[sacw] SACW #1 (13 Nov. 01)

[Harsh Kapoor]

South Asia Citizens Wire | Dispatch #1.
13 November 2001
http://www.mnet.fr/aiindex

------------------------------------------

#1. A division of Afghanistan would be like so much dynamite in the=20
foundations of Pakistan ( MB Naqvi)
#2. To and from New York (M. B. Naqvi)
#3. Tehelka Poll Results: Would you condone the US if it used=20
nuclear devices in Afghanistan?
#4. Invitation to A one- Day Open Forum on Asian/South Asian=20
Contemporary Art (New Delhi)
#5. Visa to Pakistan (Mehmood Hussain )

________________________

#1.

M.B. Naqvi
Karachi Nov 10:

The story of stories is two separate series of possibilities, amounting
to probabilities, of the ongoing Afghan war. This is about what lies
beyond this War and the consequences that are likely to flow from it.
Focusing on American interests and the viewpoint, there is one large
vista of possibilities for the US in central Asia and beyond. Should
one stand on Pakistani soil and look around, a separate vista of
possibilities, all gloomy, opens up.

Insofar as the American stakes in the war are concerned, a great deal
has already been achieved in geopolitical terms. True, Mulla Omar and
Osama might never be caught or killed. But so what. Look at the US
gains already under its belt. The Americans have already befriended and
co-opted both India and Pakistan in their long quest against terrorism
and have marched on ---- northward. It is still largely a symbolic
presence, but it is a military presence, in Tajikistan and Uzbekistan
and also in Afghanistan.

That has its own symbolism and, more than merely notionally, American
influence in central Asia has now a military foundation. Number of
personnel and equipment in these bases may be small and even
circumscribed by conditions today. But these =91deficiencies=92 can be mad=
e
up more or less easily and Americans can make their presence gradually
more massive by persuading host countries. Thanks to the peculiar
circumstances of Russia, the old expected resistance from that quarter
is no longer to be feared. On the contrary, Russians are as anxious to
become partners the America in this American war effort as are, or were,
the Indians.

That vastly improves the American position for the long-term
geopolitical games. The rich resources of central Asia, stretching from
Kazhakistan to Azerbaijan are there to be invested in and to profit
from. These include a lot of hydrocarbons and many other minerals.
This would also enable America to help modernise the armed forces of
central Asian republics and to profit from their nationalistic
rivalries.

This has other and larger consequences. China is notionally preempted
from meddling in central Asia. It has already weakened and perhaps
eroded the Strategic Consensus between Russia and China. The same fate
may have overtaken, or would, the Shanghai Six or its later shape the
Shanghai Cooperation Organisation. These are giant steps in the
direction of containing, and up to an extent, encircling China. Most of
central Asia being open to American influence, with its military
presence there, the long-term impact on developments in Russia offers
opportunities to the US to help or hurt as well as scope for speculation
by the world. The American Big Business may be well on its way to
garner the rich pickings from central Asia.

But the impact of the Afghan war on Pakistan is a subject of surpassing
interest. Americans have already preempted Pakistan from playing any
role in Afghanistan whatsoever by having first declared that they would
not let Pakistan or India have a veto on what happens in Afghanistan
next. The Taliban regime, on the face of it, has its goose cooked. On
the political and diplomatic anvil is the future government for
Afghanistan. A plethora of Pushtoon voices is clamouring for a
traditional Grand Assembly of notables, called Loya Jirga, as the
panacea for all Afghan ills. It is however a useless piece of social
archaeology. Many Loya Jirgas were convened during the last 25 years and
each time the LJ has returned a decision that merely confirmed the
choices of those who convened it. After all, it is the convenors who
choose the notables, pay for their coming together and other
hospitality and maybe some bribes. The decisions of any new LJ would the
what the convenors want it to make.

Insofar as the Pakistan government is concerned, it goes on repeating
that the future Afghan government should be broad-based, comprising all
the major ethnic groups and chosen by the Afghans themselves. It should
represent all major ethnic groups, with no interference from outside.
In the given conditions, this is a combination of puerile words. There
is simply no way that such a government can be shaped by the embattled
Afghans. The realities on the ground are quite different, all against
Pakistani wish list.

To begin with, the Taliban regime hasn=92t collapsed and the loss of
Mazar-i-Sharif is by no means decisive. Even the loss of Kabul can be
foreseen in quick succession. That would not mean the decimation of the
Taliban power or weakening of their hold over the mainly Pushtoon parts
of Afghanistan. Not that the Taliban are indestructible or their
support base --- still considerable as of today --- can also quickly
erode or evaporate in the circumstance when their cause would look
hopeless to the ordinary Pushtoons and anti-Taliban forces would be
threatening to engulf their strongholds. But it is doubtful if the
Americans have the stamina for a truly protracted, largely guerilla war
with Taliban after they have been ejected from main cities.

No made-in America government --- which is the only thing on offer ---
can however hold on to power in Afghanistan except nominally in the main
cities. The countryside will be wholly outside its control and may be
infested with all manner of disgruntled an opposition elements led by
Taliban. Pacifying and making the writ of the desired government run
over the countryside as a whole may require ages, if ever. It is quite
doubtful that the Americans would undertake any such enterprise.

Hence, doubts are growing that the Americans would finally opt for a
division of Afghanistan --- so much in the air today--- and that
Washington may accept a Taliban regime minus Mullah Omer and Osama in
the mainly Pushtoon south and a government in the north --- perhaps in
Kabul --- run by the Northern Alliance.

A division of Afghanistan would be like so much dynamite in the
foundations of Pakistan. The old fears about Pushtoonistan have
surfaced again. While there are few open supporters of dividing
Afghanistan, except one Pakistani newspaper, there are reasons to take
the threat seriously. That break up of Afghanistan=92 unity would start
the process of Balkanising Afghanistan because the northern areas cannot
be held together by any one ethnic group. A federal arrangement in
the whole of Afghanistan would be ideal. But experts say that the
backward Afghans cannot possibly run such a sophisticated constitutional
arrangement. It is hard to disprove the experts, though why should not
the attempt be nevertheless made by creating a modern administration
first through an international peace keeping force. Anyhow
Afghanistan=92s future per se is not the subject here.

It is its impact on Pakistan that is what needs to be focused on. It
would mean the start of the process of Pakistan=92s own Balkanisation.
Which is why Pakistanis of all persuasions desperately want Afghanistan
to remain united, with Durand Line in place.

But everything depends on the Americans because it is their will that
will determine Afghanistan=92s future. No one else counts. It is America=92=
s
own perception of how the political map of Asia should look like that
will be the decisive factor. Ends story. MBN

______

#2.

To and from New York

By M. B. Naqvi

Indian and Pakistani heads of government went to New York (and
Washington), addressed the UN General Assembly, spoke about their
concerns about terrorism, had bilateral discussions with the US
President George W. Bush and other American officials and should now be
back. These two heads traversed on parallel lines without any
intersection. The Indian Prime Minister A.B. Vajpayee even observed
diplomatic purdah from President Musharraf by not attending the UN
Secretary General=92s lunch for fear of having to sit in proximity to
Musharraf. What have the two gained for their respective peoples?

Pakistan=92s gains are simple to count. These were mainly financial aid,
rescheduling of debt servicing and various American promises to be
helpful in getting more funds and understanding from the multilateral
agencies and other donors. Pakistan President must have been very
pleased with the kind of reception he received in America in contrast
with what was his experience until this year=92s September 11. Pakistan
has reaffirmed its commitment to go on acting the faithful ally in the
fight against Terrorism. Among the non-tangible gains are words of
fulsome praise for the President and his courage with the American
promise that they would not again walk away after the war, unlike the
1989 experience. How substantial is the credit side of the ledger and
whether there is any debit side to it would remain a subject for
discussion.

Insofar as India is concerned, it is clear the BJP leaders have not
swallowed the American decision of recruiting Pakistan=92s cooperation in
the war against Afghanistan. They do display signs of feeling jilted and
slightened after their astonishing offer of unreserved cooperation for
American military operations against Afghanistan. They have been irked
and that seems to verge on chagrin. What did they really aiming at
requires investigation. It is understandable if they had Kashmir in mind
and would have liked the Americans to lean on Pakistan to stop its
cross-border terrorism. That is how they see their national interest.
The Americans have not refused to accept Indian cooperation but have
deferred it until after they have done with Taliban, Osama bin Laden and
al-Qaeda. The logic of American priorities should have been
understandable to the Indians. America=92s perceived need for Pakistan=92s
cooperation for fighting in Afghanistan is geography=92s imperative. Why
this Indian attitude that looks like petulence?

Aid for Pakistan is ingenious due to the overall US attitude being
un-trustful of it. Their bilateral relationship remains wary and
halting. There is no identity of purposes despite all talk of identity
of views. The shadow of the Indo-Pakistan cold war hangs heavy and has
resulted in the US President not countenancing Pakistan=92s wish ---
whether or not Musharraf brought it up --- to let the earmarked F-16
aircrafts restored to Pakistan. American concerns about nuclear
proliferation question, the Kashmir Jihad and democracy remain. These
concerns are not being pressed for the time being. No one should forget
that they are still there. Pakistan=92s desire for America playing a role
in the Kashmir dispute with India has always had willing listeners in
Washington. Indeed the US has been anxious to play the mediator. But it
is stymied by the total Indian refusal of third party intervention in
Kashmir. American readiness to mediate is hard to count as a gain for
Pakistan. Americans have been desirous of playing a role on their own.
Should India relent and permit a larger American role, no matter what it
is called, it will not necessarily be a boon for Pakistan --- unless
Islamabad is only interested in getting off the hook.

Taking India=92s obsessive interest in Kashmir as the datum line it is
possible to see its sudden and unconditional cooperation, not to mention
the earlier astonishing and unreserved support for NMD, as being
calculated to buy American goodwill for India=92s Kashmir stance of all
trouble being due to cross-border terrorism --- and to isolate Pakistan
more even more. If so, the calculation seems to have gone awry.
Americans show no sign of giving up their desire for playing the
mediator=92s role, now preferring to call it facilitator=92s role. On the
contrary, it is possible to see the other side of the coin as Americans
having made India tacitly accept its =91facilitation=92 in Kashmir by its
persistent assertions and India=92s unconditional cooperation offers
nonetheless. Anyway, the way the Americans are going their own way and
disregarding Indian, Pakistani and others=92 sensitivities, it is clear
that the Indians and Pakistanis are now reconciled to unprecedentally
larger role in South Asia while their own wishes can safely be
disregarded. Both have been diminished to an unprecedented level.

The suspicion that the Indian saw an opportunity in the American
reaction to September 11 attacks for itself has been strengthened by
Indian reaction to the American decision to recruit Pakistan=92s help in
its campaign in Afghanistan. Why cavil at Pakistan becoming the conduit
and staging post for any operation in Afghanistan, if you agree with the
overall purpose? Could it be that the BJP leadership was immature enough
to expect the Americans to eat out of their hands and align themselves
with the Indians in fighting cross-border terrorism in Kashmir
simultaneously with the war against Taliban? Should that dream have come
true, India would have gained many collateral benefits: Pakistan would
be on the enemy states list and the strategy for war would be suggested
by M/s Vajpayee and Advani. It is astonishing that politicians of
Vajpayee=92s and Advani=92s experience would suggest a course of action to =
a
superpower that will pull India=92s chestnuts out of the fire --- the
chestnut being so big as Pakistan itself, itself a nuclear power ---
that can offer so much more to the Americans.

The question of who has gained how much should be discussed with some
objectivity and from various angles. The commonest angle being used in
Pakistan is what did the country gain out of the whole affair? Well,
Pakistan has gained the status of an ally with the US and those who call
it a gain should be happy, although it seems uncommonly like a
satellite=92s. Pakistan military may be happy because it can get its
officers trained in America, obtain spares, components and other
necessities from the US. The other gain is, as noted, $ 1 billion plus
some more aid for a few more years. That is about all. There does not
seem to be any prospect of substantial longer-term gains from the US
connection, only goodwill for so long as the master-client relationship
lasts. Insofar as promises of not walking away again after the victory
in Afghanistan, it is a tale to the Marines. When the time comes, the
Americans would review the situation and do what is urgent and expedient
then. Can they remain faithful to an old flame?

Insofar as Indians are concerned, they have certainly gained long-term
friendship of the US, although even that relationship would not be
between equals. The Indians have by their actions --- motivated largely
by spite for Pakistan --- become seekers of favours. The operative part
of their desires amounts, at its maximum, to be recognised as a regional
influential. Recognition of American supremacy over the whole Asia is
implicit in it. India=92s would be a somewhat higher level of
satellitehood, something like being a butler among other menials.
Talking about India in this context largely because the relationship
between India and Pakistan is ineffably close, even if not cordial.
Enmity does not preempt closeness. Besides, South Asia remains a perfect
region made by nature itself. The potentialities inherent in the region
cannot be ignored for the sake of --- yes, even the Americans. The
governments of India and Pakistan cannot be allowed to ignore the fact
that their main business is to promote the interest of their people.
Their relationship with foreign powers comes later; it is a secondary
matter. The primary interest of the people in both India and Pakistan is
obtaining a job, to be able to buy foodstuffs, clothes and a shelter.
They require governments that cater to them first of all.

For Pakistanis, there is a special democratic deficit in this visit.
While President Bush=92s earlier commitment to stabilise the Musharraf
presidency had merely made Pakistanis apprehensive, there is now a none
too inscrutable reality to be faced: President Musharraf has told New
York journalists that while he will honour his pledge to hold polls for
national and provincial assemblies by October 11, 2002, he is sure to
remain the President for as long into the future as he could see. It
sounds like a threat rather than a promise to rejoice in.

Governments in South Asia are primarily fighting over foreign policy
issues. The Indians are fond of saying that Pakistanis are obsessed with
Kashmir. It is largely true. But can it be denied that Indians are
obsessed with Pakistan --- and quite malevolently too. Who does not know
that the ruling party in India has been recently weighing the pros and
cons of mounting an invasion nominally of Azad Kashmir, though the
objective could only be larger. The two governments of New Delhi and
Islamabad are quite similar in outlook and political rhetoric. The BJP
wallahs have always flourished on anti-Muslim policies and actions;
anti-Pakistan propaganda helps them electorally. The military and other
conservative regimes in Pakistan have also flourished on anti-India
(connotation being anti-Hindu) rhetoric and Kashmir. The two are happy
enough to be enemies so long as there is no shooting; both would
flourish politically in their respective countries by demonising each
other. But the politics in India is remarkably anti-people. The grinding
or near grinding poverty of some 60 to 65 per cent Indians is being
ignored while maximum resources are pumped into war preparations,
research for war and war industries. The Pakistanis do the likewise.
This half a century old pattern needs to be broken.

Let=92s imagine for a moment that the governments in Delhi and Islamabad
have buried the hatchet and have returned to peaceful pursuits. What
would their first priority be? It would be to manage various glitches in
the India Pakistan relationship and their first priority would be to
fight poverty and economic backwardness. They would automatically opt
for regional cooperation and free and preferential trade. They would go
in for integrated regional planning and execution through regional
institutions and instruments. The resources that nature has endowed the
region would be developed and exploited from the point of view of
growing more wealth without forgetting a more equitable distribution.

Should the standards of living begin to rise in the region, the various
nationalistic, communal or caste polarisations will become less
explosive and would gradually erode. This is an area where one and a
half billion souls, perhaps more, live and have many ethnicities ---
within each nation state. The point to be remembered is that while mass
poverty lasts and most of the mobilisable resources are spent on
war-like purposes the various polarisations would continue to grow and
become harder still to tackle in each country.

It is from this viewpoint that the India Pakistan relationship should be
viewed. A new purposeful politics has to be introduced which would be
more people friendly and would assign higher priority to economic
development than war preparations. Insofar as Kashmir is concerned, it
is hard to conceive any immediate solution that would satisfy all the
three parties: India, Pakistan and Kashmiris themselves. The best that
can, and should, be done is to isolate it, contain the violent part of
it by mutual agreement and postpone a solution to better times by
putting the problem in a new political framework that is democratic and
people friendly. Meantime the two countries should normalise their
relationship and embark on a course of people-to-people friendship with
maximum economic and trade cooperation. This regionalism should not
ignore the need for a more equitable distribution of incomes. What they
have so far done, particularly in this visit to America by the two heads
of the governments, is to glory in being satellites of America and have
lowered their own statures. Both countries have lost substantially as a
result of this visit. They can only regain self-respect by turning their
attention to their own region and by developing it.

______

#3.

[ Tehelka.com, is a very well known Indian portal on the internet]

From: "M. V. Ramana"
Subject: Tehelka poll
Date: Mon, 12 Nov 2001 01:49:38 -0500

I can't believe this...

http://www.tehelka.com/

Would you condone the US if it used nuclear devices in Afghanistan?

Yes 49.80%
No 49.18%
Can't say 1.02%

______

#4.

AN INVITATION TO A ONE- DAY OPEN FORUM ON ASIAN/SOUTH ASIAN CONTEMPORARY AR=
T

CHAOS OR CONGRUENCE?
Towards a dialogue on Asian/South Asian contemporary art=
.
Sunday 18 November, 2001 9.30 a.m. to 6 p.m. India=20
International Centre [New Delhi]

"It is my hypothesis that the fundamental source of conflict in this=20
new world will not be primarily ideological or primarily economic.=20
The great divisions among humankind and the dominating source of=20
conflict will be cultural. Nation states will remain the most=20
powerful actors in world affairs, but the principal conflicts of=20
global politics will occur between nations and groups of different=20
civilizations. The clash of civilizations will dominate global=20
politics. The fault lines between civilizations will be the battle=20
lines of the future."
Samuel Huntington, The Clash of Civilizations

"In fact, Huntington is an ideologist, someone who wants to make=20
"civilizations" and "identities" into what they are not: shut-down,=20
sealed-off entities that have been purged of the myriad currents and=20
countercurrents that animate human history, and that over centuries=20
have made it possible for that history not only to contain wars of=20
religion and imperial conquest but also to be one of exchange,=20
cross-fertilization and sharing."
Edward Said, The Clash of Ignorance

Culture is today as it always has been a primary protagonist in the=20
theatre of war. Images of the systematic blasting of the Bamiyan=20
Buddha's coalesce with video-game lookalike cruise missiles winging=20
their way to the Gulf, then dissolve into the relentlessly repeated=20
falling twin towers of the World Trade Centre. Once again, we are=20
asked to choose between apparent opposites: 'civilization' or=20
'terrorism', globalization or fundamentalism.
Discussions of contemporary art practice in Asia/S Asia has been=20
shaped by many such binaries: Asian/Western, tradition/modernity,=20
local/ global, indigenous /international, technological/artisanal.
Perhaps it is time to turn our gaze inwards and consider questions=20
that arise from within cultural practice in the region. Do these=20
mutually exclusive terms actually describe the rich, complex context=20
within which we work and live? Can nation states be equated with=20
civilizations? How have these questions been addressed in different=20
locations within the region? How do we, as contemporary artists=20
negotiate the specificity of multiple locations, multiple identities?=20
Can we create new lines of affiliation; ways of understanding which=20
refer to each other's experience?=20

Khoj is an autonomous, artist led initiative based in New Delhi. Over=20
the last five years we have been engaged in building connections=20
between artists/artist communities within the region and=20
internationally, through workshops, residencies and exchange programs.
These interactions have underlined the increasingly felt need for=20
inter-regional exchange.

Chaos or Congruence? seeks to initiate inter-regional comparisons.=20
Despite a rich and complex history of exchanges and interconnections=20
within Asia, we have tended to establish comparisons between each=20
location and the West. Our intention is to shift this reference=20
point. The forum brings together artists, critics, curators and=20
writers from Bangladesh, Bhutan, China, India, Indonesia, Nepal,=20
Pakistan, Sri Lanka, Tibet and Thailand in an open and vigorous=20
examination of both commonalties and differences.

We take pleasure in inviting you to participate in this daylong=20
discussion. Shared reflection - on the contradictions, pleasures,=20
dilemmas and excitement of contemporary art practice in S Asia/Asia=20
amongst practitioners/thinkers in the region has become crucial.Your=20
contribution will be of great value. Please find a
detailed programme attached and do join us for lunch.

KHOJ1@h... phone: 91 11 6250927 fax: 91 11 6011578
Khoj International Artists Workshop, A 74-A South Extension Part 11,=20
Second Floor, New Delhi 49

CHAOS OR CONGRUENCE? towards a dialogue on Asian/South Asian contemporary a=
rt
Sunday 18 Nov 2001, 9.15 a.m. - 6.15 p.m. Main Auditorium, India=20
International Centre [ New Delhi India]

Session One: 9.15 a.m. to 1.30p.m

9.15 - 9.45 a.m. Registration

9.45 - 10.05 a.m. The place of path -an invocation (performance)
Navtej Johar

10.05 - 10.15 a.m. Chaos or Congruence? the issues before us:
Sheba Chhachhi, artist/co-coordinator open forum

10.15 - 10.25 a.m. Chairperson: Prof. Kumkum Sangari, Fellow,=20
Centre for Cultural Studies, TeenMurti, Nehru Memorial Museum

10.25 - 11.10 a.m. 'We sinful women': the story of=20
Pakistani women artists
Salima Hashmi, previous Director, National College of Fine Arts,=20
Lahore/ artist/ independent curator, Pakistan
=09=20=20=20=20=20
11.10 - 11.25 a.m. Coffee break

11.30 - 12.15 p.m. Moments of Cultural Impact: a Socio-Political=20
reading of contemporary art practice in Sri Lanka
Jagath Weerasinghe, Senior Professor of Archaeology/ artist, Sri Lanka

12.15 - 1.30 p.m. Co-existence: art institutions, culture, management
Gridthiya Gaweewong, independent curator and Director of Gallery 706, Thail=
and

1.30 - 2.30 p.m. Lunch

Session Two: 2.30 to 6.30 p.m.

2.30 - 2.45 p.m. Chairperson: Ms. Gayatri Sinha,=20
Independent curator/Art critic,

2.45 - 3.30 p.m. The body as material in Chinese=20
Contemporary Art
Pi Li, Research Associate, Art History , Central Academy of Fine=20
Arts, Beijing, China.
=20=20=20=20=20=20=20
3.30 - 3.45 p.m. Tea

3.45 - 4.30 p.m. Bangladesh art in retrospect: a=20
socio-political view
Abul Mansur, Professor, Fine Art Department, Chittagong University, Banglad=
esh

4.30 - 5.30 p.m. Sites of Art: Other Sites, Other Locations
Gulammohammed Sheikh, Professor, Faculty of=20
Fine Art, MS University, Vadodara / artist, India

5.30 - 6.15 p.m. Panel Discussion with all=20
speakers/chairpersons followed by open discussion

6.15 p.m-6.30pm About Khoj/ Communications network for South Asian=20
contemporary art -
Pooja Sood, co-ordinator=20
Khoj/Independent curator

7.15pm " Amir: an afghan refugee=20
musician's life in Peshawar, video
John Bailey,UK, 54 mins. (To be confirmed)
___________________________________________________________________________=
_____
Chumpon Apisuk, Thailand will make a performative intervention during=20
the open forum

______

#5.

The Times of India
TUESDAY, NOVEMBER 13, 2001

Visa to Pakistan
MEHMOOD HUSSAIN
REALISING the urgency of the situation, my friend and I flew to Delhi=20
for his uncle's visa to visit Pakistan for attending a relative's=20
marriage in Karachi that weekend.
Next morning we were at the Pakistan high commission. A Delhiite sat=20
under the shade of a tree near Nehru Park selling visa forms at an=20
exorbitant price.
"Why is the visa application form sold outside the embassy while it=20
is available inside other embassies?" I asked the form-seller. "Those=20
are embassies but this is a kabrastan (graveyard)", he replied.=20
"Being an Indian how are you allowed to sell it?"
"It is the magic of commission", he said. "But on one occasion I had=20
incurred heavy losses when a new Pakistani diplomat changed the=20
format. Thousands of my forms were wasted".
At the high commission, we joined the queue, almost half a kilometre=20
long and submitted the application forms mentioning the date of the=20
flight.
An Indian woman had a squabble with the Pakistani staff at the=20
counter. She was out of touch with her husband, a Pakistani citizen,=20
for six months.
Every time she came for a visa, the high commission's hackneyed reply=20
was: Enquire after 60 days.
"I don't know whether my husband is alive in Karachi", she wailed and=20
sat down crying with her two children.
Those were the days when Mohajirs were under attack in Pakistan.=20
Another Indian quarrelled at the counter as he, too, got the same=20
stock reply which he said he had heard a number of times before.
"Our Hindu brothers are better than you", he told the high commission=20
staff who ill-treated him.
"Why do you shed crocodile tears for Indian Muslims?" he asked=20
angrily. "That is politics", the men at the counter replied=20
arrogantly, "You want visa or politics?" Most of the visa-seekers had=20
similar tales to tell of how frustrating, if not futile, the effort=20
was.
In contrast, when three Europeans came, they were warmly received:=20
"You don't have to stand in the queue".
They were ushered into the high commission. Soon five Sikhs arrived,=20
and they too were given VIP treatment. A Hindu was courteously=20
treated by the staff.
But the Indian Muslims were treated like stray cattle, not human=20
beings. On submitting his visa application, my friend also was told:=20
Enquire after 60 days. But the wedding was just five days away, he=20
pleaded in vain.
I approached the MP from my constituency to talk to the Pakistani=20
high commissioner. Despite the MP's best efforts, "His Excellency"=20
didn't take the call.
His secretary, whose conversation with his boss could be overheard on=20
the telephone, said: "High commissioner is on the line to Islamabad.=20
But the MP refused to be put off and said, "I am sending two persons=20
from my constituency. Do what they want".
Next day we were received very cordially at the high commission and=20
my friend got the visa within 15 minutes.
Pakistan may not have democracy but we appreciated their respect for=20
a democratically-elected member of Indian Parliament.

_/_/_/_/_/_/_/_/_/_/_/_/_/_/_/_/_/_/_/_/_/_/_/_/_/_/_/_/_/

SACW is an informal, independent & non-profit citizens wire service run by
South Asia Citizens Web (http://www.mnet.fr/aiindex) since 1996. To=20
subscribe send a blank
message to: <act-subscribe@yahoogroups.com> / To unsubscribe send a blank
message to: <act-unsubscribe@yahoogroups.com>
________________________________________
DISCLAIMER: Opinions expressed in materials carried in the posts do not
necessarily reflect the views of SACW compilers.

--=20