***SPAM*** SACW Feb 5-6, 2011 | Afghan women / Pakistan: expanding bigotry / India Counter Terror and Human Rights

[Harsh Kapoor]

South Asia Citizens Wire -  Dispatch No. 2706 - February 5-6, 2011
From: sacw.net

[1] Afghanistan: Fears over child recruitment, abuse by pro-government militias
   - Afghan women fear for the future (Homa Khaleeli)
   - The hasty exit strategy   (Aunohita Mojumdar)
[2]  Pakistan: Citizens Groups Letter to Authorities in Pakistan re the Salman Taseer Murder Case
     - The steady expansion of intolerance (Amina Jilani)
     - Editorial : Political bigotry (Daily Times)
[3] Pakistan - India [Frozen Dialogue] : Two years and still counting (Siddharth Varadarajan)
  - 'Indo-Pak nuke war may kill 12 mn people'
[4] India: India Must Book Narendra Modi  for role on Gujarat Riots:
  -   The Truth About The Godhra Special Investigation Team Report 
  -    SIT Probe Nails Gujarat CM on many counts: Compiled news reports 
  -    Gujarat Govt takes on Police office for blowing the whistle on them 
  -     The SIT report must lead to legal consequences - Else, it would end up as an exorcism ritual (Shiv Visvanathan)
[5] India: Human Rights
(i) Text of Supreme court ruling on membership of banned organizations
(ii) The “Anti-Nationals”: Arbitrary Detention and Torture of Terrorism Suspects in India (Human Rights Watch)
[5] Announcements:
   Faiz in Song and Translation - Faiz Centennial (12 February)
   Shadow Anthropology - A post-9/11 satire about Afghanistan, anthropology, and life during wartime by Rick Mitchell (14 February 2011)
---------

[1] Afghanistan:

IRIN Asia

AFGHANISTAN: FEARS OVER CHILD RECRUITMENT, ABUSE BY PRO-GOVERNMENT MILITIAS

Little has be done to stop the use of children by armed groups
KABUL, 20 January 2011 (IRIN) - Pro-government militias in parts of Afghanistan are believed to be recruiting underage boys and sometimes sexually abusing them in an environment of criminal impunity, local people and human rights organizations say.

In a bid to counter the intensifying insurgency, the Afghan government and US/NATO forces have been setting up controversial community-based militias, such as the Afghan Local Police, in insecure provinces. To date, thousands of men have been recruited to such bodies in Kunduz, Baghlan and Kandahar provinces, says the Interior Ministry.

“The militias and commanders are hiring young, underage boys in their ranks for different illicit purposes,” said Haji Abdul Rahim, a tribal elder in the southern province of Kandahar.

Another elderly man, Khan Mohammad, accused pro-government militias of kidnapping teenage boys primarily for sexual exploitation.

The Afghanistan Independent Human Rights Commission (AIHRC) also said it had received reports of child recruitment by pro-government militias in some provinces.

“We’re seriously concerned about this,” said Hussein Nasrat, a child rights officer at AIHRC, adding that his organization was investigating the issue.

“The use and abuse of children by local armed groups is very worrying because they [pro-government militias] fall beyond the formal, legal and disciplinary structures within which the police and army operate,” he said.

The UN Children’s Fund (UNICEF) said it had not received “confirmed information” on the issue, but that it was concerned about the “association of children with such forces” due to their community-based status.

NGOs have demanded that the government and US/NATO forces stop using local militias and instead devote greater resources to developing a more professional and accountable police and army.

The International Committee of the Red Cross, meanwhile, has said the proliferation of armed actors impedes and threatens humanitarian work in Afghanistan.

Child soldiers

Children are recruited and used for military purposes by the Afghan national police, as well as the following anti-government groups: Haqqani network, Hezb-i-Islamic, Taliban, Tora Bora Front and the Jamat Sunat al-Dawa Salafia, the UN Secretary-General said in a report in April 2010.

''The use and abuse of children by local armed groups is very worrying because they [pro-government militias] fall beyond the formal, legal and disciplinary structures within which the police and army operate''
Internally displaced and isolated children in conflict-affected areas are particularly at risk of recruitment by non-state armed groups, Radhika Coomaraswamy, a special representative of the UN Secretary-General for Children and Armed Conflict, said in a February 2010 country mission report.

“The recruitment and use of children by both [anti-government] armed groups and national security forces was documented throughout the country by the UN Country Task Force on children in armed conflict between 2008 and 2010,” UNICEF’s country office told IRIN.

In addition to recruiting children as foot soldiers, the Taliban and other insurgent groups are accused of using children as suicide bombers, and forcing them to plant improvised explosives.

“Armed opposition groups continue to perpetrate grave violations against children in the context of the armed conflict,” said UNICEF, adding that the fragmentation of armed opposition groups was jeopardizing dialogue with them on the issue of child soldiers.

Poverty and unemployment are believed to be pushing children into joining armed groups. Extremely low levels of birth registration and weak identity documents are also contributing to the problem, UNICEF said.

Sexual abuse

War-related sexual violence is another issue which needs tackling, human rights organizations say.

Children, particularly boys, are sexually abused by different armed groups and `baccha baazi’ (meaning “boy play”, a paedophiliac practice) has been reported among armed forces across the country.

Despite assurances by the government that child sexual abuse will be tackled and perpetrators punished, little has been done thus far, according to AIHRC.

“This is most probably due to the social stigma attached to the issue as well as the inability of the government to fully control armed group leaders who may be perpetrating such acts,” Coomaraswamy said in her report.

As a result, cases of the sexual abuse and exploitation of children have rarely been tackled due to impunity and the weak rule of law, AIHRC said.

Children are also killed, wounded, detained, displaced and denied access to essential health and education services by the warring parties, human rights organizations say.

In the first half of 2010, 176 children were killed and 389 wounded in the conflict - up 55 percent on the same period in 2009, the UN Assistance Mission in Afghanistan reported.

Backed by the UN and other international actors, the Afghan government says it is committed to tackling all the problems which adversely affect children in the context of war. However, human rights bodies such as AIHRC accuse the government of promising much but delivering little.

o o o

The Guardian, 4 February 2011

AFGHAN WOMEN FEAR FOR THE FUTURE

Life for many Afghan women improved dramatically with the fall of the Taliban. But as the west prepares to pull out, fears are growing for the future

by Homa Khaleeli

When Zainab Salbi was in Afghanistan this summer she met a woman whose story she could not forget. Married at 15 and widowed by 16, Zarqouna was banned, like all women, from working or even leaving her house unaccompanied during the Taliban regime of the 1990s. One day, needing food for her baby, she defied the law to sell hats in the street, only to be caught by local Taliban members and beaten with the one pair of shoes she possessed.

When the allies invaded in 2001 and the Taliban were toppled, Zarqouna's life was transformed. She started work, sent her daughter to school and is planning to send her to college. But her new-found freedom and that of many Afghan women could be at risk if, as Salbi – founder of Women for Women International, an organisation that supports women in war-torn countries – and other campaigners fear, the allies pull out from Afghanistan without insisting on guarantees for women's rights.

This year will see the 10th anniversary of the US and UK's military intervention in the country. After a decade of war, and with no sign of the insurgency ending any time soon, western governments are talking about bringing their troops home as early as next year. Meanwhile, with the Taliban still controlling parts of the country and unlikely to be defeated, the Afghan government is making plans for reconciliation and reintegration with the hardline militia. This, fear Afghan women, could mean a reversal of all the hard-won improvements of the last few years.

Although Afghan women's rights were a prominent part of the rhetoric of invasion, today the treatment of women under the Taliban is increasingly being dismissed as part of local culture. This apparent change in attitude in the west is seen as a consequence of the British and US governments' desire to extricate themselves from a messy, expensive and time-consuming war. In November, David Cameron stressed he was taking a more "hard-headed" approach to the country. "We are not there to build a perfect democracy, still less a model society. We are there to help Afghans take control of security and ensure that al-Qaida can never again pose a threat to us from Afghan soil."

Today, according to Salbi, who has testified before the US senate, there is little appetite among US politicians for protecting women in the region, despite support from the US secretary of state, Hillary Clinton. Instead, she says: "There is a clear, clear opinion that women's rights were a) not that relevant and b) irreconcilable with peace in Afghanistan."

Samira Hamidi, director of the Afghan Women's Network – an umbrella organisation for more than 600 women's rights groups and NGOs – has also noticed this increasing lack of interest and fears that once the troops pull out, the west will turn its eyes away from Afghanistan, even though "the insurgents still kill children, they still put poison in the food of school girls, they throw acid in the face of school girls, they burn schools. They still exist."

"Something most American male politicians have said – 90% of them – is that it's just their culture and we can't do anything about it," adds Salbi.

Deniz Kandiyoti of the School of Oriental and African Studies' gender studies department disputes these claims that the culture is to blame. "These people have been tossed to the wind and displaced, the old society has been eroded. Girls being given away to pay for opium debts, that's hardly traditional. Now it is the people with the guns, the money, and the drugs runners who have power," she says.

Few would argue that improvements have been made in women's rights in the last decade. On a recent visit to the UK, Hussan Ghazanfar, Afghanistan's minister for women's affairs, outlined the progress made: 57% of women and girls now go to school, and 24% of health sector workers and 10% of the judiciary are female.

Yet activists say improvements are patchy and far from ideal – with healthcare, social care and freedom unavailable to many poverty-stricken rural women, many already living in Taliban-controlled areas. Even Ghazanfar admits: "Life is different in the countryside – the literacy level is different, traditional customs are stronger, and women have no financial or economic freedom there."

Hamidi says most women she speaks to "are tired of war and killing", and fearful of the future. "If the situation goes bad again the women here have nowhere to go."

A suicide bomb attack in Kabul last weekend that killed Hamida Barmaki, a law professor and commissioner at the Afghanistan Independent Human Rights Commission, along with her husband and four children, illustrates the everyday danger in Afghanistan, while the release of footage showing the stoning of a couple in Kunduz province reveals the extent of the plight of women in areas controlled by the Taliban.

Politician Malalai Joya, dubbed the "bravest woman in Afghanistan" for speaking out against the warlords in the government after being elected to the Afghan national assembly in 2005, warns: "The situation of women is a disaster. Men and women today are squashed between three enemies – the Taliban, the warlords and also the occupation forces who are bombing from the skies and killing civilians, women and children. Now the Taliban are being invited into the government – there is no question the situation of women will be more disastrous and more bloody."

Orzala Nemat, a human rights activist who risked her life to set up a secret network of literacy classes for girls under the Taliban regime, agrees that the situation has worsened since 2006 with the revival of the Taliban. "Places which were very safe last year are very unsafe now," she says. "If this conflict is not winnable, we need a political settlement."

Last summer, the Afghan government created a peace council to pursue talks with the Taliban. Ghazanfar says there are safeguards to protect the women in any deal, with the government of Afghanistan insisting the Taliban abide by the country's constitution, which enshrines women's rights.

But Kandiyot is among those worried about the direction negotiations are taking. She points out that the Taliban continue to reject the constitution, and that the document includes a clause that says no law can contradict the principles of Islam. "And who decides what these principles are?" she asks. "It is the supreme court, which is full of hardline clerics."

Salbi, meanwhile, says informal, closed negotiations have already begun between a small group of politicians and the Taliban, with women's rights being traded as collateral. She describes one of "the advisers in the process" talking of women's "mobility and attire" being an area for "compromise".

The government itself has appeared keen to promote what it sees as improvements in the Taliban's hard line on women, possibly in a bid to make negotiations seem more palatable. Earlier this year the education minister, Farooq Wardak, insisted the Taliban leadership was prepared to drop its ban on girls' schools.

Yet Rachel Reid, Human Rights Watch's Afghanistan researcher, says: "There may be some low-level Taliban leaders who negotiate with communities that want girls' education, but there is no evidence to suggest that the leadership has done a U-turn."

She points out that the ministry's own statistics show that 20 girls' schools were bombed or burned down between March and October 2010. At least 126 students and teachers were killed in the same period – an increase from the previous year. Meanwhile, night letters – missives containing terrifying threats – are still being sent to working women in Taliban-controlled areas. One sent to a teacher in a girls' school read: "We warn you to leave your job as a teacher as soon as possible otherwise we will cut the heads off your children and shall set fire to your daughter."

President Hamid Karzai's government has traded women's rights for political power in the past. The Shia personal status law in 2009 was only toned down after women took to the streets in protest, sparking an international outcry. If implemented it would have meant women from the Shia minority sect could not leave their homes without their husband's permission or refuse them sex – making rape within marriage effectively legal. Other campaigners point to the president's pardoning of two men sentenced by the supreme court for brutally gang-raping a woman in public.

The Taliban are not the only group in Afghanistan keen to destroy women's rights, says Nemat. "Westerners think the only enemy Afghan women have is the Taliban, and when they go we will be liberated. But Afghan women have many men who are scared of women having power. These are warlords, conservative clerics, many powerful authorities sitting in key government positions."

In this anti-female environment violence against women in general is rising daily, fuelled by the war, the poverty it brings, and the conservative values it leaves behind, according to Hamidi. Refuges are attacked in the media, while anecdotal evidence suggests that self-immolation, domestic violence and suicide among women are increasing.

In December, a UN report on "harmful traditional practices" revealed that 57% of Afghan marriages are child marriages (where one partner is under the age of 16) and cited the case of an orphaned 13-year-old girl who was bought by a 65-year-old man for $3,000 (£1,895).

Then there are the honour killings and the fact that women and girls who run away – to escape forced marriages or violence – are often arrested, prosecuted and imprisoned, usually under a charge of attempting to commit zina (sex outside marriage).

Campaigners say the only hope for women is to give them a chance to fight for their rights at the negotiating table. But with little political will among Afghan politicians, pressure for this must come from abroad, says Hamidi. "If we are going for a negotiation involving insurgents who don't believe in women's rights and there is no commitment from the international community [to help women] . . . we may go back to the years when Taliban were ruling this country." And even Ghazanfar seems to echo this when she says: "Afghan women need and require peace with justice. This is our request to the world and international communities."

The alternative could be terrifying, says to Salbi. "'One Afghan woman said to me, what would it take for the allies to know that by abandoning us, it will hit them later on? That violence that manifests itself with us will spread. The Taliban started with us, then Afghan men, then America, and the world."

Nemat is more sanguine about the possibility of western troops pulling out soon, believing the only hope is for women to fight for themselves. "As someone who has worked under the Taliban, I don't believe there will be a return [of their rule] in the same way as in the past," she says. "They won't silence our voices. We will not sleep and stay passive in our homes. We will continue to struggle."

o o o

Himal Southasian, February 2011

THE HASTY EXIT STRATEGY  

By Aunohita Mojumdar

As the Western powers prepare to hightail it out of Afghanistan, there is little accountability to the Afghan people.

'If only you could take the Afghans out of the equation, you might be able to rebuild their country’ – or at least so goes the black humour within a small section of the international community, the long-term residents who have watched with frustration as the country has moved from international-backed plan to plan, proffering new panaceas with seasonal regularity as the situation deteriorates. With each year deemed more critical than the last, the only underlying strand unifying these ‘solutions’ has been a singular absence of the Afghan citizen from the centrality of plans, projects and policies. Like collateral damage, the euphemism used to describe the death of civilians in military operations, Afghan citizens have been corollary to the rebuilding of their country. Unless their interests are allowed to take centre stage, no plan or policy is likely to make a substantive difference, even though other interest groups, including the donor countries or the powerful political elite of Afghanistan, might achieve their short-term or even long-term goals.

Although there is widespread agreement that Afghanistan is a complex country with complicated problems, solutions adopted have usually lacked the necessary sophistication, being reduced to one-dimensional aims. Despite its shortcomings, the 2001 Bonn process spelt out the components of a modern state, implementation of which could have done much to stabilise the country. However the timetable set for its completion was unrealistic, with emphasis on achieving the form rather than the substance of the agreement. While this allowed the international community to claim success in completing its blueprint by 2005, it left Afghans with a Constitution riddled with contradictions and a lack of clarity on the delegation of administrative and political authority, both of which have repeatedly come back to haunt the polity.

Since then, the situation has followed a downward spiral, with the international community adopting and discarding a succession of diagnoses and treatments, each centred on the one big idea that would provide the key. Corruption, President Hamid Karzai, Pakistan, Indo-Pakistani relations have, by turns, all figured as the bogey. Even democracy has begun to be seriously considered in this light – the ‘Afghanistan is not Switzerland’ theme. The accompanying solutions have, however, suffered from a remarkable lack of accountability to the Afghan citizen.

No accountability
The current buzzword is ‘Afghanisation’. This goal sounds both noble and progressive, constituting the handing over of control of decision-making to Afghans, thus strengthening their sovereign status. Yet, the institutions and processes put in place since 2001 have been contrary to the aims of establishing a responsive government and representative polity. Despite the obvious difficulties of creating a strong, centralised state in a country characterised by regional autonomy and the dysfunction of three decades of conflict, the most centralised form of government was chosen. Dominant interests of the Western coalition ensured that the Constitution, rather than reflecting the country’s decentralised polity and pluralistic social fabric, centralised all political and executive authority in the president. Having a one-man show made it easier for many of the donor countries to deal with Afghanistan, but it denied representative and participatory decision-making to Afghans.

While Afghanistan has been called an electoral democracy, political parties were banned from elections under an electoral law that prevents political consolidation through a complex system of multi-seat single-constituency voting (see Himal March 2010, ‘Tattered parachute’). Afghans therefore have neither the advantages of a strong authoritarian government nor the benefits of a political democracy.

Even the limited accountability to the people that might have been possible under this system has been further diluted by denying elected bodies a clear role and authority. The Parliament, the strongest of the country’s elected bodies, uses its leverage to play the spoiler, but is prevented from playing a more positive role in shaping governance in the partyless system. Provincial representatives, meanwhile, although also elected, have almost no role or power, with the provincial governments run by governors answerable only to the president. Even the governors themselves lack power, and moves at introducing effective sub-national governance have yielded little. District-level elections, mandated by the Constitution, have not been held.

While there is a strong body of opinion that feels a Westminster-style democracy might be more suited to Afghanistan, there is scope for much greater political and administrative accountability even within existing provisions. At a time when the armed opposition is being wooed to lay down arms and join the mainstream, it is imperative that ordinary Afghans are also provided the means to participate in governance if their loyalties to the pro-government forces are to be retained. Channels also have to be created to address citizens’ grievances, if they are not to be further alienated.

A critical aspect is the conflict of interest of the Afghan leadership. A significant section of influential Afghans benefit directly from the spoils of war, as the international community pays them for providing militias, land for military bases, goods and services for those bases, all at hugely inflated prices. Whatever the reasons for this, the operational practices of the international community have created a divide between the interests of the Afghan population and a significant section of its leaders, who stand to lose personally and monetarily if peace were to arrive.

Good to go
The disjunction between the concerns of Afghans and those of the Western compact was highlighted starkly in the December 2010 review of US strategy in Afghanistan. The review drew exceedingly positive conclusions of the US security strategy, claiming ‘notable operational gains’, ‘progress across all three assessed areas of al-Qa’ida, Pakistan and Afghanistan’ and ‘significant progress in disrupting and dismantling the Pakistan-based leadership and cadre of al-Qa’ida over the past year’. It also claimed that the security forces had ‘reduced overall Taliban influence and arrested the momentum they had achieved in recent years in key parts’ of Afghanistan. The glowing report card was presented even as civilian casualties increased sharply amidst a general rise in violence, increasing restrictions on the movement of the international community within Afghanistan and an increased threat level faced by the diplomatic community, even in relatively safe Kabul.

The contradictions between the US claims and ground realities are reconcilable, however, if one looks at the divergent goals between the US and the Afghan people. Speaking of the review, President Barrack Obama said, ‘From the start, I’ve been very clear about our core goal. It’s not to defeat every last threat to the security of Afghanistan, because, ultimately, it is Afghans who must secure their country. And it’s not nation-building, because it is Afghans who must build their nation. Rather, we are focused on disrupting, dismantling and defeating al-Qaeda in Afghanistan and Pakistan, and preventing its capacity to threaten America and our allies in the future.’

The Western coalition and the troop-contributing countries see themselves as answerable to their own populations – not to Afghans. As early as 2001, the US, reflecting ‘a desire by the American people to not seek only revenge, but to win a war against barbaric behaviour’, in the words of President George W Bush, prevented the expansion of the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) mandated by the UN; and co-opted key militia commanders by equipping them in the pursuit of extremists turning a blind eye to their human-rights record and their terrorisation and brutality towards the local population. ISAF itself came under NATO command, later changed to US-led NATO command, and the cooption of militia leaders was carried on by several other Western countries with donor countries providing arms and money to specific commanders in the area, both in Kabul and, more specifically, in areas where their troops are based. By engaging with these commanders, they have also provided them with a degree of political legitimacy they might otherwise lack.

Receiving their wherewithal directly from the Western coalition, these militia commanders have remained unaccountable to the local population. They have also manipulated the considerable firepower of the Western military forces to target their political enemies and settle local rivalries, consolidating control in a situation of political flux. The international community did not deploy troops for the essential task of peacekeeping,  and the strengthening of the Afghan army and police was neglected. All the while, the Afghan population was asked to support the Karzai government and its allies, and left at the mercy of insurgents, criminal networks and the drug mafia.

Civilian casualties caused by international forces and the response to them provide a clear example of the divergence of interests and the lack of accountability to the Afghan population. While the Afghan government has been paying solatia, or compensation, to civilians killed by the international forces, it lacks the authority to pursue action, either criminal or disciplinary, against the foreign military personnel. This task has been left to the discretion of the troop-contributing country. Instances of disciplinary action are rare and the civilian casualty figures acknowledged by the international forces remain consistently lower than those compiled by the UN. Most civilian casualties take place either due to lack of information or due diligence, but the numbers have almost certainly escalated because of the lack of punitive action.

Transition to what?
In seeking to hand over the responsibility of security to the Afghan security forces, the foremost concern of the Western coalition has been a timetable for pullout of troops to present to their own domestic public, rather than an appraisal based on the security for Afghans (see Himal December 2010, ‘Afghanistan: Too much, too little’). But how convinced is the Western coalition that Afghans are actually ready to begin the transition, now mandated to begin in early 2011?

In answer, panic followed the Karzai government’s decision to put a halt to the operations of private security companies in Afghanistan in October last year. The Western countries, most of whom use such companies, went into a frenzy, and private companies executing their projects said they would vote with their feet if the private security companies were shut down – a threat that most donor governments found both credible and justified. As recently as early January, US Ambassador Karl Eikenberry was asking President Karzai to increase the number of personnel in the private security companies. Yet the preparedness of the Afghan forces is nonetheless deemed sufficient to begin taking over the security of the country.

To ensure this ‘preparedness’ the international coalition has adopted two policies that are likely to further weaken the security apparatus of the Afghan state and endanger its citizens. The Afghan forces are now being built up at a rapid rate, with the emphasis on churning out numbers rather than ensuring quality of training and command structures. It is clear that an army and police force created in this manner will prove to be more of a threat than a panacea. In addition, since the numbers of personnel still remain below what is seen as required, the international forces are setting up community militias and arming communities. Needless, to say, these are two measures that have proven detrimental in Afghanistan, not just in the distant past but over the past three years, as communities fight each other and militias prey on the
general population.

Until the ‘security transition’ is recast as a transition from the goals of foreign troop-contributing countries to the concerns of the Afghan population, the rising tide of insecurity is unlikely to be reversed.

Donor-drive
The use of international aid to rebuild Afghanistan remains the most glaring example of a policy that is driven by the needs of donors rather than that of the Afghan population. An example of this is the underfunded ‘urgent humanitarian appeal’ launched by the UN for the past three years. Though the international community spends billions of dollars in Afghanistan each year, the humanitarian appeal identifying the most urgent requirements goes underfunded though it amounts to far less (USD 666 million in 2009, USD 775 million in 2010 and USD 678 million in 2011). This is because the bulk of aid continues to be spent bilaterally by donors following political and military objectives (see Himal August 2010, ‘Conferences, calendars and caveats’).

Major donors route their aid to the areas where their troops are based, and to sectors on which they would like to focus. Some, such as the US, make sure that a considerable portion of this money returns to American corporations. The commonly acknowledged rate of money returning back to the Western donor is between 40 and 50 percent. Beneficiary citizens ultimately receive a fraction of the original amount, with the rest going to overheads at each level of the sub-contracting process. The money leaks out in inflated salaries as well as inflated costs. The sub-contracting culture also means that the money reaches the final implementer very late, due to delays at each stage of the contracting process. Based on the donor’s annual budgetary cycle, the money is then required to be spent quickly, resulting in projects executed in a hurry, often shoddily.

Most donor countries have a system of accountability, but again, they answer to their own governments and elected representatives, not the Afghan beneficiaries. There are almost no mechanisms that allows the beneficiaries to have a say in aid projects, or how they are executed. The sight of private contractors executing projects while using hired guns to keep the ‘beneficiary population’ at bay is a common sight in Afghanistan. The system ensures that information about failed projects or misappropriation of money comes through only intermittently. Instances of companies being penalised because of complaints of beneficiaries, whether for badly constructed school buildings or inoperable water canal project are unheard of.

In fact, establishing accountability is not that hard, even within the existing remit. For example, Integrity Watch Afghanistan (IWA), an Afghan civil-society organisation, started a project in 2007 that empowers local communities to monitor projects being executed in their name with donor or government money. The community selects trustworthy members who are trained in the task of monitoring, to ensure there are no compromises in the quality of the projects. IWA also enabled the local monitor groups to go up the chain of contractors, to obtain information from the donor as necessary. The popularity of the process is evident from the growing demands on IWA to train communities throughout the country. Nevertheless, such initiatives are rare and receive inadequate support from the donors.

Peace before justice
The absence of the Afghan citizen is most starkly evident in the current mantra of ‘reconciliation’. As the Western coalition seeks to exit, it is compromising on the small political, civil, democratic and human-rights gains made by and for the Afghan population since 2001. While rhetorical homage is being paid to the Constitution and the so-called ‘red lines’ that will prevent compromise on the most fundamental of rights for the Afghan people, the actual rollback of these rights is taking place even now on the international community’s watch.

In 2005, for example, the international community, led by the UN, had extended robust support to a Transitional Justice Action Plan. It focused on prosecution for war crimes, reparation for losses, and acknowledgement of the suffering of victims as a means of reconciling citizens and bringing a sense of closure to the past. In 2007, the international community opposed the adoption of a law that sought to provide blanket amnesty to all participants in the conflict, pointing out that the law was against the principles of justice and human rights and violated international humanitarian principles. In 2010, however, with the focus shifting to reconciliation with the armed opposition, the concerns of citizens received short shrift. The amnesty law has indeed been adopted by Kabul, with scarcely a murmur from the international community. In fact, the UN itself has put peace before transitional justice, not only delinking peace and justice but also suggesting that the two were mutually exclusive in the current context.

Meanwhile, there is escalating violence against women, reversing the trend of the initial post-Taliban years. Opinion surveys show support for women’s work outside the home has dropped, as has support for women in Parliament. The parliamentary elections of 2010 – which dragged on messily for over four months - demonstrated the international community's changing posture. In the name of ‘Afghanisation’ of the electoral process, the international community decided to step back from its stated goal of strengthening the electoral institutions and processes. Though at the time Himal went to press a resolution under international pressure looked likely, it was not before the democratic process had been put through the wringer, setting a bad precedent for the future. To stem this deterioration, the international community needs to do more to support the efforts of Afghan civil-society organisations, which have been voicing demands for a spectrum  of rights – rights that are being marginalised in the hasty exit strategy.

Rather than treating human rights and democracy as inconvenient principles that need to be shelved or circumvented in the short term, the international community needs to look at the country’s long-term stability by supporting policies that would reflect the country’s complex and pluralistic social and political fabric, and by strengthening democracy, rule of law, justice and an inclusive polity. By proffering ‘Afghanisation’ as the reason for not playing its part, the international community is being disingenuous. For better or worse, it is international aid money that is the current dominant determinant in Afghanistan. By picking and choosing individuals, institutions and forces it wants to fund, it is the international community that shapes the Afghanistan of today – and moulds the Afghanistan of tomorrow.

Aunohita Mojumdar is a Contributing Editor to this magazine.

_____

[2] Pakistan:


[IMPORTANT - the letters below are being sent on behalf of CFD to:
1.	President and Prime Minister of Pakistan; 2. Chief Justice of Pakistan; 3. SCBA and all four provincial Bar Associations

Endorsing organizations and individuals listed below; others wishing to add their names or the names of their organisations are requested to please reply to cfd.pak at gmail.com (cc’d here) by  Feb 6th, 6 pm Pakistan time, [1pm GMT]
thanks
beena ]


Feb 6, 2011

(1).
To:	President of Pakistan
To:	The Prime Minister of Pakistan

We the undersigned express our deep dismay and outrage at the withdrawal of the public prosecutor from the Salmaan Taseer case on Feb 4. The prosecutor has reportedly said he was not given adequate protection. We find this to be an utterly unacceptable situation. It is indeed a sad day when a victim cannot find legal representation but many lawyers offer to represent a murderer, gratis.
We demand that the assassinated Punjab Governor be provided appropriate legal representation by the State.
We demand that both the Punjab and Federal governments immediately provide the prosecutor the requisite protection to enable him to appear in court and discharge his legal duties, and that action be taken against those who are threatening him.
Expecting justice to be done and the rule of law to be followed
Sincerely,
Citizens for Democracy (CFD), an umbrella group of professional groups,
NGOs, trade unions, student unions, political parties and individuals


(2).
To the Chief Justice of Pakistan
Your Honour:
We the undersigned draw to your attention the sad and shameful fact that no public prosecutor appeared in the Salmaan Taseer case on Feb 4, citing lack of adequate protection. We find this to be an utterly unacceptable situation. It is indeed a sad day when a victim cannot find legal representation but many lawyers offer to represent a murderer, gratis.
We have asked both the Punjab and Federal governments to immediately provide the public prosecutor the requisite protection to enable him to appear in court and that action be taken against those who are threatening him.
We demand that the victim’s family be provided appropriate legal representation by the State.
Not least, we urge your personal intervention to protect the assassinated Punjab Governor’s right for legal representation.
Expecting justice to be done and the rule of law to be followed
Sincerely,
Citizens for Democracy (CFD), an umbrella group of professional groups,
NGOs, trade unions, student unions, political parties and individuals


(3).
To the Supreme Court Bar Association
And High Court Bar Associations of all four provinces:
Dear President (SCBA/HCBA)
We the undersigned draw to your attention the sad and shameful fact that no public prosecutor that no public prosecutor appeared in the Salmaan Taseer case on Feb 4, citing lack of adequate protection.
We find this to be an utterly unacceptable situation. It is indeed a sad day when a victim cannot find legal representation but many lawyers offer to represent a murderer, gratis.
We have demanded that both the Punjab and Federal governments immediately provide him the requisite protection to enable him to appear in court.
We have also urged the Chief Justice of Pakistan to intervene to ensure that the victim’s family be provided appropriate legal representation by the State to protect the assassinated Punjab Governor’s right for legal representation.
We also expect the Bar Associations to immediately intervene in this situation and ensure that legal norms are not violated on one pretext or other.
Expecting justice to be done and the rule of law to be followed
Sincerely,

On behalf of
Citizens for Democracy (CFD), an umbrella group of professional groups,
NGOs, trade unions, student unions, political parties and individuals
Citizens for Democracy (CFD) : a coalition of professional organisations, trade unions, political parties, non-government organisations and individuals, including Professional Organisations Mazdoor Federations & Hari Joint Committee (POJAC), an umbrella organisation including: 1. Sindh High Court Bar Association; 2. Pakistan Medical Association (PMA);  3. All Pakistan Newspaper Employees Confederation (APNEC); 4. Mutahida Labour Federation; 5. Karachi Union of Journalists; 6. Pakistan Workers Federation; 7. All Pakistan Trade Union Federation (APTUF); 8. All Pakistan Clerk Association; 9. Democratic Labour Union State Bank of Pakistan; 10. UBL Workmen Union (CBA); 11. National Bank Trade Union Federation; 12. Karachi Bar Association; 13. Pakistan Nursing Federation; 14. National Trade Union Federation; 15. Sindh Hari Committee; 16. Govt. Sec. Teachers Association; 17. Pakistan Hotel And Restaurant Workers Federation; 18.  Mehran Mazdoor Federation; 19. All Sindh Primary Teachers Association; 20. Sindh Professor Lecturer Association; 21. Malir Bar Association, Karachi; 22. Pakistan Trade Union Federation (PTUF); 23. Railway Workers Union Open Line (cba) Workshop; 24. Mehran Railway Employees Welfare Association; 25.  All Pakistan Trade Unions Organisations. Other CFD members and endorsing organizations include: 26. Awami Party; 27. Labour Party Pakistan (LPP); 28.  Progressive Youth Front (PYF); 29. Communist Party Pakistan (CPP); 30. Peace and Solidarity Council; 31. Pakistan Institute of Labour, Education & Research (Piler); 32. Action Committee for Human Rights; 33. Dalit Front; 34. National Commission for Justice and Peace (CJP); 35. Human Rights Commission of Pakistan (HRCP); 36. Caritas; 37. Aurat Foundation; 38.  Women¹s Action Forum (WAF); 39. People¹s Resistance; 40. Sindh Awami Sangat; 41. National Organisation of Working Committees; 42. Pakistan Fisherfolk Forum (PFF); 43. Child and Labour Rights Welfare Organisation; 44.  Progressive Writers Association (PWA); 45. Port Workers Federation; 46.  Shirkat Gah; 47. Pakistan Peace Coalition (PPC); 48. Idara-e-Taleem-o-Aagahi (ITA); 49. Sanjan Nagar Public Education Trust  (SNPET);  50. Pakistan Dalit Solidarity Network (PDSN); 51. Sindh Democratic Forum (SDF); 52.  SAP-Pakistan; 53. AwazCDS-Pakistan; 54. GCAP-Pakistan; 55. Home Based Women Workers Federation (HBWWF); 56. Labour Education Foundation (LEF); 57.  Progressive Youth Forum; 58. National Students¹ Federation (NSF); 59. The Researchers; 60. Tehrik-e-Niswan; 61. Democratic Commission for Human Development (DCHD); 62. Crises Support Group of Residents for Defence and Clifton, Karachi; 63. Baaghi: A blog for secular Pakistan; 64. Communist Mazdoor Kissan Party (CMKP); 65. Ansar Burney Trust International; 66.  Viewpoint International; 67. Pakistan Youth Alliance; 68. Sustainable Development Policy Institute (SDPI) 69. Youth Together for Human Rights (YTHRE)

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The Express Tribune, February 4, 2011

THE STEADY EXPANSION OF INTOLERANCE

by Amina Jilani

In recent days, The New York Times, as well as this newspaper, expressed concern about the steady expansion of Pakistan’s nuclear arsenal. Of much more concern at this point in time, however, is the steady and frighteningly swift expansion of intolerance, bigotry and mindlessness, all of which are common to both parliament and the streets.

The expansion of the nuclear arsenal is, of course, in itself mindless, if not downright wicked, as the nation sinks under massive debt, criminal governmental expenditure, an economic meltdown due to a state of non-governance and the selfishness of the mighty army, forever thirsting for more toys for the boys.

We have known, for long, of the fecklessness, the corruption and the damage that can be done by various leaderships, mostly because of their cowardice in the face of religious extremism or, in the case of Ziaul Haq, of his religiosity. Since Pakistan was broken in 1971, we have had Zulfikar Ali Bhutto surrender to the religious right and successive so-called democratic governments uphold laws and practices that have brought upon Pakistan international opprobrium.

What is happening now is probably a logical progression, but it is horrid and it is highly worrisome to a few pessimists who fail to spot any optimism — even in the blossoming fashion show industry. Following the governmental unzipping line, the honourable Senate exhibited the true calibre of its members when, under the craven leadership of its chairman, it was prevented from acknowledging the murder of the governor of the largest and most powerful province. What a bunch of lily-livered funks, all of them, other than the gutsy Nilofar Bakhtiar who, some time ago, showed that she has spunk. And the same description applies to the rest of what passes for parliament and government.

Ably supported by politicians of all hues, the religious right has now claimed the streets as their own. United, the religious parties, banned and un-banned, marched and screamed, presumably with governmental blessings, first in Karachi and then in Lahore, where they were joined by several of our mainstream ‘democratic’ political parties who cheered them on. The ‘demand’ involved the blasphemy laws over which the government has bent backwards to assure everyone that they will not be touched, despite their propensity to support murder, terrorism, unlawfulness and downright bigotry. That this country has spawned such laws is a disgrace and that they are supported by various leaderships is a quadruple-disgrace.

These people, who claim to be men of the book, are unable to substantiate the punitive aspects of the blasphemy laws with citations from the Holy Quran. They march mindlessly, grasping at all and any straws, and in Lahore there were even anti-Shia chants, despite the fact that a Shia organisation marched with them. Brought in as an extra during the Lahore demo of January 30 was the issue of the American cowboy responsible for a shooting incident a few days previously, and, of all people, it was a representative of the party of Imran Khan who ‘demanded’ that he be hanged publicly. Just where is this nation going? And how has it come to pass that it finds itself in a situation where many normal educated citizens are in such a state of fright that they are unable to even dispassionately discuss any matter pertaining to religion as it is practiced and preached in the Islamic Republic?

And why are the street warriors silent on the regular bombing, murder and maiming of the citizens of Pakistan?

The US and the world have good reason to be worried about the expanding nuclear arsenal — if it ever falls into the hands of our government’s favoured allies, heaven help us all.

Published in The Express Tribune, February 5th,  2011.

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Daily Times, 1 February 2011

EDITORIAL : POLITICAL BIGOTRY

Thousands of followers of the religious and right wing parties gathered in Lahore to warn the government not to amend the blasphemy laws. The religious parties included the Jamiat Ulema-e-Islam-Fazl (JUI-F), Jamaat-e-Islami (JI), Tehrik-e-Millat-e-Jafariya, banned militant outfit Jamaat-ud-Dawa (JuD) among others, while the PML-N, PML-Q, PML-Z, Pakistan Tehreek-e-Insaf (PTI) were the centre-right parties present.

Just last month there was a large congregation of the extreme right in Karachi under the same banner, demanding the same thing – no amendment or repeal of the blasphemy laws. The rally in Lahore was almost as ‘successful’, but certain dimensions of this rally make it more significant. The extreme right managed to bring on board the centre-right political forces. Equally important is the fact that a Shia organisation decided to join them despite the fact that Sunni sectarian extremists have been involved in massacring Shias over the decades. The bigotry of the Deobandis came out in full force when Sajid Naqvi, a Shia leader, joined the rally and many in the crowd started shouting: “Kafir, kafir, Shia kafir” (Shias are infidels). JuD chief Hafiz Saeed also addressed the crowd. Hafiz Saeed seems to be on the frontline of this ‘struggle’. JuD is a front of the banned terrorist organisation Lashkar-e-Tayyaba (LeT). How is it then that the Punjab authorities allowed the chief of a banned outfit to address a mammoth rally in the provincial capital (yet again)? This will also have an adverse impact on the Indo-Pak foreign secretaries meeting about to take place this month in Thimphu.

JUI-F chief Maulana Fazlur Rehman’s ‘advice’ to Punjab Governor Khosa to pay a visit to late Governor Taseer’s assassin Mumtaz Qadri in order to ‘thank’ him for his governorship shows the level of the speeches at the rally. On the other hand, the centre-right parties showed their support for bigotry by their participation. The PPP-led government has backpedalled and completely retreated on its stance on the blasphemy laws and repeatedly bleated that no change to these flawed laws is being contemplated.

The track record of blasphemy cases shows that these have nothing to do with religion or blasphemy. These laws are flawed and open to abuse. Instead of stopping the misuse of these laws, now that the religious right has strengthened itself, the abuse is likely to be perpetuated. The government, even if it is not ready to repeal or amend these laws, should at least put a check on the misuse of these laws that has led to so much injustice. *


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[3] Pakistan - India: That Frozen Dialogue

The Hindu
February 05, 2011

TWO YEARS AND STILL COUNTING

by Siddharth Varadarajan

Further delays in the resumption of dialogue with Pakistan will not make it easier to get satisfaction on the terror front.

An entire year has passed since the Manmohan Singh government decided it was time to find a way to break the dialogue deadlock and kickstart the process of engagement with Pakistan.

During this period, Dr. Singh has met his Pakistani counterpart, Yusuf Raza Gilani, once, Foreign Secretaries from both sides have met twice, and the two Foreign Ministers sat together once, in Islamabad in July 2010. That encounter ended inconclusively, even disastrously, with the Pakistani host compounding the visible lack of progress made in their talks with the impropriety of a public diatribe against his visitor. When the opportunity for a second ministerial meeting arose at the United Nations where both Ministers spent a week in the fall, cussedness ensured a suitable date could never be found.

At the root of the Islamabad fiasco was the fact that neither side was willing to risk upsetting political equations at home by appearing to concede too much ground to the other. Pakistan's Foreign Minister Shah Mahmood Qureshi wanted to be able to tell the stakeholders who matter in his country — the military — that he had got India to agree to a calendar for the resumption of dialogue on Kashmir and Siachen. But India's External Affairs Minister S.M. Krishna was not prepared to go that far. He wanted to calibrate any timetable for the resumption of talks on politically sensitive issues like Siachen to visible progress in the investigation and prosecution of those involved in the Mumbai terrorist attack of November 2008. What resulted, thus, was a stalemate.

On February 6, the two Foreign Secretaries will make a fresh attempt to press the reset button on the frozen process in Thimphu on the sidelines of a Saarc event. Unfortunately, they will meet under circumstances that are seemingly less propitious for a breakthrough with both leaderships under siege. In India, Prime Minister Singh is battling charges of dragging his feet in high-profile corruption cases and the Opposition's hostility towards him and his government has never been greater. In Pakistan, the killing of Punjab Governor Salman Taseer and the open sympathy his assassin attracted from religious clerics and sections of civil society have vitiated the atmosphere and put the liberals and the entire secular political class — which forms a natural constituency for cooperation with India — on the backfoot.

On paper, the government of Yusuf Raza Gilani is likely to find a second helping of whatever fare India served last July as unpalatable as the first. India, too, may feel it has no option but to spurn the Pakistani demand for a clear timeline for the resumption of dialogue in the absence of headway in the 26/11 case. And yet, a deeper look at the dynamics within Pakistan and at the core interests of India ought to give both governments cause to re-examine their attitude.

In a speech to the Research & Analysis Wing on January 21, the Prime Minister's Special Envoy for Pakistan, Satinder Lambah, spelt out the government's policy dilemma. “Engagement,” he said, “does not always assure us of a desired response, nor does it guarantee success. However, rejecting the process of engagement will not enable us to achieve our long-term goals.”

In relation to Pakistan, India's principal goal today is the permanent neutralisation of terrorist organisations which operate with differing levels of support from the establishment of that country and launch attacks on Indian targets. The second key long-term goal is the establishment of normal relations with Pakistan. In his speech, Mr. Lambah made the only public reference the Government of India has cared to make in all these years to the back-channel negotiations which took place with Islamabad from 2004 to 2007. Prime Minister Manmohan Singh's measures to improve relations with Pakistan were based on the principle that “borders cannot be redrawn but we can work towards making them irrelevant,'' Mr. Lambah said, adding that a lot of progress had been made. “The ball is in Pakistan's court. We will be willing to pick up the threads.”

In my opinion, Mr. Lambah's words point the way towards the possibility of forward movement but only if both governments have the courage to acknowledge the illogicality of their current official positions.

Three paradoxes

India knows “rejecting the process of engagement” will not enable it to achieve its goals on the terror front and yet it is unwilling to talk until it sees satisfactory progress in the Mumbai attack case. A second policy paradox it must overcome is that it is reluctant to resume the harmless ‘front channel' talks on Kashmir even as it is “willing to pick up the threads” on the far more substantive back channel if Pakistan agrees. Finally, Pakistan, which has spent the better part of the past six decades demanding substantive progress on the Kashmir issue must explain why it is obsessed with the immediate resumption of the formal process (even though it knows this will lead nowhere) but is reluctant officially to embrace the back channel process and formula which offer the best chance for a speedy, win-win outcome.

For the past two years, I have been part of a Track-II India-Pakistan dialogue process that the Institute of Peace and Conflict Studies in Delhi and the Jinnah Institute in Islamabad have been conducting. The meetings take place in Bangkok because neither government is willing to guarantee it will issue visas for all the participants coming from across the border, but that is the subject of another article! Besides strategic analysts and journalists, the ‘Chaophraya Dialogues' have brought together senior retired military, intelligence and foreign service officers, many of whom spent their entire careers planning and executing moves against the other side. Even in the tense atmosphere which prevailed following 26/11, these dialogues always produced a broad consensus in favour of engagement. But this tended to stop short of a fulsome endorsement of the composite dialogue process and the back-channel. Indeed, several Pakistani interlocutors — whether from military or political backgrounds — seemed reluctant to endorse the back channel. The military men said the venture was General Pervez Musharraf's ‘solo flight,' the politicians felt the process was tainted by its association with a dictator.

In our most recent round, however, both sides made some progress. “The absence of a formal and sustained engagement on the full range of issues confronting India and Pakistan is unhealthy, counterproductive and dangerous,” the Indian and Pakistani participants declared in a joint resolution. “We welcome the forthcoming meeting of foreign secretaries in Thimphu and hope that the two sides will be able to prepare the ground for the resumption of a comprehensive and sustained dialogue.” More significantly, the principle which Mr. Lambah spoke of — and which Khurshid Ahmed Kasuri, who was Foreign Minister in the Musharraf years, has also spoken of — found joint support: “We agree with the broad vision of India-Pakistan relations in which borders cannot change but can indeed be made irrelevant. We resolve that a dialogue between the two countries should include discussions on Jammu and Kashmir. The formal bilateral dialogue should be complemented by back-channel contacts. The people of J&K should be appropriately consulted in this process”.

Terrorism, the resolution noted, is of deep concern to both India and Pakistan. “Indian concerns about the Mumbai attacks in 2008 have seriously affected the dialogue process. The perpetrators of the attack should be brought to justice at the earliest. Pakistan has deep concerns about the tragic loss of lives in the Samjhauta Express attack. India has to expeditiously prosecute those involved and keep Pakistan informed.”

Taken together with the views of Prime Minister Singh's envoy, this resolution, which leading members of the strategic community in India and Pakistan approved, indicates a possible way forward. What is required is a process that can build on the Indian enthusiasm for the back channel with the Pakistani insistence on resumption of the front channel. One way to do this is to examine whether, after a suitable period of time, the two channels can be merged. After all, once the back channel reaches an understanding on broad concepts, translating it into actionable parameters will involve painstaking negotiation. It is significant that Mr. Kasuri made well-rehearsed statements during his recent visit to India to the effect that the Pakistani military brass, including Gen. Parvez Kayani, who was head of the Inter-Services Intelligence directorate at the time, were kept fully briefed after each back-channel meeting with the Indian side. No one in GHQ, Rawalpindi, has refuted what he said.

On terror, the aftermath of the assassination of Salman Taseer has brought home to most Indians the degree to which the Pakistani state is caught in a vortex. A system which cannot ensure justice when a high constitutional functionary is killed is unlikely to be able to offer India much relief on 26/11. This is not to say India should stop insisting on progress. But tying the future course of our bilateral engagement to this futile pursuit is unhelpful and counterproductive. Liberal Pakistanis say the resumption of dialogue with India will strengthen them in their struggle against the jihadis and the ‘establishment'. They may well be exaggerating their own influence and our own. In the worst case scenario, dialogue will turn out to be a placebo that will not help them or us. But India has nothing to lose by following their prescription.

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WIKILEAKS: TENSION IN THE MIDDLE EAST AND ASIA HAS 'DIRECT POTENTIAL' TO LEAD TO NUCLEAR WAR
http://tinyurl.com/46pc9pn

____


[4]  INDIA MUST BOOK NARENDRA MODI NAILED FOR ROLE ON GUJARAT RIOTS:


THE TRUTH ABOUT THE GODHRA SPECIAL INVESTIGATION TEAM REPORT 
http://tinyurl.com/6lasx6y

SIT PROBE NAILS GUJARAT CM ON MANY COUNTS: COMPILED NEWS REPORTS 
http://tinyurl.com/5usmmr2

GUJARAT GOVT TAKES ON POLICE OFFICE FOR BLOWING THE WHISTLE ON THEM 
http://tinyurl.com/6yrr5u8

THE SIT REPORT MUST LEAD TO LEGAL CONSEQUENCES
Else, it would end up as an exorcism ritual

by Shiv Visvanathan (Tehelka, 4 February 2011)

Ahmedabad

From the SIT report it is evident that the level of indictment of Narendra Modi is very high. The important part is that the indictment is not just on the level of involvement, but erasing evidence too. India specialises in outsourced jobs, but Modi has outsourced murder.

It is astonishing and frightening to know that he sent two men who ordered policemen to furbish any account of a crime as they wished it to be. Such engineering of an act of murder is synonymous with murder. The media concentrated on the fake encounters in Gujarat, whereas the riots were put on the backburner. And even though it is back in focus now, unfortunately, as the report shows, the SIT is ready to indict him but not accuse him legally. There is a thin line between what is political and what is legal. What we have done is an exorcism ritual where we accuse Modi of guilt, hoping that he will carry the burden of guilt, but he will not face the legal consequences of his crimes. This is really sad.
Narendra Modi

We will have to wait for the Supreme Court’s decision on the issue, as well as the report of the amicus curiae. Based on what directions the Supreme Court may give, civil society groups must take the lead and access further information on issues that have supposedly been “not used or destroyed”. That will raise the chances of Modi’s indictment under charges of destruction of information and evidence, apart from the simple fact that he destroyed human lives. It is very important that Modi be legally indicted – legally shown that he is not fit for political conduct. This will take time and I know that those who have fought against Modi for the past eight years are quite tired. The media, on the other hand, should pick up the real issues rather than nitpick on Teesta Setalvad’s conduct or her exercising her democratic rights.

For example, what was the issue with Setalvad approaching the UN? Isn’t India a part of the UN? We might not be able to hold Modi for murder, but destruction of information should be considered a huge crime against citizens, as information is a legacy of the people, and a tool for availing justice. Modi has indeed violated and destroyed the integrity of polity. There have to be norms to handle genocide.

It is also extremely important to get to the bottom of the corporate nod for Modi. I would really like to know which corporations are in support of Modi, and at what public cost. Apart from this, it is worth noting that some IPS officials have come under fire in the report, but what about all those submissive and supportive IAS officials who got extensions, promotions or new jobs after the genocide? Since this report does not name all the officials and bureaucrats, a different kind of investigation is necessary on these matters. It is important to know the cost of silence – I’m sure it is tremendous.

For many urban liberals, this case has unfortunately become a medical report – if you cannot solve it, dispose it. That is why we see opinions like – if you have not been able to indict him in eight years, give him a clean chit and move on. It might be good for minor criminals, but minor criminals enter chief ministerial offices to become major criminals. And Modi is one. Closing investigations will not keep memories away. That is why terror becomes an alternative form of memory and not justice.

Modi is a magnified pracharak, a dream-like malevolent dictator for the elite and their idea of a modern Gujarat. This is a Gujarat that would love to do away with civilisational memories and never involve itself with ethical responsibilities. We have such a situation here. Take, for instance, the prominent academic institutions of Ahmedabad that have taken vows of silence on what happened in 2002. Unless justice acts as therapy for the memories of 2002, this society will remain tainted forever.

Lastly, I don’t think another magazine in India would have carried this kind of an exposé except TEHELKA. One just needs to look at the track record of the mainstream newspapers and the way they have dealt with the subject, especially the Gujarati media.

Shiv Visvanathan is an Ahmedabad-based social scientist 

_____



[5] India: Human Rights

(i) Text of Supreme court ruling on membership of banned organizations

REPORTABLE

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA

CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION

CRIMINAL APPEAL NO(s). 889 OF 2007


ARUPBHUYAN                                  Appellant (s)

                      VERSUS

STATE OF ASSAM                               Respondent(s)

O  R  D  E  R

   Heard learned counsel for the parties.
   This Appeal has been filed against the impugned judgment of the Designated Court, Assam at Guwahati dated 28.03.2007 passed in TADA Sessions Case No. 13 of 1991.
   The facts have already been set out in the impugned judgment and hence we are not repeating the same here except wherever necessary.
   The appellant is alleged to be a member of ULFA and the only material produced by the prosecution against the appellant is his alleged confessional statement made before the Superintendent of Police in which he is said to have identified the house of the deceased.
   Confession to a police officer is inadmissible vide Section 25 of the Evidence Act, but it is admissible in TADA cases vide Section 15 of the Terrorist and Disruptive Activities (Prevention) Act, 1987.
                      :1:

   Confession is a very weak kind of evidence.  As is well known, the wide spread and rampant practice in the police in India is to use third degree methods for extracting confessions from the alleged accused.  Hence, the courts have to be cautious in accepting confessions made to the police by the alleged accused.

   Unfortunately, the police in our country are not trained in scientific investigation (as is the police in Western countries) nor are they provided the technical equipments for scientific investigation, hence to obtain a conviction they often rely on the easy short cut of procuring a confession under torture.

   Torture is such a terrible thing that when a person is under torture he will confess to almost any crime. Even Joan of Arc confessed to be a witch under torture.  Hence, where the prosecution case mainly rests on the confessional statement made to the police by the alleged accused, in the absence of corroborative  material, the courts must be hesitant before they accept such extra-judicial confessional statements.
   In the instant case, the prosecution case mainly relies on the alleged confessional statement of the appellant made before the Superintendent of Police,  which  is  an
                      :2:


extra-judicial confession and there is absence of corroborative material. Therefore, we are of the opinion that it will not be safe to convict the accused on the basis of alleged confessional statement.
   For the reasons stated above, we are in agreement with the impugned judgment so far as it has taken the view that the confessional statement in question cannot be acted upon as the sole basis for conviction of the appellant.

   However, the TADA Court has convicted the appellant under Section 3(5) of the TADA which makes mere membership of a banned organisation criminal. Although the appellant has denied that he was a member of ULFA, which is a banned organisation. Even assuming he was a member of ULFA it has not been proved that he was an active member and not a mere passive member.
   In State of Kerala  Vs. Raneef,  2011 (1) SCALE 8, we have respectfully agreed with the U.S. Supreme Court decision in Elfbrandt  Vs.  Russell,  384 U.S. 17 (1966) which has rejected the doctrine of 'guilt by association'.  Mere membership of a banned organisation will not incriminate a person unless he resorts to violence or incites people to violence or does an act intended to create disorder or  disturbance  of  public  peace  by  resort  to
                      :3:

violence (See : also the Constitution Bench judgment of this Court in KedarNath
Vs.  State of Bihar, AIR 1962 SCC 955 para 26).
   In Clarence Brandenburg  Vs.  State of Ohio,  395 U.S. 444 (1969) the U.S. Supreme Court went further and held that mere “advocacy or teaching the duty, necessity, or propriety” of violence as a means of accomplishing political  or industrial reform, or publishing or circulating or displaying any book or paper
containing such advocacy, or justifying the commission of violent acts with intent to exemplify, spread or advocate the propriety of the doctrines of criminal syndicalism, or to voluntarily assemble with a group formed “to teach or advocate the doctrines of criminal syndicalism” is not per se illegal. It will become illegal only if it incites to imminent lawless action.  The statute under challenge was hence held to be unconstitutional being violative of the First and Fourteenth Amendments to the U.S. Constitution.
   In United States  Vs.  Eugene Frank Robel, 389 U.S. 258, the U.S. Supreme Court held that a member of a communist organisation could not be regarded as doing an unlawful act by merely obtaining employment in a defence facility.

   We respectfully agree with the above decisions, and are
                           :4:
of the opinion that they apply to India too, as our fundamental rights are similar to the Bill of Rights in the U.S. Constitution.
   In our opinion, Section 3(5) cannot be read literally otherwise it will violate Articles 19 and 21 of the Constitution.  It has to be read in the light of our observations made above.  Hence, mere membership of a banned organisation will not make a person a criminal unless he resorts to violence or incites people to violence or creates public disorder by violence or incitement to violence.
   Hence, the conviction of the appellant under Section 3(5) of the TADA is also not sustainable.
   The impugned judgment of the Designated Court, Assam at Guwahati dated 28.03.2007 passed in TADA Sessions Case No. 13 of 1991 is set aside and the Appeal stands allowed.

   By Order dated 29.10.2007 this Court had directed that the appellant be released on bail on his furnishing adequate security to the satisfaction of the trial court.  Security furnished by the appellant in pursuance of Order

           dated 29.10.2007 shall stand discharged.


                           ..........................J.
                           (MARKANDEYKATJU)



                           ..........................J.
                           (GYANSUDHAMISRA)
NEW DELHI;
FEBRUARY 03, 2011.      :5:

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(ii) THE “ANTI-NATIONALS”: ARBITRARY DETENTION AND TORTURE OF TERRORISM SUSPECTS IN INDIA

   A report by Human Rights Watch, 1 February 2011

   (PDF, 726.34 KB)
http://tinyurl.com/6z2w338

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[6] Announcements:

rsvp at twelvegatesgallery.com

FAIZ IN SONG AND TRANSLATION - FAIZ CENTENNIAL 1911 - 2011
Join us in commemorating the 100th birth anniversary of Faiz Ahmed Faiz
Saturday 12 February, 2011 7p - 9:30p
Tickets: $20

The year 2011 marks the Centennial of Faiz, one of the greatest poets of our times. Events are planned throughout the world to cherish and recall the values of humanity, peace, social justice, and love within the realms of the beauty of Faiz's poetry. This is the first of the many events planned for North America in New York and Philadelphia.
http://twelvegatesgallery.com/

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Friday February 18 , 6:30-9pm

The University of Pennsylvania Dept. Of South Asia Studies, South Asia Center, Middle East Center, and Theater Arts Program invite you to a reading of Shadow Anthropology - A post-9/11 satire about Afghanistan, anthropology, and life during wartime by Rick Mitchell.

Venue: Huntsman Hall, Room 245 - 3730 Walnut Street
RSVP required by 14 February to Raili Roy : railiroy at sas.upenn.edu

In 2011, Shadow Anthropology will appear in the UK in the book Disaster Capitalism; or Money Can't Buy You Love: Three Plays by Rick Mitchell, Intellect Books. (The University of Chicago Press will distribute the tome in the U.S.) 



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South Asia Citizens Wire
Buzz for secularism, on the dangers of fundamentalism(s), on
matters of peace and democratisation in South
Asia. An offshoot of South Asia Citizens Web: 
www.sacw.net/


DISCLAIMER: Opinions expressed in materials carried in the posts do not
necessarily reflect the views of SACW compilers.