest of the world. Meanwhile we observe and analyze. CP
Tariq Ali, a frequent CounterPunch contributor, is the author of The=20
Stone Woman.
______
#3.
[ The below article was submitted to November 2001 issue of Red=20
Pepper (London, UK)]
BLAIR'S JIHAD
by Gita Saghal
As airstrikes are launched against Afghanistan, I'm reminded of the words o=
f
the 15th century poet Kabir:
As the city blazes, the watchman
sleeps happily,thinking,
My house is secure.
Let the town burn, as long as my things
Are saved.
Is the house of Western democracy to be secured by the fire of cruise
missiles, or will their blaze consume it? The Prime Minister has argued tha=
t
this war is just, democracy's jihad, if you like. But Muslim scholars have
recently explained that jihad does not simply mean a holy war but expresses
the individual's spiritual struggle - the battle within . As the war develo=
ps
we are being treated to the spectacle of the Prime Minister's jihad on a
daily basis as he struggles to make moral sense of the Western powers
ramshackle coalition with despots and fundamentalists.
Watching the Prime Minister's speech to the Labour Party conference I wa=
s
struck as much by his silences as by his tunnel vision. 'We are all childr=
en
of Abraham' he said, appealing to a common Judeo-Christian -Islamic traditi=
on
and rightly opposing racist attacks on Muslims. But he spoke as a=20
Christian - a position of such extraordinary partiality that watching it, =
I
felt, not for the first time , doubly marginalised. As a child of Hindu
parents who has rejected all theisms for atheism, I wondered what space
there is for discourses which are not founded on faith positions. Where was
the 's' word? No , not socialism, a word long exorcised from the lexicon of
New Labour, but 'secularism', a concept which has barely had a proper outin=
g.
Democracy, meanwhile, is constantly invoked. But it is too precious a
commodity to be exported. Make no mistake about it, Afghanistan is up for
grabs. Every possible hideous future is being imagined and reimagined.
Already Samaritan Blair has promised that he will not walk away from post
-war Afghanistan. In Pakistan, he promised to produce a balanced
multi-ethnic government in which Pashtuns would play a large part . So don'=
t
be surprised to see a rump of the Taliban to ensure 'stability'. He also
recognised Pakistan's interests in Afghanistan, thereby legitimising in
advance any new interventions prepared by the ISI, Pakistan's parallel stat=
e.
An American State Department spokesman rather charmingly said that the USA=
=20
would love to see a vibrant democracy in Afghanistan but, the people had t=
o
be educated first. He understood, he said that only 30% of men and almost n=
o
women were literate. So while democracy's jihad is fought to free the women
from their fundamentalist, sorry terrorist oppressors, they must be protect=
ed
from the rough and tumble of the freedom to choose their rulers. Does the
State Department not know that millions of illiterate people across South
Asia (every where except their closest ally Pakistan) regularly give their
leaders a bloody nose with their ballot papers as their only weapon? No, th=
at
is exactly what they do know.
Afghans,meanwhile , are struggling to be heard when they demand democra=
cy
by Afghans and for Afghans reaching for a sense of nationhood which is more
than the sum of tribal divisions. And the Revolutionary Association of Afgh=
an
Women (check) RAWA have put in plea for the demilitarisation of the area. I=
n
this, they echo the unsung peace movements across South Asia. The oppositi=
on
to war does not come solely from the supporters of bin Laden
In Britain, civil libertarians are warning of the threat to our civil
liberties from draconian legislation that has been already passed and that
which is still to come.But there are other more insidious threats that
emanate from Blair's visionary reconstruction of the House of Abraham.
Downing Street's version of loya jirgas- the parading of our Muslims-
'good' and demonising of their Muslims 'bad' ignores the real fault lines
within the different faith communities and their support ideological and
financial, for the politics of terror.
{The political-religious traditions which fostered both Osama bin Laden and
the Taliban have their origins in Saudi Arabia and Egypt - which explains
the skittishness of the grand coalition. Osama bin Laden, in effect, sees
himself as practising what the House of Saud preaches. As we now know, it w=
as
the madrassahs funded by Saudi Arabia which provided the students -the
'Taliban' for the holy war in Afghanistan .} It was also the Jamaat
-i-Islami, a pan- South Asian political party, with links to the Saudis an=
d
the Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt which has ridden to political influence on
the coat-tails of Pakistan's military, which also played a large part in t=
he
Northern Alliance in Afghanistan. Recently, RAWA , has said that they are
even more fearful of a government of the Northern Alliance which they have
already experienced than they are of the Taliban.
But what has any of this to do with Britain, where Muslims are a beleagured
minority? Many on the left have argued for the extension of faith schools b=
y
the government on the grounds that the funding of Christian and Jewish
schools alone is patently unfair and that minorities are better able to
maintain their identities within a faith tradition, protected from a racist
society. Estelle Morris, meanwhile has announced that they will do what
parents want- and that means enormously expanding the number of faith-based
schools of many denominations..
There are many battles ahead for the left, but I would argue that the
division of Britain into rigidly separate religious communities would be a
disaster not just for British democracy but for the lives and aspirations =
of
many within those communities. We need to put the arguments for secularism
loudly and clearly so that they are directed at a re-construction of Brita=
in
and not just used as a stick with which to express anti-Muslim feeling.
We need not travel very far to understand the consequences of rigid
educational separation. Holy Cross Primary in Belfast should be a sufficien=
t
reminder of some of the consequences of separation. Even where separate
identities may be served up with a thin veneer of 'tolerance',(a word whose
underlying sneer of inequality has already been unpicked by Georgie Wemyss =
in
an earlier issue of Red Pepper), fundamental misunderstandings abound. On a
Radio 4 phone in recently, a teacher in an English Catholic school asked he=
r
secondrary school pupils whether they knew the difference between Catholics
and Protestants. 'We believe in Jesus,' came the answer.=20
The Ouseley Report on Bradford, pointed to the problems caused by increasin=
g
segregation of different racial groups. In many parts of Britain, christia=
n
voluntary -controlled schools have played a central, if inadvertant role in
racial segregation . Where a voluntary-controlled school exists side-by-sid=
e
with a state school, it is the faith school which takes in the white and
Afro-caribbean population, leaving the state school almost entirely Asian.
What hope then for understanding which is based on a school system which
fosters a deep sense of victimisation as one of the permanent markers of
religious identity, along with what Tariq Ali has termed a'bleak Islamic
cosmopolitanism' taught in those Saudi funded madrassahs. I witnessed that
bleakness in Dewsbury, in Yorkshire which houses the largest mosque in
Europe.There, a community of Gujarati Muslims already suffering from the
effects of deindustrialisation, had abandoned the richness of their cultur=
al
roots and the Gujarati language for a rote learning of the Qu'ran. It is we=
ll
-established that multi-lingualism is better at securing a deeper sense of
identity than a forced assimilition into a unitary (and non-existent) Briti=
sh
identity, but it is doubtful that religious schooling can secure this.
Even in communities which are not suffering from severe economic deprivatio=
n,
the mark of a religious education is likely to be a belligerent defence of
religious identity allied to a political project. Julia Bard of the Jewish
Socialist Group argues that the teaching of Hebrew is closely associated wi=
th
the zionist project. What Jewish children are not taught are the languages =
of
their ancestors be they Yiddish, Ladino, Arabic or Malyalam. And we are all
familiar with the defence of Israeli aggression, of its expanding borders a=
nd
illegal settlements in the voice of the victim.
Similarly, the aggressive Hindu fundamentalist project of the ruling party,
the BJP, in India is known as Hindutva. Briefly , it subsumes all minoritie=
s
under a common Hindu identity or declares them aliens with foreign loyaltie=
s.
It, too, is an internationalist project heavily backed and funded by Hindus
abroad. It, too, drapes itself in a cloak of vicitimhood. In India in 1992,
in the wake of the Hindu right destruction of historic mosque -Babri Masjid=
,
said to be sited on the birthplace of Ram, there were riots all over India=
,
leading to massive loss of Muslim life.
In Britain, there were some attacks on Hindu property and temples - wheth=
er
by white racists or angry Muslims was unclear. In either case, the actions
were deplorable. So too was the political response of various Councils of
Hindu temples up and down Britain which used the crisis to argue for
protection and separate representation for British Hindus. Not one
memorandum sent to the British government expressed any regret over the los=
s
of Muslim life or property. In fact, it would have been impossible to tell
from the arguments put forward, that the proponents of Hindutva in India an=
d
abroad had themselves engineered the violence in India.
The academic version of this judging by the rewriting of text books in Ind=
ia
to glorify a mythical Hindu past and propound a view of the indigenous
origins of Aryans in India which is as academically suspect as it is
politically dubious.
The Councils of Temples like the Councils of Mosques are bodies created to
provide a visible leadership, 'community leaders' with which the British
state can do business. A minority of extreme activists can set the agenda a=
nd
the tone of all discussion through the projection of a unitary identity who=
se
existence is under threat from attacks on religious sentiment. {The Hindu
right in Britain was merely using the lessons they had learnt from the very
successful construction of a British Muslim identity through the agitation =
to
ban 'The Satanic Verses and extend the basphemy law.'And incidentally from
the policing of representation by Jewish lobbies in the USA}.
Support for this modernised religious identity, a politcally resurgent
fundamentalism can can come from the very bodies which project themselves =
as
progressive, capable of arguing their positions in the language of human
rights.
One of the organising groups of the anti-Rushdie agitation was the Jamaat i
Islami whose activists controlled some of the key mosques in Britain. Durin=
g
the war of 1971 when Pakistan attacked the Bengali nationalist movement
which had won a majority of the vote, the Pakistani army was supported by
the Bengali Jamaat i Islami. It formed a para-military wing called al Badr
which instigated massacres and assisted those of the Pakistani army. Some =
of
its activists escaped to Britain where they were active in promoting Islami=
st
politics including campaigning against 'The Satanic Verses' and working in
education and Muslim youth groups. In Britain, they successfully constructe=
d
an identity founded in Islamist politics rather than a Bengali nationalist
identity.=20=20
Bangladesh, like Bosnia has a movement to indict those who committed war
crimes and crimes against humanity in the Bangladesh war. The support for
that movement in Britain was instructive. While young men reared in modern
Islamism bayed their hostility in British accents; their elders in their
skull caps and beards, some Imams among them, came out to demand that the
fundamentalists be held to account.
It is the older complex version of Islam often denigrated in this country a=
s
traditionalist and backward which battles with the 'purer' , more
cosmopolitan versions in South Asia every day. To be sure, it is socially
extremely conservative - for instance on the question of forced marriage. B=
ut
it lives with a memory of a society of different faiths and groupings, whos=
e
politics is not inevitably mullah- lead Those same old men, who attended
secular meetings on crimes against humanity, may have massed around the
banners of 'Islam in Danger' during the Rushdie affair and may now do so
again in fear and distress as news of Afghan casualties filters out. That
does not make them supporters of bin Laden or the Taliban as their younger=
=20
counterparts are more likely to be. Nor does it make British Muslims docil=
e
fodder for the grand coalition seeding new discontents which will only be
entrenched by domestic sops such as faith schools .
To assist Blair's personal jihad, I offer the words of a man outside the
Abrahamic tradition, shot eventually by a religious fanatic of own faith.
During the Seond World War, Gandhi enjoined us 'to look at the world with
calm eyes though the eyes of the world be bloodshot.'
______
#4.
The New York Review of Books
November 15, 2001
The Making of Afghanistan
By Pankaj Mishra
http://www.nybooks.com/articles/14780
______
#5.
The News International (Pakistan)
Sunday November 11, 2001
Interpreting Islam to the west
by Dr Manzur Ejaz
I really believe that the Pagans, and the abortionists, and the=20
feminists, and the gays and the lesbians who are actively trying to=20
make that an alternative lifestyle, the ACLU, People For the American=20
Way - all of them who have tried to secularize America - I point the=20
finger in their face and say, 'You helped this happen." said Jerry=20
Falwell, one of the most influential leader of the Christian Right.=20
Rev Falwell was commenting on September 11 tragedy while giving=20
interview to Pat Robertson, another extremist Christian leader who=20
has become a media mogul by selling conservative ideas. These two=20
gentlemen are so influential that the Republican Party owes a lot to=20
them for its resurgence.
The rise of Christian Right in politics indicates that religious=20
fundamentalism is a universal phenomenon rather than being limited to=20
Islamic countries only. There is an Internet site,=20
www.funnystrange.com, that gives out a Falwell/Robertson/Bin Laden=20
quiz of 20 statements, which can be assigned to either of the three.=20
I am sure that one can add names of ideologues of Hindu extremism,=20
Rashtaria Sewak Singh, Israeli puritans, and many others to this quiz=20
and it will become clear that religious revivalists have a common=20
ideology all over the world. For example, killings of tiny Christian=20
minority by extremist Hindus and Muslims in India and Pakistan have=20
similar traits.
Understanding the rise of religious fundamentalism in a universal=20
context is not meant to offer an apology for the menace of terrorism.=20
On the contrary, in order to find the remedies for religious=20
extremism it is necessary to identify its root causes. Presently, a=20
better part of (western?) intelligentsia is narrowly concentrating on=20
the rise of Islamic fundamentalism in a few countries or hot spots.=20
Some expatriate researchers have also positioned themselves as key=20
intermediaries and interlocutors to interpret Islam for the west.=20
Nothing wrong with that except that they are presenting apologies=20
and, in many cases, are confusing Arab nationalism with Islamic=20
fundamentalism. They lack insight into the generalities and=20
particularities of this phenomenon in the South Asian context.
Religious extremism has been rising in the entire South Asia region,=20
not only in Pakistan and Afghanistan. The rise of a fundamentalist=20
movement for Sikh homeland, Khalistan, in East Punjab, and emergence=20
of BJP, a front for extremist Hindu organization, Rashtria Sewak=20
Singh, are the manifestations of the same trend. Ziaul Haq's=20
government may have taken advantage of Sikh disaffection with India=20
but it would be incorrect to say that Khalistani movement was a=20
creation of Pakistan. No such excuse can be found for the rise of=20
Hindu fundamentalism. The ascendancy of Hindu extremism in certain=20
areas of India have earned them the nickname of 'cow belt.' Hindu=20
extremism cannot be justified even as a reaction to Islamic=20
fundamentalism because it has been targetting Christians also.
Pakistani state started shifting towards theocracy during Zulfiqar=20
Ali Bhutto's period, coinciding with sliding down of secularist=20
parties in India. As Ziaul Haq was consolidating the tenants of an=20
Islamic state in Pakistan, BJP had started climbing the political=20
ladder, overshadowing the secular Congress Party. Progressive forces=20
were diminishing and secular elements were weakening in India and=20
Pakistan during the same period. By 1990s, Pakistani state had been=20
overwhelmed by religious laws while BJP had successfully brought=20
'Hinduvta' to Delhi. Unlike Pakistan where Ziaul Haq's dictatorship=20
silenced every ideological opponent, BJP could not overrun the Indian=20
secular state completely because of strong opposition by regional and=20
lower caste parties. Nonetheless, it is ironic that BJP ideologues=20
are closely following the footsteps of Pakistani retrogressive forces=20
by revising educational curriculum for the purpose of social=20
engineering.
It is also misleading to consider that Afghanistan's society has=20
always been in the grips of Islamic fundamentalism. Not too long ago,=20
it was ruled by a secular and enlightened monarchy. Kabul, the=20
capital of Afghanistan, was considered one of the most modern cities=20
in South Asia. Probably, it was the only city in northern part of=20
South Asia where female literacy was very high and women could wear=20
skirts and western dress. Key businesses in Afghan cities were owned=20
by Hindu, Sikh and Jewish minorities facing no religious=20
discrimination. Majority of Afghans, unaffected by modernistic Kabul,=20
lived in hilly rural areas contended with their primitive tribal=20
values. Nonetheless, societal balance in Afghanistan started falling=20
apart due to emerging regional trends, successive changes in=20
government and anti-Soviet war. In the process, the state, whose writ=20
was traditionally limited to city walls, withered away and an extreme=20
form of religious fundamentalism filled the vacuum.
Rise of religious fundamentalism is neither new nor unique to South=20
Asia. Muslim fundamentalism has been raising its head from time to=20
time. Religious dictates of Mughal emperor, Aurangzeb Alamgir=20
(1618-1707), were not less severe than the Talibans. However, there=20
was a strong intellectual and political resistance to Islamic=20
fundamentalism. North India's most potent literature created by=20
Bhagti movement was meant to counter the onslaught of organized=20
religion. The prime of Punjabi (mother tongue of over 65% Pakistanis)=20
literature is also a fierce attack on organized religious code in=20
favour of Triqat (Sufism). Most of the Pakistanis in Punjab and Sindh=20
follow the teachings of the sufis rather than of proponents of=20
organized religion. As a matter of fact, anti-organized-religion=20
sufis were the prime motivators of conversion to Islam. They were=20
also leaders of renaissance in Indian languages, art and culture.=20
Most of the Northern Indian languages owe their birth to these sufis=20
and bhaghats. A new sprit was infused by enlightened Muslim=20
intelligentsia into music, art, architect and other spheres of=20
knowledge in India.
Mughal dynasty prospered adopting secular and non-discriminatory=20
religious policies but started degenerating with the advent of=20
religious fundamentalism of Aurangzeb. Interesting parallel: Pakistan=20
made significant progress while the state was not so religious but=20
started deteriorating with the penetration of Islamic fundamentalism.=20
Unfortunately, now there are no Muslim sufis to defy the un-organized=20
religion. The secular elite opposing the religious fundamentalists in=20
the subcontinent is alien to masses. Such an alien, elite on which=20
the west depends for combating religious fundamentalism, cannot lead=20
a much-needed renaissance in South Asia. The vacuum will continue to=20
exist and will be filled by retrogressive forces of one kind or the=20
other.
_/_/_/_/_/_/_/_/_/_/_/_/_/_/_/_/_/_/_/_/_/_/_/_/_/_/_/_/_/
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South Asia Citizens Web (http://www.mnet.fr/aiindex) since 1996. To=20
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DISCLAIMER: Opinions expressed in materials carried in the posts do not
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--=20