[sacw] SACW #2. (09 Oct. 01)

[Harsh Kapoor]

South Asia Citizens Wire | Dispatch #2.
09 October 2001
http://www.mnet.fr/aiindex

------------------------------------------

#1. India: Romance of NE homeland dreams may survive war on terror=20
(Sanjib Baruah)
#2. Pakistan: An interview with Dr Hamza Alavi (Abdul Sattar)
3. The alternative option - The Government of Pakistan has begun to=20
mobilise public opinion in support of its "option-less" decision to=20
join the international coalition for aggression (Aasim Sajjad Akhtar=20
and Ali Qadir)
#4. Bangladesh: Minority voting issues: When Shamsur Rahman protests...
#5. Book Announcement: 'Power Politics' by Arundhati Roy
#6. Lecture: "Gender and Nation in Indian Calendar Art" (New York City)

________________________

#1.

h<http://www.sentinelassam.com/sentinel_en/story5.htm>ttp://www.sentinelass=
am.com/sentinel_en/story5.htm

The Sentinel (Guwahati, India) October 9 2001

ROMANCE OF NE HOMELAND DREAMS MAY SURVIVE WAR ON TERROR
Sanjib Baruah
NEW YORK: The images of September 11 seemed horrific even by the=20
standards of our violent times. Purely, in terms of the number of=20
people murdered on a single day, the world had seen such violence=20
before. The daily death tolls of the Rwandan civil war of the 1990s,=20
for instance, were not dissimilar to the death toll of September 11.

But two things about the terrorist attacks of September 11 account=20
for their extraordinary global impact. First, they were attacks on=20
the world's only super power. And second, hundreds and millions of=20
people all over the world watched the images of the blazing World=20
Trade Centre Towers crumble. The large number of countries whose=20
citizens worked in those Towers - and in the surrounding areas of New=20
York city - multiplied manifold the number of people world-wide who=20
were directly affected by the tragedy. Indeed if the goal was to show=20
to the world the vulnerabilities of the superpower of our global era,=20
no one could have chosen a better set of targets. The perpetrators=20
knew what they were doing; and they did it with tremendous effect.

The consequences have already been profound. The empty American=20
airports, for instance, don't bode well for the US economy and, for=20
significant parts of the world economy. Frequent domestic and=20
international travel are essential to the health of the US economy=20
and, by extension - given the enormous importance of the US to the=20
world - to the global economy. In terms of domestic politics, US=20
priorities have changed overnight. There has been significant=20
political realignments and George Bush's popularity has soared. More=20
ominously, laws that are being considered for strengthening=20
governmental capacity to prevent terrorist attacks, and the general=20
climate of uncertainty and mistrust, might effect the openness of=20
American society, especially the quality of life for many visible=20
minorities, including those of us from the Indian subcontinent.

But from a global perspective, the most far-reaching will be the=20
effects of the change in US foreign policy. Almost overnight, the=20
global superpower has changed its foreign policy making the fight=20
against global terrorism the touchstone for its alliances. Even=20
relations with old allies like Israel are showing signs of strain, as=20
the US tries to build a broad international coalition, including=20
moderate Islamic states, to punish the perpetrators of the September=20
11 attacks.

South Asia has felt most dramatically the effects of these changed=20
priorities. The possibility of war in our neighbourhood looms in the=20
horizon. And suddenly, Pakistan from being on the verge of becoming a=20
pariah state for harbouring terrorism, has become a frontline state=20
in the US-led fight against terrorism. The US decision to generously=20
reward Pakistan for its withdrawal of support from the Taliban has=20
profoundly changed the regional security environment.

By all indication, Indian policymakers have been taken aback. The=20
Vajpayee government was acting feverishly with the hope that=20
September 11 might provide yet another opportunity to marginalize=20
Pakistan. Whether government officials are saying that in public or=20
not, the evidence of disappointment is there for all to see. While=20
India too is part of the US-led international alliance against=20
terrorism, its unseemly rush to support the US could not make up for=20
the geographical advantage that Pakistan had due to its proximity to=20
the theatre of the potential war. It no longer seems likely that the=20
US position on the Kashmir conflict will converge with the Indian=20
position of framing it only as a issue of terrorism and de-linking it=20
with the history of the partition of 1947 any time soon - which was=20
beginning to appear as a possibility prior to September 11.

Perhaps this disappointment of our top policy-makers should be a=20
wake-up call for India. No matter how genuinely we may share the=20
grief of people dying thousands of miles away, and how real may be=20
our hard-learnt lessons about the evils of international terrorism in=20
Kashmir, reacting to a global spectacle cannot be a substitute to=20
making good foreign or domestic policy.

After all, the results of last week's elections in Bangladesh may=20
have more impact on India - and on North-east India in particular -=20
than the fallout of the September 11 attacks on the US. The defeat of=20
the pro-India Awami League government and the coming to power of the=20
Bangladesh Nationalist Party led by Begum Khalida Zia, may make=20
Bangladesh, once again, more hospitable to some of the insurgent=20
groups of North-east India. For instance, ULFA leader Anup Chetia,=20
who has been in a Bangladeshi jail since 1997, has reasons to be more=20
hopeful now about a positive response to his request for political=20
asylum in Bangladesh.

The news from New York has dominated the media in India for more than=20
three weeks. This underscores a danger that has been apparent for=20
some time about our era of globalization. International news=20
especially when they come with dramatic visuals - tend to drive out=20
important local issues from the news and opinion columns of=20
newspapers and television programmes. Yet considering how complex,=20
stubborn and costly some of our local conflicts have been, we cannot=20
afford to ignore these conflicts. We must continue to examine their=20
roots, follow their twists and turns closely, and debate policy=20
options. We take our eyes away from our immediate surroundings only=20
at considerable peril to ourselves.

It is unlikely that the post-September 11 international climate will=20
change the dynamics of the conflicts that we face locally. After all,=20
the romances of an independent Assam, an independent Bodoland or of=20
Nagalim have proven rather resilient in the face of the might of raw=20
state power and, rational calculations about practicality. It is=20
unlikely that they will suddenly fall apart now.

_______

#2.

The News on Sunday / News International | 7 October 2001

AN INTERVIEW WITH DR HAMZA ALAVI
By Abdul Sattar

Dr Hamza Alavi was born in Karachi in 1921. He got his early=20
education from his grandfather's school established for the children=20
of lower classes and completed his MA in Economics from Aligarh=20
University. He started his career as a banker and worked for the=20
Reserved Bank of India first and later State Bank of Pakistan. In=20
1950 he resigned from his post and went to study agriculture system=20
of Tanzania. Soon after he went to the London School of Economics for=20
higher studies. In 1958, he voiced against the autocratic government=20
of Ayub Khan by publishing a magazine called 'Pakistan Today' which=20
contained critical articles against the military regime. While he was=20
in England, he became an active member of the new Left Movement and=20
contributed articles to 'The Socialist Register' and 'The New Left=20
Review'. His writings popularised him among the intellectual circles=20
of Europe and the US. He was appointed as a fellow at the Institute=20
of Development Studies, Sussex University. During his fellowship he=20
wrote his famous research thesis about a village of Sahiwal in 1968.=20
Afterwards he taught at Michigan University. In 1971 he was appointed=20
as a Professor at Queens University Kingston Canada but his entry was=20
banned because of his political ideas. Later, he went to Leeds=20
University and then to Manchester University where he taught till his=20
retirement. He has been a visiting professor to the University of=20
California and University of Danure. He is actively involved in the=20
cause for racial equality and also protested against the Vietnam War.=20
Alavi is a member of the Journal of Peasants Studies and Journal of=20
Contemporary Asia. He has edited five books along with his=20
contemporaries. His essays have been compiled and translated in many=20
languages and are also included in universities' syllabi.

In an interview with Political Economy, Alavi talked about feudalism,=20
land reforms and the rise of fundamentalism in Pakistan. Excerpts=20
follow:

PE: Economists like Syed Akbar Zaidi and politicians like Mumtaz=20
Bhutto think that feudalism does not exist in Pakistan anymore.=20
Please comment.

HA: Feudalism has different forms. One needs to see the kind of=20
social organisation that a society is constructed upon. In Europe it=20
had a different shape and in Pakistan it is different. I think that=20
feudalism should be linked with the power that a feudal has because=20
of his land owned by him. Now, we need to see whether that power has=20
really reduced. I think it is still prevalent. The feudal in our=20
rural areas is still a symbol of power. Nobody can challenge his=20
power and authority. Most of the farmers are at the mercy of the=20
feudals. Given that, how can one say that feudalism has ended in our=20
country?

PE: What effects did Ayub Khan's land reform leave on our country?

HA: They did not leave any major impact. He allowed feudals to own=20
only 1000 acres land but after 10 years of this announcement when I=20
went to Punjab, I found that people had more land than they used to=20
have earlier.

PE: Why couldn't his land reforms be successful?

HA: Because feudal lords were clever enough to withdraw infertile and=20
barren land. Then 1000 acres is a huge piece of land. Ayub did not=20
maintain any statistics which could reveal how much land somebody=20
owned. Even today we don't have any. Besides, the land reform=20
programme was not revolutionary in its essence. Had it been so, it=20
could have been a little successful.

PE: How do you view the policy of tractorisation?

HA: It proved disastrous because earlier the farmer would cultivate=20
eleven acres with the help of his bulls and he would take more=20
interest in cultivation. But when the feudal got tractors he evicted=20
many farmers as one tractor could cultivate 110 acres land. It means=20
that one tractor rendered ten families jobless which resulted in=20
disastrous consequences.

We paid millions for tractorisation which instead could have been=20
diverted to development works for farmers.

PE: Why did the land reforms programme of Z A Bhutto fail?

HA: Bhutto did not want any land reforms. He would only blackmail the=20
landlords.

PE: When the share croppers were evicted from the fields where did they go?

HA: Some of them established huts along the main highways. Many went=20
to cities and still many started starving. A large number of them=20
would come to villages at harvest time for manual labour.

PE: Did Zia's granting agriculture land to military generals leave an=20
impact on our rural society?

HA: Yes, it did because the interests of feudal lords and those of=20
the military generals became similar. It consolidated the position of=20
the feudal lords which prevented further land reforms.

PE: Why have there not been a major resistance movement against=20
oppression of the feudal lords?

HA: It is because of the fact that those who were fighting or claimed=20
to protect the rights of farmers were themselves unaware of=20
conditions of the farmers. In 1968 I went to Multan and attended a=20
convention of the Kisan Committee and I was surprised to find that=20
those who were making speeches there did not know anything about the=20
farmers. They were not from that class.

PE: Do you find a link between the emergence of seminaries and=20
agriculture policies of the government?

HA: In our country people don't understand the phenomenon of=20
fundamentalism. I think that it is closely associated with the=20
policies of the Ayub regime. I have stated earlier that the policy of=20
tractorisation brought miseries to the farmers. When they did not=20
have enough means of livelihood they became fascinated by the=20
seminaries which were providing everything to their children from=20
shelter to education. In a situation where one is unable to sustain=20
his family one would be happy to send his children to a place where=20
all things are provided. I ask that if no appropriate arrangement is=20
made for the students of the seminaries, where would they go? If you=20
conduct a survey of the madressahs, you would find there more=20
children from villages and lower classes. In the last 20 years, many=20
seminaries were set up and those people who were affected by the=20
polices of tractorisation found a solace in sending their children to=20
these institutes.

_____

#3.

The News on Sunday | 7 October 2001

The alternative option

The Government of Pakistan has begun to mobilise public opinion in=20
support of its "option-less" decision to join the international=20
coalition for aggression

By Aasim Sajjad Akhtar and Ali Qadir

The debate is raging in all circles, from the mohallah to the living=20
room: Should Pakistan have made a commitment to the US military=20
machine? Are the Taliban worth protecting any longer? What will be=20
the fallout of the decision? No doubt the entire population is=20
thinking about little else.

Jingoistic calls to war from the American-led coalition have had the=20
predictable effect of inciting a war-like response from the Taliban=20
and from militant religious groups across the world. The Government=20
of Pakistan has begun to mobilise public opinion in support of its=20
"option-less" decision to join the international coalition for=20
aggression. In Pakistan, the danger is all too real: state-bred=20
militant extremists, an integral part of our warped foreign policy,=20
have begun mobilising resources and people for a "holy war". Time is=20
precious indeed for the majority of citizens, for whom both options=20
spell fear, insecurity, worsening quality of life and even death.=20
There would appear to be no other path visible.

The American stand -- which by default now represents the Pakistan=20
government's viewpoint -- is simplistic: "Terrorists" have attacked=20
the United States, and Americans want retribution. There has been no=20
attempt to identify the reasons why such hatred exists for the US in=20
so many parts of the world and the fact that this hatred induces=20
attacks from desperate people who feel wronged. That is why it is=20
difficult to swallow American calls for "Infinite Justice": America=20
is involved in atrocities in different countries where it can hardly=20
be said to be fighting the cause of justice. Rather, it is=20
perpetuating structural inequalities and therefore inciting the anger=20
of entire nations. This "blowback", although recognised by the=20
American establishment, is studiously ignored in militant=20
retaliations, which are seen as isolated attacks upon "civilisation".

When Pakistan instantly offered its support to the Americans after=20
that infamous late night telephone call, it might have been expected=20
that extremist elements in the country would react passionately.=20
After all, groups such as the Lashkar-e-Tayyaba and Sipah-a-Sahaba=20
operate on much the same ideological lines as the Taliban. These=20
groups have warned the government that they will react violently=20
should Pakistan be co-opted by the Americans into waging their war=20
against Afghanistan. Claiming that American aggression should be=20
viewed as aggression against Islam, they are trying to use the=20
opportunity to build a mass base for their dictatorial ideology. The=20
fact that Muslims are not falling behind a call to jihad is because=20
they, particularly in Pakistan, are peace-loving. And so the=20
demonstrations of extremists are crowded only with a few hard-core=20
elements and brain-washed students of their madrissahs.

So the talk of war continues from both sides. There is talk of peace,=20
but very little of it here in Pakistan. Peace is being promoted by=20
European civil society, and a small section of the American public.=20
These groups all point out that it is important not to retaliate to=20
the attacks in a manner that could ignite a cycle of violence. These=20
groups talk of the need to discuss the above-mentioned contradictions=20
in American foreign policy, but also of the need to make concerted,=20
thoughtful efforts to eliminate the extremist threat from the world.=20
These groups may be making some noise in their own countries, and=20
playing their role as citizens of the globe. Unfortunately in=20
Pakistan, where the threat of violence and civil strife is most=20
severe, this alternative, is till now, the viewpoint of a small=20
minority. However, what needs to be remembered is that there is still=20
a silent majority in Pakistan that does not know how to express the=20
frustration that it feels and from which platform to express this=20
frustration. This silent majority is frustrated by the antics of the=20
religious parties, which, as always, are manipulating a situation to=20
suit their own hegemonic aims. All of these extremist groups are=20
beneficiaries of policies of the American and Pakistani=20
establishments since the late 1970s, which is why both governments=20
find it so difficult to stuff them back into the bottle.

The silent majority is also frustrated by the Pakistani government's=20
willingness to invite America to do as it pleases. Pakistanis do not=20
want to see their country used as a launching pad for military=20
excursions into neighbouring countries, not least of all because of=20
the risks of internal conflict and economic fallout that such=20
excursions might bring. They know that they are likely to be on the=20
receiving end of America's "use and abuse" foreign policy. And there=20
is also a genuine sense that the Afghani population has suffered long=20
enough due to its strategic position on the world map. Pakistanis do=20
not want to feel complicit in creating another Iraq-like situation=20
where a vendetta against one man has destroyed an entire nation.=20
Pakistan's ethnic and cultural links with Afghanistan are strong and=20
the majority does not want to shatter them.

The silent majority is aware that individuals such as Saddam Hussein=20
and Osama bin Laden are the creation of America. They, therefore,=20
know that should these individuals lose their battle against time,=20
others will emerge to make it convenient for America to continue to=20
pursue its current policies. They are also sick and tired of any kind=20
of extremism and the destruction that it has caused. Now they do want=20
an offensive against extremism, but they want our government to=20
pursue it, and not take the cue from the American hegemons.

When all is said and done, what are the prospects for this silent=20
majority to take up the alternative path, that of peace, justice, of=20
human-centred actions and democratic decisions? Unfortunately,=20
mainstream political parties have never represented the aspirations=20
of the populace and are definitely not about to take principled=20
stands now. Civil society is what remains, made up of different=20
segments of the population including trade unions, students,=20
professionals such as doctors and lawyers, mediapersons, and social=20
and political activists.

These groups will have to come together if they expect to mould the=20
opinions of the silent majority in such a manner as to actually=20
affect the way our government, and foreign governments, make=20
decisions. It is unlikely that civil society can mobilise quickly=20
enough to truly impact any of the immediate decisions that have=20
already been, and will be, taken. However, testing times loom ahead=20
for the Pakistani population. It is never too late to get our act=20
together.

______

#4.

The Daily Star (Bangladesh)
9 October 2001
Opinion

Minority voting issues: When Shamsur Rahman protests...

Dr Asif Nazrul
A letter of protest by poet Shamsur Rahman that appeared on October 5=20
in some national dailies has drawn the attention of many conscious=20
citizens. In that, the poet raised objections to the use of his name=20
in a statement of the leaders of South Asian Conference against=20
Fundamentalism published on October 4. That statement denounced=20
impeding the minorities from exercising their voting rights in the=20
just-concluded parliamentary election as well as repressing them,=20
both during and after the election. It also rejected the result of=20
the election and somewhat irrelevantly made arrogant remarks=20
suggesting that a pro-fundamentalist, pro-Taliban government led by=20
BNP chairperson Begum Khaleda Zia is about to be installed in power=20
following the election. Shamsur Rahman asserted: "I strongly protest=20
that statement since I have no involvement with it." On Saturday he=20
resigned from both the Nirmul Committee and the South Asian=20
Conference.

Shamsur Rahman is not only our cardinal poet, but is also regarded as=20
the conscience of Bangladesh. The inclusion of his name without his=20
consent in the controversial statement raises questions about the=20
mentality of people who did it.

Most of the signatories to the statement are, however, well known=20
figures in Bangladesh. One section of them had vigorously campaigned=20
against the fundamentalist leaders in the 1 October election. This=20
could have beefed up their expectation. But that did not happen to=20
that extent, mainly because their campaign was also directed to=20
assist the victory of a particular political party which itself did=20
not take any meaningful measures to curb fundamentalism and had been=20
quite similarly guilty of exploiting people's religious sentiments=20
during the election. It may be the debacle of that party which has=20
enraged the said statement-makers to the extent of blaming and=20
branding the BNP as leader of Taliban. Such castigation could pose a=20
serious threat to the interest of Bangladesh in view of the present=20
polarization of the world powers against the Talibans in the wake of=20
11 September terrorism in the US. Besides, it tantamount to=20
dishonoring the verdict of majority of the electorate of this country=20
who voted for BNP led 4-party alliance, and at least 80 per cent of=20
whom have no connection with fundamentalists, let alone with the so=20
called Talibans.

The said statement centered around the voting rights of the minority=20
community in the country. The allegation that the minority people=20
were not allowed to cast their votes has been surfacing in a section=20
of the press since the day after the elections. If the rights of the=20
minority are really infringed in a systematic and coordinated manner=20
and if that affects the election results, it is of course condemnable=20
and disgraceful for the nation. But before jumping into such=20
conclusions, one has to be sure about the factual basis of any such=20
allegation.

The constituencies where Hindu voters are largely concentrated=20
include the following: Narail-1, Bagerhat-1, Khulna-1, Barisal-1,=20
Pirozpur-2, Barisal/Pirojpur, Netrokona-1, Shariatpur-1, Shariatpur-2=20
and the three seats of Gopalganj. In these, the Awami League (AL)=20
candidates won by overwhelming margins in three constituencies of=20
Gopalganj. At Gopalganj-2, Sheikh Selim alone bagged 185 thousand=20
votes, whereas the rest polled less than 12 thousand votes in=20
aggregate. At Gopalganj-3, Sheikh Hasina bagged 154 thousand votes=20
while the total number of votes cast for all other candidates is less=20
than 10 thousand. At Gopalganj-1, the BNP candidate got only one=20
seventh of the votes the AL candidate received. Seventy-eight to 89=20
per cent of the voters participated in these constituencies whereas=20
the overall percentage of vote cast in 1 October election neared 75=20
per cent.

BNP candidates in two constituencies at Shariatpur could not come=20
anywhere near the electoral battle. Of these two constituencies, the=20
rate of vote casting at Shariatpur-1 is marginally less than overall=20
percentage i.e., 75 per cent. But organisationally the BNP-led 4=20
party alliance is too weak in this area to disenfranchise any=20
particular class. The two candidates (nominated and rebel) of AL here=20
got more than 150 thousand votes in aggregate, while the BNP=20
candidate received only 734 votes. Should anyone be expected to=20
believe that the party that polled only 734 votes had attempted to=20
disenfranchise a stronghold of several thousand minority voters of=20
Shariatpur-1 and had succeeded in doing that!

Narail-1 features as a constituency where the BNP candidate fought=20
closely in the election. Direndranath Saha, the BNP candidate at=20
Narail-1, is himself a minority member. He won last three consecutive=20
elections as an AL candidate and one major reason behind his success=20
was the absolute support of the minority community in this=20
constituency. After he had become a turncoat in this election, is he=20
supposed to invite the further risk of obstructing the very minority=20
voters who supported him so long? Even if anyone did it for him, has=20
that affected the election result? The answer is No. Sheikh Hasina=20
herself is the winner here.

Instead of prolonging the discussion, we can devote our attention to=20
two aspects of minority vote-casting. 1) Of the 12 constituencies=20
mentioned above, the voting percentage in seven exceeded the overall=20
percentage. In most of the constituencies, where the voting=20
percentage is 75 per cent or above, the percentage of Muslim voters=20
is around 70. Given that 80 per cent of them had voted, of the 75 per=20
cent vote cast, the Muslim voters account for 56 per cent. That means=20
the remaining 20 per cent of the votes cast came from the minority=20
community. Going even by this conservative estimate almost 66 per=20
cent of the minority did exercise their franchise in these=20
constituencies. 2) Of these 12 constituencies, AL (nominated or rebel=20
candidates) bagged 8 in contrast with BNP's 3. Anwar Hossain Monju,=20
the leader of one fraction of JP who had also been in the immediate=20
past cabinet won the remaining seat. It means, in spite of the=20
electoral tide in favour of BNP in the just-concluded election, the=20
success rate of AL in minority concentrated areas is three times that=20
of BNP. Given this, cannot we derive the conclusion that even if the=20
minorities were disenfranchised on sporadic occasions, it did not=20
influence the election results?

One more interesting thing that may have escaped our notice is the=20
failure of GK Chowdhury, a former BNP MP and the younger sibling of=20
SK Chowdhury, to get elected. S K Chowdhury did win, but in a much=20
narrower margin compared to the 1996 election. These two=20
constituencies feature a considerable number of Hindu voters. In=20
spite of the election tide in favour of BNP at the just-concluded=20
election, the two brothers' performance was far better in the 1996=20
election. Does this indicate the Hindu voters managed to cast their=20
vote in this election or they could not do that? Given the track=20
record of Chowdhury family, which one of these has higher possibility?

Irresponsible propaganda or overstatement for the minorities does not=20
yield anything positive for them. Nether does any propaganda against=20
them. Rather, both add to their fear as well as vulnerability. It is=20
imperative that everybody comprehends this.

Dr Asif Nazrul is Asst Prof, Deptt of Law, University of Dhaka,=20
journalist, novelist.

______

#5.

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_______

#6.

EVENTS
Lecture: "Gender and Nation in Indian Calendar Art"=20=20
Thursday, October 11, 2001

A lecture by Dr. Patricia Uberoi, Co-curator, From Goddess to Pin Up
Over the last thirty years, figures of women have frequently been=20
used in Indian calendar art to embody the nation. Representing=20
auspiciousness and plenty, the female form was deployed to promote a=20
national development agenda during the Nehru years. The mother,=20
alternately nurturing and fiercely protective, has invoked multiple=20
and contradictory aspects of Indian society. In this lecture, Dr.=20
Patricia Uberoi, co-curator of the exhibition From Goddess to Pin Up,=20
examines images of femininity in the ubiquitous popular medium to map=20
changes and conflicts in the ideals of the nation and nationalism.
Dr. Patricia Uberoi is an Australian-born sociologist, who has lived=20
and worked in India for more than thirty years. She has taught=20
sociology at the University of Delhi and the Jawaharlal Nehru=20
University, New Delhi. She is currently on the faculty of the=20
Institute of Economic Growth, Delhi. She has worked extensively in=20
the field of marriage and family, and on issues of gender and=20
feminist theory. She has had a long-standing interest in aspects of=20
Indian popular culture as a resource for insights into contemporary=20
cultural and social issues.
Among numerous publications, she has edited three books, Family, Kinship an=
d
Marriage in India (Delhi, Oxford University Press, 1993), Social Reform,
Sexuality and the State (New Delhi, Sage Publications, 1996), and Tradition=
,
Pluralism and Identity (New Delhi, Sage Publications, 1999). Her new book i=
n
progress, Dharma and Desire, explores aspects of gender and family=20
through the lens of Indian popular culture.
6:30 p.m.: Reception
7:00 p.m.: Lecture
Admission: $10/person (Members free)
Please RSVP to 212-462-4221

INDIA CENTER OF ART AND CULTURE
530 West 25th Street, New York, NY 10001
PH: 212.462.4221; info@i...

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