[sacw] AA: Pakistan: Caught in a Taliban trap

[Harsh Kapoor]

=46YI
Harsh Kapoor
----------------------
The Asian Age
8 December 1999

Pakistan: Caught in a Taliban trap

By M.B. Naqvi

Karachi: Pakistan is impaled on an excruciatingly painful dilemma over
Afghanistan. On the one hand, the Americans are angry with the
Taliban-run Afghanistan, demanding that Osama bin Laden be handed over
to them. The Taliban are adamant and say they will not. The Americans
are also putting pressure on Pakistan to force the Taliban to comply
with Washington's demand. Pakistan has either tried and failed or is
unwilling to really try to ensure this. There are also other reasons why
Islamabad may not want to. But the Americans are determined to get at
bin Laden. What will they do in or about Afghanistan? More importantly,
Pakistan has its own worries vis-=E0-vis that country and these should
override others.
The Taliban's victory over its rivals in Afghanistan in 1995 and 1996
was supposed to have symbolised a glittering political and diplomatic
victory for Pakistan. It made Pakistan in effect an imperial power:
Islamabad's advice is perceived as having become decisive in that
mountainous country. No one, friend or foe, regards the Taliban as
anything but political proxies for this country, despite all their
fierce independence and distinctive cultural traditions. How can
Islamabad afford to be seen as forcing Taliban to do a thing so
un-Afghan as to surrender a guest who has sought refuge and protection
from them? Making over Osama bin Laden to the Americans will make
Taliban leadership lose face and credibility. That entails fearsome
consequences for them in the still on-going civil war with the Northern
Alliance. Islamabad can only be well aware of that.
But the Western opinion is a factor. The Taliban are hated and feared.
Up to a point, even the friends of the Taliban in Pakistan are
embarrassed by their rigidity, intolerance and their harsh policies and
practices vis-=E0-vis the minorities, women and opponents. Their disregard
of human rights is so shocking that not many in the West or even the
developing countries are prepared to accept their legitimacy. This
essentially Western view finds a resonance among large sections of
Pakistanis - except among the religious far right. Support for a
Talibanised Afghanistan is a divisive issue in Pakistan politics. Only a
certain kind of begotted Islamists approve of them. Others try to forget
the Taliban and their works.
How far should Pakistan go in support of the Taliban regime is no longer
the question. The issue now is what Pakistan should do about or in
Afghanistan. Where the Americans are concerned, they are mainly
interested in bin Laden and, while deprecating the Taliban and their
ways, they make no specific demand on them in pursuance of their faith
in human rights and democracy. This is remarkable and will surely inform
Islamabad's decision-making. If a modus vivendi can be found for bin
Laden to leave Afghanistan, the Americans will be off the backs of
General Pervez Musharraf and Mulla Omar.
Some, including the foreign office officials, might see this as a way
out of the crisis. But that will do nothing for the Pakistanis who are
not thrilled by the fact that this country - itself in grave economic
trouble and political turmoil - has a satellite (in an even more
pitiable condition), not to say the abhorrence they feel for the ways of
the Taliban. They find the whole situation odd and unsustainable.
But it is all very well for liberals to make sarcastic remarks about
Pakistan gaining a decisive hold on Afghanistan which once constituted a
buffer zone between rival imperial systems and which had occasioned
repeated defeats of two superpowers of the time. The Pakistani
establishment is understandably proud of this trophy of a decade-long
war - much of it arguably masterminded by itself. The claim, however, is
only informally made about the grand design for winning over
Afghanistan.
It goes back to at least
Z.A. Bhutto days when by 1975 all the Seven Sisters of Pesha-war had
sent their leaders or other representatives; Engineer Gulbadin Hekmatyar
based himself in Peshawar in that year.
It claims that it convinced the Americans to get militarily involved in
Afghanistan after April 1978 Saur Revolution, though the latter took
their
time and came in strongly only after the arrival of Russian troops. It
is only fair to mention that Americans only smile knowingly.
However that may be, at this point in time the support for Taliban-run
Afghanistan - and the implied commitment to sustain the Taliban in
government through thick and thin of its unending civil war, including
keeping the Afghan population supplied with foodstuffs, fuel and vital
consumer goods - constitutes a bigger dilemma for liberal Pakistanis.
The latter do not think Pakistan has to perform a mission in Afghanistan
that can be a variant of White man's burden. The benefits of this policy
are actually questionable. Superficially, its position in Afghanistan
would seem to confer many advantages on Pakistan.
But what concrete gains can a nearly insolvent Pakistan derive from
being in the position it is? True, Afghanistan is a gateway to Central
Asia's oil and gas and its big market. But can Pakistan's crony
capitalists exploit any of the myriad opportunities? The very idea is
ridiculous. Pakistan's economy is hard put to it to keep the Afghans
supplied through this winter and is trying hard to obtain $280 million
loan installment from the IMF.
The cost of this so-called victory, apart from heroin and gun culture,
has been tremendous. Pakistan stands alone and friendless. Even China,
which had befriended Pakistan one-sidedly for its own reasons and gave
it so much aid and support, is unhappy with its Afghan policy. Iran has
been alienated. Russia is leading all the Muslim republics of Central
Asia politically and diplomatically against Pakistan. Russia and China
are working towards a partnership and hope to become a new axis for
other Asian states to adhere to. Maybe, they will succeed in recruiting
India, if somehow the Indo-American partnership does not work out. Where
is Pakistan?
But in simpler words, if the Taliban remain the rulers of Afghanistan,
that will continue to keep Pakistan the odd man out in the eyes of
modernists and liberals everywhere. That alone is a telling argument
against persisting with accustomed line of least resistance: go on
protecting the supposedly priceless advantage in Afghanistan. It is
emotionally so addictive as to be a complete substitute for the painful
process of questioning your own premises and conclusions. And yet it is
necessary to analyse and examine the bases of one's past positions,
especially when past expectations have not been fulfilled. The
proposition being made here is that the assumed benefits of the Afghan
"victory" are illusory. What is more, in any national cost-benefit
analysis, it is obviously more expensive and dangerous than beneficial.
One mentioned dangers emanating from the Taliban rule in Afghanistan; it
is necessary to specify. The Taliban have already divided and brutalised
the political life of that country. It stands polarised between what are
called Islamic fundamentalists - the soulmates of the Taliban, not to
say the Pakistani Taliban themselves - and the Muslim liberal modernists
and democrats. The Islamic extremists have, thanks to successive
governments' indulgence, armed themselves. They have declared their
intention to make revolution - to capture power through brute force.
These anti-democrats constitute a serious and credible threat to the
people of Pakistan's fundamental right to govern themselves and choose
their direction through the vote. That is the starting point of a p
ossible Talibanisation of Pakistan.
The head of one extremist Islamic militia or other with the use of his
guns and chance, may try to seize power - that is the logic of such
parties' politics. But the very process carries the seeds of conflict
similar to what has happened in Afghanistan. That too is the logic of
such politics because most religiously-oriented militias are frequently
defined by denominational distinctions that actually prevent compromise
in the political sphere. Also, the multiplicity of religious parties and
militias also puts a premium on their rivalry necessarily conducted
through extremist stances, slogans and methods. Rights of ordinary
citizens are going to be certainly increasingly in danger. But the most
serious threat comes from the rivalry amongst the multiplicity of re
ligious militias which is another manifestation of Talibanisation of
Pakistan. Is this not an argument against Pakistan's current policy of
Afghanistan?
What can, then, Pakistan do? Logically, it should cut its losses and
wash its hands of the whole sorry business in Afghanistan. But in real
life such about-turns are not made suddenly. Moreover, Pakistanis,
through myriad links of history and ethnicity, have to acknowledge that
they owe something to the long-suffering people of Afghanistan. In
reality, following Russian withdrawal from Afghanistan in 1989, Pakistan
has played a role in increasing the Afghans' sufferings by being
partisan and thus keeping alive the flames of civil war in that country.
Pakistan owes it to the Afghans to do something for reducing their
suffering. Irrespective of substantive questions of politics, Pakistan
must enable the common Afghan to get day-to-day foodstuffs, fuel, and
vital consumer goods through this winter at affordable prices, as has
been the custom.
Pakistan has no option but to wind down its advantageous position in
Afghanistan by replacing it with the quest for a democratic resolution
of the Afghan crisis created and sustained by the clashing ambitions of
so many warlords, most of them constantly mouthing Islamic slogans while
promoting their own power and influence. No ad-hoc addition of a
minister or two from a rival party will now bring peace; things have
gone too far and too much warfare has taken place among parties
championing conflicting religious interpretations. Nine years is a long
time. Afghan religious parties have never been able to produce an agreed
Islamic code or a transitional Islamic government. Nor can they ever.
Besides, Taliban say they are a substantive, indeed final and definitive
Islamic government - the embodiment of the Nizam-i-Islam. Obviously, not
everyone in Afghanistan or Pakistan shares this view.
The sad fact is that few among the so many Afghan religious parties are
likely to accept the legitimacy of the present Kabul government's claim
to speak for all Afghan Muslims now or later. Sheer physical control
over large parts of the country might strengthen the claim of the
Taliban. But the additional claims of its being the true - and only -
Islamic government runs counter to the concept of a broad-based
power-sharing arrangement is what Afghanistan needs. As far as can be
seen, Afghan civil war is likely to continue. Poor and largely
unlettered Afghans are sure to go on suffering in and outside the
control of Taliban.
Pakistanis owe it to themselves to remind the world that common Afghans
are all human beings. They too have or should have rights - all the
human rights. A fair and democratic solution of the Afghanistan problem
can only be found through the time-tested democratic methods of asking
the Afghans whom do they trust. That government will be truly Islamic.
Treat all Afghans equally. Let all Afghans vote. That will produce a
really acceptable assembly. That will also be the Loya Jirga. It can
rule as well as produce a Constitution. If the UN, the US and the West
have any regard for the Afghans' human rights, they should help resolve
the problem of Afghanistan through a democratic methodology. That will
work and peace will return and endure. That is the policy Pakistan
should follow. All else are siren songs, maybe in the service of someone
else.
By arrangement with Dawn