[sacw] SACW #2. (10 Oct. 01)

Harsh Kapoor aiindex@mnet.fr
Wed, 10 Oct 2001 11:44:45 +0100


South Asia Citizens Wire | Dispatch #2.
10 October 2001
http://www.mnet.fr/aiindex

------------------------------------------

#1. NGO's and rights groups face the wrath of politico-religious=20
hotheads in Pakistan
#2. India: Protest Against Arrest of Antiwar Activists in Delhi - New Delhi
#3. Bangladesh: EU rep. urges govt for steps to stop attacks on minorities
#4. India: New Delhi Meet To Plan for anti-terrorism and anti-war demonstra=
tion
#5. Into Pakistan's maelstrom (Tariq Ali)
#6. Pakistan: The bitter fruits of strategic alliance (Ian Talbot)
#7. India: Book Review of "Beyond Hindu and Muslim" (Yogi. Sikand)

________________________

#1.

{POSTED BELOW ARE EXTRACTS FROM A LETTER BY A PROMINENT PAKISTANI=20
WOMEN'S, RIGHTS ACTIVIST , FOLLOWED BY A NEWS REPORT FROM DAWN THE=20
WELL KNOWN PAKISTANI DAILY NEWSPAPER}

Date: 10 October, 2001

" [...] the office of HRCP in Quetta was burnt down and also one of=20
their prominent lawyer's office broken into and destroyed. Today's=20
news is that even the hospitals being run by NGOs in NWFP are being=20
attacked and have been forced to shut down, several NGOs in Takhtbai=20
destroyed, some offices attacked more than once

The concern is that the police was present (at least in some places)=20
and did nothing and furthermore refused to register a case (FIR). JAC=20
has decided to not shut offices in Peshawar so we shall continue to=20
work but SG field work stopped in terms of both research and=20
trainings in Malakand & elsewhere. In NWFP also all cars registered=20
with yellow number plates (indicating foreign ownership) are being=20
attacked.
[...] ."

o o o o

DAWN (Pakistan)
10 October 2001

PESHAWAR: Protesters attack NGOs, schools: Joint body seeks protection
Bureau Report

PESHAWAR, Oct 9: Three nonformal schools for girls run by an NGO here=20
on Charssada Road were closed down on Tuesday after an attack on one=20
of them More than a dozen unidentified persons had attacked the=20
school situated at Khazana village on Monday and threatened two=20
teachers of dire consequences if the institution was not closed down.
The attackers reportedly removed the signboards of the school and=20
vandalized the furniture. The NGO, Civic Awareness Promotion Society=20
(Caps) has been running non-formal education project with the support=20
of Cida (Canadian Fund).
The chief executive of Caps, Shakeel Waheedullah told Dawn that at a=20
time when NGOs throughout the province were being threatened he had=20
no option but to suspend operation of the nonformal schools at=20
Khazana, Nehqai and Sheroojhangi. He said that it was beyond=20
anybody's understanding why NGOs were being targeted.
About the attack on the school he said that it was difficult to tell=20
who the attackers were as it was not an organized demonstration. A=20
joint action committee of civil society groups has asked the NWFP=20
governor and inspector general of police to provide security to all=20
the NGOs in the province.
An emergency meeting of the action committee was held on Tuesday at=20
the office of Human Resource Management and Development Centre=20
(HRMDC), which was attended by members of different segments society.=20
They condemned the attacks on offices of NGOs in Takhtbhai (Mardan),=20
Battagram, Bajaur Agency and Peshawar.
The speakers said that some elements had been settling scores with=20
the NGOs in the garb of the protests against the attack on=20
Afghanistan. A three-member committee would visit Takhtbhai.
Some members even felt that all the NGOs in the province should=20
suspend their field operations forthwith till the time when=20
conditions would again be conducive to resume operations. It was=20
decided to send a written request to the NWFP governor and the IGP=20
asking them to provide security to the their organizations.
SUNGI OFFICE RABSACKED: The branch office of Sungi Development=20
Foundation at Oghi tehsil was ransacked by a mob protesting against=20
the US attacks on Afghanistan, our abbottabad correspondent adds.
The protesters believed that the NGO was an agent of the United=20
States and that it was introducing western culture in the locality.=20
Office furniture and record of the organization were also destroyed=20
by the prostesters.

_______

#2.

Date: Tue, 9 Oct 2001 21:09:05 -0700 (PDT)
From: Jangroko Abhiyan <>[ Anti War Campaign]
Subject: Dharna Against Arrest of Antiwar Activists in Delhi [ on 11 Octobe=
r]

Dear Friends,

PLEASE JOIN US IN LARGE NUMBERS TO PROTEST AGAINST THE
UNLAWFUL DETENTION OF ACTIVISTS PROTESTING AGAINST THE
US WAR ON AFGHANISTAN AND THE INDIAN GOVERNMENT=EDS OPEN
SUPPORT OF THE WAR.

Six students of Delhi Students Union were arrested on
Monday the 8th of October while distributing antiwar
leaflets in East Delhi. The police seized all the
leaflets in the AIPRF office, thoroughly interrogated
their members present, and put two of them under home
arrest. The police have gone to the extent of
arresting the owner of the printing press too.

Bail has been denied to them yesterday the 9th of
October. There are heavy charges against those
detained that include sedition, spread of communal
hatred between different religious sections and breach
of peace.

Both DSU and AIPRF are constituent organizations of
the newly formed JANG ROKO ABHIYAN that constitutes
several other groups. This police action is an attack
on our democratic right to express our strong
condemnation of the war that has begun.

THERE IS A DHARNA TOMORROW [the 11th October] AT THE POLICE HEADQUARTERS
IN ITO AT 11 AM WHERE WE WILL REGISTER OUR PROTEST IN
UNISON AND DEMAND THE RELEASE OF THOSE DETAINED.

We are assembling near Pearey Lal Bhavan next to the
Pioneer office at 10.50 am [11th October]. Do spread this
message as wide as possible.

In solidarity,
Reena, John, Arvind, Ranjana, Gautam, Subhash
(for JANG ROKO ABHIYAN)

_______

#3.

The Daily Star (Bangladesh)
10 October 2001

Menezes urges govt for steps to stop attacks on minorities

UNB, Dhaka
European Commission head of delegation Ambassador Antonio de Souza=20
Menezes yesterday appealed to the new government to take action=20
against those who attack minorities and maintain law and order.
In a statement, he said many NGOs and other organisations had=20
contacted the European Commission expressing their concern over the=20
current level of violence specially against the minority people.
Menezes said they had raised the matter with BNP leaders at recent=20
meetings and requested them to refrain their partymen from such acts.
"But it is still continuing... I strongly urged the new government to=20
take immediate actions to stop it and maintain law and order in such=20
areas where attacks are taking place on minorities and their=20
property."

_______

#4.

Wed, 10 Oct 2001 10:16:52 +0530
To Plan for anti-terrorism and anti-war demonstration Revised Plan

Dear Friends,

Shalom, Peace and Shanti.

Every concerned citizen of India joins the democratic and progressive=20
forces all over the globe to condemn the terrorist attack on the US=20
on the 11th of September. We express our shock and grief over those=20
who were killed and express our condolence to all those who lost=20
their near and dear ones in this brutal attack
We are aware of the fact that every country, every community and=20
every nation have the right to defend the common good against=20
aggression. Hence, we take firm stand against every form of=20
terrorism. But we decry any form of counter terrorism. In a special=20
way we oppose all the evils that are being perpetuated in the name=20
of 'seeking justice'. We oppose any indiscriminate, "blanket"=20
military response in the name of countering terrorism. We demand=20
that everyone respect and use the structures and standards of=20
international law and human rights ratified by most of the countries.

The liberal, progressive and democratic forces oppose the move to=20
utilise this period of crisis by the ruling establishment to engage=20
in war with its neighbours. Many of the political moves and=20
diplomatic gestures made by the political leaders at this juncture=20
could have devastating effect on the future of this country and=20
society.
To take stock of these things and to plan for some act of=20
solidarity, a meeting of the like minded people was held on the 9th=20
at Indian Social Institute. In the meeting it was proposed that=20
all those who believe in liberal, progressive and democratic=20
principles come together and organise a human chain on 19th {Friday=20
=96 5.30 to 6.30 pm} October near India Gate or Rajghat area to=20
express our solidarity with the victims and to demonstrate our=20
protest against any form of war and counter attack. You are=20
cordially invited for the planning meeting to be held at:

Venue for the planning: Indian Social Institute, Lodi Road, New Delhi 1100=
03
Date: 13th October, Saturday.
Time: 4.30 pm.

Please inform us about your participation or atleast send a representative.
Thanking you in anticipation
Prakash Louis
Executive Director
Indian Social Institute
New Delhi 110003

_____

#5.

The Guardian , Wednesday October 10, 2001

Into Pakistan's maelstrom
When western victory is proclaimed, the prospect in Muslim countries=20
will be social and political eruption

Tariq Ali

For the last three weeks Pakistan's military rulers have been trying=20
to convince the Taliban to hand over Osama bin Laden and avoid the=20
catastrophe being prepared. They failed.

Since Osama is the son-in-law of Mullah Omar, the leader of the=20
Taliban, this was hardly surprising. The more interesting question is=20
whether Pakistan, after withdrawing its own soldiers, officers and=20
pilots from Afghanistan, has managed to split the Taliban and=20
withdraw some of those totally dependent on its patronage. This would=20
be a key aim of the military regime to maintain its influence in a=20
future coalition government in Kabul.

Relations between Pakistan and the Taliban leadership have been tense=20
this year. Last year, in an effort to cement Pak-Afghan friendship,=20
Pakistan dispatched a football team to play a friendly against=20
Afghanistan. As the two teams faced each other in the stadium at=20
Kabul with the referee about to blow the opening whistle, bearded=20
security forces entered and announced that the Pakistani footballers=20
were indecently attired. They were wearing normal football shorts,=20
whereas the Afghans were dressed in surreal long shorts which came=20
down well below the knees. Perhaps it was felt that the rippling=20
thighs of the Pakistanis might cause upheavals in the all-male=20
audience. Who knows? The Pakistani players were arrested, their heads=20
were shaved and they were all flogged in public while the stadium=20
audience was forced to chant verses from the Koran. This was Mullah=20
Omar's friendly warning shot to the Pakistani military to assert the=20
independence of his leadership and his loyalty to Bin Laden.

The bombing of Kabul and Kandahar by the United States and its=20
ever-loyal British ally will not have seriously affected the fighting=20
strength of the Taliban. The combined force - including Bin Laden's=20
special brigade of Arabs - is now reported to consist of 30-40,000=20
hardened veterans. Nonetheless the Taliban are effectively encircled=20
and isolated. Their defeat is inevitable. Both Pakistan and Iran are=20
ranged against them on two important borders. It is unlikely they=20
will last more than a few weeks. Obviously some of their forces will=20
go to the mountains and wait till the west withdraws before attacking=20
the new regime, likely to be installed in Kabul when the octogenarian=20
King Zahir Shah is moved from his comfortable Roman villa to less=20
salubrious surroundings in the wreckage of Kabul.

The Northern Alliance backed by the west is marginally less religious=20
than the Taliban, but its record on everything else is just as=20
abysmal. Over the last year they have taken over the marketing of=20
heroin on a large scale, making a mockery of Blair's claim that this=20
war is also a war against drugs.

The notion that they would represent an advance on the Taliban is=20
laughable. Their first instinct will be revenge against their=20
opponents. However the Alliance has been weakened in recent days by=20
the defection of Gulbuddin Hekmatyar, once the favourite=20
"freedom-fighter" of the west, welcomed in the White House and=20
Downing Street by Reagan and Thatcher.

This man has now decided to back the Taliban against the infidel.=20
Sustaining a new client state in Afghanistan will not be an easy=20
affair given local and regional rivalries. General Musharraf has=20
already told Pakistanis he will not accept a regime dominated by the=20
Northern Alliance. This is hardly surprising since his army has been=20
fighting the Alliance for over a decade.

Till now the Pakistan army (unlike its Arab counterparts) has avoided=20
a coup mounted by captains and colonels. It has always been the=20
generals who have seized power and kept the army united, largely by=20
sharing out the pieces of silver.

It is an open question whether that will be enough on this occasion.=20
A lot will depend on the aftermath of the current war. A major=20
concern for the overwhelming majority of Pakistanis is that the=20
Taliban, cornered and defeated in their own country, will turn on=20
Pakistan and wreak havoc on its cities and social fabric. Peshawar,=20
Quetta, Lahore and Karachi are especially vulnerable. By that time=20
the west, having scored a "victory", will turn a blind eye to the=20
mess left behind.

As for the supposed aim of this operation - the capture of Bin Laden=20
- this is unlikely to be easy. He is well-protected in the remote=20
Pamir mountains and might well disappear. But victory will still be=20
proclaimed. The west will rely on the short memory of its citizens.=20
But let us even suppose that Bin Laden is captured and killed. How=20
will this help the "war against terrorism"? Other individuals will=20
decide to mimic the events of September 11 in different ways.

More importantly, the focus will shift to the Middle East. In Saudi=20
Arabia fierce factional struggle within the royal family is in=20
progress. Saudiologists have long recognised that Crown Prince=20
Abdullah is close to the Wahhabi clerics. But he will still face a=20
bitterly angry population - as will Hosni Mubarak of Egypt. The=20
prospect of eruptions in these two countries is growing and the=20
consequences of the Anglo-American war in Afghanistan are likely to=20
be incendiary.

Tariq Ali's novel The Stone Woman is published in paperback this month by V=
erso

______

#6.

Times Higher Education Supplement
05 October 2001

The bitter fruits of strategic alliance
by Ian Talbot
=
=20
The radical Islamic sects that threaten to derail Pakistan's=20
commitment to the war on terrorism are a result of the country's=20
efforts to counter India's regional supremacy, writes Ian Talbot.

On September 14, after a seven-hour meeting with his generals,=20
Pakistan's president, Pervez Musharraf, pledged full cooperation with=20
the war on terrorism declared by the United States, whose first=20
target was Osama bin Laden, the Saudi dissident "guest" of the=20
Taliban regime in neighbouring Afghanistan. A week later, a visibly=20
tense Musharraf tried to justify the decision in a national=20
broadcast. He had cause for anxiety as it had not only aroused angry=20
street protests, but also threatened the unity of the intelligence=20
and military establishment. A doomsday image of the Pakistani state=20
imploding as dramatically as the twin towers of the World Trade=20
Center on the fateful morning of September 11 was discussed.

The reasons for and implications of this momentous decision to cede=20
to US wishes can be understood only with reference to the changes in=20
Pakistan since Zia ul-Haq assumed power as a military ruler in 1977.

Zia used the Soviet occupation of Afghanistan to secure massive=20
economic and military aid from the US-which, under President Ronald=20
Reagan, saw Pakistan as a frontline state in the war against the=20
"evil empire" of communism. It is possible to date the growing=20
Pakistani military and security ties with radical Muslim groups in=20
Afghanistan from this period. The goal was conceived of establishing=20
a client regime in Kabul that would at last provide strategic depth=20
in the greater struggle with India.

The influx of up to 3 million Afghan refugees coincided with Zia's=20
Islamisation process. One aspect of this was the mushrooming of=20
mosque schools that preached a radical Islamic message. By the=20
beginning of the 1990s, these numbered more than 30,000. Students=20
from these schools were later to form the Taliban army through which=20
Pakistan sought to end the civil war in Afghanistan. Others joined=20
jihad (holy war) groups fighting in Kashmir or swelled the ranks of=20
armed religio-political groups that thrived in the sectarian=20
atmosphere of Zia's state-sponsored Islamisation.

The legacy of Zia's 11 years in power was growing intolerance,=20
sectarian violence and a militarisation of society, as weapons=20
leaked from the supply lines to Afghanistan, creating a Kalashnikov=20
culture.

After democracy was restored in 1988, the links with Islamic=20
militants continued as the military kept control of key aspects of=20
security and regional foreign policy. The Taliban were given=20
logistical and combat support, and support was provided for jihad=20
groups fighting in Kashmir. Liberals fruitlessly argued that this=20
policy was leading to increased militancy and lawlessness in=20
Pakistan, but the military regarded these links as crucial to its=20
foreign policy goals. Musharraf's reversal of policy is likely to=20
have sent shock waves through the Pakistani establishment and=20
infuriated the religious parties outside the halls of power.

Because of their power at street level, the main religious parties=20
have great political influence, although they failed miserably at=20
the ballot box in the 1990s. Benazir Bhutto would not remove=20
discriminatory Islamic ordinances introduced in 1979 because she=20
felt vulnerable to popular protests. Recently, Musharraf himself=20
backed away from reform of the blasphemy ordinance in the face of=20
opposition from the religious parties, which have traditionally been=20
regarded as allies of the military. Musharraf now faces the=20
uncomfortable situation of the largest "fundamentalist" party,=20
Jamaat-e-Islami, and the Jamiat-ul-ulema-e-Islam, which runs many of=20
the Islamic schools in northern Pakistan, playing the leading roles=20
in orchestrating nationwide protests against his decision to extend=20
support to the US.

Anti-American sentiment in Pakistan rose sharply at the end of the=20
anti-Communist Afghan war in 1992. This was manifested dramatically=20
in the killing in broad daylight of two US consular staff in Karachi=20
in March 1995.

US foreign policy elsewhere in the Muslim world, as well as the US's=20
apparent dumping of Pakistan once the Afghan war had ceased, helped=20
fuel growing resentment. It also led to more poverty, which by the=20
end of the 1990s affected almost a third of Pakistan's population of=20
140 million. As a result of pressure to contain fiscal deficits,=20
development expenditure, primarily education and health, had fallen=20
to just 3 per cent of gross domestic product by the end of the decade.

The economy partly explains Musharraf's risky policy reversal=20
regarding the Taliban and Islamic militant groups. Spurning=20
Washington could have led to ruin. The ailing economy, with debts of=20
$38 billion (=A326 billion) and foreign exchange reserves of just $1.5=20
billion, would no longer get the International Monetary Fund cash it=20
needs to stay afloat. Joining the international coalition could bring=20
economic benefits. The US has moved swiftly to end the sanctions it=20
placed on Pakistan and India after their nuclear explosions of May=20
1998. Pakistan also hopes that the US may write off its bilateral $3=20
billion debt, as it did with Jordan and Egypt. Financial aid from=20
Japan, a big lender to Pakistan, may also be part of the country's=20
"reward". Canada and Europe have already announced financial aid for=20
Pakistan.

The India factor was equally compelling in Musharraf's=20
decision-making. Indo-Pakistani rivalry, with Kashmir at its heart,=20
drives Islamabad's security, military and diplomatic strategies.=20
Pakistan's attempts to determine Afghanistan's politics have been=20
part of a wider goal of countering India's regional predominance.=20
The speedy offer of support for the US from the government in New=20
Delhi raised the prospect of Indian forces going into Afghanistan and=20
Indian fighters flying over Pakistan's airspace. In the longer term,=20
a successful military campaign in which Pakistan was sidelined would=20
not only result in unprecedentedly close Indo-US military ties, it=20
would marginalise Pakistan's regional influence.

The Northern Alliance is increasingly seen as an ally of the West in=20
Afghanistan. This group-a loose coalition of minority ethnic groups,=20
Shiite Muslims supported by Iran, and former tribal powerholders in=20
the 1992-96 civil war-has long been seen by Pakistan as being=20
opposed to its interests. A pro-western government in Kabul would=20
further tilt the scales in India's favour.

There is, of course, a risk that this will happen anyway, even with=20
Islamabad's involvement, and that the US will walk away from=20
Pakistan as it did at the end of the Afghan conflict and leave the=20
country in domestic chaos. For decision-makers, this was a risk that=20
had to be taken in the hope of minimising the shift in India's=20
favour.

Musharraf's predicament was the culmination of 20 years of military=20
and security strategy and socioeconomic change that had locked=20
Pakistan into the deadly embrace of Islamic extremism. The=20
challenges in the weeks ahead are likely to increase as armed=20
militants slip over the porous 2,400km border with Afghanistan and=20
as popular protests intensify in the wake of military action against=20
not just bin Laden's al-Qaida, but the Taliban too. The Musharraf=20
regime will be forced to further distance itself from its own jihad=20
groups by cracking down on their training camps in Pakistan and=20
ending its logistical support for their fighting units in Kashmir.=20
The realisation that a military solution to the Kashmir dispute is=20
finally rendered impossible may be too much to bear for sections of=20
the security services that have invested years of effort in this=20
cause.

The personal consolation for Musharraf is that if he can ride out=20
the storm, the Americans may fold up the road map to national=20
elections in October 2002. Ironically, Afghanistan may prolong his=20
tenure of power, just as, in very different circumstances, it did=20
Zia's. Such an undemocratic outcome would bode ill for Pakistan's=20
long-term stability. The country's turmoil is the direct result of=20
years of authoritarian rule. Democracy has not failed, but it has=20
never been able to function unfettered. Elections by themselves will=20
be insufficient. Only empowerment of the dispossessed and the=20
alleviation of poverty will bring peace to this volatile region.

Ian Talbot is director of the Centre for South Asian Studies at=20
Coventry University and the author of Pakistan: A Modern History ,=20
published by Hurst, price =A317.50.

THES Editorial =A9 2001 TSL Education Ltd.
_______

#7.

Date: Tue, 09 Oct 2001 06:30:29 +0000
Book Review
Title of the Book: Beyond Hindu and Muslim - Multiple Identity in=20
Narratives from Village India
Author: Peter Gottschalk
Publisher: Oxford University Press, New Delhi
Pages: 215
Price: Rs. 525
ISBN: 019565439-0
Reviewed by: Yoginder Sikand

The much bandied-about thesis of a clash of civilizations doing the=20
rounds these days threatens to become a self-fulfilling prophecy,=20
with prophets of doom the likes of Samuel Huntington being lionized=20
in the press and academic circles. In a religiously plural country=20
such as India, the devastating effect of religiously inspired=20
conflict are particularly real and threatening. Multiple religious=20
identities need not, however, be a source of conflict, as this book=20
seeks to argue. Rather, if carefully managed, religious diversity can=20
be a source of a country's strength and stability. Never before, it=20
seems, has the art of skillfully negotiating the conflicting demands=20
of diverse religious identities been so desperately needed as it is=20
today.
Gottschalk=92s basic thesis is that religious identity is only=20
one of the many identities that people possess. If religion divides=20
people on confessional lines, there are other factors that bring=20
people of different religious persuasions together, including shared=20
race, language, locality, nation and ethnicity. One's religious=20
identity need not necessarily be the most important or potent of=20
one's multiple identities. What determines which particular identity=20
is stressed at a particular moment in time is determined by the=20
particular spatio-temporal context in which an individual or group=20
finds itself placed. At one point in time factors such as a common=20
language or race can serve to unite a people across religious=20
divides, while at other times religion could come to the fore. What=20
is particularly crucial in this constant flux of identity politics is=20
the source of the threat or opposition that an individual or group=20
faces in a particular context. If the perceived source is another=20
religious group, then the community's religious identity is stressed,=20
but this might change if the source of threat, perceived or real, is=20
transformed over time.
This book looks at this understanding of multiple and=20
shifting identities from the perspective of the denizens of a=20
multi-caste and multi-religious village in the north Indian state of=20
Bihar. The village of Arampur, like most other north Indian villages,=20
is home to Hindus and Muslims, 'upper' caste landlords and 'lower'=20
caste peasants and artisans alike. Gottschalk charts the multiple=20
ways in which different sets of groups in the village define=20
themselves in contrast to other groups. Thus, the 'high' caste Hindu=20
Rajput and Muslim landlords, when faced with the threat of peasant=20
insurrection, stress not just their common class interests but also=20
their common origins, as descendants of the founders of the village,=20
two brothers, one of whom converted to Islam several generations ago.=20
On the other hand, in the face of the growing influence of chauvinist=20
Hindu political parties, 'high' caste Hindu landlords see themselves=20
as one with their 'low' caste servants pitted against the Muslim=20
'other'.
Oral narratives provide a fertile field of investigation of the=20
complex process of negotiation of multiple identities. Gottschalk=20
examines the diverse ways in which one of the founding myths of the=20
village are told by different individuals and groups in the village.=20
The story of a Brahmin priest who, insulted by the local Hindu king,=20
seeks the help of the Muslim Sultan of Delhi to invade the village,=20
and populate it with a new set of inhabitants, both Hindu and Muslim,=20
is told in a variety of ways, stressing a village identity that=20
transcends divisions of religion. So too are the stories told about a=20
Sufi saint buried in the village, whose shrine continues to attract=20
Hindus and Muslim, 'high' caste and 'low' caste alike. In other=20
words, the author insists that the politics of identity is one that=20
must be understood in the context of a constantly shifting=20
constellation of local power relations. Religious identity is=20
constantly being renegotiated through other, competing identities,=20
such as caste, class and gender.
This book strongly interrogates the notion of monolithic=20
Hindu and Muslim identities invariably and necessarily pitted against=20
each other. The author insists that religious diversity need not have=20
to inevitably lead to conflict, and thus suggests the possibility of=20
learning from local ways of negotiating multiple identities through=20
dialogue or simply through shared struggles for sheer survival.

_/_/_/_/_/_/_/_/_/_/_/_/_/_/_/_/_/_/_/_/_/_/_/_/_/_/_/_/_/

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