[sacw] sacw dispatch (22 Nov.99)

[Harsh Kapoor]

South Asia Citizens Web Dispatch
22 November 1999

[This issue of the SACW dispatch is dedicated to the memory of Begum Sufia
Kamal the famous poet and relentless campaigner for women's human rights,
democracy and secularism in Bangladesh. Begum Kamal died on saturday the
20th Nov.99]

--------------------------------------------
#1. The Bomb & The 'Sangh' [Hindu Right in India]
#2. Curse of Fatwas on Rural Women of Bangladesh
#3. NGO activists letter to World Bank
--------------------------------------------

#1.
The Hindustan Times
21 November 1999
Sunday Supplement

THE BOMB & THE BROTHERHOOD

[South Asia on A Short Fuse:
Nuclear Politics and the Future of Global Disarmament
New Delhi: Oxford University Press | 1999, 354 pp.]

In a well-argued new book that provides the cultural-political context of
Pokharan II which the media missed in its rush to report the event, PRAFUL
BIDWAI and ACHIN VANAIK discuss how the Bomb fit into the Sangh Parivar's
civilisational perspective. EXCLUSIVE EXTRACTS

There are both fundamental reasons, and more proximate causes, for India's
going nuclear when it did. To understand the foundational factor it is
necessary to recognise that for at least fifteen years there has been an
ongoing battle for the "soul of India nationalism." One side has been
trying with ruthless determination, belligerence, and deceit to impose its
version of what this must mean, both internally and externally. It has
advanced its cause considerably, winning major support within the Indian
elite and the so-called middle classes. In a context where this elite's
sense of nationalism is frustrated, tension-filled, and insecure, the
Sangh's message of an aggressive, belligerent, and
essentialist-exclusivist nationalism, of "blaming the others" (be they
Muslims, China, Western hypocrisy, or whatever) has found powerful
resonance. The very fact that the RSS was clearly privy to knowledge of
these blasts while the BJP's coalition partners in government were not,
should indicate not only how deeply authoritarian and contemptuous of
democracy the Sangh Combine is, but how determined it is to carry out a
total transformation of Indian society towards the establishment of a
Hindu rashtra.

The Sangh meant what it said (deliberately contradictory signals and all)
on Ayodhya and it meant what it said on the Bomb. The BJP (or its earlier
incarnations), it should be remembered, is the only political party which
officially said it wanted India to be a nuclear weapons power. It has been
saying this consistently since 1951, well before there was any issue of
the Pakistan and chinese bombs! To be sure, previous Congress and UF
governments in the '90s speculated about the possibility of testing, but
eventually resiled from taking such a decision at least in part because it
would (in contrast to the BJP) have been such a sharp break from their own
declared party positions without their making any public or even private
preparation for such a dramatic turnaround. The fact that this became a
serious possibility only in the last few years itself reflects precisely
the point we are seeking to make about the change in the elite's
nationalist self-perceptions and how this process of change is linked to
what has been happening to India internally ever since the rise of
Hindutva!

It cannot, of course, be the aim here to provide a disquisition about the
transformation of Indian society over the past fifteen years or more. Only
a very brief survey will be attempted. From the early '70s onwards, in
most countries of the third world (partially excepting East and South-East
Asia, whose plunge into economic crisis is of more recent '90s vintage)
there has been a deepening crisis of capitalist developmentalism; a
failure of the post-Independence promise. In most countries it has been a
many-sided failure of growing socio-economic inadequacy, serious
political-democratic limitations and weaknesses, ideological disarray and
confusion. One consequence has been the dramatic rise of culturally
exclusivist political movements, currents, forces, and parties everywhere
in the third world. These have invariably been pivoted on issues of
ethnicity, religion, and nation, either singly or in some combination.
When the latter, the nation has had the capacity to subsume the other two
themes in a way that cannot be reciprocated on their part. Thus, an
exclusivist (often viciously so) form of nationalism has emerged and
gathered strength in many countries=8A.

India has not escaped this trend. The specific form taken by its crisis of
capitalist developmentalism has been the collapse of what was called the
Nehruvian Model or Consensus, itself the legacy of the National Movement
for independence before 1947. This had four central components, all of
which have come under assault: socialism (a Fabian-influenced, social
democratic nation of welfarism and social justice within the framework of
a capitalist economy), democracy, secularism, and non-alignment. Whatever
the deficiencies in the particular understandings and elaborations of
these four basic principles, they represented for twenty-five years after
1947, a relatively humane notion of Indian development internally and of
its behaviour and ambitions externally. what is now under attack is not
the failure of these principles to be realised or institutionalised
effectively, but the very principles themselves.

=46or decades, the incredible plurality and diversity of Indian society, it=
s
enormous cross-cutting of communities of all kinds, its great social
disparities between richer and poorer, literate and illiterate, meant that
its integrating form of nationalism was a centrist, secular-populist one
with progressivist pretensions to securing greater prosperity, and social
justice for the majority, namely those oppressed and exploited in one way
or other. The failure to make enough such progress, symbolised by the
political failure and historical decline of the Congress, coupled with the
dramatic increase in social polarisation between the well-off and the
rest, the greater hedonism and arrogant insularity of an elite, which in
numbers is very large (10 per cent of 950 million) and misleadingly calls
itself a middle-class, has created both a political-ideological vacuum and
a shift in the character of the elite's nationalist inclinations. It is
into this vacuum that the forces of Hindu communalism and nationalism,
relatively marginal throughout the National Movement and for decades after
Independence, have stepped in with alarming consequences. The basis for an
explicitly right-wing party of mass proportions now exists, and has been
taken advantage of, in a way decisively different from the political past
of the country.

It is not the case that what the Sangh Combine has to say is new. Far from
it. It has been saying the same thing for decades, but before the '80s it
was never seriously heard even by the elite. What is new is the much
greater elite receptivity to an old message because it at least promises a
way out of the current morass. The promise is illusory and the way
disastrous for the preservation of democracy and decency in the country.
It is, however, a coherent perspective of sorts in a context where the
opposing forces and ideologies are in some disarray. The central motif of
this Hindutva ideology is the idea of a 'strong India'. To become strong,
India must be united culturally and politically. This in turn requires
recognition and acceptance of its cultural foundations, which are
supposedly unambiguously Hindu, and a complete transformation of society.
The construction of this new social anatomy is to be carried out on the
basis of the existing skeleton, established by the RSS's three million-odd
dedicated activists, its 50,000-plus shakhas, and their associated
structures of operations. The practices of the government and state
apparatuses must also express a new determination and 'virility', for
India can only secure in proper civilisational role as a major world power
if it follows the prescription of the Sangh. The classic statement of
Hindutva from virtually the birth of the RSS in 1925 has been 'Unite
Hindus and Militarise Hinduism'.

No one should underestimate the extent to which the Sangh Combine has
extended its influence, especially among the elite and the 'middle
classes' of cities and towns. In three areas, the centre of gravity of
Indian politics has swung sharply to the right over the last decade.
Regarding the economy, a right-wing neo-liberalism holds sway. Regarding
secularism and democracy, both have been reinterpreted to mean something
other than what they should mean or once meant. Therefore, whereas once
secularism at least meant a wide public commitment to the maintenance of a
non-denominationalist state independent of religious affiliations, it has
now come to mean in many more eyes, a religiously tolerant state where the
false self-image of Hinduism as uniquely tolerant becomes the implicit
justification for having a Hindu state as the correct or best embodiment
of 'true' secularism. Democracy has come to be seen as majoritarianism
within which the 'majority' who are Hindus should have their voices and
interests preferred.

=46inally, in the domain of world politics, with the collapse of the Cold
War and the growing irrelevance of old-styled non-alignment, India must
ruthlessly pursue its global ambitions to become a Great Power, breaking
away from a past marred by a namby-pamby third worldism and excessive
moral posturing especially on the nuclear issue. It should come as no
surprise that among the great admirers of Samuel Huntington's thesis of
the 'clash of civilisations' (where civilisations are understood as
cultural-religious entities of a sort) are a number of top leaders of the
Sangh Combine. For them the identification of a supposedly unified
'Islamic civilisation' is vital not only as a counterpoint for the
purposes of identifying a unified 'Hindu community' in opposition to Islam
and Muslims, but also to promote a perspective that might be attractive to
Western right-wings - of a possible civilisational alliance between a
strong Hindu world with a Christian one against Islam certainly, and the
Sinic world possibly.

On the nuclear front specifically, this is tantamount to suggesting to the
US that it see merit in a potential Indian nuclear ally against its other
civilisational rivals. That the Indian Prime Minister, Atal Behari
Vajpayee, should therefore send feelers of this kind need not occasion
surprise to anyone familiar with the Sangh's fundamental ideology. Thus,
Vajpayee not only sent a letter to President Bill Clinton immediately
after the May tests hinting at such a China-directed alliance, but again
sent a feeler in his speech to the Asia Society in New York during his
Autumn 1998 UN visit. In an astonishing display of outrageously grandiose
ambition, he declared, in effect, that not only were the US and India
'natural allies', but that the cornerstone of a new and better 21st
century would be this alliance.

At this point, to sum up the basic argument: it was not changes in the
"external security environment" or even changes in threat perceptions that
was the principal cause of India's decision to go nuclear. It was changes
in elite self-perceptions - and the fact that the Sangh was in power,
albeit in a coalition government. Self-perceptions, unlike threat
perceptions, are far more susceptible to alternation as a result of
significant changes in domestic politics and dominant ideologies. Elite
frustrations have risen in tandem with external ambitions and also been
fed by the lack of adequate fulfilment of these aspirations. Things have
not turned out the way this elite expected or hoped. If at the time of
independence there was a self-confidence that India would in time
'naturally' take its place at the high table of the great nations or,
obviously enough, become a great Asian power, this has clearly not
happened. India's own search for regional eminence has been so uneven and
the outcome so uncertain that this, too, has left its mark on the
frustrated ambitions of this more callous and self-serving elite. If the
1987 India-Sri Lanka Accord was the high water mark of India's
post-Independence foreign policy ambitions, its collapse the following
year revealed how difficult it was to realise these aspirations in a world
becoming ever more complex.
---------------------

#2.

The Daily Star
22 November 1999
=46eatures

CURSE OF FATWA AND PLIGHT OF RURAL WOMEN
By Mansoor Mamoon

IN a disadvantaged and backward society or family the male members play
the role of rulers and oppressors while women remain ruled, dominated
and repressed. Through religious injunctions and social prejudices
arrangements have been made in a calculated manner to continue this
repression, subjugation and exploitation of women." - Abdul Gaffar
Chowdhury.

=46atwa, an Arabic word, etymologically denotes decree or judgement
according to Islamic Shariah. In Bangladesh it had its origin since the
advent of Muslim Rule in the then Bengal in early thirteenth century.
But with the passage of time it has become a misnomer and a dreaded word
for the rural women in Bangladesh professing the religion of Islam. The
half-educated rustic Mulllah's with virtually no knowledge of Islamic
jurisprudence, interpret the Quaranic injunctions and Sunnah in their
own free-wheeling way to repress and subjugate the women taking
advantage of their illiteracy, lack of awareness and socially backward
position in a predominantly male-dominated society as well as taking
advantage of the religious sentiment of the simple rural-folk.

Village based Mullahs, who are mostly Imams of local mosques and clerics
teaching in rural Maktabs and Madrashas (Islamic religious institutions)
are the zealous advocates of Fatwas. Their cohorts are rural influential
groups, the landed peasantry known as Jotdars and the local musclemen.
In the Fatwa based Shalish (arbitration) women have no representation
and it is usually an all-male affair.

=46atwas are pronounced on adultery, rape, divorce etc and the verdict
invariably goes against women. The punishment meted out is lashing,
whipping, stoning and or fine. There are instances of a number of women
succumbing to lashing and stoning. Apart from social boycott. Those who
survive the ordeal had to live with the social stigma for the rest of
their lives. Many women commit suicide out of shame and discriminatory
treatment.

The case of Nurjahan of Chattakchara in Moulavibazar district, whose
marriage was arbitrarily declared annulled and awarded 101 lashes by a
local Mullah for what was described as illicit relations with her
husband after the pronouncement of the world talak (divorce) created a
stir all over the country. Nurjahan subsequently committed suicide.

In 1998 in Manikganj, a couple also committed suicide when their
marriage was declared illegal by a Fatwa court and both the wife and
husband were awarded lashing and fine in public.

Similar cases of whipping and stoning including burning by Fatwa were
also reported from Madhukhali in Faridpur District, at Kaliganj in
Satkhira, Jakiganj in Sylhet District in 1999. In the month of September
1999 there were reports of at least four Fatwa related deaths. The
argument put forward by the half-educated Mullahs behind stoning and
lashing is that the women in question are to be purified by this method.
Islam, however, does not allow that women should be treated unfairly.
Quranic injunction is that they should be treated at par with the male
members of the society

Interestingly enough, the eviction of prostitutes of Kandupatti in Dhaka
city on May 12, 1997 and the demolition of the brothels of Nimtali and
Taanbazar in Narayanganj district in 1999 were allegedly carried out
with the direct complicity of the so-called local religious
personalities, political leaders and the vested interest groups of
greedy land-grabbers. According to justice K M Sobhan, a former judge of
the Supreme Court of Bangladesh, the eviction of the prostitutes without
their proper rehabilitation was a flagrant violation of basic human
rights and misinterpretation of the constitutional provision regarding
prostitution.

Bangladesh is not governed by Sharia Law. Fatwa has been strictly
prohibited. The National Women's Policy enunciated by the present
government on March 8, 1997 clearly stipulates that any attempt or step
which is contrary to the fundamental rights of women and the law
prevalent in the country through the misinterpretation of injunctions of
any religion at local or national level will be strictly dealt with. But
despite the avowed holistic approaches of the government and prohibition
by law of the land, the practice of Fatwa still continues unabated and
cold not be done away with. The vice of Fatwa and the arrogance of the
fundamentalist religious zealot remains a stumbling block to the
emancipation and empowerment of rural women. The Fatwa practicing Mullas
even prevent the women from going out to eke out their existence or
working for the NGOs. The Mullahs take advantage of the religious
sentiments of the mass people as they invoke the injunctions of the
Quran and the Sunnah albeit in a distorted way to satiate their
gender-biased evil design.

As Bangladesh approaches the new millennium the practice of Fatwa by the
rural Mullahs should be strictly prohibited and the women in general
should be ensured their rightful place in the society in line with
developments in other countries. Creating necessary awareness through
target-oriented mass education with a clear vent for the women living in
rural areas is considered one of the steps in the right direction.

The Writer, a SAARC Gold Medalist, is a former Research Scholar of the
Institute of South-east Asian Studies, Singapore and the Commonwealth
=46oundation for Broadcasting Development

----------------------
#3.

November 17, 1999

Maninder Gill
Resettlement Thematic Group
World Bank
1818 H Street, NW
Washington, DC 20433

=46ax 202 522 3247
resettlementhelpdesk@w...

RE: Draft OP/BP 4.12: Involuntary Resettlement

Dear Mr Gill

We appreciate the opportunity to comment on the proposed "conversion" of
the World Bank's Involuntary Resettlement policy. Like many NGOs and
people's movement around the world we are extremely disturbed by the
large-scale abuses of economic and civil rights condoned and indeed
encouraged by the World Bank under the rubric of Involuntary Resettlement.
This policy conversion provides the Bank an opportunity to establish a
framework for providing reparations to those who are still suffering the
consequences of Bank-financed evictions, and to develop a policy which
ensures that the Bank's disastrous record of the past in this area is not
repeated.

Unfortunately, Draft OP/BP 4.12 shows that this opportunity is being
wasted. The adoption of this Draft would likely ensure that the impacts of
Bank-financed evictions in the future would be no better than those of the
past. As in the past, the only people certain to be better off due to
Bank-funded involuntary resettlement under the new policy as drafted will
be resettlement consultants.

The overarching weakness with OP/BP 4.12 is that it is a policy on
Involuntary Resettlement. The Bank certainly needs to have a Resettlement
policy, but should not have one on Involuntary Resettlement. Footnote no. 9
defines "involuntary" as "without the displaced person's informed consent
or power of choice or choice is being exercised in the absence of
reasonable alternative options". OP/BP 4.12 therefore condones and
encourages forced eviction as a part of the Bank's business. The UN
Commission on Human Rights states that "forced evictions are a gross
violation of human rights" (UNCHR Sub-Commission on Prevention of
Discrimination and Protection of Minorities, Resolution 1993/41). It is
hard to imagine any other area where the World Bank has a policy on how
best to carry out gross human rights abuses.

If the Bank is in any way serious about seeking to minimize the trauma of
displacement it must do everything it can to ensure that no people are
resettled without their freely given, prior and informed consent.
Bank-financed resettlement should be voluntary and based on negotiated
settlements with affected people to which project developers can be held
accountable. If forced resettlement continues to be normal practice for the
Bank, project-affected people and their allies will continue to mobilize
against Bank projects.

Important sectors of the dam industry now accept the principle of prior and
informed consent. The International Commission on Large Dams (ICOLD), for
example, states that "water resources development projects=8A have to be
planned, implemented and operated with the clear consent of the public
concerned" (ICOLD Position Paper on Dams and the Environment, May 1997).
Likewise dam-building utility Hydro-Quebec states that "local consent is
now a pre-condition for all future projects" (Submission from Hydro-Quebec
to the World Commission on Dams, August 1999).

If resettlement can be done in such a way as to ensure that people's
well-being is improved after project construction then there is no reason
to believe that people would not give their consent. Draft OP/BP 4.12 does
not require that people be better off after displacement, and is therefore
weaker than the position of the International Commission on Large Dams
which states that "For the population involved, resettlement must result in
a clear improvement of their living standards, because the people directly
affected by a project should always be the first to benefit" (ICOLD
Position Paper on Dams and the Environment, May 1997).

As has already been explained in previous comments on OP/BP 4.12 (e.g. by
Thayer Scudder, July 28, 1999), requiring only that people are enabled to
restore their pre-displacement livelihoods means in fact that the living
standards of the majority of displaced people will be worsened by the
project. It is hard to see how an institution with the stated aim of "A
World Free of Poverty" can adopt a policy which seeks to make poor people
even poorer.

The principle of free, prior and informed consent will require a number of
improvements in the way in which projects are planned and implemented.
Among the most important of these improvements will be:

-the provision of all relevant project information in a timely manner and
in a form and in languages intelligible to affected communities. This would
include information on: all expected costs and benefits; the assessment of
the range of technical and locational options to achieve project goals; the
rationale for the selection of the project option involving displacement;
and full details of communities and areas to be affected and the precise
nature of the impacts upon them.

-acceptance of the right of communities to say no to displacement free of
the risk of any form of intimidation, punishment or sanction from the state
or developers.

-the involvement of community representatives in the process of proposing
and assessing alternative project options.

-negotiations between affected communities and developers (including
funders) which result in mutually agreed, formal and legally enforceable
settlements (these settlements should not require the surrender of any of
the affected people's rights).

-mutually accepted processes for the resolution of grievances arising after
a settlement has been reached.

-where necessary, project proponents may have to assist in building the
capacity of communities, community institutions and community
representatives to engage in negotiations on a free and informed basis.
Hydro-Quebec, for example, states in its submission to the WCD that
"Capacity-building is often a requirement for more effective participation.
By 'capacity-building' we mean the strengthening of indigenous peoples'
institutions and technical knowledge to ensure that both parties are at
level (sic)." The same would also apply to non-indigenous communities.
Capacity-building will likely work best by giving communities the time,
political space and, where appropriate, resources to organize themselves,
secure legal representation, form political alliances etc.

One important reason why past resettlement plans have invariably been
failures is that monitoring has been weak or non-existent. The provisions
in Draft OP/BP 4.12 are unlikely to change this situation. OP/BP 4.12
should insist that monitoring bodies (including "expert panels") include
meaningful representation from affected communities and that they have the
legal authority to halt project construction if delays or other problems
are experienced with resettlement.

Another vital issue which is missing from Draft OP/BP 4.12 is the need for
the Bank to develop guidelines for the provision of reparations to the
millions of people who were displaced by Bank-funded projects in the past
and are still suffering the consequences. The Bank has made some faltering
steps toward addressing this major issue, for example at Chixoy and Kariba
dams, and should now take the opportunity of the "conversion" of OP/BP 4.12
to develop policy guidelines on reparations. The principles of free, prior
and informed consent, negotiated settlements, participatory monitoring,
capacity building etc. should also be applied in reparations projects.
Before resettling any more people, the Bank should ensure that people
harmed by past Bank-funded resettlement have been as far as possible
compensated for their losses.

As you are aware, a major task of the Bank-sponsored World Commission on
Dams is to develop policy recommendations on resettlement and reparations.
The WCD's thematic review on resettlement should be finalized by early next
year and its final report and recommendations available by August 2000. As
the World Bank itself has been one of the sponsors of the WCD it is
illogical for the Bank to finalize a new policy on one of the major issues
under investigation by the WCD only months before the WCD reports. It is
also hard to see why there should be such a rush to complete this policy
conversion when the Bank's existing Involuntary Resettlement policy remains
in force, and when this conversion has already been ongoing for several
years. The Bank should therefore await finalization of this "conversion"
until it has been able to consider the recommendations of the WCD.

We look forward to hearing from you on how you will take the above comments
into account.
Yours sincerely

Patrick McCully
International Rivers Network

endorsed by

Sadi Baron
Movimento dos Atingidos por Barragens, Brazil

Shripad Dharmadhikary
Narmada Bachao Andolan, India

Shalmali Guttal
=46ocus on the Global South

Naeem Iqbal
Pakistan Network for Rivers, Dams and People

Chainarong Srettachau
Director, South East Asia River Network

Himanshu Thakker
South Asian Network on Dams, Rivers and People

Chotanagpur Adivasi Sewa Samiti, India

Prerana Resource Centre, Bihar, India
__________________________________________
SOUTH ASIA CITIZENS WEB DISPATCH is an informal, independent &
non-profit citizens wire service run by South Asia Citizens Web
(http://www.mnet.fr/aiindex) since1996.