[sacw] SACW #1 | 2 Jan. 03

[Harsh Kapoor]

South Asia Citizens Wire #1 | 2 January 2003

__________________________

#1. Chilling nuclear disclosure (Praful Bidwai)
#2.India: Nothing At All To Lose: The Congress does not know how to=20
oppose political Hindutva (Achin Vanaik)
#3. An ode to the Indian Constitution (M.N. Buch)
#4. India: National Textbooks for the Future? (Kumkum Roy)

__________________________

#1.

The News International
January 02, 2003

Chilling nuclear disclosure

Praful Bidwai

Pakistan President Pervez Musharraf's disclosure that he planned an=20
"unconventional" response to a possible Indian attack across the=20
border last year has sent tremors through the international=20
community. His statement, and the Indian response to it, are a grim=20
reminder that South Asia is still "the world's most dangerous place".

To be fair, Gen Musharraf's statement-that Indian troops "should not=20
expect a conventional war" if they "moved a single step across the=20
international border or the Line of Control", and further that this=20
was conveyed to "Prime Minister Vajpayee through every international=20
leader who came to Pakistan" did not explicitly use the words=20
"nuclear weapons".

It is also true that Maj Gen Rashid Qureshi later "clarified" that=20
"the President only meant unconventional forces, and not nuclear or=20
biological weapons...They (a section of the media) took this=20
unconventional form of people rising against the Indian armed forces=20
as meaning nuclear weapons..."

However, the world is likely to interpret the statement as a=20
disclosure, or at least a broad hint, that Islamabad had made=20
preparations to use nuclear weapons at some point during the=20
10-month-long post-December 13, 2001, eyeball-to-eyeball=20
confrontation, as New Delhi in all probability did; he also conveyed=20
a nuclear threat, however obliquely, to India.

This conclusion is not unwarranted. For one, historically, nuclear=20
threats have been generally made not through overt, explicit=20
references to nuclear weapons, but through warnings of "horrible"=20
consequences, etc. For another, it is broadly understood, especially=20
after the Kargil war, that both Pakistan and India would have=20
contingency plans to use nuclear weapons; both have doctrines that=20
permit such use (in Pakistan's case, a first strike).

And for a third, the specific context to which Musharraf referred was=20
an exceptionally dangerous situation, with a distinct potential for=20
escalation from "limited" skirmishes, to large-scale war (with=20
conventional weapons and methods), on to a nuclear exchange.

Even assuming that Musharraf had in mind "non-traditional" war,=20
involving far more lethal armaments than those deployed in past=20
India-Pakistan wars, or the use of unconventional manoeuvres=20
(encircling of Indian forces by the Kashmiri people), the immediate=20
response from India's forces suggests the assumption of a more=20
aggravated scenario.

Thus, outgoing army chief Gen S Padmanabhan said: "We were absolutely=20
ready to go to war. Our forces were well located but such a decision=20
is ultimately a political decision." Padmanabhan dismissed the notion=20
that Pakistan's nuclear capability had deterred India from going to=20
war twice last year. He said: "When we assess our adversaries, we=20
assess all [their] capabilities. We had evaluated it [Pakistan's=20
nuclear capability] and were ready to cope with it." Padmanabhan=20
hinted that an "informal" nuclear command structure has already been=20
in existence. "What is invisible today will become visible tomorrow."

The lightest interpretation that can be put on this exchange is that=20
the threshold for an India-Pakistan nuclear confrontation has now=20
fallen to a dangerous new low. Amidst the heightened visceral=20
hostility, which the two states' rulers mutually nurture, nuclear=20
weapons could be used not at the fag-end of a conventional conflict,=20
when the defeat of one adversary appears imminent. They may be used=20
early-without much warning.

This week's verbal exchanges have further raised the temperature of=20
India-Pakistan rivalry. There have been several such recent=20
exchanges, including the hubris-driven claim by each state that it=20
"won" the recent border confrontation against the other. Two months=20
ago, India's defence minister George Fernandes declared "victory".=20
Now, Musharraf has announced: "We have defeated our enemy without=20
going into war...The enemy has withdrawn its forces..."

In reality, both India and Pakistan lost billions of dollars in=20
staging the globe's biggest military mobilisation since World War II,=20
involving a million troops. Both imposed avoidable hardship and=20
fatigue upon their forces by keeping them on high alert for long=20
periods.

Both sacrificed the lives of scores, if not (a few) hundreds, of=20
their soldiers-in landmine blasts, shelling, and accidents. In India,=20
the estimate is 300 armed personnel dead, and an unspecified number=20
of civilians, along with loss of limb to several hundreds, and the=20
death of countless sheep, goats and cattle. Neither gained strategic=20
advantage or political-diplomatic leverage from the confrontation.

Both India and Pakistan parody, ridicule or altogether demonise each=20
other's intentions, plans and actions. Thus, The Hindu quotes=20
officials to say that India believes that Musharraf was "addressing a=20
domestic audience" on Monday. He "wanted to show" that it was India=20
which "backed down" after mobilising its troops. "India believes=20
Musharraf wanted to bring the India-Pakistan issue under the=20
spotlight once again" when the international community's interest in=20
it is "waning". India treats Musharraf's statement "with disdain".

At the same time, New Delhi has termed Musharraf's statement "highly=20
dangerous" and "provocative" and used it to reject any meaningful=20
"forward movement" in mutual relations.

Such casual, cavalier exchanges between the two receive tub-thumping=20
reception from the expected cheerleaders: strategic "experts" and=20
hawkish politicians. This sows the irrational illusion that each side=20
is in some sense "prepared" to match/counter the other's "nuclear"=20
challenge, that nuclear wars are winnable, that "protection" is=20
possible against these mass-annihilation weapons.

This is heady Macho mythology, the most dangerous part of the=20
pathological mystique associated with nuclearism. For there are, can=20
be, no victors in a nuclear war. Nuclear weapons are strategically=20
irrational. They cannot protect civilian non-combatants. Rather, they=20
make them especially vulnerable.

The best "security" nuclear weapons afford is of a negative kind --=20
based on fear, insecurity, balance of terror. It is at best cold=20
comfort to know that retaliation is possible after the adversary's=20
first attack. But nuclear retaliation is an act of senseless revenge,=20
not of regaining security.

Yet, both India and Pakistan are hurtling towards inducting nuclear=20
weapons into their armed forces. Pakistan announced last April it was=20
upgrading its strategic nuclear command. India is planning to=20
establish this month its Strategic Forces Command (SFC) tasked with=20
managing the nuclear arsenal. "The Cabinet Committee on Security is=20
expected to give the formal go-ahead...A nuclear command post in the=20
shape of a concrete underground structure is also being built,"=20
reports The Times of India.

For the moment, the nuclear system's different components will be=20
kept separately. The radioactive cores will be with the Department of=20
Atomic Energy, the detonation assembly will be in the custody of the=20
Defence Research and Development Organisation, and the delivery=20
vehicles with the armed forces.

This is one more step in the direction of raising the nuclear danger=20
in South Asia. Yet, given its preoccupation with the Middle East, and=20
the many actions of the US government in legitimising nuclear=20
weapons, the world community is unlikely to intervene in this region=20
to counsel restraint and halt India and Pakistan's descent into a=20
nuclear arms race.

The pressure for such restraint will have to come from within. In=20
today's vitiated climate, that is a tall order. India's government,=20
the country's most rightwing and conservative since Independence, has=20
decided that it will obstruct the normalisation of relations with=20
Pakistan as much as possible. That's what the latest visa=20
restrictions mean. Pakistan has duly reciprocated this hostility.=20
Only a strong peace movement can alter this dismal situation.

_____

#2.

The Telegraph
January 02, 2003
Op-Ed.

NOTHING AT ALL TO LOSE
- The Congress does not know how to oppose political Hindutva

Achin Vanaik

One of the more comforting assumptions that political analysts have=20
had is that India's sheer size, complexity and array of diverse and=20
cross-cutting social, cultural, ideological and economic demarcations=20
force all national-level politics to ultimately move towards some=20
kind of "moderate" centre. Even though the rise of the Bharatiya=20
Janata Party and the sangh parivar pushed the centre of gravity of=20
Indian politics to the right, there has always been the argument that=20
if the BJP wants to be a "normalized" ruling party then it cannot at=20
the same time be the party of the Hindu rassemblement. Hence the=20
repeated predictions that the only way it could grow electorally and=20
legitimize itself nationally would be by moderating its ideological=20
proclivities.

However, its first major spurt took place between 1984 (two Lok Sabha=20
seats) and 1989 (89 seats) mainly because of its Ramjanmabhoomi=20
campaign. Its next major spurt took place after its calculated=20
demolition of the Babri Masjid in December 1992 when in subsequent=20
elections in 1996, '98 and '99, its tally hovered between 161 and 182=20
seats. This new electoral plateau had then suggested to many that the=20
same principle of moderation stood as the guarantor preventing=20
further acceleration of the Hindutva project.

The Gujarat results have put paid to this belief. It is by shifting=20
even further to the right that the sangh now expects to make further=20
electoral inroads. For if the failures of governance (the=20
anti-incumbency factor) were the main reason earlier for pendular=20
shifts between ruling and opposition parties in the states, thus=20
holding out the promise of a Congress-centred ruling coalition at the=20
national level in the next Lok Sabha elections, such a view must now=20
be reassessed.

The gains from Gujarat for a hard and ruthless Hindutva project are=20
very significant. The first lesson is that the failure of governance=20
is not enough to topple a party if it also has a powerful mobilizing=20
strategy and capacity. After all, a wearied electorate has enough=20
experience of all parties performing miserably when it comes to=20
governance. Second, a state-organized pogrom against Muslims does not=20
horrify very substantial sections of society, not just in Gujarat.=20
There is a new and widespread "common sense" about needing to "react"=20
against "threatening" Indian Muslims supposedly linked by religion to=20
both Pakistani treachery and "Islamic terrorism". Third, patient=20
grassroots work in civil society amongst tribals and Dalits through=20
the Rashtriya Swayamsevak Sangh, Vishwa Hindu Parishad and other=20
front organizations can pay rich dividends even if these activities=20
cannot overcome material problems and deprivations faced by these=20
communities. Fourth, allied parties in the National Democratic=20
Alliance have neither serious political scruples nor any national=20
vision and are most concerned simply to continue enjoying the feeble=20
fruits of a minority share in power at the Centre. Fifth, the=20
Congress opposition does not know how to oppose political Hindutva.

This last factor is perhaps the most disturbing. For the sangh to=20
carry out fully its Hindutva agenda (the establishment of an=20
anti-democratic reg- ime, and an authoritarian civil society) it must=20
achieve an electoral majority or close enough to it so that it can=20
rule on its own. Even better would be achieving the two-thirds=20
majority that would enable it to permanently change the Indian=20
Constitution and institutionalize irrevocably a Hindu rashtra.=20
Standing in the way of this electoral route to decisive political=20
authority is the Congress. The Congress must suffer a virtual=20
electoral demise if political Hindutva is to fully triumph.

The Congress must fight this opponent at two different levels - the=20
electoral and the ideological-political. For over 15 years, whatever=20
the fluctuations in the electoral graph of the BJP at the Centre or=20
in the states, the curve of the sangh's ideological-political advance=20
has moved steadily, even if sometimes only slowly, upwards. This is=20
because there is no other force capable of matching the range and=20
depth of their activities - from the cultural-ideological to the=20
welfarist-recreational - in the pores of Indian civil society.

In contrast, the Congress has for a long time been little more than a=20
ramshackle electoral machine periodically geared up, whose own=20
activists are, in so many cases and at so many levels, attracted to=20
various themes of Hindutva ideology as well as tempted to change=20
sides since the sangh bears the aura of being nationally the possible=20
"wave of the future" or at least the next party of governance in the=20
states where the Congress today rules. The Congress has no inspiring=20
vision of its own, no systematic programme that reflects strong=20
social commitments to the lower castes and classes, and therefore no=20
assured constituency of supporters, ideological, political or=20
electoral.

In the longer term, the sangh has to be confronted and defeated in=20
civil society. If the Congress cannot develop comparable grassroots=20
organizations and activities, can it at least think of various local=20
and regional, if not national-level, campaigns on particular issues=20
that can provide inspiration and appeal to many sections of Indian=20
society as well as enthuse its own party-workers and supporters?

Can the Congress become, at least in part, a campaigning force of=20
some creativity not only adopting the negative posture of opposing=20
Hindutva, which it must (soft Hindutva is finished, which is not to=20
say the Congress might not still pursue this approach), but also of=20
pursuing the positive posture of standing for something worthwhile=20
and relevant to the lives and feelings of the people it wishes to=20
attract? In short, how does it make itself politically distinctive=20
and meaningful and how does it convince people of its sincerity and=20
commitment in this regard? If today's Congress is not even capable of=20
doing this much, then is there anything else it can do?

Manmohanomics makes it neither distinctive from the BJP nor=20
meaningful to society outside the mislabelled Indian "middle class",=20
that 10-15 per cent of the Indian elite which is in fact the=20
strongest social base today for Hindutva. At the last general=20
elections of 1999, 46 per cent of Hindu upper castes voted for the=20
BJP compared to 21 percent for the Congress. Not only is the BJP no=20
longer a Brahmin-Bania party (having made inroads into other backward=20
classes as well as tribals) but it is also now the most favoured=20
party of the Hindu upper castes and classes.

In the short term, there are two things the Congress can and should=20
do besides abandoning permanently the temptation to pursue soft=20
Hindutva. It must make pre-poll alliances with other political=20
parties so as to forge stable coalitions that are seen as being=20
stable, and by doing so send home the message that there is also a=20
broad unity of forces strongly opposed to what Hindutva stands for.=20
It can no longer afford to remain aloof or simply expect others to=20
woo it. Second, given its programmatic or organizational limitations=20
it must look for a "low fuss-high impact" initiative that has the=20
potential to alter its image and to attract those sections of Indian=20
society whose own resurgence offer the best chances of countering the=20
sangh.

In effect, can it find a way, for example, to give its own ranks and=20
support-base a Dalit composition? No mainstream party in India has=20
had the courage to adopt a policy of reservations at all internal=20
organizational leadership levels for Dalits, tribals and women in=20
proportion to their membership within the party. As the membership of=20
such groups grows, so does their leadership presence. Such a policy=20
can galvanize the Congress as never before. It has everything to gain=20
and what, given its current plight, does it have to lose?

_____

#3.

The Hindustan Times
Wednesday, January 1, 2003
=09=20
An ode to the Indian Constitution
M.N. Buch

The VHP has been trumpeting the Hindu Rashtra theme after the=20
Gujarat elections. Around 82 per cent of the population professes the=20
Hindu faith. With such a vast majority being Hindu, why should the=20
VHP suffer from such a deep-rooted inferiority complex that it=20
insists on a formal declaration of India as a Hindu Rashtra?

The average Hindu has no doubts about his Hindu status or faith, nor=20
does he want that there should be a formal declaration of the nation=20
as a Hindu nation. Unless, there are other ulterior motives, as is=20
clearly the case with the VHP.

The first motive could be to change the Constitution, to remove the=20
word 'secular' from the Preamble, to dilute Article 14 which mandates=20
equality for all and to eliminate Article 25 which gives freedom of=20
worship as a fundamental right to all Indians. In other words -=20
declare India as a theocratic State.

Our neighbour, Sri Lanka, in its Constitution (Chapter II, Article=20
9), accords a special place to Buddhism. The article reads, "The=20
Republic of Sri Lanka will give to Buddhism the foremost place and=20
accordingly it shall be the duty of the State to protect and foster=20
the Buddha Sasana, while assuring to all religions the rights granted=20
by Articles 10 and 14 (1) (e)."

The Sinhala speaking people are largely Buddhists. Article 18 of the=20
Constitution made Sinhala the official language. Hence, the balance=20
of employment in government services tilted in favour of the=20
Sinhalese to the disadvantage of the Tamils. An official religion and=20
language which excluded Tamil is one of the main reasons why an=20
extreme form of violent separatist movement was launched by the=20
Jaffna Tamils under the banner of LTTE.

Sri Lanka's status as a near-theocratic State has not led to national=20
development. It has instead triggered a civil war.

We have the example of Pakistan whose Constitution declares it as an=20
Islamic republic, mandates Islam as the official religion and directs=20
that only a Muslim may hold the high offices of State such as=20
president, prime minister, etc. The truth is that the binding force=20
of Islam has not brought about unity between the western and eastern=20
wings of Pakistan as originally constituted in 1947, nor has it led=20
to peace between the Shias and Sunnis, the original inhabitants of=20
the four constituent units of present day Pakistan and the Mohajirs=20
(refugees from India), and between the four provinces themselves.

Islam has not resolved the internal conflicts in Pakistan. It has not=20
brought democracy. It has instead made the civil society subservient=20
to military control. Despite Islam, Pakistan sponsors terrorism,=20
especially against India. Theocratic Pakistan, when compared with=20
secular Turkey, is certainly not a happy country to live in.

In every true democracy, there is complete separation between the=20
church and the State. In all temporal matters, temporal and secular=20
laws govern the State. Religion has no role in governance. Every=20
great democracy tends to be multicultural and multiethnic and this=20
was true of Anglo-Saxon Britain before the Asian influx. Britain=20
consisted of the Anglo-Saxons, the Normans, the Picts, the Irish, the=20
Welsh and the remnants of the original Britons. Even this society was=20
multiethnic and multicultural, a democracy. The Anglo-Saxons or the=20
Normans no longer dominated once the power of the king was broken and=20
parliamentary democracy was introduced.

The strongest point in favour of democracy is that everyone is equal=20
in the eyes of law and justice is done on the basis of merit rather=20
than on religion, caste or status. Because Anglo-Saxon jurisprudence=20
is based on such equality it has given the world a system of justice=20
and adjudication which is the model for most countries, other than=20
dictatorships.

Even the Indian system of justice is based on Anglo-Saxon law, as=20
modified for Indian conditions. And it is this system of justice=20
which permits people like Praveen Togadia to make highly provocative=20
and obnoxious statements.

Another motive of touting a Hindu Rashtra could be to rid India of=20
anyone who is not a practising Hindu or owes allegiance to another=20
faith. If they fail to push out such people or to physically=20
liquidate them, then in a Hindu Rashtra they would have second class=20
citizenship and be denied of rights of a free citizen. This,=20
incidentally, is the fate of non-Muslims in Pakistan.

An extreme example of such brute discrimination was Nazi Germany in=20
which the Jews didn't have the right to live and the people of=20
Eastern Europe, the Slavs, who were called Untermenschen=20
(sub-humans), were fit only to be slaves. Can a democratic India=20
afford to call its non-Hindu citizens Untermenschen? Or create=20
concentration camps for Muslims, Christians and 'liberals'? Or murder=20
millions inside gas chambers?

A third motive could be to play the communal card to win elections.=20
Nothing could be more myopic than this. Winning votes in the name of=20
religion demands that the electorate should consist of fanatics who=20
are prepared to put religion above such issues public order, access=20
to a development and employment, better education and health services=20
and a bright future. The Constitution of India mandates the welfare=20
of the people as the primary duty of the government and a party=20
seeking power must convince the people that their welfare will be=20
promoted.

The appeal made by the VHP is an open invitation to bigotry.=20
Ghettoisation, mental or physical, is fatal to the well-being of the=20
nation and everything that Ashok Singhal, Togadia and their ilk say=20
only promotes such ghettoisation. This is a dangerous trend because=20
the ultimate in ghettos was the Warsaw Ghetto in which the Jews were=20
herded by the Nazis and then exterminated. Perhaps the likes of=20
Togadia have yet not reached the depths of degradation of Hitler, but=20
the intention seems to be common.

A sane, democratic India cannot afford the insanity of a Togadia or=20
Singhal. LK Advani has categorically stated in Parliament that India=20
cannot be a Hindu Rashtra and its secular nature will prevail.=20
Indeed, the VHP is the greatest enemy of Hinduism.

______

#4.

Economic and Political Weekly
December 21, 2002
Commentary

National Textbooks for the Future?

We have been told how the sentiments of self-proclaimed=20
religious leaders have been taken into consideration in rewriting=20
school history textbooks. What is obvious is that the first casualty=20
of this rewriting has been truth. Presumably these so-called=20
religious leaders do not include the quest for truth in their=20
agenda. Neither does the National Council of Educational Research and=20
Training. The case of the Class XI book on ancient India authored by=20
Makkhan Lal.

Kumkum Roy

We have been reviewing textbooks that have been published by the=20
National Council of Educational Research and Training (NCERT) for the=20
past few months, and it is quite likely that we have reached a=20
saturation point as far as interest in the issue is concerned. Yet,=20
given the gravity of the situation, it is perhaps necessary to=20
continue with the exercise, in order to draw attention to the serious=20
problems that will arise if these books are recommended and used in=20
schools. It is in this context that we need to scrutinise the Class=20
XI book on ancient India authored by Makkhan Lal.

We need to remember that these are books that will be used by=20
students who consciously opt to study History at the Senior Secondary=20
School level, some of whom will perhaps go on to study History in=20
college and subsequently as well. It is these young men and women who=20
will become History teachers in the next generation. Also, given past=20
experience, one knows that NCERT books have often been used by=20
students preparing for various competitive examinations. As such,=20
what goes into them has widespread implications that cannot be=20
overlooked.

Some statements in the book are confusing, to say the least. I will=20
cite just two instances. One, from page 11, informs us: "they [the=20
British] were worried of the fact that British civilians were getting=20
brahmanised and developing inferiority complex" (p 11). Elsewhere (p=20
32) we learn that "India is a country with vast variety of rich=20
vegetation and congenial regular weather chain. It is most suited for=20
human habitat. Conditions for population saturation resulting in mass=20
human migrations are more probable here than in any other part of the=20
world like central Asia or Europe." It is perhaps our loss that we=20
are unable to make sense of such ideas.

Perhaps more worrisome are the inaccurate statements that have=20
slipped into the book at a number of points. Once again, a handful of=20
glaring examples must suffice. We learn on page 86 that "RigVedic=20
society comprised four varnas, namely, Brahmana, Kshatriya, Vaisya=20
and Sudra." As I have pointed out elsewhere ('Where Do We Go From=20
Here?' in Saffronised and Substandard: A Critique of the New NCERT=20
Textbooks, SAHMAT, New Delhi, 2002, pp 25-38), there is only one=20
reference to the fourfold varna order in the Rig Veda, in one verse=20
out of more than 10,000, and to use this to suggest that society=20
represented in the text was stratified along varna lines is simply=20
inaccurate. It is not justified by any logic of historical=20
reconstruction, but then perhaps we are na=EFve to expect such logic to=20
operate. What we are up against is the logic of attributing as much=20
antiquity and sanctity as possible to any institution that is=20
regarded as valuable from a narrow, majoritarian, homogenising=20
perspective. So the varna order has to be classified as early Vedic,=20
even if the evidence cannot sustain such a claim.

The second statement, on the same page, flows from similar concerns.=20
"The Vedas prescribe a penalty of death or expulsion from the kingdom=20
to those who kill or injure cows." Once again, this is inaccurate,=20
simply because the Vedas consist of mantras or prayers to the=20
gods/goddesses. They are not normative texts, and do not prescribe=20
punishments. But then, in the introduction to one of the most popular=20
works on Vedic mathematics, we are told:

It is the whole essence of his [Jagadguru Shankaracharya of Puri who=20
"discovered" Vedic mathematics] assessment of Vedic tradition that it=20
is not to be approached from a factual standpoint but from the ideal=20
standpoint, viz, as the Vedas, as traditionally accepted in India as=20
the repository of all knowledge, should be and not what they are in=20
human possession. That approach entirely turns the tables on all=20
critics, for the authorship of Vedic mathematics then need not be=20
laboriously searched in the texts preserved from antiquity. [italics=20
in the original, General Editor's Note, p vi, to Vedic Mathematics by=20
Jagadguru Swami Sri Bharati Krsna Tirthaji Maharaja Sankaracarya of=20
Govardhana Matha Puri, Motilal Banarsidass, Delhi].

We also learn (pp xxix-xxx):

Revered Guruji used to say that he had reconstructed the sixteen=20
mathematical formulae (given in this text) from the Atharvaveda after=20
assiduous research and 'Tapas' for about eight years in the forests=20
surrounding Sringeri. Obviously these formulae are not to be found in=20
the present recensions of Atharvaveda; they were actually=20
reconstructed, on the basis of intuitive revelation, from materials=20
scattered here and there in the Atharvaveda. =8AIn 1957, when he had=20
decided finally to undertake a tour of the USA he re-wrote from=20
memory the present volume, giving an introductory account of the=20
sixteen formulae reconstructed by him.

As such, we should not be surprised that the term Veda can be used to=20
mean just about anything. Such attempts to redefine 'Vedic' could=20
have been dismissed as harmless eccentricities in most situations.=20
But, as we have seen in Jhajjar, people can lose their lives if they=20
are thought to have been guilty of killing cows, and it is in that=20
context that we need to ensure that such statements do not go=20
unchallenged.

It is perhaps worth recalling what H D Sankalia, recognised for long=20
as the father of Indian archaeology, said with respect to the cow:

The ban on cow slaughter is indeed of comparatively recent growth,=20
mostly as a reaction against Islam rather than genuine, real love and=20
reverence for the cow. ...From some 3000BC to C700 BC, man in India,=20
as elsewhere in the world, continued to prefer beef to all other=20
forms of animal diet...What the cow/ox in India needs today is good=20
treatment - wholesome food, and fodder and water, and freedom from=20
exploitation by the Hindus at all levels. Their reverence for the cow=20
is always superficial. This was noticed and recorded by the authors=20
of the Bhagavata Purana and the Ramayana centuries ago and regarded=20
as one of the symptoms of the Kali Yuga! The Kali Yuga has increased=20
in its intensity and so also the exploitation of the cow. It is=20
against this exploitation that we must all strive, not for a blanket=20
prohibition of go-vadha. ('The Cow in History', Seminar, 1968.)

What is alarming is the scant regard for truth that has accompanied=20
the rewriting of history in the name of updating antiquated=20
scholarship.

Another instance of tampering with evidence occurs on page 90. Here=20
we learn that "Indra is known as Purandara, 'Lord of Cities'". This=20
is a shocking travesty of Vedic Sanskrit. It is true that there are=20
several references to Indra, one of the most important gods of the=20
Vedic pantheon, as Purandara in the Rig Veda. But the term purandara=20
means destroyer of pura, and not lord of cities. Pura itself might=20
mean a settlement, perhaps fortified, and not necessarily a city. The=20
only way in which one can arrive at the sense of lord of cities is by=20
replacing d by dh, and creating a term purandhara that does not occur=20
in the Rig Vedic mantras. But clearly, the devotees of Indra will=20
stop at nothing to achieve their ends. And why must Indra become the=20
lord of cities? Well, the Harappan civilisation is by any standards=20
urban, and if it has to be claimed as Vedic, then Indra, as one of=20
the chief gods of the Vedic pantheon, and as a warlike, valorous hero=20
figure, has to be urbanised. What better than a simple sleight of=20
tongue, replacing one consonant by another? So, while on the one hand=20
lip-service continues to be paid to the sanctity of the Vedas, on the=20
other hand, Vedic mantras and words can be transformed to suit=20
present-day agendas.

Consider certain other problems with the book. Let us look at the=20
definition of the Dharmasutras (p18).

The Dharmasutras and the Smritis are rules and regulations for the=20
general public and the rulers. It can be termed in the modern concept=20
as the constitution and the law books for the ancient Indian polity=20
and society.

Such parallels between modern and ancient institutions and practices=20
were frequently drawn by nationalist historians in the early=20
twentieth century, when there was a preoccupation with trying to find=20
parallels for modern institutions in the past. However, in the=20
twentyfirst century, and after more than 50 years of independence, we=20
should be able to move beyond such strategies, which were=20
not necessarily accurate, and acknowledge historical change instead=20
of constructing a picture of a changeless past by all means, fair=20
and foul. Notice also that equating the Constitution with the=20
Dharmasutras obscures and denies the very different histories that=20
have gone into the production of these documents. The Constitution=20
emerged through a process of intense discussion and debate, which is=20
part of our democratic heritage. The Dharmasutras and Smritis, on the=20
other hand, are primarily brahmanical documents and need to be=20
understood as such.

A related problem is the way in which this perspective leads to=20
constructing a picture of uniformity, one that runs counter to the=20
rich diversity of developments in ancient India that have been=20
documented over the last few decades. We read, for instance, on page=20
35

Although there always had been many states in India but their social=20
and cultural setup had been broadly the same throughout. Sanskrit was=20
the most respected language besides the local languages. States were=20
administered and governed on the basis of law-books called=20
Dharmasastras. Places of worship and pilgrimage are distributed=20
throughout the country. These cultural bonds gave the Indians a sense=20
of unity and nationality.

It is worth examining the implications of this statement, which in=20
fact constitutes one of the running themes of the book. The only=20
diversity that is acknowledged is that of different political powers.=20
Social change is brushed aside and the fact that we have histories of=20
the spread, modification and change in the varna/jati system would be=20
impossible to accommodate within this framework. Linguistic diversity=20
is likewise suppressed. Students would not be allowed to examine the=20
implications of the fact that the earliest inscriptions (including=20
those of the Mauryan ruler Asoka) are primarily in Prakrit, and not=20
in Sanskrit and that the Dharmasastras may have had little or no=20
significance for the Mauryan administration (and those of many other=20
polities) for instance. The fact that the institution of pilgrimage=20
has a history of its own would not be focused on and the fact that=20
nationality is a modern notion would be lost on students who would be=20
taught that it existed from time immemorial. And what about=20
pedagogical strategies? Sadly, the book abounds in statements that=20
are simple assertions, designed to encourage rote learning. Read the=20
following paragraph, (p 84) which is inserted to suggest that the=20
Vedas are of great antiquity:

Bal Gangadhar Tilak, on astronomical grounds, dated Rig Veda to 6000=20
BC. According to Harmon Jacobi Vedic civilisation flourished between=20
4500 BC and 2500 BC and some of the Samhitas were composed in the=20
latter half of the period. Famous Sanskritist, Winternitz felt that=20
the Rig Veda was probably composed in the third millennium BC. R K=20
Mookerjee opined that "on a modest computation, we should come to=20
2500 BC as the time of Rig Veda". G C Pande also favours a date of=20
3000 BC or even earlier.

What, if anything, does this tell us about the logic of dating texts?=20
The student will have half a dozen names to remember but little=20
insight into a serious historical problem. To add to the confusion,=20
we have a sentence on page 92 that states "there are other scholars=20
who consider Vedic culture as different from that of the Harappan=20
civilisation." If we look for any understanding of why they suggest=20
this, we will be disappointed.

Finally, it may be worth considering what happens with four issues=20
that have been marginalised from standard histories. One would have=20
expected that in a new history written in the twentyfirst century,=20
these issues would have found some space. But that is not to be. The=20
first issue that we can consider is the treatment of regions, and I=20
will simply focus on the treatment of Tamilakam, the ancient Tamil=20
region. On page 153 we find a map of south India, where=20
Gangaikondacholapuram and Tanjavur are listed as sites of the Sangam=20
Age. Obviously, chronology has been sacrificed. There is a=20
discrepancy of several centuries between the Sangam Age and the=20
period of the later Chola rulers when these settlements emerged as=20
important urban centres, but then, perhaps from the perspective of=20
the author, notions of time are generally irrelevant for regional=20
history. It is also worth looking at the treatment of the tradition=20
of Bhakti in the text. The Alvars are referred to as Vaisnava saints=20
on page 193, they become Vaisnava devotees on page 199 and finally on=20
page 229 we learn that "The Bhakti movement led by Nayanars (Saiva=20
saint) and Alvars (Vaisnava saint) spread all over the country. These=20
saints went from place to place carrying their message of love and=20
devotion." Which of these three statements is the student to accept?=20
Clearly, time, space and factual accuracy are trivial matters when=20
reconstructing regional histories. And this is the case of a region=20
whose history has been amongst the best researched in the last few=20
decades.

It may also be useful to see what happens with issues of gender.=20
Women pop in and out of the pages of the book occasionally, in=20
connection with inheritance, where we are told that they could=20
inherit in the absence of "male issues" (p 96) or if they were the=20
only child of their parents (p 86), a situation that is portrayed as=20
being virtually constant (p 160, p 226). None of the concerns with=20
engendering history that have been raised in the last three decades=20
find space in the book. If we expect to find discussions about women=20
in connection with other matters, including their roles in=20
production, or in alternative religious traditions such as Buddhism=20
and Jainism, we will be disappointed.

Perhaps more intriguing is the treatment of the concept of 'tribe'.=20
Clearly, this has become a dirty word, to be scrupulously eschewed.=20
This may have to do with the fact that 'tainted' scholars such as R S=20
Sharma had suggested "that the social formation represented in Vedic=20
literature could best be understood in terms of the category of a=20
tribal society in transition. In the present book, the only reference=20
to tribe occurs in the context of the Kusanas (p 145) who are=20
connected with central Asian tribes. There is also an illustration of=20
tribal coins on page 142, but beyond that the student would be left=20
in the dark about the possibility of tribal societies existing in the=20
past. In other words, tribal populations will now be denied a past=20
and will perhaps figure as a figment of the imagination of Christian=20
missionaries, if at all.

It is also worth examining what happens to the question of=20
untouchability. This almost surfaces twice in the book: once, on page=20
97, in the context of the later Vedic period, when we learn that "The=20
most glaring evil of the jati system, namely, the concept of=20
untouchability had not yet reared its ugly head". Then we suddenly=20
stumble on some remarkable information on page 225. "The=20
transformation of a specific profession into jati and the increasing=20
phenomenon of hypergamous unions between different jati led to the=20
rise of mixed jati. Jatis were also formed on the basis of religious=20
sects such as lingayats, virasaivas, svetambaras, and digambaras,=20
etc. The lowest were the antyajatis of whom Chandalas are the=20
most important representatives." Does this tell us anything at all=20
about the oppressions associated with caste, and how these=20
affected the lives of vast sections of people? And do our children=20
have a right to know and understand these issues?

One is left wondering whether women, dalits, tribals are part of the=20
nation or not, or whether the nation is envisaged as an upper caste,=20
brahmanical construct, centred on the Ganga valley. Surely, the=20
National Council of Educational Research and Training has some=20
responsibilities to discharge towards the vast majority in the=20
country. We have been hearing about how the sentiments of=20
self-proclaimed religious leaders have been taken into consideration=20
in rewriting History. What is obvious is that the first casualty of=20
this rewriting has been truth. Presumably, these so-called religious=20
leaders do not include the quest for truth in their agenda. Neither=20
does the NCERT.

It is in this context that it is absolutely essential that many more=20
of us engage in what has been called the battle of the books. We need=20
to intervene in as many ways as possible, as parents, teachers,=20
concerned citizens of the country, to ensure that future generations=20
of school-going children learn histories that move beyond a=20
preoccupation with dynastic vicissitudes, and can be equipped to=20
understand and intervene in an increasingly complicated social=20
scenario.

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