[sacw] SACW #1 (4 Dec. 01)

[Harsh Kapoor]

South Asia Citizens Wire | Dispatch #1
4 December 2001
http://www.mnet.fr/aiindex

------------------------------------------

#1. Villagers Yearn for the Old, Eternal Afghanistan (TIM WEINER)
#2. Afghanistan/ Pakistan : US turns to drug baron to rally support=20
(Syed Saleem Shahzad)
#3. Who is going to run the Show in Afghanistan (M.B. Naqvi)
#4. India: Sensitising officials (P. Radhakrishnan)
#5. India: Sangh School Skeletons in Government Cupboard
#6. India: For an intolerant secularism (Dipankar Gupta)
#7. India: A Colloquium on the Madhya Pradesh Special Areas Security Act 20=
00
________________________

#1.

The New York Times December 3, 2001

SMALL TOWN LIFE
Villagers Yearn for the Old, Eternal Afghanistan
By TIM WEINER
AMLA, Afghanistan, Dec. 1 - The farmer says his name is Suffer. It=20
means journey in Pashto. His village lies in a place called=20
Dar-i-Noor. It means Valley of Light. [...] . Full Text at:=20
http://www.nytimes.com/2001/12/03/international/asia/03TOWN.html

______

#2.

Asia Times December 4, 2001

US turns to drug baron to rally support
By Syed Saleem Shahzad
KARACHI - Pakistan and the United States have turned to a tried and=20
trusted "friend" in their efforts to exert control over events in=20
Afghanistan - convicted Pakistani drug baron and former=20
parliamentarian, Ayub Afridi.
Whatever the outcome of the United Nations-sponsored Bonn talks on=20
the establishment of a Post-Taliban administration in Afghanistan,=20
sensing too much Russian influence being exerted on the Northern=20
Alliance, the US and its allied intelligence networks have decided to=20
cultivate support from within the majority Pashtun belt in the=20
eastern and southern Afghan provinces.
Although the minority groups under the umbrella of the Northern=20
Alliance, which has a firm foothold in Kabul, are also fragmented on=20
the question of a power-sharing formula, most of its central leaders,=20
including President Burhanuddin Rabbani and General Mohamad Fahim,=20
are leaning towards Russia.
Afridi will be central in moves to bring together the shattered=20
Afghan warlords, whom it is hoped will not only become a force to be=20
reckoned with in any future interim set-up, they will also be able to=20
assist in the the tracking down of Osama bin Laden. The Pashtun=20
tribes, although they have no clear vision of ideology or politics at=20
present, are the only ray of hope for American designs in the region.
At present, the Pashtun belts in the south and east are divided among=20
warlords, each of whom is locked into his area of interest, and who=20
cannot see beyond their limited perspectives. Further, many small=20
tribes have taken refuge inside Pakistan and it seems that if the=20
present situation persists, there will be a massive erosion of the=20
Pashtun population in Afghanistan.
Conversely, since northern Afghanistan has been restored to its=20
indigenous strength in the north and in Kabul, the Hazara, Uzbek and=20
Tajik populations that had emigrated to Iran and Pakistan will start=20
returning to these areas, making the pro-Russian Northern Alliance=20
case that they are not a minority more powerful.
Afridi is probably the only person capable of gathering the Pashtun=20
commanders and tribal chiefs together to broker their interests to=20
get them to agree on one leadership - which could be either former=20
monarch Zahir Shah or any of his nominees - to initially form an=20
interim set-up leading to the formation of a constitutional framework=20
to establish an elected government in Afghanistan.
Without fanfare, Afridi was freed from prison in Karachi last=20
Thursday after serving just a few weeks of a seven-year sentence for=20
the export of 6.5 tons of hashish, seized at Antwerp, Belgium, in the=20
1980s. (He had been in custody for over two years). He had also been=20
fined 5 million rupees (US$82,000). No reasons were given for=20
Afridi's release, or under which legislation he was allowed to return=20
to his home town in Khyber Agency in North Western Frontier Province.
Afridi was a key player in the Afghan war of resistance against the=20
Soviet Union's occupying troops in the decade up to 1989. It is a=20
matter of record that top US Central Intelligence Agency (CIA)=20
officials believed in the early 1980s that they would never be able=20
to justify a multibillion-dollar budget from the government to=20
provide support to the mujahideen in the fight against the Red Army.=20
As a result, they decided to generate funds through the poppy-rich=20
Afghan soil and heroin production and smuggling to finance the Afghan=20
war. Afridi was the kingpin of this plan. All of the major Afghan=20
warlords, except for the Northern Alliance's Ahmed Shah Masoud, who=20
had his own opium fiefdom in northern Afghanistan, were a part of=20
Afridi's coalition of drug traders in the CIA-sponsored holy war=20
against the Soviets.
Sources say that Afridi's constituencies in eastern and southern=20
Afghan provinces have been revived following the withdrawal of the=20
Taliban, and with them the drugs trade. Commanders such as Haji Abdul=20
Qadeer, Haji Mohammed Zaman and Hazrat Ali are once again ruling the=20
roost in these areas. These commanders used to be the biggest heroin=20
and opium mafia in Afghanistan's Pashtun belt.
They are all friends and will play a vital part in helping Afridi=20
forge an alliance to push for a strong representation in any future=20
interim council in Afghanistan, and if they can set aside their=20
mutual differences they could work out an effective strategy to nail=20
bin Laden, who is now strongly believed to be in Jalalabad and who=20
has a $25 million price tag on his head.
The saga of Afridi is a good illustration of the troubling links=20
between traffickers and politicians in Pakistan, as well as the shady=20
deals made by the United States with both sides.
Afridi, Pakistan's most wanted drug baron, returned to Pakistan on=20
August 25, 1999, after serving a three-and-a-half year sentence in a=20
US prison and paying a $50,000 fine. His imprisonment is said to have=20
been a face-saving gesture. From his refuge inside Afghanistan, and=20
with an Afghan passport, Afridi voluntarily traveled to Dubai in the=20
United Arab Emirates, where he "negotiated" with American authorities=20
and from where he boarded a cargo flight to the US in December 1995=20
to hand himself over as a drug baron.
At the time there was much hue and cry in the international media=20
about Afridi's unholy nexus with drug lords, who happened also to be=20
the leading Afghan warlords. He served his full term before being=20
released by US authorities and returning to Pakistan.
Hardly had his feet touched Pakistani soil, though, when the=20
Anti-Narcotics Force arrested him and detained him, for the first six=20
weeks at a secret location. But it was not until two weeks ago that=20
he was formally sentenced.
Afridi owns a palace straight out of fairy-tale books, reminiscent of=20
A Thousand and One Arabian Nights, in Landi Kotal, part of the Khyber=20
tribal agency not far from the Afghan border. The palace was built on=20
about 15 acres at a cost of more than $2 million about 15 years ago.=20
The sumptuous and many rooms are stocked with precious European=20
goods, and each room is named after a Western fashion brand, such as=20
Armani and Lagerfeld.
A warrant for the police to bring Afridi before the courts was first=20
issued in 1983 following the discovery of 17 tons of hashish in a=20
warehouse in Balochistan. Three years later, he was the subject of a=20
wanted notice issued after a smuggler arrested in Belgium denounced=20
him as his supplier. At that time, he was under the protection of the=20
authorities in the virtually autonomous tribal agency, which in=20
theory he was not allowed to leave.
The military conspiracy against then premier Benazir Bhutto on August=20
6, 1990, leading to her ouster and the installation of Nawaz Sharif=20
allowed allowed Afridi to become one of eight deputies elected to=20
parliament from the Federally Administered Tribal Areas (FATA), and=20
to consequently benefit from parliamentary immunity.
He won under the ticket of the Islamic Democratic Alliance, the=20
coalition headed by Nawaz Sharif. This alliance had been built by an=20
Afghan war hero and former lieutenant-general, Hamid Gul, to fight=20
(unsuccessfully) Benazir Bhutto in the 1988 elections.
However, sensing that the military would not tolerate for too long=20
the corruption and chaos that characterized Nawaz Sharif's first=20
government, the barons of the tribal zones, including Afridi,=20
switched their support to the opposition Pakistan People's Party of=20
Benazir Bhutto, and participated in the maneuvers that allowed the=20
Pakistani President, Ishaq Khan, to dismiss Sharif on April 18, 1993.=20
This favor earned him a new immunity.
However, his candidacy in the following elections was rejected and he=20
was forced to go into hiding, dividing his time between the Pakistan=20
tribal areas, Afghanistan and the United Arab Emirates. He was=20
approached by the Americans, (with Benazir Bhutto herself acting as=20
an intermediary), who allegedly promised him a lenient sentence in=20
recognition of the "services" he had provided during the Afghan war,=20
and Afridi accepted to go to the US.
In August, 1999, when Afridi was arrested on his return to Pakistan,=20
many observers believed that his arrest was a ploy on the part of=20
Sharif as the move violated international norms by which a person=20
should not be tried twice for the same crime. It is thought that=20
Sharif hoped to use Afridi's testimony to implicate Benazir Bhutto's=20
husband, Asif Ali Zardari, who had been imprisoned on corruption=20
charges since October 1996, and against Rehmat Shah Afridi, the owner=20
of the Frontier Post, a newspaper sympathetic to the opposition, who=20
had been arrested in April 1999.
Arrest warrants were issued for Afridi and half a dozen members of=20
his family in July 1995 by a special court in Peshawar, which also=20
called for the seizure of his assets, estimated at $2.7 million. The=20
case has been in the courts ever since, which observers attribute=20
mainly to his vast resources
______

#3.

Who is going to run the Show in Afghanistan
M.B. Naqvi
Karachi December 3:

As against expert opinion and carefully nurtured mythology about the
uniqueness of the Afghans=92 ways, especially consensus making, a simple
radically different approach is being discussed in some non-Pushtoon
left inclined circles here. These thinkers maintain that looking for
peace and stability through an interim government --- that is supposedly
broad-based, multiethnic and representative of all ethnicities --- with
or without an interim nominated Council to act as a parliament, and in
association with ex-King Zahir Shah is like looking for a black cat in
pitch dark room on a dark night. There are so many armed groups under
various commanders or warlords controlling separate pockets on the
ground that any notional agreement among mostly expatriates and exiles
--- itself a near-miracle --- would stand little chance of sticking on
the ground.

As of now there is already a government, of sorts of course, in Kabul
under President Burhanuddin Rabbani --- that seems to have been in
effect recognised by the US, Russia and India, not to mention other
central Asian neighbours of Afghanistan --- which is, despite
conciliatory language of its delegates and of Rabbani himself vis-=E0-vis
the Bonn Conference and UN formulas, unlikely to handover power to a
bunch of expatriates. War for gaining or retaining power among so many
armed militias is to go on. This is no route to peace. Only a democratic
methodology might work, if at all.

What these people suggest is in effect to revive or energise UN General
Assembly to force Security Council through some kind of "uniting for
peace" resolution (as it once did before) to takeover Afghanistan in
trusteeship for a given number of years, say five to seven, in which it
should help set up a neutral but efficient administration for the sake
of reviving the shattered economy, planning and beginning to implement
rehabilitation of Afghans now in Pakistan, Iran and elsewhere and to
rebuild and expand or modernise the physical and social infrastructure.
Its top slots must be manned by foreign administrators from small third
world countries and smaller European ones with lower level posts going
to suitable Afghans on merit. Care should be taken that no person from
the neighbourhood should be employed by the UN. Nor should anyone be
taken from the P5. The purpose should be to create a modern national
government for Afghanistan for post-UN period.

But none of this can be done if there is no peace inside cities as well
as countryside and armed groups and persons are disarmed. That will
require a force of international peace enforcers for the period the UN
administers Afghanistan. This force should be able to overcome
resistance from various militias, if necessary, but should be for
policing to eliminate all serious violent crime. Selection of personnel
for this force should keep the same precautions in view. It will train
and put in place a modern and non-political police.

The international administration will hold a neutral political ring in
which all Afghans will have all civil liberties with freedom to engage
in peaceful politics with the help of free private media. The
administration=92s chief purpose will be to recreate a free and united
Afghan state (that does not now exist) through a freely elected Assembly
on universal franchise. Naturally it will hold a comprehensive
demographic and economic census and an electoral roll. Power at the end
of the period should be transferred to this Assembly that should be
deemed to be a sovereign Constituent Assembly which should then proceed
to elect a democratic government as well as make a Constitution.

There will be many difficulties to be sure. The biggest are two:
political will in the international community to undertake such a task
in the face of easily expected indifference amounting to opposition by
the US and its close allies which seem to have an agenda of their own
for Afghanistan for achieving extraneous aims that may need a merely
managed but otherwise chaotic Afghanistan. The second difficulty ---
sure to be made greater by US non-cooperation --- is funds. The task may
require for these five to seven years anything up to $ 12 to 14 billion,
roughly amounting to $ 2 to 3 billion a year. Where is this money to
come from? International community is very parsimonious if the
individual spending state does not see something in it for itself. It is
a challenge on which nobody can pronounce: whether this actually small
sum can be made available or not. But it can help create the necessary
political will.

The reason for rejecting the Loya Jirga mythology and the typical Afghan
consensus making technique may have is that those old balmy days are
over when there had been no break in tradition and social stability or
when power of the government-appointed leaders, maliks and Pirs (though
not religious leaders) was a continued reality. During the last 28 years
Monarchy was abolished to no one's regret, two Presidents were murdered
and central power structure broke into uncounted numbers of warlords,
governors and quasi-political factions, with two foreign military
invasions and external support for separate factions or warlords
continues. Those old stable social structures have disappeared and
common Afghans had had to make startling new experiences and their
expectations and mental horizons can no longer be constrained by those
close small social organisations in villages or of a tribe. Now, the old
methods of making; commoners obedient to their social betters can
scarcely work. More modern and democratic methodology of appealing
directly to, and of consulting, the individual Afghans will have to be
tried including giving him all the human rights. The talk of election is
already beginning to be heard.

Experts are however in full cry. They have brought nearly all notable
expatriate groups together in Bonn. They think that some kind of magic
attaches to Zahir Shah --- a supposition hard to sustain in the face of
facts that the King was successfully overthrown 28 years ago. There is
no one inside Afghanistan who will fight and win power for him. There
are absolutely new but powerful (armed) individuals and groups on the
ground who have exercised the basic attributes of sovereignty over their
own small fiefdoms --- of providing minimal law and order, justice of a
kind and collected taxes. They are ambitious. They are not going to give
up the privileges that have accrued to them through their militia=92s
efforts. Anarchy will suit them fine.

There is also a government that pretends to be national by virtue of
being in control of Kabul plus being recognised by quite powerful
nations, as noted. The real makers and breaker of things, the US, also
has intimately cooperated with Rabbani regime. It would not be quite
safe to assume, one way or another, what its real position is going to
be vis-=E0-vis the Rabbani regime. The Yanks may opt to enable Rabbani ---
who is unlikely to make way for anyone else, especially the Bonn crowd
--- to nominally subdue other warlords to become the future of
Afghanistan or they might want to reshape things more radically in
Afghanistan. Who knows whether the Bush team is playing by the ear or
has a script in Afghanistan?

_____

#4.

Source: The Hindu (http://www.hinduonnet.com)
[The following 2 part article appeared on 3 & 4 December 2001]
Opinion

Sensitising officials - I
By P. Radhakrishnan

AS INDIAN society entered into a covenant with itself to be secular,=20
democratic, and egalitarian, encumbered by a heavy socio-cultural=20
baggage of a rigidly caste-based hierarchical structure, with=20
ascending and descending orders of privileges and disabilities, an=20
overwhelming majority of it is still backward - socially,=20
economically, educationally, and politically. These victims comprise=20
the present Scheduled Castes, Scheduled Tribes, and Other Backward=20
Classes.

Though all three categories are known by the generic term backward=20
classes, the first two are the most backward. Because of their=20
accumulated disadvantages, it is mainly through state action for=20
sponsored mobility that the backward classes can participate in=20
Independent India's national life on anything like terms of equality=20
with the advanced groups. In the absence of such action, India's=20
commitment to advance these groups can only exacerbate their=20
disabilities.

Proceeding from an awareness of this is the directive in Article 46=20
of the Constitution that the state shall promote with special care=20
the educational and economic interests of the weaker sections, in=20
particular, the Scheduled Castes and the Scheduled Tribes, and=20
protect them from social injustice and all forms of exploitation. As=20
central to this directive and related provisions is reservation,=20
sensitising officials on its Constitutional contexts is a=20
prerequisite for its effective implementation.

In fact, sensitise is the chant in a number of countries and among a=20
number of social and activist groups, in the context of the on- going=20
efforts to democratise societies and polities, and expand the civil=20
and political space for those at the margins.
As there are officials and officials, especially in the context of=20
globalisation and its multinational market manipulations, a context-=20
specific distinction needs to be made between the two, depending on=20
the demarcation of the realms of development. Though there are no=20
clear-cut demarcations of such realms, in developing countries such=20
as India, where the state has an overarching and obtrusive presence,=20
such demarcation is necessary as there are areas where the state=20
alone acts and is called upon to act, legally.
Understood thus, in the context of facilitating the state to=20
discharge its legitimate functions, ``officials'' here should mean=20
that heterogeneous ensemble called the bureaucracy - the=20
administrative apparatus of all governments.
While sensitising officials in the context of state action=20
necessarily means sensitising the bureaucracy, the emphasis should be=20
on public service as its raison d'etre, and public service ethics and=20
moral reasoning. In a symposium on ``Ethics in the Public Sector:=20
Challenges and Opportunities for OECD Countries'', Kai Dramer,=20
Ministry of National Planning and Coordination, Norway, asked: ``When=20
is moral reasoning required in the public sector?'' and answered that=20
it is required in the following types of situation:

Policy making; preparation of legislation and quasi-legislation=20
(regulations, instructions, etc); interpretation of law and=20
quasi-law; exercise of administrative discretion; when legislation,=20
quasi-legislation and custom are reticent; grey areas (i.e., areas of=20
moral uncertainty between the clearly right/good and wrong/bad);=20
moral dilemmas or conflicts (i.e., when morally relevant values,=20
norms or considerations conflict); prioritisation (i.e., when=20
legitimate needs or claims cannot all be met due to scarce=20
resources); and when conscience demands disobedience.

While the framers of the Constitution were sensitive enough to make=20
adequate provisions for the advancement of the Dalits, as they still=20
remain at the margins of society, what is relevant to ask here is:=20
have our bureaucrats been sensitive enough to understand these=20
provisions and act on them adequately and effectively. The answer=20
anticipates a close look at these provisions and the present state of=20
the Dalits.
Briefly, these provisions are of three broad categories: political,=20
educational, and employment. Reservation of seats in proportion to=20
their numbers for the Scheduled Castes and the Scheduled Tribes in=20
the Lok Sabha, and the Vidhan Sabhas, is for the first. Empowering=20
the State to make any special provision for the advancement of any=20
socially and educationally backward classes of citizens or for the=20
Scheduled Castes and the Scheduled Tribes, is for the second.=20
Empowering the State to make any provision for reservation in=20
appointments or posts in favour of any backward classes of citizens,=20
which, in its opinion, is not adequately represented in the services=20
under it; for reservation in matters of promotion to any class or=20
classes of posts in the services under it in favour of the Scheduled=20
Castes and the Scheduled Tribes which, in its opinion, are not=20
adequately represented in the services under it; and to take into=20
consideration the claims of the Scheduled Castes and the Sch!
eduled Tribes, consistently with the maintenance of efficiency of=20
administration, in making appointments to services and posts in=20
connection with the affairs of the Union or of a State, and similar=20
provisions, are for the third.

Though the reference to ``maintenance of efficiency of=20
administration'', has led to controversies, the Judiciary has often=20
interpreted it as fixing an upper limit to the overall reservation=20
for the three categories of backward classes combined; and the=20
hitherto judicial pronouncements.

As ``maintenance of efficiency of administration'' is still=20
controversial, with stigmatising effect on the Dalits as though 19=20
per cent of the employees (assuming that the quota is filled up=20
fully) can make the whole official machinery in the state=20
inefficient, four clarifications will be in order: (a) Modern=20
administration of even a small State is so complex that there is=20
hardly any conceivable yardstick by which its efficiency could be=20
measured, notwithstanding the indulgence by economists in=20
``commodification of human beings'' (read human resources) by, among=20
other things, narrow and short-sighted ``cost-benefit analysis''; (b)=20
any talk of efficiency in relation to reservation is meaningless as=20
there is a minimum standard prescribed for even those passing through=20
the reservation mill; (c) if the administration has the will and the=20
benevolence, even a dullard could be turned into a wizard by=20
motivation, and training; and (d) if the state has not been doing=20
this it is the s!
tate and not the reservation policy that needs to be blamed. It is in=20
this context, the importance of sensitising officials has to be=20
understood.

As the bureaucracy is like the traditional caste hierarchy - with=20
ascending and descending orders, discriminatory and exclusionary=20
practices, and so on, sensitising it is easier said than done. So,=20
any agenda for sensitisation should have the following important=20
issues: (a) Providing proper perspective on the Constitutional=20
provisions in the context of the Constituent Assembly Debates by=20
engaging the officials in a continuous ``learning process'' or=20
``discourse'' in the social and philosophical foundations of the=20
Constitution vis-a-vis the caste system, caste-based traditional=20
society, and historically disabled groups; for, as the Constitution=20
per se is more like a rulebook, if officials go by its alphabets and=20
letters without understanding the spirit underlying its provisions,=20
they cannot do much, and what they do may even turn out to be=20
detrimental to the spirit of the provisions;

(b) providing proper guidelines on the ``dos'' and ``donts'' for=20
officials in regard to the implementation of the provisions, and a=20
``check- list'' on what they have done, not done, where they have=20
flawed or flouted the rules and why; and

(c) insistence on periodic time-bound returns on implementation of=20
the provisions followed by explanations from the officials and=20
departments concerned, and corrective action where necessary, as was=20
the practice when the Communal GO was in force in Madras Presidency=20
for more than two decades since 1927.

(This article is based on the writer's presentation at a Workshop on=20
``Sensitising Officials (Secretaries to Government) on Adi- Dravidar=20
and Tribal Welfare'', organised on November 29-30 by the Government=20
of Tamil Nadu.)

o o o

Sensitising officials - II

By P. Radhakrishnan

http://www.hinduonnet.com/stories/2001120400341000.htm

____

#5.

The Telegraph
3 Dec. 2001

SANGH SCHOOL SKELETONS IN GOVERNMENT CUPBOARD

FROM KAY BENEDICT
New Delhi, Dec. 2:
Much before Parliament erupted in controversy over history, a=20
government-appointed panel had frowned on the books used in the=20
RSS-run Vidya Bharati schools.

A series of booklets used in the over 6,000 Vidya Bharati Akhil=20
Bharatiya Shiksha Sansthan schools, in the form of a question-answer=20
series, expose an agenda to promote communal and chauvinistic ideas,=20
said the National Steering Committee on Textbook Evaluation appointed=20
by the human resources development ministry in 1993.

The 16-member committee headed by Bipan Chandra, then professor at=20
Centre for Historical Studies, and comprising eminent historians=20
submitted its recommendations in 1994 but they were never implemented.
The number of students in the schools, the first of which was set up=20
in 1978, is 12,00,000 now, and have some 40,000 teachers.
"Much of the material (taught in the RSS-run schools) is designed to=20
promote bigotry and religious fanaticism in the name of inculcating=20
knowledge of culture in the young generation. That this material is=20
being used as teaching and examination material in schools which,=20
presumably, have been accorded recognition should be a matter of=20
serious concern," the committee said.

The materials the panel objected to make for some interesting reading:
How many devotees of Ram laid down their lives to liberate Ram temple=20
from 1528 to 1914? -"Three-lakh-fifty thousand." (There is no mention=20
of how the schools arrived at this figure).

"Thousands of opponents of idol worship, the followers of Islam, go=20
to the pilgrimage centre of Islamic community at Kaaba to worship=20
'Shivalinga'. In Muslim society, the greatest wish is to have a=20
darshan of that black stone (Shivlinga)".
The credit for lighting the lamp of culture in China goes to the=20
ancient Indians.
The first people who began to inhabit China were Indians.
The first people to settle in Iran were Indians.

Besides Pakistan and Bangladesh, Tibet, Nepal Bhutan, Sri Lanka and=20
Brahmadesh (Myanmar) are all supposed to have been parts of India.
What is the name of the island in the south which touches the feet of=20
Bharat Mata and reminds us of Sri Ramchandra's victory over Ravan and=20
which was a part of our country at one time?

Many of these booklets, the report said, have a section each on "Sri=20
Ramjanmabhumi". Some of the questions contained are:

How many times the foreigners invaded Shri Ramjanmabhumi?=20
"Seventy-seven times."

What was the number of the struggle for the liberation of Ram=20
Janmabhumi which was launched on October 30, 1990? "78th struggle."
Why will November 2, 1990 be inscribed in black letters in the=20
history of India? - On that day, the then chief minister (of Uttar=20
Pradesh) ordered the police to shoot unarmed kar sevaks and massacred=20
hundreds of them.
Which Muslim plunderer invaded the temples in Ayodhya in 1033? -=20
Mahmud Ghaznavi's nephew Salar Masud.
Which Mughal invader destroyed the Ram temple in 1528? "Babur."

On Christianity, the Series No. 12 says: "It is because of the=20
conspiratorial policies of the followers of this religion that India=20
was partitioned. Even today, Christian missionaries are engaged in=20
fostering anti-national tendencies in Nagaland, Meghalaya, Arunachal,=20
Bihar, Kerala and other regions of our country because of which there=20
is a grave danger to the integrity of present day India."
The RSS has arisen to end the misery and for the defence of the=20
greatness of Bharatiya sanskriti, the report quoted a booklet as=20
saying.

_____

#6.

The Hindu
Monday, Dec 03, 2001
Opinion

For an intolerant secularism
By Dipankar Gupta

SECULARISM HAS been identified for too long with warm hearts, and=20
soft shoulders. It is about time to break this image as it does not=20
seem to have done much good for the cause of secularism anyway. It is=20
necessary for secularism to stiffen its back and set a few things=20
ramrod straight. This is the only way to cut through interminable,=20
and pointless, wranglings, about what one should be tolerant about.=20
Secularism, as our experience shows, does not work if it depends on=20
ideological suasion, on raising moral standards; and so forth.=20
Secularism thrives only when it is presented as an offer that cannot=20
be refused. Once this is made abundantly clear, other things,=20
including celebration of diversities and all that is noble, fall in=20
place very quickly.

Should we grin and bear other peoples' religious customs even if they=20
sanction the most backward of mores and values? Should we overlook=20
other peoples' inherited prejudices, instead of shutting them up=20
before they can spew their venom?

Does secularism only apply to the arena outside one's home? Is it=20
legitimate to overlook what a man does to his wife and children after=20
working hours behind closed doors. The theory and practice of=20
secularism have been hamstrung by all these considerations and there=20
is very little agreement on any of these issues.

That this state of affairs should obtain is not at all surprising.=20
This is because debates on secularism usually take off on the wrong=20
foot. The governing assumption in such disputes is that a secular=20
nation-state has to be big enough to tolerate differences? If one=20
begins with this assumption, without making clear what a nation-state=20
will not tolerate under any circumstances, no worthwhile discussion=20
on secularism can be conducted. A clear enunciation of secularism can=20
only come about if it is made clear, by precept and practice, that=20
the law applies to everyone without ``fear or favour''. Anyone who=20
breaks the law has to pay for it.

No secular country is worth its name if it cannot guarantee equality=20
of status to all its citizens - man, woman, young or old. So, much=20
before we even begin to talk about how to tolerate differences, we=20
should first guarantee similarity of status at a certain fundamental=20
level for all. Very often people throw up their hands in exasperation=20
when asked to learn from Hegel; but it was Hegel who first said that=20
a family is where little citizens are brought up, and where a husband=20
and wife enjoy a parity of status. A family thus cannot be allowed to=20
go against the grain of citizenship on the pretext that what happens=20
within it is a purely private affair.

Therefore, the most important thing is to first establish the law=20
before we start thinking in terms of exceptions to it. We are=20
generally reticent about being steadfast on any matter. Incidentally,=20
this lack of firmness regarding the law is a pre-modern outlook for,=20
in tradition, the law was always meant to be broken, especially if=20
one was rich and powerful. This traditional bent of mind survives=20
today among professional politicians; and even among well meaning=20
members of the literati. For them it is important that the right to=20
be different should trump the law that all citizens be fundamentally=20
recognised and treated as equal. This is a completely ill advised=20
position to take in a functioning democracy. What needs to be made=20
clear, over and over again, is that no one has a basic right to be=20
different. If one has a problem with that then it is just too bad!

What kinds of differences will be sanctioned by society becomes a=20
matter of policy that has to be carefully enunciated. It should be=20
made very clear from the start that secularism will not tolerate, or=20
stand for, any maneouvre that will fundamentally infringe upon, or=20
undermine, the basic equality of status among citizens. Only after=20
this intolerant base is firmly established it is possible for us to=20
consider, as citizens, which social practices deserve to be=20
tolerated. What does similarity of citizenship status imply? First,=20
and foremost, all citizens should have equal opportunities to develop=20
those skills which society considers valuable. There should be no=20
cultural barrier that prevents anyone from gaining access to those=20
institutions which impart socially valuable skills. This rule applies=20
to all - Hindus, Muslims, Christians, man, woman, boy or girl. There=20
can be no reason which will allow for a diminution of this principle.=20
It will not help to quote from the Gita or the Koran or the Bible, in=20
order to seek a dispensation against this basic norm of citizenship.=20
In a modern nation-state the most supreme text is the Constitution.=20
Similarity of status also implies that everyone is equal before the=20
law. The BJP cannot prevaricate on dealing effectively against=20
vandalism when its electoral partners engage in arson and loot.=20
Neither can so-called secular parties get away if they make common=20
cause, even if it be a tactical and short term alliance, with=20
organisations that do not respect the maxim that everyone is equal=20
regardless of their religious denomination.

Once the ground rules of secularism are clear we are in a position to=20
examine what kind of differences can be permitted. All those areas of=20
choice that do not infringe upon the right to gain socially=20
worthwhile skills, and thus pose no threat to the pursuit of=20
citizenship, should be allowed free rein to thrive; prosper and even=20
multiply. Aesthetic preferences; music, food, sartorial styles are=20
matters which should not be legislated upon. They do not come in the=20
way of realising one's potential as a citizen. Thus, if a Muslim girl=20
wants to wear a head dress that covers her hair there is no reason to=20
press the panic button; as the French Government did. Covering one's=20
hair does not come in the way of learning mathematics; physics or=20
philosophy. But the situation takes an entirely different turn if=20
religion sanctions that widows burn at their dead husbands' pyre. In=20
this case the rights of citizenship and status equality are being=20
taken away from women. Nor can secularism allow polygamy, for then=20
the family will be structurally flawed and incapable of serving as a=20
nursery for citizenship (pace Hegel). In both these cases the law is=20
obviously not being even-handed between the sexes. Neither is it=20
acceptable if a certain community refuses to allow its women to go to=20
school and gain those technical qualifications that will help them=20
become independent earning citizens.

Nor should secularism stand aside and let vandals ruin works of art=20
because they believe it is against their culture - no matter how this=20
ambiguous concept is defined. Even when art becomes a political=20
matter, the state cannot tolerate indiscriminate violence in the name=20
of culture. There are good-old fashioned laws against such forms of=20
violence and that should be enough. Such recourses to mob behaviour=20
should be seen as law and order problems and dealt with as such. Why=20
bring in the issue of secularism at all? For example, when M. F.=20
Husain's paintings were vandalised by Hindu squads why did everyone=20
talk about secularism and tolerance at that point? That was the time,=20
if any, to show secular intolerance and properly brand these=20
miscreants with the instruments of the law.

If secularism is to make headway in this country, or anywhere else,=20
it is necessary to firmly draw the lines on the limits of tolerance.=20
Once we are clear about what we will not tolerate then there is a=20
firm principle against which it is possible to decide what can be=20
allowed, and what ought to be proscribed. Failing this, all debates=20
on secularism will be inconclusive; and from this only sectarianism=20
will stand to gain.
If the West has any lesson to teach us, it is the efficacy with which=20
the law works there in most cases. So let us then establish laws that=20
guarantee citizenship and promote similarity of status between=20
members of a common public. Let us also be very intolerant with all=20
those who break these laws. This is how we can best protect and=20
advance the cause of secularism. This will also ensure that the=20
celebration of differences has a proper legal basis and is not=20
dependent solely on nobility and enlightened will power.

(The writer is Professor of Sociology and Social Anthropology,=20
Jawaharlal Nehru University, New Delhi.)
_____

#7.

A Colloquium on the Madhya Pradesh Special Areas Security Act 2000

December 1, 2001
Dear Friends,

The Government of India has made up its mind to introduce
Prohibition of Terrorism Ordinance (POTO) to =91regulate
terrorist activities=92 in the country. Every conscious citizen of
this country knows very well that this ordinance is nothing
but an attempt to bring back the infamous TADA in its new
avatar. Such ordinances and acts which are passed in the
name of terrorism or insurgencies ultimately go against the
common people of the country. They are also used to stifle
any dissent from below to oppose the anti-democratic move
of the ruling establishment.

The irony is that some of the political parties which
are opposing POTO at the centre, have worked out similar
or even more disastrous acts and ordinances in the states
where they are in power. The Madhya Pradesh Government
has enacted =91Madhya Pradesh Special Areas Security Act
2000=92, which like POTO leaves many issues vague and
thus provides scope for greater abuse and misuse of the
act. For example, the =93unlawful=94 activity is defined which
poses a danger to public order, peace or tranquility of fear
thereof. Another gross violation of human right to form
association is violated by the clause 3 of the act =93If it is the
opinion of the State government that any organisation is an
illegal organisation, or has become one, it may, by
notification, declare such organisation to be an illegal
organisation. The notification shall be in force for one year,
ant it may be extended for such longer period or periods, as
may be deemed necessary after an examination of the
situation=94. Such undefined laws lead to greater abuse and
often put the common persons in greater difficulties.

Keeping these facts in mind, some of the representatives of
"Jansangharsha Morcha", Coalition of Peoples Movements
in MP will be here in Delhi on the 4th December to oppose
the MP Act and also to express their dissent about POTO. A
meeting will be held at Indian Social Institute, on the 4th
December at 4 p.m.

The speakers from MP are
Shri Sunil, Kisan Adivasi Sangathan, Kesala, Hoshangabad
Smt. Madhuri, Jagrit Dalit Adivasi Sangathan, Badwani
Shri Anurag Modi, Shramik Adivasi Sangathan, Baitul.

Justice Rajender Sacchar and Prashant Bhushan both
former Presidents of PUCL Delhi will also address the
gathering.

We invite you to participate in this colloquium and express
your solidarity with those who are opposing the anti-people
and anti-democratic policies.
Venue: Indian Social Institute, Lodi Road, New Delhi 110003
{Behind Saibaba temple}
Date: Tuesday, 4th December
Time: 4.00 pm.
Thanking you in anticipation

Yours sincerely,
Prakash Louis, Yogendra Yadav, R.M. Pal Vijayan
Indian Social Institute Lokniti PUCL Other Media

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