[sacw] sacw dispatch (16 Dec.99)

[Harsh Kapoor]

South Asia Citizens Web - Dispatch
16 December 1999
http://www.mnet.fr/aiindex
_______________________
Contains:
#1. Literature of courage
#2. Findings of [Pakistan's] Hamoodur Rahman Commission on 1971 war be made
public
#3. Why India should sign & ratify CTBT
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#1.
Hindustan Times
Wednesday, December 15, 1999, New Delhi
Opinion

Literature of courage
by Chanchal Sarkar

Taslima Nasreen has been compared with Salman Rushdie, but it is an unfair
comparison. Unfair to Taslima. For one thing she is a woman and so the
object of even greater congealed hatred than a man. Rushdie lives in a
settled society with liberal perceptions, not so Taslima. Rushdie writes
in English, a language most of his fanatical accusers do not know,
Taslima's language is Bengali which all her country people know. Rushdie
is guarded night and day by the British police at public expense; the
Bangladeshi police didn't do much at all to protect Taslima, so she had to
flee her own country trailing criminal cases behind her.

One other thing, Rushdie gets the support of numerous literary and liberal
figures of the Western world where he lives. Taslima did indeed collect
some support from a section in Bangladesh but not in large numbers. India
was even-handed in its hypocrisy in both cases-the visa ban for both was
removed and Taslima was able to make a six-day visit to Calcutta a few
days ago. Why the silence from the educated women of Bangladesh? Because
Taslima has dared to hold the view that a woman should be free to do what
she wants with her body. She has also said that the Shariat needs reform,
particularly about women's rights. After her first husband's death Taslima
has lived with several men outside marriage. Her poems, columns and novels
are often explicit. In an Islamic state this raises eyebrows to the
hairline even among the sophisticated, with the unexpressed view that
maybe she's going too far too brazenly.

Taslima, then, has had a much harder row to hoe than Salman Rushdie and
she has, in her writings, sailed seas which no woman, certainly in South
Asia, has ever done before. Male domination has been touched upon
strangely in Bengal earlier by the famous Rokeya Begum and by Kazi Nazrul
Islam but sexual freedom for women has been kept under a bushel. Taslima
has ripped open the covering not only for India and Bangladesh but for the
whole of South and South-East Asia where there are powerful Muslim
societies. She would probably be refused the right to speak in Malaysia,
Indonesia or Pakistan. This makes her braver than Salman Rushdie because
Taslima could be the subject of a fatwa from Muslim countries no less than
banning from non-Muslims who disapprove of her views.

As always happens there is a nosy curiosity about her way of life and
about her writings. Literary critics, even while admiring her courage,
have disagreed about the literary quality of her writing. Bangladesh's
foremost living poet, Shamsur Rahman, has given her high praise, so have
accomplished critics like Kabir Chowdhury and Zillur Rahman Siddiqui.
Others have been more reserved. Certain it is that her best known novel
Lajja (Shame) is not a great writing but is notable because it touches a
theme which Bangladeshis, even the liberal ones, find uncomfortable-the
sad plight of the Hindu minority in that country. Again Taslima has
outdone other notable figures in courage and brought down a ton of bricks
on herself. It has been said that the BJP engineered the Hindi
translation. Her latest book just out, My Girlhood Days, has appeared
first in French and then in an edited and pruned version in Bengali. It
deals with the first 13 years of her life and is shorn of all cant and
hypocrisy about women's 'greatness' and 'status' in family life.
Taslima's writings have been translated into more than 12 European
languages-and how many, or how few, Indian and South Asian?
_____________
#2.
DAWN
12 December 1999, Sunday
Weekly Magazine

Make it public, please!
by Akhtar Payami

NOW that the veil of secrecy is being lifted from various unresolved
mysteries, is it not the time to make the findings of the Hamoodur Rahman
Commission public? Though enough material is available on the tragic events
of 1971, we still need more authentic and well-documented accounts of the
events that followed the folly of postponing the National Assembly session
which was scheduled to be held in Dhaka in March.

In the absence of an independent assessment of the situation, many
happenings might have been fictionalized. Some people who had been closely
associated with the governance of East Pakistan during the crucial period
of the 1970s have tried to present an objective view of the catastrophic
developments. Most of them are above all prejudice. Still, there are many
things that need to be understood and analyzed in a clear and correct
perspective.

For instance, it is widely believed that a few weeks before the fall of
Dhaka, the government had planned to kill all the secretaries and
high-ranking officials of East Pakistan. It is said that time-bombs were
tied to their chairs on the day when they were asked to attend an important
meeting. Presumably, some officials got the hint of the sinister plan and
eventually nobody attended the scheduled meeting.

It is also said that the then government of East Pakistan had prepared an
elaborate list of Bengali writers, poets, teachers, intellectuals and other
professionals who were to be assassinated in Dhaka.

After the emergence of Bangladesh, Sheikh Mujibur Rahman had declared that
at least three million people had been killed in the army action. Since
then this figure is always officially quoted by the leaders of Bangladesh.
There is no means to ascertain the veracity of this statement.

Then, there are also reports that in a retaliatory move against the
supporters of the army, a large number of non-Bengalis were killed in
various parts of East Pakistan. The federal government is believed to have
appointed a commission to inquire into the allegations of massive killings
of Urdu speakers. The commission, headed by a member of the Board of
Revenue, continued to work on this project even after December 16. The
chairman of the commission has died recently, but there is still no trace
of what that report might have concluded.

It is not known whether these and various other related aspects were
covered by the Hamoodur Rahman Commission. The Commission was set up by the
then president of Pakistan, Mr Z.A. Bhutto, on December 26, 1971, under the
chairmanship of Justice Hamoodur Rahman. The Commission prepared its
provisional report in July, 1972. The report was not considered final as it
did not contain the statements of several army officers who were then
prisoners of war in India.

When they were released, the government advised the Commission to complete
its inquiry. The report was finalized, incorporating the statements of the
major players of the 1971 war theatre. It was then presented to the
government which constituted a special committee to go through the report
and make its recommendations. It is believed that the committee had
recommended the publication of the report.

Apart from the Hamood Commission, three other committees were also set up
to consider and review the military aspects of the 1971 war. Those
committees had also prepared their reports. More or less there was said to
be a consensus among army circles about the publication of the reports.

Nobody knows what happened to the Hamoodur Rahman Commission's report. No
accurate answer is available. The matter is shrouded in mystery. It is
believed that several copies of the report were made and passed on to
selected people. But presumably all other copies were destroyed by Mr
Bhutto himself. General Zia-ul-Haq claimed that only one copy of the report
was found at Mr Bhutto's residence.

Is there any truth in all these reports? Of and on some so-called excerpts
of the report have appeared in newspapers. They may or may not give a
truthful account of the events. It is, therefore, of utmost importance that
the people of Pakistan are told about the findings of the Commission. If
there are any sensitive details which cannot be revealed, the government
may decide to make public only the relevant parts. We have already put
under the carpet many such reports. But by suppressing truth and by
distorting facts, nothing substantial can be achieved. The assassination of
Mr Liaquat Ali Khan, and Gen Zia-ul-Haq's death in the C-130 disaster
remain a mystery till today.

The publication of the Hamoodur Rahman Commission Report is all the more
necessary in the context of the present day political situation in
Pakistan. It is not known if the report had discussed the myriads of
factors that alienated the people of East Pakistan from the rest of the
country. It would be wrong to assume that the 1971 crisis came about
suddenly. The indefinite postponement of the National Assembly session in
Dhaka was a major turning point in the worsening political relationship
between East and West Pakistan. But that was not the only factor. The
ground for the separation of East Pakistan was being prepared several
decades before the war.

Unfortunately, the rulers sitting pretty in the well-protected
surroundings of West Pakistan failed to understand the psychology of the
people of East Pakistan. It would be a travesty of fact to think that the
people of East Pakistan were inspired and instigated by the Hindus to sever
their ties with Pakistan. Yes, there were a number of Hindu teachers and
Hindu professionals in the then East Pakistan. But never the Hindu
influence on East Pakistan was a decisive factor.

Although the Bengali Muslims worked relentlessly for the creation of
Pakistan, most of them were essentially secular in their outlook. This is
true of almost all the Bengalis living in the two parts of Bengal.
Otherwise, how can anybody explain the fact that both Mr H.S. Suhrawardy
and Mr A.K. Fazlul Haq were acceptable to the large Hindu majority as the
chief minister of a united Bengal.

But it was not the secular factor that alienated the Muslims of East
Pakistan from their brethren in West Pakistan. It was, indeed, the alarming
economic disparity between the two wings that widened the gulf. Dr Mahbubul
Haq, Pakistan's chief planning adviser during the Ayub regime, had said
that "East Pakistan with 55 per cent of the total population enjoys at
least 60 per cent less real income per head than West Pakistan, consumes
very little besides rice and fish, has a poor infrastructure, and a tiny
industrial sector, and at least one-third of its labour force can be
regarded as unemployed".

At the time of independence both wings had inherited backward economies.
Both were regarded as the raw material producing hinterlands for the more
industrialized regions of undivided India. But after independence a number
of factors helped the western wing to make a phenomenal progress. Among
them were the migration of Muslim capital and the entrepreneurship to the
west wing, the location of the federal capital and the headquarters of the
armed forces, a greater development of infrastructure, increased government
expenditure, planning strategy and policies favouring the western wing,
transfer of foreign exchange earning and capital resources of East Pakistan
to West Pakistan, concentration of banking and credit institutions in the
west, meagre share of the eastern wing in central revenues, loans and
grants and the domination of power structures by West Pakistanis.

These economic factors accentuated the feeling of deprivation that had
been troubling the people of East Pakistan for long.

It is time, therefore, to understand the real reasons behind the
catastrophe that befell Pakistan only 26 years after its creation. It would
be suicidal to proceed with a wrong premise and arrive at false conclusions
based entirely on distortion of facts. In this quest for truth, all avenues
should be explored to understand the causes and the repercussions of the
1971 tragedy. The publication of the Hamoodur Rahman Commission report, in
this context, can serve the cause of truth and fair play.
_____________
#3.
The Hindustan Times
16 December 1999
Op-Ed.

Policy on CTBT

(Kanti Bajpai favours signing the treaty)

Should India sign the CTBT? There is a strong case for doing so,
notwithstanding the arguments of well-meaning opponents. Opponents of
the treaty make worthy arguments and, by doing so, help clarify why
India should, on a considered basis, sign the test ban.

The first argument of the opponents of the CTBT is that it is a bad
treaty. It is bad for two reasons: because it is "discriminatory" and
because it has loopholes. The charge that the treaty is discriminatory
rests basically on the fact that the P-5, in agreeing to the prohibition
on explosive testing, also agreed among themselves to define explosive
testing as excluding sub-critical, hydro-nuclear and computer-simulated
tests. The P-5 understanding on non-explosive tests damned the treaty in
the eyes of many Indians because, prior to 1998, India could not carry
out such tests.

Today, however, matters are different. If India desires to conduct
non-explosive tests, it can do so. Indian scientists have claimed that,
post-Pokhran II, India is in a position to conduct non-explosive tests
and generate useful data. Whether or not such tests can indeed generate
data of the requisite quality is of course another issue altogether. But
to the extent that they can, India, like the P-5, has the capability to
do them. The charge that the CTBT has loopholes also is not valid. Some
opponents argue that since the US and others did not detect the Indian
tests of May 1998 this damns the verification system of the treaty. That
foreign experts reputedly got the magnitude of the tests wrong is cited
as testifying to the inadequacy of the system.

Neither charge is convincing. The CTBT's verification system cannot, for
the most part, predict that someone is going to test. Certainly, the
seismic and radio-nuclide sensors cannot do so. These only come into
play when a test had already occurred. In principle, the on-site
inspections (OSIs) might detect preparations for a test. However, given
the stringent conditions under which an OSI can take place, it is highly
unlikely that a team of inspectors would be permitted to enter a
country's facilities on the mere suspicion of a test.

As for the apparent error of foreign experts on the nature of the Indian
tests, this does not challenge the reliability of the verification
mechanism. For, the fact is that the entire range of verification
devices is not up and running even now and clearly was not operational
when the Indian tests were carried out in May 1998. The May 1998
explosions are not therefore a critical test of the verification system.
That system, when it is set up, will need to be carefully calibrated
through international cooperation in order to detect tests in a
foolproof manner.

It should be added that it is highly unlikely that the system can ever
detect sub-critical, hydro-nuclear and computer-simulated tests. Given,
however, that such tests are basically aids in testing the safety and
reliability of a stockpile and not likely to be useful in developing new
weapons, this lacuna is also not fatal to the treaty's verification
system.

A related charge against the treaty is that verification could be
misused against India, that it could be used for mischievous inspections
of Indian facilities, and that should India ever refuse inspections it
could face an armed armada against it, as Iraq did in 1991. This is
highly improbable for three reasons. First, the treaty defines on-site
inspections in a highly restricted way. Second, refusing an inspection
is in no way comparable to what Saddam did in Kuwait. Third, the
government's promise to weaponise, India, unlike Iraq, will be a nuclear
power.

The second key argument advanced by opponents of the treaty is that
India seemingly is not getting anything in return. Some critics suggest
that India should get high technology for its civilian nuclear programme
and for conventional weapon systems. Others want a more political quid
pro quo, such as a permanent seat on the UN Security Council.

=46or India to get technology in the nuclear area is virtually impossible,
as things stand. Giving India nuclear technology would go against the
Nuclear Non-proliferation Treaty (NPT), the various suppliers' regime
built up by scores of countries since 1974 when India first tested, and,
in some cases, domestic laws (e.g. in the US). Broadly speaking, any
country that does not have full-scope safeguards on its nuclear plants
cannot get nuclear technology. One way of working a deal may be to put
Indian reactors not involved in weapons research on safeguards. India
will have to change its nuclear policies to broker such a deal and will
have to persuade outsiders to resume nuclear ties with India. This is
not impossible. As for a deal on conventional weapons technologies, this
also is not an impossibility.

The key question, though, is: should such a "deal" be a precondition for
signing the CTBT? On balance, probably not. Signing the treaty on its
merits is more dignified for a power of India's standing and, more
importantly, will strengthen the country's traditional stand that it
supports international covenants that are universal and
non-discriminatory. That stand is based not just on "moral"
considerations. It is based on the understanding that such covenants
help build a more democratic and just international society that will,
over time, bind the big powers to norms and practices which are agreed
upon by the international community at large. This is an investment in
international security and the protection of weaker powers.

As for getting a permanent seat on the UN Security Council, this is more
difficult. For one thing, the international community is not keen to
"reward" proliferators. For another, if nuclearisation is implicitly or
explicitly the criterion of membership, then Pakistan and Israel would
qualify for permanent membership - which surely would dilute the value
of membership if it did not positively complicate India's diplomacy.
=46inally, it is far from clear that anyone can necessarily deliver on the
promise of permanent membership even if they should give India that
promise. We have seen over the past three years that the Security
Council issue is a highly contentious one among the Western allies as
well as between continents and regions in the South.

The third argument against signing the CTBT is that India needs more
tests to refine its weapons capability and therefore that this is not
the time to restrict the country's options. This contention is refuted
by the statements of India's nuclear scientists. If the country is
determined to build a deterrent, then the scientists, at the highest
level and in public statements, have certified that India does not need
any more tests. India is apparently capable of deploying nuclear weapons
of virtually any size and adequate for deterrence against virtually all
comers.

It remains to be stated that there are very positive reasons for signing
the treaty. First and foremost, India will be more secure if the P-5 and
all other states, especially Pakistan and China, are verifiably
prohibited from testing and refining their nuclear capabilities. Second,
signing the CTBT is vital to a diplomacy of deep engagement with key
diplomatic partners, especially the US, the European Union, and Japan,
but also East and Southeast Asia. The long-term strategic benefits to
India of such an engagement will be crucial in the turbulent years to
come. Third, it should be underlined that signing is crucial: a
unilateral commitment not to test, via a Parliamentary resolution, will
not suffice because, as India has always emphasised, only verifiable, mu
ltilateral arrangements can work in global arms control. In sum, it is
in India's interest to sign and, at the appropriate time, ratify the
CTBT.

(The author teaches at the School of International Studies, Jawaharlal
Nehru University, New Delhi)

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SOUTH ASIA CITIZENS WEB DISPATCH is an informal, independent &
non-profit citizens wire service run by South Asia Citizens Web
(http://www.mnet.fr/aiindex) since1996.