[sacw] SACW (18 Nov. 01)

[Harsh Kapoor]

South Asia Citizens Wire
18 November 2001
http://www.mnet.fr/aiindex

------------------------------------------

#1. Bangladesh: Special committee to investigate minority attacks
Good move, but to be meaningful, it must act quickly
#2. Bangladeshi Diapora in the US: Demoto Protest Atrocities on=20
Minorities in Bangladesh
#3. Pressured to Perform (Dipankar Gupta)
#4. India, Kashmir and War against Terrorism (Balraj Puri )
#5. Book Review: Dennis Kux's book examines the roller-coaster=20
relationship between Pakistan and the US=8A [ The United States and=20
Pakistan 1947-2000: Disenchanted Allies] (I.A. Rehman)
#6. On the recent South Asian Human Rights (SAHR) two-day convention=20
held in New Delhi
#7. Book Announceement: Civil Society in Sri Lanka - New Circles of=20
Power (Nira Wickramasinghe)

________________________

#1.

The Daily Star (Bangladesh)
18 November 2001
Editorial

Special committee to investigate minority attacks
Good move, but to be meaningful, it must act quickly

The Government has decided to set up a special Secretaries committee=20
to investigate the attack on the Hindus. This is appreciated and=20
welcomed. While some would say that it arrives rather late we would=20
say that it's better late than never. Moreover, it can suggest steps=20
to prevent such incidents from happening in future. That is very=20
necessary, very important.

The Daily Star has taken a strong position on the issue and has=20
published numerous reports on the matter. In fact it continues to=20
publish such reports and a series is on even now. We hope to publish=20
more and expect that the said committee will be able to take=20
cognizance of the reports that the media in general has made on the=20
issue.

As an extremely powerful body, it will not only have access to=20
confidential reports but will be able to convince the district and=20
lesser level officials to present the facts as they are. The decision=20
to end such incidents ultimately depend on the political will of the=20
government. That means this committee has to deliver what the nation=20
is waiting to hear.

Overwhelming evidence exists that such incidents did take place. Even=20
the government has not denied that in the end. Which is why no=20
wishing away of the incident through a bland committee report will=20
do. Denial of the incidents will be suicidal. It didn't happen=20
everywhere or affect everyone but this is not about the scale and=20
numbers. It's about the moral definition of minority rights and=20
whether Bangladesh can claim to be a multi-community state. It might=20
even lead to regional disturbances. This is a serious matter.

We all have a stake in the success of the committee. By that we mean=20
the victims will be identified and compensated, the perpetrators will=20
be identified and punished and the factors that led to such incidents=20
will be ended. The role of the administrative machinery needs to be=20
evaluated as well.

It may be a big task but nothing less will do.

______

#2.

Tentative Demonstration Date, Friday, 23 rd Nov. 12 to 1 PM to=20
Protest Atrocities on Minorities in Bangladesh

Dear Human Rights Activists and Friends of Bangladesh,

We tentatively selected our demonstration day and time in front of=20
Bangladesh Embassy and US State Department [Washington] to register=20
our vehement protest for the looting, harassment, and rape on the=20
Hindu and other minorities in Bangladesh, just after the election on=20
1st October this year. Following are the tentative program:

1. Date and Time: Friday, 23 rd Nov. From !2:00 Noon to !:00 PM
2. Places: In front of Bangladesh Embassy and US State Department Building
3. Representations: Written Representations to Ambassador of=20
Bangladesh and Secretary of State, US

Police Permit for the demonstration are being taken. Volunteers for=20
demonstration, writing placards, writing representations (English and=20
Bengali) are needed. Please contact Mr. Harun Chowdhury Ph. No=20
703-471 5152. Our Sherina Chowdhury Bhabi who had her knee surgery on=20
11-9-01 will participate in the demonstration. We appeal to all=20
Bangladeshi Community members to participate and join the protest.

Yours,
1. Mrs. Sherina Chowdhury
2. Mr. Harun Chowdhury
3. Golam Akhter

Members of Bangladesh-USA Human Rights Coalition

______

#3.

The Times of India
SATURDAY, NOVEMBER 17, 2001

Pressured to Perform
DIPANKAR GUPTA

IN times of sectarian crises, Muslims are expected to stand up and=20
display their commitment as citizens of India. When the Shahi Imam=20
rants, liberal Muslims are seen as wanting if they do not come out=20
with immediate rebuttals.
When Pakistan gets unusually belligerent, Muslims are again supposed=20
to openly reaffirm their partisanship with India.
Now even in the case of the Taliban, Muslims are being forced to=20
perform and demonstrate their hostility, from whichever podium, to=20
Osama bin Laden and to his brand of Islamic politics.
Why are secular Hindus not pressured every time the Bajrang Dal or=20
the Shiv Sena commit excesses? Surprisingly, it is not just the=20
professional Hindus who apply this pressure, but Muslim liberals too=20
feel the need to stand up and be counted among the ranks of Indian=20
patriots whenever their community spokesmen and religious virtuosos=20
do something inappropriate.
It must indeed be humiliating for a Muslim citizen to have to=20
performatively demonstrate his or her allegiance with this country=20
every now and again.
But, on the other hand, if Muslim liberals do not take on the Shahi=20
Imam and other backward-looking religious virtuosos, who will? In the=20
case of Hindu fundamentalists, the matter is different.
Hindu militants are roundly criticised by a host of other secular and=20
political organisations in the country. The Samajwadi Party, the=20
Congress Party, the Left parties, the Janata Party, among others,=20
come out in opposition to Hindu sectarians.
The need to criticise and be counted among the ranks of liberals and=20
secular patriots is thus not felt as strongly among ordinary Hindus.
As there are several mass organisations doing this job, they can=20
concentrate on their identities as lawyers, doctors, professors,=20
etc., and not be obsessed about being Hindus. As Hindus then they are=20
not forced to perform.
Muslim liberals do not have this luxury. When the Shahi Imam delivers=20
a fiery speech, a majority of secular parties with a national=20
presence keep quiet.
They suddenly lose their voice. This becomes solely a Muslim matter=20
and not something that implicates the nation-state as a whole.
They do not want even to mildly reprimand Muslim virtuosos for fear=20
that they might alienate their Muslim voters.
Neither the Congress, nor the Socialists would like to oppose what=20
the Shahi Imam may say or do. They are extremely uncomfortable if=20
pressured to openly flout such Islamic extremists.
If examined closely, the underlying rationale for this abstinence=20
from taking a political position is not neutrality, but a certain=20
stereotyped image of the Muslim that these secular parties also=20
harbour.
V P Singh even went to the extent of having some of his policies=20
whetted by the Shahi Imam of Jama Masjid.
The only explanation for why these parties do not take on, for=20
instance, the Shahi Imam, is their perception that the majority of=20
Muslims actually think the way he does.
Secular parties may remain quiet and non-committal in such=20
situations, but this is just the time when Hindu communal=20
organisations swing into action with another round of hate-mongering.
All the known stereotypes of Muslims get a fresh lease of life on=20
occasions like these. If there were no Muslim bigots, the Hindu right=20
would have to invent them just for the sake of their survival.
They long for some Muslim preacher or local hoodlum to step out of=20
line so that they can get into overdrive.
This state of affairs also suits the secular parties for they can=20
then make political capital safely by criticising the Hindu right for=20
its bigotry.
But where does that leave the Muslim liberal? High and dry. The basic=20
issue still remains unanswered.
As there is no secular forum from where attacks can be launched=20
against Muslim extremists, the popular Islamic stereotype lives on.
This is why Muslim liberals cannot afford to be just liberals, like=20
their Hindu counterparts can, and are, on occasions, forced to=20
perform as Muslims.
If no one else will contribute to undermining the Muslim stereotype,=20
not Congress, not Samajwadi, not Janata, then Muslim liberals have no=20
alternative but to seek forums everywhere just to make the point that=20
there are Muslims and Muslims.
One of the reasons why Sikhs could not be stereotyped in a similar=20
fashion as secessionists and Hindu baiters for too long was because=20
secular parties were in the fray contesting Bhindranwale and his=20
brand of politics.
This gave many Sikhs an opportunity to work through established=20
secular and non-denominational organisations in order to distance=20
themselves from the Khalistanis of various stripes.
When I K Gujral won a resounding victory in Punjab it was his=20
opposition to Sikh militants that provided everyday Sikhs with a=20
political platform to act as moderates and committed citizens of=20
India.
When V P Singh went to Punjab, after becoming prime minister, to=20
apply the healing balm, he was perceived as being both anti-Congress=20
and against Sikh extremists.
Though there was a great deal of disinformation doing the rounds in=20
those days about the Sikhs, and though a large number of secular=20
intellectuals did not come out in too good a light, the relevant=20
point is that major national parties had not wiped their hands off=20
the Bhindranwale factor.
They were willing to engage themselves against religious extremism in=20
Punjab. This allowed Mr Gujral to win, and this also is why an=20
overwhelming number of Sikhs went against the call for an election=20
boycott issued by Sikh militants in 1984.
If Muslim liberals feel that they are being painted into a corner,=20
then it is largely the fault of secular parties that have not been=20
consistent in advocating secularism.
It is not that the Hindu right alone has stereotyped Muslims, many=20
secular parties also seem to work on that presumption. How else can=20
one explain their inaction when it comes to taking on Muslim fanatics=20
who pretend to speak for the entire community?
Out of this stereotyping, the left and centrist parties may derive=20
different political strategies from the right, but that does not=20
absolve them of their larger secular responsibilities.
This is what puts pressure on liberal intellectuals to perform solo=20
in talk shows, seminars and public gatherings.
Naturally, given the circumstances, Muslim liberals stand out alone=20
in professing their secularism and the whole nation watches as if=20
they were members of a passive audience.
It is only when secular parties shake off their stereotyped image of=20
the Muslim voter, and politically engage against Muslim virtuosos,=20
that liberal Muslims will be spared the humiliation of having to=20
demonstrate their secularism and patriotism time and again.

______

#4.

Economic and Political Weekly
October 27, 2001
Commentary

India, Kashmir and War against Terrorism

Balraj Puri

Whoever may be responsible, more than the other, for recreating=20
tension between India and Pakistan, in particular over Kashmir,=20
India which was disappointed over the visit of Tony Blair, was none=20
too pleased by the conciliatory efforts of Collin Powell. Both=20
advised the two countries to observe restraint and resume their=20
dialogue. Powell told the press in Pakistan that the US too believed=20
the Kashmir issue to be central to and at the heart of India-Pak=20
relations, which should be resolved "in accordance with the=20
aspirations of the Kashmiri people". He also laid emphasis on respect=20
for human rights in the state. He expressed the willingness of the US=20
to play a more helpful role in settling the Kashmir dispute. US=20
deputy secretary of state Richard Armitage feared that "rising=20
tension between India and Pakistan during the US-led war on terrorism=20
has made Kashmir the most dangerous place in the world". Reacting to=20
what the Indian army called its punitive action against the Pakistan=20
army across the LoC, president Bush advised the two countries to=20
"stand down during our activities in Afghanistan, for that matter for=20
ever."
Pakistan was, according to its official spokesman, very pleased with=20
the US stand; which vindicated its viewpoint. He believed that "US=20
could play an important role in addressing the issues that posed a=20
threat to international peace and security". Pakistan has always=20
endeavoured to keep the Kashmir issue alive and to internationalise=20
it. Its immediate compulsion to raise the bogey of a threat from=20
India and to revive the Kashmir issue was to use them to neutralise=20
the massive hostility within the country to its support to the=20
American war against the Taliban. It has every reason to welcome the=20
involvement of a third party in resolving its dispute with India,=20
which India insists is a bilateral matter.

But why did India have to queer the pitch in its relations with=20
Pakistan and raise the Kashmir issue at this hour? Soon after=20
offering "unconditional and unambiguous support" to the global=20
anti-terrorism fight, India started a persistent campaign for=20
including Kashmir in the fight against the terrorists. India drew a=20
parallel between the way the terrorists had struck at America on=20
September 11 and their attack on the assembly in Srinagar on October=20
1. There was a similar parallel between the way the Taliban provided=20
a safe haven to bin Laden and the way Pakistan had harboured=20
terrorists who operate in Kashmir. India also warned the anti-terror=20
coalition against inclusion of Pakistan in it in view of its past=20
record and its close collision with the Taliban. Fears were expressed=20
that withdrawal of sanctions on US aid to Pakistan would be used by=20
it to increase its armed strength which would pose a threat=20
to India. Our foreign minister, Jaswant Singh, is reported to have=20
cancelled his meeting with Joseph Bidden, head of the US foreign=20
relations committee, because he had supported the US move to lift=20
sanctions against Pakistan.

India's efforts to have Kashmir included in the international agenda=20
was responded by Osama bin Laden's Al Qaeda which in its video taped=20
statement "ordered the Americans to stop support to Hindus in=20
Kashmir". This, for the first time, put Kashmir on the international=20
terrorist agenda. It was almost a literal echo of the voices of some=20
naive Hindus who were looking for an opportunity in what is being=20
perceived as a clash of civilisations between the west and Islam for=20
settling score with the latter; in particular with Pakistan by=20
joining the former camp.

The official Indian interpretation of Al Qaeda's threat attributes it=20
to the influence of the ISI. It is based on the presumption that the=20
understanding between Pakistan and the Taliban has remained=20
unaffected after the former joined the American war against the=20
latter. The ban on SIMI, inter alia, is being justified on grounds of=20
its links with the ISI and the Taliban.

True, the ISI had links with Al Qaeda, the Taliban and possibly SIMI.=20
General Musharraf himself was a patron of the Rabta Trust, which is=20
now banned in America and Pakistan. The CIA and the ISI which had=20
jointly created the Taliban are jointly trying to destroy it. If=20
there are doubtful elements in the ISI, they are more a threat to=20
Pakistan than to India. Already to ward off such a threat Musharraf=20
sidelined the ISI chief and two army generals.

Even the Taliban pose a greater threat to Pakistan than to India.=20
According to a survey by a Pakistan paper, Musharraf is the most=20
hated person in Afghanistan. With the Pushtoon community in the=20
Frontier Province and Baluchistan virtually in revolt against=20
Pakistan's Afghanistan policy, prospects of the revival of a movement=20
for an independent Pushtoonistan are haunting Pakistan. In the rest=20
of the country also, jehadi forces are threatening the pro-America=20
government. How the Pakistan government suppresses these elements=20
within the country and supports them in Kashmir should become a more=20
serious problem for it than for India.

At a time when Pakistan is fighting a war for its integrity and=20
survival, why did India start crying wolf and try to divert=20
international attention from the war against terrorism to the threat=20
it perceived on its western border? Expectedly it just succeeded in=20
reducing its status to that of parity with Pakistan and received=20
sermons for restraint.

Similarly, whatever be the outcome of the jehad of the terrorists=20
against the government in Pakistan, their jehad against India in=20
Kashmir is bound to receive a setback. But why was India in a hurry=20
to seek priority for its fight against jehadis and thus try to shift=20
the attention of the anti-terrorism coalition away from its first=20
target in Afghanistan? Notwithstanding India's brave declarations of=20
its capacity to fight terrorism in Kashmir on its own, why hid the=20
prime minister rush a missive to president Bush when the state=20
assembly was attacked by terrorists - like a damsel in distress -=20
telling him that there was a limit to India's patience. What=20
immediate relief did we expect from America? And why single out a=20
single world leader for such an appeal? If it was a diplomatic move,=20
to win international sympathy, why was not a similar letter sent to=20
the governments of other countries? Sole trust in America and=20
excessive expectations from it was not only a national humiliation=20
for us but an embarrassment to the superpower.

Expectedly, we are advised to talk to Pakistan on the Kashmir issue,=20
keeping in view the wishes of the people. The New York Times,=20
reminded India more bluntly that "it cannot crush Muslim aspirations=20
in Kashmir with the use of force". Much more needs to be done at the=20
diplomatic level and within the state to resolve the issue.

Muslims' Reaction
How have Kashmiri Muslims reacted to the latest developments? Most of=20
the Muslims everywhere, including those who condemned the terrorist=20
attack on New York, are, in varying degrees, swept by an=20
anti-American wave. Kashmiri Muslims have not remained unaffected by=20
this. There are many reasons that have cumulatively caused it.=20
Without going into its causes and merits, its effects on Kashmir=20
include marginalisation of the Muslim leadership that Pakistan had=20
recognised so far. Anti-America slogans have replaced anti-India and=20
pro-Pak slogans. Whether this turns out to be a loss or gain will=20
depend upon how the popular Muslim sentiment is interpreted and=20
channelised.

That would also apply to Muslims in the rest of the country, the=20
largest minority. The media have projected the Shahi Imam of Delhi as=20
the most representative voice of India Muslims without understanding=20
that his status is no more than that of the Imams of thousands of=20
mosques in the country. His diatribes against America have been cited=20
as proof not only of the fundamentalist, fanatic and extremist=20
character of the entire Muslim community but also of their lack of=20
patriotism. Vociferous demands are being made for his arrest and=20
trial for sedition and disloyalty.

Explanations were sought from moderate and liberal Muslims about=20
their stand and that of Indian Muslims. They have disowned the Shahi=20
Imam and asserted that he did not represent the Muslim mind. But a=20
more important issue is the definition of patriotism.

While moderate and liberal Muslims have started speaking out and the=20
media have started taking notice of them, it is necessary to define=20
the limits of patriotism. The Shahi Imam may be condemned for the=20
type of language he uses and for his views on most subjects. But has=20
he not condemned Pakistan for being a traitor to Islam and said,=20
"common people there will teach general Pervez Musharraf a lesson for=20
betraying the cause of Islam"? Has he not condemned the Pak sponsored=20
jehad in Kashmir as un-Islamic. On Kashmir his stand is more=20
nationalistic than that of many liberal Hindus. Condemnation of=20
Pakistan and support of the Indian case on Kashmir are certainly very=20
parochial tests of patriotism. But if a Muslim leader passes these=20
tests, should his loyalty be still doubtful? A fundamentalist Muslim=20
can be as loyal to the country as any fundamentalist Hindu can be. In=20
no case can anti-America outbursts, however wrong, be equated with=20
disloyalty to India. But six students were arrested in Delhi on the=20
charge of sedition for distributing anti-America leaflets. What could=20
be a better way of undermining the basis of patriotism?

India's stand on a post-Taliban policy is no less uninformed about=20
the ground realities and our national interest. Its insistence on a=20
key role for the Northern Alliance in the new regime would further=20
alienate the Pushtoons who comprise the most numerous ethnic=20
community in Afghanistan and are totally unrepresented in the=20
Northern Alliance. Any regime without due representation to the=20
Pushtoons will be unstable. It is true that they are the ethnic base=20
of the Taliban. But it is equally true that they used to rever Gandhi=20
and Abdul Ghaffar Khan. The urges of a community do take different=20
ideological expressions - sometimes moving from one extreme to the=20
other - depending on which ideology can give them better expression.=20
But on this account no community can be written off forever. In their=20
present anti-Pakistan mood, they could be helped to assert their=20
identity through a non-fundamentalist ideology instead of diverting=20
their hostility towards India.

In its post-September 11 role India has neither been able to promote=20
its national interest nor raise its moral and political stature in=20
the world. Within the country Muslim and Hindu fundamentalisms got a=20
new impetus. This weakened internal unity and the plural character of=20
the country which would further undermine its international role at=20
this crucial turn of history.

A reassessment of the realities and realignments in the world and of=20
its own potential and strategic priorities is called for by the=20
leadership of India if its aspires to play a role befitting its size,=20
strength, geo-political position and civilisational background to=20
further world peace and its own enlightened self-interest.

______

#5.

Newsline (Pakistan)
October 2001

Wages of Fear

Dennis Kux's book examines the roller-coaster relationship between=20
Pakistan and the US=8A
[ The United States and Pakistan 1947-2000: Disenchanted Allies]

By I.A. Rehman

Thanks to the Americans' habit of maintaining records of=20
official business and transferring piles of papers and photographs to=20
outgoing Presidents' libraries, and allowing this record to be used=20
(except for the more explosive or tell-tale papers that are still=20
classified), we have learnt a great deal about what the rulers in the=20
USA and Pakistan have been doing to the passive, voiceless and=20
uninformed people of this country vide such publications as American=20
Role in Pakistan, The State of Martial Rule, Pakistan's Foreign=20
Policy in the First Decade, and The American Papers besides the=20
memoirs of diplomats. Dennis Kux's meticulously researched work, The=20
United States of Pakistan, 1947-2000, Disenchanted Allies, is a=20
valuable addition to this literature.

The author appropriately begins by taking a brief view of=20
the US attitude towards the Muslim League demand for a separate=20
homeland for the Muslims. While it favoured the end of colonial=20
rule, it did not like the idea of the subcontinent's partition on the=20
ground that it would reduce the US role in promoting "peace and=20
security." The Indian Muslims also thought the US was unfriendly, as=20
the Quaid-i-Azam told an American diplomat on May 1, 1947. When=20
Pakistan came into being, it was an impoverished nation whose=20
"future, even its survival, was far from secure." By then the US had=20
become not only the world's strongest and most prosperous country but=20
also "the leader of the anti-communist bloc in the Cold War." It=20
showed only modest interest in the new state, and "expected to have=20
closer ties with the larger and more important India than with=20
Pakistan."

A detailed analysis of the US-Pakistan relations during=20
1947-2000 is summed up in this paragraph: "Yet after New Delhi chose=20
a neutralist path, Pakistan became attractive as a potential partner=20
in security arrangements for containing Soviet expansion in the=20
Middle East. The US-Pakistan alliance partnership that followed in=20
1954-55, however, proved unstable. It came apart in the 1960s during=20
the Kennedy and Johnson presidencies, came together again with Nixon=20
in the White House, but fractured once more with Jimmy Carter as=20
president. During the 1980s, the struggle against the Soviet=20
presence in Afghanistan provided new glue to bind the two countries=20
together. Since the departure of the Red Army and the end of the=20
Cold War, relations once more have been plagued by differences."

Looking for an explanation for this "roller-coaster"=20
relationship, the author rejects both the Pakistani view, that the=20
Americans are inconstant and the American assertion about Pakistan's=20
"wrong-headedness, particularly its fixation with India," The reason,=20
in his view, "lies in the fact that over the years U.S. and Pakistani=20
interests and related security policies have been at odds almost as=20
often as they have been in phase."

This, too, is perhaps an inadequate explanation, because=20
it begs the question regarding the justification for the whole=20
strategy of seeking security through militarisation of states and=20
societies. The entire humankind has paid a heavy price for the=20
diversion of colossal resoures to cold war strategies of securing=20
peace and security, and Pakistan has gravely undermined the promise=20
of freedom by concluding that it can be secure only with borrowed=20
weapons.

The book makes it amply clear that the United States=20
responded favourably to Pakistan's endless begging for military aid=20
only when this country could find a place in its global strategy and=20
had no hesitation in turning its back on the most allied of allies=20
the moment its priorities changed. But no Pakistani has a=20
justification to cavil at that because every country has the right to=20
pursue what it perceives as its national interest. On the other=20
hand, the book offers abundant material to reflect upon the utter=20
bankruptcy and lack of self-respect of Pakistan's rulers in dealing=20
with the United States.

As early as 1947, it was clear that the US preferred=20
India to Pakistan but every time Washington inclined towards India,=20
we felt aggrieved. We were extra keen on joining MEDO and SEATO even=20
though the effectiveness of these alliances was not clear even to the=20
US. The way Pakistan solicited military aid is simply pathetic.=20
Liaquat Ali declined to send troops to Korea until the Kashmir issue=20
was resolved and Nazimuddin rejected joining MEDO on the same plea.=20
But after that, no conditions were attached to following cold war=20
policies. Pakistani spokesmen took pride in telling the US, "Our=20
army is your army."

There certainly were occasions when Pakistan had valid=20
reason to complain of breach of trust - the US decision to give India=20
military aid in violation of the undertaking of prior consultation=20
with Pakistan, criticism of Pakistan's approaches to China under the=20
same logic of security that had pushed it towards the US, and patent=20
discrimination against Pakistan in subjecting it to nuclear-related=20
sanctions while India's Pokhran I was ignored.

One issue on which no Pakistan government spokesman could=20
protest was its deviation from democratic rule. It must be said in=20
fairness to the US policy-makers that in their internal discussions=20
they did not fail to stress their commitment to democracy. However,=20
when the time for decisions came, the plight of the Pakistani people=20
under dictatorship could be ignored. The indifferent attitude=20
towards the dismissal of the Nazimuddin government could not be=20
rationalised by sending a CIA man on a two-year mission to help=20
Pakistan draw up its constitution. When, during the Zia regime,=20
Pakistan's emissary requested the US Secretary of State not to fret=20
about lack of democracy in his country, the reply he got was: what=20
you do to your people is your internal affair. General Zia was asked=20
about revival of democracy during his last visit to the US and nobody=20
shut him up when he boasted: "Ours is a constitutional government.=20
We are not a pack of clowns." It seems Pakistan has had to suffer=20
more than its share of clowns.

For instance, on the Kashmir issue. By 1953, mediators=20
had begun to rule out plebiscite and suggest a partition of Kashmir.=20
Nehru offered division along the ceasefire line with minor=20
adjustments. Pakistan presented a counter-proposal which none else=20
than President Ayub described as "unrealistic" and "damned nonsense."=20
A succession of Pakistani rulers agreed with Nehru, Macmillan and US=20
authorities on this way out but would not take the Pakistanis or the=20
Kashmiris into confidence. Finally, after the Simla Accord the US=20
had no difficulty in shifting from its 1948-49 position and leaving=20
the matter to be sorted out bilaterally. Mr. Kux also throws useful=20
light on the circumstances in which the US rejected the idea of an=20
independent Kashmir presented by Sheikh Abdullah in 1948 when he was=20
a member of India's delegation to the Security Council.

For Pakistani readers, some impressions of unhappy events=20
have been explained. Yahya Khan's belief that China was going to=20
intervene in the Bengal crisis was grounded in Kissinger's=20
misinterpretation of what the Chinese had said to him during his=20
secret mission. Nixon's tilt towards Pakistan in December 1971,=20
though stated to be based on a misreading of the situation, was more=20
real than imagined. The author also explains what had happened when=20
the expression 'the party is over' provoked Bhutto in 1977, what was=20
meant by making an example of Pakistan if it continued with its=20
nuclear programe, how President Ghulam Ishaq was taken aback by the=20
abrupt departure of a US emissary when he was explaining his stand on=20
the nuclear issue, and what were the conditions under which Benazir=20
Bhutto was allowed to assume power in 1988.

Perhaps the part of the book most relevant to Pakistan's=20
present crisis deals with Afghanistan. The US objections to ISI=20
delivering more arms to fundamentalist factions than the others, were=20
ignored. Also brushed aside were allegations of misappropriation of=20
money and weapons delivered for the mujahideen. But perhaps the most=20
crucial excess was Gen. Zia's decision to keep the heat on when the=20
Soviets had already decided to pull out. According to Kux, General=20
Zia, who had no inhibition in declaring that he could continue to lie=20
as he had done for ten years because a Muslim was allowed to lie for=20
a good cause, had raised his ambitions. Instead of ending the Afghan=20
people's suffering, Mr. Kux thinks he started thinking of acquiring=20
"strategic depth" through a client state and of establishing a=20
religious rule in Afghanistan, a mission he could not quite=20
accomplish in Pakistan. It was then that the strategy of imposing a=20
Pakistan-friendly government on the Afghan people took shape,=20
although at least Sahibzada Yaqub had the presence of mind to doubt=20
that the set-up being created would remain friendly to Pakistan.

No research into the past is free from subjective=20
factors. That is why the study by Mr. Kux, for all its value and=20
richness of detail, is at best a possible version of truth. But=20
Pakistanis who wish to understand their descent into the present=20
straits will find it extremely helpful.

=A9 Copyright 2001 Newsline Publications (Pvt.) Ltd. All rights reserved.

______

#6.

The Daily Star (Bangladesh)
18 November 2001

5 Bangladeshis elected to SAHR Bureau

BSS, Dhaka
Five delegates from Bangladesh were elected to the Bureau of the=20
South Asian Human Rights (SAHR) during its two-day convention held in=20
New Delhi recently.

All the five Bangladesh nominees - Editor of The Daily Star Mahfuz=20
Anam, advocates Sigma Huda and Subrata Chowdhury and civil society=20
figures Dr Hameda Hossain and Farah Kabir - were elected by delegates=20
from India, Pakistan, Bangladesh, Sri Lanka and Nepal.

Pakistan's human rights leader Asma Jehangir polled highest votes=20
followed by compatriot I A Rehman and former Indian prime minister I=20
K Gujral secured third highest votes for 19 posts in the bureau.

Bangladesh's Iktedar Ahmed was elected unopposed the country's=20
representative to "Membership Council". Bhutan and Maldives were not=20
represented in the New Delhi convention, but are expected to be=20
included in the forum.

A 49-member Bangladesh delegation comprising by eminent=20
personalities, and human rights and civil society activists took part=20
in the convention which was addressed, among others, by UN High=20
Commissioner for Human Rights Mary Robinson and Nobel laureate=20
Amartya Sen.

The delegates were received by Indian president K R Narayanan at the=20
"Rastrapati Bhavan".

The Bangladesh delegation included, among others, Justice Fazlul=20
Karim of Appellate Division of Supreme Court, Economist Prof Rehman=20
Sobhan, lawyers Dr Kamal Hossain and Amirul Islam, senior journalists=20
Zaglul A Chowdhury and Abdul Quayum Mukul, Prof C R Abrar of Dhaka=20
University, civil society figures Taleya Rehman, Sultana Kamal and=20
Nihad Kabir and cultural figures Sara Zaker and Shomy Kaiser.

The convention adopted resolutions calling for protection and=20
promotion of human rights in the South Asian region and sought=20
cooperation from all in upholding human values and rights in the=20
region where such rights are trampled upon.

_____

#7.

Civil Society in Sri Lanka
New Circles of Power

Nira Wickramasinghe University of Colombo, Sri Lanka

Pages: 180
Cloth (0761995765) November 2001

The essays in this volume address in different ways some of the new=20
international and transnational forces that are shaping the=20
developmental state in Sri Lanka.

http://www.sagepub.co.uk/

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