[sacw] S A A N Post | 25 Aug. 00

[Harsh Kapoor]

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South Asians Against Nukes Post
25 August 2000
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#1. Is the Pugwash movement ready for new challenges?
#2. The 'Kursk' Submarine Disaster - Stop this nuclear madness!
#2. From Jharkhandi's Organisation Against Radiation (JOAR) , Jadugoda
[Bihar, India]
#3. Cyberabad Under Radioactive Cloud=20

_____________________

#1.

The Friday Times
18 August 2000

Is the Pugwash movement ready for new challenges?

Ejaz Haider says the Pugwash Conferences on Science and World Affairs
will have to redraw its strategy to face up to the new challenges to
global security

The 50th Pugwash Conference on Science and World Affairs titled,
"Eliminating the Causes of War," met at Queens' College, Cambridge, UK
from August 3-8. The annual conference was attended by over 150
participants from 45 countries around the world.

The Pugwash Conferences are eponymous with Pugwash, a small village in
Nova Scotia, Canada, where the first meeting was held in July 1957. The
meeting, which brought together 22 eminent scientists from 10 countries
of the world, was hosted by an American philanthropist, Cyrus Eaton, who
was born in the village of Pugwash. The stimulus for the meeting was the
1955 Russell-Einstein manifesto, signed at the time by nine other
eminent scientists, including Nobel Laureate Sir Joseph Rotblat, who,
according to Mike Moore, editor of The Bulletin of the Atomic
Scientists, today "embodies Pugwash". The Manifesto by Albert Einstein
and Bertrand Russell, known originally as "A Statement on Nuclear
Weapons," was a response to the testing of thermonuclear devices by the
United States and the Soviet Union. Since the first meeting at Pugwash,
there have been over 250 Pugwash conferences, symposia and workshops and
the number of living "Pugwashites" around the world stands close to 3000
(for more information, see http://www.pugwash.org).

Interestingly, as Dr Zia Mian points out: "The...irony is that 'Pugwash'
could actually have been 'Delhi'. The meeting set up after the
Einstein-Russell manifesto was planned for Delhi, at the invitation of
Homi Bhabha and [Jawaharlal] Nahru. Russell is said to have sent out the
letters of invitation to Delhi. But then things came unstuck. Thus the
meeting moved to Pugwash, with Eaton paying the bill."

When it began campaigning against the nuclear weapons and in favour of
nuclear weapons arms control and disarmament in the late fifties,
Pugwash brought together the finest expertise in the field despite
opposition and criticism by policymakers and "realist" strategists. It
provided the expertise and the alternative paradigm (which looked at
security as a holistic concept not in terms of balance of terror but in
terms of "humanity". As the Manifesto said: "Shall we instead, choose
death, because we cannot forget our quarrels? Remember your humanity,
and forget the rest...") when the developed world, especially the United
States, began to think in terms of some kind of nuclear weapons arms
control. This mindset was the basis of the breakthrough Pugwash got with
the signing of the PTBT (Partial Test Ban Treaty) of 1963 within six
years of the first meeting. The movement played a significant role in
providing expertise and stimulus for the negotiations and signing of the
Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT) in 1968, the Anti-Ballistic
Missile Treaty (ABM) of 1972, the Biological Weapons Convention (BWC) of
1972 and the Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC) of 1993.

The work over four decades finally managed to create what has come to be
known as the "nonproliferation norm". In 1995, at the NPT Review
Conference, that norm was established when the RevCon extended the
treaty indefinitely. The same year, in October, Joseph Rotblat, then
President of Pugwash, and the Pugwash Conferences for Science and World
Affairs, won the Nobel Prize for Peace in two equal parts. This was a
great moment for Pugwash Conferences, not only for its ability to bring
the best experts in the world together and campaign consistently against
proliferation of nuclear weapons, but also because it had evolved as a
forum which could speak on these matters from what has been described as
the "policy-relevant" angle. The following year, 1996, saw negotiations
on, and the signing of, the CTBT (Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty). The
treaty was to be ratified finally in September 1998. The norm Pugwash
had helped establish, taking advantage of its own expertise, but more
significantly of the changed mindset in the official circles which
allowed it to bring that expertise to bear on policymaking, had finally
crystallised.

It had everything going for it. And then the unimaginable happened with
first India's and then Pakistan's nuclear tests. South Asia had cocked a
snook at the developed world, especially the Club of Five, and the
"norm". The going from thereon has been tough for Pugwash as was clear
from the closing address of Sir Michael Atiyah, the President of
Pugwash, at the recent annual conference. Among other problems, Atiyah
listed the decision by the US Administration to carry on with the
"highly controversial US missile defense program [which] raise[s] the
grim prospect of a renewal of the nuclear arms race." "Other dangerous
developments on the world scene include the failure of the US Senate to
ratify the CTBT, certain changes in [the] Russian nuclear doctrine,
further nuclear proliferation, and the latent danger of terrorist use of
weapons of mass destruction, including biological and chemical."

Interestingly, Atiyah's closing address, which was in the Pugwash
spirit, went against the presentations in a plenary session of the
Russian and British speakers. While the British presenter listed the
achievements of the United Kingdom in terms of reducing its stockpile of
nuclear weapons, rely as the UK now does - since the Strategic Defence
Review of 1998 - only on the four Trident submarines, he was clear about
the need for a minimum deterrent. Moreover, he asserted that any further
movement by the UK towards disarmament would depend on the other nuclear
powers after they have reached the minimum level presently maintained by
his country.

The Russian presenter not only defended his country's nuclear arsenal,
but maintained that in view of the strategic asymmetry caused by the US
missile defence programme, the growing inferiority of the Russian
conventional force strength, the higher costs of maintaining greater
conventional forces, NATO expansion and the US unilateralism -
symbolised by NATO's war against Yugoslavia - the Russian Federation
could not but rely on its nuclear forces. In fact, his entire
presentation was an attempt to defend Moscow's official position, a far
cry from the Pugwash agenda.

Atiyah's closing address was therefore a refreshing reminder of the
Pugwash charter, symbolised by what the Russell-Einstein Manifesto said:
"Shall we put an end to the human race or shall mankind renounce war?"
Atiyah mentioned the need to take "bolder steps," calling upon the
"nuclear powers to implement their 'unequivocal undertaking to
accomplish the total elimination of their nuclear arsenal' made at the
Sixth Review Conference of the Non-Proliferation Treaty in April 2000."
That is the catch. While South Asia's nuclearisation might have broken
the norm, South Asia never really provided the real challenge to
Pugwash, though it has now, in conjunction with other factors, brought
the challenge closer, and sooner, to Pugwash.

Let us put it this way: Even if India and Pakistan had not tested, or
the US Senate had ratified the CTBT, or the US government had not
embarked upon the missile defence programme, or even the Russian
Federation had not announced its greater reliance on nuclear weapons by
rejecting the so-called doctrine of no-first-use, the challenge to
Pugwash would still have come - how to move from nonproliferation to
disarmament. The added irritants have only complicated the situation and
threatens to unwind the whole system at greater speed then if none of
the above had happened. The Pugwash expertise and policy-relevant
initiatives could work in an atmosphere where the leading countries came
to appreciate the imperative of nuclear arms control. Given the gravity
of the situation at the time - "the Cold War, marked by the Berlin
Crisis, the Cuban Missile Crisis, the invasion of Czechoslovakia and the
Vietnam War" - and the realisation by the Kennedy Administration to do
something to contain horizontal proliferation and introduce bilateral
arms control, the Pugwash could contribute to the effort. Having
achieved the nonproliferation norm in a hypothetical situation in which
all else would have stayed normal, the challenge would have been, as
said, the movement from nonproliferation to disarmament.

That is where Pugwash would have largely lost its relevance to
policymaking. The situation is now more complicated because our
hypothetical situation does not exist and the nonproliferation agenda is
today more threatened than ever before, notwithstanding the undertaking
by the P-5 at the 2000 RevCon to move towards total disarmament. The
question for Pugwash now is: Where does it go from here? This is not to
say the Pugwash Conferences should pack up and disappear, but that it
should redraw its strategy on how to regain its effectiveness in the
present situation. As a movement against nuclear weapons and war in
general it can live on, but the question relates to its relevance to
policymaking. That is what made the Pugwash more prestigious and more
prominent than other such efforts. That is what now threatens to reduce
it to just one of the many fora that routinely point to the dangers of
war and weapons of mass destruction without necessarily being able to do
much to actually change the situation on the grund.

At his final presidential address to the 47th annual conference, Rotblat
is reported to have said: "The questions that nag me are: Was there a
need to have done more? Should we have done more? I cannot help feeling
that the answer to both questions is yes. Yes, there was a need to have
done more, and therefore, yes, we should have done more."

There is greater need today than when Rotblat spoke these words for the
Pugwash to do more. The fight lies not so much in the domain of
technology and science - though that is very significant - but in the
domain of strategy: How can the world get rid of the theory of
deterrence, or can it? Or should it? After all, wars happened, and are
likely to happen, even if there are no nuclear weapons. And as experts
working in conflict zones say statistically more people have been, and
continue to be killed by small arms than weapons of mass destruction.
These are difficult and complex questions and do not lend easily to
Cartesian modes of analysis. It is a difficult task. Pugwash Conferences
cannot do it alone or overnight. Its significance lay in being able to
provide expertise and reach out to the policymakers. For any future
progress, it will have to keep in mind the deteriorating security
situation and come up with viable solutions. What made it different from
other fora was its ability to translate its charter and its statements
into achieved goals. It remains to be seen whether it can continue to do
so in the present situation.

The author, News Editor at The Friday Times, attended the 50th Pugwash
Conference
______

#2.

The Praful Bidwai Column
August 28

The 'Kursk' Submarine Disaster
Stop this nuclear madness!

By Praful Bidwai

It is hard to get over the sheer horror of the last moments of the 118
soldiers who died gasping and choking aboard the Kursk submarine. Their
death could not have been more wanton, cruel, merciless, undignified or
sordid. And yet, the accident was in some ways only waiting to happen--in
line with the 120-plus "incidents" involving Russian submarines since 1956.
The disaster holds many lessons for the world, in particular India.

However, the Kursk catastrophe is far from over. Indeed, the radiation
danger is only beginning to unfold. According to the Bellona Foundation, a
Norwegian environmental group which monitors Russian submarines, the
Kursk's two nuclear reactors with their 380 MW output contain an estimated
1,200 kg of highly enriched uranium, mostly uranium-235. This isotope has a
half-life of 710 million years. This means that even with radioactive
decay, some 600 kg of the material will still be present a mind-boggling
710 million years later. Millions of generations in the region will remain
menaced with radioactive poisoning.

Even the short-term environmental hazard from the Kursk is grave. Its
reactors are likely to have been damaged in the explosions that sank the
Kursk. Even if they aren't, removing them from its twin hulls is an
enormously complex and expensive task. It will necessarily entail huge
radioactivity exposures. Abandoning the submarine would be even more
dangerous. The metal enclosing the reactors will decay, releasing huge
amounts of potent toxins, contaminating marine life and eventually
endangering humans. Nuclear-powered submarines contain a cocktail of
poisons: highly enriched uranium, hundreds of fission products including
deadly plutonium, and high chemical explosives, to boot.

Besides the Kursk, there are a total of 110 nuclear submarines in Russia's
Northern Fleet whose reactors are still to be dismantled. About 180 subs
have been taken out of service since 1991. The Fleet operates in a patently
unsafe and increasingly sloppy fashion. And the subs are rapidly corroding.
Any day, any month, one or more of the 200-plus nuclear reactors rotting
and seething in this poorly guarded fleet could undergo a catastrophic
accident. This threat will remain real so long as the nuclear cores are
around.

Since 1994, Alexander Nikitin, a former submarine captain, has been doing
some whistle-blowing by documenting the Northern Fleet's poor safety
practices and warning of disaster. For this, Nikitin was arrested in
February 1995 and gravely charged with treason and espionage, which carry a
death sentence. Ironically, he had obtained his information from open
sources. He was badly harassed and prevented from choosing his lawyer. Last
year, however, the courts acquitted him. He now faces another trial on the
treason charge!

I interviewed Nikitin less than two months ago in Stockholm. His worst
fears have come true: Russian armed forces face massive budget cuts and
maintenance standards are falling precipitously. Today, Russia's military
runs on $5 billion (compared to the US' $300 billion). More than 70 percent
of Russian warships are in disrepair. Many soldiers earn less than $100 a
month. Some don't get paid at all. "Vast numbers of soldiers and sailors
moonlight," Nikitin said. "This means they pay little attention to their
job. Their skills have eroded. A quarter of them are homeless, and most
live in acute demoralisation and depression." Two years ago, a young sailor
went berserk on a sub and held eight men hostage at gunpoint. Some of the
generals who prosecuted the Chechnya war would get regularly drunk by 9
a.m. Such men now sit on the world's biggest nuclear arsenal, with 22,000
weapons!

Even before the USSR's collapse, there were 121 accidents and "incidents"
on the country's nuclear submarine fleet. According to "Greenpeace", at
least 10 of these seriously damaged nuclear reactors. Meltdowns--the worst
possible reactor accidents--occurred in 1979 and 1989. Since 1991,
following the economy's near-collapse, safety conditions have probably
further worsened.

However, Russia's specific submarine troubles should not obscure the
generic problem with nuclear submarines the world over, which have all
recorded serious accidents. All nuclear technology is highly hazardous.
Submarine reactors are worse because they pack a large amount of energy in
a tiny volume (just as nuclear weapons do). They evolved in a breakneck
arms race in which safety hardly counted. Today, wrecks of American,
British as well as Russian nuclear subs lie on the earth's ocean floor--at
least five of them for more than a decade. These include different classes
of vessels, large and small. Some caught fire; others had reactor accidents=
.

There is, of course, an especially sordid quality to the way the Russian
authorities handled the Kursk crisis. First, they denied the accident posed
serious danger. For fully four days, they refused all external help,
boastfully claiming Russian resources were sufficient to handle the job.
When the help did come on August 19, they announced that the rear hatch of
the vessel was irreparably damaged, when in fact it wasn't. President
Vladimir Putin refused to cut short his Black Sea holiday--until it was too
late. The British and the Norwegians too delayed sending in assistance or
reached Murmansk via a detour.

The Russian nucleocracy, like all nucleocrats everywhere, refused to
disclose relevant information, including the names of the sailors (their
number too was raised without explanation from 116 to 118), the location of
the sub, and circumstances of the accident. According to independent
sources, there were two internal explosions, not an external collision, as
the Russians claimed. Official estimates of how long the oxygen would last
were contradictory. The authorities' behaviour towards the victims'
relatives was appalling. Mr Putin's conduct cost him a lot in reputation.

This pattern of behaviour is typical of nuclear establishments everywhere,
marked as they are by paranoid and excessive secrecy, and dominated by
"experts" who play God but are answerable to nobody and cynically exploit
their privileged access to information. In India, we have our own obnoxious
Atomic Energy Act of 1962 which allows the Department of Atomic Energy
(DAE) to withhold any information it likes. (Eminent jurists like V.R.
Krishna Iyer term this unconstitutional and undemocratic).

In India, we also have an exact analogue of Nikitin: Capt B.K. Subba Rao,
a critic of the so-called Advance Technology Vessel (ATV) or nuclear
submarine project which has soaked up Rs. 2,000 crores, but produced
little. For questioning the DAE's bungling and incompetent scientists, he
too was charged with espionage and jailed for years--until he was
honourably acquitted by the Bombay High Court.

India's nuclear and defence establishments work at sub-Russian levels of
safety. For instance, of the world's 10 worst performing nuclear reactors,
six are Indian. The Tarapur nuclear station is, going by IAEA records, the
world's most contaminated. It has the highest radiation exposure per unit
of power. The record of the Defence Research and Development Organisation
is extremely poor too. Its three biggest projects--the ATV, main battle
tank and light combat aircraft--are all embarrassing failures.

The armed services fare no better. Since 1991, the Indian Air Force (IAF)
has lost 202 aircraft and 85 pilots. In financial terms, this loss exceeds
the IAF's annual budget! In the last six months alone, there were 14
aircraft crashes. Over forty percent of IAF accidents are caused by defects
attributable to substandard spares. The army has had its share of
catastrophic ordnance explosions, defective equipment and plain duds. (For
details, see Praful Bidwai & Achin Vanaik's recent South Asia on a Short
Fuse: Nuclear Politics and the Future of Global Disarmament, Oxford, New
Delhi, 1999).

Some of these problems are rooted in India's poor safety culture. India is
a disaster-prone society with high rates of mishaps, sloppy disaster
forecasting, and poor precautionary and relief-provision procedures. India
is among the world's largest recipients of toxic waste and unsafe
technologies. Industrial accidents occur here four times more frequently
than in the US. Fatality in road accidents is ten times higher than in the
OECD countries. The point about a generally poor safety culture is simple.
If Indian engineers can't control the frequency of mishaps in relatively
uncomplicated systems such as road traffic, they can't be trusted to safely
handle highly complex systems such as nuclear weapons or submarines.

The conclusion is stark. The chances of a disastrous accident in India's
nuclear facilities are unacceptably high, as is the probability of the
accidental use of nuclear weapons. The Pakistan story is even worse. This
makes South Asia uniquely dangerous. Nuclear weapons are unconscionably
destructive not just in their use, but even in the process of manufacture,
handling, transportation and deployment. The environmental damage from the
US nuclear weapons programme alone is officially estimated at $254
billion--the same order as India's annual GDP! Each stage in the nuclear
fuel cycle, and each component of the weapons programme, is fraught with
grave hazards. This argument applies a fortiori to South Asia.

Therefore, it would be suicidal for India to go further down the nuclear
trajectory. We must abandon the ATV submarine project and declare a nuclear
weapons freeze: There must be no testing, manufacture, induction or
deployment of nuclear weapons.-end--

______

#3.

[The following release was sent out after the 9th August Hiroshima day
event organised by activists working to highlight safety issues at at the
Jadogoda uranium mine ]

Jharkhandi's Organisation Against Radiation (JOAR) , Jadugoda [Bihar, India=
]

HIROSHIMA DAY IN JADUGODA

On 6th August the uranium mining town of Jadugoda in Jharkhand India was
connected to hundreds of demonstrations all over the world observing
Hiroshima Day. The day started with a three-minuet silence remembering
those killed and affected by the bombing of Hiroshima and Nagasaki by the
US Air Force in 1945, even after Japan had surrendered.

A picture poster exhibition brought ghastly visions of how the people of
these innocent towns suffered by the Bombing.

Hundreds of school children had assembled on the playgrounds of a
Government School in the center of the town. Out of their innocent
imagination they drew sketches that appealed to the world leaders for
Peace and sanity. . A nuclear disarmament and global peace cloth signature
campaign was being conducted by the Pakistan Indian People's Forum for
Peace and Democracy. Presently this campaign is going on in both
countries.

Thousands of paper doves, symbols of peace, had arrived from all over the
world, which were made by children to express their commitment towards a
radiation free world. These doves were hung from trees on the school
campus. Children present also made doves on the spot and offered them to
the picture of Sadako, the Japanese girl affected due to radiation ten
years after the Hiroshima bombing. She had dreamt of living forever by
making one thousand paper doves. Sadako died before reaching the needed
figure. But the children of Japan and other parts of the world are still
carrying forward her campaign for nuclear disarmament. There could not be
a stronger symbol of linkage between Jadugoda and Hiroshima.

About 60 children of the surrounding villages of Jadugoda whose mental and
physical abilities have been affected in one way or the other due to
radiation were also present. With crayons they too joined the school
children doing paintings and made tiring but joyful efforts to express
their feelings and emotions in sketches. It was quite obvious from what
the children had drawn that there was lack of coordination between their
different faculties.

For those who had seen the award winning Documentary "Buddha Weeps in
Jadugoda" it was painful to feel the absence of most of the children in
the documentary, they were no more.

In severe heat and humidity hundreds of children, adults and
representatives of different organizations from India took out a rally
through the streets of Jadugoda town and colony. The Uranium Corporation
of India Ltd. Management a Government of India monopoly undertaking had
given strict orders to the State Police and their security agencies to
stop the rally, but it went on despite efforts of the Police to intimidate
the children and Peace activists.

At a Public meeting later in the day, Peace activists of all ages and
communities called for world peace and pleaded with the Government of
India to stop the spread of radioactive waste in and Jadugoda. Dr
Sangamitra who had the previous day taken the readings of radiation levels
in Jadugoda with a Gaiga counter revealed to the audience that the
readings in that very school premises was ten times more than what the
radiation lobby call "acceptable levels" . To have this in the playground
of a school, amounts to a criminal act she said.

The connection between Jadugoda and Hiroshima was further highlighted with
the presence of Ghanshyam Birulee the Secretary of JOAR in Hiroshima that
day. He together with Shri Prakash the Director of the documentary "Buddha
Weeps in Jadugoda" were invited by Peace groups in Japan to participate in
various programs in Japan for that whole week.

Jadugoda that continues to be one of the worst run and dangerous uranium
mine in the world, has now become the active voice of the Peace movement
in India. Undeterred by a Public Interest Litigation case in the Supreme
Court the management continues to ignore all appeals of citizens all over
the world to stop the dumping of radioactive waste within areas inhabited
by the local Indigenous People.

The preparations for this programme at the National and International
level was organised by National Alliance of People =19s Movement NAPM. Amo=
ng
the eminent people present were Sandeep Pande of NAPM, Dr Sangamitre
Gadekar of ANUMUKTI, Dr Bhramanadan Mishra of Sasram, Prof N K Upadyaya,
Mrs Mashima of Shantiniketan

JOAR wishes to express its gratitude to all organizations and individuals
that extended support and sent special messages of solidarity on this
occasion. This international solidarity is crucial for us as we take on an
establishment that refuses to listen to our humble voice.

Dumka Murmu
Secretary
JOAR

Xavier Dias
Spokesperson

JOAR
P.O. BAG No. 3.
# 27 Annexe - C H Area East
Jamshedpur 831 001
Jharkhand (Bihar)
India. Tel: 0657 22 02 66
Fax: 0657 22 90 23

-------------

#2.

The Telegraph
18 August 2000

CYBERABAD UNDER RADIOACTIVE CLOUD=20
=20=20=09=20
FROM G.S. RADHAKRISHNA
=20
Hyderabad, Aug. 17=20
There is concern over a radioactive capsule which was lost from a
hospital in the city. The capsule can cause environmental hazard, some
experts feel.
Administrators of the Mehdi Nawaj Jung Cancer Hospital here admitted a
Caesium-137 spring with 73 millicurie of radioactivity was lost two
months ago. The capsule was reportedly thrown away by a ward boy,
hospital sources said.

Atomic scientists and hospital staff have been scouring municipal
garbage bins and sewers for the capsule in vain over the past two
months.

Municipal authorities were directed by Delhi to "sift through all
garbage dumps" in the city as a precautionary measure. Hospital
authorities are not sure whether the material is lying loose or in a
cylinder. "The 16 mm x 3 mm cylinder is also reportedly lost along with
the radioactive material," they said.

"Continuous exposure to the material for over a week or less might cause
infection leading to leukaemia or dermatitis allergy," cardiologist
Kakarla Subba Rao of the Nizam Institute of Medical Sciences here said.

"It may also cause burns. But if it has been submerged in water, it will
not have any after-effect," he said.

The loss of the source is rated at level 2 in the International Nuclear
Event Scale of the International Atomic Energy Agency, indicating it is
an "incident" without major safety hazard.

The caesium spring is used for treatment of gynaecological cancers.

According to the Bhaba Atomic Research Centre (BARC), the hospital kept
the loss under wraps since June fearing an outcry. The material had
thrown away with other hospital waste. The missing caesium indicates a
serious procedural lapse on the part of the hospital, said secretary of
the Atomic Energy Regulatory Board K.S. Parthasarathy.

The Nuclear Fuel Complex, which was approached by the hospital, failed
to locate it.

The hospital tried to trace the garbage by following the municipal van
which carried hospital waste. It also examined the Golconda garbage dump
on the outskirts of the city. For nearly two weeks it poured water twice
over the garbage everyday to dilute the material. Two teams of the BARC
scientists, who investigated the entire episode, concluded that the
radioactive material was "somewhere alive in Hyderabad". The rains in
June disrupted the search.

The Atomic Energy Regulatory Board secretary visited Hyderabad last week
on a fact-finding mission to the hospital. Following the finding of
procedural lapses, the hospital's licence for procuring radioactive
material was also suspended by the board. Some patients being treated
for breast cancer were advised to shift to other institutions in the
city.

Municipal authorities, however, denied that there was any panic search
for the missing radioactive material. "The hospital and the Nuclear Fuel
Complex reported the matter to the municipal corporation only at the end
of July. We have begun the search since then. But you know how difficult
it is to locate a cylinder as small as a bottle cork. Besides one is not
sure whether the material was still in the cylinder," said a senior
municipal engineer in charge of the operations.

All residents living close to drains have been advised to get preventive
medicines against dermatitis allergy. BARC has advised health
authorities and the municipal corporation to check the garbage points
till the material is finally located.

"The inadequate precautions in hospitals against radioactive material is
proverbial in Hyderabad. There should be a government depository of
radioactive material which should be drawn and dispensed under strict
vigilance of trained personnel," said Dr K. Purushottam Reddy, convenor
of the Centre for Environment Concerns, an NGO.
=20