[sacw] SACW #2. (08 Oct. 01)

Harsh Kapoor aiindex@mnet.fr
Mon, 8 Oct 2001 10:52:04 +0100


South Asia Citizens Wire | Dispatch #2.
08 October 2001
http://www.mnet.fr/aiindex

------------------------------------------

#1. Terrorism: The War Within: Why 'ban-and-bang' won't work (Praful Bidwai=
)
#2. Bangladesh: Misreading the October elections: Lessons for both=20
parties (Rehman Sobhan)
#3. Pakistan: Policy review should go the whole length (M.B. Naqvi)
#4. 'how he felt about the suspects sharing his Islamic faith' Mohammad Al=
i
#5. Joseph Allen Stein, born Omaha Nebraska, April 10, 1912, died=20
Raleigh, North
Carolina, October 5, 2001

________________________

#1.

Terrorism: The War Within
Why 'ban-and-bang' won't work

By Praful Bidwai [ 8 October , 2001]

Has India finally joined "the global war against terrorism"--not=20
through the "servile" route Mr Jaswant Singh first proposed, with his=20
unsolicited offer of unlimited military cooperation with the US, but=20
rather, through the "Advani route"--by cracking down on the Students'=20
Islamic Movement of India (SIMI)? The answer, says the Home Minister,=20
is yes. SIMI is the domestic face of international terrorism. It is a=20
sinister, subversive group with close links to Pakistan's=20
Inter-Services Intelligence and assorted global terrorist groups. So=20
by arresting 400 of its office-bearers India has joined the "global=20
anti-terrorist war".

However, Mr Advani should know that there isn't one anti-terrorist=20
"war", there are two. First is the war that Washington vowed after=20
September 11, but about which its own policy-makers have become=20
somewhat hesitant. Some, like Colin Powell, are asking hard=20
questions: Is there clinching evidence against Osama bin Laden?=20
Should they capture him and also dislodge the Taliban government? How=20
much force should be used? What is the physical reality of that=20
diffuse "enemy" called "global terrorism"? How to secure a mandate=20
for the use of force from the UN Security Council and a "broad=20
international coalition"? The "first" war's votaries loathe the=20
suggestion that it is directed at Islam or Muslims.

The "second war" is already fully under way: in America's=20
streets--where innocent people who don't look White Anglo-Saxon have=20
become targets--and in the minds of the "holy" men in Afghanistan who=20
have decided they won't hand over bin Laden. They will instead target=20
the "Great Satan" and his people. Racial minorities, including 200=20
Indians, have become victims of this "second war"--because "educated"=20
Americans don't know that the Sikh's turban is not "a diaper on the=20
head," nor the same as the Arab's headgear.

The "first war" is (or should be) about the legitimate use of=20
measured force, based upon detailed investigation and reasonable=20
proof of guilt for September 11. To succeed, it will need a proper=20
international mandate, and may have to address some of the=20
root-causes of the extreme frustration and desperation that lead to=20
terrorism. The "second war" is about outright revenge. It demands no=20
accountability, no proof, not even investigation. Its perpetrators=20
already know the enemy. They know where he is--in Afghanistan,=20
Palestine, Pakistan, Iran, and all "those uncivilised" countries.=20
Their mission is to convert these lands into "glowing deserts." Their=20
crusade will thus bring "history's wrong-doers to their senses" and=20
even "restore dignity to Afghanistan", to quote one of their Indian=20
acolytes.

Regrettably, it's this "second war" that India has joined by banning=20
SIMI. The official case against SIMI is full of legal holes and=20
factual contradictions. A major charge is that SIMI is "working for=20
an international Islamic order," and "aims to achieve Allah's=20
pleasure." Now, this may not appeal to many people--just as the=20
RSS-VHP's "global Hindu" mission doesn't. But holding such beliefs is=20
neither unconstitutional nor a crime. Not all people with weird or=20
fanatical schemes for the world are criminals. There's also the=20
charge that SIMI has been "in touch with militant outfits," and=20
invited the head of Hamas, the Palestinian organisation, several=20
times over. But the Home Ministry too has been "in touch" with=20
"militant outfits" such as the NSCN. It has also held talks with=20
Kashmiri groups it itself accuses of having receiving training,=20
funds, etc from Pakistan. Hamas is not banned in India.

The only substantial anti-SIMI charges pertain to specific=20
activities, such as protests against the burning of the Holy Koran,=20
and collusion with the Hizbul Mujahideen in causing a number of=20
explosions in UP between February and August. It is also charged that=20
two SIMI activists, including Abdul Mobin, a student of Aligarh=20
Muslim University, were "involved" in six explosions causing nine=20
deaths. These charges surely warrant action under various laws of the=20
land. They still do not justify an outright ban on the organisation=20
itself, unless it is proved that SIMI's entire structure resembles a=20
terrorist group's and must be destroyed because each of its tiers=20
poses a threat to India's security.

This has never been established. In fact, the government's approach=20
is contradictory. On the one hand, it accuses SIMI of having=20
published pro-Al-Qaeda pamphlets after September 11. On the other,=20
home secretary Kamal Pandey asserts that there is no connection=20
between post-September 11 events and the SIMI crackdown. Put bluntly,=20
regarding bin Laden as an ideological beacon or a hero of "the global=20
struggle against America" is a detestable idea. I personally find it=20
obnoxious. But it is not a crime. The chargesheet against SIMI is=20
based for the most part on vague, unproved, suspicions and surmises.=20
None of these has stood the scrutiny of our lawcourts for 20 years.

As if this weren't bad enough, the official accusation concerning the=20
AMU student (Mobin Ahmed) is probably a canard. In September last=20
year, the UP police unleashed horrible excesses on the AMU campus on=20
mere suspicion of Mobin's involvement with the Hizb largely because=20
he is Kashmiri. The highly regarded AMU Vice-Chancellor, and students=20
and teachers of different persuasion, told me early this year that=20
the police ransacked the entire campus, but unearthed no evidence.=20
Similar raids were conducted in Jamia Milia in Delhi. The police=20
mercilessly beat up students, but found no incriminating evidence.

The hounding of SIMI is politically obnoxious. It comes at a time=20
when anti-Islam prejudices are on the rise. At this critical juncture=20
we must strongly defend pluralism and secularism. If the government=20
really wanted to punish the spreading of communal prejudice, then the=20
prime candidates were the VHP, RSS and Bajrang Dal, which have done=20
so much damage: through Mr Advani's rathyatra, the Babri demolition,=20
killing of Graham Staines, attacks on Christians, hounding of M.F.=20
Hussain and Deepa Mehta, and harassment of secular historians... By=20
selectively banning SIMI, the government is alienating the entire=20
Muslim community. It is pandering to, and spreading, hatred.

The official double standards are appalling. In replication of Mr=20
Advani's conduct after Staines' heinous killing, his deputy (I.D.=20
Swamy) admitted in a TV programme ("Reality Bites", Star) that the=20
Bajrang Dal and VHP are guilty of hate crimes, but must be exonerated=20
and can't be banned because they "glorify our ancient past". It is=20
nobody's case that SIMI is a secular or democratic organisation. It=20
is communal, probably fundamentalist. But it is not terrorist.

To tar all Islamic groups with the brush of bin Laden-style=20
terrorism, while letting off Hindu communalists who have a proven=20
record of hate crimes, reeks of a communal bias. The government is=20
callously insensitive to the idea that the fight against terrorism=20
must be waged on a principled basis. Or else, it wouldn't have issued=20
full-page advertisements on September 18, mourning the US carnage,=20
while comparing it with three acts of "Islamic" terror in India--as=20
if the 1984 anti-Sikh riots or the 1992-93 Bombay pogrom of Muslims=20
didn't occur. Nor would it have begged America to fight our war=20
against terrorism after the October 1 Srinagar blasts.

The "second," dubious, anti-terrorist "war" is bound to produce=20
excesses. Precisely because it is not based on universal values and=20
sacredness of human life, it will pass off the targeting of civilians=20
as "normal" or "collateral damage." Because it is being conducted=20
with cynical calculation, it will dress up parochial national=20
interests as universal interests, and selfish economic gains as=20
international achievements. Recall the Gulf War a decade ago. The US=20
and its allies intervened in Iraq because Saddam Hussein had invaded=20
Kuwait. Ten years after his aggression was vacated, Iraq continues to=20
face terrible sanctions, the West continues bombing it, but Hussein=20
is still in power. The war entered a particularly brutal phase in its=20
sixth week when the US bombed an air-raid shelter in Baghdad, simply=20
because it suspected that Hussein was there. This killed 400=20
civilians. This instance of high-tech barbarism inaugurated yet more=20
inhuman "collateral damage." The West's military machine is awesome.=20
Unless it is restrained and used in a sober, principled manner, it=20
can cause havoc.

The danger of this happening in Afghanistan is immense. Already, the=20
Afghan people have been brutalised and pulverised for 22 years. The=20
more the war's apologists say that the violence inflicted on them is=20
"violence for civilisation," for redeeming Afghanistan, the greater=20
the likelihood of more carnages. After all, we are doing all this for=20
the Afghans' own good--because they understand so little, see so=20
little, and yet hate us. Many Americans don't stop to ask why the=20
World Trade Centre was attacked, and why there is so much hatred=20
against the US in the Third World. They think they already know the=20
answers: irrational, mad mullahs detest the American way of life, our=20
democracy, our freedom, our prosperity. They are abnormal, crazy;=20
they must be eliminated.... It is on this terrain that the coming=20
confrontation will take place: between votaries of the "first war,"=20
and advocates of the second. We must decide where we stand.--end--

_____

#2.

The Daily Star | 8 October 2001 | Op-Ed.

Misreading the October elections: Lessons for both parties
by Rehman Sobhan

A negative approach could undo the political gains of the AL,=20
registered in the election, by demoralizing their workers and would=20
leave 22 million of their voters voiceless in parliament... Indeed,=20
if we take account of the votes received on account of the three=20
allies, the BNP's individual vote share is perhaps less than that of=20
the Awami League which increased both its vote share and also its=20
absolute vote by 40 per cent. Under the circumstances, the BNP cannot=20
afford to ignore the Awami League, even if they do occupy not more=20
than 70 seats in the house, since it represents the aspirations of 22=20
million voters.

After the October 1 elections the country appears to be tragically=20
poised on the brink of yet another, avoidable, political crisis. It=20
is argued that this crisis derives from a misreading of the lessons=20
from the election. This paper seeks to provide a perspective on the=20
October election which can, hopefully, be drawn upon by the=20
leadership of both parties to assess the implications of their=20
actions and then to move towards a resolution of the political crisis.

The elections of 1stt October, 2001, to the 8th Jatiya Sangsad, have=20
ended in an unprecedented landslide for BNP and its allies, the=20
Jamaat, IOJ and Jatiya Party who, at the latest count, have won 203=20
seats in a house of 300. The Awami League, in power over the last=20
five years, has so far won a mere 61 seats. The BNP led alliance is=20
enjoying a sense of historic triumph, having done far better than=20
even they expected. The Awami League is finding it difficult to come=20
to terms with its significantly diminished position in the new=20
Sangsad which appears to them to be at variance with the support they=20
enjoy in the country. Ershad's Jatiya Party is somewhat deflated,=20
with a halving of their vote and seats in the Parliament.

The above table, however, shows that the vast disparity in seats=20
between the BNP Alliance and the Awami League in no way reflects the=20
preferences of the voters. The Awami League remains the party with=20
the largest share of the vote, as it was in 1996 and indeed, 1991.=20
Significantly, the Awami League vote share has gone up in successive=20
elections. In 1991 the Awami League won 33.7 per cent of the vote, in=20
1996 it won 37.4 per cent of the vote and on 1st October, 2001, 40.20=20
per cent, where their vote share actually exceeded the share=20
registered when they formed the government in 1996. These figures=20
indicate that in terms of conventional election analysis, there was a=20
small vote swing in favour and not against, the Awami League in the=20
October 1, 2001 election. The retention by the Awami League of its=20
share of the vote has been matched by the fact that the AL has=20
increased the absolute number of votes polled by 40 per cent, from=20
15.9 million in 1996 to 22.3 million on October 1st, 2001. This is=20
the highest number of votes ever received by the Awami League or any=20
other single party in Bangladesh or Pakistan, over the last half=20
century. Whilst the size of the electorate has undoubtedly increased,=20
the fact remains that the Awami League has protected its share of the=20
vote in 1996 and also captured 48.5 per cent of the additional 13=20
million votes, cast on October 1st.

On the basis of the arithmetical evidence it would be fallacious to=20
say that the polls reflect a massive rejection of the Awami League,=20
its record in office or its politics. All of these factors may, in=20
some measure, have worked against the Awami League, but the poll=20
results can hardly provide the evidence for this. If an additional=20
six million people voted for the AL in the October election, this=20
suggests that the sense of revulsion against terrorism, corruption=20
and partisan administration could not have been so powerful as to=20
drive away its erstwhile voters or to attract new voters. After all,=20
in Dhaka City, which was presumably the worst affected by the issue=20
of terrorism, in virtually every one of the eight metropolitan=20
constituencies, the Awami League candidate substantially increased=20
the size of the AL vote and attracted over 40 per cent of the share=20
of the total votes cast. Indeed, the increase in the AL vote share=20
and in the absolute numbers of votes polled, across virtually every=20
constituency, suggests that the AL regime must also have registered=20
some positive achievements to its credit, which were appreciated by=20
the voters. The above statistical evidence is not intended to suggest=20
that citizens were not concerned about terrorism and corruption in=20
casting their vote or that the AL regime may have much to answer for=20
in these areas, but to put these issues into some sort of=20
perspective, as reflected in voter behavior.

Lessons in electoral strategy
So how does one account for the fact that the BNP and its allies will=20
go into the new Parliament with over 200 seats, leaving the Awami=20
League with a modest 61 or so seats, at most? The answer, at its most=20
obvious, is to be found in the arithmetic of election alliances. In=20
1996 the movement against the BNP found the Jamaat and the Jatiya=20
Party, along with the AL, in direct electoral contestation with the=20
BNP. Between them, the BNP, the Jamaat and the Jatiya Party gained=20
over 60 per cent of the votes cast in the 1996 poll, but this vote=20
remained divided, leaving the BNP with a vote share of 33.6 per cent.=20
This was, significantly, an improvement over the 30.8 per cent of the=20
vote share of the BNP in 1991,when they formed the government. This=20
suggests that the BNP did not unduly fall in the affection of the=20
voters, as a consequence of the political mobilization against them=20
in 1995-96.

The AL's strategy of dividing the anti-AL vote in 1996 proved to be a=20
more effective weapon. It was, thus, not unduly unexpected that the=20
BNP strategy, over the last three years would have focused on=20
building a political coalition to mobilize the anti-AL vote under one=20
banner. This strategy appears to have been a brilliant success, in=20
spite of the defection of the JP under Ershad. The BNP retained the=20
Naziur Rahman faction of the JP in the alliance so that the Ershad=20
JP's vote almost halved from seven million in 1996 to 3.6 million in=20
2001. This residual JP vote, of around 3.4 million, may be presumed=20
to have been delivered by the JP (Naziur), as its dowry to the BNP=20
alliance.

The highly rewarding outcome of the BNP strategy of forging electoral=20
alliances, is evident from the fact that, in the October election,=20
the BNP-led alliance recorded 25.8 million votes. This was made up=20
from the BNP vote of 14.3 million, 3.7 million votes of the Jamaat=20
and 3.4 million votes retained by the JP (Naziur), all recorded in=20
the 1996 election, which add up to 21.7 million votes. The balance of=20
4.1 million votes accruing to the BNP alliance may have come from its=20
share of the 13 million additional votes cast in 2001 over 1996.=20
Pooling the BNP, Jamaat and a share of the Jatiya Party votes, in all=20
300 constituencies, earned the alliance only 46.6 per cent of the=20
total votes cast, compared to 40 per cent received by the AL.=20
However, when this 7 per cent higher vote share is spread across 300=20
constituencies, it was enough to win the BNP Alliance the two-thirds=20
majority which they command today, in the 8th Parliament. Had Ershad=20
remained loyal to the 4-Party alliance the Alliance's share of seats=20
could have been even larger since the JP (Ershad) has won 14 seats=20
and 6.5 per cent of the vote.

This evidence of the electoral outcome of such a BNP-led alliance was=20
provided some months ago in two long articles by Nazim Kamran=20
Chowdhury, in the columns of The Daily Star of April 13, 2001, a=20
summary of which also appeared in the Holiday around the same time.=20
In an article presented in The Daily Star of 6 October, Kamran has,=20
most presciently, drawn attention to these forecasts he made in April=20
2001. The recent Daily Star article shows how Kamran's forecast of=20
April 2001 has largely matched the outcome of the October poll. What=20
Kamran had done in the April article was to add up the votes of the=20
BNP, Jamaat and JP in 1996, in each constituency and to show how many=20
seats could be won by such an anti-AL alliance if they voted for a=20
single candidate. The Awami League should have heeded Kamran's=20
exercise in electoral arithmetic more carefully, to help them to=20
quantify the magnitude of the task before them in the forthcoming=20
polls. I doubt if the electoral strategists in the Awami League were=20
even aware of this article, though some persons did bring it to their=20
notice.

Lessons from the polls for the Awami League
There are lessons from the polls which need to be absorbed by both=20
parties. The party which most urgently needs to take stock of the=20
changing trends in electoral arithmetic is the Awami League, because=20
its assessment will impinge on their immediate response to the=20
October polls. The AL needs to come to terms with the fact that the=20
BNP has built a political coalition which has carried them to a=20
decisive electoral, rather than political victory, on October 1, even=20
while the Awami League was winning the allegiance of six million new=20
voters and 40 per cent of the electorate. Such a BNP-led coalition=20
could have longer term implications for the Awami League. As long as=20
the BNP keeps its anti-Awami League coalition intact, the Awami=20
League stands in danger of being reduced to a permanent minority,=20
within the prevailing constitutional framework, of Westminster-style,=20
first past the post, parliamentary politics. If the Awami League is=20
to ever hope to recapture power it will have to win over some of=20
those people who voted for the BNP and Jatiya Party in the recent=20
elections. In the October election the Awami League has retained most=20
of its past voters and it has captured 48.5 per cent of the new=20
generation of voters who have entered the voters' lists in the last=20
five years. The BNP has also capitalized on these new voters but its=20
principal strategy for 2001 was to ensure that the old voters of 1996=20
cast their votes for a single anti-AL candidate in every=20
constituency. The Awami League, therefore, has to persuade a segment=20
of these old voters who vote for the BNP to join with a rising=20
proportion of the new voters entering the lists in 2006, to vote for=20
the Awami League in the next election.

This new generation of voters, who came of age in 2001, presumably do=20
not bring with them any inherited loyalties to either party or carry=20
over fewer historical political memories. For this new generation of=20
voters, the present is the moment. These new voters do not have any=20
strong memory of the record of the BNP when they held office from=20
1991 to 1996. Otherwise they would have recollected that terrorism,=20
corruption and a partisan administration were not invented by the=20
Awami League and were alive and well under both the Ershad and the=20
last BNP administration. New voters in the age group of 18-23 are=20
more inclined to be cognizant of the terrorism, corruption,=20
partisanship and misgovernance that they witnessed or read about over=20
the last few years. Obviously, for this generation, the development=20
performance, good crops and stable prices, recorded during the tenure=20
of the Awami League regime needed to be highly persuasive to outweigh=20
the image of misgovernance of the outgoing regime. The new voters=20
appear to have divided their vote between the AL and that of the BNP=20
led alliance. This statistical evidence of the behavior of new voters=20
remains contrary to popular wisdom which implies that the new voters=20
clearly opted for the BNP alliance. This perspective is not=20
substantiated by the available evidence and, thus, holds some hope=20
for the future, for the Awami League, when another 15-20 million new=20
voters will come of age in 2006.

Whilst time will reveal how far the bias of the caretaker=20
administration may have influenced the outcome of the October 1=20
election, it is likely that most of the vote swing towards the BNP=20
alliance will remain ascribable to the changed political arithmetic=20
provided through the strategic alliance crafted by the BNP with its=20
three allies. Such a perspective on the October election suggests=20
that the Awami League will be making a grave, if not fatal, political=20
mistake, if it continues to ascribe its massive electoral defeat=20
exclusively to the malign intent of the caretaker government. Rather,=20
the AL should be looking much more closely at the logic and=20
implications of alliance building and, accordingly restructuring=20
their political appeal to the new generation of voters whose votes=20
will be appearing in the electoral market in 2006.

For such a new generation of voters, the Awami League will have to=20
project itself as a credible opposition in the new Parliament, where=20
they can compensate for the smallness of their numbers, through the=20
effectiveness of their voice on the floor of the house. They will=20
have to use Parliament, as well as the public political platform, to=20
hold the BNP accountable for their electoral promises and their=20
various acts of misgovernance over the next five years. To play such=20
a role in Parliament will demand serious and continuous homework=20
rather than ad hoc responses and incendiary rhetoric. More=20
importantly, the Awami League will have to put together a credible=20
political agenda of its own, which responds to the needs of a new=20
generation of voters, by providing solutions to the innumerable=20
problems which face Bangladesh at the dawn of the new millennium. All=20
these tasks will require serious self-assessment prior to a=20
rebuilding of the Awami League. Such a move to transform the AL into=20
a Party of the 21st century will need to reinvigorate grassroots=20
organization, introduce professionalism in designing its political=20
strategy as well as party organization and invest enormous creative=20
thinking through drawing in expert advise in designing its future=20
agenda. Such a rebuilding of the party would need to originate in a=20
process of ongoing consultation with the voters, as well as drawing=20
in a new generation of young people, with a clean image, who may be=20
motivated to participate in the exciting task of renovating a major=20
democratic party, over the next decade.

This task of rethinking and rebuilding the party will not be possible=20
if the Awami League continues to remain without comprehension as to=20
the principal factors contributing to its massive electoral defeat,=20
in spite of the record level of support it has received from the=20
voters at the recent polls. The current approach of the AL, of=20
questioning the legitimacy of the October polls, is likely to devalue=20
their own electoral performance in mobilizing 22 million voters who=20
account for two-fifths of the voters. Such a record level of votes is=20
not only the largest received by any party in the history of=20
Bangladesh but is one of the largest votes recorded by any political=20
party, within a democratic election, anywhere in the world, outside=20
of the two largest democracies of the USA and India.

Failure to diagnose their defeat correctly appears to be keeping the=20
Awami League out of the 8th Parliament and is driving them down a=20
political blind alley from which reversal would be difficult. Such a=20
negative approach could undo the political gains of the AL,=20
registered in the election, by demoralizing their workers and would=20
leave 22 million of their voters voiceless in parliament. Such a=20
process of potentially dead-end politics will delay, if not postpone,=20
the crucial task of embarking on the Herculean political challenges=20
which lie before the party, if it is to retain its position at the=20
vanguard of the democratic movement in Bangladesh.

Lessons for the BNP
There are lessons from the polls which also need to be absorbed by=20
the BNP. The BNP has won a massive electoral victory which gives them=20
an unprecedented two-thirds majority in the Parliament. This dramatic=20
victory has come as a result of a strategy of political alliances=20
which ties the BNP to the Jamaat. This link cannot be seen as a=20
temporary liaison but may have to be transformed into a permanent=20
marriage, if the BNP is to sustain its anti-Awami League coalition.=20
The BNP should work out the implications of such a marriage and=20
identify what political goals of the Jamaat they will have to=20
accommodate, in order to sustain marital bliss. The voters,=20
particularly the new generation, will monitor the impact of alliance=20
politics on the working of the BNP administration very carefully over=20
the next five years.

Beyond the issue of alliance maintenance this significant victory=20
should not blind the BNP leadership to the reality that the Awami=20
League has won two fifths of the vote whilst the victorious alliance=20
has won 46 per cent of the vote. Indeed, if we take account of the=20
votes received on account of the three allies, the BNP's individual=20
vote share is perhaps less than that of the Awami League which=20
increased both its vote share and also its absolute vote by 40 per=20
cent. Under the circumstances, the BNP cannot afford to ignore the=20
Awami League, even if they do occupy not more than 70 seats in the=20
house, since it represents the aspirations of 22 million voters, of=20
whom six million are new voters.

It is not very useful for the BNP to argue that the Awami League, in=20
office, ignored the opposition in the last Parliament which commanded=20
the allegiance of 60 per cent of the voters. It is recognized, after=20
three elections, that the BNP and the Awami League both remain=20
equally powerful and cannot be eliminated from political=20
consideration. Bangladesh's two party political system is here to=20
stay and policy making has to be built around this reality. Begum=20
Khaleda Zia, as the prospective Prime Minister, should therefore take=20
some lessons from her first tenure in office, as also from that of=20
the Awami League, and move away from a winner take all strategy by=20
making a genuine attempt to initiate an ongoing consultative=20
political process with the opposition. This exercise has to be=20
sincere and not be designed as a cosmetic gesture. To move in this=20
direction will require a serious effort at bridging the chasm which=20
has opened up in communications between the two parties. To do so,=20
Begum Zia will have to break away from the mirror image of politics=20
where you do unto your opponent, what they did to you only moreso.=20
This may require unilateral gestures which cater to the special=20
sensitivities of the Awami League. Mahfuz Anam, in his thoughtful=20
article in The Daily Star of 7 October has given some useful ideas of=20
where this process may begin. The BNP should, however, ascertain for=20
themselves, through informal exchanges, what are the most immediate=20
concerns of Awami League and how far such gestures by the new ruling=20
party would be reciprocated. Out of such a mutual set of gestures=20
could come more substantive discussions on ground rules for the=20
functioning of the new parliament and other pressing concerns. Such=20
concerns would need to address more substantive issues such as the=20
structure of politics and the direction of policymaking, in the days=20
ahead, to ensure that we move away from the dysfunctional politics of=20
the last decade to build a more inclusive and tolerant democratic=20
polity.

Prof Rehman Sobhan, an eminent academician, is Executive Chairman of=20
Centre for Policy Dialogue.

_____

#3.

8 October | Karachi

Policy review should go the whole length
By M. B. Naqvi

In an interview to Christina Amanpur, President Pervez Musharraf=20
admitted that Pakistan=92s Afghan Policy has not worked and has to be=20
reviewed. It was a profound admission that has come not a day too=20
soon. It was also a pregnant statement. Its implications are=20
wide-ranging. For, this Afghan Policy was not an ad hoc one like an=20
isolated flower in the desert; it grew out of the basic assumptions=20
and purposes of Pakistan=92s foreign, and indeed national, policies=20
pursued over 50 years.

What was the starting point of the Afghan Policy that actually dates=20
back to the earliest years of independence? Pakistan has eyed=20
Afghanistan with a mixture of motives in which being the Big Brother=20
attitude was never absent. In later years the phrase made current by=20
a previous COAS was that a union of some kind with it could give=20
Pakistan a =91strategic depth=92. Its incongruity should be patent by=20
now: what did this strategic depth avail Pakistan? Afghanistan has=20
been technically amenable to Pakistani advice for almost 10 years.=20
Each Afghan government, otherwise beholden to Pakistan, has=20
disappointed Islamabad and its supporters have had grievances against=20
Pakistan. For a poor under-developed and aid-addict country to nurse=20
imperial dreams can only be unrealistic. Pakistan was not, and is=20
unlikely to be, in a position to develop Afghanistan as a dependency,=20
exploit its resources and draw strategic or any other benefits from=20
that realpolitik vantage point. That was and will remain beyond the=20
capacity of Pakistan. The whole venture should thus be pronounced=20
unwise.

But the policy vis-=E0-vis Afghanistan did not owe itself to any one=20
person or a particular government. It grew naturally out of a general=20
policy orientation. The main manifestation of that orientation was=20
the old and lingering need for foreign aid and support by a major or=20
superpower. Its fundamental basis was the assumption that India is a=20
permanent security threat of a radical kind. The only way to deal=20
with India was to go on confronting it militarily by acquiring as=20
much gun powder as possible and keeping it dry. Since Pakistan=92s=20
resources are small, it was always assumed foreign aid can fill the=20
gap. But the confrontation with India ostensibly over Kashmir dispute=20
has been conceived as an inevitable, unalterable and permanent=20
requirement. Hence the need for foreign support and aid was also seen=20
as permanent. That was also the basic motive for aligning with the=20
west in the cold war and its extension was the idea of strategic=20
depth which, as a flight of fancy, included even Iran. However the=20
Iran part of the dream was dropped before too long. But to think of=20
subsuming a wholly different entity like Afghanistan into Pakistan,=20
merely on the basis of Islamic fraternity, and that too to confront=20
India, was wholly fanciful.

What has been the net outcome of Pakistan=92s over 50 years long=20
policy orientation? It gained nothing but frustrations. It has been a=20
story of successive disappointments. Pakistan has had to go through=20
five wars with India if Rann of Kutch and the 1999 Kargil fighting=20
are to be included in the tally. Although Pakistan army has shown=20
flashes of brilliance in specific battles, mainly to its own=20
satisfaction, the net results of the wars did not add any feather to=20
Pakistan=92s cap. And it could not be otherwise. Here are two unequal=20
nation-states. One has a six to seven times larger resource base,=20
including a higher degree of industrialization and other scientific=20
accomplishments. The other is much poorer in all relevant=20
departments. Motivated by medieval folk tales about personal valour=20
being the decisive factor in a war, even highly-placed Pakistanis in=20
1950s thought that thanks to the martial tradition of the Muslims,=20
Pakistan army could go through India in the event of a war like a=20
knife in butter, though it was admitted that what happens after it=20
reaches some distance into the fastnesses of India was unclear.

The fact of the matter is that the folk tales in India too are=20
similar. The larger resource base of India would come into play at=20
some stage. And personal valour would become relevant in only a few=20
hand-to-hand engagements in today=92s wars. One hopes that Pakistanis=20
in senior positions have now grown out of the infantile notion of=20
subduing India and take Kashmir, or anything else, by force. The two=20
South Asian nations have become nuclear powers, properly socalled.=20
That means that neither side can initiate a war--for no matter what=20
purpose. All their disputes must therefore be treated as stalemated.=20
All the issues of serious contention between them will remain=20
suspended permanently. All their differences and disputes will have=20
to be resolved through negotiations, if at all.

The required negotiations had better be bilateral for two reasons:=20
one because India refuses to entertain any third-party intervention.=20
Indeed that knocks out international mediation. Secondly, it is=20
always better to face facts as they are, dealing directly with=20
parties concerned, if sanity and reasonableness has not left them. If=20
it is true that war is no longer an intelligent option for either=20
side, why not realistically recognize it and reorient policies=20
accordingly.

Pakistanis and Indians have the example of France and Germany before=20
them. These two European neighbours fought three terrible wars from=20
1870 to 1939 in which millions of French and German men and women=20
lost their lives. But neither side gained anything worthwhile, while=20
the net outcome was grievous losses. Ultimately they agreed to take=20
the only way out: in order to avoid permanent conflict and=20
self-stultification, France and Germany decided to bury the hatchet=20
and reconcile with each other. Pakistan and India have no other sane=20
option.

Insofar as Pakistan is concerned its disappointments and frustrations=20
are not confined to the battlefield. Even more serious were the ups=20
and downs of its relationship with the US and the rest of the West.=20
The old notion of wanting aid with the aim of getting even with India=20
some day has never worked. Foolish would be the great power that=20
would annoy a stable and bigger India for the sake of a smaller and=20
unstable Pakistan. The foolishness part does not apply to anyone=20
else; it fits the case of Pakistan only. Fighting unendingly an enemy=20
far bigger and with more resources is distinctly a zany notion. Life=20
imposes certain restrictions on nearly all the peoples. The limits=20
imposed by geography and resources have to be respected, though human=20
ingenuity can be employed to reduce the natural disadvantages by=20
developing the available resources to the maximum-not for war but for=20
the improvement in living conditions of the people.

Pakistan today is the outstanding example of the unworkability of the=20
pure national security state, at least in the third world. Unthinking=20
borrowing of ideas and tenets from geo-political thinkers and famous=20
generals=92 obiter dicta are no substitute for commonsense. The fact is=20
that Pakistan=92s entire mobilisable resources were being devoted to=20
national security. All that effort has yielded little of security and=20
more of avoidable pain. The poor in Pakistan were perhaps always=20
poor; but those below the defined poverty line could scarcely be 5=20
per cent in 1947. Today, after all the socalled development, 40 per=20
cent people live below the poverty line. As for security, Pakistan=20
was never less secure than today. What is to be noted is that the=20
military regime has been forced to reverse its major policies just on=20
one telephone call. How secure was Pakistan? Two points emerge.

Insofar as most of Pakistan's policies grew out of a single set of=20
internally consistent security perceptions but grounded in=20
unrealistic assumptions and defective assessments, the strategy of=20
achieving defectively-defined national purposes, including ensuring=20
security to the nation, has simply not worked. Pakistan faces a=20
situation similar to what Germany and France faced after 1945; there=20
was no further go along the old policies. Secondly, if India and=20
Pakistan wish to avoid further frustrations and failures, they must=20
reverse courses dictated by mutual animosity. Let them subordinate=20
national security to the people: let the welfare and empowerment of=20
common citizens at grassroots level be the test of national security,=20
as EU seems to have done in practice. Let South Asia as a region=20
unite for peaceful pursuits and achieve prosperity in freedom. Let=20
every nation=92s security be strengthened. But the first step is the=20
rapprochement between India and Pakistan; next few steps will bring=20
self-fulfillment nearer.

Alternative option is ever more raucus and competitive soliciting of=20
the US favours by both India and Pakistan. Both will end up, if they=20
have not done so already, as the satellites of the US. Just conceive=20
what might have been the situation if only South Asia could speak=20
with one voice. Today New Delhi and Islamabad can still make a=20
choice. Later, all choices will be made for them --outside South Asia.

_____

#4.

Former heavyweight boxing champion Muhammad Ali visited the ruins of the
WTC on September 20. When reporters asked how he felt about the suspects
sharing his Islamic faith, Ali responded, "How do you feel about Hitler
sharing yours?"

_____

#5.

Joseph Allen Stein, born Omaha Nebraska, April 10, 1912, died Raleigh, Nort=
h
Carolina, October 5, 2001
Joseph Allen Stein, the architect of such noted New Delhi buildings as the
India International Centre, the Triveni Kala Sangam, the Ford Foundation an=
d
the India Habitat Centre died early Saturday morning at the age of 89.
Educated at the University of Illinois and at the Cranbrook Academy, Stein
began his work in architecture in New York, later moving to Los Angeles in
the late 1930's to work for Richard Neutra. He moved to San Francisco in
1941, where, after the War, he established a practice which became known fo=
r
his designs for houses that had a unique ability to integrate the buildings
with their surroundings and gardens.=20
Leaving the US in 1950 to develop his interests in low cost housing, he
eventually found the position of Professor of Architecture at the Bengal
Engineering College in Sibpur. After three years, he moved to New Delhi
where he practiced from 1955 until his retirement from active work in 1995.=
=20
In addition to the buildings in New Delhi noted above, he also designed the
city of Durgapur in West Bengal, the Kashmir Conference Centre in Srinagar
and ICRISAT in Hyderabad. Many of his buildings also benefited from his
special working relationship he had with his wife, Margaret, who designed
their interiors to complement his highly developed sense of detail and
appropriate use of materials.
His belief in both the dignity of man and the importance of treating the
environment with full respect and attention underlay his many designs and
projects. He was awarded the Padma Shri by the Government of India in 1992
and the JK Cement Grand Master Award in 1994. He was also awarded a Doctor
of Philosophy (Honoris Causa) by Chennai University in 2000, the first
architect to be so honored in India.
He is survived by his two sons, their wives and two grandchildren.

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