[sacw] SACW (28 July 01)

[Harsh Kapoor]

South Asia Citizens Wire
28 July 2001
http://www.mnet.fr/aiindex

----------------------------------------

[1.] Sri Lanka: Building ethnic harmony gets into top gear
[2.] India: Demolishing memory of Kashmiris
[3.] Pakistan Reckons With a Rising India
[4.] India: Attention Mr Advani
[5.] India: Ajmer - Communalism is king
[6.] India: Press release regarding Shrikrishna Commision follow up
[7.] India: Book Review "Fascism of Sangh [Jang] Parivar "
[8.] India: Holy Cow: Beef in Indian Dietary Traditions

-----------------------------------------

#1.

Daily News
Friday, 27 July 2001

Building ethnic harmony gets into top gear
by Florence Wickramage

The Sri Lankan Government is of the opinion that Sri Lanka could achieve
lasting peace if there is ethnic harmony and national integration within th=
e
confines of her multi-ethnic and multi religious-society. The task of
implementing this government policy has been entrusted to the Ministry of
Ethnic Affairs, National Integration and Mineral Resources Development. The
Daily News spoke to the Minister in charge Athauda Seneviratne who outlined
the programme drawn up by his Ministry towards this end.
Minister Athauda Seneviratne said that the programme seeks to recognize
existing differences in our multi ethnic society and through these
differences seek areas where harmony could be achieved. This was an onerous
task, he said, for the simple reason that each nationality in our society h=
as
its own culture, customs, religious and other differences peculiar to it.
The Ministry has decided to utilise this base to implement its programme of
Ethnic Harmony and National Integration.

National Integration

The first step in this direction is the launching of several programmes to
achieve ethnic harmony with an Advisory Body consisting of different
religious heads to advise the Ministry.
This programme aims to educate the nation to respect and accept each other'=
s
religious faiths, to value cultural, historical and national backgrounds of
each other. Harmony through diversity will be the ultimate goal.
Minister Seneviratne said that ever since Sri Lanka gained independence in
1948 our nation progressed continuously while nurturing different identitie=
s.
Yet even during the 53 years that has lapsed since independence, no specifi=
c
effort had been made to create an identity as one Sri Lankan nation. This i=
s
borne in the fact that in certain documentations, though important even
today, race has been given priority. True enough, he said, that a nation ha=
s
to identify its different nationalities, but these nationalities should not
be separated into different vacuums to create disharmony within the Sri
Lankan society.
The situation prevailing in the country has unfortunately been created
through attaching undue importance to different nationalities. As such
certain sections of our society feel that their rights and privileges had
been usurped or denied while certain sections had been favoured for
preferential treatment. The terrorist war which is eating into our society
like a cancer is the result of this ethnic disharmony, Minister Athauda
Seneviratne emphasised. Efforts undertaken to conduct proceedings in the
Swabhasha in the lower courts and the police department since 1943 has not
achieved the desired results.The situation has not improved even after 1948
and the two main languages used in our country i.e. Sinhala and Tamil has n=
ot
achieved equal status.

Program

The Ministry has launched a two-pronged short term and long term programme
aimed at national integration. Within these programmes, the Ministry hopes =
to
work closely with the Official Languages Department, the Official Languages
Commission and the Education Department and other relevant Ministries to
successfully implement the proposals contained in them.
Whilst launching a programme of work to create ethnic harmony the Ministry
has simultaneously commenced a work-plan towards national integration. As a=
n
initial step, the Government has identified and gazetted 71 specific
Divisional Secretariat areas where a 12% representation of minorities exist=
.
These areas are the Badulla and Nuwara Eliya Districts and 2 Divisional
Secretariat areas in the Colombo District. In order to facilitate the
implementation of the official languages programme of work, the Ministry of
Ethnic Affairs, National Integration and Mineral Resources Development has
supplied Tamil typewriters to state institutions and police departments in
these identified areas. Officials and translators who are competent in the
Tamil Language will all be detailed to work in these areas. In addition the
printing of Sinhala/Tamil and Tamil/Sinhala books is in progress. Training
programmes with incentives attached to it, have been organised to help stat=
e
officials achieve fluency in the national languages. By the year 2010, the
Government will enforce regulations to recruit persons qualified in both
Sinhala and Tamil languages to the Typists and Stenographers Service and
other sections of state departments and institutions coming under its
purview.
Finally for the purpose of evaluating the progress of the national language=
s
programme, monitoring units will be attached to different ministries which
will be empowered to identify problem areas and suggest solutions where
improvements are necessary. They will be required to submit reports on a
regular basis to the Ministry of Ethnic Affairs, National Integration and
Mineral Resources which in turn will represent matters to the Government on
the progress implementation of the Official Languages policy.
In conclusion Minister Athauda Seneviratne said that the continuing war is =
a
heavy burden on the country's economy as well as tourism, industry,
agriculture, business and other sectors of the country. The Ministry's
programme aims to contribute to the ending of the war so that the country
could achieve economic stability and develop as a United and Sovereign Sri
Lankan nation.

______

2.

The Hindustan Times
28 July 2001
Letters to the Editor

Demolishing memory

It is shocking to learn that a memorial being built for more than=20
5,000 persons missing in Jammu and Kashmir was razed to the ground by=20
the state government a day after its foundation was laid on July 18.

It was being built by the Association of Parents of Disappeared=20
Persons which had provided a voice to the families of victims of=20
"enforced disappearance". Why does the government fear a memorial=20
built for those missing? Was it their guilt that propelled the rulers=20
to demolish it? Whatever the reason, silence on this matter feeds the=20
sense of alienation of the Kashmiri people. Not unsurprisingly, they=20
are not inspired to believe that the Indian government cares much=20
about them.

Gautam Navlakha Delhi

________

3.

The New York Times
July 24, 2001
Op-ed

Pakistan Reckons With a Rising India
By Pankaj Mishra=20

LONDON -- Earlier this month, in the small north Indian city of Agra, the
leaders of India and Pakistan met to discuss the troubled relationship
that has led them into four wars in the last five decades. The Taj Mahal,
a symbol of eternal love, seemed an appropriate backdrop to their efforts:
the marble monument was built by Shah Jehan, the 17th-century Mogul
emperor, in memory of his wife, who had died young. There also appeared
something reconciliatory in the choice of venue by India's ruling Hindu
nationalist party, which is not known for its affection for Muslim-built
cities and monuments -- the party rose to power after destroying, in 1992,
a 16th-century mosque it thought expressed a Mogul invader's contempt for
Hindus.=20

The India-Pakistan summit's failure now adds to the Taj Mahal's more
melancholy associations. Shah Jehan spent the last years of his life
gazing upon it from a small room in a nearby fort, where he was imprisoned
by his son, Aurangzeb. General Pervez Musharraf, president of Pakistan,
had a similarly clear view of the Taj from his hotel suite; but it plainly
didn't much alleviate the ''hurt'' and ''disappointment'' he says he felt
over the futile summit.

His hosts may have been more commercially motivated in their choice of
backdrop: India receives, despite the Taj Mahal, just .4 percent of the
world's tourist traffic, and a concerned government has recently paid
millions of dollars to a New York advertising agency for a campaign that
emphasizes the soothing and peaceful nature of India. In this marketing
plan, the serene possession of a great cultural and spiritual heritage
goes together with the quick adaptability represented by India's
information technology tycoons. The projection isn't just meant for
foreigners. The Hindu triumphalist belief that India -- despite its
gigantic problems of poverty, illiteracy and disease -- is advancing fast
toward superpower status is widely shared among the Indian middle classes
who have benefited most from the neo-liberal economic reforms of the last
decade. The economic lives of the majorities in India and Pakistan are
roughly the same; India's per capita gross domestic product is indeed
higher, but not wildly so. However, for India's middle classes and elite
the interest lies in whatever superiorities can be identified and
concentrated upon. The growth of India's software and related
high-technology industries is one such superiority; closer ties between
India and Pakistan's old cold war ally, the United States, are another.

To look, as many Indians do, at Pakistan from such heights of ambition is
to look at a struggling neighbor, economically reliant on International
Monetary Fund handouts and politically blocked by the unworkable
ideologies of Islam and a hyperactive military. Some of the Pakistani
newspapers themselves seemed to confirm this stereotype of a country
unable to move forward when, in the hectic buildup to the summit, they
referred nostalgically to the Taj Mahal and the long centuries of Muslim
rule over India.

Such a nostalgia, the dream of recovering lost Muslim glory, contributed
greatly to the partition of India and the creation of Pakistan in 1947: it
was the other side of the quite real fear among Indian Muslims of being
reduced to a powerless minority in a Hindu-majority country. Unlike India,
Pakistan had a self-image tied, from the very beginning, to religion. But
as the secession in 1971 of Pakistan's Bengali-speaking province proved, a
shared Muslim faith couldn't solve the problem of how people with
different ethnic and linguistic backgrounds were to live together.

The peculiar logic of the partition, however, dictated that the
Muslim-majority state of Kashmir be part of the new homeland for Indian
Muslims; and the civilian and military rulers of Pakistan have started two
wars with India, and since 1990 have backed a popular insurgency by
Kashmiri Muslims, in an attempt to force India into renouncing, or at the
very least reconsidering, its possession of Kashmir. The Indian government
has responded by declaring Kashmir an ''internal matter'' and denouncing
Pakistan as a sponsor of ''cross-border terrorism.''

These accusations are not without basis. Nevertheless, they -- along with
India's reputation as the world's most populous democracy -- have helped
veil the appalling human rights record of the almost half a million Indian
soldiers in Kashmir.

India's more recent intransigence on Kashmir also owes something to the
growing closeness of the globalizing Indian elite to the United States.
Indian traditions of anticolonialism and nonaligned foreign policy have
been transformed with the end of the cold war and the rise of Hindu
nationalism. India's rise has been acompanied by Pakistan's fall, as
Pakistani help in fighting the Soviet Union and balancing Indian
nonalignment has become correspondingly less important to America. This
situation has caused anger and frustration among Islamic fundamentalists
in Pakistan, the tiny but well organized minority that enjoyed Western
patronage during the anti-Soviet war in Afghanistan. For these
hard-liners, jihad, and not dialogue, is the way to deal with the arrogant
and deceitful Hindus of India and their fair-weather American friends.

Liberal Pakistanis have tried to hold on to the optimistic view that
India, weary of fighting the Kashmir insurgency, will eventually
negotiate. Few have been willing to confront the harsher possibility: that
the Hindu nationalists may not be much inclined to make concessions on
Kashmir to what they perceive as a weak and isolated state. This is the
bitter lesson Mr. Musharraf learned in India, where he was reduced to
arguing that the Indian side settle for calling Kashmir an ''issue'' if it
isn't happy with the word ''dispute.''

Some anxious American goading might bring the two governments together.
Their ministries continue to arrange future meetings; the failure in Agra
does not seem to have greatly surprised the participants or led to a sense
that progress is impossible. India and Pakistan can at least talk about
their (as yet undefined) nuclear arsenals. It might be easier to create
some trust on this issue, since India and Pakistan have achieved a kind of
parity with their weapons of mass destruction. Yet in all other ways the
gap between the two countries grows, and this disparity -- in status,
resources and self-confidence -- lay behind the failure of the
India-Pakistan summit. It is likely to make the Kashmir problem even more
intractable.

________

4.

The Hindustan Times
28 July 2001

Attention Mr Advani
Khushwant Singh

It is scarcely believed that the home minister is unaware of the=20
proliferation of private armies being raised and trained in the use=20
of firearms right across the country.

For the last two years, newspapers and magazines have been carrying=20
reports of training camps where young men and women are taught how to=20
handle rifles and given target practice. Those organising such=20
private armies are all Right-wing Hindu organisations: the VHP, the=20
Bajrang Dal and the Shiv Sena.

Are they being raised for the defence of the country? No. We have a=20
highly professional army to defend our frontiers. Are they meant to=20
ensure maintenance of law and order in the country? No. We have a=20
large police force to ensure the maintenance of peace in the land.=20
Are they vigilante groups meant to keep a sharp look-out for foreign=20
agents like Pakistan's ISI and prevent them from making mischief? No.=20
We have our CID and RAW to keep watchful eyes on foreign spies.

So what is the purpose behind raising these private armies? Without=20
doubt they are meant to terrorise Muslims, Christians and people who=20
disapprove of making India a fascist Hindu State. Undoubtedly, they=20
will vehemently deny this charge. They can deny it for all they are=20
worth, but these charges will stick because they are true.

Raising private armies of volunteers is illegal. Possessing firearms=20
without licences is a crime punishable with heavy fine and rigorous=20
imprisonment.

One consequence of the government's reluctance to disband these=20
illegal organisations is that people who feel threatened by them will=20
take similar precautionary measures. Other communities will start=20
raising their own dals and senas. As it is, several bombs and arms=20
manufacturing units run by militant Muslim groups have been=20
unearthed. Mr Advani, you will agree this is not good for the=20
country. Outlaw these para-military organisations before it is too=20
late.

Rising intolerance

The debate was on the growing intolerance in our country - the latest=20
example being objections raised by a section of Muslims to the=20
screening of the film, Gadar. The venue was Karan Thapar's studio.=20
The participants were Syed Shahabuddin, former MP, Tarun Vijay,=20
editor of Panchjanya, the mouthpiece of the RSS, and myself.

In his usual style Thapar fired his salvo: "What is going on in our=20
country?" he asked. "Ban Gadar, ban Fire, do not celebrate=20
Valentine's Day, don't have birthday cakes, ban beauty contests.=20
Where will it end?"

Shahabuddin was the first to respond to a section of Muslims=20
objecting to Gadar. "You must understand that a minority community is=20
always more sensitive than others when it feels it is being attacked.=20
On two points Muslims are particularly sensitive: references to the=20
Prophet and the Koran. In this film the main character is Sakina,=20
which is the name of the Prophet's grand-daughter, particularly=20
revered by the Shias."

Thapar butted in: "But Sakina is a very common name." Shahabuddin=20
agreed. "My mother's name is also Sakina. But I think Shia=20
susceptibilities were hurt," he said. "Or was it her being shown with=20
sindoor while performing namaaz that displeased many?" asked Thapar.

I butted in: "Many Bangladeshi Muslim women wear sindoor and have=20
bindis on their foreheads. There is nothing un-Islamic about it."

All the participants agreed that Gadar is a second-rate film,=20
anti-Pakistani and, therefore, reprehensible. But because of the=20
hangama created by a few rabble-rousers, it's now breaking all=20
box-office records. T
[...]

Thapar turned to Tarun Vijay. "You have two children. Do you=20
celebrate their birthdays?" "I do," he replied. "With birthday=20
cakes?" asked Thapar. "Yes, with birthday cakes. But we don't sing=20
'Happy birthday to you'. We perform a pooja before we eat the cakes."=20
For good measure he added: "We Hindus are a most tolerant community."

That is the self-image most Hindus subscribe to notwithstanding the=20
fact that it is the only religion which condemns a quarter of its=20
people to untouchability. I kept silent on the issue only to avoid a=20
slanging match with Vijay.

Thapar turned to Valentine's Day. I described Indians taking it up=20
with so much enthusiasm as being asinine. But that did not mean=20
denying their right to celebrate it. I also described a West Bengal=20
minister being against Usha Uthup, loved by millions including me,=20
'westernising' Indian songs. I also mentioned UP Chief Minister=20
Rajnath Singh banning beauty contests. Tarun Vijay rose to Rajnath=20
Singh's defence - not very effectively.

I referred to our tradition of open-minded tolerance, of erotic=20
sculptures in our ancient temples, of explicit scenes of sexual=20
encounters between gods and goddesses in figurines available in=20
antique shops and illustrated copies of the Kama Sutra. Thapar agreed=20
with me. Tarun Vijay looked unhappy. Shahabuddin smiled.

I could not help but bring up the ruckus created by a remark I had=20
once made about how I did not think Rabindranath Tagore was a great=20
writer of fiction (although I regard him as a great poet and writer=20
of songs). I was gheraoed in Calcutta, the Bengal legislative=20
assembly and Rajya Sabha passed unanimous resolutions censuring me.

Not many members of these august bodies could have read Tagore.=20
Nevertheless, they condemned me. So it is not only ignorant mobs=20
which try to restrict freedom of expression but even educated people=20
do the same if they hold important positions. Tarun Vijay could not=20
allow this remark of mine to pass. "You are always trying to provoke=20
people," he said. I am glad I succeed in doing so.

________

5.

The Indian Express
EDITORIALS & ANALYSIS
Friday, July 27, 2001

Dateline Ajmer
Communalism is king

Now tie a thread for Hindu-Muslim unity

SUKHMANI SINGH

THE irony is so sharp it almost pierces. While the dirty, congested=20
city of Ajmer attracts devotees from all faiths to the shrine of=20
Khwaja Moinuddin Chisti, a magnetic symbol of peace, harmony and=20
brotherhood, this Rajasthan district has metamorphosed into a=20
high-tension zone, where communalism is now king. Perhaps a barometer=20
of rising levels of intolerance in a state obsessed with the=20
trappings, not the core, of religion. A microcosm of the sharp=20
differences in outlook that rendered the Agra summit inconclusive.

Certainly 2001 will go down as one of the worst years in the=20
district's history. Shortly before Muharram, on April 5, an irate=20
group of Hindu shopkeepers in the town of Nasirabad downed their=20
shutters in protest against the defilement of their boards and a=20
statue in one of the town's many mandirs. They alleged that=20
pre-Moharram revellers were the culprits. Soon, the protest turned=20
violent and the town was placed under curfew for five days. Due to=20
some quirk of fate, both Muharram and Mahavir Jayanti fell on the=20
same date this year. Finally, both communities were placated.

Six days later, communal violence erupted in the nondescript village=20
of Rawla Ka Bariya, Tehsil Masooda. In the dog-eat-dog, senseless=20
violence that followed, dozens of innocents were seriously injured.
Given this background, Ajmer district, which boasts a Muslim=20
population of 20 per cent, has acquired the distinction of being the=20
most incendiary district in Rajasthan. Only Ajmer city remains=20
insulated due to the power and pull of the dargah.

The rising communalism elsewhere is a recent phenomenon. Previously,=20
the soothing influence of Ajmer's revered sufi saint permeated the=20
entire district. So much so that the four main castes which together=20
comprise the Ajmer parliamentary constituency are somewhat uniquely=20
secular. All of them -the Rawats, Cheetahs, Mehrats and Kathats - are=20
considered the direct descendants of the legendary Hindu ruler,=20
Prithviraj Chauhan. And apart from the rigid Rawats, the three other=20
castes are traditionally wedded to a synthesis of both Hindu and=20
Muslim faiths. When it came to weddings, they have never been=20
particular, at times conducting the Hindu religious pheras, while at=20
others, performing the Muslim nikaah. Both Diwali and Eid were=20
celebrated with equal fervour. And while one member of a family was=20
cremated, the other could be buried.

Sadly, this very duality and spirit of adjustment made these=20
peace-loving castes the targets of the VHP. Piously committed to=20
bringing errant Hindus back to their fold, it initiated a=20
re-conversion drive in the district in the late eighties. As a=20
reaction, Muslim fundamentalists too stepped up their activities=20
here, kickstarting the war of dominance between the two communities.=20
Today, it has reached a frenzied pitch. While the VHP has accelerated=20
its re-conversion efforts and membership drive, Muslim organisations=20
have launched a mosque-building exercise to compete.

Last year, a CID report prepared by the Home Department indicted a=20
ruling party MLA for involvement in the propagation of his faith. The=20
report, now consigned to some dusty shelf, warned that the democratic=20
structure of the district was crumbling and that ''anything can=20
happen in the district, at any time''. Observers agree that this=20
year's violence presages much worse to come, referring to the=20
district as a tinderbox. Elsewhere in Rajasthan too, it takes just a=20
trifling incident or small accident involving one of the two=20
communities to spark communal tension and violence. Such incidents=20
have been mounting over the past year. Never before has there been=20
more need for a modern-day Moinuddin Chisti. Perhaps a dignitary=20
should tie a sacred thread in the shrine soon making an all=20
encompassing mannat - not just for Indo-Pak friendship but for a=20
return of Hindu-Muslim amity.

=A9 2001: Indian Express Newspapers (Bombay) Ltd.

________

6.

Date: Fri, 27 Jul 2001 10:04:35 +0530 (IST)
From: "R.R.Punyani"

Friends,

Nirbhay Bano Andolan, Mumbai Aman Committee, Voice of the Exploited,
Awaij-a-Niswan, and EKTA (Committee for Communal Amity) and many other
organistations held a press conference at Mumbai Marathi Patrkar Sangh on
26th. In a well attended press conf. the following statement was released.
A leaflet on similar lines was distributed at VT on the same day.

In solidarity

Ram Puniyani

(EKTA)

------

PRESS RELEASE

Only one policeman to be dismissed for riot-related conduct.
22 policemen charged with murder have neither been suspended nor arrested=
.
7 of the 31 policemen indicted by the Srikrishna Commission exonerated.
No criminal prosecution, only departmental inquiry against PSI Nikhil
Kapse, whom the Srikrishna Commission has held responsible for the death of
six innocents, 4 of them inside Hari Masjid, Wadala.
No departmental action against policemen who have retired.
Only 5 cases re-opened out of 1358 cases closed by the police during the
riots.
Only ?? riot-accused arrested so far.
Compensation paid to heirs of only 3 missing persons by this government.

The Maharashtra Government, which shouts from the rooftops about
implementing the Srikrishna Commission Report, has shown its true
intentions in its latest affidavit filed in the Supreme Court.
The STF was set up almost a year ago. In all this time, all it has done is
re-open 14 cases and register eight fresh cases.
It has sought time to complete its work till September 30. Going by its pac=
e
over the last year, little more can be expected of it over the next two
months.
The attitude of the STF and the government towards punishing the guilty was
clear from the manner in which it treated former Police Commissioner R D
Tyagi. A murder accused continues to remain out of custody for
two-and-a-half months thanks to the government=92=C4=F4s reluctance to arre=
st him at
the very start. Unlike other murder accused, his statement, and those of hi=
s
co-accused, has already been recorded by the STF in its office, without
seeking their custody. The investigation is almost over. The charge-sheet
may be filed any minute. After that, there will be no need to arrest him.
It is worth noting that Tyagi has made no move to appeal against the High
Court order, though he had asked for a stay on it only to go to the Supreme
Court.
Even after the High Court rejected his anticipatory bail application, the
government made no move to arrest his 16 co-accused police officers.
The Srikrishna Commission report has recommended 3 things:
1. Strict action against 31 police officers.
2. Re-opening of closed cases.
3. Compensation to missing persons.

We urge the government to implement all three.

Nirbhay Bano Andolan
VOTE
EKTA
Bombay Aman Committee
Awaaz-e-Niswaan

________

7.

Date: Fri, 27 Jul 2001 06:55:29 +0000
Book Review
Name of the Book: Fascism of Sangh Parivar
Author: Ram Puniyani
Publisher: Media House, Delhi
Year: 2000
Pages: 127
Price: Rs. 50
Reviewed by: Yoginder Sikand

The rise of Hindutva today as the ideology of major sections=20
of India=92s ruling class has crucial consequences for the future of=20
democracy, pluralism and social justice in the country. The nature of=20
Hindutva as an ideology and political programme has been hotly=20
debated by scholars and journalists alike. Many writers have remarked=20
that it bears a close resemblance to Nazism and Fascism, and thus=20
insist that it poses a grave danger for India=92s future.
Puniyani, professor at the Indian Institute of Technology,=20
Mumbai, and a leading social activist, insists that Hindutva is an=20
Indian version of fascism and hence must be considered with all the=20
seriousness that this deserves. Examining the writings and history of=20
the Rashtriya Swayamsevak Sangh, the apex body of Hindutva, the first=20
chapter of this well-written book draws striking parallels between it=20
and the German Nazis. Both, he argues, share a similar core class=20
support-base, both represent largely the same class interests and=20
both have common methods and tactics with which to pursue their=20
political agendas. Like German Nazism, he points out, Hindutva=20
fascism is a militaristic doctrine, based on the notion of Aryan=20
supremacy, stern patriarchy and a hierarchical social order. Both=20
represent the interests of ruling classes under threat from those=20
below them in the social ladder, and both target minority groups in=20
the name of nationalism.
Critically examining the role of the Hindutva=20
movement in Indian politics, Puniyani writes that, contrary to what=20
its ideologues claim, groups such as the RSS and the Hindu Mahasabha=20
hardly played any role in the struggle against British rule. On the=20
contrary, he says, their opposition to Hindu-Muslim unity at this=20
crucial juncture of Indian history only played into the hands of the=20
British, helping them divide and rule, and in this, he says, they=20
were no different from their Muslim counterpart, the Muslim League.
Hindutva has, and rightly so, been seen as representing a=20
grave threat to groups such as Muslims and Christians, but, as=20
Puniyani goes on to argue, the dangers that it poses are not limited=20
to these communities alone. Rather, he argues, since, at root,=20
Hindutva represents, despite its rhetoric of =91Hindu=92 unity, the=20
interests of only a small group=97middle and upper class Hindus=20
belonging to the =91upper=92 castes=97it bodes ill for the vast majority of=
=20
Indians irrespective of religion. Closely analysing the attitude of=20
the Hindutva camp towards marginalised groups such as women, the=20
Dalits, Tribals and Backward Castes, Puniyani shows how the vital=20
interests of these groups, too, are at stake with the rise of=20
Hindutva. Puniyani states, and in this he is not alone, that, in=20
effect, Hindutva is a contemporary form of Brahminism, which is=20
geared to preserving the interests of the Brahminical elite at the=20
cost of the rest of the Indian population. In this sense, the=20
rhetoric of Hindutva represents the use of majoritarian logic to=20
preserve and promote the interests of only a small minority of the=20
Indian people.
In his concluding chapter, the author urges the need for=20
taking the Hindutva threat seriously and chalking out methods and=20
ways of effectively combatting it. Countering it at the political=20
level alone, he says, is not enough. This would require a broad=20
movement on the cultural front as well, uniting the struggles of all=20
marginalised groups. Puniyani places his greatest hopes in the Dalit=20
movement, seeing this as representing the most effective challenge to=20
the might of organised Brahminism. It would also mean, although,=20
unfortunately, Puniyani does not elaborate on this, but one presumes=20
that he would agree, that the struggle against fascism must also=20
include combatting fascist formations among other communities, such=20
as, for instance, radical Islamists, who, like their Hindutva=20
counterparts, speak the language of religion and cultural=20
authenticity while pursuing the same goals.

Sender: Yoginder Sikand
4304 Oakwood Apts.
8th Main, 1st Cross
Koramangala-III
Bangalore-560034

--------------

8.

Holy Cow: Beef in Indian Dietary Traditions

By D N Jha

Published by Matrix

-----------

http://www.tehelka.com (27th July)

The Elusive 'Holy Cow' In an explosive essay, D N Jha, Professor of=20
History at the University of Delhi, argues that the image of the cow=20
projected by Indian textual traditions, especially the=20
Brahmanical-Dharmasastric works, over the centuries is polymorphic.=20
Its story through the millennia is riddled with inconsistencies and=20
has not always been in conformity with dietary practices current in=20
our society. As Jha points out, "Even today 72 communities in=20
Kerala-not all of them untouchable perhaps-prefer beef to the=20
expensive mutton and the Hindutva forces are persuading them to go=20
easy on it."

This essay forms the last chapter of DN Jha's forthcoming book Holy=20
Cow: Beef in Indian Dietary Traditions. After being rejected by=20
several publishing houses because of its 'controversial' content, the=20
book will finally be published by Matrix Books (on August 8th), a new=20
small press committed to the publication of brave and offbeat=20
academic research.

Several points emerge from our limited survey of the textual=20
evidence, mostly drawn from Brahmanical sources from the Rgveda=20
onwards. In the first place, it is clear that the early Aryans, who=20
migrated to India from outside, brought along with them certain=20
cultural elements. After their migration into the Indian subcontinent=20
pastoralism, nomadism and animal sacrifice remained characteristic=20
features of their life for several centuries until sedentary field=20
agriculture became the mainstay of their livelihood. Animal=20
sacrifices were very common, the most important of them being the=20
famous asvamedha and rajasuya. These and several other major=20
sacrifices involved the killing of animals including cattle, which=20
constituted the chief form of the wealth of the early Aryans. Not=20
surprisingly, they prayed for cattle and sacrificed them to=20
propitiate their gods. The Vedic gods had no marked dietary=20
preferences. Milk, butter, barely, oxen, goats and sheep were their=20
usual food, though some of them seem to have had their special=20
preferences. Indra had a special liking for bulls. Agni was not a=20
tippler like Indra, but was fond of the flesh of horses, bulls and=20
cows. The toothless Pusan, the guardian of the roads, ate mush as a=20
Hobson's choice. Soma was the name of an intoxicant but, equally=20
important, of a god, and killing animals (including cattle) for him=20
was basic to most of the Rgvedic yajnas. The Maruts and the Asvins=20
were also offered cows. The Vedas mention about 250 animals out of=20
which at least 50 were deemed fit for sacrifice, by implication for=20
divine as well as human consumption. The Taittiriya Brahmana=20
categorically tells us: 'Verily the cow is food' (atho annam via=20
gauh) and Yajnavalkya's insistence on eating the tender (amsala)=20
flesh of the cow is well known. Although there is reason to believe=20
that a brahmana's cow may not have been killed, that is no index of=20
its inherent sanctity in the Vedic period or even later.

The subsequent Brahmanical texts (e.g. Grhyasutras and Dharmasutras)=20
provide ample evidence of the eating of flesh including beef.=20
Domestic rites and rituals associated with agricultural and other=20
activities involved the killing of cattle. The ceremonial welcome of=20
guests (sometimes known as arghya but generally as madhupurka)=20
consisted not only of a meal of a mixture of curds and honey but also=20
of the flesh of a cow or bull.

Early lawgivers go to the extent of making meat mandatory in the=20
madhuparka-an injunction more or less dittoed by several later legal=20
texts. The sacred thread ceremony for its part was not all that=20
sacred; for it was necessary for a snataka to wear an upper garment=20
of cowhide.

The slaughter of animals formed an important component of the cult=20
of the dead in the Vedic texts. The thick fat of the cow was used to=20
cover the corpse and a bull was burnt along with it to enable the=20
departed to ride in the nether world. Funerary rites include the=20
feeding of brahmanas after the prescribed period and quite often the=20
flesh of the cow or ox was offered to the dead. The textual=20
prescriptions indicate the degree of satisfaction obtained by the=20
ancestors' souls according to the animals offered-cow meat could keep=20
them content for at least a year! The Vedic and the post-Vedic texts=20
often mention the killing of animals including the kine in the ritual=20
context. There was, therefore, a relationship between the sacrifice=20
and sustenance. But this need not necessarily mean that different=20
types of meat were eaten only if offered in sacrifice. Archaeological=20
evidence, in fact, suggests non-ritual killing of cattle. This is=20
indicative of the fact that beef and other animal flesh formed part=20
of the dietary culture of people and that edible flesh was not always=20
ritually consecrated.

The idea of ahimsa seems to have made its first appearance in the=20
Upanisadic thought and literature. There is no doubt that Gautama=20
Buddha and Mahavira vehemently challenged the efficacy of the Vedic=20
animals sacrifice, although a general aversion to beef and other=20
kinds of animal flesh is not borne out by Buddhist and Jaina texts.=20
Despite the fact that the Buddha espoused the cause of ahmisa, he is=20
said to have died after eating a meal of pork (sukaramaddava).=20
Asoka's compassion for animals is undeniable, though cattle were=20
killed for food during the Mauryan period as is evident from the=20
Arthasastra of Kautilya and Asoka's own list of animals exempt from=20
slaughter, which, significantly, does not include the cow. The=20
Buddhists in India and outside continued to eat various types of meat=20
including beef even in later times, often inviting unsavoury=20
criticism from the Jainas. In Lahul, for example, Buddhists eat beef,=20
albeit secretly, and in Tibet they eat cows, sheep, pigs and yak.

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