[sacw] "Nation & civilisation" (The Hindu)
Harsh Kapoor
aiindex@mnet.fr
Tue, 6 Jul 1999 22:07:33 +0200
July 7, 1999
FYI
(South Asia Citizens Web)
============================
The Hindu
Wednesday, July 7, 1999
Op-Ed.
Nation and civilisation
By Gail Omvedt
``TO HOLD that distinctions of caste are really distinctions of race and
to treat different castes as though they were so many different races is
a gross perversion of the facts. What affinity is there between the
Brahman of the Punjab and the Brahman of Madras? What affinity is there
between the Untouchable of Bengal and the Untouchable of Madras? The
Brahman of the Punjab is racially the same stock as the Chamar of the
Panjab, and the Brahman of Madras is the same race as the Pariah of
Madras. Caste system does not demarcate racial division.''
With these words, in Annihilation of Caste Ambedkar in 1936 strongly
disavowed the ``Aryan theory'' of caste origins and identities. But his
argument pointed to another problem: what lay behind the Punjabi and
``Madrasi'' identities he so strongly asserted? The use of the term
``race'' is scientifically inaccurate - and even if it were possible to
locate some ``racial'' aspects of Punjabi-Tamil differences, what could
be said about Telugu-Tamil, Bengali-Oriya or numerous other major
groups?
The primary basis of the identities Ambedkar was pointing to is, of
course, language. Linguistic communities have constituted perhaps the
most important unit of action and thinking of most Indians beyond the
narrow confines of family, caste and village. From the 12th to 17th
centuries, partly expressed in bhakti movements and other cultural
forms, partly in economic linkages, more tenuously in political ones,
social communities based on Tamil-speakers, Telugu-speakers, Gujarati,
Marathi and so forth became consolidated. The rhythm and pace were
different in different parts but it is arguable that had colonial rule
not intervened, India might have developed nation-states within an
overall ``subcontinental'' identity similar to those of Europe.
This, of course, did not happen. European imperialism changed the
history of the world for both the coloniser and the colonised. Within
India, a new framework of action and identity developed: communication
based on English, intensified economic linkages and a pan-Indian
nationalist organising and struggles that confronted the pan-Indian Raj.
``India'' took on new force both as a weapon against imperialism and an
increasingly articulated social reality. Yet, even in the 19th and 20th
centuries, both Indian elites and representatives of the Dalit-Bahujan
subalterns wrote and acted as much in their linguistic communities,
speaking and organising as ``Marathas,'' ``Tamils'' or whatever, as in
the context of an overall ``Indian'' nation.
The assertion that such language-based communities have represented the
real ``national'' identities of India has perhaps been the major
contribution of the Dravidian movement. Discussion of the antiquity and
glory of the Tamil language and of a Tamil identity and culture, as
distinct from (and oppressed by) a north Indian-based, Sanskritised
``Hindu/Hindi'' tradition, began in the 19th century itself. But it was
during the 1930s that this got constructed as Tamil/Dravidian
nationalism.
>From the late 1930s also, communist conceptualisations of ``nation''
began to develop, marked by the writings of Stalin himself. ``Nations''
were seen as based on language and culture, not on race; as having the
right to self-determination. But just as the abstract right to
self-determination was never interpreted to mean support for the
independence of nationalities in the USSR or China, so it was also
played down in India. India was conceptualised as a ``multinational
country,'' but one in which the anti-imperialist struggle was central.
This provided much scope for communist work in terms of Marathi, Tamil,
Malayali or other nationalities, for supporting the linguistic
reorganisation of States and the linguistic-cultural rights of the
masses. But the communist movement as a whole, as Periyar and others
bitterly noted, was ready to (mis) apply its concept of nationalities to
support a ``Muslim Pakistan'' but not to support an independent Tamil
Nadu.
The basic problem with the usual Marxist and many later sociological
formulations is that they left no scope for conceptualising
social-cultural communities larger than the ``nationality.'' If Tamil
Nadu and Andhra Pradesh and Maharashtra were ``nationalities,'' then
what was India?
Concepts formed in the era of the nation-state could legitimise the
struggle of nationalities to claim an independent state, but they could
only conceive of the relations between states as ``international
relations.'' A ``multinational country'' was an extremely abstract, if
not empty, formulation. It has resulted in violent criticism by Hindutva
forces, accusing the Left of being imitation Western secularist who
never really understood the meaning of Indian existence, the glories of
a 5000- year-old culture. At the same time, ironically, the leftists,
from the Nehruvian socialists to the communists, remained vulnerable to
Hindutva ideology itself, accepting the basic themes that ``Hinduism''
was the majority religion of India - and hence the main cultural basis
for Indian identity - and that the core of Hinduism lay in the Vedas, in
Sanskrit and in the Aryan heritage.
The argument that beyond all the diversities in India, even those of
language communities, have lain common traditions, linguistic
similarities and widespread cultural linkages could never be adequately
answered in a framework that included only ``nations'' and ``nation-
states.''
Similarly, it is not the secular Left, but rather the tradition of the
Dalit-non-Brahman movements which could effectively challenge Hindutva
at the cultural level. And the powerful and community-based polemics of
Satyashodhak leaders like Phule or Self-Respecters like Periyar have
spoken not only of Tamil and Marathi realities but also of ancient, much
broader cultural- historical traditions; their movements have had
all-India ramifications and implications, if not an organisational
expression.
>From a near-21st century perspective, there is something unreal about
the ``nationality'' debates. It is clearly a historical fact that
powerfully articulated communities based on linguistic- cultural
identities have been a salient social reality in India.
The existence of a broader, encompassing ``India'' is also a reality; it
is not for nothing that soldiers fighting and dying to recapture the
snow-bound peaks in the far north evoke emotions everywhere. The
question is that of the best ways to conceptualise and analyse these
diverse identities, one regional and language-based and the other
pan-Indian.
The concepts of ``nationality,'' ``nation'' and ``nation-state'' have
arisen out of the political, economic and cultural developments
connected with industrialisation and Enlightenment, and are too
impoverished to capture the complexities of world culture today. Though
works like Samuel Huntington's Clash of Civilisations may be flawed, it
might be argued that the best concept to capture the reality of India is
not that of ``nation'' but that of ``civilisation.'' India has been a
civilisational entity of great power and age, like Europe encompassing
various languages and nationalities but retaining its uniqueness.
The development of such ``nationalities'' into independent nation-states
has been a historical fact only in some regions of the world at some
periods in history. The political structures appropriate to a 21st
century reality are, perhaps, still to emerge. A Tamil community, firmly
based in India but maintaining global linkages, providing firm support
to the Dravidian parties but never really pushing to the point of a
demand for independence, perhaps shows what Kashmir and ``kashmiriyat''
might have become without external interference.
(The writer is Visiting Professor, University of Pune.)
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