[sacw] SACW #1 (30 Oct. 01)

[Harsh Kapoor]

South Asia Citizens Wire | Dispatch #1.
30 October 2001
http://www.mnet.fr/aiindex

[ Interruption Notice: SACW dispatches will be interrupted between=20
the period 31st October - 7th November 2001]

------------------------------------------

#1. These religious zealots who invoke islam are interested in=20
snatching power from their former patrons in Pakistan? ( M.B. Naqvi)
#2. This attack on Afghanistan is unleashing all the dormant, and not=20
so dormant forces of religious fanaticism in Pakistan (Fahmida Riaz)
#3. Pakistan's Peaceniks: A Tiny Antiwar Movement Takes on Nukes,=20
Military Spending, and Dictatorship (Michael Kamber)
#4. Pakistani Intelligence Had Links to Al Qaeda, U.S. Officials Say

________________________

#1.

These religious zealots who invoke islam are interested in snatching=20
power from their former patrons in Pakistan?
by M.B. Naqvi

Karachi October 29:

Five or six masked men came riding motor bikes to St. Dominican Church
of Bahawalpur on Sunday (October 28), after killing a police guard at
the gate, entered the main hall during the Sunday service, shut their
doors and started shooting at worshippers. In all 18 persons, including
women and children died and many more were injured. The killers escaped
unhindered on their vehicles. It was left to the government to condemn
the outrage, promise their arrest and condign punishment and announce
compensation to the bereaved families of one lakh [100 000] rupees each.

These proforma actions do not impress anyone in Pakistan. The government
has been singularly unable to arrest mass killers despite plenty of
leads that the victims=92 families are often able to provide. There is a
regular pattern to such killings. Should the killers have any personal
reason for their violent actions --- like old enmity, dispute or of high
passion --- it will be easy to understand. In most such killings, there
is never a personal reason. The killers do not even know their victims.
But they regard their actions good and brave. They thereby hope to
please their God who is going to reward them handsomely in the
hereafter.

What makes decent men and women sad and shocked is this misguided and
paranoid mind that think nothing of killing human beings. Indeed, these
terrorists do so in the name of Islam, the very name mean peace (and
security). None of these killers is ever sorry. On the contrary, they
brag about it and are sorry only about the fact that they were unable to
kill more of the infidels. The tragedy is that such men, or rather the
people with such idea, are thick on the ground. They are organised. The
government agencies are fully aware of their activities --- unless its
secret services are utterly inefficient. Ordinary people know a lot
about such terrorist organisation. However the point is that government
has never been able to nab killers and vandals who thought they were
killing or burning down a place of worship of non-Muslim for a noble,
Islamic, reason.

The many and well-established failures of the government are in fact
compounded by various apologists. After shaking their heads sagely,
they propound the theory that such criminals can only be
anti-Pakistani. Then, they go further and confidently speculate that it
must be the Israeli Mossad and the Indian Raw that are behind the
outrage. Haven knows there may be enough reasons for Mossad and Raw to
try to harm or hurt Pakistan. But, pray, let us examine how would they
do it? Obviously no Israeli or Indian secret service operative is in
the habit of sneaking into Pakistan to do it, the borders of which are
supposedly well-guarded by both the armed forces and the paramilitary
agencies, which should be reinforced by the various secret services.
How then would the foreigners do it? The answer is likely to come pat:
through their local agents, of course.

That is no answer to the question. What it boils down to is the
shameful supposition that there are so many Pakistanis who are ready to
do others=92 bidding. If they do so, what is their motivation?
Ordinarily, it should be money? The people are being asked to believe
that the Mossad or the Raw or both have been paying large sums of money
to Pakistanis to go out and kill notable persons, religious leaders and
frequently to kill people while praying in their various places of
worship when they do not burn down temples, Churches and other places of
worship. Considering all the many incidents of this nature, Pakistan
must be brimful with potential traitors and ready-for-hire killers. Is
it so? The proposition is outrageous. It is only an alibi for
government's inability or unwillingness to catch and punish the
terrorists and killers.

Pakistanis have yet to examine the phenomenon honestly. They have their
own home-grown killers in relative plenty. They go and kill top Sunni
or Shia leaders, doctors and prominent persons by way of near-routine
activity and when passions run high for some reason they attack places
of worship --- Muslim, Hindu, Christian, though not Synagogues for want
of any --- as a good work for which God Almighty will give them ample
reward. They do it as a matter of duty, thinking that killing
infidels is a duty enjoined by God. It is this paranoia and a wholly
intolerant mind set that are the real killer of men, women and children
of Bahawalpur. Islam has the misfortune of being invoked for opposite
purposes: some regard it as a benign religion that loves mankind and
holds that killing a person is as good as the killing of whole mankind.
The others quote other parts of scriptures to say that you cannot trust
Christians, Jews and infidels; and when necessary kill them.

It is however true that over the centuries, the kind of belief system
that is typified by the Taliban has remained a minor fringe throughout
the length and breadth of Islamic world. Muslim societies, on the
whole, have learnt to be tolerant and the subcontinental Islam has been,
above all, plural and quite tolerant. How then do we account for the
rise and rise of an intolerant and militant Islam in Pakistan? The
Afghan Taliban are in fact an export from Pakistan; the main theoretical
development has been here. Pakistan is the general headquarters of this
new Islamic Revolution. The reason, in short, was the intense
ideological debate about Pakistan's identity and destiny. New Islamic
Ideologues, led by Moulana Abul Ala Maududi, paved the way for religious
parties to stake the claim for leading Musalmans of Pakistan to the
Vallahala of a uniquely Islamic State. That was to be a Caliphate, on
the model of the four right-guided Caliphs who came after the Prophet.
Later others took over the lead and produced and exported Taliban-style
Islam to Afghanistan with the active assistance of the government (ISI).

The fact of the matter is that today Pakistan is sharply polarised
between the religious parties and their ancillary Jehadi outfits, on one
side, and the rest on the other. All the others are content to live in
a modern nation state run on democratic lines. As Jinnah's vision faded,
democracy collapsed and a succession of dictatorial governments came and
went; throughout, only the religious rhetoric remained the sole
legitimising prop of the dictators. Later, the religious party leaders
realised their own political value and began to aspire for power. Their
sights have been rapidly climbing ever since the Taliban took over
Afghanistan. They are now a contender for power. The old
military-dominated establishment has started feeling threatened, despite
its co-option of some successful professionals and of course
industrialists and moneybags. It has reasons to fear because of the long
symbiotic relationship between the army and the religious zealots.

Commentators are, in justified panic, conjuring up visions of civil war
and worse. While civil war is the logical consequence of the existing
and sharpening polarisation, the prospect is in fact worse. Why?
because the number of religious parties is at least 45 and quite a few
of them are major ones. Each has a private army of its own with
adequate funds and armaments. There would be at least 50 if not more
claimants for the top Islamic slot: Amir-ul-Momenin, the Caliph, who
would be the spiritual and temporal head of all Muslims throughout the
world. All wanting to be new Mulla Omars of Pakistan.

A united front of all these would-be-Caliphs may be possible during the
struggle for snatching power from their former patrons and with the help
of some of them. But let the hour of their victory draw nigh, there
would be splits galore. While many would surely fall by way side, some
are sure to fight it out. That may be the undoing of them and us all.
All these possibilities, if not anyone possibility in particular being
the likelihood, are so many chicken coming home to roost.

______

#2.

[ Fahmida Riaz, a well known Pakistani poet and a defender of women's=20
rights & democratic politics sent in the following note]

o o o

To: act-owner@yahoogroups.com
Date: Mon, 29 Oct 2001 11:07:14 +0000

Right now so many things are happening around here .This attack on=20
Afghanistan is unleashing all the dormant, and not so dormant forces=20
of religious fanaticism , especially in the NWFP province.In the=20
thick mist of emotional outbursts, no one is noticing that the Durand=20
Line between Afghanistan and Pakistan is getting more and more=20
blurred by the day. .Someone will have to decide in the coming months=20
or years where Pakistan begins and Afghanistan ends, if it ends at=20
all. Our fantastic theory of Afghanistan giving us "strategic depth"=20
in the region is standing on it's head.

On the other hand millions of Pashtun refugees pressing against the=20
Chaman border are laying the foundations of future bloodshed in=20
Balochistan The dramatic changes in the ethnic complexion in this=20
province has been driving the Balochs towards Khuzdar and they could=20
violently resent it in the future.as the Sindhis resent the incursion=20
of non Sindhis on their soil resulting from an earlier population=20
displacement in 1947 and thereafter.. This conflict at present has=20
subsided but not without many years of bitter confrontation and, as=20
it grew more complex and complicated, bloodshed and mayhem.

Right now the religious parties are demanding resignation from Parvez=20
Musharraf. In their opinion Pakistan should follow the example of=20
Iraq and servive as an outcast. state . They are dreaming of a=20
worldwide Muslim fraternity of funamentalist states adhering to the=20
Wahabi tenets as practiced by the House of Saud. This is not likely=20
to happen unless the governments in all the 56 Muslim countries are=20
overthrown and Wahabi or quasi wahabi dispensations establish a=20
Taliban like set-up in their countries, . However, this is what they=20
intend to achieve. So all the temporal manifestations of Muslim=20
civilization, its art and architecture, mausoleums and shrines, music=20
and literature ,women's rights etc hang in the balance.

However, this is only one aspect of the present scenario .Underneath=20
the religious and moralistic rhetoric , or perhaps parallel to it ,=20
is the striving of the powerful western world to appropriate the=20
energy resources of planet earth, much of which are located in the=20
lands inhabited by other people and other races who are now, by some=20
quirk of fate or history , Muslim. The Arab groups most wanted by the=20
US avowedly espouse this cause and it strikes a responding chord in=20
the hearts of the peoples of these lands .Perhaps unconsciously they=20
feel that the war in Afghanistan is being fought by the US and its=20
allies to ensure the unjustly low royalty rates for oil and gas in=20
the year 2050

Intertwined with it are also the myopic manipulations of the western=20
powers to prolong global supremacy , In very recent past it made them=20
exploit Islamic fundamentalism to demolish a super power, and that=20
also made it expedient for the US to give an aid of 38 billion=20
dollars to the Talibans a few months ago to create flashpoints in=20
Chechenia, in Sinkiang in China and establish militant Sunni states=20
around Shia Iran to teach it a lesson ( It is noteworthy that at that=20
point in time, Osama bin Laden was ensconced in Afghanistan in the=20
full knowledge of the western powers.)

In this maze, we have to decide which side we stand on and how this=20
can be translated in practical terms.It has something to do with our=20
being Muslim but a lot to do with purely secular concept of justice=20
and even a just global market leading to giobal peace and development=20
in the twenty first century..

Fahmida [Riaz]

______

#3.

http://www.villagevoice.com/issues/0143/kamber.php

The Village Voice (New York City, USA)
Week of October 24 - 30, 2001

A Tiny Antiwar Movement Takes on Nukes, Military Spending, and Dictatorship
Pakistan's Peaceniks
by Michael Kamber

ISLAMABAD, PAKISTAN=97"This is not the dawn we had dreamed of, this=20
blood-stained dawn," wrote the Pakistani poet Faiz Ahmad Faiz of his=20
nation's violent birth. In 1947, when British India was divided into=20
Muslim Pakistan and the largely Hindu India, the trains arrived=20
silently at their destinations=97their cargo a bumper crop of death;=20
thousands of Muslims shot and stabbed by maddened crowds as they fled=20
west. Half a million people would die on both sides before the=20
carnage ended.

Pakistan was born in strife; in strife it remains, engaged in a=20
nuclear standoff with India, deeply enmeshed in military actions in=20
Afghanistan and the disputed province of Kashmir, and spending $2.9=20
billion a year on guns and soldiers. Today the populace takes comfort=20
in the machine-gun toting soldiers that loiter in public places and=20
street corners across the country.

The country's minuscule peace movement has its work cut out for it.=20
"I don't know if I would even call it a peace movement. It is=20
something=97maybe an initiative?" says Saba Gul Khattak of the=20
Citizens' Peace Committee, a group of 100 or so activists in=20
Islamabad. The CPC is part of a large coalition, the Pakistan Peace=20
Committee, an umbrella organization of about 1000 peace activists in=20
this nation of 140 million.

The political views of this small group are wildly divergent from=20
those of the average Pakistani, who could be described as=20
pro-military, pro-nuclear, deeply hostile towards India, and content=20
with Pakistan's military dictatorship. The peace activists conduct=20
community workshops and hold small demonstrations and press=20
conferences in the face of skepticism from the populace and=20
harassment from the authorities. Their goal, they say, is to raise=20
awareness about what they see as the dangers of Pakistan's massive=20
militarization, its lack of democratic government, and the effects of=20
economic globalization.

Faiza Mirza (right), with her daughter Fariha, supports militarism:=20
"You have to fight back." (Photograph by Michael Kamber)

If there was a catalyzing event for Pakistan's antiwar movement, it=20
was the country's first nuclear tests, which took place in 1998.=20
Arch-rival India had provocatively detonated five nuclear devices. A=20
wave of near hysteria swept Pakistan; the press and public demanded a=20
response to the saber rattling. Faced with U.S. sanctions that would=20
cost the country hundreds of millions of dollars, Pakistan=20
nevertheless went ahead with its own series of trials; six bombs were=20
exploded, doing India one better. Citizens celebrated in the streets=20
and the government made May 28, the day of the first successful=20
trial, a national holiday. (Simultaneously, it declared that May 2,=20
the worldwide labor holiday, would no longer be celebrated.) Echoing=20
the sentiment of many, an Islamabad resident explained recently, "We=20
never felt secure until we had our own bomb."

A small group of academics and NGO (nongovernmental organization)=20
employees=97policy planners, aid workers, and union organizers=97was=20
stunned by these sentiments and banded together to form the CPC. "We=20
don't need nuclear bombs in our country," said Roshan, a CPC member=20
who asked that her real name not be used. "If we stop making bombs,=20
all that money can be spent on schools, hospitals, and development."

CPC member Saba Gul Khattak is the daughter and granddaughter of army=20
officers. She is now researching Pakistan's history of=20
militarization, as well the peace movements of its early years. She=20
vividly remembers the 1965 and 1971 wars with India, the bombs=20
exploding, the roar of airplanes and tracers filling the night sky.=20
She argues that there has always been a peace movement in Pakistan,=20
but that much of it occurred in literature and poetry, which was=20
banned by the government, allowing no consciousness to take root. "In=20
a state-sanctioned discourse these thoughts were wiped out, and so=20
there is no collective memory," she explains. "If the state bans your=20
voice, then your words become just a solitary event that takes place,=20
and with time, it fades from memory."

Today, state-sanctioned obstacles to peace organizing continue. Aasim=20
Sajjad, a CPC mainstay and union organizer, can't remember how many=20
times he has been jailed here. "Maybe a dozen," he says. His crime?=20
Publicly criticizing=97and demonstrating against=97the military=20
dictatorship of General Pervez Musharraf. "All the power in Pakistan=20
is in one man," says Izmat Shahjehan, a fiery, outspoken CPC member.=20
"He's the president, the chief of the army, the prime minister.=20
Parliament has been dissolved. He has no constituency=97he's never been=20
elected=97and now he alone sits down with Bush and makes all decisions=20
in the name of the people of Pakistan. We know this military=20
government is going to stay=97the U.S. supports it=97but democracy has=20
never been more important for us."

Yet most Pakistanis much prefer General Musharraf to the man from=20
whom he seized control, the elected but unpopular Nawaz Sharif. "For=20
most Pakistanis, the concept of peace and democracy is meaningless,"=20
says Sajjad. "It does not really mean anything unless linked to=20
people putting food on the table. There was a military coup almost=20
exactly two years ago [in which Musharraf took power]. Nobody said a=20
word. Democracy in and of itself is irrelevant to these people."

Sajjad sees the current debate over the war in Afghanistan as a=20
window of opportunity, one he is trying to exploit. He believes=20
unionizing workers is an important step in getting them involved in=20
the democratic process, and he is trying to organize brick-workers,=20
shoemakers, and taxi drivers. "We need to link them to other groups=20
and explain how the democratization of the state will benefit them,"=20
he says.

But unionizing here is a difficult process. Only 4 percent of the=20
workforce is unionized, and unions are forbidden in the country's=20
large industrial export zones. Students are forbidden from organizing=20
as well, depriving Pakistan's antiwar movement of a natural source of=20
activists.

A further obstacle is the class divide between the activists and=20
Pakistan's proletariat. Most Pakistanis are agrarian, illiterate, and=20
desperately poor. Per capita income is $480 a year. The CPC is made=20
up of the upper-middle-class city dwellers. There are several Ph.D.'s=20
among its members and many have studied abroad, usually in the United=20
States or England.

The class divide was clearly on display at a mid-October press=20
conference held at the Marriott hotel. The group held the briefing in=20
English, in hopes of attracting the foreign press. But the=20
English-language media was otherwise occupied, and only the local=20
Urdu-language press attended, most of whose members know only=20
rudimentary English. "Our speaker was speaking in the most complex=20
academic jargon," recalls Roshan. "Intents are good, but the local=20
journalists couldn't even follow what he was saying. I kept saying,=20
'Let's switch to Urdu,' but he just kept going." The CPC presentation=20
was followed by a barrage of hostile, accusatory questions from the=20
local press.

Roshan goes on to tell an anecdote about a friend who announced she=20
was planning to take her servant to a CPC demonstration. Was the=20
friend trying to increase consciousness among her employees? asked=20
Roshan. "No," came the reply. "It's hot out, and if I get tired of=20
holding this placard, she can carry it around for me."

Sajjad listened to Roshan talk on a recent evening. "What we're=20
saying is unintelligible to others," he agreed. "Unless we change=20
that, ordinary Pakistanis will never hear our message." Still, the=20
CPC press conferences and demonstrations do occasionally get airtime.=20
Often they are ridiculed, portrayed as unpatriotic, or even subject=20
to veiled threats, yet even the brief television appearances are a=20
valuable outlet for the group's message.

And there have been other successes as well. Shandana Khan, like most=20
members, an employee of one of the dozens of NGOs scattered=20
throughout Islamabad, recently sent out an e-mail to 18 friends and=20
colleagues asking for funds and materials to aid the incoming Afghan=20
refugees. Despite her objections, the e-mail was passed on,=20
eventually arriving in places as far-flung as Singapore and the U.S.=20
She has been deluged with donations and supplies. To date, five=20
truckloads of food and blankets have been sent to Afghan refugees.

Other members see the antiwar efforts as intrinsically tied to an=20
antiglobalization campaign. Pakistan's economy is in tatters;=20
unemployment is rampant among young men, whom the activists see as=20
providing cannon fodder for militant fundamentalist groups that=20
indoctrinate and send teenagers to fight in Kashmir and Afghanistan.=20
"My own cousins say, 'What can I do, our kids are out in the street,=20
getting into trouble, they have nothing to do,' " says Shahjehan.=20
"They say, 'We'll send them to a madrassa (a religious school where=20
many Pakistani youth are taught by fundamentalist teachers), they'll=20
learn the Qur'an. It will pacify them.' Now my brother's three sons=20
have met these recruiters, and they want to go to Afghanistan to=20
fight with the Taliban. They say, 'We get three thousand rupees as a=20
bonus (about $50), we get to see another country, and if we're=20
killed, we get a one-way ticket to heaven.' "

In various forms, Pakistan has always had a small progressive=20
movement. Yet for many Pakistani peace activists, it was time spent=20
as students in England and America that helped to politicize=20
them=97that reinforced their belief in democracy and protest.

And yet today they are fighting against what they regard as the=20
pernicious influences and policies of the West. Anti-American=20
sentiment runs deep among many activists, so deep that it has created=20
schisms within the group. "Who's the real terrorist? America!" was=20
the favored chant at the CPC's last rally, a lackluster affair held=20
last week and attended by perhaps 20 activists, 40 journalists, and=20
80 police officers. Towards the end of the rally, Pervez Hoodbhoy, a=20
committee member, could take it no more. "I lost my temper," he=20
recalls. "I started yelling, 'If you're going to talk about=20
terrorists, let's shout about Osama first, then America.' "

Hoodbhoy talked about his differences with the majority of CPC=20
members last week as he sat in his modest home on the grounds of=20
Quaid-i-Azam University, where he has spent 28 years as a professor=20
of nuclear physics. "How hard it is that I came back to Pakistan=20
because of the crimes of Vietnam and that I should be here today=20
stopping people from shouting death to America," he says. Hoodbhoy=20
became radicalized during his time at MIT, where he arrived in 1968.=20
He attended SDS rallies, participated in building takeovers, and=20
later spurned job offers in the U.S. "Here in Pakistan, I can make=20
more of a difference," he says. But he is increasingly disturbed by=20
the attitudes of many of his fellow citizens.

"September 11 was mass murder," he says, "And it should be condemned.=20
People who talk about peace have no business saying the U.S. brought=20
it upon itself. It's one thing to try to understand the roots, but=20
first you should condemn this mass murder. I'm not finding the=20
condemnation."

Hoodbhoy had a seminar planned for September 12. He changed the topic=20
to a discussion about the attack, seeking to use the event as a=20
catalyst for change. Among many of the students there was a=20
celebratory mood, he recalls. "They said, 'Worse things have happened=20
in the world, many of them perpetrated by the U.S.=97why are you making=20
a big deal out of this?' I said, 'Before our eyes, we saw the deaths=20
of thousands of people. This is a defining moment in history.' "=20
Through the seminar, Hoodbhoy believes, he was able to remind a few=20
students about the concept of a shared humanity.

One of only half a dozen nuclear physicists in Pakistan, Hoodbhoy=20
understands better than most the dangers he says are inherent in his=20
country's nuclear program. "In this century we may very well see the=20
use of nuclear weapons," he says. "There are many scenarios. There=20
could be fighting along the line of control (in Kashmir), during=20
which India pursues Jihadis (guerrillas fighting against India) into=20
Pakistan, and there is a conventional war. Pakistan is losing=97before=20
the major cities are lost, we use our nuclear weapons. And it would=20
not be just one bomb, it will be many. They will respond. We're=20
talking about tens of millions of people dying."

Hoodbhoy differs from his fellow peace activists in another way as=20
well. Although he is against war on principle, Hoodbhoy is so alarmed=20
by the extremist form of Islam that has swept through Pakistan and=20
Afghanistan that he sees this war as "an opportunity for Pakistan to=20
rid itself of something dangerous. If [the] U.S. does not succeed in=20
driving out the Taliban, we're sunk. [The fundamentalists] have=20
changed the character of Pakistan=97they've taken us back and back and=20
back," he says. "In Malakand [a city in western Pakistan], they have=20
established Islamic penal codes. They cut off hands, stone people to=20
death, smash televisions. They're the barbarians of our times.=20
They're against culture, emancipation of women."

Ten years ago, Hoodbhoy says, a woman in a burkah, a full body=20
covering, stood out on the university campus. Today he has three such=20
students in a class with 13 women; seven others wear hijab, which=20
covers their faces, leaving only a slit for their eyes. Only three go=20
about with just a scarf over their heads.

A former dictator, General Zia-ul-Haq planted the seeds of Islamic=20
fundamentalism in the 1970s. His goal was to create a more=20
conservative Islamic state, one that would be stalwart in the fight=20
against India. By all accounts, that vision has come to pass. Over=20
the last 20 years, the public schools have been "Islamicized," the=20
madrassas staffed with fundamentalist mullahs, and the country's mood=20
has shifted far to the right.

Faiza Mirza, a 36-year-old housewife, is part of this wave of=20
fundamentalism. She lives with her husband and four children in a=20
well-appointed concrete house in the city of Rawalpindi, not far from=20
the raucous downtown area where tens of thousands of merchants and=20
shoppers jam the narrow streets.

She does all the things housewives do the world over. She shops,=20
meets with her children's teachers, drives a car. But she is=20
different from most Western women in that Islam is the guiding force=20
in her life, and she believes that after puberty, women should not be=20
seen uncovered by males outside the family. Accordingly, both she and=20
her 15-year-old daughter, Fariha, wear the hijab.

Sitting in the living room recently, with the other children=20
occasionally coming to listen in, Faiza and her oldest daughter spoke=20
about their beliefs. "If a woman is good-looking," explained the=20
outspoken Fariha, "men will treat her like she is important. They act=20
like what is inside does not matter." Now that she has taken the=20
hijab, she said, men treat her with far more respect. "They have to=20
pay attention to what is inside, not just appearances."

Faiza is a supporter of Afghanistan's Taliban government=97after all,=20
she says, "under the Taliban, there are no guns [among the=20
population], no drugs, no corruption; they are true believers." A=20
college graduate, she thinks that the Taliban's poor treatment of=20
women has been exaggerated; in any case, their beliefs dovetail to a=20
large degree with her own.

As for her own country, she says, "The founders of Pakistan said,=20
'What is the meaning of Pakistan? There is but one God: Allah.' There=20
is no point in having Pakistan except to have an Islamic state." (In=20
fact, Mohammad Ali Jinnah, the "father of Pakistan," specifically=20
conceived of the country as a secular state.) Like many here, Faiza=20
is fearful of India and in favor of Pakistan's nuclear weapons: "If=20
you have a strong neighbor, and he tries to take part of your house,=20
you have to fight back," she explains.

Yet she agrees with the peace activists on one point. General=20
Musharraf speaks without a mandate. If there were a democracy, she=20
and other fundamentalists could elect a more conservative politician,=20
one who shares her and her family's views. If Pakistan's leader were=20
elected, she says, he or she never would have sided with the U.S.=20
against the Taliban. And Faiza's democracy has one caveat. "Only=20
those of sufficient moral standing should be allowed to vote," she=20
says.

Both mother and daughter are well-educated and intelligent=97they come=20
across as reasonable people. "People are the same the world over, we=20
all want the same thing," she says. Then she reminds a visitor that=20
Islam literally means peace.

It is Pakistanis like Faiza that the peace activists would like to=20
reach. Yet the gaps between the two groups are immense. Part of the=20
problem, some peace activists say, is that they have not found a way=20
to explain their movement in a way that emphasizes Islam, an issue=20
that is so central to the lives of many Pakistanis. As Roshan said=20
recently, "There is no movement per se. We have not been able to link=20
our cause to that of the ordinary Pakistani."

______

#4.

New York Times
29 October 2001

THE SPIES
Pakistani Intelligence Had Links to Al Qaeda, U.S. Officials Say

By JAMES RISEN and JUDITH MILLER
Agence France-Presse

Photos:
1. Taliban soldiers at a Qaeda-run camp near Khost, Afghanistan,=20
after the United States bombed it in 1998.

2. Pakistan captured Ramzi Yousef, mastermind of the 1993 World Trade=20
Center bombing.
Reuters
Mir Aimal Kansi, killer of two C.I.A. men.
------------------------------------------------------------------------

WASHINGTON, Oct. 28 - The intelligence service of Pakistan, a crucial=20
American ally in the war on terrorism, has had an indirect but=20
longstanding relationship with Al Qaeda, turning a blind eye for=20
years to the growing ties between Osama bin Laden and the Taliban,=20
according to American officials.

The intelligence service even used Al Qaeda camps in Afghanistan to=20
train covert operatives for use in a war of terror against India, the=20
Americans say.

The intelligence service, known as Inter-Services Intelligence, or=20
I.S.I., also maintained direct links to guerrillas fighting in the=20
disputed territory of Kashmir on Pakistan's border with India, the=20
officials said.

American fears over the agency's dealings with Kashmiri militant=20
groups and with the Taliban government of Afghanistan became so great=20
last year that the Secret Service adamantly opposed a planned trip by=20
President Clinton to Pakistan out of concern for his safety, former=20
senior American officials said.

The fear was that Pakistani security forces were so badly penetrated=20
by terrorists that extremist groups, possibly including Mr. bin=20
Laden's network, Al Qaeda, would learn of the president's travel=20
route from sympathizers within the I.S.I. and try to shoot down his=20
plane.

Mr. Clinton overruled the Secret Service and went ahead with the=20
trip, prompting his security detail to take extraordinary=20
precautions. An empty Air Force One was flown into the country, and=20
the president made the trip in a small unmarked plane. Later, his=20
motorcade stopped under an overpass and Mr. Clinton changed cars, the=20
former officials said.

The Kashmiri fighters, labeled a terrorist group by the State=20
Department, are part of Pakistan's continuing efforts to put pressure=20
on India in the Kashmir conflict. The I.S.I.'s reliance on Mr. bin=20
Laden's camps for training came to light in August 1998, when the=20
United States launched a cruise missile attack against Al Qaeda=20
terrorist camps near Khost, Afghanistan, in response to the bombings=20
of two American Embassies in East Africa. The casualties included=20
several members of a Kashmiri militant group supported by Pakistan=20
who were believed to be training in the Qaeda camps, American=20
officials said.

Since the attacks on the World Trade Center and the Pentagon on Sept.=20
11, the Pakistani government, led by Gen. Pervez Musharraf, has=20
turned against the Taliban and Al Qaeda in favor of the United States.

One element in that shift was General Musharraf's decision to oust=20
the chief of the intelligence service, Lt. Gen. Mahmood Ahmed, who=20
may have been reluctant to join an American-led coalition against the=20
Taliban government that his organization helped bring to power.

Still, American officials said the depth of support within elements=20
of the I.S.I. for a war on the Taliban and Al Qaeda remained=20
uncertain, and a former chief of the agency has become one of the=20
most vocal critics of American policy in Pakistan.

The former director general, Hameed Gul, complained in an interview=20
with a Pakistani newspaper that the Bush administration was demanding=20
that the agency be placed at the disposal of the Americans, as if it=20
were a mercenary force.

"The I.S.I. is a national intelligence agency, whose potential and=20
ouput should not be shared or rented out to other countries," Mr. Gul=20
said.

American officials acknowledged that recent American policies toward=20
Pakistan had fueled such attitudes. In the 1990's the Central=20
Intelligence Agency failed to maintain the close ties it had=20
developed with the I.S.I. in the American agency's covert action=20
program to support the Afghan rebels fighting the Soviet army of=20
occupation in the 1980's.

The close personal relationships that had developed between C.I.A.=20
and I.S.I. officials - General Gul among them - during the war=20
against the Soviets withered away.

"After the Soviets were forced out of Afghanistan," said Shamshad=20
Ahmad, Pakistan's ambassador to the United Nations and a former=20
foreign secretary, "you left us in the lurch with all the problems=20
stemming from the war: an influx of refugees, the drug and gun=20
running, a Kalashnikov culture."

In recent years, in fact, American officials said, the United States=20
offered few incentives to the Pakistanis to end their relationship=20
with the Taliban. Washington gave other issues, including continuing=20
concerns about Pakistan's nuclear weapons program and its human=20
rights record, much greater emphasis than the fight against terrorism.

Those priorities were illustrated by the apathetic reaction within=20
the United States government to a secret memorandum by the State=20
Department's chief of counterterrorism in 1999 that called for a new=20
approach to containing Mr. bin Laden.

Written in the the wake of the bombings of two embassies in East=20
Africa in 1998, the memorandum from Michael A. Sheehan, the State=20
Department's counterterrorism coordinator, urged the Clinton=20
administration to step up efforts to persuade Afghanistan and its=20
neighbors to cut off financing to Mr. bin Laden and end the sanctuary=20
and support being offered to Al Qaeda.

Mr. Sheehan's memo outlined a series of actions the United States=20
could take toward Pakistan, Afghanistan, Saudi Arabia, the United=20
Arab Emirates and Yemen to persuade them to help isolate Al Qaeda.

The document called Pakistan the key, and it suggested that the=20
administration make terrorism the central issue in relations between=20
Washington and Islamabad. The document also urged the administration=20
to find ways to work with the countries to curb terrorist money=20
laundering, and it recommended that the United States go public if=20
any of the governments failed to cooperate.

Mr. Sheehan's plan "landed with a resounding thud," one former=20
official recalled. "He couldn't get anyone interested." As the threat=20
from Al Qaeda and Mr. bin Laden grew and the United States began to=20
press Pakistan harder to break its ties to the Taliban, the=20
Pakistanis feigned cooperation but did little, current and former=20
American officials say.

One former official said the C.I.A. "fell for" what amounted to a=20
stalling tactic aimed at fending off political pressure. The C.I.A.=20
equipped and financed a special commando unit that Pakistan had=20
offered to create to capture Mr. bin Laden. "But this was going=20
nowhere," the former official said. "The I.S.I. never intended to go=20
after bin Laden. We got completely snookered."
The C.I.A. declined to comment on its relationship with the Pakistani=20
agency, saying it did not discuss its ties with foreign intelligence=20
services. But a former senior Clinton administration official=20
disagreed with the idea that the United States had had unrelaistic=20
expectations about the commando proposal.

"There were some concerns about the penetration of the I.S.I., and a=20
lot of uncertainty about whether it would work," the official said.=20
"But all of us, including the intelligence community, thought it was=20
worth doing. What was there to lose?"

What is most remarkable about the tensions that have grown in recent=20
years between the United States and Pakistan's security service is=20
that it was one of the C.I.A.'s closest allies just over a decade ago.

In the 1980's, when the C.I.A. mounted the largest covert action=20
program in its history to support Afghan rebels against the Soviets,=20
the Pakistani agency served as the critical link between the C.I.A.=20
and the rebels at the front lines.

While the C.I.A. supplied money and weapons, it was the I.S.I. that=20
moved them into Afghanistan. The Americans relied almost entirely on=20
the Pakistani service to allocate the weapons to the rebel leaders,=20
and the senior C.I.A. officials involved developed close relations=20
with their counterparts.

But when the Soviet Army finally pulled out of Afghanistan in 1989,=20
the C.I.A. ended its support for the Afghan rebels, the agency's=20
relationship with the Pakistani agency was neglected and Washington=20
began to complain more openly about the Pakistan's nuclear weapons=20
program.

By the early 1990's, officials of the Pakistani agency became=20
resentful over the change in American policy. In 1990, just one year=20
after the Soviets pulled out of Afghanistan, Congress imposed=20
sanctions on Pakistan for its nuclear program.

Faced with turmoil in post-Soviet Afghanistan - which the United=20
States had no interest in addressing in the early 1990's - Pakistan=20
moved in to support the Pashtun ethnic group in southern Afghanistan=20
as it created the Taliban movement.

With Pakistani support, the Taliban gradually took control of most of=20
the country. By 1996, Mr. bin Laden, who had been in Afghanistan in=20
the 1980's, helping to pay for Arab fighters to battle the Soviets,=20
returned and quickly forged a close alliance with the Taliban.

American officials do not believe that the I.S.I. was ever directly=20
involved with Mr. bin Laden and Al Qaeda in terrorist activites=20
against the United States. But the Pakistani agency used Afghan=20
terrorist training camps for its Kashmiri operations, and the=20
Pakistani leadership failed to act as it watched the the relationship=20
between Al Qaeda and the Taliban grow ever closer.

The I.S.I. did cooperate with the C.I.A. and the F.B.I. on several=20
counterterrorism operations in the 1990's. Most notably, the=20
Pakistanis were instrumental in the capture in Islamabad in 1995 of=20
Ramzi Yousef, the mastermind of the first World Trade Center bombing=20
in 1993, and the arrest in Pakistan in 1997 of Mir Aimal Kansi, who=20
killed two C.I.A. employees on a shooting rampage outside C.I.A.=20
headquarters in 1993.

American officials now believe that the Pakistanis were finally=20
starting to become alarmed in the last year or two by the extent to=20
which the Taliban had been co-opted by Mr. bin Laden. Still, the=20
I.S.I. did little to extricate itself from its relationship with the=20
Taliban - until Sept. 11.

"I think the Pakistanis realized as time went on that they had made a=20
bad deal," one State Department official said. "But they couldn't=20
find an easy way out of it."

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