[sacw] [ACT] sacw dispatch #2 (24 March 00)

Harsh Kapoor aiindex@mnet.fr
Fri, 24 Mar 2000 13:44:28 +0100


South Asia Citizens Web Dispatch #2
24 March 2000
_________________________
#1. The Problematique of Nation Building in S. Asia
#2. Cinema / india: The Film Hey Ram reviewed by India's well known film
theorist/critic
#3. Peace Process in Nagaland and Chittagong Hill Tracts
_________________________

#1.
THE PROBLEMATIQUE OF NATION-BUILDING IN SOUTH ASIA
- THE CASE OF PAKISTAN

Asghar Ali Engineer
Secular Perspective (March 16-31, 2000)

T
he concept of nation and nationhood is more recent than the concept of
country and patriotism. Of course in South Asian situation the concepts of
nation and of country often get mixed up and are treated even as
synonymous. The concept of country, called watan or mulk in north Indian
languages, has been with us for as long as one knows about. Watan or mulk
was a shared geographical area ruled by a common ruler and inhabited by the
people belonging to different castes and creeds, or even speaking different
languages. And love of ones country or mulk (patriotism) was considered as
the highest virtue. The country, ruled by a monarch or a prince, used to be
quite heterogeneous in character and what was common was territory alone.
Thus it hardly constituted a nation in the western classical sense. It was
more of an administrative unit be it under the Moghul or under the British.
India was thus never a nation in the western classical sense.

Then what constitutes a nation? Various definitions have been
advanced by different scholars and social scientists. A nation is usually
defined as a territory inhabited by those who share common history, common
culture, common language and common economy. Thus in western sense a nation
cannot be multi-cultural or multi-linguistic. It is totally a homogeneous
entity. This is how the modern nations came into existence in the continent
of Europe in sixteenth and seventeenth centuries which became model for
others to emulate. The North America, which was colonised by the British,
was somewhat of an exception. The people of different ethnic origin from
all over Europe went there in search of better prospects but when a common
nationhood emerged there after declaration of independence in 1789, a
common America identity was stressed, often referred to as the melting pot
model of identity. Thus the American nationhood deviated from the classical
European nationhood, as America had emerged as a nation from a colonised
country.

This is precisely what happened with most of the colonised
countries in Asia and Africa. The colonial countries like France, Italy or
Britain conquered as much area as they could and brought them under their
administration. When these countries were liberated from the clutches of
imperialism they were multi-religious, multi-cultural, multi-ethnic and
multi-linguistic. But they became modern nations. Not only this, the rival
colonial powers divided territories amongst themselves during colonial days
cutting into pieces homogeneous ethnic and linguistic communities. This of
course added to the problematique of the nation building in the
post-colonial arena.

The South Asia was no exception to this. Almost entire South Asia
was conquered by the British from 18th to 19th century. It included Burma
and Ceylon as well. Ceylon and Burma separated from Indian sub-continent
before India became free. However, even after separation of Burma (now
known as Myanmar) and Ceylon (now known as Sri Lanka) India remained, what
one would say, a multi-national country. There were various ethnic,
religious, linguistic and cultural groups spread across the country. Yet,
it was stressed, and rightly so, there was a thread of unity and our
national leaders gave a slogan of =EBunity in diversity=ED. While fighting
against the colonial power it was easier to maintain unity though fissures
had began to develop along caste and religious lines even during those days
of common struggle. The scheduled castes and tribes demanded their share in
power and in government jobs. But this problem could be resolved with
comparative ease by conceding reservations for SCs and STs. The struggle
for reservation was led by several low caste leaders, particularly, by
Babasaheb Ambedkar.

However, the main fissure was along religious lines. The Hindus and
the Muslims had lived with each other during the medieval period;
particularly during the Moghal rule a common and composite culture had
evolved over the centuries of their co-existence. But once freedom struggle
intensified (in which Hindus and Muslims participated together) and
prospects of independence were seen nearing at hand, the elites of the two
communities developed serious differences over the question of
power-sharing in independent India. The Muslim League led by M.A.Jinnah
demanded higher share in power for the Muslims and also proper
constitutional guarantees and arrangements in this respect. The Cabinet
Mission Plan had almost resolved the problem and the Congress and the
League had entered into the Union Government, but doubts persisted; and
some unguarded statements by nationalist leaders led to the breaking down
of that arrangement; and ultimately partition came about.

Thus two nations were created out of one country and yet both these
nations were not nations as defined above or they hardly followed the
western classical pattern. Apparently the country was divided along
religious lines thus giving birth to a new concept of nation i.e. a nation
based on religion. This was never the concept behind the European nations.
It was cultural and linguistic unity, which was thought to be more
fundamental than religious unity. Thus a new theory of nationhood was
sought to be developed by Mr. Jinnah. The irony of it was that Jinnah
himself never gave much importance to religion in his own personal life.
And, after the formation of Pakistan too, he said in his address to the
Pakistan Constituent Assembly that they were all Pakistanis and religion
was their private matter. Thus Jinnah created Pakistan on the basis of a
theory he himself was not convinced of.

The Muslim theologians, members of the Jami`at al-`Ulama-i-Hind, on
the other hand, rejected the concept of religious nationalism and justified
the concept of composite nationalism and maintained that the concept of
composite nationalism was not against the teachings of Islam. Maulana
Husain Ahmad Madani, the Rector of Darul `Ulum, Deoband, wrote a treatise
on the subject, Islam aur Muttahida Qaumiyyat and proved, by quoting from
the Qur=EDan and Hadith that composite nationalism was in conformity with th=
e
teachings of Islam. Thus the `Ulama did not support the partition project.
It was the Muslim elite who were more enthusiastic about it. It is an
interesting contradiction, which must be noted. The secular elite among
Muslims demanded the partition on religious lines. And the orthodox
theologians among them opposed it vehemently. The secular elite was using
religion (rather than believing in) for political bargain and when it
failed to get the desired share, it separated. Thus really speaking
religion was not the basis of partition, it was political vested interest
of the elite.

THE PROBLEMS OF THE NATION BUILDING

The problems of the nation building appeared on the scene once both
the countries =F1 i.e. India and Pakistan, gained independence. Religious
solidarity in Pakistan soon gave way to hard realities of life and serious
fissures began to develop on ethnic and sectarian lines. The Urdu speaking
muhajirs who were most active for creation of Pakistan soon realised that
they were strangers in Pakistan as they had no ethnic and cultural roots in
that country. There was time when the muhajirs dominated politics,
bureaucracy and economy. But that lasted for a short period. Soon the
Punjabis, the dominant nationality in Pakistan began to assert itself and
pushed out the muhajirs from all important positions. The muhajirs soon
began to feel alienated from the nation building process. The process of
edging them out intensified with the rise of Zulfeqar Ali Bhutto in power.
Bhutto=EDs Pakistan Peoples Party (PPP) had a strong base in Sindh and it
catered to Sindhi nationalism. There were clashes between the Sindhis and
muhajirs in Karachi and Hyderabad (Sindh). Hundreds were killed in these
clashes.

Earlier the Bengali speaking Muslims chose to secede from Pakistan.
Though the Bengali speaking Muslims were in majority and in 1970 elections
the National Awami Party led by Mujibur Rehman won majority the West
Pakistan politicians did not allow him to become the Prime Minister of
Pakistan. The Bengali Muslims in East Pakistan alleged that they were not
being treated fairly and that the East Pakistan had become an internal
colony of West Pakistan. The Bengali Muslims were also highly proud of
their Bengali language and culture and strongly resented imposition of Urdu
as a national language. They wanted to retain their cultural and linguistic
autonomy. The West Pakistan politicians were rather insensitive to the
Bengali cultural and linguistic heritage. Also, Pakistan remained under
long spells of military dictatorship and hardly had the concept of
autonomous civil society. Thus the East Pakistani Muslims had no democratic
space to exploit for redressal of their grievances. An armed rebellion
broke out and Bangla Desh came into existence after year long liberation
struggle.

The cessation of Bangla Desh from Pakistan proved once for all that
religion cannot be a viable basis of political and national unity between
disparate ethnic and cultural groups. Even after the cessation of Bangla
Desh the Pakistan is seriously dogged by ethnic conflicts. India opted for
linguistic states immediately after independence thus fulfilling the
linguistic aspirations of different linguistic groups. However, Pakistan
chose to remain unitary denying autonomy to various linguistic provinces
like Sindh, Baluchistan and North West Frontier Province. The Pakhtoonistan
struggle earlier led by Badshah Khan (the Frontier Gandhi, Khan Abdul
Ghaffar Khan ) was also crushed. There is strong assertion of regional and
ethnic personalities and a demand for formation of autonomous linguistic
provinces. However, the Punjab, in order to retain its hegemony, refuses to
accept the concept of provincial autonomy. Strangely, Punjab itself is
facing the problem of Saraiki nationalism. The Saraiki speakers in Punjab
maintain that they are in majority in Punjab and not the Punjabi speaking
people. They are agitating to form Saraikistan.

Karachi has been witnessing great deal of blood bath for last
several years. First there were clashes between the muhajirs and Sindhis.
Then the muhajirs and the Pathans fought and hundreds were killed in those
riots. When Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto came to power he tried to redress Sindhi
grievances by giving them greater share in government jobs which so far
they were deprived of. This was, needless to say, at the cost of the
muhajirs who had enjoyed all the privileges. This made them desperate and
having lost all privileges in Pakistan the muhajir frustration surfaced in
various forms. A Muhajir Qaumi Movement led by university students came
into existence. This movement came into existence during Zia=EDs time. Now
the Muhajir Qaumi Movement=EDs activists are clashing with the police and
para- military forces rather than the Sindhi nationalists. The MQM movement
has become highly violent. The Zia Government cleverly divided it through
infiltration of intelligence people. The MQM split into two, one led by its
founder Altaf Husain and the other led by his rivals and known as the
Haqiqi Muhajir Qaumi Movement usually referred to as the Haqiqi.

Karachi is facing same set of problems as similar mega cities are
facing in other countries. Karachi being centre of finance and industries =
=F1
it being the only port city in Pakistan =F1 faces stream of influx of
population from all parts of Pakistan. Also, at the time of partition it
took all the burden of migration. While the Punjabi Muslims naturally
preferred Punjab for migration, the Urdu speakers found Karachi as the
natural choice. Karachi, at the time of partition was a small city of a few
lakhs. After partition its population increased several fold. Then began
economic development and with it an endless in migration from all parts of
the country. Today Karachi is overflowing with more than 10 million people.
Though it is capital of Sindh, the Sindhis are less than one fifth in the
city. In such a situation it is bound to develop severe ethnic strains and
stresses. No wonder Karachi is the centre of major ethnic strife in
Pakistan today.

Pakistan is facing another serious problem that of sectarian
violence particularly since the Islamic revolution in Iran in 1979. The
exact proportion of Shi`ahs in Pakistani population is a disputed matter.
The Sunnis say, it is no more than 10 per cent. The Shi`ahs, on the other
hand, maintain it is as high as 40 per cent. The truth perhaps lies
somewhere in between. There may be around 20% Shi`ahs in Pakistan. The
Shi`ahs definitely suffer from minority syndrome. The Iranian Islamic
revolution made them not only proud but also confident. The first major
clash occurred on the question of payment of Islamic tax zakat. The Zia
regime=EDs Islamisation made it compulsory for all Muslims to pay zakat and
zakat was to be deducted from the bank account. The Shi`ahs resisted this
saying that they cannot pay zakat to the Sunni state. It can be paid only
to the Shi`ah religious leaders. They took out a huge morcha in Islamabad.
The Shi`ahs were now much better organised and forced Zia Government to
exempt them from payment of zakat. The anti-zakat movement was led by
Tehrik-e-Jafariya. This and other factors gave rise to Sunni backlash.

A section of Sunnis formed Sipah-e-Sahabah to counter the
activities of Tehrik-e-Jafariyah. The two organisations often clashed and
killed each other=EDs members. In number of instances motor cycle riders wil=
l
come with AK-47 and fire on people offering prayers inside the mosque or on
those going with funeral procession. Hundreds have died in this sectarian
violence. It is interesting to note that while Karachi is centre of ethnic
violence certain cities of Punjab are witnessing sectarian violence between
Sh`ahs and Sunnis. Karachi is centre of ethnic violence obviously because
it has become melting pot of various ethnic groups due to constant influx
of population from various parts of Pakistan as explained above. In Punjab
there is different dynamics altogether. Punjab is desperately trying to
maintain its hegemony over all other provinces. Its hegemony is being
deeply resented by other provinces i.e. Sindh, Baluchistan and North West
=46rontier Province. In all these provinces there are separatist movements o=
r
movements for autonomy. The only way Punjab can maintain its political
hegemony is through assertion of Islamic identity as against ethnic
identities.

It is for this reason that sectarianism is growing fast in Punjab.
Zia started the process of Islamisation for legitimising his regime. But
there was another reason too. He was facing greatest challenge to his
authority from non-Punjabi ethnic groups like Sindhis, Baluchis and also
partly from muhajirs. He tried to destroy the Qaumi Muhajir Movement by
manipulating and splitting it vertically. It is also interesting to note
that the Qaumi Muhajir Movement has prevented Shi`ah-Sunni strife from
developing in Karachi. The Urdu speaking Shi`ahs and Sunnis are united to
resist the Punjabi domination. Even Zia, despite his success in splitting
the MQM could not destroy it. It still yields tremendous influence among
the Urdu speaking population of Sindh. Thus it can be said that ethnic
identity is far more powerful than religious or Islamic identity among the
non-dominant groups of Pakistan. In Punjab Islamic identity is far more
important as it is dominant group and uses more universal identity to
counter assertion of local ethnic identities.

It is for this reason that Punjab has become centre of Islamic
movements and sectarian movements are far more assertive there. The
Jamat-e-Islami at one time had great hold on Urdu speaking muhajirs until
sixties. The muhajirs tried to make themselves acceptable in Pakistan
(where they had no ethnic, linguistic or cultural roots) through assertion
of their universal i.e. religious identity. But when they failed to carve
out a permanent space in civil society of Pakistan and began to feel
marginalised they replaced religious discourse with ethnic one. The Jamat
was replaced by MQM, which employed purely ethnic discourse. Thus Jamat was
considerably weakened in Sindh, particularly in Karachi and it gathered
more strength in Punjab, which was in need of universal identity (i.e.
Islamic identity). Zia=EDs Islamisation project was far more successful in
Punjab and it left other dominated provinces quite cold.

The Islamic extremist movements are growing more in Punjab than any
other provinces in Pakistan today. Again, it is Punjab, which is more
obsessed with the Kashmir problem. Kashmir has become important for Punjab
for yet another reason. It is being claimed on the basis of two- nation
theory and two-nation theory is hardly important now to other provinces who
are its victim. The logic of two-nation theory is that religious solidarity
is above, and transcends ethnic solidarity. Kashmiris also value their
ethnic identity more than their Islamic identity and hence their problem
with Indian nationalism also. The Kashmiri Islam has strong indigenous
element which is different from other Islamic traditions and which imparts
them a unique islamic personality of its own. In their fight with Indian
dominant nationalism, a section of Kashmiris might assert their universal
Islamic identity but it has no popular support. But the Punjab in Pakistan
is trying to desperately emphasise universal Islamic identity in Kashmir to
legitimise two-nation theory and thus maintain a sense of Islamic
solidarity in Pakistan as a whole to retain its own hegemony over other
marginalised ethnic groups.

The leaders like Khan Abdul Ghaffar Khan had grasped this truth
very well much earlier. He knew, through his own experience that
overarching universal identity (like the Islamic identity) will be pitted
against the local or ethnic identity (like the Pakhtun identity) and
Pathans in Pakistan will never be allowed full autonomous growth. He,
therefore, vehemently opposed creation of Pakistan. In a democratic process
of nation-building all ethnic, religious, cultural and linguistic
identities should have equal chance to flourish. Then only nation-building
could be a less problematic process. But either a dominant religious or
ethnic group tries to obstruct this as it demolishes its dominant position
and emphasises real or imagined overarching religious or national identity
to retain its own domination. In India it is again the religious right
which insists on either the Hindutva or overarching Indian identity at the
cost of more democratic regional, ethnic or other minority identities.

India being democratic the religious right cannot assert itself
beyond certain point. However, in Pakistan, the majority religion can be
much more assertive as civil society is weaker there and the state
controlled by not only majority religious identity but also dominant ethnic
identity (that of Punjab) is far stronger. The Punjabi identity could
assert itself strongly even in 1970 despite majority of Bengali speaking
Muslims in East Pakistan. The Bengali speaking Muslims thus saw no other
alternative than to secede from Pakistan. It is also interesting to note
that in united Pakistan the Punjabi identity proved far stronger than the
Islamic solidarity. Thus it is hegemonic assertion of an ethnic identity
which proves more decisive than religious unity. However, today in
Pakistan, there is combination of hegemonic ethnic identity and religion.
It is the ruling classes in Punjab, which are fanning religious extremism
in its desperate efforts to maintain unity of Pakistan on its own
conditions.

In the post-modernity era the process of nation building can become
seriously flawed if it is not truly democratic and based on respect for
diversity, plurality and human dignity. A truly democratic process demands
that all ethnic groups, big or small, should enjoy full autonomy and equal
opportunity to flourish. All religious, linguistic and cultural groups, in
majority or minority, should have sense of being equal partners in the
process of nation building. Even if the smallest ethnic or religious group
develops the sense of being left out the process of nation building can
face serious trouble. All nations in South Asia are facing problems today
precisely because the non-dominant ethnic, cultural or religious groups
have no sense of equal partnership in the process of nation building. They
feel not only left out but also victims of hate campaign. No wonder then
that there is serious ethnic and religious conflict in all the countries in
South Asia like India, Pakistan and Sri Lanka. The Tamil question in Sri
Lanka arose because in 1961 Constitution adopted by the Sri Lanka
Parliament did not give the Tamil language its due. The Tamil group felt
severely aggrieved. It ultimately took to violence when the problem was not
solved democratically. The same is true of the Kashmir problem in India.
The Union Government at Delhi never allowed democratic dissent to strike
roots in Kashmir. It always wanted a stooge government in Kashmir
undermining its Kashmiri identity. Now India is paying heavy price for it.
Had the Central Government allowed true democratic processes to flourish in
Kashmir the Kashmiri youth would not have taken to violence on such a
scale. In case of Kashmir the problem was again compounded by religion and
ethnicity combining together.

Thus in South Asia the colonial heritage on one hand, and serious
lapses on the part of ruling classes in post-colonial period, on the other,
have made the process of nation building more problematic than it would
have been. More autonomy for the civil society, greater space for
expression of ethnic identity, respect for diversity and regard for
distributive justice can go a long way in promoting peace and harmony in
South Asian nations.
________

#2.
Inter Press Service
March 2000

=46ilm: India
Menacing Partition Story, Prejudiced Against Muslims
[Hey Ram : A film review]
By Ravi Vasudevan

It's difficult to outline a coherent response to Kamal Hasan's
sprawling film 'Hey Ram' on the Partition of the subcontinent.

A plot outline would seem to make things rather more
straightforward than they actually come across, but is probably
the best place to start.

In Chennai, on Dec. 6, 1999, an old man, Saket Ram (Kamal
Hasan), is in a critical condition, and it's from his point of
view that the film flashes back to the Partition period.

An archaeologist at Mortimer Wheeler's dig at Mohenjo Daro,
now in Pakistan, Ram and his colleague Amjad Khan (Shahrukh Khan)
are abruptly asked to pack up when Hindu-Muslim riots erupt.

Ram returns to Calcutta to be with his beloved, Aparna (Rani
Mukherjee), and finds the streets torn by marauding Muslim crowds
answering Jinnah's Direct Action call.

A nightmarish account of Direct Action day follows, with
Aparna raped and killed by Muslims, amongst whom is a tailor,
Altaf, well known to Ram, and Ram himself is almost sodomised by
the tailor's mates.

Ram subsequently finds and kills Altaf, and witnesses the
systematic execution of Muslims by Hindus and Sikhs. Assailed
with guilt at his actions, Ram meets a Hindu firebrand,
Abhyankar, who urges Ram to join him on his ''shikar'' (hunt) of
Muslims, but deems Gandhi ultimately responsible for the tragic
fate of Hindus because of the alliances and appeasement he forged
with Muslim leaders.

A numbed Ram returns to Madras, where he submits to the
desires of his family and marries Maithili (Vasundhra Das), and
the two of them ultimately go to Maharashtra to meet Abhyankar,
now under the patronage of a fundamentalist local rajah.

Ram's indoctrination continues, and, when Abhyankar is
crippled in a riding accident, Ram is chosen to take his place as
Gandhi's assassin. Ram prepares for this through elaborate
rituals performed at Benares and arrives in Delhi where he stakes
out the Birla House for his assassination bid.

A plot twist takes him to the Muslim quarters of old Delhi,
where he happens upon his old friend Amjad who, despite personal
losses incurred during the riots, remains fervent in his Gandhian
values.

At first implacable in his Hindutva beliefs, Ram's attitude
changes when Amjad is threatened by what are clearly die-hard
Hindu RSS incendiaries. He defends Amjad and his family, but
Amjad dies.

Overwhelmed, Saket Ram, now celebrated as the defender of
Muslims, goes to seek atonement for his sins from Gandhi, only to
see him felled by an assassin's bullet. A traumatised Ram removes
Gandhi's sandals and glasses, and we subsequently find these
housed in the room where Ram lived out his later life in darkness
and silence.

Apart from the momentos of Gandhi, this museum of personal
history also contains the gun Ram was to kill Gandhi with, as
well as numerous photos, and one of its walls is adorned with a
huge image of the Mahatma. In a peculiarly haunting and ambiguous
last shot, the credits roll over Saket Ram's grandson opening
windows within this image of Gandhi, light flooding through it,
at once fracturing it and illuminating it.

The flashback devoted to Direct Action day has in some
fundamental sense broken certain rules for how communal conflict
is represented in popular Indian cinema.

Its extended, graphic description of Muslim bloodlust and
sexual assault on Hindu women -- reiterated in other stories told
by Hindus in the film -- goes against the particular secular
discretion of popular film in avoiding the attribution of 'first
blood'; on the other hand, it is a commonplace of popular Hindu
perception and memory, however, distorted this may be, and has
always been used to justify retaliatory violence.

It would have been courageous to have taken this commonsense
head-on, even to reproduce it graphically as the film does,
confronting the Hindu with the bestiality of the Muslim other, if
the film could then go on to substantially challenge this view,
or at least counterpoint it with parallel, unmotivated Hindu
bestiality, through the anomie which governs riot situations.

Subsequently, the entire encounter with Abhyankar, the
Hindutva ideologue, is deeply ambivalent, as the character is
charismatic, his points made with a trenchant wit and ironic
repartee, and the rajah, his patron, is a figure of regal
equipoise and political purpose.

Indeed, the whole refashioning of the cosmopolitan
professional, originally cultivated in the scientific excavation
of an earlier Indian civilisation, is charted with a sense of
heroic Hindu endeavour, if through rather kitsch imagery.

Here the film deploys multi-media imagery to fashion a regime
of political symbols. The assassin's bullet targets an image of
Gandhi surrounded by the symbols of the 'charkha' (spinning
wheel) and the crescent, and splits the image to generate a
swirling computer generated transformation of swastik into
swastika and finally into a hard-lined lotus.

Clearly, the director intended some of this to be menacing,
and, indeed, at each point, one could almost feel that the film
could be transformed into a critique of the politics, narratives
and symbols associated with a resurgent Hinduism, its ties to
other right wing movements and, indeed, to contemporary Hindutva.

But the film cannot distance itself from these passages, by
putting them into quotation marks as it were, as something being
commented upon rather than inviting identification.

Later, the turning point in Ram's development, his conversion
after the meeting with Amjad and defence of the embattled Muslim
community, is particularly offensive. For, in the name of a
reformed, more humane perspective, the narrative action merely
underlines the prevailing Hindutva ideology that the Hindu nation
will provide protection to the minority from majoritarian
extremists.

Throughout the film, Kamal Hasan fails to convey any sense of
a conflicted individual. His breakdown at his wife's death, his
later haunting by the Muslims he killed or whose suffering he
witnessed, are marked by a highly mannered histrionics that calls
attention to virtuoso gestural and emotive flourishes that
tend to detract from the moment rather than channel it.

At the moment of conversion from Hindu radicalism, he is not
even mannered, merely ineffectual, rendering the narrative
counterpointing of Muslim victimhood to Hindu tragedy an
emotionally diminished one.

It is clearly important for his character to retain a powerful
masculinity throughout; he is never under threat, inside himself
or outside. His body language is hard, firm, too competent. Even
the near-sodomy scene, surely a first in popular cinema, and
highly suggestive in term of dominant fears of Hindu
emasculation, lacks any sense of threat. This man won't get
buggered, his defense of his body and of the myths which fashion
his mind are unassailable.

And yet, the peculiar disjointed story telling methods of
Indian popular cinema leave a question mark over some of these
observations.

The very fact that you can show something without being able
to adequately explain it or ask the audience to assume a definite
stance towards it, indicates why, at many points a different
interpretation could have emerged.

Is the image or narrative account we see meant to be menacing
or laudatory? Does it invite reflection, or simply court
fascination with the charismatic Hindu personality, with a
narrative rhetoric prejudiced against Muslims with the spectacle
of Hindu masculine assertion?

Nowhere is this peculiar impasse better suggested than in the
film's framing narrative. For the Saket Ram of the present, in
his emaciated, dhoti clad body and his extended vow of silence,
now lasting some 40 years, undoubtedly conjures up an image of
the Mahatma frozen in time.

It is as if a transference has taken place between the healer
and his patient, even if the film has not been able to persuade
us of the cure. The concluding scene, when Saket Ram's grandson
shows the Mahatma's grandson (Tushar Gandhi) around his
grandfather's memory chamber, suggests the obstacles involved.

We see on the wall an all-inclusive account of Ram's life from
photos of him with his wives and family, with Amjad, Gandhi, and
Abhyankar. Abhyankar could not be censored from this account, nor
the darker fears and attractions that have governed Hindu life.

The history of Saket Ram, with its wider ramifications for
Hindu national identity, could not be condensed, or its conflicts
resolved, by converting it into the reassuring icon of the
Mahatma.

Thus the strangeness of the last image, daylight puncturing
the image of Gandhi, fracturing the icon, urging the image be
flooded with illumination. This is a fine image, and a very
suggestive last sequence.

My sense of anxiety is not with a disruption of the false
sense of security, lip-service and diminished historical
awareness that icons shore up, but with the lack of humane
intelligence that Kamal Hasan's film displays.

For I fear that in dispersing the aura, what has been revealed
is not a complicated history but the desire for a resurgent and
indomitable Hindu, however much the film may finally disavow
this. (END)

________

#3.

SAFHR Paper Series - 5

"Peace Process in Nagaland and Chittagong Hill Tracts":
An Audit Report

by Jehan Perera

December 1999

South Asia Forum for Human Rights
3/23 Shree Durbar Tole, Patan Dhoka,
Lalitpur
Kathmandu, Nepal
=46ax: 077- 1 527 852

_________________________________________
SOUTH ASIA CITIZENS WEB DISPATCH (SACW) is an informal, independent &
non-profit citizens wire service run by South Asia Citizens Web
(http://www.mnet.fr/aiindex) since1996. Dispatch archive from 1998
can be accessed by joining the ACT list run by SACW.
To subscribe send a message to <act-subscribe@egroups.com>
=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=
=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D