[sacw] SACW #1 (06 Oct. 01)

[Harsh Kapoor]

South Asia Citizens Wire | Dispatch #1
06 October 2001
http://www.mnet.fr/aiindex

------------------------------------------

#1. Bangladesh's election (a report in The Economist)
#2. On the post Taliban plans...(M.B. Naqvi )
#3. Pakistanis & the world must know whether the US would use Nukes=20
(Haris Gazdar & Foqia Sadiq Khan)
#4. The Fatwa of "No" (Mir Ali Raza)
#5. A Writer Among the Ruins (Amitava Kumar)
#6. Learning to forget (Dipankar Gupta)
#7. An upcoming Concert for Peace in Hyderabad India

________________________

#1.

The Economist print edition | Oct 4th 2001 | DHAKA

Bangladesh's election - A vote for change

Big defeat for the ruling party
ONCE the euphoria of the stunning election victory of the Bangladesh=20
Nationalist Party (BNP) of Khaleda Zia has died down, she will no=20
doubt be receiving an invitation from the American embassy in Dhaka=20
for a cup of tea and a cucumber sandwich. Her four-party alliance,=20
which has a two-thirds majority in the new parliament, contains two=20
hardline Islamic parties, a fact that has made the Americans sit up=20
and take notice.

There had in fact been some American unease during the campaign when=20
the Awami League, the party of the outgoing prime minister, Sheikh=20
Hasina, claimed that there was little to distinguish the ideology of=20
the Jamaat-i-Islami and the smaller Islami Oika Jote parties from=20
that of the Taliban of Afghanistan. And during the campaign,=20
photographs of Osama bin Laden were plastered alongside posters for=20
the parliamentary candidates, suggesting that he had support in the=20
country.
[...]
{ Full text at:=20
http://www.economist.com/world/asia/displayStory.cfm?Story_ID=3D808988 }

_______

#2.

M.B. Naqvi Column | Karachi October 4

Pakistan's Afghan policy has finally given up the ghost. It is
reconciled to Taliban regime in Afghanistan being dispensed with. A
readymade new policy has been adopted instead. It is to rely on King
Zahir Shah somehow putting together a broad-based Afghan government,
though Pakistan is still desirous of giving the Taliban a representation
in that supposedly broad-based government.

Needless to say that the policy has come well packaged from Washington
where experts had been at work creating and improving the particular
option. The American efforts predate the recent changes in the Afghan
situation and go back to a time when the UAE and Saudi Arabia had not
withdrawn recognition from Taliban. Anyhow, Pakistan although insists on
maintaining its diplomatic ties with Taliban for the sake of
convenience, President Pervez Musharraf, on the one hand, has told
Taliban that their days are numbered and, on the other, apparently
America finds it not too inconvenient.

If only Afghanistan's problems could be solved so neatly. King Zahir
Shah ruled Afghanistan from 1933 to 1973, when he was overthrown by his
own cousin and PM Sardar Mohammad Daud Khan. History has moved on since
going throw phases of a capitalist republic, communist rule and of
course 22 year long war and civil wars in which blood-letting has not
ended. Afghanistan contains any number of armed militias and warlords.
Would Zahir Shah's magic wand bring them to order, disarm themselves and
become tolerant quasi-democrats.

Few think it can be done. There are ambitious faction leaders with arms
who simply scoff at the idea of a moth-balled Zahir Shah being exhumed
and brought to work his magic that did not prevent his own ouster 28
years ago. Sceptics range from one end of the political spectrum to the
other, including Pakistani officialdom. Nevertheless, the policy package
probably was an integral part of the full cooperation that the US had
demanded and Musharraf had agreed to provide.

In one sense the arrangements might actually worked but only in this
sense. The new broad-based government would comprise tried and tested
Afghan nominees of the American experts mostly from the diaspora and
behind it should be seen the American power structure, strategically
situated to be able to stabilise and effectively protect that
government. The American power and its proxies should be near at hand.
The American proxies would comprise the members of the coalition the US
is assembling for the purpose. High on the list is sure to be Pakistan.
But India might not be too far behind.

Whether this too will work for any length of time on its own is open to
question. But if the US power, or its proxies, stays around to keep the
apple cart in place, it would.

_______

#3.

The News International | Saturday October 06, 2001

Can we rule out infinite disaster, please?
Haris Gazdar and Foqia Sadiq Khan

American "battle groups" are heading this way. The Pakistan=20
government has promised to extend "unstinted cooperation" to the US.=20
The shock waves from the terrible crime that took place many=20
thousands of miles away are already echoing in the streets of Karachi=20
and Peshawar. This, however, is only the proverbial "beginning". We=20
have no idea of the magnitude of the modern US war machine that is=20
steaming towards us at full speed. Pakistani people must now demand=20
an undertaking from their government and the government of the US.=20
They must demand this undertaking not only for their safety, but for=20
the safety of humanity and of our planet. The undertaking is the=20
following: Can we rule out infinite disaster at the very outset=20
please?

As the world begins to regain its senses in the aftermath of=20
September 11, there are sobering debates in the US and in Pakistan.=20
Is there enough evidence against Osama Bin Laden? Will this turn into=20
a war between Islam and the West? Was the Pakistani government=20
correct in its decision to extend open-ended support to the US? Will=20
the state of Pakistan perish or will it survive this conflict=20
rejuvenated? Let us leave these epochal questions aside and assume=20
for a moment that after the horror of September 11 the world is=20
moving in a benign direction.

Let us assume that the American government will act in good faith,=20
that the Pakistani government has acted in good faith, and that the=20
war against terrorism will be conducted in the pursuit of justice and=20
nothing else. Peace-loving people in Pakistan, the US, and the world=20
over would like to support actions that are in the pursuit of=20
justice. There are two or three questions, which if answered=20
satisfactorily, will help the people in reposing greater confidence=20
in the good faith of their respective governments.

The people need to know, for example, whether the US military plans=20
to bring any non-conventional weapons to this region. They need to=20
know if American nuclear, biological and chemical weapons are being=20
shipped to the Indian Ocean and if so what will be the rules of their=20
deployment. What are the contingency plans in case non-conventional=20
weapons, including nuclear submarines are involved in accidents, or=20
worse, sabotage? After all, we have been told that Osama Bin Laden's=20
group was responsible for the attack on USS Cole off Yemen.

A number of the Tomahawk cruise missiles enroute to Kandahar ended up=20
landing on Pakistan's soil in 1998. Pakistan's Chief of Army Staff=20
was informed about the cruise missile attack only a few hours before=20
the attack took place. It reflects a worrisome record of lack of=20
transparency of the US military operations.

People the world over also need to know in clear terms if there are=20
any contingencies whatsoever in which tactical nuclear weapons might=20
be used in this conflict. When asked on a BBC World news programme=20
about the options before the US military in the coming war, one=20
American expert mentioned the possible use of tactical nuclear=20
weapons. The expert (Mr Kevin O'Brien) was from Rand Corporation=20
Europe, which is a research organisation with close connections to=20
the American Department of Defence, and his views need to be given=20
serious consideration.

Mr O'Brien was not saying that tactical nuclear weapons should be=20
used, and we are not saying that they will be used. The fact that=20
they were mentioned at all, however, is a very sobering thought. The=20
same sobering thought was expressed by a Japanese news service called=20
Japan Today (www.japantoday.com) on September 19. According to this=20
news agency the Pentagon's recommended options to President Bush=20
included the possible use of tactical nuclear weapons against targets=20
in Afghanistan. This suggestion was not accepted, according to the=20
agency, but the fact that authoritative policy thinking might be=20
revolving around the use of non-conventional weapons is disturbing,=20
to say the least. The people of the world including the people of=20
Pakistan and the US need to know what they are signing up for if they=20
are to support the US government.

The people of Pakistan have a right to know about possible dangers,=20
and so does their government. Even if the use of tactical nuclear=20
weapons has a very remote probability, the use of depleted uranium=20
(DU) is not far-fetched at all. We know that the US and allied forces=20
used depleted uranium shells, used against Iraq during the Gulf War,=20
and then again more recently in the Balkans conflict. Depleted=20
uranium ammunition pierces through armour such as tanks like a flash=20
of lightning. It is classified as a conventional weapon, and has=20
become a standard part of the arsenal of western armed forces.

The impact of DU on people is far from conventional. Radioactive dust=20
is released when the DU ammunition hits the target. This dust can=20
easily get into the food chain and the water supply, and remain there=20
for indefinite periods. The unprecedentedly high incidence of=20
leukaemia among children in southern Iraq has been widely blamed on=20
the liberal use of DU ammunition by allied forces against Iraqi=20
armour in that region. Many experts now believe that the so-called=20
Gulf War Syndrome suffered by allied soldiers was also none other=20
than the delayed impact of exposure to radioactive material. Even=20
Pentagon experts were forced to admit that DU represented a "serious=20
health risk" (See, for example, the BBC website for May 11, 1999).=20
Going by recent military history there is a clear danger that DU=20
ammunition might be used. Radioactive dust does not require travel=20
documents to cross the border, and radioactive material could easily=20
enter the food chain through the Kabul River which discharges into=20
the Indus.

The US military might be tempted to use depleted uranium shells to=20
attack tanks and bunkers in the mountainous terrain of Afghanistan.=20
They might even regard the use of such ammunition as standard=20
procedure, as they did in Iraq and in the Balkans. US strategic=20
planners might develop contingency plans for the use of tactical=20
nuclear weapons, and the "battle groups" might be routinely armed=20
with non-conventional weapons. Without the right to ask difficult=20
questions about the type of forces being deployed the people of the=20
world will be in no position to know what type of danger they are=20
signing up for. The cause of pursuing justice is a noble one, and one=20
that will not find any detractors. But possible dangers to humankind=20
and to the planet are real enough for us not to take absolutely=20
everything in good faith.

All these are important questions. But even as these questions get=20
debated the "battle groups" steam ever nearer. The people of the=20
world minimally need to get a satisfactory answer to the following=20
question: can we please rule out "infinite disaster" at the very=20
outset? History has propelled the people and the government of=20
Pakistan to the forefront of those who have the right to ask this=20
question. Is our government up to this task? We have the right to=20
know.

The writers are affiliated with pro-peace groups in Pakistan

_______

#4.

http://www.outlookindia.com | Oct. 05, 2001

The Fatwa of "No"

It is certainly possible for all Muslims to issue their own fatwa. To Imam
Bukhari and his recommendation that every Muslim follow the Taliban in
jihad, I simply say no.

Mir Ali Raza

Alliance with America is a great crime forbidden by Islam.
=20
Hizb-ut-Tahrir
(Email Fatwa,=20
September 18th)

If any Islamic country or its ulema (clergy) announce jihad, it is
obligatory for each and every Muslim in the world to support it morally
and express it openly.
Syed=20
Ahmed Bukhari
(Friday=20
Prayers, September 28th)

After September 11, the world suddenly became a more difficult place
for the Muslim. First, there were the desultory racist attacks in the
United States on people who appeared "Islamic" (Sikhs and bearded
South Asians sometimes found themselves unwitting partners of the
identifiable ummah). Then, there was the entire "war of discourse,"
accompanied by the tired tropes of prejudice: Islamic terror, medieval
practices, fundamentalism, file photos of Kalashnikovs in Peshawar
streets. Also, there were those who practiced the timeless art of
political opportunism. The Vishwa Hindu Parishad of America, for
instance, sponsored a rally in Edison, New Jersey on September 23rd,
where the dominant slogan was "Hindus and Sikhs unite against
terrorism." One does not need a degree in textual analysis to decode
that one. And of course, there was the threat of bombs, which led a
terrified and desperate Afghan populace to abandon their decrepit
homes, thanks to their plane-crashing "benefactors."

But along with these outside perils, a formidable internal threat that this
nervous and uneasy community faces comes from the irresponsible
fatwas of its religious "leaders." The mullahs, most of whom are neither
likely to suffer any persecution themselves nor held accountable, have
felt free to demand a militant response from their congregations. Their
pronouncements circulate relentlessly; in the public proclamations by
sidelined powerbrokers like Imam Bukhari, from discredited leaders
seeking to re-establish themselves in mosques, and through shadowy
nameless organizations in cyberspace that spam Muslims with
anonymous e-mails.

The calls range from boilerplate denunciations of American imperialism
to exhortations urging Muslims to rally behind the Taliban. While asking
the community to follow the Buddha-destroyers who call themselves
students but deny women educational opportunities, these so-called
interpreters of religion elide one important detail: there is no basis for
the legitimacy of their fatwas in Islamic jurisprudence. For instance, the
Quran explicitly states (39: 18): "Hear advice and follow the best
thereof=85"

In effect, the Holy Book cautions believers that when faced with the
inevitability of multiple interpretations, they must use their own
judgment. Reason is celebrated throughout the Quran and Muslims are
warned not to abdicate their responsibility while making any choice. The
ulema of the faith have the right to interpret situations from a religious
standpoint, and offer an opinion. However, their proclamations are not
binding on the community. As the noted Muslim scholar Ziauddin
Sardar recently clarified, a fatwa in Islam is merely a statement of
opinion. Not a command. Not a religious imperative. And it is certainly
possible for all Muslims to issue their own fatwas. For instance, one
can issue a fatwa, as he did, denouncing the terrorists as non-Muslims
for making war on innocents.

The fact that these pronouncements by our clerics, issued in the form of
commands, go unchallenged in public (private grumbles aside) points to
a troubling paucity of formal internal dialogue within the community. It is
high time self-identified Muslims armed themselves with Quranic verses
to question their clerics who make circuitous justification of these
events. For example, they could use verses 2:190, 5:32 and 17:36 from
the Book, which unequivocally denounce killing of innocents, to
decimate any argument that remotely attempts to defend the
September 11 incidents. They can deploy verses 10:24; 30:8; 30:21;
34:46; 39:42; 59:21, all of which celebrate independent thinking, to
challenge anyone who makes any statement that begins with "All
Muslims should=85."

Unless they equip themselves with their own tolerant theology, they will
lose their community to the venality of those who, through motivated
religious interpretations of contemporary political phenomena, seek to
propel them towards the wrong end of the dangerous and false logic of
the "clash of civilizations."

After the defeat of the Arab alliance at the hands of Israel in 1967, Faiz
Ahmed Faiz, in a withering poem titled Sar e Vaadi e Seena (On the
Sinai Valley) wrote passionately against those among the Islamic clergy
who, by giving religious colour to the conflict, had obfuscated the
legitimate political grievances of Palestine:

Ab rasm e sitam hikmat e qasaan e zameen hai
Taeed e sitam maslehat e mufti e deen hai
Ab sadiyon ke iqraar e itaa=92at ko badalne
Laazim hai ke inkaar ka farmaan koi utre

Now the elites of our world seek to "cure" us by tyranny
And the mufti of our faith has chosen "wisely" to support them
To change this centuries-old tradition of followership and acceptance
It is necessary that a new command descend =96 "No!"

Perhaps Muslims already possess the fatwa of refusal, which must now
be exercised. Let me begin. I hereby say no. I refuse to accept the
equation of anti-imperialism with pro-Talibanism. I refuse to capitulate to
the rhetoric of the "clash of civilizations." And to Imam Bukhari and his
recommendation that every Muslim follow the Taliban in jihad, I simply
say no.

(Mir Ali Raza helps edit SAMAR, the South Asian Magazine for Action
and Reflection)
_______

#5.

Tehelka.com

Lit Chillum
Amitava Kumar

A Writer Among the Ruins

The dust-jacket of the book I am reading says "It was clear=20
spring day, Monday, March 20, 1995, when five members of the=20
religious cult Aum Shinrikyo conducted chemical warfare on the Tokyo=20
subway system using sarin, a poison gas twenty-six times as deadly as=20
cyanide. The unthinkable had happened, a major urban transit system=20
had become the target of a terrorist attack." The book is=20
Underground. It is written by the contemporary Japanese writer,=20
Haruki Murakami, the writer of novels like The Wind-Up Bird Chronicle.
Underground is a work of non-fiction. Murakami talked to the=20
survivors of the gas attack and even the members of Aum. Several=20
weeks ago, I had come across an interview with Murakami in which he=20
had said that the book project had started as a matter of personal=20
curiosity for him. The writer had asked himself "What kind of people=20
were on the train?" and "What happened to them in the attack?"=20
Murakami then went to say that "the media didn't offer that kind of=20
information to us, at least in satisfactory amounts."
I remember now, when I had read the interview with Murakami=20
several months ago, I had made a mental note of the Japanese writer's=20
statement. It had stuck me that in some way we were being told about=20
the difference between a journalist and a writer. Now, after the=20
events of September 11-- another fine, perfect day when you could=20
have wanted to fly a kite -- I have been wondering about the ways in=20
which a writer must write. Especially if the writer wants to distance=20
himself or herself from the dominant media.
In his interview, this is what Murakami had gone on to say: "It=20
seemed to me that the people were more interested in 'Who did it?'=20
and 'Why did they do it?' Those are important and reasonable=20
questions, without a doubt, but in my opinion they aren't enough. We=20
should inspect the thing from different directions and angles if we=20
want to know the truth of it. That's why I started to meet the=20
victims of the incident and collected their firsthand stories, face=20
to face."
Underground has about forty interviews. The book also has several=20
pages of modest, straightforward writing by Murakami. In those pages,=20
the writer explains why he embarked on this project, how he went=20
about accomplishing it, and what his own feelings are about the event=20
that affected many people in Japan, not only the injured but the=20
others too, all over the country, who experienced it as a national=20
tragedy.
I began to read Underground a few days after the attacks in New York=20
City and Washington, DC. The news for days had been of preparation=20
for war. The nation had united under the flag, and it spoke with one=20
voice. That voice belonged to President Bush. And then it just=20
happened that I remembered the line from the interview with Murakami,=20
where he had spoken of looking at an event "from different directions=20
and angles." I decided I would read the book and find out how one=20
could show to a reading public the way in which different people had=20
come to the same place from different directions, as no doubt, in a=20
grotesque and literal sense, the suicide bombers as well as their=20
victims had done that September morning.
I was picking up Murakami's book with a certain loaded sense of expectation=
.
I was not disappointed. Murakami is an intelligent, unobtrusive=20
presence; at the same time, Murakami's skill as a writer is evident=20
in the narrative flow of the interviewees' accounts. (In the=20
introduction, Murakami mentioned that the transcript was "edited,=20
reordered, or rephrased where necessary to make it more readable"; he=20
also adds, "occasionally, when the transcript seemed to lack=20
something, I had to go back and listen to the original tape.") All=20
that happened on March 20, the people and the events, gain a certain=20
density as we read through the interviews and take measure of not=20
only the consequences of the gas attack but also what a reader like=20
me would be unaware of, the ordinary details of ordinary lives that=20
an event like this enters as a violence.
A brother describes how his sister who inhaled the poison gas=20
took that train only once a year when she went to a training seminar;=20
for the rest of the year she took the train on another line. When I=20
read that, I thought of it as a Murakami touch. In some of his=20
questions, particularly to present or former members of Aum, I also=20
felt that Murakami was trying to understand something basic about=20
Japanese society itself.
Now and then, I felt that the writer had successfully drawn out a=20
significant detail from the people he was talking to. A woman who had=20
been pregnant when her husband died in the attack tells Murakami that=20
some little gesture her child makes or some food that she likes=20
reminds her of her husband. The woman tells the writer, "Even I'm=20
starting to forget his profile. At first, I could still feel every=20
part of his face in my fingers, but gradually it's all going away=8A."
These are rewarding moments, but this was not why I had come to the=20
book. Many of the newspapers here have been full of such moments.=20
Each day brings touching, harrowing stories of bravery and loss. Each=20
of these stories touch upon a devastating, transforming tragedy. The=20
point that still remains is this: how are we to make sense of all=20
this? When I return from the newspapers to Underground, my desire,=20
unlike Murakami's, is not to meet the victims and collect "their=20
firsthand stories, face to face." Rather, I want know, can Murakami=20
help me make an argument against war?
The American newspapers have been very good on reporting not simply=20
on the victims here but on those others in Afghanistan or Pakistan=20
who have already become war's victims. The earliest article on this=20
subject was published in the New York Times the very next day after=20
the attacks. Written by Barry Bearak, the Times article began with=20
the words: "If there are Americans clamouring to bomb Afghanistan=20
back to the Stone Age, they ought to know that this nation does not=20
have so far to go. This is a post-apocalyptic place of felled cities,=20
parched land and downtrodden people."
The stories in the press here are about victims everywhere. It is not only =
the
stories of the children who are learning about their fathers who will=20
not come back from office. Or the mothers who didn't make it out of=20
the twin towers. Just the other day, in the New York Times Sunday=20
Magazine, yet another story on Afghanistan by John Sifton brought the=20
American readers face to face with their pathetic enemies: "We were=20
in a windy camp for displaced persons, and a man was showing us the=20
graves of his three children, who had died of disease on three=20
consecutive days: Thursday, Friday and Saturday. It was Monday, and=20
he had buried his child the day before. After he described all this,=20
we stood around the graves in the strangely loud silence of the wind,=20
hot as an oven, and the man absent-mindedly adjusted a rock atop one=20
child's grave." The writer noted that the inhabitants of the camp=20
drank water "taken from muddy ponds - mud really."
I thought of the father, who had survived his offspring, drinking mud=20
till his mouth was stuffed with earth, like the mouths of the=20
children he had buried three days in a row. Can anyone in their right=20
mind believe that these people need to be bombed? Why are we still=20
calling for war?
In a meditative essay in Underground, Murakami writes what I had read=20
in his interview, but we also get a sense of why he believes what he=20
said: "If we are to learn anything from this tragic event, we must=20
look at what happened all over again, from different angles, in=20
different ways =8A. It's all too easy to say, 'Aum was evil.' Nor does=20
saying, 'This has nothing to do with "evil" or "insanity" prove=20
anything either. Yet the spell cast by these phrases is almost=20
impossible to break, the whole emotionally charged 'Us' versus 'Them'=20
vocabulary has been done to death. No, what we need, it seems to me,=20
are words coming from another direction, new words for a new=20
narrative. Another narrative to purify this narrative."
Murakami is insistent on the point that what happened on=20
March 20, 1995 cannot be understood if Aum and its members are=20
understood "as something completely other, an alien presence viewed=20
through binoculars on the far shore." When one thinks about the=20
horror of September 11, a similar effort has to be made. Perhaps the=20
crucial shift lies in telling ourselves other stories about us.=20
Instead of seeing victims in New York City as well as Jalalabad, it=20
is important to see both oppressors and the oppressed in both places.=20
The people who bomb and kill and maim can be found in both places. A=20
common line joins the hijackers and the military that is eager to=20
rain terror. A stronger line must unite those who will suffer the=20
consequences everywhere.

Amitava Kumar teaches English at Penn State University and is the=20
author of Passport Photos (University of California Press and=20
Penguin-India). You can write to the author at aik4@p...

_______

#6.

The Hindu | 6 October 2001

Learning to forget
By Dipankar Gupta

IT IS said about the Bourbon Kings that they forgot nothing and they=20
learnt nothing. To be able to learn something new it is important to=20
forget the old. A cluttered mind is incapable of moving ahead, of=20
being nimble and fleet-footed. This is why memories, aided by written=20
histories, have, in balance, largely helped the thick-headed=20
revivalist and not the forward-looking modernist. A modernist would=20
rather forget and move on, but a sectarian can only remember. Those=20
who see the golden age in the past, or those whose identities are=20
defined by a historic tragedy, are the ones who most doggedly refuse=20
to forget. For them only the past has significance for the present is=20
a lie. The future can be meaningful only if the past can be=20
revisited, or else, what is the use of tomorrow?! For a modernist, on=20
the other hand, the golden age lies in the future in which history=20
has practically no role to play.

Recounting the past is the strong point of the revivalists, for=20
memory, history, fable, faith and myth all combine on the basis of=20
family resemblances to set up a formidable ideological front. A=20
modernist could do no worse than try and rebut the enemies of=20
progress by challenging their memories and their recall with=20
historical facts. Pure history speaks in a feeble voice. It gains=20
charge and charisma when mingled liberally with its cognate allies -=20
personalised memory, faith and myths. A modernist has no answer to=20
such multi-pronged ideological thrusts and should quickly desert this=20
kind of intellectual battle. History is not the terrain where=20
modernists can ever hope to win.

Many well-meaning modernists do not realise that they do their cause=20
more harm than good by entering into debates with their opponents on=20
the veracity of the past. They not only fare unconvincingly in these=20
duels but they make backward-looking revanchists, who thrive on=20
cerebral sloth, come through as intellectuals.

Modernists should instead look for other bivouacs where history and=20
memory play an insignificant, or better still, no role at all.=20
Modernists should not react when the past is being recalled for this=20
is what helps the anti-modernists set the agenda. Whether it is the=20
Taliban in Afghanistan, or the Kookies of Israel, or the Hindu=20
sectarians in India, modernists, in their zeal for accuracy, try very=20
hard to set facts right. But it is a futile effort. If modernists=20
prove their point at one level the sectarians can always shift to=20
another plane, or go back to a concocted past where only faith works.=20
The controversies surrounding the origin of the Babri Masjid and=20
Sita's rasoi exemplify this. It is because modernists enter into such=20
debates that Islamic mullahs and Hindu virtuosos are now becoming=20
objects of tweedy intellectual curiousity. Books are being written on=20
them, by well-meaning intellectuals, as if they were Immanuel Kant or=20
Karl Marx or Frederick Nietzsche. There are volumes already, and more=20
are in the making, of how the Hindu right thinks (sic).

To make the past irrelevant to the present and to the future,=20
modernists should not enter into intellectual debates with=20
revivalists. This brings the lunatic fringe centre stage. Instead,=20
modernists would advance their cause more effectively if they worked=20
towards eliminating conditions that allow memories to thrive. This is=20
how modernists carve out a separate agenda where the anti-modernists=20
are most uncomfortable. Jawaharlal Nehru was able to rock back Hindu=20
revivalists not by convincing them in discussions of the finer points=20
of secularism. In fact, he probably knew nothing of how people in the=20
Hindu Mahasabha thought, and he never felt the need to do so either.=20
He, however, succeeded in making Muslim- baiters and Hindu fanatics=20
look stupid because he shifted the terms of political engagement to=20
socialism, economic development, non-alignment, land reforms and=20
self-reliance. The sectarians knew nothing about any of this, and=20
their long memories were of no use either. Nehru helped many even=20
forget Partition, which was a pretty tough thing to do. Today we=20
remember Partition again as if it happened only yesterday. Indeed=20
books are coming out fast and thick that excavate the tortured period=20
of Partition. That memories of Partition are enjoying a second=20
revival today is itself a sign that our drive towards modernisation=20
has lost its elan.

It is true that memories and the past cannot be erased simply by=20
willpower. Neither can it be wiped out by alternative histories. The=20
way out is to give a long berth to memory and concentrate instead on=20
how to forge ties that promise substantial citizenship for the=20
future. In other words, how can we make memories irrelevant to the=20
present? Nation-states are truly modern projects. Charged with the=20
project of promoting citizenship, they compel, for the first time, a=20
massive scheme in forgetfulness. France would not be France today if=20
every French person were to remember the 13th century massacres in=20
the midi region or the bloodshed on St. Bartholomew's day.=20
Nation-states consolidate because they are able to forget memories=20
that would otherwise tear them from within. From 13 colonies grew the=20
United States of America. In this short passage of time many bloody=20
things happened, including the Civil War. And, yet, Americans as a=20
people are profoundly ignorant about their past, and are proud of it.=20
In India, even the long memories of Hindutva do not recall that=20
Shaivites and Vaishnavites fought each other bitterly in the past.

But there are still many unsuccessful stories because conditions in=20
certain nation-states do not allow people to forget. Sikhs cannot=20
forget the tragedies they suffered when they were killed in large=20
numbers following Indira Gandhi's assassination. Muslims cannot=20
forget the humiliation they suffered when the Babri mosque was=20
destroyed by Hindu fanatics. Hindus cannot forget the campaigns of=20
the medieval Nadir Shah on the plains of northwest India. Jews cannot=20
forget their long history from Babylon to Auschwitz. In the Balkans=20
people had forgotten what it was to be Muslims and Christians till=20
the war raked up such memories. Quebec separatists have openly=20
acknowledged their debt to memory for their motto reads is `je me=20
souviens', or, `I remember'. To ask of such people then that they=20
forget their historical tragedies is a damn sight unfair. Yet the=20
fact remains that such memories inevitably build walls and behind=20
these walls the sun rises and sets with this just one burning anger.

Looked at closely, it is clear that only those memories live on that=20
serve to separate people around a contemporary strife. So memory=20
retention is a function of social relations. Deeply stratified=20
societies are more prone to remember than those that are largely=20
egalitarian in character, and where citizenship has been=20
substantively realised. In such modern and forward-looking societies=20
citizens relate to one another as equals. Here choices and social=20
opportunities are equally accessible by all regardless of birth and=20
privilege. A modernist social policy is one that strives towards=20
creating conditions that advance citizenship. It is only by doing so=20
that memory, history and all the baggage of the past become truly=20
forgettable. This is the best way to combat sectarians and=20
revivalists.

There is little purchase in attacking revanchist history with another=20
history. That is a mug's game!

(The writer is Professor, Centre for the Study of Social Systems,=20
Jawaharlal Nehru University, New Delhi.)

_____

#7.

>From COVA Hyderabad , India

CONCERT FOR PEACE

Dear Friends
In continuation of the Candlelight Vigil for Peace conducted on 23rd=20
September, People for Peace is organising a Concert for Peace at=20
Vemana Statue, Tank Bund, Hyderabad, from 5 P.M. to 7 P.M, on 7th=20
October 2001.

The Programme would consist of two components - a skit enacted by=20
members of the Koshish Theatre Group promoted by COVA, and a Singing=20
Competition open to all members of public. A prize has been=20
instituted for the Best Singer.

Please circulate the message among your circles so as to elicit=20
maximum participation.

Regards
Ali

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