[sacw] SACW #2 (10 Sept. 01)

[Harsh Kapoor]

South Asia Citizens Wire / Dispatch No.2
10 September 2001
http://www.mnet.fr/aiindex

----------------------------------------

[1.] Resumption of India-Pakistan official dialogue and the Prospects=20
of peace (Tapan Bose)
[2.] India: 'Those who could not follow the debate in history=20
dismissed it as Leftist' ( Romila Thapar) [Part 2]
[3.] India: No tight jeans, low-cut tops: ABVP warns UP girls
[4.] Left Perspectives in South Asia

-----------------------------------------

#1.

[Presentation at the INSAF Conference in Vancouver (August 2001)]
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Resumption of India-Pakistan official dialogue and the Prospects of peace

By Tapan K. Bose

After living in a hostile atmosphere for more than five decades, it=20
is natural that Indians and Pakistanis should want to live in peace.=20
Yet peace eludes the people of the subcontinent. The failure of the=20
recent summit level dialogue between Pakistan's President General=20
Parvez Musharrraf and Indian Prime Minister Atal Behari Vajpayee,=20
which was held in July 2001 after two years shows that despite all=20
indications of 'softening of attitude ' the governments are still=20
trapped in their hard nationalist positions on Jammu and Kashmir.=20
This five plus decades old dispute over the territory of the former=20
princely state in the foothills of the Himalayas lies at the very=20
centre of this rivalry. This has caused three wars, hundreds of=20
border clashes, deaths of thousands and displacement of millions. The=20
dispute over Jammu and Kashmir brought nuclear weapons to the=20
subcontinent pushing the peoples of India and Pakistan to live under=20
the shadow of a nuclear holocaust.

History of failed talks:

There have been several attempts in the past by the governments of=20
India and Pakistan to make peace. As the history shows the majority=20
of these peace talks or agreements between India and Pakistan were=20
mere lip services to peace rather than an actual commitment to reach=20
a truce. Neither party was willing to make any concessions. This has=20
created a history of ideological disagreements between governments of=20
India and Pakistan and fostered a so-called 'national consensus' with=20
deep situated distrust among influential sections of 'nationalist' or=20
'patriotic' Indians and Pakistanis towards each other. In the=20
national politics of India and Pakistan, from the beginning the=20
Kashmir issue was appropriated by the 'supra-nationalists' and it=20
determined the perspective of on peace and security. How the Kashmir=20
dispute or issue has come to dominate the discourse on nationalism=20
and bilateral relations between India and Pakistan may be summarised=20
in the following manner:

=B7 In Pakistan, the religious right and the military appropriated the=20
Kashmir issue claiming that 'protecting the honour of Muslim brothers=20
and sisters and recovering their homeland from non-Muslim oppressors'=20
was the 'sacred' duty of every Muslim and therefore, that of the=20
Pakistan State.

=B7 In India, both the religious right and the secular nationalists=20
projected the struggle of the Kashmiri people as an assault on the=20
integrity of the nation as well as its secularism. Together they=20
whipped up a militarised nationalism in the name of 'fighting=20
Pakistan's proxy war' thus setting the context in which defending the=20
territorial integrity of the 'Motherland' became both the 'divine=20
duty' as well as the 'secular commitment' of every Indian.

=B7 In Kashmir itself it altogether militarised the struggle=20
legitimising violence and squeezing out the space for popular=20
struggle. The victim on all fronts has been the legitimate=20
aspirations of the people and the democratic struggle against=20
oppression and the fascist response of the state. In both country=20
people struggling for substantive democracy and genuine reforms shied=20
away from engaging with the Kashmir struggle, anxious to avoid=20
entrapment in the manipulative politics of militarised nationalism=20
and religious fundamentalism.

The Agra Summit:

However, over the last six months certain 'initiatives' taken by the=20
Prime Minister of India in Jammu and Kashmir had raised expectations=20
for the resumption of official level 'peace talks' which was stalled=20
after the 1999 Kargil War. Though the Indian Prime Minister's=20
invitation to General Musharraf to a summit meeting had come all of a=20
sudden, many Indian analysts saw it as a culmination of some of Prime=20
Miniter Vajpayee's peace building initiatives in Jammu and Kashmir.=20
It was said that after the breakdown of the unilateral cease-fire=20
announced by the Hizbul Mujahideen in July 2000, hopes for peace was=20
revived by Prime Minister Vajpayee through the declaration of a=20
'unilateral' ceasefire during Ramazan in Kashmir. Pakistan=20
government's timely response in the form of partial withdrawal of=20
trops from the Line of Control in Jammu and Kashmir and the extension=20
of the ceasefire by India to February 26, 2001 and beyond were seen=20
as signals of hope.

The appointment of Mr. K. C. Pant, the Planning Minister as a one-man=20
negotiating team with a mandate to hold talks with all Kashmiri=20
political groups including those which have been advocating=20
seperation from India was perceived as the Vajpayee government's=20
willingness to resolve the political crisis in Jammu and Kashmir in a=20
democratic framework. Most Indian media analysts had summarized the=20
developments during the period between July/August 2000 and=20
March/April 2001 in the following manner: =B7

The first indication of the softening of Indian attitude was seen=20
when India indicated that it was willing to hold peace talks with the=20
Hizbul Mujahideen in the framework of insaniyat (humanity) rather=20
than within strict constitutional limits. (Though there was confusion=20
as to what constitued the framework of humanity.) =B7 The declaration=20
of the unilateral ceasefire during Ramazan (November 2000) and its=20
extension despite its rejection by Jihadi organisations was another=20
indication of Indian governments willingness to make peace. =B7

Pakistan's decision of partial troop withdrawals from the Line of=20
Control in Jammu and Kashmir in December 2000 in response to India's=20
'unilateral cease-fire' in November 2000 which resulted in=20
significant reduction in border clashes was read as an indication of=20
Pakistan's willingness to soften its position. Pakistan's invitation=20
to All Parties Hurriyat Conference (APHC) was interpreted as=20
Pakistan's attempt to somewhat distance itself from the=20
militant/Jihadist line of struggle in Kashmir. =B7 The fact that both=20
countries, especially India, were showing willingness to pick up=20
official level peace talks that were ruined due to the Kargil war=20
where Pakistan supported the invasion by Islamic militants into=20
Indian-held Kashmir in April/May 1999. During this period there was a=20
visible increase in the activities on the 'non-official', 'track-2'=20
and 'peoples' track' efforts by members of the elite in both India=20
and Pakistan in the past few months. The cease-fire offer lent vigour=20
to the initiatives by the Pakistan-India People's Forum for Peace and=20
Democracy and the South Asian Forum for Human Rights to include=20
Kashmiri civil society elements (both sides) into the peace=20
discourse. There were reports that a few U.S.-based Kashmiri groups=20
were exerting political pressure on the US administration to bring=20
the Indian and Pakistani governments to the negotiation table. It was=20
also reported in a section of the American press that a group of=20
senior officers of Pakistan's military had approached a NGO in the=20
U.S. for brokering talks with India.

Why Agra Summit Failed:

Whatever might have been the reasons that brought about the summit in=20
Agra on July 14 and 15, 2001 it is obvious that the summit had raised=20
high hopes on both sides of the border. If the developments of the=20
preceding seven months were indications of any real change in the=20
attitude and approach of the two governments, then the Agra summit=20
should have produced some positive results. Yet it appeared that the=20
two governments had gone to the meeting without much preparations.=20
Much hope was pinned on the one to one talks between General=20
Musharraf and Prime Minister Vajpayee. It was assumed that a military=20
ruler and a radical nationalist prime minister were best equipped to=20
make a radical break from traditional positions. Yet they failed. As=20
it became apparent that the two were not willing to budge even a=20
millimeter from their respective positions on Kashmr.

It seems that during the talks in Agra, India refused to accept that=20
Kashmir was the 'core' or the 'central issue'. While Pakistan=20
insisted that Jammu and Kashmir was a 'disputed territory', India=20
claimed Jammu and Kashmir's 'accession' to India was final and=20
irreversible and that the only dispute was over the portions of the=20
territory of Jammu and Kashmir which was 'under illegal occupation of=20
Pakistan'. It accused Pakistan of sponsoring 'cross border terrorism'=20
in Indian administered territories of Jammu and Kashmir. While=20
Pakistan claimed that it was supporting the 'freedom struggle' of the=20
people of Indian controlled Jammu and Kashmir and accused India for=20
gross violations of the human rights of the people of Jammu and=20
Kashmir, India asserted that the 'so-called' movement in Indian=20
administered Jammu and Kashmir was an 'internal matter' and Pakistan=20
had no business interfering in India's internal matters. It seems=20
that India was willing to discuss the Kashmir 'issue' with Pakistan=20
only in the context of 'cross border terrorism '.

Future of the Peace Process:

The need to guard against minimalist solution dictated by=20
'realpolitik' In my opinion, the failure of the Agra summit is not a=20
set back to the genuine peace process. If peace is not just a=20
cessation of war or postponement of a conflict, then the solution of=20
the Kashmir dispute should be based on the principles of=20
reconciliation that would heal the wounds and address the issues of=20
justice for the victims in a non-retributive framework. In Agra the=20
two leaders were engaged in an exercise to resolve the Kashmir=20
dispute within the bounds of the 'reasons of the realm', and the=20
logic of 'realism'.

It seemed that Indian and Pakistani governments had begun to take a=20
more pragmatic stance to the dispute over Kashmir. It was seen by=20
many peace activist in Kashmir, India and Pakistan essentially as a=20
move towards acceptance of the logic of 'realpolitik'. There was a=20
legitimate fear that under pressure of the global powers and squeezed=20
by their own failing economies, the two governments might go for a=20
'minimalist' solution, that is converting the Line of Control (LoC)=20
in Kashmir into the international border between India and Pakistan=20
after making minor adjustments on ground to protect each other's=20
strategic installations in the region.

Any partition of Kashmir today will lead to disastrous consequences.=20
It will unleash massive violence along ethnic, religious and=20
linguistic fault lines in the entire Jammu and Kashmir because in the=20
new divided entities each group would start manoeuvring for greater=20
control of the political power and privileges. There is every reason=20
to fear that this violence would spill over into the whole of India=20
and Pakistan. =B7 Indian state, on the one side, is aspiring to become=20
a new (regional) super-power, not just in economic, but also in=20
geo-strategic terms. This is evident from its efforts to garner=20
support for its application for a permanent seat in the UN Security=20
Council. Its attempts to build alliance with the U.S., Russia and=20
China to isolate Afghanistan and the "strategic partnership against a=20
common threat" with Russia on anti-terrorism. In order to achieve=20
these goals, India would like to foster good relations with the West=20
(e.g., the U.S). This, however, cannot be done while fighting an=20
internal war in Kashmir, or worse a cross-border war with Pakistan.=20
In this context the September 2000 statement of the head of Indian=20
army that the Kashmir problem could not be solved militarily and his=20
endorsement to the extension of the unilateral ceasefire, despite the=20
continuation of hostile activities by militant/Jihadi groups in=20
Indian administered Kashmir may be seen as a move towards realpolitik.

=B7 Pakistan, on the other side, even though potentially having similar=20
aspiration, is struggling with a failing economy and increasing=20
international isolation because of its politics in Kashmir (but also=20
Afghanistan). Therefore, Pakistan cannot afford to turn down offers=20
of ceasefire and dialogue from India, nor can it afford in the long=20
run to continue fighting a war in Kashmir since a continued=20
engagement with Islamic militants supported by domestic extremist=20
parties holds the far greater danger of fuelling social=20
disintegration in Pakistan by increasing the gap between the=20
liberal-secular and the religious-extremist forces.

=B7 In this context it is important to note that almost all the=20
non-governmental actors in Jammu and Kashmir, both in India as well=20
as in Pakistan administered areas, are apprehensive that the two=20
governments- India and Pakistan might be moving towards a partition=20
based solution of the Kashmir dispute. In other words, Kashmir would=20
be permanently divided along the Line of Control. All most all=20
Kashmiris are frightened by this prospect as they fear that this=20
would lead to forced movement of populations and massive bloodshed=20
due to ethnic, religious and sectarian violence. It is this fear,=20
which has opened a new debate in Kashmir about the ethno-religious=20
perspective and bias of the movement that began in 1990. This is also=20
motivating Kashmiris to reach out to broader democratic parties and=20
civil society groups in India and Pakistan for support. Some of them=20
are actively seeking the assistance of civil society organisation=20
from the region as well from outside the region in their quest for a=20
non-military solution. (It is not a unique to Kashmir. Under similar=20
conditions in the Baltic republics the decision of the local=20
authorities, de facto and de jure, to invite outside assistance had=20
opened opportunities for the domestic civil society actors to seek=20
assistance of outside actors for a peaceful and non-violent means to=20
resolve existing conflicts.) This has opened up a real window of=20
opportunity for democratizing the peace process in Kashmir.

The challenge posed by 'ideologies' of state:

The western governments see Kashmir as a potential nuclear=20
flash-point. In the post-cold war geo-politics Islamic fundamentalism=20
as emerged as the west 's enemy number one. The growing nexus between=20
the Talibans in Afghanistan and the Islamic Jihadi forces in Pakistan=20
on one hand and the failure of the Pakistani regime to control these=20
forces has increased western concern about the spread of 'terrorism'.=20
Terrorism as we know has emerged as one of the main concern's of the=20
global powers today. And in this global fight against terrorism India=20
had become a vocal partner. This new alliance between India and the=20
west became visible during the Kargil war, when the western powers=20
led by the USA assisted India in reclaiming the grounds it had lost.=20
As we all know, Kargil was not a military, but essentially a=20
diplomatic one.

Some of the India business groups led by the powerful houses of the=20
Ambanis have also been involved in lobbying Indian and Pakistani=20
government leaders. It is said that it was this business group which=20
was responsible for setting up the 'second' or the 'back door'=20
channel of contact between the Prime Ministers of India and Pakistan=20
and the government of United States at the height of the Kargil war=20
in July 1999. Apart from the need to ensure the safety of its large=20
industrial establishments on India's West Coast, the Ambani group is=20
reported to be involved in the proposed Iran-India gas and oil=20
pipelines.

Mindful of India's opposition to international interference in what=20
it considers a strictly bilateral issue, and not wanting to annoy its=20
newly acquired partner in South Asia, the western powers have been=20
trying to exercise their influence through the so-called 'track-two'=20
diplomacy. Of these the Nimrana Dialogue Group, the Kashmir Study=20
Group and the recently held Wilton Park conference are well known.=20
particularly as the two warring governments have acquired nuclear=20
weapons. The international finance lobby, multinational business=20
groups and their collaborators and counterparts in the subcontinent=20
are keen on restoration of peace as this would improve the climate=20
for investment and open up hitherto untapped resources and markets.

Generations of Indians and Pakistanis have been brought up on a creed=20
of hatred of the other. In fact this hate has became an essential=20
component of the definition of the national 'self'. This autogenous=20
hatred provides the moral sanction for all types of actions aimed at=20
wresting Kashmir from the clutches of the other. No matter how we=20
look at it, the dispute over the territory of Kashmir constitutes the=20
core of the national ideologies of India and Pakistan today. It is=20
the arena of the last war between India and Pakistan, the two=20
self-righteous entities who are driven by an autogenous hatred for=20
the other. Any attempt to reduce the importance of the Kashmir=20
dispute by trying to treat it at per with other disputes between=20
India and Pakistan will not help the dialogue process in any manner.=20
It will only reaffirm Pakistan's fear that India wants to sidetrack=20
the real or the core issue and trap Pakistan into a diplomatic game=20
where it would be forced to give up its.

A sustainable peace:

It needs to be emphasised that if the search for peace remains=20
limited to dialogue between the representatives of the governments of=20
India and Pakistan, it would fail to achieve a sustainable peace. It=20
is important for India and Pakistan to recognize that they have a=20
dispute over the territory of Jammu and Kashmir. It is equally=20
important for them to understand that Kashmir never was and is not a=20
mere territorial dispute between them. The people of Kashmir whether=20
they live in Indian held Kashmir or in Pakistan held Kashmir they are=20
the real parties to this dispute. It is their future that is at stake=20
and the injustice done to them by both India and Pakistan for the=20
'reasons of state' has to be redressed. All Kashmiris, irrespective=20
of whether they belong to India or Pakistan held areas eventually=20
have to be brought to the peace table.

The Vajpayee government in India can turn its initiatives in Jammu=20
and Kashmir into a real opportunity for peace building by immediately=20
initiating steps to restore the rule of law in the valley and=20
ordering its forces to respect human rights of the people of Kashmir.=20
Both the governments of India and Pakistan are guilty of denying the=20
basic democratic rights to the peoples of Jammu and Kashmir under=20
their control. They havee manipulated every so-called'elections' and=20
continued to impose'client' governments in the territories of "Azad=20
Kashmir' or Jammu and Kashmir'. They should simultaneously lift all=20
restrictions against peaceful public activities in all parts of Jammu=20
and Kashmir. This will enable the people of Jammu and Kashmir to=20
discuss their social and political problems and their future in a=20
democratic manner. As the Kashmiri civil society recaptures its lost=20
space and the vexing question, 'whom do we talk to in Kashmir' will=20
lose its relevance. A vibrant civil society will provide the answers.=20
It is necessary for the two governments to recognize the following:

1. The people of J & K have the right to take steps towards the=20
regeneration of a secular, pluralistic and non-violent civil society=20
and the reconstruction of the polity along democratic lines.

2. The people of South Asia, particularly, India and Pakistan have an=20
obligation to help the people of J & K in this process.

3. The states of India and Pakistan must stop the policy of=20
suppressing the people and communalizing the situation, demilitarize=20
the region and establish a durable peace.

4. For the fulfillment of the aspirations of the people of J & K, a=20
policy of reconciliation and peace is the first necessary step=20
forward.

Immediate efforts have to begin to institute dialogue among various=20
sections of civil society in J & K, among the people of the different=20
regions and sub-regions of J & K, and also among the people of India=20
and Pakistan for the realization of the democratic aspirations of the=20
people in the region.

_________

#2.

Tehelka.com

PART II

'Those who could not follow the debate in history dismissed it as Leftist'

Romila Thapar, eminent historian and an authority on ancient
India, speaks to Rinku Pegu about the intellectual crisis that is responsib=
le
for all non-Rightwing intellectuals being saddled with the epithet, "Leftis=
t"

New Delhi, September 8

Union Human Resources Development Minister Murli Manohar Joshi has=20
been defending his stance saying that prior to the National=20
Democratic Alliance (NDA) government, Left academics dominated=20
research institutions. He claims he is only correcting an imbalance.
First of all, there is a certain context in which the interpretation=20
of history has changed. Let me elaborate; this is a difficult=20
question. First, there was the colonial view of Indian history, which=20
was prevalent in the 19th and early 20th century. Then came=20
nationalist history, which, to serve the nationalist movement, often=20
tended to glorify the past. Then, in the 1950s and 1960s, came a=20
paradigm shift.

The framework through which history was being interpreted moved. It=20
incorporated the impact of the social sciences, particularly=20
economics, anthropology, sociology, linguistics, archaeology and=20
demography. How did this happen? In the late 1950s and early 1960s,=20
the central intellectual question was that of growth and change.=20
Growth economics, change in caste and class, became important.=20
Demographic change became very important. The study of societies=20
conforming to different cultures suddenly became part of looking at=20
the totality of Indian society.

When this happened, economists would ask the historian, "In an=20
agrarian structure, we have this kind of a problem. Has this existed=20
in the past?" And the historian, who has been brought up on the=20
national movement answered, "We have never looked at it that way. We=20
have only looked at dynastic history and political history." So, the=20
historian began to work on answers to the questions raised by=20
economists, sociologists and so on. Consequently, there was this=20
swing towards social and economic history. This swing lasted right=20
through the 1960s and the 1970s, forming the major core interest of=20
the historians.

Within the study of social and economic history, there are different=20
schools. Besides the Marxist school, there was another school that=20
was very deeply influenced by the Annal school from France. This=20
school saw a lot of work being done on themes like European=20
feudalism, agrarian and trade history and peoples' attitudes in what=20
is called "mentality". There were other streams as well, like the=20
Structuralists, and others interested in Anthropological models. The=20
Sixties and Seventies was an age in which there were a lot of=20
theories and models. Ideas were just bursting all the time. It was=20
the most exciting period, in terms of thought, to be a social=20
scientist.

If you look at the people who chaired the Indian Council for=20
Historical Research (ICHR), there were some Marxists and many=20
non-Marxists. Some of the projects that were given money had to do=20
with social and economic history, but there was a great deal of money=20
given to just plain regional history. The idea was that these were=20
areas not known and the ICHR must encourage the development of this=20
kind of history. To argue that the Leftists controlled the ICHR is a=20
fabrication. If you were to analyse effectively who was doing the=20
controlling and what were their political affiliations were, you will=20
find that it was very mixed.

People like M M Joshi do not realise that there is a multiplicity of=20
interpretation even within the economic and social framework. Anybody=20
who is doing the history of agrarian relations doesn't ipso facto do=20
it from a Marxist point of view. That can be done from a non- Marxist=20
point of view. It can be done, for example, from the point of view=20
influenced by Marc Bloch (French Historian). Or you have got this=20
whole reconstruction of South Indian history - the huge debate on the=20
"Segmentary State". This was an idea pushed by an American historian=20
called Burtenstein, who was anything but Marxist. The debate,=20
however, raked up the whole issue of what form the State takes, how=20
politics relate to economics, how economics relate to caste - all=20
inter-linkages that were so important to the social scientist.

Because all these were going on at the academic and research level,=20
there was a tendency for those who could not follow it, or could not=20
cope with the intellectual demands this made, to dismiss it as=20
Leftist. Create a demarcation and say that this is Leftist history.=20
There are a number of us who are labelled "Marxist". The other day V=20
K Malhotra got up in Parliament and called me a Communist historian.=20
This shows that Malhotra does not understand the meaning of the word=20
Communist, nor does he seem to know anything about history.

Even within the Marxist school, aren't there various divisions and affiliat=
es?
Within groups that are labelled as Leftist, there are a number of=20
debates and discussions. Lets take the issue of feudalism, which=20
started one of the major debates. It started with a Marxist=20
historian, R S Sharma, arguing that there was a feudal period in=20
Indian history with feudal mode of production. Now part of this was=20
based on Marx and Engels, and partly on European historians like Marc=20
Bloch, who are not Marxist. The ignoramuses assumed that if you are=20
talking about feudalism, you are talking about the term Marxist=20
feudalism, forgetting that there are many other schools that use the=20
term "feudalism" and use it in a different way. A good historian is=20
aware of all these differences.

So when this debate on feudalism started, and initially it was only a=20
Marxist debate, the critique of the notion came from among the=20
Marxist. It was a Marxist historian, Harbans Mukhia, who said that=20
this does not hold for India. Nobody mentions that. The debate on=20
feudalism took all kinds of historians into its scope. And from that=20
followed various other theories that have come up in more recent=20
times.

The problem really is that there is a lack of understanding of the=20
historiographical changes that have taken place in Indian history.=20
Interpretation of Indian history has become sophisticated, and much=20
more theoretical, much more intensive. Therefore, those who are=20
unable to follow the methodology and the professional side of=20
historical analysis, simply label all this history as Leftist. This=20
is completely incorrect. They cannot distinguish between real Leftist=20
history and history that is simply concerned with society and the=20
economy. This way it becomes easy. In this sense, historiographical=20
interpretation of history is an intellectual crisis, in the sense=20
that people who don't understand history tend to dismiss everything=20
as Leftist.

Then there is the political side, which is what M M Joshi is using -=20
an attempt to whip up excitement against a certain kind of historical=20
analysis. The Hindutva ideology cannot stand historians like us,=20
because we say that you have to examine each issue in great detail.=20
We say that you need to look at it from different points of view, as=20
we are dealing with multiple causes. We are not just dealing with=20
Hindus and Muslims all the way. Even when you are talking about the=20
Hindu-Muslim relationship during the mediaeval period, you have to=20
look at it from the point of view of multiple causes. Proponents of=20
the Hindutva ideology cannot stand this view, because they want=20
simplistic history, which says all Hindus are good and all Muslims=20
are bad. We are saying that you have to look at situations. There are=20
situations when Hindus have been good and bad, and there have been=20
situations when Muslims have behaved in a good and bad way.

What are the cultural and political implications of such an assault=20
on the plural traditions of historical research and teaching?
The cultural implications are fairly clear. Primacy will be given to=20
one particular religion, Hinduism, and it is based on the political=20
idea (this is where politics and culture come together) that the=20
culture of the majority must be dominant. So if three-quarters of=20
your population belongs, according to census return, to a particular=20
religion, it means that they have the right to dictate. This is=20
totally against all notions of democracy. Utterly undemocratic.

First of all, you do not divide up your population into Hindu,=20
Muslim, Sikh and Christian communities. Religion is an identifier for=20
different things, not for political functioning and nation-building.=20
So, to talk about the rights of the majority community, by which you=20
mean the Hindu, really makes very little political sense and is anti-=20
democratic. The whole point about majority functioning in a democracy=20
is that on every issue, groups of people come together and groups cut=20
across caste, religion, class, whatever it might be. And then, in a=20
body like Parliament, you decide on certain measures, which are based=20
on a majority opinion - opinion from all kinds of people, not just=20
from one community.

What is happening is there is a tendency towards arguing that because=20
the majority population is Hindu, therefore it is the dominant group,=20
it is their state, and they (Hindus) should be determining what kind=20
of culture and politics we have (in India). This is unacceptable.=20
This is not the way democracy works.

>From a minority perspective, what is the future likely to be?
The minority has to join in with the liberal secular elements in the=20
majority and fight for equal recognition. I think that is very=20
necessary. I personally have no use for terms like majority community=20
and minority community. On the other hand, given the kind of=20
situation that exists, maybe the fight for recognition may initially=20
have to go through a process of demarcating a minority community. But=20
eventually, these kinds of labels should be forgotten. Besides, the=20
labels should depend on the issues that are being discussed and the=20
context.

As a historian, how are you, personally, dealing with the situation?
I am deeply depressed for the simple reason that there is no=20
attention given to those who are critical of decisions (I am talking=20
about education). Take for example the statement that universities=20
will now have a department of Astrology. So many scientists and=20
social scientists protested and said that the government can't do=20
this. By all means, let Astrology texts be taught as part of Sanskrit=20
curriculum, nobody objects to that. But you cannot have full-fledged=20
departments of Astrology in a self-respecting university in this day=20
and age. Because astrology is not a pedagogy but a belief system. And=20
if you are trying to prove that astrology is a pedagogy, you must=20
first prove that before you start opening up universities.

This protest has been going on for months. Newspapers and journals=20
have carried it. People get up on public platform and say that this=20
can't go on. But there is no stopping the government. Obviously, the=20
government has the power to put all this into action. And the Indian=20
middleclass is not concerned enough about the content of education.=20
The only worry is the marks and numbers a child gets in school. What=20
is my child being taught? What is useful to the child? What kind of=20
child is it going to produce at the end of 10 years of schooling?=20
These questions leave the middleclass unconcerned.

They will not stretch themselves to try and understand what schooling=20
and education is all about. The end result is that every government=20
in power has neglected education. There isn't enough protest from the=20
people. It is not enough that academics alone protest. We are not=20
demanding immediate retraction of the education policy. We ask for a=20
rational approach - let's have a major public debate on the purpose=20
of education. What do we want our children to grow up in to?

What about the political class? There is a distinct lack of concern=20
in them as well=8A
The political class is sitting pretty because it is now the=20
privileged class. If one were to do a census, the majority of their=20
children are going to good English medium schools. This is because=20
they know that's where the future lies; the kind of future they are=20
interested in. The point is, of course, to suggest viable=20
alternatives futures for children. This ought not be done by dragging=20
them back into the ancient period - saying you must accept=20
obscurantist ideas to orient children in school to the value system=20
of being an Indian today.

I think the other big crisis is that you have a society where the=20
role models are people who lack ethics. Anything goes today and those=20
most admired by the Indian middleclass are those who beat the system=20
by any means. What is the teacher going to teach children when the=20
school is surrounded by people indulging in this game of beating the=20
system?

Gandhiji wanted to disband the Indian National Congress after=20
Independence. If the Congress (I) regards itself as inheritor of=20
India's plural tradition, what is the cause of the Congress' current=20
paralysis?
I think the Congress would have to assert itself much more. It is not=20
enough to ride on the capital of once being part of the National=20
Movement. You have to have an ideology, an ethic - the two make a=20
political thrust. To do that, the Congress has to be much more=20
assertive about the values that you uphold.

It is interesting to observe, in this connection, governments in the=20
states that are closer to the Central Opposition party. The question=20
that needs to be asked is - are these governments behaving, acting=20
and performing in a manner that is exemplary, ethical, secular,=20
liberal and democratic? Or are they making compromises? I think it is=20
a question that all non-NDA governments should ask themselves. And if=20
they are making compromises, they must try and build an alternative.=20
But the alternative will not be built by adopting the same measures.=20
The alternative can only be built by standing right out and saying we=20
stand for something different.

When the Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP) was voted to power, a number of=20
people went around saying that it is a clean party. And, therefore,=20
assumed that it will be a different party. But now, within a matter=20
of two and half years, the BJP has been proved to be corrupt. They=20
are functioning just as other parties have been functioning, and they=20
are high-handed. For the Opposition merely to stand up and say we are=20
an alternative is not enough. People will not accept that and would=20
want something much more. The Opposition has to articulate and define=20
how they are an alternative in concrete terms.

The way the present regime, led by the BJP, has been conducting=20
itself has led to comparisons with Hitler and Nazism. Would you=20
consider this fair?
These comparisons were made when the present government made=20
decisions where protest and criticism were not incorporated. Where=20
decisions are taken irrespective of opposition, they become=20
dictatorial decisions. Dictatorial systems have definitely used this=20
technique. Systems like this have agendas, very often hidden, but not=20
always. An analysis of the agenda gives you a clue to the degree of=20
dictatorship in it.

It is quite interesting to note here that the ideologues of Hindutva=20
movement were great admirers of Hitler himself and the Nazi movement.=20
Even today, Bal Thackeray in Mumbai said that he is an admirer of=20
Hitler and Nazis. When you are absolutely desperate to change society=20
in a particular direction and you feel that the ends justify the=20
means, it provides a certain model. That is what one has to watch out=20
for.

_________

#3.

Sify News
Sun, Sep 9, 2001

No tight jeans, low-cut tops: ABVP warns UP girls
By Vinay Krishna Rastogi in Lucknow

The Akhil Bhartiya Vidyarthi Parishad is again planning to launch a=20
movement for a dress code for girls in colleges and universities of=20
the state.

The state unit of the Hindu Jagran Manch and ABVP had advised girls=20
to stop wearing "provocative" dresses like skin-tight jeans and=20
trousers, low-cut tops and short skirts because "it is against the=20
culture of India".

Girls of Lucknow and other cities are angry at the imposition of such=20
a dress code, which makes salwar kameezes compulsory in colleges and=20
Universities.

A Lucknow student said: "Why do only girls have these restrictions?=20
Why not on the boys who get obscene and wear designer dresses?"

She feared that soon girls would be asked to wear "Burqa" in Uttar=20
Pradesh just as in Kashmir.

Some months ago, fashion shows were banned throughout the state. Such=20
shows are not being organised anywhere in the state as organisers and=20
participants fear arrest on charges of obscene behaviour.

Many Muslim religious leaders support imposition of dress code for=20
women. Although many vice-chancellors are not in favour of imposing a=20
dress code in colleges, RSS- oriented teachers are in favour of it.

Sometime ago, the ABVP and the Hindu Jagran Manch had demanded a ban=20
on celebration of festivals like Valentine's Day.

The issue of dress code cropped up again after a series of cases of=20
eve-teasing and ragging in Lucknow University campus and campuses of=20
other universities.

=A9 Copyright Satyam Infoway Ltd, 1998. All rights reserved.

_______

#4.

Exclusive report on South Asia Citizens Web

=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=
=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D

LEFT PERSPECTIVES IN SOUTH ASIA

Meena Dhanda & Pritam Singh

[The paper below has been published in The British Association for=20
South Asian Studies Bulletin Vol.4 No.1 Winter 2001 ]

At the Annual Conference of the British Association of South
Asian Studies held at the Bath College of Higher Education on
April 11-13, 1997 , a panel discussion on Left Perspectives in
South Asia was convened by Pritam Singh on April 11. The
panelists were: Yogendra Yadav (Center for the Study of
Developing Societies, Delhi), Ranjan Poudyal (London School Of
Economics and Save the Children Fund, Kathmandu), Mohammed
Waseem (St. Antony=EDs College, Oxford and the University of
Islamabad), Jairus Banaji (Wolfson College, Oxford and the Union
Research Group, Bombay), Surinder Jodhka (Queen Elizabeth House,
Oxford and the University of Hyderabad) and Robin Archer
(Corpus Christi College, Oxford). In planning the format of the
panel discussion, no guidelines were given to the panelists
except to try to focus less on past introspection and more on
futuristic thinking. This was done deliberately, in order to
enable the spontaneous articulation of their engagement with and
reflections on the 'Left' in their own country. All the
panelists had a chance to revise their contributions in the
written comments they put forward for the preparation of this
report.
I
It is rare for Left scholars and activists from South Asia to be
able to meet each other and exchange ideas and experiences on
issues of mutual interest. The panel discussion at Bath was
expected to make a contribution to enriching our understanding
of the Left in different countries in South Asia. A comparative
assessment of the strengths and weaknesses of the Left in
different countries of South Asia could be mutually beneficial
to the Leftist political forces in these countries. In
organizing the panel, the aim was to get at least one
commentator on each of the five countries of South Asia-
Bangladesh, India, Nepal, Pakistan and Sri Lanka. As we did not
succeed in arranging a speaker on Bangladesh and Sri Lanka, this
aim was only partially fulfilled.

[ Full text of the above (47k long) paper is available to all at the=20
recently updated South Asia Citizens Web Site. The exact URL for the=20
paper is: http://www.mnet.fr/aiindex/leftperspectives01.html ]

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