[sacw] SACW #1 (29 June 01)

[aiindex@mnet.fr]

South Asia Citizens Wire / Dispatch #1
29 June 2001
http://www.mnet.fr/aiindex

----------

#1. A Tale Of Two Neo-feudals: Mahathir Mohamad & Zulfi. Bhutto=20
Reconsidered. Part 3
#2. Sri Lanka: A commission to probe the anti-Tamil pogrom of 1983
#3. Where Sri Lankans fear to tread

-----------------------------------------

#1.

28 June 2001
For this week's Malaysiakini.com (The Other Malaysia).
------------------------

The Other Malaysia:

A Tale Of Two Neo-feudals: Mahathir Mohamad and Zulfikar Ali Bhutto=20
Reconsidered.
(Part 3 of 3)

By Farish A Noor.

Zulfikar Ali Bhutto=92s days in politics were numbered from the very=20
beginning. But being the sort of feudal leader that he was, his story was=20
inevitably told in epic proportions. When he was a child his mother had=20
taken the young Bhutto to a palm reader who predicted that the young feudal=
=20
would blaze a trail of fire on the political landscape of his country. The=
=20
child was destined to leave a mark on the nation=92s psyche, claimed the=20
fortune teller- but he could not (or would not) say what was in store for=20
Bhutto after his fiftieth birthday.

As Bhutto reached the fateful date in his life, he grew ever more erratic=20
and controversial in his thoughts and deeds. The man managed to inspire an=
=20
entire generation of Pakistanis with his calls for rapid development and an=
=20
end to the bad old days of the past. His nationalisation scheme had=20
uprooted the traditional ruling elites and turned the economy on its head.=
=20
His violently patriotic rhetoric of national dignity and self-determination=
=20
provoked a hostile response from the United States as well as Pakistan=92s=
=20
more powerful neighbour, India.

However Bhutto the populist also proved to be Bhutto the demagogue and=20
despot. While he laboured to put an end to traditional forms of domination=
=20
and control, he also introduced new forms of coercion that were equally=20
brutal. His attacks on the free press, his manipulation of the judiciary,=20
his use of restrictive laws, his penchant for declaring states of emergency=
=20
whenever he or his party were under threat and his reliance on his own=20
crypto-fascist Federal Security Force to intimidate (and even kill) his=20
political opponents made it clear to the people that the so-called=20
=93people=92s hero=94 was more than capable of turning on the people themse=
lves.

But the fateful mistake came when Bhutto, in a flawed attempt to jolt the=20
senior leadership of the armed forces, promoted a certain General Zia=20
ul=92Haq as its new commander in chief in 1976. The selection of Zia was=20
meant to serve as a snub and a reminder that it was Bhutto who was calling=
=20
the shots. Bhutto wanted to show that he could make and unmake the=20
leadership of the army (and any other institution in Pakistan for that=20
matter) on his own terms. General Zia was the son of a lower ranking civil=
=20
servant from Jullundur who had no foreign education or landed estates to=20
speak of. His promotion to the senior most position within the army was=20
effectively a blow to the feudal system that had taken root within its=20
senior ranks.

Once again, Bhutto was trying to show that he was in charge of the=20
situation. His own relationship with General Zia was a highly complex, and=
=20
at many times, painfully embarrassing one. On a number of public occasions=
=20
(including visits and meetings with foreign dignitaries), Bhutto would=20
openly refer to Zia as his =93monkey general=94 who would perform tricks fo=
r=20
him. Bhutto poured scorn on Zia for the latter=92s humble family background=
,=20
sartorial manners, appearance- even his moustache. Meanwhile Zia bided his=
=20
time and slowly began to sow the seeds of the fall of his mentor. While=20
Bhutto insisted that politics and religion should not mix, Zia was slowly=20
going ahead with his plans to Islamise the armed forces from within,=20
turning it into a =93Mullah=92s army=94 that Bhutto found abhorrent.(1)

In the end, Bhutto=92s fall came when it became obvious that he no longer=20
represented the values and ideas that he had spoken off all the while. By=20
the late 1970s the =91people=92s leader=92 and =91democratic reformer=92 wa=
s, in=20
fact, attempting to radically alter the constitution to give himself even=20
more power and authority than ever before.(2) The man who claimed to want=20
to lead Pakistan away from the days of obscurantist religion and=20
fundamentalism was also courting the radical Islamist parties left, right=20
and centre. Bhutto gave the Jami=92at-ul Ulema-I Islam (JUI) party a free=20
hand in the north. (The JUI later became the principle sponsors of the=20
Mujahideen and then the Taliban movement in the 1980s). So desperate had he=
=20
become to keep his image intact that Bhutto even went as far as donating a=
=20
solid gold door to the shrine of the Sufi saint Lal Shabaz Kalander in=20
Sehwan Sharif in his efforts to boost his Islamic image and credentials.

But none of Bhutto=92s efforts bore fruit. In a coup attempt codenamed=20
Operation Fair Play, the army under the direction of General Zia took=20
control and Bhutto was apprehended along with his clique of cronies and=20
fellow collaborators. He was accused of a host of crimes- ranging from=20
corruption to treason and murder. But in the end, it was the testimony of=20
the director of his own Federal Security Force (3) that sent Zulfikar Ali=20
Bhutto to the gallows in 1979.

Zia and the Islamisation of Pakistan.

During the 1980s, Zia worked tactically with the Islamists (and vice-versa)=
=20
to legitimise his grab for power and to justify the policies that he=20
introduced. Pakistan opted for all-out Islamisation, particularly in the=20
wake of the Iranian revolution of 1979. Zia Islamised the state=20
bureaucracy, encouraged the creation of more and more institutions of=20
Islamic learning, and indirectly supported (or at least tolerated) the=20
growth of numerous forms of Islamic militancy in the country.

The era of General Zia remains, for many Pakistani liberals and=20
secularists, the darkest hour of the country. The ostensibly Islamic laws=20
he introduced turned the country into a conservative homosocial environment=
=20
where women were virtually absent from public space. (During this time,=20
Western movies were banned on the grounds that they were morally corrupt,=20
but John Wayne flicks were regularly shown as they, at least, portrayed a=20
=91positive=92 image of men as gun-wielding homicidal maniacs). Zia=92s Isl=
amic=20
laws also equated fornication and adultery with =91crimes against the State=
=92=20
and more importantly =91crimes against God=92.

But ironically, it was the sheer brutality and oppressiveness of Zia=92s=20
regime that helped to rehabilitate Zulfikar Ali Bhutto. In time, the people=
=20
of Pakistan also grew fed up with the staid militarist rhetoric of Zia. His=
=20
Islamisation campaign was nothing more than a front for the army=92s=20
consolidation of power and the =91holy war=92 against Communist Russia in=20
Afghanistan turned into a massive black market industry for the smuggling=20
of arms and drugs into the country. The madrassahs that Zia promoted also=20
turned into the breeding ground for all kinds of sectarian extremist=20
groups, and in time the country was awash with blood as Sunni Muslims were=
=20
killing Shia Muslims on a daily basis. When Zia finally died in a plane=20
crash in 1988, the people were more than willing to welcome back their=20
feudal-despot leader Zulfikar Ali Bhutto. In his absence, they voted for=20
his daughter Benazir, who proved to be every bit a feudal as her father=20
was. Irony of ironies, it was actually the harrowing experience of living=20
under Zia ul=92Haq=92s military regime that helped to rehabilitate the memo=
ry=20
of Zulfikar Ali Bhutto.

No Zia for Malaysia

The same cannot be said of Malaysia. Since 1981, the country has been=20
living under the rule of a government dominated by the overpowering=20
personality of a sole charismatic leader, Dr. Mahathir Mohamad.

As we have pointed out earlier (see parts 1 and 2), Dr. Mahathir attempted=
=20
an State-sponsored Islamisation programme of his own, like Zulfikar Ali=20
Bhutto. But while Bhutto=92s brand of Statist Islam was heavily influenced =
by=20
his own particular approach to Socialism and populist politics, Dr.=20
Mahathir=92s school of Islam was directed towards a radically different=20
agenda altogether: economic development along Liberal-Capitalist lines. At=
=20
the hands of Malaysia=92s technocrats and =91Islamocrats=92, Islam was rein=
vented=20
as a work ethic that was business-friendly and conducive to economic growth=
=20
and the free market. Dr. Mahathir=92s brand of Islam was also=20
anti-obscurantist and anti-fundamentalist (4), though for different=20
reasons- he wished to create a new school of thought that broke away from=20
the burden of historical baggage from the past. It was, in a sense, an=20
attempt to reinvent Islam and to restore it at the same time.

The rest of the story we are all familiar with by now. Dr. Mahathir could=20
not complete this task on his own, and with the goal in mind he co-opted a=
=20
number of Malay-Muslim Islamist activists, one of whom happened to be none=
=20
other than the young student activist leader Anwar Ibrahim. Anwar was=20
himself a figure that spanned the Malaysian-Pakistani divide in more ways=20
that one. His years in the wilderness of political activism had endeared=20
him to the proponents of Islamisation in Malaysia and Pakistan, and in 1979=
=20
he was even awarded the Mualana Iqbal Centenary award by none other than=20
that =91Islamist=92 military dictator, Zia ul=92 Haq of Pakistan.

But when the Malaysian economic model began to fall apart at the seams with=
=20
the advent of the economic crisis of 1997, things came to a head between=20
the two men.

The economic crisis of 1997-98 ended the Malaysian dream as it quickly=20
turned into a political crisis. Between June and August 1997, the economies=
=20
of Southeast Asia were rocked by the worst financial crisis in decades. Due=
=20
to the overheated and poorly-planned economic development that had taken=20
off since the 1980s, the economies of the region were all suffering from=20
the same set of problems: Banking practices were not properly regulated and=
=20
there was a conspicuous absence of transparency, credit expansion was=20
indiscriminate, the governments had embarked on a number of mega-projects=20
that were economic unviable (not to mention hazardous to the environment)=20
and there was a visible glut in commercial infrastructure in most of the=20
major capitals and industrial zones in the region. When economic bubble=20
finally burst, the entire region experienced a rapid and devastating=20
outflow of capital (dubbed =91hot money=92) which was made all the more fas=
t=20
and uncontrollable thanks to the fact that these economies were opened up=20
to the yet-unregulated global economic and financial architecture.

In Malaysia, the financial crisis brought to the surface irreconcilable=20
differences between the Prime Minister Dr. Mahathir and his Deputy Anwar=20
Ibrahim, who was also Finance Minister at the time. The more conservative=20
Mahathir favoured the introduction of fiscal injections to kick-start the=20
economy and boost domestic consumption once more. His deputy Anwar opted=20
for an austerity drive and higher interest rates that effectively led to a=
=20
crippling credit squeeze in his attempt to prevent further outflow of=20
capital from the economy.

Suddenly the tables had been turned: The nationalist Mahathir was seen by=20
many to be defending his clique of =91crony capitalists=92 and political al=
lies=20
instead of the interests of his nation. The one-time Islamist radical and=20
vocal critic of the United States, Anwar Ibrahim, on the other hand, began=
=20
to employ the rhetoric of =91reform and transparency=92 that was popularise=
d=20
not only by the IMF but also the reformist movement that ousted President=20
Suharto in neighbouring Indonesia.

Things came to a head when the differences between Anwar and Mahathir came=
=20
out into the open. Anwar not only parroted the discourse of the IMF but=20
also denounced the Mahathir administration in an attempt to distance=20
himself from his ex-mentor and political patron. Anwar and his supporters=20
also made unflattering comparisons between Mahathir and Indonesia=92s=20
president Suharto (who was removed from office after widespread street=20
demonstrations in May 1998). Mahathir in turn accused Anwar of being in=20
league with the IMF and the United States, and accused him of acting as a=20
Trojan horse for Western multinationals and governments that were out to=20
=91re-colonise=92 Malaysia. Finally, Anwar was sacked by Dr. Mahathir on th=
e=20
1st of September 1998, the day before the country announced that it would=20
impose capital controls.(5)

Throughout September Anwar took to the streets and mobilised the public in=
=20
his campaign against Dr. Mahathir. He launched the =91Refomasi=92 (reformat=
ion)=20
movement of Malaysia and was soon winning back the support of thousands of=
=20
Malay-Muslim activists, students and UMNO party members. The fact that the=
=20
movement was called reformasi was also significant- it was the same word=20
used by Indonesian activists who toppled the government of Suharto. Then by=
=20
the third week of September, Anwar was arrested and detained. Following=20
that a number of prominent Muslim activists, politicians and academics were=
=20
detained as well. In the weeks that followed, riots broke out in the=20
streets of the capital as soldiers and police confronted demonstrators even=
=20
in places like mosques.

Martyrs and Mentors

The actions of the Mahathir government succeeded only in making Anwar=20
Ibrahim look like a political martyr in the eyes of the Malaysian (and=20
especially Malay-Muslim) public. By eliminating Anwar from the political=20
scene (in a crude and brutal manner, one might add), the Mahathir=20
administration had foreclosed any possibility of Anwar and his followers=20
from coming to power. But by doing so, the establishment had also condemned=
=20
itself.

For as a result of the political removal of Anwar, the Malaysian public=20
will never know of the =91what ifs=92 that might have come about had Anwar =
and=20
his followers from the reformist-Islamist camp come to power. These=20
questions, incidentally are still in the air and the current ruckus about=20
PAS=92s claims that it wants to create an Islamic state in Malaysia if it=20
wins the next elections shows just how sensitive these concerns remain. We=
=20
will never know what might have happened had Anwar and his followers been=20
given the chance to gain political power in the country. Would Malaysia=20
have taken the same route as Pakistan under Zia or Iran under Ayatollah=20
Khomeini? (Two Islamist leaders who were glorified and valorised by Anwar,=
=20
by the way).

Instead, we are now left with the prospects of a country that faces an=20
uncertain future, not knowing for sure who the next Prime Minister will be.=
=20
Here the paths of Mahathir and Bhutto part once again, this time for good.

Bhutto the populist despot was reclaimed by the people he betrayed because=
=20
after his death came another leader whose brutality and hunger for power=20
was even greater than his own. But Mahathir =AD the man once regarded by=20
millions of Malays as their saviour- has instead been reinvented as the=20
great Mahafiraun, Mahazalim and Mahakejam, for the simple reason that in=20
his quest for power he has left no counter-factual examples against his own=
=20
model and his own image (now tarnished, apparently beyond repair). How this=
=20
process came about we will try to address in the next article, entitled=20
=91How Mahathir became the great Mahazalim=92. But the divergent paths that=
=20
Bhutto of Pakistan and Mahathir of Malaysia have taken should remind us all=
=20
that politics is never a predictable science (despite what political=20
scientists like me would say to you), and that the arena of political=20
activity can never be free from the elements of contingency and irony.

End.

Endnotes:

(1) When he was first appointed, General Zia'ul Haq was warned by Zulfikar=
=20
Ali Bhutto that he did not want a 'Mullah's army'. But all the while Zia=20
was working hand in hand with the Islamist parties and movements in the=20
country and he was actively engaged in promoting the ideas of Maulana=20
Maudoodi, the founder-leader of the Jama'at-e Islami in particular.=20
Thousands of copies of Maudoodi's Tafhimul Quran (Translation of the Quran)=
=20
were sold and distributed to regular army troops and officers. In July=20
1976, Zia himself distributed copies of Maudoodi's text as prizes during a=
=20
debate arranged by the Army Education School. The Tafhimul Quran was then=20
proposed as a core text for the examination of junior officers who wanted=20
to gain promotion to the rank of Major and above.

(2) Wolpert (1993) notes that while Zulfikar Ali Bhutto was presenting=20
himself as a democratic leader who wanted to reintroduce democracy to=20
Pakistan as soon as possible, he was in fact working towards a new=20
constitutional arrangement that would give him even more power after the=20
1977 elections. 'He had hired an academic expert on constitutional=20
government, Professor Leslie Wolf-Phillips of the London School of=20
Economics and Political Science, who was busy preparing a presidential=20
constitution in London, working for the Pakistan embassy there, devising=20
'secret codes' and deceptive uses of appendices to draft a document that=20
no-one would be able to read or understand until Bhutto was ready to spring=
=20
it on an unsuspecting nation.' (Stanley Wolpert, Zulfi Bhutto of Pakistan:=
=20
His Life and Times. Oxford Pakistan, Karachi. 1993. pg. 267).

(3) Bhutto was put on trial for the attempted murder of his adversary and=20
rival Ahmad Raza Kasuri. During the trial, one of the men who accused him=20
was his own follower Masood Mahmood, Director General of the Federal=20
Security Force (FSF)- the para-military armed force that he had created for=
=20
himself as his Praetorian Guard. Masood claimed that Bhutto had ordered the=
=20
FSF to carry out the killing and that he was the mastermind behind the=20
botched assassination attempt.

(4) By the term =91fundamentalist=92 we are referring to a form of conserva=
tive=20
scripturalism that is best compared to the Christian fundamentalist=20
movements that have emerged in the West and in North America in particular.

(5) Mahathir=92s decision to remove Anwar was based on claims that the latt=
er=20
was both morally and politically corrupt. Anwar was accused of being a=20
closet bisexual who had several sexual liaisons with both men and women.=20
Anwar in turn denounced Mahathir as the ring-leader in a complex =91high=20
level conspiracy=92 to destroy his political career.

________

#2.

The Island (Colombo)
Wenesday 27 June 2001

Cat's Eye
A commission on 1983 at long last!

Cat's Eye heartily welcomes the Sri Lankan government's move to set up a
commission to probe the anti-Tamil pogrom of 1983. In fact, it is extremely
shocking that it has taken so long for any government, be it of whatever
political persuasion, to set up such a commission of inquiry. Since 1983, w=
e
have set up commissions to probe allegations of bribery and corruption and
misuse of power.

We have set up commissions to investigate the assassination of individual
politicians. We have set up commissions to hear about the atrocities that
were perpetrated during the JVP uprising from 1987-1989 and we have built
moving monuments such as the Shrine of Innocents in Kotte to commemorate
those who died during this uprising. But we as a nation have consistency
refused to confront the gaping wound that was left in the wake of July 1983=
.
This wound continues to fester but we have shut our eyes and held our noses
and gone merrily on our way. By our very silence, we have been complicity
with the violence that was perpetrated against our Tamil neighbours, friend=
s,
co-workers and class mates, in 1983. In 1993, ten years after this event of
such tragic proportions, it was only a handful of journalists and research
institutes such as the International Centre for Ethnic Studies, Colombo =E2=
=80=94
under the directorship of the late Dr. Neelan Tiruchelvam =E2=80=94 who sou=
ght to
commemorates the many thousands who suffered at the hands of Sinhala mobs a=
nd
most importantly, to analyse the causes and consequences of such forms of
violence within our society.

Truth and Reconciliation

According to Athauda Seneviratne, Minister for Ethnic Affairs, the commissi=
on
on the 1983 pogrom
will be modelled on South Africa=E2=80=99s Truth and Reconciliation. Commis=
sion=20
which
was set up after the overthrow of Apartheid. "The commission=E2=80=99s basi=
c task",
the Minister has noted, "will be to unravel the extent of damage the riots
had done to the polity and economy of Sri Lanka and educate the people on t=
he
need for ethnic understanding and harmony. The present economic difficultie=
s
are due to the war, which in turn is the result of the 1983 riots". These a=
re
laudable aspirations indeed, though we find the pinpointing of the 1983
pogrom as the origin of the present war rather disingenuous and wrong heade=
d.
We don=E2=80=99t want to go into the causes of the civil war in Sri Lanka o=
nce again
here but it is very clear that there was dissension among the Tamil communi=
ty
for many decades which culminated in the formation of several Tamil militan=
t
groups in the late 1970s due to the consistent ignoring of Tamil grievances
by successive, primarily Sinhala- dominated, governments. The fact that the
civil war was exacerbated after the pogrom of 1983 is however, a more
sustainable argument.
Mr. Seneviratne=E2=80=99s intention to model this commission on that of the=
Truth=20
and
Reconciliation Commission (TRC) in South Africa and his hope that this
commission will be able to educate the Sri Lankan populace on the need for
ethnic understanding and harmony, must be taken very seriously. The project
of the South African TRC was to provide a quasi-judicial setting in which t=
he
truth was sought and some measure of justice rendered in order to create a
more desirable future for a new nation. Most impotently, it provided a publ=
ic
forum for those whose voices had until then been suppressed, repressed or
uneasily accommodated. Once the TRC began their sittings it soon became cle=
ar
that it was not only "truth" and "reconciliation" that was on the cards.
More importantly, the commission had become a space within which losses cou=
ld
be mourned and pain and suffering acknowledged in a collective manner. As t=
he
historian Dominick LaCapra has noted, the "Truth and Reconciliation
Commission was in its own way a trauma recovery centre".

The Sri Lankan context

If even half the successes of the TRC can be achieved in Sri Lanka we could=
a
long way as a nation. But we must also be aware that the TRC in South Afric=
a
has arisen out of specific historical and political circumstances. Most
crucially, the TRC was formed in a context where former victims/survivors
were now rulers who were trying to find ways and means of reconciling
themselves with former rulers who had been the perpetrators of their
oppression and suffering. This obviously will not be the case in Sri Lanka.
In Sri Lanka, the commission will be formed in a context where the
victims/survivors are not the new rulers but only a significant minority in=
a
country that seems to have become even more anti-minoritarian during the la=
st
few years =E2=80=94the recent riots in Bindunuwewa and Mawanella being just=
two
tragic examples. The formation of new political parties which openly and
aggressively campaign for the primacy of majoritananism is yet another
troubling example, though their dismal performance at the recent general
elections is a hopeful sign that the voters in the south are sceptical of
such incendiary rhetoric.
Consistent attempts to portray the Sinhala majority as one that is vulnerab=
le
and constantly besieged by grasping and manipulative minorities will be qui=
te
decisively negated with the setting up of a probe into the incidents that
took place in 1983. The Sinhala mobs were clearly not the only aggressors
here. A Sinhala majority government organized and participated in the
violence and allowed its institutions of law and order such as the Police t=
o
watch unconcernedly while Tamil citizens were killed and their houses burne=
d.
All those who looted, all those who stood to gain by Tamils going out of
business or vacating rented homes or leaving the island, and all those who
remained silent during and after this carnage were aggressors too, in varyi=
ng
degrees. We hope the commission will provide a space within which all of us
can come forward and acknowledge our complicity and ask forgiveness of our
Tamil brothers and sisters.
In such a context, we must also guard against the Sinhala majority trying t=
o
enter into a balancing of accounts as in "the LTTE killed thirteen Sinhala
soldiers" or "we thought the Tigers had invaded Colombo" etc. Such
constructions of quid pro quo A" what are mobilised by both the LTTE and th=
e
Sri Lankan forces as in "you bombed A so we bombed B" and will lead us
nowhere.
The fact that a commission of inquiry has been suddenly appointed so many
years (18 to be exact) after the pogrom of 1983 has also raised questions a=
nd
suspicions. However, Minister Seneviratne has stressed that witch-hunting i=
s
not the motive behind the decision to set up a commission to probe the 1983
anti-Tamil pogrom: "Nobody will be charged or punished." The Minister has
also specifically asserted that the intention of the commission is not to
browbeat the opposition United National Party (UNP) and force it to abandon
its present bid to table a no-confidence motion against the government. "Th=
e
idea is not to re open old wounds and animosities but to build bridges", th=
e
Minister has noted. We trust the Minister is sincere and will keep his word=
.

Compensation and Representation

Deputy Minister of Ethnic Affairs, K. Ganeshamoorthy, has also brought up t=
he
issue of compensation for the victims and survivors of violence and we
understand that the commission will probably consider this issue as well.
Setting a price on loss of life and limb and the incurring of agony and
anguish is always a painful process and the government should embark on thi=
s
with care and sensitivity.
The composition of the commission has not been finalised as yet, but it is
likely to be comprised of persons who have served in the judiciary and will
be representative of the multi-ethnic composition of our society. We also
hope it will be representative in terms of gender.
We stress the latter point advisedly based on several South African
feminists=E2=80=99 critiques of the early operations of the TRC for not pro=
viding an
adequately sensitive and supportive forum for women who came before the
commission. However, credit must go to the members of the TRC for heating
these criticisms and trying to rectify them as much as possible. In light o=
f
similar difficulties being faced by the Sri Lankan commission, we strongly
advice the government to consult feminist and human rights activists from t=
he
very inception of this process. After so many years without redress, we=20
don=E2=80=99t
want this commission becoming yet another instance of too little too late f=
or
the Tamil community in Sri Lanka.

______

#3.

Asia Times
28 June 2001

Where Sri Lankans fear to tread

PIRIMANALANKULAM, Sri Lanka - Rolls and rolls of barbed wire glint in the=20
morning sun as unarmed soldiers await the weary men, women and children=20
straggling along the long gravel path through the no-man's land in this=20
tense northern Sri Lanka village.

Carrying a few clothes, bottles of treacle and squawking chickens, these=20
people are being helped by the International Committee of the Red Cross as=
=20
they cross into government-controlled territory from areas run by Tamil=20
Tigers.

"See the suffering the people have to go through," laments Father R=20
Arulraja, a Roman Catholic priest who went to the "other" side to attend=20
his brother's wedding. "People are struggling to cope due to the embargo on=
=20
a range of goods. Prices of essentials are high. There's no work and no=20
money."

He says people long for peace and urged that all sides in the 18-year-old=20
conflict, which stems from the minority Tamils' campaign for a separate=20
homeland and which has resulted in the loss of more than 65,000 lives, end=
=20
this sad situation.

The peace process between the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam and=20
Chandrika Kumaratanga has been marred by a series of starts and stops. The=
=20
process suffered a serious setback in the beginning of last year when two=20
suicide bombers killed a total of 35 people and left Kumaratanga blind in=20
one eye. When prominent Tamil lawyer Kumar Ponnambolam was assassinated, it=
=20
appeared the quest for peace could become permanently stalled.

Although a peace initiative is still being brokered between the two sides,=
=20
the Tamils now object to the Sri Lankan government's call to change the=20
role of peace envoy Erik Solheim of Norway, a country with a large Tamil=20
population. In the wake of a series of humiliating defeats suffered by the=
=20
Sri Lankan army at the hands of the Tigers, as well as the government's=20
refusal to grant the Tamils' requested reciprocal ceasefire, it appears=20
peace may still find itself in short supply. In the meantime, the people in=
=20
Sri Lanka's no man's land continue to suffer - and wait.

The plea for peace has been echoed by a majority of the 1,400 people - 700=
=20
crossed from either side last Tuesday at the only road between the north=20
and south of Sri Lanka, watched by armies from both sides.

Fresh-faced young soldiers, most probably in their teens, man sandbagged=20
and camouflaged bunkers with quiet efficiency. Along the crossing, about 15=
=20
kilometers off the government-controlled town of Vavuniya, lie a cluster of=
=20
thatched huts with a solitary Red Cross flag fluttering in the middle.

A few vehicles of the Red Cross, which supervises the crossing and ensures=
=20
both sides do not shoot it out, are parked in this no-man's land. Tiger=20
soldiers can be seen at a distance of 300 to 500 meters from the government=
=20
barrier, watching the soldiers.

There is an eerie silence. There have been some shootouts between the two=20
sides but the Red Cross has intervened to ensure that Tamils and government=
=20
forces abide by a Red Cross-initiated agreement in December 1999 to allow=20
civilians and vehicles to cross to either side of the "border".

The Tigers have on-and-off controlled large stretches of land in the=20
northern Wanni region. During these periods, crossing into their territory=
=20
and back into government-held areas has been restricted by both sides.=20
Prior to December 1999, the only crossing point was at Mankulam on the=20
Jaffna-Kandy road, which went straight to the northernmost point of Sri Lan=
ka.

The current crossing lies on the Vavuniya-Mannar road heading toward the=20
northwest coast and residents are forced to make a detour to travel to=20
areas north and east of the Wanni region. While government supply trucks=20
carry food and other essentials into Tiger-held areas twice a week, the=20
region is still short of supplies, particularly medicines.

"The situation is very bad. Prices are high. There are no medical=20
facilities. Milk products is not available," says 74-year-old S Mylvaganam,=
=20
who has two-days of stubble on his chin. He had gone to see his daughter=20
who is teaching in Mullaitivu, which is on the eastern side of the Wanni.=20
Mylvaganam, like many of the elder Tamils, has seen it all happening - the=
=20
close bonds between the Tamil and the Sinhalese in the 1950-1970s, then the=
=20
frustration of Tamils over not getting their share of jobs, discrimination,=
=20
their demands for separation, and the ensuing conflict. He has lived in=20
Colombo, the Sri Lankan capital, for 30 years and still does.

"I don't like this division," he says. "Those days we went to Sinhala homes=
=20
in the south and the Sinhalese came to our homes in Jaffna to visit places=
=20
like Nagadipa. But now we are afraid to speak to each other. Politicians=20
are at fault."

There is no direct transport in the Wanni. Travelers have to break their=20
journey at three points and pay 1,200 rupees (US$13) for transport alone,=20
for a journey which costs a fraction of this price during peace time.=20
Residents going to the north have to travel through Pirimanalankulam and=20
fly to Jaffna, the northern capital, in a costly military-run transport=20
plane with limited space.

"It's easier to go to a foreign country than travel to the north," whispers=
=20
a weary traveler as he is checked by security personnel at the barrier.=20
Getting permission to travel to either side is not easy. From 5 am, more=20
than 800 people gather outside the gates of the main government office at=20
Vavuniya with bags containing belongings. Kerosene, coconut oil, fuel,=20
cycle tubes, bottles of aerated water, a child's wooden rocking horse, a=20
tricycle, and brightly colored plastic chairs are strewn along the road.=20
Some have spent close to a week awaiting permission to travel from=20
government officers.

On paper, the procedure looks simple. Anyone who wants to visit Tamil-held=
=20
territory, which the government labels as "uncleared areas", fills out a=20
form and hands it over with a photocopy of his or her identity card to=20
officials and is issued a card. Once cleared by the army, a passenger list=
=20
is put up in the government office where people check it out and get a=20
small, numbered card that is their passport to the other side.

Crossings are allowed only on Tuesdays and Saturdays. When travelers gather=
=20
at the office, they are herded into sheds and queue up - the first line=20
being for government servants and the sick and the rest for the others.=20
Each is allowed to carry 40 kilograms, with restrictions on certain items.

A junior medical officer at the head of the government servants' queue=20
laments that the procedure is arduous. Her family, husband and two=20
children, one of whom is disabled, are in Colombo because her husband works=
=20
there. "My transfer [to Colombo] was approved a year ago, but the people in=
=20
the [northern] Kilinochchi area have not released me because there is a=20
lack of staff," she says.

Life has been like this for the past eight years. Her husband, who has=20
accompanied her to Vavuniya to see her off, gets back to Colombo and=20
worries until she reaches her workplace in Tiger-controlled territory and=20
sends him a letter that she is safe. She will reach Akrankulam village,=20
where she works, at 3 am the next day after an 18-hour journey which should=
=20
normally take less than two hours. The mail is irregular, so he does not=20
know when he will hear from her again.

When she reached Vavuniya the last time, she and her husband got an urgent=
=20
call that her mother had died in Colombo. By the time they reached Colombo,=
=20
her brother had come to Sri Lanka from England for the funeral. On the=20
Tiger-controlled side of Pirimanalankulam, the procedure to enter=20
government areas is not much different. Residents need clearance from the=20
Tigers first.

The old, the feeble, and the young, assisted by the Red Cross, make their=20
way to the army checkpoint. Their bags are not as heavy as those heading in=
=20
the reverse direction. They bring only a few clothes, treacle, dried fish,=
=20
and at times home-bred chickens in cardboard boxes. They cross no-man's=20
land to the army side and undergo body checks.

At five o'clock in the evening, the army gate made of sticks and barbed=20
wire is closed. However, as dusk falls, families seeking refuge on the=20
cleared side and also Tigers who want to surrender approach the checkpoint.

"My soldiers have greeted those who have come to surrender. They come=20
generally under cover of darkness. We ask them to take off their outer=20
clothing to see whether they are armed. Then we give them [something] to=20
eat if they've not had anything," Tissera says. "It's the same with the=20
families who creep along the jungle and seek refuge on this side, with a=20
white flag. About two families come a week."

(Asia Times Online/Inter Press Service)

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