[sacw] S A A N Post | 13 Dec. 00

[Harsh Kapoor]

South Asians Against Nukes Post
13 December 2000

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#1. Pakistan: Musharraf strengthens grip on nukes, power
#2. Failing The Test: International Mismanagement of the
South Asia Nuclear Crisis
#3. India: Protests underway in Jadugoda Uranuim Mine Area
#4. India: Questionable Decision to embark on Uranium Mining in N.East Indi=
a

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#1.

Asia Times
December 8, 2000=20=20=20=20=20=20=20=20=20=20=20=20=20

Musharraf strengthens grip on nukes, power

STRATFOR.COM's
Global Intelligence Update
Dec 7, 2000

Summary

Pakistan's National Command Authority held its second meeting on November
27, during which Islamabad decided to consolidate its nuclear weapons
management under the control of General Pervez Musharraf. The decision
deters military adventurism by Pakistan's archrival, India. The
consolidation also puts Musharraf in a position of strength in terms of
international bargaining and fighting off his enemies within Pakistan.

Analysis

Pakistan's National Command Authority (NCA) held its second meeting in
Rawalpindi on November 27 at the Strategic Plans Division, The Nation
reported. Pakistan's Chief Executive General Pervez Musharraf, who leads
the NCA, chaired the meeting. During this last session, the NCA made
decisions to consolidate its nuclear weapons management system.

Musharraf is reforming Pakistan's nuclear sector and command system as a
strategic deterrent to India. He wants to consolidate his power in the
country, which is driven by different and antagonistic forces. Musharraf
needs the added strength in order to negotiate with the international
community - and within his own country.

The NCA was established in February 2000 to create command and control
mechanisms for Pakistan's nuclear weapons and missile systems. It is
responsible for policy formulation, employment and development control over
all strategic nuclear forces and strategic organizations. Besides
Musharraf, the NCA includes foreign affairs, defense and interior
ministers, chiefs of all military services and heads of strategic
organizations.

After the meeting, the Pakistani government released a statement saying,
"The meeting reviewed the strategic and security environment facing
Pakistan and took important decisions on nuclear policy matters that
included, among others, strategic threat perception, restructuring of the
strategic organizations and export control mechanisms," according to the
November 28 Times of India.

Pakistan has no intention of abandoning its nuclear program, at least in
the near future; when a country enhances its nuclear weapons command and
control system, it generally reveals the opposite. For Islamabad, nuclear
weapons provide a final trump card in a possible conflict with its much
bigger rival, India.

India has Pakistan outmanned and outgunned, both overall and in
conventional forces and arms. There are approximately 980,000 active Indian
troops and another 800,000 in reserve. In comparison, Pakistan has an
estimated 562,000 active soldiers and 500,000 reservists. India boasts
3,600 tanks to Pakistan's 2,200, and the Indian air force maintains 890
fighting aircraft as compared to Pakistan's 620.

Pakistan has worked hard to gain the advantage in number of conventional
arms. Once Pakistan achieves some success, India once again upsets
Pakistan's hard-earned advantage. For example, this year has witnessed the
beginning of production of Pakistan's new major battle tank, Al-Khalid.
This 46 ton, three-man tank was built with Chinese help and has a maximum
speed of 40 mph. With a cruising range of 250 miles, it is indeed superior
to India's Arjun tank. But India signed a US$3 billion package with Russia
last month, and New Delhi is building and will receive 310 of Russia's
newest major battle tanks, the T-90s, which beat Al-Khalid in every
parameter. The same is true of combat aircraft and naval ships.

Pakistan maintains a first-strike option in its nuclear doctrine. With
India outgunning Pakistan's conventional forces at every turn, the accepted
use of nuclear weapons in response to a conventional attack sends a message
to New Delhi that, despite its larger military, Pakistan is not incapable
of defending itself.

Pakistan also had a nuclear advantage because its chief of the army staff
had been in charge of nuclear planning and deployment, even when there was
a civilian head of government. Last month, India hoped to catch up with
Pakistan on the issue of nuclear planning and management by introducing a
new high command structure.

Islamabad's response was to integrate all research, design, production,
planning and deployment of nuclear weapons in the NCA under Musharraf's
control, once again positioning itself above its archrival. India still
does not have a centralized nuclear authority body such as Pakistan's NCA,
and its political and military branches of power are not linked together
with regard to nuclear weapons. India's civilian government executes full
control over design, research and production of nuclear weapons, while the
Indian military is in charge of operational control over nuclear weapons.

Pakistan's government is concerned with not only nuclear but also missile
capability. Musharraf also has established a Strategic Force Command led
by a serving army general responsible for deployment of strategic missiles.
Pakistan possesses two versions of a medium-range nuclear-capable missile
called Ghauri. Its Shaheen-1 and Shaheen-11 also belong to the same class
of missiles. The existing version of the Ghauri missile is operational and
has a range of 800 to 1,200 miles; the ability to carry nuclear, biological
and chemical warheads; and the ability to be launched from land or air. The
missile is said to be equipped with an extremely accurate guidance system.

By all these parameters, the Ghauri is superior to India's medium-range
missile Prithvi. It means Pakistan's missile-launching abilities are higher
than those of India. Pakistan also may have tested a new version of the
Ghauri with a range of up to 1,800 miles that amounts to a new class of
missile - not medium range, but the so-called long-range missiles. To
counter Pakistan's temporary superiority, India is actively working in two
directions: first, to improve characteristics and range of its medium-range
missiles, and second, to create its first intercontinental ballistic
missile (ICBM) with a range of 5,000 to 8,000 miles.

By further integrating and strengthening its nuclear command system under
the NCA, Pakistan is trying to better position itself for future challenges
in the region. The first test is probable talks with India, in which
Pakistan would be able to talk from a position of strength, not weakness.
The NCA will guard the work of organizations such as the Khan Research
Laboratories (KRL) led by Dr Qadeer Khan, who is considered the mastermind
of Pakistan's nuclear program, the National Development Complex (NDC) and
the Pakistan Atomic Energy Commission (PAEC). Thus, Musharraf is reining in
the very strong, nearly autonomous civilian nuclear research and
development agencies. This will add to consolidation of his authority in
the country as a whole and in the nuclear field in particular.

Musharraf has made himself the sole caretaker for the country's nuclear
arsenal. This will make it much more difficult for someone else to use
Pakistan's nuclear weapons and strategic missiles without Musharraf's
authorization. He faces the threat of some hardline factions within the
military, Inter-Service Intelligence and radical Islamic circles whose
influence in the country grows. Any of these internal threats may try to
gain access to the Pakistani nuclear arsenal - either for striking India or
"the enemies of Islam".

Musharraf also may have more authority and negotiation power while dealing
with the United States and other Western powers. He needs it for discussing
the nuclear proliferation problem and Pakistan's adherence, or
non-adherence, to the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT). Musharraf can
demonstrate the international community should not worry about Pakistan's
non-adherence to CTBT because its nuclear weapons are now under complete
control of secular- and reform-minded Musharraf.

Restructuring export control mechanisms through the NCA also means
Musharraf is strengthening his control over the export of fissile materials
and nuclear technology. In addition to Musharraf taking this important
field under his tight control, the move is also an attempt to reverse the
worsening of Pakistan-US relations. It is meant to send a positive signal
to America that Pakistan is making an effort to tighten its export controls
on nuclear materials and technology.

Putting everything under Musharraf's control does give him better leverage
both inside and outside the country. But it also gives him little
flexibility to place the responsibility on others if he is in a tight spot
and blamed for Pakistan's current and likely future failures.

Also, it remains to be seen whether this full control over Pakistan's
nuclear arsenal will be transferred from Musharraf as the top leader of
Pakistan to the country's civilian supreme authorities after elections are
held next year. In the status of the NCA, there is no wording on the role
of the Pakistani prime minister or other top civilian authority as a future
head of the NCA. Also, if another military ruler replaces Musharraf, there
is no guarantee his successor would pursue the same nuclear policy.

Nevertheless, integrating all decision-making power over nuclear weapons
within the NCA represents the opportunity to gain full control over
Pakistan's nuclear arsenal. Provided the military does not rebel, a future
civilian government of the country would have a chance to assert its
authority over the whole nuclear complex, since the NCA is not a military
body.

(c) 2000 Stratfor, Inc. All rights reserved.

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#2.

Failing The Test: International Mismanagement of the
South Asia Nuclear Crisis
By Achin Vanaik
Disarmament Diplomacy -- Issue No 51

http://www.acronym.org.uk/51test.htm

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#3.

Important message from activists in Jadugoda Uranuim Mine Area, Bihar, Indi=
a

" this is an urgent message to all anti nuclear groups and people in India=
.

In Jadugoda there is a protest movement going on against UCIL [Uranium
Corp. Of India Ltd.] ;
government did not fulfill the demands of the movement. So JOAR [Jharkhandi
Organisation Against Radiation] decided to protest and went for a fress
movement .

so this is their program:
10 to 15 dec they are doing protest dharna (nonviolent sit-in)
16 to 22 dec consecutive hunger strike
on 22 dec there will be a mass meeting

after 23 dec people will stop the uranium nuclear waste which is coming fro=
m
hyderabad and other parts of the country by railway. and they also stop the
mill and mine waste which is dumped in the third tailing pond.
please spread this message as soon as possible to other groups. "

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#4.

Economic & Political Weekly=20=20=20
November 11-17, 2000=20
Editorial

Uranium Mining: Questionable Decision

Last week an inconspicuous news item announced that Meghalaya had given the
long-denied permission to the Uranium Corporation of India (UCIL) to start
mining operations in Domiasiat in the West Khasi Hills. If this is true the
way is now clear for the hill region to be turned into another Jadugoda =96
UCIL's other uranium mine which has devastated the lives of the largely
tribal population of the region, just so that the uranium-hungry atomic
energy industry may be kept running. UCIL has been eyeing the north
eastern hill regions for a long time. Some 10 years ago the atomic minerals
division of the department of atomic energy discovered uranium in the
region. An initial survey found that the area around Domiasiat may well
yield some 10,000 tonnes of the precious mineral, making it the largest and
richest deposit to be discovered in the country. Moreover, the mineral is
fairly close to the surface and is embedded in sandstone-type of rock which
would make mining a comparatively low-cost operation. The ore is reportedly
spread over a 10-km area, in some places as close to the surface as 8m to
about 47m. So far all of India=92s uranium needs have been met from local
sources, all of them in the Singbhum district of Jharkhand. The three
mines, Jadugoda, Batin and Narwarpahar have been extensively mined although
the operation has become relatively more expensive as the ore is mined some
500m below the surface. The UCIL's record in providing rehabilitation to
the large number of people progressively being displaced by the mining
operations, offering health care or ensuring environmental protection to
the region has been dismal. And because the population of the region, as in
the vast majority of uranium sites all over the world, comprises very poor
indigenous people, the neglect has been visible and blatant.

Independent studies around the Jadugoda mines show that the uranium mines
have indeed resulted in radiation pollution. During the mining and milling
process the quantities of tailings produced are radioactive and are dumped
in ponds. Water from these ponds as also from the processing seeps into the
surrounding soil. The first tailing pond was constructed in Telaitand
village which was subsequently evacuated when a second needed to be built.
A third pond was built in another village =96 Chatijkocha, a prosperous
village with good crops and producing forest products and the seat of
famous theatre groups. The village was forcibly evacuated in 1996 by the
UCIL with the help of the police forces and razed to the ground. This led
to a huge mobilisation that resulted in the UCIL =91apologising=92, but not=
hing
has been done about rehabilitating people either from these villages or
from the mines area.

In Meghalaya the Khasi Hills Autonomous District Council (KHADC) has
steadfastly opposed any move to open the area for uranium mining so far.
And a member of the council is reported to have stated that a "no
objection" certificate has not been issued so far. The local population in
the early 1990s sent protest letter to the prime minister. The DAE has used
the specious argument that by mining out the uranium it is after all
removing a source of radiation from the area.

The irony is that the DAE is apparently well within its right to undertake
mining operations under the Atomic Energy Act, even without the permission
of the local government. With India now attempting to prepare its own fuel
for its nuclear power plants, it becomes imperative for the atomic industry
to find and exploit all sources of uranium. In these circumstances a local
agitation against mining operations will not have sufficient weightage
unless supported by the larger demand which exposes the anti-people nature
of this and other aspects of the Atomic Energy Act.