[sacw] SACW #1 (18 Dec. 01)

[Harsh Kapoor]

South Asia Citizens Wire | Dispatch #1. | 18 December 2001
http://www.mnet.fr/aiindex

------------------------------------------

#1. Revisiting the Quaid-i-Azam during his 125th Birthday Year (Dr.=20
Iftikhar H. Malik)
#2. Pakistan: Schooled in Terror - an interview with Mushahid Hussein=20
(Shobha John)
#3. Attack on India's Parliament: An agent provocateur's act (Imtiaz Alam)
#4. Afghan women sex workers in Peshawars refugee camps (Branwen=20
Jeffreys , BBC)
#5. India: Restrain the war mongers- Unity, not Poto, can fight=20
terrorism (A. J Philips)
________________________

#1.

Revisiting the Quaid-i-Azam during his 125th Birthday Year
(Dr. Iftikhar H. Malik)
Few individuals significantly alter the course of history.=20
Fewer still modify the map of the world. Hardly anyone can be=20
credited with creating a nation-state. Mohammad Ali Jinnah did all=20
three. (Stanely Wolpert)

Mohammad Ali Jinnah (1876-1948), the founder of=20
Pakistan, is that distinguished statesman who was initially seen as=20
the spoiler of the British India's unity but is retrospectively and=20
rather belatedly being visualised as one of the most prominent=20
leaders of the 20th century. Generally known as the Quaid-i-Azam (the=20
great leader), Jinnah was the most preeminent leader of Muslim India=20
with a modernist life-style, secular outlook and democratic vision.=20
As in the words of the noted analyst of Pakistan, S. M. Burke, Jinnah=20
combined the three personalities of a barrister, a legislator and of=20
a statesman. Trained in England as a barrister, Jinnah returned to=20
Bombay to practice law and established his reputation as a bold,=20
original and successful lawyer who moved in the upper circles;=20
dressed immaculately and harboured nationalist dreams for entire=20
India. He refused to work for the government and instead established=20
an independent and successful practice and well-earned reputation as=20
an honest and diligent spokesman of the equal rights for Indians.=20
>From the cosmopolitanism of Bombay, a pragmatic Jinnah became an=20
active member of the Indian National Congress, followed by a=20
membership of the All-India Muslim League--the two pioneer political=20
parties in British India. His effort for the next three decades=20
focused on bringing about unity between the two parties to achieve a=20
common platform for Indian nationhood and also to ease the rising=20
Hindu-Muslim communal tensions. Staying away from the agitational=20
politics of Gandhian style Jinnah pursued constitutional means=20
towards Hindu-Muslim unity as well as for a better deal for the=20
Indian Muslims. Jinnah, in his early years, was known as the=20
ambassador of Hindu-Muslim unity which he thought was quite crucial=20
in seeking freedom for India. However, the increasingly exclusionary=20
policies pursued at the highest level by some of the Congress leaders=20
besides a common lack of open-heartedness for the religious and=20
caste-based minorities, Jinnah, very much like B. R. Ambedkar--the=20
leader of the `untouchables' {Dalits}-- became a critic of the=20
altruism so often attributed to some upper caste leadership.
By that time, an emerging Muslim middle class had=20
begun to transform their cultural aspirations and intellectual ideals=20
into an evolutionary political creed, which finally culminated into=20
the demand for a separate statehood. The common socio-economic=20
development of the disparate Muslim communities across the=20
Subcontinent became the major preoccupation of this Muslim=20
bourgeoisie who concurred with several regional elite in forming a=20
united strategy to establish a greater sense of parity and community=20
across plural India. The idea of Pakistan--as a non-hegemonic and=20
trans-regional dispensation--attracted the urban Muslims from Bombay,=20
Delhi, Lucknow, Lahore, Dhaka, Madras, Calcutta and concurrently=20
sought the goodwill of the Indus Valley landlords and the landless=20
Bengali and Bihari Muslim peasants. The polarity at the top converged=20
with the class and community-based schisms at the subaltern levels=20
and the colonial state rather than providing a bonding platform=20
conveniently sought a refuge in this divide.
As is borne out by various studies including those by=20
Aziz Ahmed, Farzana Shaikh and others, Jinnah's idea of Pakistan=20
combined a territorial statehood for Muslim majority regions yet was=20
equally disdainful of divorcing Islam from India altogether. As a=20
staunch liberationist and constitutionalist, he abhorred violence of=20
every kind but equally attempted to ascertain a better deal for the=20
Indian Muslims during the most crucial decade in South Asian history.=20
His idea of Pakistan was not geared to rigid or communalist demands=20
as has been generally misperceived, rather was based on an ideal of=20
equal citizenship, mutual respect and the primacy of constitutional=20
rights for every community across India. He did not aspire to keep=20
his struggle simply confined to a territorial redefinition of Muslim=20
majority regions rather sought democratic and tangible frameworks for=20
the post-Britain Subcontinent. This Jinnahist vision, largely=20
compromised by the ethnic cleansing of 1947 and the subsequent=20
endemic Indo-Pakistan discord, needs to be revisited especially when=20
one considers his decision to buy a personal house in Delhi, just a=20
few weeks before independence. His will that he completed before his=20
death in 1948--thirteen months after independence--stipulates the=20
allocation of major assets for the universities in Bombay and=20
Aligarh, some significant donations for Bombay's Ajuman-i-Islam=20
School and the Arabic College in Delhi. Of course, he willed assets=20
for Islamia College, Peshawar and his old alma mater in Karachi,=20
Sindh Madrassa, but through such substantial measures he was=20
reluctant to sever relationship with India. To him, Partition was the=20
rearrangement of Hindu-Muslim relationship with newer opportunities=20
and challenges and not a cut-off point, which sadly it has become as=20
one looks at the bi-lateral relationship or even at the texts=20
produced in these countries. To Jinnah, both the new states were to=20
commonly tackle the multiple communitarian and socio-economic=20
problems seeking wisdom and inspiration from their moral and global=20
heritage rather that disassociating themselves from each other=20
altogether.
Jinnah's Pakistan--like Nehru's India--was to be an=20
abode of equality, democracy and social justice by guaranteeing equal=20
citizenship rights to all. His view of Islam was that of a holistic,=20
progressive and enlightened civilisation, far removed from the=20
sectarian and theocratic proclivities. In Pakistan, Islam was to be=20
an inspirational force and not a dictatorial dogma. In an=20
overwhelmingly Muslim state, Jinnah was duly concerned about a new=20
kind of majoritarian authoritarianism which the Muslim minority=20
itself had resisted earlier on, so his important exhortations focused=20
on equality before law and social justice as ordained in Islamic=20
traditions. His speeches and statements on the eve of independence=20
and before the Constituent Assembly require a greater attention in=20
his country where sectarian and majority-minority tensions have been=20
sapping the national energies and scarce resources. Jinnah, in his=20
various roles as an individual, statesman, colleague, family friend,=20
legislator, party leader, the organiser of charities and institutions=20
(like Dawn, the newspaper) and as a persistent negotiator comes out=20
as a forthright, industrious, honest and warm-hearted human being. A=20
host of writings by his contemporaries and friends, including Miss=20
Fatima Jinnah, Sarojini Naidu, K. H. Khurshid, M. H. Saiyid, Yusuf=20
Haroon, Hashim Reza, Ata Rabbani, Princess Abida Sultan of Bhopal,=20
Justice Channa, Yaqub Khan, Shaista Ikramullah and writers such as=20
Hector Bolitho, Samuel Burke, Ayesha Jalal, Sharif al-Mujahid,=20
Stanley Wolpert, S. Pirzada, Akbar Ahmed, Riaz Ahmed, Ahmed Saeed and=20
others recapture what Beverely Nichols had written about Jinnah. In=20
his Verdict on India (1942) he had described him as "the most=20
important man in Asia" and called his meeting with Jinnah as "a=20
dialogue with a giant". Lady Wavell considered Jinnah as "one of the=20
handsomest men I have ever seen; he combined the clear-cut, almost=20
Grecian features of the West with Oriental grace of movement". To the=20
Aga Khan, of all the leaders he met and worked with including=20
Clemenceau, Lloyd George, Churchill, Curzon and Mahatma Gandhi,=20
"Jinnah is the most remarkable".
In an obituary on 13 September 1948--two days after=20
Jinnah's death-- The Times had noted: "Mr Jinnah was something more=20
than Quaid-i-Azam, supreme head of the State, to the people who=20
followed him; he was more even than the architect of the Islamic=20
nation he personally called into being. . . Few statesmen have shaped=20
events to their policy more surely than Mr Jinnah. He was a legend=20
even in his lifetime". While paying tribute to Jinnah one must not=20
forget that despite all the military coups and misgovernance, his=20
vision of tolerance, persistence, equality and progressive outlook=20
can still rekindle a glimmer of hope for a better tomorrow.

(Dr.) Iftikhar H. Malik, FRHisS, 22 Worcester Place, Oxford OX1 2JW.

______

#2.

The Times of India
MONDAY, DECEMBER 17, 2001
http://timesofindia.indiatimes.com/articleshow.asp?art_id=3D2105614876
Schooled in Terror
The attack on Parliament once again brings into focus the problem of=20
terrorism and its perpetrators. Many believe terrorists cut their=20
teeth in extremism at religious seminaries in Pakistan. Others,=20
however, perceive these schools as charity organisations providing=20
free education, food and boarding to poor children. And now, the=20
Pakistan government plans to register madrassas and audit their=20
funds. Mushahid Hussein, a political commentator who was a minister=20
in Nawaz Sharif's cabinet, talks to Shobha John about the issues=20
involved:
What is Pakistan's reaction to the attack on the Indian Parliament?=20
Is this incident in any way related to the Taliban's defeat in=20
Afghanistan?
Pakistan's stand is clear. It was one of the first countries to=20
condemn the attack. One shouldn't link the Taliban's defeat with what=20
is happening in India without knowing the facts. India itself has so=20
many insurgencies - so it's premature to link it with what's=20
happening in Afghanistan.
Does the Pakistan government's proposal to register madrassas and=20
enact legislation to deal with religious extremists mean it admits=20
that these schools are hotbeds of extremism?
On December 3, a high-level meeting in Islamabad sought to streamline=20
the working of madrassas in Pakistan, which official figures say=20
number 7,231. This number doubled in the last 20 years, especially=20
after the joint 'jehad' by Pakistan and the US against the Soviet=20
Union in Afghanistan.
The government says it wants to register and regulate all existing=20
madrassas, not allow new ones without prior authorisation, modernise=20
their curricula by adding science and computer literacy, disallow the=20
entry of foreign students unless they have their own government's=20
clearance and valid travel documents, and audit/monitor their funds=20
especially from overseas.
It would be wrong and unfair to classify all madrassas as ''hotbeds=20
of extremism'' - after all, not too long ago, General Musharraf cited=20
them as providing ''Pakistan's biggest welfare system since poor and=20
needy students get free board, lodging and education'' - something=20
the state is unable to do. However, some madrassas have been accused=20
by officialdom of imparting sectarian thinking, which is divisive for=20
society.
Is Pakistan serious about curbing these schools or is this just an=20
attempt to cosy up to the US in its fight against terrorism? After=20
all, most of the Taliban leadership has been the product of these=20
madrassas.
Streamlining and modernising the madrassa is an educational=20
requirement from Pakistan's perspective since approximately 500,000=20
students are said to study there. The government had been making=20
noises and talking about it much before September 11.
Interior minister Lt Gen Moinuddin Haider on April 13, 2000,=20
threatened to ban those madrassas allegedly involved in spawning=20
sectarianism, although he later retracted his statement. On July 14,=20
2000, he announced that the ministry of education was carrying out a=20
survey of madrassas through a questionnaire.
Yes, many of the Taliban leaders were educated in madrassas in=20
Pakistan since they were refugees living here. Later, most of them=20
also got military training, courtesy the CIA-funded Afghan jehadis.
But would you hold Harvard University responsible for subsequent=20
actions/terrorism of, say, the Unabomber, who once studied there? The=20
US, though, has been expressing muted concern over what is=20
loosely-labelled as ''religious extremism'' with its specificity or=20
contours not being clarified.
Which are the countries giving donations to these madrassas?
Official sources cite Saudi Arabia, Libya, Iraq and Iran.
Can the government actually audit these religious schools since it=20
has no control over them?
Yes, it could, after registering them under a new law. It would=20
probably work like the audit done by the Election Commission of=20
Pakistan of accounts of political parties that are registered with=20
it, which does not mean it has control over the parties.
Having a proper law and an efficient but simple procedure of auditing=20
would be essential ingredients for this move to succeed.
Would modernising these seminaries mean an automatic toning down of=20
the ideology taught here?
Modernisation of seminaries has two aspects. First, adding=20
contemporary sources of knowledge like maths, science and=20
computer-literacy so that the students are able to play a broader=20
role as part of the educated citizenry. And the other is deleting any=20
kind of literature that may be spawning sectarian hatred.
In the long-term, the government would need to end the three-tier=20
caste system in our education: the elitist, private or missionary=20
'English-medium' schools, the mostly government-run 'Urdu-medium'=20
schools and the madrassas. Invariably, the Pakistani establishment is=20
largely drawn from the 'English-medium' schools.
What will be the reaction of fundamentalists to these measures? Isn't=20
Musharraf playing with fire?
If the government confines its task to its stated goals of=20
administrative streamlining and educational reform, then it will be=20
welcomed, but if it becomes an endeavour to delineate ''moderates''=20
from ''extremists'', as some statements have suggested, then it would=20
be counter-productive since it will be perceived as a move driven by=20
a political agenda.
Pakistan, like most Third World countries, has diversity within its=20
society and elections are always the best recipe to root out any=20
'extremism'.
Unlike India, in no election in Pakistan since 1970 has any religious=20
or so-called 'fundamentalist' party been able to garner more than=20
five per cent of the popular vote. We should learn from other=20
examples: the DMK in 1964 espoused separatism but today it is part of=20
the democratic process.
The Hizbullah in Lebanon now has elected members in parliament, which=20
is an important reason why the Lebanese government rejected US calls=20
to freeze its accounts - it is considered an integral part of a=20
democratic electoral process.
Isn't it ironic that after having provided training to these jehadis,=20
Pakistan is now cracking down on them?
Let's be clear about the facts: The training was provided by the=20
Americans who encouraged Arabs like Osama bin Laden, indeed roped=20
them in, from all over the Arab world, to join a jehad to fight=20
'godless Communism'.
The original sin, if I may say so, was committed by the US, not=20
Pakistan. As for fighting Frankenstein's monsters that you yourself=20
create, it's nothing new - India knows it better than others: Mrs=20
Indira Gandhi encouraged Sant Bhindranwale in 1980 to counter the=20
Akali Dal and then destroyed him in 1984 when he became too big;=20
India backed the Tamil Tigers in 1983 and then tried to destroy them=20
through the IPKF in 1987, and Israel initially encouraged Hamas in=20
1987 as a means to counter the PLO's Intifadah, using religion to=20
undercut Arab nationalism, and now it's trying to destroy the Hamas.
Will this have a positive impact on India and the situation in Kashmir?
Not necessarily. Pakistan's madrassa policy and relations with India=20
and the Kashmir situation are not related. The latter emerged as an=20
indigenous reaction and rejection of Indian occupation and misrule by=20
the Kashmiris themselves, particularly after the rigging of=20
successive polls there in 1987 and 1989.

______

#3.

The News International (Pakistan) Monday December 17, 2001
An agent provocateur's act
Imtiaz Alam

It was just a matter of two-minute delay in the departure of Vice=20
President of India Krishan Kant that saved him from an encounter with=20
the terrorists who killed his four personal security guards in their=20
suicide-bombing mission on the Indian Parliament. The armed intruders=20
could have caused unprecedented havoc at such a level that might have=20
pushed the subcontinent to yet another war - this time may be a=20
nuclear conflict. Regardless of the accusations and the abounding=20
conspiracy theories, this was a highly provocative act that was=20
ostensibly meant to push India and Pakistan into a devastating=20
conflict. Neither could Islamabad gain anything by perpetrating it,=20
nor could have India by "stage-managing" an attack on the symbol of=20
its democracy. The culprits have their own axe to grind and need to=20
be nabbed before they succeed.

Some new political development on Kashmir was in the offing, as=20
indicated by the chairman of Hurriyat Conference, Abdul Ghani Bhat,=20
prior to the attack on the Indian Parliament. But, some agent=20
provocateurs, it seems, have not only subverted it, but have also=20
tried to create some space for refuge by igniting a dangerous=20
standoff between the two regional rivals. Thanks to the international=20
war against terrorism and destruction of terrorist havens in=20
Afghanistan, there are many desperate elements who can go to any=20
length in fomenting anarchy and diverting the focus from the most=20
wanted of all. Still there is no dearth of rogue elements on many=20
sides who desperately require a catharsis of their pent-up=20
frustration or a room to manoeuvre. Who could be a better client than=20
India and Pakistan, ready to jump the gun at all times, for such a=20
provocation?

Prime Minister Vajpayee is right when he said that there is a limit=20
to one's patience, so is General Musharraf in his annoyance and=20
worry. Mr Vajpayee had hardly overcome the hawkish backlash that the=20
terrorists struck to reinforce the hawks who want to follow in the=20
footsteps of the US. The cabinet decided: "India will liquidate=20
terrorists whoever they are, wherever they are". A demarche was=20
delivered the very next day asking Pakistan to arrest the leadership=20
and stop the activities of Lashkar-i-Taiba and Jaish-i-Mohammed,=20
besides confiscating their assets. Before the investigations could=20
unearth the perpetrators of criminal act, Islamabad has been blamed=20
for harbouring the terrorists and being asked to fulfil its=20
obligations under UN Security Council resolutions, 1368 and 1373.

Frustrated over its failure to get Pakistan clubbed together with=20
Al-Qaeda and Taliban and Islamabad's alignment with the international=20
coalition against terrorism, New Delhi was waiting for such a God=20
sent opportunity to drum up its campaign against Pakistan. No doubt=20
there is a partial security lapse, as the Congress Party has accused,=20
despite a warning by Prime Minister Atal Behari Vajpayee 12 hours=20
before the terrorist struck that the possibility of blowing up of the=20
Parliament was "not (a) figment of anyone's imagination". But it=20
cannot be brushed aside by accusing India of stage-managing a drama,=20
as General Rashid Qureshi would like a disbelieving world to believe,=20
although New Delhi is trying hard to extract a maximum diplomatic and=20
political mileage at both international and domestic fronts by=20
exploiting it to the hilt. Investigations are in "progress" and "many=20
clues" have been found, some real and many cooked up, as the press=20
reports reveal.

In the next few days India will have a case, backed by some sort of=20
"proof" and based on a lot of circumstantial evidence, to be=20
presented before the international community inclined to entertain=20
even a slight hint at both harbours and perpetrators of terrorism.=20
The world has changed after September 11, thanks to Al-Qaeda's=20
misadventure. Now, regardless of the credentials of the right of an=20
occupied people to self-determination, a right to self-defence has=20
been granted to the powers that be. The US has exercised it and=20
Israel is blatantly using it. Taliban has paid the price for=20
harbouring the terrorists with a global reach. The Palestinian=20
Authority and its Chairman Yasser Arafat is paying, perhaps, the last=20
penalty for the extremism of Hamas and Al-Jihad who have, ironically,=20
served the Zionist agenda of Sharon to pre-empt the emergence of a=20
Palestinian state and bury the land-for-peace formula. A worldwide=20
pattern has emerged: Any movement of people, however legitimate, will=20
be dubbed as terrorism if it took up arms and the powerful will have=20
the right to suppress it as a "right to self-defence". And in this=20
pattern the extremists, whether provoked or used, act as a pawn in=20
the design of the oppressor.

The fact of the matter is that whoever has attacked the Indian=20
Parliament has not in anyway served the cause of the Kashmiri people.=20
They have, rather, played into the hands of the Indian hawks=20
desperately seeking to get the Kashmiri peoples' struggle dubbed as=20
mere terrorism on the pretexts provided by the extremists, the=20
foreign Islamic internationalist militants in particular. They have=20
also increasingly become a source of great embarrassment to Pakistan=20
as they promote their own agendas in the name of jihad in Kashmir.=20
Last time when the state assembly building in Jammu was attacked and=20
more than 30 people were killed, and Jaish-i-Mohammed had first=20
claimed the responsibility only to rescind it later, General=20
Musharraf had to condemn it as an act of terrorism and sympathise=20
with Prime Minister Vajpayee on phone. Similarly, when=20
Lashkar-i-Taiba announced to attack Red Fort, and it was later=20
attacked, General Musharraf had to snub such an irresponsible=20
behaviour.

The legitimate indigenous struggle of the Kashmiri people in the=20
occupied Valley and Pakistan's legalistic, although somewhat=20
irredentist, stand have had some moral support among the=20
international community. India was asked to address the Kashmir issue=20
in accordance with the aspirations of the Kashmiri people. But our=20
backing to the militant outfits based here with non-Kashmiri recruits=20
and jihadi leaders was neither accepted by the international=20
community nor appreciated by the indigenous Kashmiris. Maintaining=20
the sanctity of the LoC, pending the settlement of the dispute, has=20
been the mainstay of the world opinion. Nobody agreed to our=20
interpretation of jihad, termed as "cross-border terrorism" by India=20
and increasingly shared by the international community.

After the terrorist attack on the Indian Parliament, India's=20
contention that the fight against terrorism is indivisible will be=20
more and more acceptable to the world, even though we remain a=20
frontline state at the fag end of war against terrorism. At the=20
moment the world has fully sympathised with New Delhi while=20
cautioning it for restraint. But that doesn't mean we will be allowed=20
to stick to our interpretation of jihad on the Kashmir front. No=20
doubt Pakistan is not a hapless Palestinian Authority, nor is India=20
so close an ally of the US as Israel is in the Middle East. But it=20
will be a great folly that we will be allowed to continue with our=20
old Kashmir policy. After playing such a pivotal role against=20
terrorism on our western front against former close ally, Taliban, we=20
will be asked to follow suit on the Kashmir front as well. Instead of=20
getting on the defensive due to skeletons in our cupboard, we must=20
put India on the defensive for its crimes against the people of=20
Kashmir.

Whether one doesn't admit today, as was the case with our Afghan=20
policy till the last moment, our Kashmir policy is also flawed in=20
some ways. The foreign elements that found their way into the=20
Kashmiris' indigenous struggle will have to be reigned in before they=20
push Pakistan to yet another brink and make the Kashmiris pay heavily=20
for their adventurism. This is not just an issue of the Kashmiris, it=20
is much more relevant to Pakistan's own security. The Hamas and=20
Al-jihad of our Kashmir jihad, the Lashkar and Jaish, are not=20
constrained by our strategic requirements, nor do the interests of=20
the Kashmiri people dearer to them than their ideological agenda. The=20
Indians can also use many rogue elements to grind their axe, and many=20
among the militants are naive enough to be used by those who want to=20
stifle the Kashmiris' political resistance or to promote their vested=20
designs.

Pakistan needs to recalibrate its Kashmir policy that fits into the=20
new constraints and serves the legitimate political struggle of the=20
Kashmiri people for their right to self-determination. Before the=20
agent provocateurs again strike back, and leave no space for=20
Islamabad to fallback on, we must clear our decks before the world=20
asks us to do the needful. The choice is between becoming yet another=20
Mulla Omar or repeating General Musharraf to save the Kashmiris'=20
political struggle from being wiped out in the name of "terrorism"=20
and, above all, Pakistan as a state on the right side of history=20
since September 11.
______

#4.

BBC News Saturday, 15 December, 2001, 12:41 GMT
http://news.bbc.co.uk/hi/english/world/from_our_own_correspondent/newsid_17=
11000/1711362.stm

Inside a Peshawar brothel
Afghan women struggle to survive

By BBC's Branwen Jeffreys in Peshawar

It's not easy finding a prostitute during Ramadan. During the holy=20
month they lie low, as their customers stay away.
Even during the rest of the year in Peshawar the oldest profession=20
operates with discretion bordering on invisibility.
But I had been told in the refugee camps around the city that some=20
destitute women coming over the border from Afghanistan had turned to=20
selling sex to support their children. It's not hard to see why.
If I had education there's no way I'd do this work

Afghan prostitute The war has left many women widowed and without=20
other immediate family. Village women, who only know how to farm,=20
find themselves alone in one of the huge refugee camps or in a city.=20
In Peshawar at sunset each day crowds of women gather on the=20
pavements outside bakeries, begging for bread at the breaking of the=20
Ramadan fast.

Hidden problem
Arian McGee works for a charity that carries out education work on=20
Aids and other sexually-transmitted diseases in this intensely=20
conservative society. That means not just going into schools, but=20
trying to reach those most at risk - the sex workers of Peshawar and=20
the other frontier towns.
Adrian and his team had become familiar with the public pick-up=20
points - bus stops, parks and even hospital waiting rooms. In the=20
last two years, he told me, they had seen a steady and visible=20
increase in the number of Afghan women working as prostitutes.

Afghan girls at a school in Peshwar: A new opportunity to learn

"It's a hidden problem and I can't put numbers on it, but it's=20
happening," he said.
"Some of these women have no other option, they've tried to get other=20
work, but it's so difficult for women, some turn to prostitution."
Adrian sent us with one of his colleagues, an outreach worker=20
recruited from a male dance troupe - they often worked alongside=20
female prostitutes, and he could take us to a brothel.
Slight, lithe and incredibly camp, he draped one leg over the other=20
in the front seat of the car.
Shops were closing in the dusk. Formidable looking men in turbans=20
hurried home by cycle, rickshaw or horse drawn cart.

Inside the cart the former dancer broke in a high voice into a famous=20
Pashtun love song, Bibi Shirini, giving it the full song and dance=20
routine - swaying and making eyes at our young Pakistani driver, who=20
was by turns embarrassed and pleased.
We drove along progressively narrower and shabbier streets until he=20
told us to stop. We were hurried into a large house, and sat on a bed=20
to wait.
A young prostitute combed out her hair, watching us in the mirror.=20
Five or six girls - none older than their mid twenties - were ushered=20
in to meet us - lining up to look at the two European women sitting=20
in the bedroom of a Peshawar brothel.
Friendly, shy and curious they were all Pakistani - but knew of=20
Afghan women. A few minutes of shrugging and smiling followed the=20
inevitable question - how could we meet them? They said they would=20
ask.

Desperation
So late one evening I found myself sitting on the floor besides two=20
Afghan women - both refugees.
The younger - just 22 - had arrived a couple of months earlier from=20
Afghanistan - from a village north of Kabul. She pulled nervously at=20
her clothes, her head modestly covered with a white voile shawl as=20
she told me her husband and parents had been killed in the war.

Many Afghan women have been reduced to begging
She had not long been married, a village girl with no education -=20
now, so ashamed she wouldn't tell me her name.
Left alone to look after three young children, two brothers and a=20
sister, she had walked with them into Pakistan to Peshawar.
"If I had education there's no way I'd do this work," she said=20
softly. "I wish something would come out of the blue to take us away=20
from this life. We are forced to do this; so are other women. For the=20
children I've destroyed my life."
The price for her shame is thousands of rupees. A pretty young woman=20
like this can earn more than a $150 a month, a fortune compared to=20
any other work. But some older women are reduced to selling sex for=20
less than two dollars.

And as prostitutes lose their novelty value many are compelled to=20
move from town to town in search of new clients, trying to keep their=20
price high.
So many of the refugees you meet in Pakistan talk with real longing=20
of going home to Afghanistan. But this time I didn't need to ask.
For this young women and others like her there is no way back. Once a=20
respectable girl, now a prostitute, she won't be able to return to=20
her village.

______

#5.

Indian Express (India) Tuesday, December 18, 2001

Restrain the war mongers
Unity, not Poto, can fight terrorism
by A. J Philips

The much touted Prevention of Terrorism Ordinance (Poto) failed to=20
avert December 13. But the vigilance and professionalism shown by the=20
police succeeded in averting what could have been a national=20
catastrophe. While a young member of Parliament from Orissa was=20
honest enough to admit that his first impulse on hearing the gunshots=20
was to run for cover, a lady constable did not think about herself or=20
her tiny tots as she challenged the terrorists. She and six others=20
laid down their lives so that those abominable characters could not=20
enter the sacred precincts of Parliament.

Come to think of it, the terrorists could not have accomplished what=20
they have if the person who sold the car had shared his suspicion=20
with the police, instead of taking a photograph of the buyer, only to=20
compare it with the pictures of the slain terrorists. In that case,=20
the police could have hunted them down even before they strapped=20
their bodies and the vehicle with the incendiary stuff. It is a grim=20
reminder that no law, however harsh it may be, is a deterrent for the=20
criminals, particularly when they harbour notions of heavenly bliss=20
in the company of nubile virgins after their ''martyrdom''. Only an=20
enlightened citizenry who act in concert with a vigilant law and=20
order machinery can meet their challenge.

It is incidental that the terrorists who struck at Parliament and=20
their alleged collaborators are Muslims, whose beliefs are at=20
variance with that of the devout, who find no contradiction between=20
modernity and Islam and between Islam and secularism. Without going=20
into the reasons that compel them to become terrorists, is it not=20
strange that little effort is being made to fathom the Muslim mind=20
and use their goodwill to counter terrorism? Do our intelligence=20
organisations like the Intelligence Bureau (IB) and the Research and=20
Analysis Wing (RAW) have enough Muslims on their payrolls who will be=20
in a better position to gather such intelligence? Or are we like the=20
British who trusted only their own people or the Anglo-Indians for=20
intelligence jobs and to run railway engines? It took several years=20
for the Delhi police to lift the unofficial ban on recruitment of=20
policemen from a particular community after two of its members took=20
the law into their own hands to avenge the desecration of their=20
holiest of shrines at Amritsar.

Needless to say, the ultimate weapon against terrorism is not Poto=20
but the unity of the people. But do we foster unity when we allow=20
political forces to preach hatred against fellow citizens whose only=20
fault is the accident of their birth in a particular religion? When=20
the Bajrang Dal is allowed to distribute lakhs of trishuls among its=20
cadres, when VHP leaders are allowed to violate the prohibitory=20
orders in force in Ayodhya and when those who ransack cinema theatres=20
showing films they do not approve of, like Fire, are treated=20
leniently, it does not foster unity. No such leniency is showed to=20
those who campaigned against US multinationals in Malegaon, the=20
students who distributed anti-US pamphlets on the university campus=20
and the maverick Delhi Municipal Councillor who pasted his walls with=20
Osama bin Laden's pictures at a time when the US had not produced any=20
evidence against the Al-Qaeda chief and he was not a wanted criminal=20
in India.

Unity cannot be achieved when, post-September 11, the government=20
publishes an advertisement that carries pictures of only instances of=20
''Islamic'' terrorism, overlooking worse instances of ''Hindu'' and=20
''Sikh'' terrorism, if at all terrorism can be described in such=20
religious terms. And to make matters worse, no step is taken against=20
those who threaten to start construction at Ayodhya on a particular=20
date no matter what the court decides or does not decide. It is this=20
failure of the state to apply the law universally and impartially=20
that raises doubts about the bona fides of the government. Think of=20
it, Poto would not have faced the problems it faces now if its=20
forerunner, Tada, was used against terrorists and not to incarcerate=20
a large number of Muslims in Gujarat for minor violat- ions of law.=20
When those in power claim that no matter what happens to Poto, the=20
ruling party already stands to gain from the ordinance in the coming=20
UP elections, they do not have national unity in mind.

Home Minister L.K. Advani has in the wake of December 13 made a=20
comparison of the patriotism of Indians with that of Americans. He=20
compared the manner in which the relatives of the passengers of the=20
hijacked Indian Airlines aircraft brought pressure on the government=20
that ultimately resulted in the release of three terrorists with the=20
resoluteness, unity and determination the Americans showed in facing=20
the challenge September 11 posed. Whatever be the justification of=20
such comparison, one must not overlook the point that the US is the=20
most multicultural society. Does this not expose the hollowness of=20
the Sangh Parivar's one-nation-one-law-one-language argument in=20
support of patriotism?

The day Advani's interview appeared, newspapers carried reports of a=20
54-year-old American woman being sentenced for 30 days in prison for=20
shouting racial slurs at two Sikhs and trying to pull a turban from=20
the head of one of them. The full might of the law is now being used=20
against the xenophobic American who stabbed a Sikh to death. It will=20
not be long before justice will be done in this case too. But what=20
about our own record? The number of people who took part in the=20
pogrom of the Sikhs in Delhi in 1984 must be several times more than=20
the 3,000 or so who were killed in two days. Those who have the blood=20
of innocent Sikhs on them are all leading normal lives in the=20
Capital, some of them as legislators, political leaders and=20
government officials. Similarly, thousands of Muslims were killed in=20
Mumbai and elsewhere following the frenzy created by the demolition=20
at Ayodhya. Commissions like Sri Krishna have gone into these mayhems=20
but there is no possibility of the state ever laying its hands on the=20
killers.

Prime Minister Atal Bihari Vajpayee has rightly deprecated the=20
practice of indoctrinating young minds while delivering the=20
convocation address at Shantiniketan. The extent of such=20
Talibanisation can be gauged from the report that in Afghan school=20
textbooks, the alphabet 'A' stood for AK-47 and not apples, 'B' for=20
bombs, 'T' for Talibs and 'I' for infidels. While condemning the=20
method, can we gloss over the teachings in Shishu Bharati schools=20
where even arithmetic is taught using Hindutva terminology?

In the competitive patriotism spawned by December 13, even leaders=20
who have been sensible are dropping their guard and advocating strong=20
arm methods against Pakistan. They claim to represent public opinion.=20
But if leaders are merely articulators of public opinion, what about=20
their role as moulders of public opinion? It is on occasions like=20
these that leaders should show statesmanship by decrying those who=20
argue for hot pursuits and precision bombings. Now over to Vajpayee.

_/_/_/_/_/_/_/_/_/_/_/_/_/_/_/_/_/_/_/_/_/_/_/_/_/_/_/_/_/

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