[sacw] SACW | 6 Jan. 03

[Harsh Kapoor]

South Asia Citizens Wire | 6 January 2003

CRIME AGAINST HUMANITY -- GUJARAT 2002: A report on the=20
investigations, findings and recommendations of the Concerned=20
Citizens' Tribunal
on http://www.sabrang.com.

FOREIGN EXCHANGE OF HATE- IDRF and the American Funding of Hindutva
A report on the US-based organization -- the India Development and=20
Relief Fund (IDRF), which has systematically funded Hindutva=20
operations in India.
http://www.mnet.fr/aiindex/2002/FEH/

__________________________

#1. Sri Lankan Ethnic Crisis (Jayadeva Uyangoda)
#2. Pakistan: Sociology of Lumpen Politics (Imtiaz Alam)
#3. Pakistan: Fighting Against the Hate Agenda (Rehman Faiz)
#4. India: Ambedkar versus Moditva (Udit Raj)
#5. India: VHP sees a potential Ayodhya in a Karnataka Sufi shrine=20
(N. Bhanutej)
#6. India: Public Hearing on 'Living with Hunger' (New Delhi, 10 January 20=
02)
#7. India: Public Screening of 'Tales of the Nightfairies' a film by=20
Shohini Ghosh [on struggles and aspirations of sex workers] New=20
Delhi, January 28, 2003

__________________________

#1.

Lanka Chronicle
January 02 2003
Features

Sri Lankan Ethnic Crisis

R. B. Herath's book, Sri Lankan Ethnic Crisis: Towards a Resolution,=20
has come at a time when Sri Lanka is entering into a decisive phase=20
of political transformation. The government of Sri Lanka and the=20
Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE) have reached an agreement to=20
explore the possibilities of a federalist constitution as a measure=20
of settling the ethnic conflict through political reforms.=20
Interestingly, the LTTE leadership has now re-interpreted their=20
concept of national self-determination to mean regional autonomy and=20
self-rule within a 'united' Sri Lanka. The constitutional model=20
within which the arrangements for regional autonomy would be=20
concretized is federalism. If the ethnic question were to be resolved=20
through non-military means, it required a system of extensive power=20
sharing, an option that also presupposed a democratic reconstitution=20
of the post-colonial Sri Lankan state. But, Sri Lanka's=20
political-constitutional debate on this theme has not been a=20
particularly strong one. Many constitutional jurists in Sinhalese=20
society appear to prefer a unitary model in its unreformed=20
Westminster heritage while the federalist constitutionalism has been=20
developed in Sri Lanka primarily by Tamil legal scholars. A reasoned=20
and passionate plea for federalization of the modern Sri Lankan has=20
at last come from a scholar with a Sinhalese ethnic identity. This is=20
indeed a welcome intervention in the otherwise thin Sri Lankan debate=20
on political transformation.

In a lucid and concise introductory chapter, the author presents the=20
basic framework of his analysis and arguments, thereby enabling the=20
reader grasp the essence of the book with relative ease. His starting=20
point is one with which I totally agree. It is true that Sri Lanka=20
has had a long pre-colonial and colonial history and some of the=20
factors that may have contributed to the ethnic conflict also have a=20
long history. However, the escalation of the ethnic conflict into a=20
separatist war has been largely due to developments that occurred=20
after independence. He identifies three factors that have contributed=20
to post-independence conflict escalation in Sri Lanka: shortcomings=20
of the post-independence constitutions, divisive and chauvinistic=20
policies of the political leadership and the inadequacies of the=20
post-colonial economy to promote equity, justice and development=20
across class and ethnic cleavages. The failure of nation-building and=20
national integration, as the author points out, is at the center of=20
our post-independence predicament. The challenge, then is, how to=20
address this failure and move forward in order to build a modern,=20
pluralistic and democratic polity in a society that is torn sunder by=20
a protracted intrastate war and violence associated with it.

In chapter two, which runs into 65 pages, the author provides an=20
account of the historical background of Sri Lanka's present crisis.=20
Marshalling a multiplicity of analyses in a vast range of scholarly=20
literature, Herath presents a strong argument for reconciliation and=20
trust building among different ethnic communities in Sri Lanka. His=20
historical narrative is both critical and independent of the received=20
narrativization of Sri Lanka's past in the nationalist historiography=20
as well as literature. Chapter three is about what the author calls=20
"present paranoia," or the making of Sri Lanka's present tragedy. The=20
authors focus on the rise of majoritarian politics in Sinhalese=20
society that has led to the breakdown of democratic ethnic relations=20
in a plural society and the emergence of a protracted ethnic war. His=20
democratic, secular critique of ethnicized politics is penetrating,=20
rationalistic and modernist.

The most important chapter of the book is Chapter Four entitled "A=20
New Beginning." He makes the assertion that a meaningful new=20
beginning for Sri Lanka is possible only when a revived awareness and=20
recognition of the linguistic, religious and ethnic diversity that=20
already exists in Sri Lankan society. The recognition of this=20
essential diversity is, as the Canadian philosopher Charles Taylor=20
would put it, is fundamentally linked to a politics of recognition.=20
The politics of mis-recognition of ethnic minorities has been at the=20
center of minority grievances as well as minoritarian rejection of=20
the kind of institutional democracy that has been practiced in=20
post-colonial Sri Lanka. Hearth's plea is to accept the essential=20
heterogeneity of Sri Lankan society as an enabling and empowering=20
force, and not as a debilitating factor as viewed in hyper-ethnicized=20
politics of exclusivity. The acceptance of diversity and difference=20
in an enabling and democratic perspective, as the author argues, can=20
also effectively deal with the highly emotionalized idea of homeland.=20
Obviously, Herath has observed the recent ethnic politics in Canada=20
and elsewhere. While advocating the position that there should not be=20
ethnically exclusive homelands, he concludes that the government=20
should not determine where its citizens should go and settle. The=20
settler himself or herself should make that decision. The government=20
should not assume the power to control the rights and freedoms of the=20
individual in any manner.

In Chapter four, the author also proposes a new democratic model for=20
Sri Lanka. His concept of the government has three levels, the=20
central government, regional governments and municipal governments.=20
The national legislature should be a bicameral one, elected by the=20
people. The regional governments should also have bicameral=20
legislatures. The central government and regional governments should=20
in turn share the legislative powers of the people which should base=20
itself on the principle of popular sovereignty. There should also be=20
an extensive framework of checks and balances in the proposed federal=20
system of governance in order to " enrich and foster bonds of oneness=20
among the different regions of the country" (p. 168). These checks=20
and balances should include the constitutional prohibition of=20
discriminatory legislation, guarantee of fundamental rights and=20
freedoms for all, unanimity as well as veto power in legislation,=20
promotion of common values, equalization programs and people's=20
exchange programs as diverse levels.

The author is also aware of the fact that changing the centralized=20
model of Sri Lanka's system of government into a federal model could=20
come into effect only through a major amendment to the Constitution.=20
Any amendment to the constitution is possible only through a=20
two-thirds majority support in parliament. But given the divisive and=20
fragmented nature of politics in Sri Lanka at present, cooperation=20
among political parties and leaders necessary for such a major change=20
is not possible to materialize. Herath addresses this dilemma by=20
shifting the role of agency from political parties to the people. As=20
he argues, in the final analysis, the real power to implement or not=20
to implement changes to the constitution lies with its people. The=20
people should not wait for any particular political leader to=20
"ceremoniously initiate such a process." People themselves must=20
initiate the process on their own, discuss and debate among=20
themselves "wherever they meet and talk." In this almost Aristotelian=20
envisioning of active participation in citizenry in the public realm,=20
such discussions and debates should constitute "a deliberate,=20
rational and democratic process, involving all the people of the=20
country, in an atmosphere of reason, cooperation, goodwill and mutual=20
respect" (p. 174).

As Henry Subasinghe comments in his note, R. B. Herath's book is a=20
frank reflection of history and politics of Sri Lanka that has=20
produced its tragic ethnic crisis. It is written with the purpose of=20
making a constructive intervention in Sri Lanka's present conjuncture=20
of politics. It seeks the resolution of the ethnic conflict through a=20
process of transformation leading to democratic and pluralistic=20
re-fashioning of political communities in Sri Lanka. It is a reasoned=20
plea for tolerance, pluralism, peace and democratization which has=20
interestingly come from an expatriate Sri Lankan who has reflected on=20
the tragedy and crisis of his country from afar.

Dr. Jayadeva Uyangoda
Professor and Head
Dept. of Political Science and Public Policy
University of Colombo
Sri Lanka

______

#2.

The News International
Monday January 06, 2003

Sociology of lumpen politics
Imtiaz Alam

Pakistan's social development, politics and ethos remind the famous=20
thesis of lumpen bourgeoisie developed by sociologists about the=20
peculiar character of social development in Latin America. Extending=20
this theme to evaluate the current political patterns in Pakistan, we=20
come across a breed of lumpen politicians who thrive on the betrayal=20
of their public commitments, breach of democratic conventions,=20
expeditious somersaults and self-aggrandisement at the cost of public=20
interest. What is this phenomenon, how does it emerge and where would=20
it lead to?

Lumpen politics, as a political phenomenon, is not new to Pakistan=20
that remained under the military tutelage for too long. It has its=20
bases in both the material infrastructure and an over-binding=20
superstructure. In a peripheral post-colonial state that developed in=20
a client-patron relationship, the ruling civil-military clique was to=20
perform certain functions for the metropolitan patron, in our case=20
the US, and be rewarded with variable wages according to the nature=20
of job whenever performed. This is how a client state developed and=20
so has its social classes, barring those who emerged in a defined=20
production relation.

In the early decades of the development of Pakistan's social=20
formation, a new-rich class emerged in a void though false claims on=20
or occupation of evacuated property. Subsequently, during Ayub Khan's=20
'decade of development', a new-business class emerged through=20
bonus-voucher scheme, license regime, Pakistan Industrial Development=20
Corporation (PIDC) and gracious loans. It flourished on the pattern=20
of primitive accumulation, regardless of any rules and norms, tax=20
evasion, false claims and defaults and, in most cases, without the=20
risks involved with pure entrepreneurship. This is how a lumpen=20
bourgeoisie developed in a dependent economy.

The other big source was land settlements and allotments both on=20
false claims and as rewards for the services rendered for the state,=20
especially by the personnel of armed forces and high echelons of=20
bureaucracy. But, more than anything else, wielding of and access to=20
power remained a major source for accumulation by other means. Since=20
state structures, especially the civil and military bureaucracy that=20
controlled them, played a central role in the allocation,=20
distribution and use of resources, they became one of the major=20
beneficiaries. Entering and rewarding of contracts became the tools=20
for the enrichment of those who have been at some level of authority.=20
Essentially, it was an all out business of rent-seeking that=20
contributed to capital and wealth formation.

As, initially, civil and, later, military bureaucracy dominated the=20
power-structure, it determined both the character and nature of=20
power. The client-patron relationship (between the US and Pakistan)=20
was also reproduced within the state. With the firm domination of=20
over-developed military structure over the state, it was the garrison=20
that ultimately decided the fate of political structures with the=20
exception of the initial years after the defeat of the army in 1971=20
that provided the opportunity to the civilian politicians to frame=20
the 1973 Constitution. But such a social contract that reversed the=20
civil-military relationship in favour of civil society was to be=20
overturned with the passage of time needed for overcoming the shock=20
of defeat the army had to face in 1971.

A kind of viceregal system was evolved over the decades in which the=20
dominant army needed subordinate classes to work to its tunes. Hence,=20
in the last analysis, the power was never transferred to the=20
so-called elected representatives of the people. Whatever room the=20
garrison conceded to the marginalised political structures, it was to=20
be shared by the competing dominant groups from the core regions and=20
that too at the cost of the periphery. The Punjabi-Mohajir axis=20
played a central role in defining an unequal relationship between the=20
core regions -- Punjab and Karachi -- and the periphery -- East=20
Pakistan, interior Sindh, Balochistan and partially NWFP. The=20
dividends of power and office were to be distributed according to the=20
place in the power structure.

Given the marginalisation of civil society and civilian structures,=20
an autonomous growth of a dynamic political structure was stunted.=20
During the course of development of an underdeveloped political=20
culture, a breed of pygmies found the space to flourish. Since the=20
backdoors provided quick money and easy means to riches and fame,=20
they became the norm rather than the exception. All these factors=20
helped produce the generations of lumpen politicians and lumpen=20
intelligentsia ready to ditch their parties, work against their=20
conscience, abandon principles and betray their constituencies. It=20
started with Unionist Party and consummated the Muslim League. Like a=20
virus it spread even to those parties who had some noble causes to=20
pursue or had fought some good historical battles, like the PPP and=20
the Baloch and Pakhtun nationalists.

Groomed in this expeditious culture, most of the PML-N stalwarts=20
abandoned their leadership to form the largest block of turncoats=20
brought together in the King's party -- PML-Q. Since lumpen politics=20
knows no moral limits, the defectors of the PML-N did not hesitate to=20
name their faction after the Quaid. Similarly, the forward block=20
created by the PPP turncoats felt no embarrassment in naming their=20
faction as 'Patriot', to underscore the 'unpatriotic' character of=20
those who remained steadfast on their commitment to the electoral=20
platform they had contested from to win the mandate of the electorate.

In an undemocratic dispensation, an authoritarian culture flourishes=20
with the help of lumpen politicians. But such a pattern of politics=20
can never create a sustainable political structure, nor produce rule=20
of law and ensure good governance. As opposed to the authoritarian=20
model of development, such as Singapore, this mode of authoritarian=20
governance is devoid of a useful function since it relies upon=20
cooption by rewarding sycophants and nourishing lumpen politics=20
motivated by graft. A pattern has evolved over the decades in which=20
the strongman from the army gives his self-centred political=20
structure that seeks support from those elements who have no stakes=20
in democratic politics.

Over the years, a social soil has been created that produces=20
single-constituency and no-constituency politicians. Since the army=20
became sovereign, it allowed only municipal power to be transferred=20
to the so-called representatives of the people. It started with Ayub=20
Khan's Basic Democracy, universalised during General Ziaul Haq's=20
'shurai nizam' and has culminated into devolution of power plan under=20
General Musharraf's brand of 'true democracy'. The common feature of=20
all these variants of lumpen political structures has been their=20
failure to survive beyond the life of their creators. Yet, they leave=20
a legacy of lumpen politics that, in turn, provides the basis to go=20
back to square one. And this is how we as a nation that remains in a=20
vicious circle.

______

#3.

[5 January 2002]

FIGHTING AGAINST THE HATE AGENDA

By Rehman Faiz
Chairperson, RPRO
President Amnesty International Lahore

On December 25, the day of Christmas, a grenade attack on a church killed
three girls and wounded 13 people. The reports say on Wednesday, December
25, two assailants covered in burqas, tossed a grenade into the Protestant
congregation at Chianwala, about 40 miles northwest of Lahore. Earlier two
unidentified gunmen entered the offices of a Christian welfare organization
in Karachi on Wednesday, 25th September, tying office workers to their
chairs and shooting each of them in the head at close range, as police and
intelligence officials said. At least seven people were killed and another
was critically injured.

On Aug. 9, attackers hurled grenades at worshippers as they were leaving a
church on the grounds of a Presbyterian hospital in Taxila, about 25 miles
west of the capital, Islamabad. Four nurses were killed and 25 other people
wounded. Two men alleged to have supplied guns and grenades to the attacker=
s
were arrested afterwards.

Four days before the Taxila attack, assailants raided a Christian school 40
miles east of Islamabad, killing six Persons including guards and
non-teaching staff. And on March 17, a grenade attack on a Protestant churc=
h
in Islamabad's heavily guarded diplomatic quarter killed five people,
including an American woman, her 17-year-old daughter and the lone
assailant.

Earlier, Seventeen Christians and a Muslim policeman were brutally shot and
killed in the attack on St Dominic's Roman Catholic Church, Bahawalpur, on
Sunday 28 October.

Despite official assurances of protection to the country's minorities, the
human rights of minorities have been abused over the past year by religious
fundamentalists and the state laws while the state apparently condoning suc=
h
abuses. Particularly at risk of abuse are members of the Ahmadiyya
community. Ahmadis, members of a religious group founded in the nineteenth
century, consider themselves to be Muslim but orthodox Muslims regard them
as heretical. In 1974, a constitutional amendment introduced by then Prime
Minister Zulfikar Ali Bhutto declared Ahmadis a non-Muslim minority.
Subsequent legislation passed in 1984 has made it a criminal offence for
Ahmadis to call themselves Muslim, and to profess, practice and propagate
their faith as Muslims.

Both Ahmadis and Christians have been subjected to a wide range of abuses. =
A
ready tool of discrimination and harassment are the country's blasphemy law=
s
which have been consistently used to harass, intimidate and detain members
of the minorities or members of the majority religion who in some way
interpret, teach or debate their religion in a non-orthodox manner; usually
the alleged blasphemer's motive is not taken into account. The blasphemy
laws continue to be used under the present government to arbitrarily detain
members of the minorities. Charges filed under those sections of the penal
code, which are specifically directed against Ahmadis, and charges, which
entail trial by the special anti-terrorism courts, which fail to provide a
fair trial in accordance with international standards for fair trial, appea=
r
to have increased in this period.

An event was organized by Religious Peace Research Organization (RPRO)
today, in collaboration with the people of St. Anthony=92s Parish, Empress
Road Lahore to promote religious harmony and peace in Pakistan. In the
ceremony, renowned Muslim figures participated in the Sunday Service to sho=
w
solidarity with their Christian brethren and to lighten up 'Peace Torch' as
a part of Christmas celebrations. A big number of Christian and Muslim
people belonging to all segments of society attended the ceremony. Among th=
e
distinguished guests were, Mr. Muhammad Hanif Ramay (politician, human
rights activist), Ms. Hina Jilani (renowned human rights activist) and
Allama Zubair Ahmed Zaheer (renowned Muslim religious leader).

Addressing the ceremony Mr. Hanif Ramay said that all the human beings are
the creatures of one God. The people who are trying to win the favour of Go=
d
by killing His men cannot be the righteous people; rather they are earning
the annoyance of God. Since God has the same love and affection for all of
His creatures. He said that the actual theme of the world religions is
universal peace and unconditional love. Unfortunately in the last many
years, the walls of revulsion and hatred have been developed in the country
by a small group of people, which is entirely against the spirit of Islam o=
r
any other religion. Today it is required to build the bridges to cross thes=
e
walls so that we follow the true religious spirit and should emerge as one
nation.

Ms. Hina Jillani, in her address, said that the respect and dignity of huma=
n
beings is given the prime importance in the teachings of all religions.
Hatred, terror and violence do not belong to any religion. The people shoul=
d
be respected and recognized in reference to their character not to their
relation with a specific creed. She praised Religious Peace Research
Organization for taking positive step to promote religious peace and harmon=
y
in the society. She said that this ceremony calls for a Pakistani society i=
n
which everyone should be dealt equally and should be given equal protection=
.
A society in which no one should be deprived of his basic rights in the nam=
e
of religion. She strongly condemned the incidents of terrorism in which
innocent citizens were killed in attacks on churches and urged the
government to repeal all discriminatory laws which are the root cause of
this hatred and violence.

While addressing to the ceremony, Allama Zubair Ahmed Zaheer denied any
religious teaching influencing people to harm the innocent and common peopl=
e
in the name of religion. He called such orders satanic rather religious. He
said that the persons persuading people to harm the innocent and common
people are not the representatives of Religion but the slaves of their own
selfish desires, which have become the motive of such inhuman acts. He said
that Christianity, like other religions, is given prime importance and
respect in the teachings of Islam and there are many points of common
interest in the teachings of Islam and Christianity both. Some of the
conceited people hide the actual teachings of Islam to promote their hate
agenda. He insisted that the prime message of religion is to give respect
and dignity to every human being and it wants every one to serve humanity.

The host of the ceremony and Parish Priest of St. Anthony's Church Father
Emmanuel Aasi told about the scope of love and peace in the teachings of
Christianity and called all human beings the Sons of God. He said that
Religion demands mutual respect and interfaith harmony and it should be
promoted through every platform of Religion. He called this ceremony the
milestone in the way to great religious tolerance and harmony in the future
Pakistani society. He thanked all the participants for participating in the
ceremony, which he called a symbol of inter-religious peace in our society.

Afterwards, the distinguished guests and the host priest lightened up a
peace torch collectively while a peace song was sung by all the
participants.

______

#4.

The Hindustan Times
Sunday, January 5, 2003

Ambedkar versus Moditva
Udit Raj

The ideology of the Sangh parivar is a bundle of thoughts that are so=20
elastic that they can fit into all circumstances. The common thread=20
in this intellectual opportunism is that its protagonists are totally=20
bereft of any moral bindings.

Vinay Katiyar, the BJP's Uttar Pradesh chief and Barjrang Dal=20
stormtrooper, said while unleashing his Moditva type of campaign from=20
Varanasi this week that Dr B.R. Ambedkar was against the Muslims. He=20
also said that the ideas of Ambedkar were akin to those of Keshav=20
Hedgewar, the RSS ideologue for whom Adolf Hiter was the role model.

In the past, the BJP and its hydra-headed fronts have never dared to=20
coopt Ambedkar's ideology. They have mustered the courage to do so=20
now only because they have entered into a shaky alliance with the=20
BSP. Katiyar is of the opinion that his party would continue the=20
caravan, where they left it in the hate-filled fields of Gujarat.=20
It's visible. He has crossed all limits when it comes to transparent=20
lies, slander, conspiracy and shame.

The BJP, under his leadership, has started a campaign against the=20
Muslims citing so called cultural nationalism. Ambedkar was never=20
against the Muslims; instead, he was emphatically against=20
'Manuvaditva' and what goes by the current xenophobia of Moditva.

Katiyar is correct in saying that Ambedkar was never in favour of the=20
Partition of India. Ambedkar wrote in the book, Thought on Pakistan,=20
that he was against Partition and even if it took place, Muslims and=20
Hindus should go to their respective countries because of the fact=20
that if Muslims stayed back, they would be treated like the fifth=20
varna or devils (mleksh) by the upper caste Hindu caste society. He=20
believed that the Muslims would have no future in a Brahmanical=20
social order.

This is exactly what is happening in contemporary India. Ambedkar=20
never said that Muslims were terrorists and they should be deprived=20
of their voting rights. This is a lie manufactured by Katiyar, who=20
has claimed from the figment of his warped imagination that Ambedkar=20
wanted the liberation of Ayodhya, Kashi and Mathura. Next they will=20
claim that Babasaheb wanted a Hindu Rashtra.

Ambedkar held the view - as per the Constitution - that on all such=20
questions, status quo should be maintained, as of 1947, at all costs.

Indian Muslims have been time and again asked to prove their loyalty=20
to the nation by these sectarian anti-socials, despite the fact they=20
not only rejected Pakistan, but have been as patriotic as you or me.=20
Not one Muslim from India crossed over to Afghanistan to fight with=20
the Taliban.

Sociologists have time and again proved that the majority of Indian=20
Muslims are different in content and character; their Indianness in a=20
secular democracy makes them different from Muslims in other Islamic=20
theocraicies. They too have fundamentalists in their midst, but the=20
majority is deeply syncretic, patriotic, multicultural, plural and=20
secular, with deep faith in India and its future.

Let's not fudge the truth. Indian Muslims are as patriotic as you and=20
me. They have fought for the country's freedom, sacrificed their sons=20
in the wars, worked for the progress of the nation in every field -=20
from business and politics, to arts, academics and sports. Why should=20
the 150 million Muslims of India prove their patriotism to the likes=20
of Katiyar, an extremist rabble rouser?

Katiyar's ancestors in his party did not even fight in the freedom=20
movement; instead, they allied with the British, as the documented=20
pleadings of Savarkar to the British clearly proves. Besides, they=20
don't believe in equality, modernity or progress. All they believe in=20
is communal carnages and hate campaigns, to score electoral=20
victories. And the action-replay of lies and falsities.

Why is Katiyar silent about Ambedkar's categorical statement that=20
Hinduism was not a religion but a conspiracy to subjugate the=20
oppressed and dalits? Is he not aware that Ambedkar burnt the Manu=20
Smiriti, the Sangh parivar's holy book? Didn't Ambedkar reject=20
Brahminical oppression and adopt Buddhism with lakhs of Dalits?

Indian Muslims have always stood with Ambedkar. When the Congress=20
pitted a Dalit against him, the Muslim League helped him by asking=20
Jogender Nath Mandal to resign from Nowakholi in his favour. Ambedkar=20
was given the opportunity to get elected. Ambedkar, in his famous=20
Mission, wrote that the upper castes (Brahmans, Kshatriyas and=20
Vaishyas), were basically outsiders. He said that the untouchables,=20
including the minorities, were the original inhabitants of this=20
country. He vowed to hand over power to these 'aborigines'. This was=20
his dream - of a new, egalitarian, secular India.

Ambedkar fought an incessant battle against the ideas which are now=20
being propogated by the Hindutva parivar. When he finally realised=20
that the Brahmanical social order was not going to change or improve,=20
he quit Hinduism along with lacks of people in 1956 and adopted=20
Buddhism.

Look at the parallel. When thousands of Dalits wanted to adopt=20
Buddhism in Delhi on November 24 last year, who tried to=20
unsuccessfully block, crush and smash their spirit - the VHP,=20
patronised by the Vajpayee-Advani regime.

The BJP has dared to malign Babasaheb Ambedkar because Mayawati is=20
its new comrade; she campagned for it in Gujarat, despite the=20
genocide. The Sangh has taken for granted her and the fact that she=20
will allow Ambedkar to be used against the Muslims to stick to power.=20
This is a dangerous game because the BJP knows that the BSP is built=20
on the edifice of Ambedkar's philosophy. This will create serious=20
conflict.

All progressive, liberal, tolerant, peaceful Indians, including=20
Dalits and Muslims, must teach a lesson to the BSP and Mayawati for=20
this dangerous sellout. The BJP's final gameplan is to pitch Dalits=20
versus Muslims in a bloody battle. But in UP, the Gujarat card will=20
fail. This is because the Dalits and Muslims will not fall for=20
Moditva's bloodbath.

Lord Gautam Buddha was repulsed by the prevailing socio-political=20
order of his time. He renounced his family and material life and=20
vowed to eradicate the philosophy of the Brahmanical social order.=20
Similarly, Babasaheb Ambedkar, with his relentless efforts - leading=20
mass agitations for entry of Dalits into temples and sharing the=20
waters of public ponds, etc - liberated the Dalits from the mental=20
slavery of Hindutva. He wanted to get dignity for the oppressed, but=20
he was opposed tooth and nail by the Manuwadis, like the Katiyars,=20
Togadias and Giriraj Kishores of contemporary India.

Ambedkar had to suffer discrimination despite his high qualification,=20
stature and ability. He was thrown out of his rented house. He was=20
employed in the state of Shivaji Gaekwad, but his peon used to fling=20
files on his table from a 'safe' distance - why? So that there is no=20
physical, polluting contact with an 'untouchable'.

Had a personality like Dr B.R. Ambedkar been alive in these dark=20
times of of Manuwadi rule in India, in all probability he would have=20
been killed. We have a large number of examples from our subaltern=20
history: Sant Ravidas, Brihdrath, Charwak, several Buddhist monks and=20
unrecorded reformers and rebels - they were all eliminated. Their=20
only crime was that they stood against Manuwad, perhaps the most=20
intolerant philosophy in the world, as expressed in the words and=20
deeds of Narendra Modi and his vangaurd.

Katiyar has tried to equate Ambedkar with Hegdewar. Can anything be=20
more shameful than this? Mayawati is party to this crime. Her=20
followers should ask her: who has created the ground for the BJP to=20
murder the philosophy of Babasaheb Ambedkar? It is she, who, despite=20
the Gujarat genocide, and despite her election promise not to go with=20
the BJP, allied with the BJP for power.

Now she will have to pay the price for the desecration of Babasaheb's=20
memory by her Hindutva comrades.

(The writer is Chairman, All India Confederation of SC/ST Organizations)

______

#5.

The Week
Jan 12, 2003

Flashpoint
Another ominous December
VHP sees a potential Ayodhya in
a Karnataka Sufi shrine

By N. BHANUTEJ/Budan Nagar

This December, the Muslims of Budan Nagar felt a chill that had=20
nothing to do with the seasonal winds. It had much to do with the=20
Baba Budan Giri shrine of the Sufi saint Dada Hayat Mir Kalandar,=20
which has been in the eye of a storm for several years.

The dargah is revered by Hindus as Dattatreya Peetha-the abode of=20
Dattatreya, the fusion of Brahma, Vishnu and Shiva. The interaction=20
of the two great religions had given birth to a syncretic faith that=20
comforted and gladdened the people of the town, nestled in the=20
periphery of the Western Ghats, 30 km from Chikmagalur.

HALLOWED GROUND: Both Hindus and Muslims
worship at the dargah of the Sufi saint

No longer so. Probably emboldened by the Gujarat wave, the Vishwa=20
Hindu Parishad (VHP)-Bajrang Dal combine, which had been eyeing the=20
shrine for a decade, firmly declared it Hindu this time. "Datta=20
Peetha is the Ayodhya of Karnataka," thundered VHP general secretary=20
Pravin Togadia in a public meeting held on Dattatreya Jayanti on=20
December 19. The pronouncement sent shivers down the spines of=20
Muslims.

Said Abdul Sattar, 47, who grows coffee: "We have no one to turn to.=20
We feel scared." To avoid 'provocation', Sattar closed his herbal=20
shop for an entire week during the Jayanti celebrations and left=20
town. Though he does not make much money from the coffee plantation,=20
Sattar had continued to live in the town because it was the home of=20
his ancestors and because it was quiet. But now the fabric of peace=20
was in danger of being torn apart by divisive forces.

"We usually disappear for four days," said Rafiq Muddin, who sells=20
coconuts and flowers outside the shrine. "Why invite trouble?" The=20
Muslims returned home after the last VHP volunteer left the hill.=20
Both Hindu and Muslim residents of the town are perturbed that forces=20
beyond their control have hijacked the town.

The Sufi saint is said to have come to the area 1,200 years ago and=20
the dargah is in a deep cave. The Dattatreya legend is part of the=20
Avadhut tradition that upholds a formless God and condemns caste and=20
priestly rituals. The two faiths had beautifully coexisted for years=20
and was often pointed out as an example of how things ought to be in=20
the rest of the country.

In 1998, the Sangh Parivar started a campaign that the shrine=20
belonged to Hindus. With the idea of 'liberating' the shrine from the=20
Sufi saint's descendants, the VHP and the Bajrang Dal sought to=20
rename it Dattatreya Peetha and started celebrating Dattatreya=20
Jayanti in December. Over the years, the three-day celebrations=20
became a major law and order problem as the Sangh workers invariably=20
pulled down the dargah's green flags and planted saffron flags in=20
their place.

SECULAR ALLIANCE: Swami Agnivesh speaking at the
Budan Giri harmony convention held to oppose the VHP plans

In 1998, despite the J.H. Patel government's resolve not to allow any=20
'liberation', the district administration placated the VHP and the=20
Bajrang Dal by allowing them to conduct a puja near the shrine. The=20
Datta puja has now become a regular feature. The government no longer=20
questions the puja and concerns itself with preserving law and order.=20
This means keeping Muslims away from the shrine during the puja days.=20
Most of them keep away voluntarily.

A new unwritten rule has come into existence: during Datta puja only=20
saffron flags can be hoisted in and around the dargah. The dargah's=20
flag is allowed only on three days in March when the annual urs is=20
celebrated. The rest of the year, no flags would fly.

The recent Jayanti celebrations showed the Sangh Parivar in all its=20
passionate intensity. All the restrictions imposed by the Chikmagalur=20
district administration were thrown to the winds.

Highly provocative speeches were made at a public meeting held at=20
Baba Budan Giri. Togadia's fiery proclamation forced the S.M. Krishna=20
government to say that it would consider banning his entry into=20
Karnataka.

While the administration wrung its hands, a group of intellectuals=20
came out to oppose the attempt to turn Baba Budan Giri into another=20
Ayodhya. On December 29-the birthday of Kannada's greatest poet=20
Kuvempu, who gave the clarion call for universal brotherhood-artists,=20
writers, academics and activists converged on Chikmagalur for the=20
Baba Budan Giri harmony convention. Swami Agnivesh, revolutionary=20
singer Gaddar and Dalit and Muslim intellectuals reassured=20
crestfallen Muslims of Chikmagalur that they were not entirely=20
helpless.

But, as Tharakeshwar, a lecturer who attended the convention, said,=20
the question how to combat the aggressive Hindutva forces remained=20
undiminished.

______

#6.

Dear Friends,

The Support Group of the Right to Food Campaign is
organizing a public hearing on 10 January, 2003 at the
sports stadium of Delhi University. The public
hearing on 'Living with Hunger' is a major attempt to
place various aspects of the invisible and
unconscionable situation of pervasive hunger within
the public eye and conscience. A panel of women and
men from vulnerable communities, with economist
Amartya Sen and writer Mahasweta Devi among others
will listen to testimonies of people living with
hunger, as well as the perspectives of experts.=20

Particular attention will be given to recent instances
of "starvation deaths" in different states. First-hand
testimonies of these events, and of the living
conditions that prevail in the affected communities,
will be presented at the hearing. Going beyond this,
the gathering will focus on the enormity of hunger in
contemporary India, and the diverse ways in which it
blights people=92s lives.

The public hearing will primarily focus on three
aspects of the problem. First, a look at utterly
impoverished communities, which routinely live with
hunger.

A second theme of the hearing will be the debilitating
impact of drought, especially on already vulnerable
communities.

A third thread of the hearing will be on the
consequences of the collapse of livelihoods of poor
people, and its effects on chronic hunger.

As you know, despite 50 million tonnes of foodgrain
sitting idle in public warehouses, India has one of
the highest rates of undernutrition in the world. The
prevailing drought (now in it=92s third year in some
parts of the country) has exacerbated the already dire
situation, with reports of extreme hunger and even
starvation deaths becoming increasingly common. This
reflects the failure of the State. The hearing seeks
to put this in perspective and put hunger on the
political agenda.=20

The programme is being organized by the Support Group
of the 'Right to Food Campaign' . The Right to Food
Campaign is a decentralized network of groups and
individuals across India, committed to realizing the
'right to food' through a variety of democratic means.
The Support Group consisting of Colin Gonsalves, Jean
Dr=E8ze, Harsh Mander and Kavita Srivatsava got together
to facilitate a public interest litigation [PUCL Vs
UoI and Ors] in April 2001.=20

Please join us at this public hearing. If you are
interested in covering the event, please contact us
for a media kit. More information on the campaign is
available at our website: www.righttofood.com

Sincerely,

Reetika Khera & S Vivek

(For the Support Group of Right to Food Campaign)

C O N T A C T D E T A I L S

Support Group of the Right to Food Campaign,
C/o. Centre for Equity Studies
C =96 88, South =96 Extension =96 II
New Delhi =96 110 049
www.righttofood.com

Contact Persons:
Reetika Khera (O) =96 27666533-5
S Vivek (R) =96 26341925 (O) =96 8640571

e-mail: right2food@y...

____

#7.

TALES OF THE NIGHTFAIRIES
(Bengali/English Subtitles/ 74 min/ 2002)

Script, & Direction,
SHOHINI GHOSH

Camera
SABEENA GADIHOKE

Editing
SHOHINI GHOSH & SHIKHA SEN

On Tuesday, January 28, 2003 at 7 PM at the

INDIA HABITAT CENTRE
(Main Auditorium)

Five sexworkers - four women and one man - along with the=20
filmmaker/narrator embark on a journey of storytelling. The Tales of=20
the Nightfairies explores the power of collective organizing and=20
resistance while reflecting upon contemporary debates around sexwork.=20
The simultaneously expansive and labyrinthine city of Calcutta forms=20
the backdrop for the personal and musical journey of stories.

The film attempts to represent the struggles and aspirations of=20
thousands of sexworkers who constitute the DMSC (Durbar Mahila=20
Samanwyay Committee or the Durbar Women's Collaborative Committee).=20
An initiative that emerged from the Shonagachi HIV/AIDS Intervention=20
Project, DMSC is a collective of men, women and transgendered=20
sexworkers. DMSC demands decriminalization of adult sex work and the=20
right to form a trade union.

(The Documentary has been produced with the support of The Centre for=20
Feminist Legal Research & MamaCash)

_/_/_/_/_/_/_/_/_/_/_/_/_/_/_/_/_/_/_/_/_/_/_/_/_/_/_/_/_/

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