[sacw] SACW #1 (15 Oct. 01)

[Harsh Kapoor]

South Asia Citizens Wire | Dispatch #1.
15 October 2001
http://www.mnet.fr/aiindex

------------------------------------------

#1. The moment of truth (Irfan Husain)
#2. Whose War? Whose Consensus? - The Indo-Pak sideshow (Praful Bidwai)
#3. South Asia is now poised between peril and opportunity (Michael Krepon)
#4. 'Golden chance for Indo-Pak. dialogue'
#5. Life during wartime - Part 1 (Ruchir Joshi)
#6. 'Normal situation' in Pakistan as protests continue (Edward Luce=20
& Mark Nicholson)
#7. Pakistan - Short-Circuited Jehadi Robots (Amir Mir)
#8. 'Media Obsession With Radical Islamists' (Yogindar Sikand)
#9. A Fuel's Errand: With Islam As Cover (Vijay Prashad)
#10. 'Exercise The Right To Ijtihad' - An interview with Ayesha Jalal
#11. 'The Quran Can Always Be Quoted Selectively' (Ishtiaq Ahmed)
#12. Kashmir Issue Complicates U.S. Alliance - As Decades-Old=20
Conflict Divides Nations (Peter Fritsch)

________________________

#1.

DAWN, 13 October 2001

THE MOMENT OF TRUTH
By Irfan Husain

EVERY once in a while in a nation's history, it is faced with a=20
defining moment in which its course is determined for years to come.
For Pakistan, this critical juncture arrived in the aftermath of the=20
1970 elections: a series of disastrous decisions by politicians and=20
generals precipitated a bloody civil war which ended in a humiliating=20
military defeat for Pakistan and the secession of its eastern wing.=20
We were next faced with such a moment after the flawed 1977=20
elections: had Zulfikar Ali Bhutto immediately agreed to fresh polls,=20
he would have denied the army an excuse to stage a coup and spared us=20
a decade of Zia's crippling Islamization that haunts us still.
These are the ifs and buts of history, and historians will no doubt=20
debate the fallout of those distant events for years to come. But the=20
consequences of the September 11 terror attacks on America are much=20
more immediate. While the world struggles to come to terms with those=20
gruesome acts and their still murky aftermath, Pakistan was faced=20
with its moment of truth immediately after the mayhem in New York and=20
Washington just a month ago.
So far, General Musharraf has taken the right decisions and made all=20
the right moves. Perceptibly, his resolve has hardened. This firmness=20
was evident in the ruthless manner in which he rid the army high=20
command of generals known for their fundamentalist views. By=20
manoeuvring officers loyal to him into key positions, he has secured=20
his flanks. Clearly, he could not keep people on his team who were=20
identified with Pakistan's failed pro-Taliban policy. However, this=20
spring-cleaning is also due to our intelligence agencies that have=20
been propping up the medieval regime in Afghanistan: many officers=20
have established close personal links with the Taliban leadership,=20
and need to be eased out so that their organizations can better=20
respond to the dramatically altered environment after September 11.
Changing a deeply entrenched policy is a bit like changing a large=20
ship's course: it takes time for the bow to respond to the helmsman.=20
For the last quarter century, Pakistan has been drifting away from=20
the course of rational self-interest and basing its policies on=20
ideological abstractions divorced from reality. When Zia boasted that=20
he would make Pakistan "a laboratory of Islam", he was as good as his=20
word. A series of failed experiments have pushed Pakistan toward=20
financial bankruptcy and international isolation. From declaring=20
interest un-Islamic to supporting the Taliban next door, successive=20
leaders have done little but confuse and demoralize the nation.=20
Sectarian and ethnic parties and terrorists have moved into this=20
moral and intellectual vacuum.
Now, after the massive jolt provided by the events of September 11,=20
there is a real opportunity to move away from the disastrous policies=20
of the past. General Musharraf was clear in his recent impressive=20
press conference that Pakistan's taliban policy would have to be=20
abandoned in the light of the changed environment. This pragmatic=20
approach was also evident in his acceptance of a possible role for=20
Zahir Shah in the post-Taliban dispensation. The ex-king of=20
Afghanistan had earlier been anathema to the Pakistani establishment.
It is this rationality and ability to call a spade a spade that=20
distinguishes General Musharraf from his undistinguished=20
predecessors. A leader must be able to spot dangers and=20
opportunities, avoiding the former and seizing the latter. By=20
aligning himself with the global alliance against terror, he has=20
avoided the certain isolation that would have followed had he tried=20
to sit on the fence. By doing so, he has taken on the fanatics and=20
their fury is evident but containable. After years of being covertly=20
encouraged in their madness by short-sighted members of the=20
establishment, they feel suddenly betrayed.
But to put things in perspective, many of the contorted, bearded=20
faces on our TV screens belong to Afghan refugees who are committing=20
acts of violence in Pakistani cities. While Iran isolated its Afghan=20
refugees in camps near the border, Zia allowed ours to go anywhere=20
they pleased. Their presence in the major cities provides extremist=20
parties with foot soldiers while injecting a further element of=20
instability into our polity. All over the world, foreign nationals=20
breaking local laws are deported. Why can't our vast law and order=20
apparatus at least put disorderly refugees into camps far from the=20
cities?
Pakistan's transformation from a backward and violent country of=20
armed zealots into a moderate Muslim state will take time and=20
political will. Above all, it will take strong nerves and an iron=20
fist. But it is a task made easier by the knowledge that extremist=20
religious parties have never won more than five per cent of the=20
popular vote. The interior minister has been making well meaning but=20
ineffectual noises about reining in jihadis and sundry militants.=20
With the recent ouster of hard-line generals from positions of power,=20
it will be easier to tackle these armed and dangerous groups.
But we must face the fact that without a resolution of the Kashmir=20
issue, thee will always be a cause for homegrown terrorists to rally=20
around. While the conflict may be a freedom struggle for Kashmiri=20
militants, there has clearly been cross-border support by=20
Pakistan-based groups. In the changed international environment, this=20
kind of activity will be branded as support for terrorism and the=20
Pakistan government will be held accountable for the actions of its=20
citizens.
At Agra, General Musharraf showed more flexibility than any of his=20
predecessors by accepting the possibility of a 'third option' - an=20
independent Kashmir. India must explore the contours of a possible=20
solution based on such a formula. For far too long have politicians,=20
journalists and generals in Islamabad and New Delhi been locked in=20
their respective rigid positions, unable to think creatively on this=20
vexed issue that has held the entire subcontinent hostage, and cost=20
untold lives and treasure. The Pakistani leader's recent telephone=20
call to the Indian prime minister was an excellent move to break the=20
deadlock. Both sides need to build on the progress made at Agra.=20
Hardliners on both sides need to be reined in, and verbal=20
hair-splitting must not be allowed to torpedo future talks.
Other steps are required to exorcise the spectre of intolerance that=20
stalks the land. First and foremost, we need to reintegrate our=20
sundered minorities into the mainstream. For far too long have they=20
been oppressed and unfairly marginalized. The hateful system of=20
separate electorate must go, and the controversial blasphemy law=20
needs to be reviewed. Similarly, laws that discriminate against women=20
should be repealed. In short, Zia's poisonous legacy must be shed if=20
we are to progress.
A month ago, the world changed. For better or for worse only time=20
will tell. Meanwhile, there are dangers and opportunities for all=20
nations. Pakistan has made a good start in avoiding the former; we=20
must now capitalize on the latter by returning to the comity of=20
nations as a modern, progressive state where all citizens are equal=20
before the law.

=A9 The DAWN Group of Newspapers, 2001

_______

#2.

October 15, 2001
--
WHOSE WAR? WHOSE CONSENSUS? - THE INDO-PAK SIDESHOW
By Praful Bidwai

Wars have a bludgeoning, brutal, way of creating "consensus." As the=20
United States' aerial armada repeatedly bombards Afghanistan, three=20
circumstances put a question-mark over today's "international=20
consensus". The US has launched this war without presenting to the=20
world clinching evidence of Al-Qaeda's direct culpability for the=20
barbaric, thoroughly condemnable, attacks of September 11. This=20
carnage undoubtedly calls for a punitive response. But a just,=20
measured, response can only be based on solid, unimpeachable=20
evidence. What Washington has disclosed won't even stand the scrutiny=20
of a junior magistrate's court. The British government has tabled a=20
17-page dossier on such evidence in the House of Commons. But a large=20
number of jurists and lawyers, including seniors in Ms Cherie Blair's=20
own legal firm, question its adequacy.

Second, Washington has not secured proper authorisation to use force=20
from the UN Security Council. It only has a pre-September 11 mandate=20
to ask the Taliban to hand over Osama bin Laden. Yet, it is already=20
threatening to extend its target beyond Afghanistan. Answerability=20
for "collateral damage" to innocent lives thus remains fuzzy. Third,=20
and most important, it is hard to claim that there exists a popular=20
world "consensus" for the Afghanistan reprisals. Many states have=20
entered reservations (e.g. Indonesia, Malaysia, Iran, Iraq) or=20
caveats about their own participation (Saudi Arabia, Pakistan). There=20
have been spirited protest demonstrations in many cities of the world.

The US must deal with this issue with the utmost sensitivity. Large=20
numbers of citizens--including Muslims, but also others--in 30-plus=20
countries, including even America, see this war as a "crusade,"=20
motivated as much by revenge and anti-Islam prejudices as by an urge=20
to punish wrong-doing. They are not convinced this is a just war, or=20
that it is being fought justly. War must only be waged for just ends.=20
The means of fighting it must also be just-proportionate, legal and=20
in conformity with the Geneva Conventions, etc. To meet both these=20
requirements, and assuage popular misgivings worldwide, the US must=20
do more than declare that it is waging a "principled" battle.

America's objectives are both political and military. Terrorist=20
networks are globally dispersed. Isolating them and gathering=20
intelligence demands exceptionally close cooperation with a number of=20
countries. The US has therefore built four concentric circles of=20
allies and friends. The first consists of combatants: Britain,=20
France, Australia and Germany. The second comprises countries that=20
provide intelligence and logistical support, not troops. This=20
includes Pakistan, Russia, Tajikistan, Spain, Turkey, Uzbekistan and=20
Japan. The third circle consists of countries that provide no=20
logistical support, but political backing with varying commitments,=20
e.g. the bulk of the Arab world, especially Saudi Arabia, Oman, Qatar.

The fourth circle consists of states which essentially do nothing,=20
but won't disturb US plans either: e.g. Iran, Iraq, and with some=20
qualifications, India, Israel and China. Given this strategy, such=20
differentiation is only "natural." The scheme has only an oblique,=20
even contradictory, relationship to "fighting terrorism."

Indian policy-makers are greatly disconcerted at New Delhi's=20
exclusion from the second and third circles. They are being=20
childishly peevish. The US is not concerned at this stage to fight=20
the whole global range of terrorist groups. Its immediate targets are=20
specific groups such as Al-Qaeda. It doesn't even want to eliminate=20
the Taliban for the moment. But New Delhi is undignifiedly joining=20
the war's sub-continental side-show--by assuming that this is a=20
global war against terrorism. Islamabad has played its cards=20
better-indeed, cynically well from a short-term point of view. But it=20
is likely to lose heavily in the long run.

Islamabad wants to have a say in shaping the regime that will replace=20
the Taliban. Gen Musharraf has secured a categorical assurance from=20
Mr Tony Blair that Pakistan has "a valid interest in ... a future=20
[Afghan] regime," which must give adequate representation to the=20
Pushtun tribal group. His warning that the Northern Alliance must not=20
be allowed to "draw mileage" out of the current bombing campaign=20
promoted this objective.

Put simply, Islamabad would like to keep the bulk of its Taliban=20
supporters intact and decisively influence the formation of the next=20
government in the name of "ethnic balance". Pushtuns constitute about=20
40 percent of Afghanistan's population. The Northern Alliance=20
includes hardly any Pushtuns. Pakistan can claim that it has more=20
Pushtuns inside its borders than does Afghanistan. However, demanding=20
a say in Afghanistan's fate is an altogether different proposition.=20
Going by past experience, this will become a licence to create an=20
Afghan snakepit of conflicting interests with each external power=20
pushing its own sectarian agenda. That's what the Soviets did between=20
1979 and 1992 as the Americans played with the Mujahideen. The=20
Iranians did that with the Hazaras, the Pakistanis with the=20
Taliban....

The real trap into which Pakistan is luring the US--and itself--is=20
not Kashmir but Afghanistan--in continuation of its fiendish=20
post-1994 policy. This has already caused enormous political, social=20
and economic damage to Pakistan. As a political-military force, the=20
Taliban are a creation of Pakistan's Inter-Services Intelligence=20
agency. The ISI pushed them across the border in 1994 as part of a=20
Grand Design to fill the vacuum left by Najibullah's fall. The ISI=20
hoped the Taliban, its biggest investment, would help it control=20
Afghanistan, and also establish access to Central Asia's huge oil and=20
gas resources. Ms Benazir Bhutto personally approved this devious=20
plan concocted by Home Minister Nasrullah Babar.

There have been differences within the Pakistani establishment on the=20
wisdom of unleashing the Taliban and legitimising its perverse,=20
distorted, form of political Islam. But at the end of the day, the=20
ISI always prevails. It is the ISI that put bin Laden in touch with=20
the Taliban in 1996 and allowed the two to integrate their military=20
structures. Pakistan has thus been complicit in inflicting=20
unspeakable horrors upon the Afghan people through the Taliban.

The Taliban cut through Afghanistan like a knife through butter. It=20
established despotic order in a situation of warlordism, lawlessness=20
and social disintegration. Its first act was to exclude half of=20
Afghanistan's people from public life--women. It closed down girls'=20
schools, made head-to-toe burqa compulsory, as also beards for all=20
men. It consciously practised cruelty as state policy. It set up the=20
Department of the Promotion of Virtue and Prevention of Vice, which=20
proceeded to ban television, dancing, music, even kites. The Taliban=20
has concocted a new brand of Islam, an ultra-intolerant,=20
unquestioning, fanatical cult, itself a crude version of Saudi=20
Arabia's Wahabbi fundamentalism. Its destruction of the priceless=20
Bamiyan Buddhas was of a piece with this.

The Taliban are not a political party or state structure, but a=20
misbegotten hybrid-a militia much like the medieval lashkar, with a=20
single line of authority emanating from the self-appointed chief. Its=20
30,000 regulars are not paid wages, but given bakshish after a=20
battle. The Taliban "government" consists of just three councils or=20
shuras--with less than 35 men. All major decisions are taken not by=20
the shura of 14 ministers, but by the supreme shura of Taliban=20
Founding Members (Kandahar), headed by Mullah Mohamad Omar--the=20
Leader of the Faithful, the Supreme Commander, the sarasanghachalak.=20
Mullah Omar's is always the last word, sometimes the only word. His=20
authority originally derived from his reputation--of being simple,=20
harsh, and incorruptible. Increasingly, his power comes from=20
controlling money and reshuffling commanders--thus making himself=20
indispensable.

The Taliban's "treasury" consists of two tin trunks (one with US=20
dollars) in Mullah Omar's possession. Most of its decrees and laws=20
are hurriedly pencilled notes by one Mullah or other on pieces of=20
paper, including cigarette packets. Under the Taliban, the=20
de-institutionalisation of the state could not have been more=20
complete. Nor could the brutalisation of society. The Taliban have=20
invented only two things: their own shariah, and barbaric forms of=20
punishment which have no basis in Islam or in Pushtunwali (the=20
Pushtun way) or tribal customs. The Taliban have destroyed the tribal=20
traditions and sufi culture that are part of Afghan rural life.

The Taliban represents the world's most retrograde, reactionary,=20
anti-modernist, male-supremacist, inhuman, barbaric state. It is this=20
that Islamabad is still trying to preserve with US collusion--in the=20
hope of retaining influence over Afghanistan. According to The=20
Guardian (London), the ISI plans to assassinate Mullah Omar and=20
replace him with someone pliable. It will try to keep the Taliban's=20
core intact and insert it into a loya jirga (traditional tribal=20
assembly) which could form the next government.

India, for its part, is happily courting the Northern Alliance, some=20
of whose members have a gruesome record of murder, rape and loot. The=20
US too is playing and ducks and drakes in Afghanistan--supporting all=20
kinds of bloodthirsty groups, and creating new monsters to destroy=20
old ones. This is no way to wage a just struggle against terrorism.=20
Indeed, it is a recipe for strife, violence and destruction--not just=20
in Afghanistan, but in Pakistan, India and the whole world. Such an=20
"anti-terrorist" war could only breed more terrorism.-end-

______

#3.

The Hindustan Times | 14 October 2001

FORBEARANCE IS THE KEY WORD
Michael Krepon
South Asia is now poised between peril and opportunity. The=20
subcontinent has ridden a roller coaster ride ever since India and=20
Pakistan tested nuclear weapons in 1998. Subsequently, the leaders of=20
both countries held an olive branch summit, fought a high-altitude=20
war along Kashmir's divide, endured a mini-Cold War, and then held=20
another surprise summit that collapsed. Now New Delhi and Islamabad=20
find themselves awkward coalition partners in the opening rounds of a=20
war against terrorism.
http://www.hindustantimes.com/nonfram/141001/detFEA03.asp

______

#4.

The Hindu | Sunday, October 14, 2001

'GOLDEN CHANCE FOR INDO-PAK. DIALOGUE'
By R.K. Radhakrishnan

CHENNAI, OCT. 13. The current geo-political realities in south Asia,=20
which find India and Pakistan on the same side, offer a ``golden=20
opportunity'' for both parties to ``initiate a meaningful dialogue,''=20
the former Chief of Naval Staff (CNS) and vice-president,=20
India-Pakistan Peoples Forum for Peace and Democracy, Admiral (retd.)=20
L. Ramdass, has said.

``Even without the Americans, we were trying to take forward the=20
peace process. The dialogue must continue. This has also been=20
reinforced recently by the Foreign Minister, Mr. Jaswant Singh,'' the=20
former CNS said here in an interview. At the moment, the U.S. may not=20
want to assume a pro-active role since the Centre was not keen on=20
involving Washington in the dialogue process. But the U.S. would=20
``certainly'' look forward to a constructive dialogue between the two=20
countries, he felt.

There was a need-based ``convergence'' of interests of both the=20
countries which arose out of immediate ground realities. ``Apart from=20
our common enemies of illiteracy, poverty and socio- economic=20
problems, our other common enemy is terrorism. Extreme fundamentalism=20
is as much a threat to the Pakistan President, Gen. Musharraf, as=20
they are to India,'' he said.

The ``more liberal, moderate leadership'' represented by Gen.=20
Musharraf presented a good chance to address outstanding problems=20
including Kashmir. This was because, Gen. Musharraf, unlike his=20
predecessors such as Ayub Khan and Zia-ul- Haq, understood ground=20
realities better and was much more flexible.

India should not get upset or riled over the fact that Pakistan had=20
again turned out to be America's frontline state. Instead, this=20
should be treated as an opportunity which has presented itself at the=20
right time, he said.

Pakistan might be more receptive to addressing the issue of=20
cross-border terrorism now than six months earlier. ``To that extent,=20
September 11 (terrorist attacks in the U.S.) becomes a watershed (for=20
both countries) to recognise the common threat of organised terrorism=20
irrespective of what source, what medium and what faith these people=20
belong to,'' he added.

Commenting on the various levels of interaction between the two=20
countries, he said when the national emblem gets tagged on, the=20
behaviour of people changes. While people-to-people interactions=20
elicit high hopes and raise mirages of peace, when the nation or the=20
Government element gets added, then everything ``suddenly differs.''=20
``It is like a drama - an interesting phenomenon to observe.''

Added to this was the definition of security as perceived by the=20
state. The Admiral said that over a period of time, the state had=20
begun to dictate terms of national security. ``What the state says is=20
national security. If you relate national security to people's=20
security, then many of the false veils will collapse. Then you will=20
be able to relate more freely. In the long run, only these policies=20
will be sustainable.''

On the U.S. attacks on Afghanistan, he said the world had not=20
witnessed ``any reaction of terrorist groups.'' It was possible that=20
some groups might take the bombing as an insult to their religion and=20
prepare to retaliate. ``Violence cannot stop with counter-violence.=20
The best way is to address the root cause such as the Palestinian=20
problem and arrive at a just settlement with U.S. mediation,'' he=20
said.

______

#5.

The Hindu , Sunday, October 14, 2001
Features

LIFE DURING WARTIME

All through his time in New York, RUCHIR JOSHI carried a bag of fear=20
inside him, as the city never lost a certain hum of general=20
aggression and nastiness. But it also had a chaotic warmth ... a=20
sense of camaraderie, its inhabitants happy at living in the innards=20
of this particular beast and no other. New York was the world, and=20
the whole planet sent bits of itself to the city as human tithe. The=20
first of a two-part article.

WHEN I lived in New York I never saw it as a part of America. New=20
York was New York and, even though I had no plans to settle there, it=20
felt like it belonged to me as much as anyone else. America, on the=20
other hand, was emphatically not mine. America was the soulless mess=20
that began once you came out of the tunnel or got off the bridge into=20
New Jersey or southern New York state. The grey suburban-industrial=20
penumbra of the city was a truly foreign place and not where I liked=20
spending any time. I journeyed out when I needed to, on as few=20
occasions as possible, and escaped back to the city as fast as I=20
could.

I rented a top floor garret between Avenue B and Avenue C, not too=20
far from Wall Street. The World Trade Center (WTC) was pretty close=20
by NYC standards - a friend who lived next door and worked down near=20
Tribeca got there in 15 minutes every morning - but for all real=20
purposes the twin towers were on the other side of the planet, so far=20
away that they could even have been in America. Downtown was where=20
all the world's money was, and the East Village was where all the=20
world's money was not, unless of course you happened to be in the=20
narcotics trade.

I loved this non-American, un-dollared, neighbourhood which had been=20
the first beachhead on the continent for so many generations of=20
immigrants, from Ukranians and Poles in the early 20th Century to,=20
more recently, the Puerto Ricans and Bangladeshis. I loved the sounds=20
that welcomed me as I returned home every day, the old alcoholics in=20
Tomkins Square beating up mad salsa rhythms on their beer cans, the=20
timbre of each can changing as it emptied, the warring boom-boxes on=20
the basketball courts, the modern-jazz guy reverberating the empty=20
school building across my street with his tenor sax, the acappella of=20
police sirens, the broad Belfastese of the Irish Republican Army=20
(IRA) priest who ran the boys' shelter next door, the deep hammer of=20
a Harley when a local Hell's Angel landlord rode by, cruising for=20
some tenant late on his rent.

As I climbed up the six floors to my "apartment" there was also a=20
whole sequence of smells, and I could almost identify each floor with=20
my eyes closed: stale urine and dirty cat litter on the ground, ganja=20
on the second, pork fat frying on the fourth, industrial strength=20
bug-killer on the fifth, old dust and fresh coffee on my own floor,=20
the sixth.

No, it was not America, or not just America, it was the whole world,=20
and I was sure it was like no other place on earth.

It was not always nice. All through my time in New York I carried a=20
little bag of fear inside me, and there were times, when faced with a=20
gun or a knife, when the bag burst open and spilled out total,=20
abject, terror. Besides the fear, the city never lost a certain hum=20
of general aggression and nastiness. Then there was a visibility to=20
poverty here that put the visibility of the rich into sharp relief,=20
like morning light shining sideways on a tall building. There was=20
that huge verticality always dwarfing you, and that fed into a=20
particular New York loneliness. If you happened to be broke when the=20
December wind funnelled down an avenue and jumped you, it could=20
become chillingly clear that nobody really gave a damn whether you=20
were starving or not.

But the city also had a chaotic warmth. I came from Calcutta, and=20
there were similarities that I appreciated. The naked garbage on the=20
streets was comforting, as was the maelstrom of traffic - there was=20
the satisfaction that not everything worked and not everything had=20
to; strangers would pick up conversations, have opinions they needed=20
to communicate, advice to offer about your shoes, and questions to=20
ask about the universe; friendships would form much faster than in=20
other western cities - there was a sense of camaraderie against this=20
beast we were living in, but we also shared an electric sense of=20
adventure, a happiness at living in the innards of this particular=20
beast and no other.

New York was the world, and the whole planet sent bits of itself to=20
the city as human tithe. In one day, without being conscious of it at=20
all, I would find I had stopped at the Cuban's bodega to buy my=20
coffee beans, visited the bakery run by the three old Jews on East=20
9th to get bagels and poppy seed cake, shook hands with the East=20
African Gujaratis running the subway newstand ("Bawss, ek Playboy=20
aney ek Voice aapjo ney!"), chatted to the Ukranian lady as she=20
served me my lunch of borsht and chala bread at Veselka, visited the=20
trendy new Japanese restaurant for a quick beer, and ended the=20
evening knocking back Wyborowa Vodka and cursing the Soviet=20
leadership in the Polish bar called Blue and Gold; and most of all of=20
this within seven minutes of where I lived.

Besides my American friends, around me also lived several different=20
non-Americans who had nothing to do with running shops and=20
restaurants. Till I reached New York, job-descriptions such as=20
"bohemian", "revolutionary", "exile" and "dissident" were only=20
romantic words I had seen on paper. In the East Village I found=20
myself surrounded by real exiles and dissidents. As I looked around=20
at the diverse people around me I totted up yet more lists and this=20
was the "political" one: there were the two Iranian Communists who=20
had been persecuted by the Shah's Savak and who then had comrades=20
executed by the Ayatollah's goons; then there were the=20
anti-communists, some young Cubans, and the slightly older Poles, one=20
of whom gave me a real Solidarity union badge from the Gdansk=20
shipyards; there was the anti-Zionist Israeli sculptor; and then=20
there were a couple of Palestinians at the breakfast diner who kept=20
to themselves, but who began nodding hello to me once they realised I=20
was Indian. In the middle of all this there was me, neither an exile=20
nor a dissident, very happy to be where I was for the time being, and=20
happy precisely because I knew I could always go back home to a=20
normal life in Calcutta.

Despite all the craziness, there was a normalcy to New York too.=20
Life's major upheavals happened elsewhere and we, as was due to those=20
living at the centre of the world, received news of them. In no=20
particular sequence, I remember the following taking place between=20
the Augusts of 1981 and 1982: Jaruzelski's crackdown on the=20
Solidarity movement which signalled the beginning of the end of the=20
Soviet Empire; the war in the Falklands, which would be cited nine=20
years later as a kind of precedent and model for the Gulf War; the=20
first cases of AIDS starting to come to public notice; the war in=20
Afghanistan escalating as the war between Iran and Iraq continued;=20
Britain exploding into race riots; Israel invading Lebanon, and the=20
butchery at Sabra and Shatila refugee camps being overseen by an=20
ex-Panzer General called Ariel Sharon.

There were things brewing in India too, but I was less aware of these=20
than I should have been. I was far more interested in the events in=20
other parts of the world. There were signs though, if only I had been=20
clever enough to read them, and they would lead to a shattering of=20
many normalcies that I took for granted at the time.

Over the next decade, all the components of September 11 would=20
appear, one by one, in the arena of Indian politics. Before the=20
Lockerbie crash there would be the bomb which exploded Air India's=20
"Kanishka" - the first instance where airport security was breached=20
not to take hostages but to bring a plane down. Next, Rajiv Gandhi=20
was killed by a woman with a bomb strapped to her body - till then=20
the highest profile murder by a suicide bomber. Bombs also went off=20
in an attempt to destroy the Air India building and the Bombay Stock=20
Exchange, two tall buildings standing near the sea, in the financial=20
heart of the major commercial city of the country. These and the=20
other blasts across Bombay were in retaliation for attacks on=20
Muslims. Looking back, one can see the whole kit that went into=20
making the WTC atrocity being laid out, as if a macabre collagist was=20
cutting out the various bits he was later going to stick together to=20
make a bigger deconstruction.

In New York I had, of course, no idea that any of this was coming.=20
Despite knowing so many people, all of whom were, in some sense,=20
questioning where they had come from and where they now found=20
themselves, I continued to hold on to a certain idea of India - one I=20
had carried with me in some shape or form throughout my conscious=20
life. Despite its many problems, mistakes and failures, India, to me,=20
was the "good guy", stable, and inherently decent. India was the=20
David to the Goliaths of America, the former USSR and China. India=20
was, in more ways than one, home.

I was from India but also, in a deep sense, India was from me. In=20
retrospect, it seems a crazily nave idea to have retained till the=20
ripe age of 21. I was old enough to know better, and it was in New=20
York, in the international bhelpuri I found myself in, that my=20
picture of India first got dented and began its irretrievable slide=20
towards disintegration.

The first time "India" got knocked was at a falafel stall near=20
Madison Square Garden. Whenever I passed by I used to pick up a kebab=20
and pita from this place. The two guys who ran it looked like they=20
were from my part of the world, but I never had the time to ask them.=20
Then, one day, as the man handed me my loaded pita, he asked me -=20
"Where you from?" "India," I said, "What about you?" "Kashmir, I am=20
coming from Kashmir." I nodded. "So, same. India, no?" The man's eyes=20
flashed and he shook his head. "Not India! Azad Kashmir!" Some=20
patriotic gland inside me secreted adrenalin and I retorted, "Oh, you=20
mean Pakistan Occupied Kashmir!" The man was about to hand me my=20
change, but he froze when I said this. I would swear to myself later=20
that if he had had a kebab skewer or a meat knife handy he would have=20
cut me open. For that one paused moment I could see the options=20
flashing through his eyes. Something in him decided not to kill me in=20
broad daylight on one of the busiest crossroads in the world. Instead=20
he leaned forward and spoke quite slowly, making sure I got it. "No=20
India and no Pakistan. One day all Kashmir - free!" Then he pressed=20
the change into my hand as if giving me back all of India.

I dismissed the man as some fool loaded with the delusion that=20
Pakistan would ever let Kashmir be independent. I tried to put the=20
incident out of my mind, but the Kashmiri had opened a Pandora's box.=20
A couple of weeks later, I fell into a conversation with a=20
Bangladeshi man who told me he had fought in the Mukti Bahini against=20
the Pakistanis in 1971. True or false, I was fascinated by his=20
stories and quite unprepared for what happened as we came out of the=20
bar.

"I would say let us meet again," he said to me, his slurring making=20
it difficult for me to understand his East Bengali accent, "but I=20
have found it is best not give you Indian bastards too much. You can=20
never trust an Indian. First we thought you were our friends, but now=20
... but now." He expelled some abuses that I recognised despite the=20
accent, " ... now we know, really, really what Big Brother means!" He=20
spat a couple more expletives at me and turned and walked away,=20
leaving me mystified.

India, as far as I remembered, had given shelter to hundreds of=20
thousands of East Bengali refugees fleeing the murderous Pakistani=20
army. Finally, our own army had gone in, fighting a war to free what=20
was now Bangladesh from Pakistan.

I just could not understand the man - what had India done wrong?=20
Equally confusing was the drunken Nepali who tried to beat me up one=20
January night outside the Astor Place subway. "You! India! Bastard!"=20
I can still remember the words coming out of his mouth, three=20
distinct shapes smoking up in the winter air as he lurched after me,=20
throwing punches. As I sprinted away from the madman the same=20
question ran with me - why? And then a variation of it, when once or=20
twice Sikhs I passed on the street looked at me funny - had they,=20
perhaps, mistaken me for a Pakistani?

(To be continued)

(The title of this essay is taken from the title of a song by the=20
rock group Talking Heads. The song was a big hit in New York during=20
the time I describe.)

Ruchir Joshi's first novel The Last Jet-engine Laugh was published=20
earlier this year by HarperCollins India.

______

#6.

Financial Times
'NORMAL SITUATION' IN PAKISTAN AS PROTESTS CONTINUE
By Edward Luce and Mark Nicholson
Published: October 14 2001 19:15 | Last Updated: October 14 2001 19:19
http://news.ft.com/ft/gx.cgi/ftc?pagename=3DView&c=3DArticle&cid=3DFT3IWEW5=
TSC&live=3Dtrue&tagid=3DZZZC19QUA0C&subheading=3Dasia%20pacific

______

#7.

Outlook
PAKISTAN
SHORT-CIRCUITED JEHADI ROBOTS
The current churning in Pakistan clearly brings out its very own=20
'clash of civilisations'-pandered Islamists vs a US-dependent elite.
AMIR MIR
http://www.outlookindia.com/full.asp?sid=3D5&fname=3DGround+Report+%28F%29&=
fodname=3D20011022&secname=3D

______

#8.

Outlook - 13 October 2001 - Debate
'MEDIA OBSESSION WITH RADICAL ISLAMISTS'
Joining the debate -- 'Muslims' are not a homegeneous community, and=20
Hinduttva radicals in India fuel and feed their Islamist=20
counterparts...
YOGINDAR SIKAND
http://www.outlookindia.com/full.asp?fodname=3D20011013&fname=3Dyogi&sid=3D=
1

______

#9.

Outlook - 13 October 2001 -- Opinion
A FUEL'S ERRAND: WITH ISLAM AS COVER
Ah, Islam is in crisis; its radicals have declared war on America, on=20
Christianity, on civilization? What about the crisis of Capitalism or=20
Christianity? When eevn fools would know it's all about oil.
VIJAY PRASHAD
http://www.outlookindia.com/full.asp?fodname=3D20011013&fname=3Dvijay&sid=
=3D1

______

#10.

Outlook - 13 October 2001
'EXERCISE THE RIGHT TO IJTIHAD' - An Interview with Ayesha Jalal
http://www.outlookindia.com/full.asp?sid=3D1&fodname=3D20011013&fname=3Daye=
sha

______

#11.

Outlook - 13 October 2001 -- DEBATE
'The Quran Can Always Be Quoted Selectively'
Joining the debate on what is being described as a 'crisis in Islam'.
ISHTIAQ AHMED
http://www.outlookindia.com/full.asp?fodname=3D20011013&fname=3Dinterview&s=
id=3D1

______

#12.

THE WALL STREET JOURNAL
October 12, 2001
Kashmir Issue Complicates U.S. Alliance - As Decades-Old Conflict=20
Divides Nations
By PETER FRITSCH
http://interactive.wsj.com/articles/SB1002833281473067840.htm

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