[sacw] SACW -> From DAWN #1 (July 2 -5, 1999)

[Harsh Kapoor]

South Asia Citizens Web - Dispatch # 1 [Beat the Ban Service]
July 7, 1999

*********Beat the Ban Service !********
In response to the Government of India's ban on
the prestigious Pakistani newspaper DAWN's website
this is a first part in a regular series of dispatches being addressed to
Dawn readers in India. All recipients are requested to
share news from DAWN with others in India.
Lets beat the Ban !
:-)
*********************************************
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Excerpts from DAWN, Part 1 -July 2- July 5 1999
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Contents:
[1.] What is the political leadership up to?
[2.] Zero minus fifty-two
[3.] War clouds in the subcontinent
________________________

# 1.
DAWN
02 July 1999 Friday
Ayaz Amir Column

What is the political leadership up to?
By Ayaz Amir

OF the situation arising from the flare-up in northern Kashmir nothing
is more dismaying, nay mind-boggling, than the smug attitude of the
political leadership. While the army is in a state of near-war, for the
political leadership it is business as usual: cricket on Saturday
afternoons, politicking in Sindh, the unveiling of more gimmicks, like
the housing scheme, on the home front.
India has conducted itself far better in this emergency. Government,
opposition and the armed forces are one about removing the 'intrusion'
in the Kargil sector. There has been criticism over the intelligence
failure in detecting the freedom fighters; there are no differences over
the objective of flushing them out from their positions. Indian
diplomacy has been more effective and quicker off the mark. Indian
television does not insult the intelligence of its viewers the way PTV
does.
As for public opinion, it is aflame in India and all for teaching
Pakistan a lesson. In Pakistan by contrast there is apathy at the
popular level simply because the government, apart from the tripe on
PTV, has not taken the trouble to mobilize the people. Every Indian
politician worth his or her salt has visited Kashmir and gone near the
Line of Control. It took Nawaz Sharif over a month to make a similar
visit to forward locations on our side of the border. Farooq Leghari, to
his credit, has also been there. But which other politician of note?
It might have been thought that for an elected leader, heavy mandate and
all, this was the one supreme occasion to speak to the people, if only
to take them into confidence. What have we seen instead? Ghaus Ali Shah
is to be the saviour of Sindh, the Ehtesab Bureau is to investigate the
affairs of the cricket team (or so at least a bemused nation has been
informed), there is endless propaganda about the housing revolution
which is set to take the country by storm, after the news headlines on
PTV there is the same footage every evening which, to the strains of an
Iqbal song, tells us of the prime minister's abiding love for the poor.
This has been the political leadership's way of preparing the nation
mentally for the emergency it faces.
To be sure, PTV has been the one great instrument of governmental
direction. But, as always, so shallow and pathetic has been the drivel
from it that even standing its higher bosses against a wall is
inadequate punishment for their appalling ineffectiveness. The ISPR and
its spokesman, it must be conceded, have done a better job of putting
the national viewpoint across but then against collective disarray and
the rooted idiocy of a fossilized propaganda machine, what can a slim
institution do?
How convenient the labels 'freedom fighters' or 'Kashmiri Mujahideen'.
They enable us and the political leadership to believe that Kargil is a
distant affair and that since, in any case, we cannot afford to proclaim
our involvement, it is strategy of the highest order not to get too
emotional about this affair. Nawaz Sharif certainly seems cool and
collected about it. No let-up on the dazzling shots to the boundary at
the Bagh-I-Jinnah. No beads of sweat or marks of tension on a forehead
known to be receptive to the first signs of stress. Is Kargil indeed on
a different planet?
This is not to say there is no enthusiasm at home for the success of our
arms in Kashmir. Threatening India's life-line to Leh, Siachen and
Ladakh has been the dream of Pakistan's fighting commanders. If it has
finally happened there is bound to be excitement and even a heady
feeling induced by the predicament in which the Indian army has been
placed. But tragically for Pakistan this feeling is confined to two
pockets: the rank and file of the army, which think that a major
tactical victory has been won, and the Mujahideen groups which have been
involved in the Kashmir uprising since 1989.
This public aloofness is intriguing. Even during the disaster of 1971,
when retrieving the last shreds of national pride from the maelstrom of
humiliation had become a problem, there was greater popular backing for
the war effort. A disaster there was but the nation as a whole (minus
the people of East Pakistan of course) was in it together. This time -
when through no small expenditure of blood and resources a limited
military advantage of some strategic significance has been gained - the
nation is apathetic or it is keeping its enthusiasm well-concealed. Our
soldiers are on their own.
Who is to blame for this state of affairs? Did the political leadership
not know of the Kargil operation? Did it not give its approval to it?
While it is entirely conceivable, given the Caesars that we have, that
all the implications and ramifications of this operation may not have
fully struck the prime minister (or, for that matter, the military
command which appears to have confused tactics and grand strategy) whose
fault is that? Why should Pakistan's fighting men have to carry - as
much in 1999 as in 1971 and 1965 - the burden of leadership failure?
Since the policy was jointly approved, what accounts for the confusing
signals that are emanating from Islamabad? While fighting rages in the
north, peace overtures are being made which appear not to take into
account the successes gained on the battlefield. Former foreign
secretary Niaz Naik who went as Nawaz Sharif's emissary to India has
hinted at the possibility of a deal and said senior military officials
may meet soon to prepare a schedule for withdrawing the 'freedom
fighters' from the positions they occupy.
If this is indeed the case, what is Pakistan demanding in return? Will
India forswear bilateralism and agree to discussions on the future of
Kashmir involving the UN? If not, what will Pakistan get for the valour
of its soldiers? If it is seen that it does not get a great deal, that
an agreement for withdrawal is being brokered under American pressure,
how will our soldiers and officers react? Will they not have reason to
feel betrayed by their political and military leadership?
There is little point in saying at this stage that the Kargil operation
was flawed. That it was ill-conceived, with its political objectives not
clearly thought through, seems to be pretty clear. But then the
responsibility for this rests on the shoulders of the political and
military leadership. In any event, we ventured forth and along the way
precious lives have been lost. These sacrifices should not be in vain.
It is important therefore for Pakistan to salvage something from the
Kargil situation. A verbal concession on Kashmir if no more, an avowal
by India to discuss the problem more meaningfully than it has hitherto
done, is the minimum that Pakistan should demand of the international
community if the Kargil and Drass peaks have to be evacuated. Or else a
profound sense of disenchantment will take hold in the armed forces.
Not the least of the ironies of the Kargil venture is that going ahead
with it is as full of hazard as winding it down abruptly. If the first
course can invite a wider conflict, a sudden withdrawal will demoralize
the army, set back the Kashmiri freedom struggle by many years and raise
the sanctity of the Line of Control which is anathema for Pakistan
because it makes nonsense of its stand on the Kashmir dispute. And there
will be no repeating the Kargil venture because the Indian army
henceforth will be on its guard. In other words, this will have been a
glorious feat of arms with nothing to show for the valour of our
soldiers.
So Pakistan needs to keep its nerve if it is not to be panicked into a
bad agreement. This requires forceful and steady leadership. Herein lies
the rub for if we have not seen much of leadership during the last two
months, by what magic wand will we suddenly get it at this juncture?
_______________________
# 2.
DAWN
04 July 1999 Sunday
Cowasjee Column

Zero minus fifty-two
By Ardeshir Cowasjee

"WRITING early in 1957, the late Professor Keith Callard, in his
'Political Study of Pakistan,' concluded that 'if representative
government collapses, it will be because its legs are not strong enough
to sustain its own body .... Pakistan, by its constitution, is publicly
committed to the operation of democratic institutions. It is too early
to say whether those institutions are likely to mature'."
This is how Herbert Feldman opens the first book of his trilogy,
covering the politics of Pakistan - 'Revolution in Pakistan: 1958-1962'.
The second book is 'From Crisis to Crisis: Pakistan 1962-1969', and the
third, 'The End & the Beginning: Pakistan 1969-1971'.
Feldman lived with the times and based his narrative largely on evidence
collected as events occurred. He arrived in Karachi in 1947 with the
hordes from across the border. He was well connected, having married
Nishat, the daughter of Liaquat Hayat Khan, Sir Sikander's elder
brother, and was thus able to observe at close quarters the strange and
convoluted politics as practiced in this country. We read Feldman:
1962-1969: "At the beginning of August 1965 it became clear to the world
that the situation in Kashmir was no longer normal. Unusual military
activity was going on, including Indian operations in the Kargil area,
in Azad Kashmir. It appeared that India considered that the Srinagar-Leh
road, linking India to Ladakh, was threatened and had acted accordingly.
The Secretary-General of the United Nations addressed a request to both
countries to cease operations across the cease-fire line, a request
which met with a negligible response from both." ('From Crisis to
Crisis')
"His [Altaf Gauhar's] promotion in September 1963 ...... to be the civil
head of the Ministry of Information and Broadcasting placed him in close
connection with Ayub Khan ..... He became almost at once a member of the
small top-level group which advocated a 'forward' policy with respect to
Kashmir, and there is no doubt that he was a member of the intimate
coterie which vigorously pressed such a policy on Ayub Khan. The others,
including Zulfikar Ali Bhutto, and the late Lt General Akhtar Malik,
were not civil servants ...... At the time of hostilities between
Pakistan and India in September 1965, Altaf Gauhar became very prominent
in promoting and guiding a markedly aggressive war-time propaganda in
which pro-Peking sentiments received emphasis." ('From Crisis to Crisis'
Appendix 1).
1969-1971: "It is evident that Palit's suggestion was an unsuccessful
attempt to conceal the real explanation. So brief a period had been
imposed on Aurora because India was relying, no doubt by prior
arrangement, on the Soviet Union's veto in the Security Council. It was
plain that once hostilities began in earnest the issue would be raised
in the United Nations, and India intended that there should be no
interruption in the fighting until its purpose in East Pakistan had been
achieved. But while the Soviet Union could, by means of the veto, hold
the ring, it could not do so indefinitely, and the swift capture of
Dacca, even if not the final destruction of Niazi's army, was necessary.
The Soviet Union exercised its veto three times, thereby providing time
for General Aurora to encircle Dacca and force a surrender. It was
accomplished in twelve days and was no mean feat of arms. Had he not
succeeded, the political situation might well have become adverse for
India. Further, if Yahya Khan and his advisers had been relying on
China, or the United States, or the Security Council, they were cruelly
deceived." ('The End & the Beginning')
"Perhaps the most interesting event at sea was the appearance in the Bay
of Bengal of a task force sent by the American Seventh Fleet comprising
the aircraft carrier Enterprise, with nuclear-armed Phantoms, an
amphibious attack ship, a guided missile frigate, dock-landing ships,
and supply vessels. The United States government explained that the
presence of this force was to facilitate the evacuation of such American
citizens as remained in the newly declared state of Bangladesh, but
whether those citizens were present in such numbers as to require so
formidable a squadron, whether they desired to leave, and whether they
were in any real danger seems extremely doubtful. It is evident that the
American ships were sent to remind the Soviet Union, then occupying a
prominent position in the drama, that the United States was not
indifferent to events in this theatre of war and had not lost interest
in the sub-continent. As it happened, India declared a cease-fire and
the American force steamed without ostentation towards other waters."
(The End & the Beginning)
"It was learned that the United States had informed Pakistan that if
India continued the war on the western front, they would give all
material help and support, but that if India declared a cease-fire,
Pakistan would have to accept it. The Soviet Union is understood to have
informed India that, after taking Dacca, a cease-fire must be declared.
Since, as it appears to me, India had no other intention than to do
exactly this, the two super-powers, each according to its own logic,
made their respective contributions to crystallizing India 's purposes."
(The End & the Beginning)
Now we come to May 1999 when the Indians discovered the presence of a
few hundred well-armed, well-trained Mujahideen entrenched on the
Himalayan heights of the Drass-Kargil sector on their side of the LoC.
The Indian army, caught napping, was embarrassed and its government, as
weak and fragile as is ours, reacted as it did.
Let us believe our side of the story. We do not know who the
infiltrators are, we do not know who armed and trained them, we do not
know how they managed to scale the heights and occupy vantagepoints. We
know they are Kashmiri Mujahideen engaged in Jehad, local
freedom-fighters from Indian occupied Kashmir, continuing their fight to
deliver their brethren from Indian oppression and occupation. The
Indians are attacking them. We have nothing to do with them, yet in the
interests of peace, we would like a cease-fire and to talk to the
Indians via the back door, the side door, or the front door, and in the
interest of humanity at large we are seeking the help of the
international community to bring about an honourable way out of the
impasse. In the bargain, we would like back some of the territory of
Azad Kashmir and Jammu in the Siachen area lost to the Indians many
years ago. The Kashmir issue has to be globalized and to prevent the use
of nuclear weapons we expect the global powers to step in and ensure
that peace prevails, on our terms, in the region and the world at large.
Now, let us not believe the big wide world's side of the story. Credit
goes to the Pakistan army for its tactics and strategy and for the
accomplishment of a tactical manoeuvre which took over six months of
prior planning, reconnaissance, the high-altitude acclimatization and
intense training of the infiltrators, and the supply of special
equipment. Presumably, this operation was given the OK by the prime
minister despite reservations from certain quarters. He probably assured
the army that as soon as vantagepoints were secured our subtle diplomacy
would come into play. The world powers and our allies of the Ummah would
stand by us, and we would end up better than when we started.
Strife-torn Europe is tired and does not want another war on its hands.
America has just won a war without bringing home one single body bag. No
mean achievement. If a war can be stopped by merely tightening the
economic screws, the tightening should start. This would be the cheaper
option.
Now, the Ummah in Ouadadougou has not sneezed, the Chinese have not
coughed, America is enjoying the long 4th of July weekend, Europe is
busy watching Wimbledon, and Big Boris is ill and, having suffered the
Taliban in Afghanistan, does not want to look our way. Our emissaries
are running round the world like headless chickens whilst our men and
brothers are dying on the heights.
To those who hold that the Vale of Kashmir has to be a part of Pakistan,
despite the desire of the Kashmiris to be independent, and to those who
feel that we can achieve this end by sending in freedom fighters, we
say, this is an expensive exercise in futility. If we want the Vale we
will have to fight for it and we can only embark on a fight if there is
a reasonable chance of winning. To embark, we must be strong, powerful,
and equal in all respects to the adversary. This might happen after
fifty years, starting as of now, of sustained good governance. What is
fifty years in the life of a nation?
For the present everything possible must be done to get out of the mess,
claiming we have won and letting India do the same.
__________________
# 3.
DAWN
05 July 1999 Monday
Opinion

War clouds in the subcontinent
By Omar Kureishi

ONE thing is certain: those whipping up war hysteria will not be donning
uniforms and moving to the battle-fronts. They will remain ensconced in
their safe havens and send reluctant heroes to their death. Wars may be
hell but it is other people's hell.
NATO has won famous victory in Yugoslavia but neither President Clinton
nor Prime Minister Tony Blair nor indeed Milosevic will be changing
their residence and moving into a refugee camp, there to live with
thousands of displaced persons as terrified strangers, moving on in
convoys that lead to other refugee camps, journeys to nowhere.
The prospect of a war between Pakistan and India, unlikely though it can
never be ruled out because events can spiral out of control, is one that
will fill people on both sides with horror. It would be madness of the
first magnitude, not merely in terms of costly human lives and the
destruction but it would de-stabilise the entire region and no one can
foresee what forces would be unleashed.
That both countries have nuclear weapons is irrelevant, for their use
would leave only the dying and the dead and no one can seriously believe
that they would be considered as a military option. But even a
conventional war will leave both countries impoverished, that is, even
more impoverished than they already are. All the more reason that we do
not fall in a jingoistic trap.
The international community has so far expressed only a distant concern
and even the United Nations is unwilling to be an honest broker, a role
it has pursued with remarkable energy in East Timor, for example, at
best a local conflict with none of the ramifications of an as yet
unresolved future for Kashmir. Yet the United Nations seems unable or
unwilling to implement its own resolutions on a plebiscite to which both
Pakistan and India are committed and from which India has resiled,
citing a different set of reasons each time and now claiming that
Kashmir is "an integral part of India," sanctifying through force
majeure an unlawful occupation of a land against the wishes of its
people.
The United Nations went to war with Iraq over its invasion of Kuwait.
Desert Storm has the legal and moral backing of the United Nations as do
the sanctions imposed on Iraq which have caused untold misery. Yet it
seems strangely motionless on Kashmir. Only the innocent believe that
the world is governed by principles. When it comes to national
self-interests, there is little to differentiate between good and evil.
We can demonize a Saddam Hussain or a Milosevic but they are villains
only for the time being and if power positions change, our view of them
will also change. After all, yesterday's Afghan Mujahideen have become
today's terrorists in the perception of those who were once their
patrons. We should be under no illusions that the international
community will be guided by right and wrong.
It is not unusual to create an external diversion to overcome domestic
difficulties. But war is too heavy a price. India is due to have general
elections soon and it is apparent that electioneering has started. The
present Indian government is a caretaker one and, therefore, has no
mandate to indulge in adveturism. It is not for us to point this out to
the Indian people. It is for them to see the present hawkish posture for
what it is.
The BJP is playing its "Pakistan" card and the beating of war drums is a
transparently cynical ploy, if war hysteria can be called a ploy, to
project itself as the party that is the custodian of India's national
interests. The other parties including Sonia Gandhi's Congress, have no
intentions of being left behind. Thus the ante is being raised. No one
would like to be seen as less patriotic. One has only to watch Indian
television channels to get an idea of this war psychosis.
A more absurd example would be hard to find than for cricketers like
Kapil Dev calling for snapping of cricketing ties. This is playing to
the gallery in the cheapest sort of way. When public opinion is aflamed
and taken to the brink, the road back becomes that much more difficult.
The Indians must not reach a point of no return. Then matters may not be
in the control of the BJP and its prime minister.
There is no war hysteria in Pakistan and the Pakistani people are
viewing the events with concern but not with alarm. This does not mean
that they are indifferent to what is happening. If called upon they will
render every sacrifice. But they do not want to precipitate what will be
a no-win situation for both sides. Pakistan is prepared to talk and only
a dialogue is the way to disengagement.
Why is the offer of talks being spurned? Because the BJP feels that it
will hurt its chances in the forthcoming elections and Prime Minister
Atal Behari Vajpayee finds that he is riding a tiger. All the more
reason why he should encourage third party mediation. If he fears that
this will internationalise Kashmir, surely he must be aware that Kashmir
is already internationalised. Only semantic nitpicking and jugglery of
words holds up the Indian position. It has no basis in reality.
India like Pakistan owes its people something more than sabre-rattling.
It owes them a future free of want and deprivation and for at least half
the population of each country, owes them two square meals a day. Peace
does not just mean an absence of war. Peace means the chance for the
people of both countries to live less difficult lives. We do not want to
be trapped forever in grinding poverty. This is the time for
statesmanship.
The Lahore Declaration was a good start. It held out hope. It was a
beginning. It would be a shame if it was to be rendered null and void.
We cannot be seen to be forever making beginnings, to getting back to
square-one. We should be seen to be going forward. The Indian Prime
Minister should tell his people what the consequences of war will be and
then ask them whether they want war. I doubt that he would win the
elections; the enemy is not Pakistan but within. It is the poverty-line
and all the sorrows it brings.
__________________

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