[sacw] sacw dispatch #2 (Pakistan Special) 10 Dec.99

[Harsh Kapoor]

South Asia Citizens Web - Dispatch #2 (Pakistan Special)
10 December 1999
http://www.mnet.fr/aiindex
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#1. Diplomacy and its different tracks: A view from Pakistan
#2. Reconstructing Pakistan: The Way Ahead
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#1.

DAWN
10 December 1999
Opinion

DIPLOMACY AND ITS DIFFERENT TRACKS
By M.B. Naqvi

THE dialogue between India and Pakistan was ruptured six months ago and in
the meantime pressure on both countries is mounting to resume the talks.
Would the dialogue resume? It probably would.

Although Indian Prime Minister Atal Behari Vajpayee, probably to please
some lobby, had indicated sometime ago that his government was ready to
resume talks without conditions, he later put the condition that Pakistan
must first affirm its faith in the Simla Agreement and the Lahore
Declaration. Anyhow there is also the Indian rider that Pakistan should
create conditions conducive to the success of the talks.

Now this caveat can mean a whole lot of things, especially that Pakistan
should first stop cross-border terrorism and then expect talks to be
resumed. However, with the pending visit earlier next year of US President
Bill Clinton and having spurned the repeated Pakistani pleas for talks, it
might actually be time for the Indians to wish the resumption of
negotiations.

It was the Indians who had haughtily stopped talking and complained of
gross breach of trust. They were referring to the Kargil operations by
Pakistan. Former Prime Minister Mian Nawaz Sharif tried to mollify them by
withdrawing from the Kargil heights through the Washington agreement. After
that Indian elections intervened. Once the BJP-led coalition government
returned to power, it adopted an even more unctuous attitude and began
laying down prior conditions for resuming talks: Pakistan should stop
cross-border terrorist attacks in Kashmir-a condition that is in part
controverted by Pakistan and in part is not acceptable to it. Later, other
conditions were added.

Thus the deadlock continues-at least on the surface. For, a former Indian
foreign secretary, Salman Haider, has claimed that he had initiated the
Track II diplomacy with Pakistan's new military regime. Pakistan Foreign
Minister Abdus Sattar has formally denied Salman Haider's claim. It is
optional to regard this statement as a fact or to treat it as some kind of
a confirmation of the back channel diplomacy contacts. In the nature of
things, Track II diplomacy is not owned-until it has succeeded.

Chief Executive Gen. Pervez Musharraf has been anxious to get the talks
started. The absence of a meaningful dialogue can only lead to heightening
crises scaling new peaks of tension along the LoC or even the international
border between the two countries, not to mention the non-abatement of, if
not further intensification of, arms race in all the three fields:
conventional armaments, nuclear weapons and missiles for delivering mass
destruction weapons. Pakistan's interest in peace is, and should be, in no
doubt. Moreover, its economy being in serious straits is no secret from
either friend or foe. The need for a peaceful settlement is thus urgent and
a recognition of this is imperative.

Although there are eminent Indians who think that Kashmir is a dispute and
that something needs to be done for resolving it and for that India will
have to go beyond its stated stance. Indian components of the various
conventions of the Pakistan-India People's Forum for Peace and Democracy
have repeatedly gone on record saying so. The Indian government and the
political class behind it has nothing much to contribute to the resolution
of the problem; all that they say and do in the course of their own
politicking only makes matters worse in Kashmir and between India and
Pakistan.

Irrespective of what New Delhi may think or say, two-maybe three-wars have
taken place over Kashmir and both countries are spending staggering amounts
of money on wholly non-productive purposes of accumulating weapons and
keeping their armies trained and fully poised. Not merely that, in such
eyeball to eyeball confrontations, with hardliners beating war drums,
eruption of hostilities is always a strong possibility. And this situation
cannot be sustained for long.

The two countries are nuclear powers. Nuclear weapons have a logic of
their own. The plain fact is that the minimum nuclear deterrence of India
is an open-ended programme of nuclear arms build-up; they are misusing the
word minimum. Pakistan's own minimum deterrent, no matter what the hawks
say, is also not a minimal one. What Foreign Minister Abdus Sattar said
some days ago-'should India test a nuclear weapon again, Pakistan will
follow suit'-proves why neither government can quantitatively define their
'minimum' (nuclear deterrent). Actually the two programmes are an
unlimitable arms race.

Peace activists can reel off the dangers of simply holding these bombs in
stock, to say nothing of their deployment. These weapons demand, as the
international practice so far underlines, ground rules to be agreed at
least between India and Pakistan, if international agencies are not to be
inducted. If for no other reason, nuclear weapons and the development of
missiles to deliver them makes it obligatory on India and Pakistan to talk
at the very least about a system of mutual restraint and safeguards against
errors and miscalculations on both sides.

But far and away, the most important consideration is that the cycle of
violence in Kashmir and the arms race it is engendering demand a major
shift in policies. The current militarization of two societies is a grim
reminder that unless they make a stable and longer-term peace, the danger
of violence and frittering away of precious national resources will not
merely continue but might go on creating ever-new crises. The aim of the
dialogue has to be clearly spelled out and should be an agreed one. In this
context, let one point be clear.

The advice the Americans have been proffering to both countries goes no
further than the desirability of a detente, a limited understanding in
which they should write agreed ground rules about nuclear weapons,
including starting of some mutually balanced force reduction talks.
Achievement of this objective would not reverse Indian or Pakistani policy
orientations from which arms race results nor would it substantially reduce
the financial burden on either.

Moreover, a limited detente is not an ideal that can enthuse people about
high endeavour, much less sacrifices. In order to effect a basic change in
the sentiment, attitudes and purposes among the two peoples, they will have
to go much farther. They have to aim at reconciliation and that too a
proper people-to-people one.

The stakes are high: the fate of one and a half billion men, women and
children of South Asia is involved. Without Pakistan and India making peace
and taking the region along with their much needed economic cooperation and
free trading in an ever closer integration of the regional framework, there
can be no optimal progress in the region. At present South Asia is
suffering huge loss of unmade progress-largely because of the inability of
Indian and Pakistani political classes to compose their differences. But
those who are suffering the heaviest cost of lost opportunities are the
poorer sections of the Indians and Pakistanis-together some 600 to 700
million of them.

The need is clear to decide: should they either give up all hope of
improved conditions of living for them or they should somehow overcome the
big hump created by the disputes between India and Pakistan and follow the
European Union founders' ideas of regional cooperation and integration.
This is the only way to work for their material and cultural progress.

By tackling this big issue, that is, entering into negotiations with its
estranged neighbour, India will not be obliging Pakistan; there should be a
clear realization in that country that a stable peace with Pakistan is in
the longer-term interest of the people of India. Similarly, by asking for
talks with India and engaging in them one is not obliging the Indians.
Pakistani rulers will make their own life somewhat easier by starting a
dialogue with India.

It is time for the Indian political class to realize that India has also
other objectives to achieve, apart from achieving national grandeur or
being recognized as a great power. Their constitution also carries some
specified guiding principles for the government and parliament to follow.
They could do that with some more wealth creation and a better distribution
of it, just as it is vital for Pakistan to do exactly that-and soon. The
kind of self-righteousness that the two foreign offices are displaying
helps neither their respective people nor is it sustainable for long.

It is in this context that employment of Track II diplomacy, if it has not
taken place so far, should be employed in earnest without delay. In its
absence the two foreign offices may not be able to take the necessary
initiative for arranging the formal dialogue's resumption; the Track II
effort, when and if it succeeds, will enable Track I to start off.

But above and beyond the Track I and Track II diplomacies, there should be
a Track III diplomacy. In this ordinary people should meet each other and
discuss as deeply as possible the serious issues between the two countries
with a view to finding honourable (to both sides) and democratic solutions.
Without Track III diplomacy being in place, the other two will remain
handicapped. The political leaders of the two nations have spoken so
fiercely and starkly that starting a dialogue would look like a climb-down
by Atal Behari Vajpayee in the rank and file of the Sangh Parivar. The same
will hold for whoever is ruling Pakistan.
=A9 The DAWN Group of Newspapers, 1999
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#2.
Economic and Political Weekly
November 20-26, 1999
Commentary

Reconstructing Pakistan: The Way Ahead
by Iftikhar H Malik

=46EELING nostalgic for a wayward and rather criminalised democratic system
by being cynical of a military takeover or even feeling euphoric over this
extra-constitutional change-over will not help Pakistan in resolving her
rather enduring problems of governance. It is definitely not an auspicious
occasion to stumble into another crisis so soon after the Kargil imbroglio.
Unfortunately, the country seems to be mired in a vicious cycle of
democratic yet inefficient and drifty administrations being dismissed
unceremoniously to be followed by unmandated interim arrangements all at
the behest of the army leadership. The generals, initially, express their
non-chalance towards assuming full responsibility and only talk of
cleansing the administration by curbing disorderliness and putting the
economy back on rails within a short while, yet end up staying longer. No
wonder, for more than half of its history Pakistan has been under direct
military rule whereas the interregnums, in most cases, appear
pseudo-democratic with the army dictating behind the scene.

The army=92s direct control accompanies a complete depoliticisation of the
people, though on the way the generals, like the erstwhile discredited
politicians, themselves assume full-fledged populist pretensions to stay in
power. Concurrently, they begin seeking discretionary ideological and
sectional props to legitimate their takeovers which seriously fragments the
society. By that time the civic groups begin to show signs of disgust, and
demand for democratisation, restoration of unfettered civic liberties and
free press start reviving themselves which are further accentuated by
serious economic anomalies. In the process, the generals use both the
brutal force as well as diverse temptations to the obliging elite to carve
out a parallel niche.

Even after the generals are presumably gone as a result of some popular
movement as was the case with Ayub Khan in 1969 or due to a humiliating
defeat as under Yahya Khan in 1971, or through some accidental death like
that of General Zia in 1988, the successive democratic administrations
suffer from weaker political culture, economic inabilities and unscrupulous
personalist ambitions. Even their dismissals followed by the interim
arrangements or full-fledged mandated governments fail to reverse the
processes of deinstitutionalisation, corruption and general disarray.

In other words, despite the temporary respite following the dismissal of a
corrupt, increasingly repressive and crisis-prone Sharif administration,
there are reasons to be sceptical. There are no quick fixes unless the
country overhauls its archaic system and policies. Equally, these squabbles
are, to a great extent, intra-elite problems whose common interest in
maintaining the system is quite obvious. Sharif=92s second administration,
despite a massive mandate, suffered from an unrelenting assault on
institutions including judiciary, media, presidency and military command.
His accountability campaign smacked of partiality despite the fact that he
and his close associates topped the list of defaulters. His confused stance
on the Kargil issue displayed opportunism rather than any well-thought-out
policy perspective causing Pakistan a major humiliation and global
isolation though he, indirectly and not totally unjustifiably, tried to
shift the responsibility to the army leaders. His quick extension of
General Pervez Musharraf as the chairman of joint committee and then the
ridiculous yet dangerous moves to sideline him turned out to be the last
straw. Retrospectively, Sharif looks like an irresponsible and unstable
politician totally devoid of any calibre who, despite being the most
powerful prime minister in Pakistan's history, turned out to be a childish
figure amassing all the toys only to crush them with a hammer. Rather than
resolving the big four K's confronting Pakistan (Kashmir, Kabul, Karachi,
Kalashnikov) he added another one in the shape of Kargil fiasco.
Concurrently and ludicurously he strengthened the existing C's
centralisation, corruption, control, chaos, conflicts and cronyism. He was
not a threat to the system at all.

Having said that the ideal scenario for Pakistan would have been to bring
about an in-house change from within the parliament with further persuasion
for vital reformative changes. The suspension of the constitution, keeping
elected assemblies in a state of limbo, imposition of emergency and
assumption of parallel executive authority, despite all the good
intentions, not only add to the current confusion, they pull the rug from
under an elected, democratic system. However inefficient this elected
framework may be, still its unilateral dismissal makes a mockery of the
concept of popular sovereignty. The non-mandated interim regimes are a
stop-gap and care-taking arrangement since no government can carry out
major responsibilities without legitimate authority. The judicial
legitimacy sought through the Supreme Court or from past traditions of
similar takeovers is not at all a substitute for duly elected institutions.
Besides constitutional propriety, such temporary arrangements, as seen in
the past, simply compromise Pakistan=92s locus standi as a fully sovereign,
confident and vibrant nation.

There is no doubt that Pakistan was achieved through a political movement
rooted in constitutionalism. The country=92s political traditions and
institutions are understandably weak, not that the entire nation lacks in
well-meaning and competent elements but rather due to a rectifiable
systemic malaise and a continued fiddling of the democratic processes by
the statist institutions. Democracy, as we see in post-Soviet states and
elsewhere, requires patient and sustained efforts from all sides and this
human project suffers from extremist measures undertaken by so-called
=91strong=92 men. Pakistan=92s authoritarian leaders have not only sought pr=
ops
from non-democratic institutions but have even used Islam nefariously to
skirt the vital issue of legitimacy causing serious dissension in a big,
populous and extremely diverse country like Pakistan. It is only through a
democratic system with built-in accountability and mechanisms of peaceful
transfer of power besides a corresponding political economy prioritising
development that Pakistan can achieve its cherished Jinnahist ideals.
Pakistan=92s agony stems from its elitist nomenclature run by the same class
of bureaucrats, generals and politicians and given their chequered past one
has reason to be sceptical of any momentous and healthier changes coming
from the representatives of the same class whether they appear in one garb
or the other. Pakistan needs and deserves a breath of fresh air and that
has to come from within.

It is Pakistan, its nationhood, civic and democratic institutions which
have been the main casualty of the hide-and-seek game amongst its powerful
ruling elite. It will be just a few weeks more when the sad and predictable
realities of a centralist, outdated system will become apparent to ordinary
Pakistanis. Economic problems, especially following the sanctions, will
come back to haunt the innocent millions and a new crisis of legitimacy
will reactivate itself to further jolt public confidence. A vulnerable
country thoughtlessly made dependent on foreign loans and directives thanks
to its insecure and corrupt elite and unbalanced political economy with a
massive non-development sector will soon deromanticise the mystique of
obtaining accountability and distributive justice. Being part of the same
pervasive malaise and, given their predominant position in the polity both
as leaders and unchallengeable guides, the generals are institutionally and
ideologically not equipped to resolve the enduring problems of governance.
As the years pass by, it is becoming clearer that Pakistan is at the mercy
of the same class of elite and the rules of the game do not allow any
massive, long overdue reforms which may steer the country out of this
morass and change the vicious cycle with a virtuous one.

The military takeover of Pakistan characterised by a mixed administration
of technocrats and military brass with promises to hold election and
legally legitimated through the law of necessity is history repeating
itself. Even without any sympathy for Sharif one is reminded of the fact
that the country's political culture has been totally unable to build up a
mechanism for replacement rather than sheer displacement. The takeovers,
dismissals and interim arrangements are no bail-outs and a country
dependent on such ad hoc and inherently inimical arrangements must be only
intensifying its governability crisis.

The current coup led by General Musharraf, either owing to compulsion or
by intention, leaves very little hope for any radical departure from
similar coups in the past. However, there is still a possibility that the
military-led administration, by properly persuading the existing
legislators, may herald a new era of stability and reformism long overdue
in Pakistan. The disgust with the tested political leadership of Benazir
Bhutto and Nawaz Sharif and massive desire for accountability and good
governance may help them usher a short but substantial reformism
characterised by constitutional mechanisms, economic egalitarianism and
administrative decentralisation.

Whereas the demands for accountability are understandable they equally
exhibit a short-term element of vendetta since it may only zero in on
politicians absolving the bureaucrats and generals who, like their
political counterparts, are suspect. Just witch-hunting the politicians
will merely smack of opportunism and expediency unless the remit is wider
both in terms of timeframe and its scope. Corruption, inefficiency and lack
of accountability exist across the board in all the official cadres. While
politicians may be rent-seeking; the generals have lost several battles
ignominiously including the former East Pakistan, Siachin and so on and
have never been held accountable. They dented politico-constitutional
institutions brazenly for decades; grabbed prime properties; held the
entire nation to ransom with an undefined theocracy and are responsible for
tragedies like the Ojhri arms dump of 1988. It is always the politicians
who have been made the scapegoats for such disasters. Pakistan's military
leaders muzzled civil liberties; were hand in glove with the maulvis and
frequently left the poor innocent citizens to the wolves. It was always the
ordinary, poor and helpless Pakistanis who were being lashed in the 1980s
whereas the powerful elements got away with murders, drug trafficking and
other serious crimes. Not one of them, especially from within the armed
forces, was ever taken to task for the crimes and dire tragedies that this
poor nation had to bear. On the contrary, many of them, with their huge
pensions and salaries, live easy churning out memoirs of non-existent
victories.

Theoretically as well as technically, state (hereby meaning the
government) and nationhood are intricately linked with the sovereignty
rooted in the latter. The state is essentially meant to represent and guard
the interests of the society in an equitable manner. If, on the contrary,
state and her components like the bureaucracy and politicians are simply
motivated by their own partisan interests then the institutions will decay,
corruption will become the order of the day without any redress and
nationhood will simply evaporate to give way to personalist and sectional
interests. The truly democratic regimes, despite their slowness and other
problems, are the best in their performance because they balance statist
unilateralism with societal prerogatives; protect civil liberties; promote
politics of dissent and through negotiations neutralise run-away forces
from within the body politic. In recent years, scholars have more vocally
begun to prioritise civil societies over statist institutions so as to
lessen centralist and monopolist tendencies, and also to broaden public
participation in various politico-economic processes. That is why the idea
of civil society is linked with societal pre-eminence and even the
privatisation of the economy is occasionally envisioned to deemphasise
statist inertia and centralism.

In most cases around the world, states emerged following the birth of the
nations themselves, with the latter delivering the statehood. In the cases
of post-colonial states, state formation has preceded nationhood. Thus, the
states, despite a generous usage of terms and emblems like nation state,
have either tried to perpetuate their own authority and interests or have
pushed very exclusionary processes towards achieving nationhood. That is
why, Pakistan, India, Nigeria, Algeria, Iraq and several other so-called
strong states are contrasted with the dilemma of weaker or even warring
nations. In Pakistan, the dilemma is quite obvious as, over the decades, it
is only the governmental institutions which have flourished in numbers and
facilities whereas the society has languished as a non-priority. If there
ever was a national project it has suffered from a lack of recognition of
plural realities. The societies in Pakistan have never been a part of the
nation-building process as the elite have never shown any national
characteristics nor any programmes to empower the subalterns.

In such a perspective, like the feudalist politicians, the military
commanders are essentially bureaucrats at the very hub of this state system
without any apparent interest or inherent attitude to empower society at
large. Like any other bureaucracy, they are supposed to be intrinsically
status quoist with a total distaste for anything radical or even reformist.
If Pakistani generals augur healthy, diverse and dynamic changes in the
larger interests of the populace they would be doing something which has
not been accomplished in this poor country since the demise of the Quaid.

Historically, Pakistan=92s entire set-up is essentially colonial by origin
as well as by choice. It is centralist, manipulative, averse to change and
challenge and derides political processes. At the most, it likes to
manipulate the political processes as mere appendages. The clear preference
is for administration instead of governance and the emphasis is on unity by
vetoing diversity. The ideal administrator is a file pusher (rather, file
piler now) who operates as the formidable political agent on the frontier
buying people off to use them against one another; dismisses people's
traditional norms, values and wisdom as anachronistic tribalism; and glows
in the glory of his power as a demigod. This politics of unquestionable mai
bap=92 and the final arbiter of powers, funds and justice all in one as was
the case with the deputy commissioner (called collector in other Indian
provinces), was embedded in a politics of patronage dished out to the local
intermediaries. The local landed elite were worth a few petty favours and
could be bought without any recourse to reason, morality or justice. The
protection of this feudatory class by the administration operated at the
expense of other vital institutions with no place or pity for ordinary
people lacking influence or affluence. No wonder, both the officialdom and
the feudals thrive in the Pakistani state structure. The army is
essentially a bureaucratic set-up and over the years it has used Pakistani
landed elite to its advantage by doling out favours. Both Generals Ayub and
Zia were quite adept in it. In the process they made the entire political
system a handmaid to this paternalism. The feudals may have Oxbridge
degrees but their interests are non-ideological, localist and extremely
reactionary. By giving them plots, development funds and other material
inducements General Zia was simply reinforcing the colonial tradition. The
new military set-up may be tempted to follow suit seeking its support from
these regional influentials.

We live in an age where pluralism is a reality. A truly democratic system
succeeds by taking pluralism aboard whereas its authoritarian counterpart
seeks shortcuts abhorring pluralist identities. The democratic ethos
achieves national harmony by respecting and co-opting pluralism while
non-representative regimes scoff at it and their coercive measures, in the
name of monoethnic nationalism, trigger violent reactions. The very
composition of Pakistan's state structure (including military and civil
bureaucracy) is massively upper Indus Valley-centred which, despite good
intentions, is not national per se and is not helpful in achieving a
national consensus. The top-brass military and bureaucracy do operate as a
class over and above ethno-sectarian diversities yet at the middle class
and lower levels it has generated a genuine grudge with serious portents.

The political system of every country seeks stability and sustenance from
its economic vigour and any distortions simply weaken the political mores
and national ethos. Pakistan's economy is heavily tilted towards defence
and loan servicing with very little for development. If the army wants to
genuinely improve the economic conditions in the country, then it needs
serious rethinking. The country's defence is a necessity but its present
levels, expenditures and strategies are untenable. Pakistan needs peace
from within and without. So far we have not won any war through any
military venture and instead have invited more catastrophes. It is time to
think in terms of neutralising our adversaries to ward off any aggression;
break our regional and global isolation and to reevaluate our policies
vis-a-vis India.

India may be pushing Pakistan ( like the US vis-a-vis the former Soviet
Union ) into a blind alley and indirectly we may be making the life of
Indian Muslims and other minorities in both the countries extremely
vulnerable to majoritarian fascism. We have genuine interests in Kashmir
and elsewhere but any balkanisation of India; fragmentation of Afghanistan,
troubles in Sinkiang or other central Asian republics will endanger
Pakistan. We must have a regional approach to create stability and
security. Our relationship with India merits a fresh perspective and a
continued single-factor pursuit is potentially dangerous for both the
countries. The Indians owe a greater responsibility to the region and it is
also in their interest to let the economies and political systems in the
neighbouring countries grow positively so that all these plural societies
benefit from peace and prosperity. A continuously weak Pakistan is not in
India's favour the way a turbulent India means serious bad omen for
Pakistan and various minorities in the region. Dialogues on various issues
must go on to achieve friendly and cordial relations. With peace abroad we
will strengthen peace within. An enduring peace may win Islamabad something
that the future generations will always cherish as it will release scarce
resources for education, health and rural development.

The systemic malaise needs bold efforts in empowering at the grass roots
by giving economic and political powers to the locally elected officials.
Pakistan urgently needs devolution in the true sense of the word. Several
new provinces (better called states) with more natural and acceptable
boundaries, characterised by elected and accountable institutions, will
provide a new leadership from below since just changing a few individuals
in Islamabad or provincial capitals is not going to stem the rot. We need
free and unfettered civil society as institutions like press, judiciary and
human rights groups are the soul of a nation and must be protected and
celebrated. They are the pillars of hope, progress and rationality and as
guardians of conscience have succeeded where others have failed. We need
our ulema to understand a true version of a humanist and tolerant religion
like Islam. Any outfit in the name of sectarian or extra-regional agendas
must be properly taken to task. Fundamentalism is the gravest threat to our
own humane values. The ordinary people are ready for a war on illiteracy
and violence and do not have time or energies to send their loved ones into
others=92 wars. The leaders need to strengthen the people's confidence in
themselves and in their country by giving them a clean, efficient and
secure system.

__________________________________________
SOUTH ASIA CITIZENS WEB DISPATCH is an informal, independent &
non-profit citizens wire service run by South Asia Citizens Web
(http://www.mnet.fr/aiindex) since1996.