[sacw] SACW | 1 Feb. 03

[Harsh Kapoor]

South Asia Citizens Wire #1 | 1 February 2003

#1. War and peace in South Asia - I, II (Georg Pfeffer)
#2. Violence in South Asia' (Communalism Combat, January 2003)
- Violence begets violence (Beena Sarwar)
#3. Pakistan: Chakwal Diary: Caught in the muddle (Ayaz Amir)
#4. Sri Lanka: Dynamics of Violence, Challenges of Peace (February=20
7-8, 2003, Cornell University)
#5. India: The Divarkar Award for Communication for Peace on the 55th=20
anniversary of the assassination of Mahatma Gandhi (Anand Patwardhan)
#6.Pakistan: Women's Action Forum (WAF) has expressed deep concern=20
about allegations re Pakistan's ambassador to the United Nations
#7. India's Milosevic : Peace activists challenge corporate India's=20
courting of Narendra Modi
(Jairus Banaji)
#8. Hindutva at Work Weblog (Khakhi Shorts)

__________________________

#1.

The Daily Times
January 31, 2003
http://www.dailytimes.com.pk/default.asp?page=3Dstory_31-1-2003_pg3_5

War and peace in South Asia - I

Georg Pfeffer

The two countries formally face one another in matters of foreign=20
policy and yet the relationship bears features of internal rivalries=20
as well. The Mischmasch results in frequent code switching as a=20
matter of policy. The other is treated, when fitting, as an external=20
power or, when convenient, as an internal competitor

On being an outsider

German visitors to India or Pakistan are inevitably confronted with=20
their past - Hitler. In the course of the usual gestures of=20
hospitality, the host mentions his admiration for the Nazi dictator.=20
Never - in the 10 years that I spent in South Asia 1959 onwards - did=20
I ever come across criticism about Hitler. Never did my hosts=20
understand my horror about this German legacy. Nationalism is a good=20
thing in South Asia. People like to identify themselves with the=20
achievements of historical autocrats in an amazingly undifferentiated=20
way. Very few disagree with the naming of modern missiles after=20
medieval conquerors popularly (but wrongly) associated with Hindu=20
(Prithvi) or Muslim (Ghauri) glory, just as the public is generally=20
excited about a coming atomic shoot-out between India and Pakistan. A=20
nuclear war would terminate much of the life and many of the lives in=20
both countries but it is impolite to mention these details, just as=20
it is impolite for a German to express horror and disgust about=20
Hitler.
South Asian nationalism has grown in the past and will continue to=20
grow in future. Two trains seem to be heading for a collision and I=20
see very few people on board these trains who want to avoid the=20
crash. Very few would even favour slowing down. Having enjoyed my=20
stay in both countries, I dare to be concerned about the situation in=20
South Asia. Friends both in Lahore and Amritsar, in Delhi and=20
Islamabad should stay alive!
Endless conversations on war and peace have, of course, dominated the=20
time I spent in drawing rooms and teahouses in South Asia but never=20
was a solution a part of these discussions. With their eyes wide=20
open, South Asians are moving towards a catastrophe. Upon realising=20
that the sides would rather agree to the extermination of tens of=20
millions of people than find a solution, any sympathetic third party=20
is simply flabbergasted. What has happened and what can be done?
The setting
The setting of the confrontation is generally known and I will not=20
dwell upon the history of partition or the phases of the Kashmir=20
conflict leave alone other issues like Bengal or the sharing of the=20
Indus waters. The protagonists have engaged each other in shouting=20
matches without ever solving anything. These points will not be=20
repeated, but some past details, known perhaps but not usually=20
mentioned, may help outline my vision for the future.
Problems vaguely comparable to the Kashmir issue have existed=20
elsewhere in the past. For example, Anwar al Sadat gave up the Arab=20
claims to the land of Israel, allowing Egypt to recover from=20
disastrous war efforts. Farsightedness of this kind cannot be=20
expected in South Asia.
Two sides are involved in the conflict but they are not equally=20
matched. India dominates South Asia. Countries like Nepal,=20
Bangladesh, or Sri Lanka would never confront India on any issue. The=20
northwestern neighbour also accepts this supremacy - but not=20
entirely. As far as Pakistan is concerned, Kashmir cannot be=20
abandoned. A plebiscite must be held and the people must provide a=20
clear mandate for either of the two countries. India, on the other=20
hand, will not allow such a precedent to be set for other minorities=20
like the Punjabis, Tamils or Nagas might then clamour for similar=20
rights and the option of independence.
This obvious demand to dominate the region has a cultural basis.=20
People in South Asia think in terms of hierarchy. When they meet me,=20
they want to know whether France or Germany dominates the European=20
Union, or whether this or that colleague is senior, or who gets the=20
central position in a group photograph. In Pakistan, the Punjab=20
dominates the rest of the country and in India the prime ministers=20
are inevitably from the higher castes and from the Hindi/Gujarati=20
belt, barring a few exceptions.
Neither India or Pakistan is a culturally homogeneous state - in=20
fact, both contain many or at least several different ethnic=20
categories. At the same time, many cultural factors are common to=20
both the countries - language, caste, clan, village life, food,=20
marriage practices etc. Internal concerns overlap with foreign policy=20
issues. If, for example, Indian Muslims are the victims of=20
state-sponsored pogroms, a case in point is Gujarat, Pakistan, the=20
self-declared home of Indian Muslims, cannot simply ignore these=20
occurrences. Similarly, much of Pakistan has always been part of=20
Indian, or even Hindu, history. India was named after the river=20
Indus, which now flows through Pakistan. The Rig Veda speaks of Sapta=20
Sindhu - the land of the seven rivers - as the home of the Arya, the=20
mythological originators of the Hindu tradition, and much of this=20
land is today part of Pakistan.
This cultural overlap has disastrous consequences for the conflict.=20
The two countries formally face one another in matters of foreign=20
policy and yet the relationship bears features of internal rivalries=20
as well. The Mischmasch results in frequent code switching as a=20
matter of policy. The other is treated, when fitting, as an external=20
power or, when convenient, as an internal competitor. Political=20
parties competing in elections denounce one another as "foreign=20
agents", never as warmongers. The art of politicking, being very=20
different from the European tradition, is the same in both India and=20
Pakistan, so the political leaders "play" the internal as well as the=20
external "game" to evade or retaliate to the opponent's moves.
But we should remember that the aims of these two domains of politics=20
are quite different. Foreign countries wage war with one another or=20
find ways to maintain peace under specified conditions. Political=20
parties and movements within a country never cease in their open=20
competition for power, a competition that does not involve use of=20
physical force.
Hence they could share a relationship similar to China and Vietnam=20
and on the other hand their political forces could compete within a=20
federation, as do the people of Quebec within Canada. In reality=20
neither of the two works. Parallels may be drawn with the antagonism=20
that develops between close family members. Both sides know that both=20
would live in prosperity not poverty, if they would come to terms and=20
invest their resources in the economies rather than huge war=20
machines. Yet both sides choose to beef up the military forces.
There are also important differences between the two. India managed=20
to enjoy uninterrupted democracy (if we leave aside the two years of=20
the emergency) while Pakistan was repeatedly subjected to=20
dictatorships. This happened, I contend, because India was blessed by=20
the Congress Party. The Congress was a grand coalition of left and=20
right, rich and poor, north and south, east and west, intellect and=20
labour, tribes and castes, modernisers and traditionalists, urban and=20
rural. The party had twin goal - to let the country survive and=20
prosper and let each segment of the population have its - culturally=20
adequate - share of power. A workable constitution was passed in 1950=20
and the grand encompassing coalition named the Congress lasted until=20
1977, or exactly 30 years.
In the course of these 30 years, the Congress government had to face=20
a number of open or disguised civil wars. In some cases or rather=20
states it declared "President's Rule" (i.e. regional dictatorship of=20
the central government) and in others it employed paramilitary forces=20
like the "Central Reserve Police" or the "Border Security Force".=20
India was also fortunate in that its prime ministers were more honest.
Pakistan on the other hand was a new creation at the time of=20
partition. Politicians seriously considered the possibility of=20
something vaguely resembling Pakistan only seven years before it came=20
into being. Two culturally distinct "wings" - geographically=20
separated by more than 1600 km - were thrown together.
More important, those that struggled the most for the creation of=20
Pakistan did not come from those regions that make up the country=20
today. Their home was in what we now know as northern and=20
northwestern India. These Muslims knew very well that high caste=20
Hindus of the Hindi/Gujarati belt would dominate independent India.=20
Being high caste Muslims of this region (and the only native Urdu=20
speakers in today's Pakistan) and being the heirs of those Muslims=20
who had ruled north India for centuries, they did not want to play=20
second fiddle to the Hindus. So they fought for their Pakistan and=20
migrated to this underdeveloped part of the subcontinent in the=20
northwest where again they were in a minority. But they were in power!
If in 1956 - after nine years of deliberations - they did formulate a=20
constitution, it was not implemented because elections would have=20
transferred the power to the locals. Eventually the army, consisting=20
of Punjabis and Pathans, put an end to the refugee regime. Later,=20
both military and civilian rulers continued with these=20
anti-democratic traditions. When Pakistan was born, Nehru's rival=20
Jinnah was on his deathbed and the other outstanding leader, Liaquat=20
Ali, was murdered soon after. With few exceptions, their successors=20
used power to enrich themselves. The 1999 coup of an - apparently -=20
honest general saved Pakistan from a total financial collapse.
Given these different histories, the anti-Indian sentiment in=20
Pakistan was the standard card played by all rulers. On the Indian=20
side, the Congress government was less polemical. Indira Gandhi may=20
have made war in 1971, but I feel that she, or her father, and even=20
her son would have agreed to a solution of the Kashmir dispute as=20
long as the valley of Srinagar was left with India. A stable Pakistan=20
on the northwestern frontier is necessary for India's own stability.
Such moderation, however, is not the hallmark of the present Hindu=20
nationalist government. Hindutva is their declared political goal.=20
This of course excludes the 12 per cent Muslim population of India.=20
Over the past decades, the Hindu nationalist party has grown rapidly=20
and increased its share of seats in the parliament. It is likely that=20
it will continue to grow stronger and as a result the persecution of=20
Indian Muslims will increase.
Georg Pfeffer teaches at the university of Berlin. He spent his=20
boyhood in Lahore. This is the first of a two-part series

o o o o

The Daily Times
February 1, 2003
http://www.dailytimes.com.pk/default.asp?page=3Dstory_1-2-2003_pg3_5

War and peace in South Asia - II

An exercise in daydreaming

Georg Pfeffer

The lowest common denominator for all peace proposals should include=20
more individual liberties for both Indians and Pakistanis;=20
maintaining the sovereign status of the two states; and an=20
international peace force for controlling the valley

The picture is again different in Pakistan. The vast secular majority=20
has, for some years now, softened its stand on Kashmir but will never=20
give in substantially. The Islamist camp, on the other hand, has=20
found a new opponent, America and the West in general. Having=20
received American money all through the decades of the Cold War, the=20
religious fanatics now conceive the main threat facing the Islamic=20
world to be on the Potomac. While the Hindutva forces in India used=20
to talk of "western decadence" a few years ago (and now would like to=20
join the American war on terrorism), the Pakistani Islamists now=20
support Al Qaeda and Saddam Hussain with the same zeal with which=20
they fought the Reds side by side with the Americans. Apart from the=20
regular armed forces of the two countries, the religious militants=20
have access to arms and are not in favour of reducing hostilities in=20
the subcontinent, thus destabilising any official policy of the two=20
governments.
The armed groups in the valley of Srinagar are mostly Kashmiri, since=20
external Muslim guerrillas have found other fields of action in the=20
last years. But they may return any time. In the past, the Pakistani=20
government has encouraged some of these groups but has not been able=20
to control them fully for some years now. Since Pakistan could never=20
dream of openly attacking India, these irregulars have been both the=20
strength and the weakness of the non-diplomatic moves in and about=20
Kashmir. Civilian Kashmiris themselves are ambivalent in their=20
attitudes towards these underground fighters.
The Indian government has built numerous roads to the valley, where=20
none at all had existed in 1947 and it has also multiplied the troops=20
stationed there. At the same time some local leaders, after having=20
spent many years in jail, were bought off while others were=20
pressurised in numerous ways but without or with limited success.=20
Since 1988, massive army occupation has put an end to the hope that=20
life will return to normal in the valley. The civilian population,=20
particularly the women, have been brutally treated by the soldiers.
The conditions in the valley differed greatly from Bihar or Madhya=20
Pradesh. "President's Rule" was also imposed in the latter two states=20
like Kashmir. But in Kashmir, the locals were treated as foreign=20
enemies, not deviant siblings. Rather than putting down the armed=20
resistance, as the army was able to do so in the Indian Punjab, the=20
army presence in the valley has aggravated the situation. Arms=20
proliferation has increased and so has militancy. And this in turn=20
has led to the stationing of more troops in the valley.
In short, both sides have failed to achieve their goals. The=20
Pakistanis (and the anti-Indian Kashmiris) may have understood by now=20
that additional irregular armed interventions will not force the=20
Indians to withdraw from the valley. The Indians, on the other hand,=20
may have found out that large number of troops and severe military=20
action will not win the hearts or the loyalty of the indigenous=20
population. Both Pakistan and India do not seem to have the means to=20
de-escalate the situation.
What is to be done?
A serious solution of the perennial Indo-Pakistani conflict implies=20
two prerequisites. The peace process must be multidimensional, i.e.=20
involve all aspects of bilateral relations and must evolve over=20
years. Both the governments and the parliamentary oppositions of the=20
two countries must support the process. These two considerations must=20
always be kept in mind. My sketch will not be able to offer a=20
detailed timetable, or even the general order of events, though these=20
are most important.
Contrary to recent Indian statements, all negotiations between the=20
two governments should include a third party as a "communicator"=20
rather than a referee. The communicator should have a UN mandate but=20
should not be from Britain, Russia or the United States. Preferably,=20
he should be a seasoned professional without any vested "national=20
interest". A name that comes to my mind is Xavier Solana.
The multidimensional nature of the peace process would imply the=20
opening of the common border! At the moment, the elites of the two=20
countries can get visas to fly between the capitals and others, under=20
severe bureaucratic restrictions, are allowed to visit relatives or=20
places of pilgrimage. These arrangements are simply ridiculous. All=20
border districts should have numerous crossings and common people=20
should be able to move to and fro as simple passport holders (i.e.=20
without visa formalities). Peace in Europe followed open borders! If=20
the South Asian governments want to retain their "iron curtain",=20
there can never be any hope for peace.
General belligerency, I contend, is also the result of the policy of=20
closed borders. If the common woman or man could shuttle across the=20
border, they would meet people who speak the same language, eat the=20
same food, haggle about the same goods and also chew betel nuts. They=20
will recognise and reach out to humans with whom they have a lot in=20
common and develop personal bonds, getting rid of the caricatures of=20
the enemy that they have in their minds.
Farmers of Jat caste and Warraich clan would find that they much in=20
common with the farmers of Jat caste and Warraich clan on the other=20
side of the border. They would discuss farming and prices under=20
comparable conditions, just as businessmen would be eager to explore=20
new markets. Bureaucrats would, of course, like to hinder this=20
interaction by highlighting espionage or smuggling, knowing very well=20
that smuggling has been a major source of wealth in the border=20
districts ever since the two sides were sealed off. I have personally=20
seen an illegal convoy of trucks full of rice and armed men moving=20
towards the border, later to return with other goods.
In fact all barriers of trade and commercial relations should be=20
removed. Similarly schools and cultural institutions on both sides of=20
the border should encourage frequent exchanges and partnerships.=20
Since I have met Punjabi Hindus, Muslims and Sikhs settled in=20
different arts of the world, I am sure their curiosity and their=20
general competitiveness would lead to multiple informal bonds. This=20
would be the best weapon against the communal hatred that forms the=20
basis of the Indo-Pakistan conflict. Punjabis of both countries fly=20
to other continents almost as a matter of routine. Surely they would=20
be eager to visit Sialkot and Jullundhar, Faisalabad and Ludhiana,=20
Ambala and Multan.
Now to focus on the most intractable issue that plagues the=20
subcontinent - Kashmir. The Kashmir issue must be tackled over=20
decades in a very gradual manner; my suggestions are by no means=20
sufficient. However, what needs to be mentioned here is that it is=20
clear that India has no desire to claim Azad Kashmir, just as the=20
Islamic Republic is not interested in Ladakh and Jammu. These=20
territories should become regular provinces of the respective=20
countries.
The valley of Srinagar is the bone of contention and should thus be=20
treated with extreme sensitivity. The Indian troops should be, over=20
time, replaced by UN troops. The United Nations should send in forces=20
to ensure security in the valley. These forces should be under a=20
mandate similar to that given to UN troops in Bosnia and Kosovo.
And to continue drawing parallels with Bosnia and Kosovo, the valley=20
should remain with India though under international law. For example,=20
Indian currency should be used there and Indian tax laws should apply=20
in the region.
Free elections should be held to decide who would govern the valley.=20
And the winners of the elections should govern the valley in matters=20
of general internal administration and this should include the=20
locally recruited police force. The UN should offer particular=20
protection to the Hindu minority of the valley, the Kashmiri Pandits,=20
who should also be given reserved seats in the regional assembly.=20
This state of internal autonomy (under UN armed control) though the=20
valley will remain a part of the Indian federation should last for=20
about two decades. Only then should a plebiscite be held to allow the=20
Kashmiris to opt either for India or Pakistan or maintain the status=20
quo (UN sponsored local autonomy) for another twenty years.
The Kashmiris have no historical record of warfare. If young men opt=20
for militancy, it is because they lack alternatives. Traditionally,=20
Kashmiris have been cultivators, craftsmen and traders. All tourist=20
sites in India and Pakistan have Kashmiri shopkeepers to this day,=20
just as all major western cities sell Kashmiri crafts.
Until the military action by the Indian army in the valley, Kashmir=20
had been a major Indian centre of tourism. For any peace plan, it is=20
essential that the rest of the world return to the valley. Thus=20
civilian air traffic to Srinagar should be encouraged and all land=20
routes - particularly the traditional one via Rawalpindi - should be=20
re-opened for the general public. Kashmiris should freely be allowed=20
to go south to both India and Pakistan. All Pakistanis should have=20
the liberty to travel to the valley. In other words: the most=20
rewarding and traditional source of income of the indigenous=20
population - the production of carpets, shawls and other crafts -=20
should be allowed to flourish, providing the vital economic=20
foundation for the peace process. Similarly, inhabitants of the=20
valley who desire to live in Pakistan for a limited time or=20
permanently should not be prevented from doing so.
The lowest common denominator for all peace proposals should include=20
more individual liberties for both Indians and Pakistanis;=20
maintaining the sovereign status of the two states; and an=20
international peace force to control the valley. The latter should=20
contain Muslim troops from Turkey, Malaysia, Indonesia or other=20
regions uninvolved in world conflicts or the subcontinental affairs.
All of this is, of course, just an exercise in daydreaming.
Georg Pfeffer teaches at the university of Berlin. He spent his=20
boyhood in Lahore. This is the second of a two-part series. The first=20
part was printed on Friday, January 31.

______

#2.

'Violence in South Asia'

Communalism Combat, January 2003, No.83
http://www.sabrang.com/cc/archive/2003/jan03/index.html

o o o

Communalism Combat
January 2003 , Year 9 No.83
Cover Story

Violence begets violence

Violence is an overriding theme and an underlying assumption in much=20
of the world, especially these days with the all-pervasive 'war on=20
terror' and its accompanying rhetoric. South Asia is no exception,=20
and Pakistan is no different

BY BEENA SARWAR

Violence pervades all aspects of life here. It is manifested in the=20
aggression witnessed daily on the streets and in homes. And it tends=20
to overshadow the positive aspects of our lives - the generosity=20
(material and spiritual), hospitality, tolerance and good humour that=20
are also part of our tradition and that our people continue to=20
demonstrate in the face of all odds.

Where does this violence come from?

The argument that poverty is the greatest form of violence has=20
resonance in a region where palatial private homes overlook shanty=20
towns in which human beings live an inhuman existence. It exists in=20
the state's glorification of war, and in the monuments it has erected=20
to war and nuclear bombs in our cantonments and public parks - the=20
Chaghi hills replicas, tanks and F-16s. It is there in some of the=20
traditions that we are so reluctant to shed - concepts of 'honour'=20
and greed for land, which can provoke blood feuds lasting for=20
generations in tribal areas. It is there in the easy availability of=20
arms and drugs, legacies of Pakistan's decades-long involvement in=20
the Afghan conflict.

The most dangerous form of violence in South Asia is arguably the=20
threat of nuclear war between India and Pakistan, which has the=20
potential to annihilate millions of lives and scar the region for=20
generations to come. It colours the statements of our politicians and=20
leaders and underlines the fanaticism of non-state actors, who feed=20
off each other's thirst for the blood of 'the other'. This threat=20
cannot be dismissed as just so much rhetoric, all sound and fury=20
signifying nothing. In fact, it plays a major role in the escalation=20
of tensions and violence between our countries and within our=20
countries.

When violence becomes part of the daily discourse, it is internalised=20
and becomes more acceptable. Talk of war eventually gives the=20
impression that war is inevitable, that there are no other options,=20
thus reducing the pressure to seek other options. The discourse of=20
violence dictates terms in our region, justifying increased military=20
spending, and diverting finances from vital areas like poverty=20
alleviation,food, housing, health care, education and social=20
infrastructures - the real issues that our people face.

Besides finances, attention is also conveniently diverted from these=20
issues. Also forced to digress from their work are those who are=20
engaged in the fight for social justice - the fight against big dams=20
and evictions, the fight for the rights of landless peasants, the=20
fight for equality and human dignity, as Arundhati Roy put it last=20
year in Karachi.

The rhetoric of war, whether it is by George Bush, Ariel Sharon, Atal=20
Behari Vajpayee or Pervez Musharraf, gives non-state actors the cue=20
to indulge in the other form of violence that we have all become so=20
familiar with, using the rhetoric of religion, patriotism, or=20
nationalism to justify their actions.

There is no religion that preaches violence, or justifies taking=20
innocent lives. Yet, religion is routinely invoked by extremists on=20
either side of the border who justify their violence on some=20
righteous pretext or other. A recent horrific example is that of a=20
serial killer who targeted sex workers in Gujranwala, near Lahore. In=20
prison now, he was interviewed by Geo TV and showed no remorse. His=20
justification was that he was following "Allah's orders" in order to=20
stop their immorality. "I did not aim to kill. If I had, I would have=20
aimed at their heads, not their bodies. I was only trying to disable=20
them," he said, "If any of them died, that was fate - their time had=20
come."

This may be a single example, but it illustrates a particular=20
mindset. Those who raped and killed in Gujarat also found some way to=20
justify their violence, and place the onus on the victims. Those who=20
threw hand grenades in Pakistani churches and targeted westerners=20
with bombs similarly must have some kind of mental justification to=20
enable them to live with themselves after taking innocent lives - or=20
die, in the case of the suicide bombers among them.

Violence here is not exclusively directed at women and religious=20
minorities or westerners, although these communities are undoubtedly=20
more vulnerable - as the recent spate of attacks on churches and even=20
a missionary school, demonstrate. We in Pakistan cannot afford to=20
console ourselves with the thought that there has never been an=20
attack like the one in India which claimed the life of Australian=20
missionary Graham Staines and his three sons, or that a Gujarat-like=20
carnage has never taken place here. Anything is possible in this=20
climate of fear and intimidation, where self-righteous frenzy can=20
take any form.

Violence is something that everyone lives with on a daily basis. Some=20
are targeted because they belong to one or other ethnic group=20
(although ethnic based violence has decreased over the last few=20
years). Some are vulnerable because they belong to the 'wrong' sect=20
of the majority religion and are considered 'kafir' (infidel) by some=20
extremists. Dozens of doctors have been killed over the past decade=20
just because they happened to be born into the Shi'a faith; several=20
others have been killed for alleged blasphemy since the 'blasphemy=20
laws' were enacted here.

These laws, along with the other so-called Islamic laws like the=20
Hudood laws which blur the distinction between rape and adultery,=20
need serious review, as recommended by human rights groups as well as=20
Islamic scholars. They illustrate only too clearly the perils of=20
using religion for political purposes. The results are far-reaching=20
and horrific.

But there has been little serious attempt to address the issue of=20
violence and its impact on society, particularly on the state or=20
government level. The human rights conference convened by Gen. Pervez=20
Musharraf proved to be just what human rights groups had predicted: a=20
lot of lip service. Such debates at the legislative level have only=20
served to reinforce negative stereotypes and beat back the voices of=20
reason.

One example is the uproar created by an attempt in the Senate (upper=20
house of parliament) during Nawaz Sharif's tenure, to move a motion=20
condemning the cold-blooded 'honour killing' of a young woman in a=20
lawyer's office in Lahore - at the behest of her parents who were=20
against her attempts at obtaining a divorce. The senators moving the=20
motion were shouted down abusively by those who felt that this was a=20
'private' matter. Almost four years after the act, her father - a=20
businessman and former office holder of the Peshawar Chamber of=20
Commerce and Industry - and mother - a medical doctor - have still=20
not been arrested.

It is such incidents that are far more terrifying than the crude=20
intolerance of rightwing fanatic outfits, which every now and then go=20
on the rampage, smashing television sets and destroying satellite=20
dishes, particularly in the NWFP and Balochistan provinces, or take=20
out processions against 'vulgarity'. Their justification for doing so=20
is that cable television spreads 'immorality' because of the=20
'provocative' images of women that they broadcast - an argument that=20
some feminists might agree with, ironically.

The threat of violence also targets 'real' women, out on the streets,=20
or in their homes. When a section of society believes that women=20
should look, dress and behave in a certain way and is willing to=20
resort to violence to enforce this ethos, any woman perceived of=20
'transgression' is vulnerable.

A couple of years ago, Karachi was gripped by news of fanatics in=20
shopping malls, using razor blades or knives to slash at the bare=20
arms of women wearing sleeveless outfits - the sleeveless fashion had=20
just made a comeback here (and is still very much evident in the big=20
cities, at least). There was no truth to this rumour, which was=20
apparently intended to intimidate women into 'covering up'. In South=20
India and SriLanka, women wearing the shalwar kameez feel threatened=20
and intimidated because of a pervasive belief that this is a 'Muslim'=20
dress, and that they should stick to saris. In the Kashmir valley,=20
women risk being physically attacked, disfigured by acid or even=20
killed if they ignore warnings by militant groups to wear a burqa.=20
Ironically, the perpetuators of these threats and violence are not=20
just men, but also women who subscribe to that particular world-view.

The underlying lesson is that dissent is dangerous, even in such=20
personal matters as dress. Dress codes, particularly for women, have=20
been made into a matter of national and religious honour and=20
identity. Naturally, dissent on other, 'more important' issues,=20
provokes equally unpleasant responses. On either side of the border,=20
those protesting India and Pakistan's nuclear policies and demanding=20
that the two governments dialogue instead of threatening each other=20
are routinely threatened.

Members of the Pakistan India People's Forum for Peace and Democracy=20
were verbally abused at a press conference in Islamabad some years=20
ago, by some 'patriotic' journalists of all people. This provoked a=20
physical attack on the PIPFPD members by some religious extremists=20
who were also present. Government functionaries react similarly. Last=20
August, several hundred demonstrators marching to the Wagah border to=20
stress the need for peace and friendship with India, were=20
baton-charged by para-military troops posted there, despite the fact=20
that they had permission from the Punjab government to proceed.=20
Earlier, the Karachi police brutally dispersed a peaceful=20
demonstration by members of the Joint Action Committee for Peace.

It speaks volumes for the State's lack of commitment to peace that=20
peaceful demonstrations by law-abiding citizens are intimidated and=20
attacked, while the violent demonstrations held by extremist groups,=20
at which effigies and flags are burnt and hate-filled speeches made,=20
are allowed to be held undisturbed.

There is, on the whole, little effort to deal with the issue of=20
violence and intolerance. Interestingly, and perhaps not=20
surprisingly, it is women-led groups (sometimes including men) that=20
have taken up the issue of violence. In one instance, members of the=20
Women's Action Forum in Karachi tried to address the issue of ethnic=20
violence in their city. They managed to make contact with women who=20
had lost husbands, sons and brothers to the violence that had been=20
holding the city hostage. Support group sessions were held, some of=20
them very intense and emotional, with women speaking out for the=20
first time about their fear and sense of loss.

Most such efforts focus on violence as it affects women - domestic=20
violence, rape and child abuse, in Karachi, Lahore or Islamabad.=20
Inroads have been made in rural areas through workshops and=20
discussion groups led by non-government organisations. The Sindhiani=20
Tehrik, a rural-based women's movement associated with the political=20
party Awami Tehrik, has managed to reach out to many women in the=20
smaller towns and villages. Often their efforts have been directed at=20
providing support to victims of domestic violence.

Other efforts, by peace groups and human rights organisations, aim to=20
raise awareness on issues which address violence from a wider=20
perspective - like poverty, skewed development priorities, the=20
nuclear threat, India-Pakistan tensions, sectarianism and=20
communalism, and so on.

These are just a few positive initiatives that address the issue of=20
violence in society, although they do not address all facets of the=20
issue and are clearly inadequate given the magnitude of the problem.=20
It has to be addressed on a larger scale - ideally, by the=20
governments of our countries, which should take the lead in scaling=20
down on their rhetoric of violence for a start. Their policies=20
provide tacit support to the non-state actors who have terrorised the=20
lives of millions with their militant fanaticism. These groups need=20
to be urgently curbed as well - but this will not happen until the=20
governments change their policies.

It is a vicious cycle, which contributes to the phenomenon of=20
aggression and depression in society, continues the pattern of=20
poverty and illiteracy which in turn breed further violence.=20

(The writer is a senior journalist and peace activist)

______

#3.

Gulf News
Chakwal Diary: Caught in the muddle
|By Ayaz Amir | 31-01-2003
Print friendly format | Email to Friend
In the October elections in which I was a candidate for the National=20
Assembly my opponents, rolling out their heaviest artillery, charged=20
me with being a Qadiani.

On the strength of a column I had written about the exploitation of=20
religion as a political tool by successive governments, in which I=20
had also referred to legislation against the Qadianis, a local=20
maulana, Qazi Mazhar Hussain, issued a fatwa to the effect that I was=20
"pro-Qadiani".[...]
{ Full Text at: http://www.gulf-news.com/Articles/news.asp?ArticleID=3D7582=
2 }

______

#4.

Sri Lanka: Dynamics of Violence, Challenges of Peace
February 7-8, 2003, Cornell University

Friday, 7 February 12:15 -5 PM

Keynote address (Sponsored by University Lectures
Committee)

12:15 - 1:30 PM; 157 Sibley Hall on the Arts Quad
"Accounting for Peace as Violence by another name:
Heretical thoughts from the Margins of the Sri Lankan
conflict.=EE
Dr. Arjuna Parakrama, Center for Monitoring Election
Violence & Center for Policy Alternatives, Colombo,
Sri Lanka

Panel 1: Social Cleavage, Hierarchy, and Difference
3 PM-5 PM; 401 Warren Hall on the Ag.Quad

'Categories, Identity and Difference: Sinhala
Buddhists and Peace in Sri Lanka'
Dr. Chandra R. de Silva , Department of History, Old
Dominion University

"Evolution of Muslim Identity in North East Sri Lanka"
Mr. Seyed Bazeer, Director, Sri Lankan Muslim
Information Centre (U.K.)

"Who's keeping who safe: space, place and the politics
of security"
Dr. Yamuna Sangarasivam Department of Anthropology,
Ithaca College

Saturday, 8 February (8:45 AM - 4 PM; 401 Warren Hall)

Panel 2: Structures of Violence and Forgiveness

'The Violence of Ideology: Jathika Chinthanaya
[Sinhala-Buddhist Nationalist Thought] as Negation of
Negation '
Dr. Kanishka Goonewardena, Department of Geography,
University of Toronto

=ECForgiveness and an Autonomy Regime in the New
Constitutional Order of Sri Lanka"
Dr. Vijaya Samaraweera, Consultant, international
human rights law

Panel 3: Suffering, Violence, Closure

"Unhealed Wounds: Social Transition in Eastern Sri
Lanka"
Dr. Patricia Lawrence, Kroc Institute for Peace
Studies, University of Notre Dame & Univ. of Colorado

Title TBA
Dr. R. Cheran, Department of Sociology & Center for
Refugee Studies, York University

Roundtable Discussion on the Peace Process

Dr. Mashesh Rangarajan, Visiting Scholar, Cornell
University

Dr. Chandra R. de Silva , Department of History, Old
Dominion University

Sponsored by: The South Asia Program, the South Asia
Academic and Political Awareness Association, the Sri
Lankan Students' Association, the Graduate and
Professional Student Assembly (GPSAFC), University
Lectures Committee, Robert A. and Ruth E. Polson
Institute for Global Development, Departments of
Anthropology, Government, & Rural Sociology,
International Studies in Planning, Peace Studies
Program, Society of the Humanities, Mario Einaudi
Center for International Studies, Feminist, Gender, &
Sexuality Studies, and lines (www.lines-magazine.org).

_____

#5.

On the occasion of The Divarkar Award for Communication for Peace=20
given by the St. Xavier's Institute for Communications on the 55th=20
anniversary of the assassination of Mahatma Gandhi:

Today on the death anniversary of the greatest peace lover and peace=20
maker our world has ever known, I am deeply honoured to be conferred=20
with the Parmanand Divarkar award for Communication for Peace. I=20
accept this award with the humility of knowing that there are many=20
others more deserving than me, who have braved the forces of communal=20
hatred and disinformation to put forth their message of love and=20
peace. Some have paid for this with their lives - I refer to people=20
like Pujari Laldas, the priest of the Ramjanmabhoomi temple who was=20
murdered because he believed in and preached the universalist and=20
tolerant face of Hinduism; I refer to the unsung, unknown heroes and=20
heroines of so many communal riots who dared to speak up for their=20
neighbours and attempted to protect them from violence, I refer to=20
the unknown parents and school teachers who fight daily against a=20
growing tide of communal hatred by continuing to teach their children=20
the meaning of life. I accept this award on behalf of all those who=20
have decided that they will not sit back and watch while our nation=20
slides towards fascism. We must continue to speak up for peace and=20
let what is in our hearts rise to our lips and we must find the words=20
and the sounds and the images that will reach those that need most to=20
be reached.

One request I made when I learned about the award was that I not be=20
asked to make a speech because I'm very uncomfortable doing that and=20
much prefer showing my films and answering questions. Today we don't=20
have the time for a discussion but instead of a long speech about the=20
work we have been involved with, I put together some excerpts to=20
share with you from various films made over the last few decades.

Anand Patwardhan, 30th January, 2003

_____

#6.

Gulf News, 17-01-2003
Forum seeks Akram recall, sacking
Lahore |From Abdullah Iqbal

The Women's Action Forum (WAF) has expressed deep concern about=20
allegations that Munir Akram, Pakistan's ambassador to the United=20
Nations, New York, was allegedly involved in violent abuse of a woman=20
and have demanded his immediate dismissal.

WAF's press release, issued in Lahore, describes the incident as=20
highly embarrassing and deplorable. "It only shows how Pakistan's=20
ambassadors get away behind the cover of immunity," the release said.

Pakistan's image regarding violence against women is already poor and=20
Akram has defended Pakistan on this count without any moral qualms,=20
the WAF claimed. The government is only interested in hiding facts=20
and defending offenders against women, such as Akram, it added.

There have been previous rumours of similar misconduct against women=20
on the part of the ambassador, it said. Further, the WAF has time and=20
again been approached by women's organisations that found Akram's=20
approach anti-women, the forum added.

WAF finds no mitigation in the fact that Akram has served Pakistan=20
well. He was, after all, handsomely paid and enjoyed high privileges=20
to perform this service, the forum said.

Former Human Rights Commission of Pakistan (HRCP) chairperson Asma=20
Jehangir also condemned the attitude of Pakistan's permanent=20
representative at the UN.

Akram, a senior Pakistan diplomat and the country's representative at=20
the UN was recently at the centre of an unsavoury row. The U.S.=20
police want to investigate him in a case of domestic abuse, and the=20
U.S. government has sought Pakistan's permission to bypass his=20
diplomatic immunity in the case.

The issue stems from a call made last month by a woman from Munir=20
Akram's New York residence to the police claiming that she was beaten=20
and had been slammed against a wall and hit by the diplomat.

It is unclear if the complainant is Akram's wife.

In addition, some sources say that allegations of harassment and=20
"unjust remarks" have also been made in the past by Akram's female=20
colleagues.

The Pakistani government has taken the line that the whole affair is=20
the result of propaganda by "anti-Pakistan" lobbyists, mainly from=20
India and Israel.

However, the U.S. government is said to have expressed its reluctance=20
to believe this, and is pressing for the charges to be pursued.=20
=09=20=09=20

______

#7.

Communalism Combat, January 2003 , Year 9 No.83

Protest

India's Milosevic

Peace activists challenge corporate India's courting of Narendra Modi

BY JAIRUS BANAJI

Some members of the Forum against Oppression of Women (FAOW) decided=20
that we shouldn't let the Confederation of Indian Industry (CII)'s=20
honeymoon with Narendra Modi pass unprotested. So at the last minute=20
we decided we would try and intervene in some way.

About 14 of us (including some from the group Insaaniyat) gathered in=20
the Oberoi hotel lobby as corporate highfliers streamed into the=20
elevators to fill the conference room on the terrace above floor 40.=20
I smuggled myself in fairly early when security was lax and the room=20
half-empty. Some of the Forum activists also managed to infiltrate.=20
But Modi was late by over an hour and hotel security working with CID=20
managed to weed out everyone who seemed inappropriately dressed for=20
the occasion, once the alert went out that there was a 'group' in the=20
hotel. Had there been even just 7-8 of us in the conference room, the=20
impact would of course have been more disruptive, but possibly also=20
less successful.

The atmosphere was depressingly obsequious, with corporate chieftains=20
close to genuflection-disgusting stuff. One had to sit through Modi's=20
string of promises and self-proclaimed achievements till the meeting=20
was thrown open. (Capital has fled Gujarat since the violence and the=20
aim of this 'interactive session' was to give Modi a chance to woo=20
investors back. The slogan was 'Gujarat Unlimited'.)=20=20

After several rounds of the usual lobbying (privatisation, labour=20
laws, etc.), Jamshed Godrej could no longer ignore my hand and said,=20
"The gentleman in the brown shirt." I first introduced myself (as=20
from Insaaniyat and the Oxford Corporate Governance Study; several of=20
my interviewees were there and would have recognised me), then said:

"You cannot have a strong economy without justice, and you can't have=20
justice without the rule of law. By now there is considerable=20
evidence that the Gujarat government actively connived in the=20
slaughter of innocent men, women, and children in Gujarat last year."=20
(Panic, consternation. Godrej interrupts, tries to shut me up, says,=20
"This isn't relevant to our meeting".) I respond, "Of course it's=20
relevant. How do you conduct business without the enforcement of=20
contracts?" (Consternation mounts...Then the final blow.) My=20
question is to the CII - "Why is the CII lending credibility to=20
political forces that have blood on their hands?"

There seemed at that point a sort of corporate roar, the backlash of=20
a wounded lion, and the CID moved in rapidly to haul me away, when=20
Modi told them (in Hindi) to stop. He wanted me there so he could=20
reply. All I did hear him say was that every meeting of his was being=20
'hijacked' by people like me 'raising the same issues' and seeking=20
publicity. I was in no mood to allow him the luxury of replying,=20
especially since my question had been directed to the CII, so=20
(divested of the mike by this stage and at the back of the hall) I=20
simply shouted, twice and very clearly so it would resonate in their=20
heads forever: "There is no justice in Gujarat!"

Outside the room I was questioned briefly by the CID, then handed=20
over to the police who took me and a whole group of Forum activists,=20
who in the meantime had been detained in the basement of the Oberoi,=20
to the nearest station where they kept us for about five hours. They=20
were surprisingly gentle with us, and when Modi had finally left=20
their South Bombay jurisdiction (after visiting the Ambanis at their=20
home, late in the evening), we were released.

The women especially were thrilled that at least something had been=20
done, otherwise everyone would have felt dejected and inordinately=20
tired.

It is outrageous that a corporate body like the CII which claims to=20
be in the forefront of modernisation in India should give credibility=20
and support to a politician with Modi's track record. It is a mere=20
technicality that Modi and his ministers are not being tried in the=20
Hague today before the International Criminal Court, the way=20
Milosevic is being tried.

In India we have a tradition of not confronting painful events and=20
experiences and deluding ourselves that we can grow without=20
confronting our past. That is no more possible for societies than it=20
is for individuals, and until we come out of this awful mindset we=20
shall never be able to undermine the culture of impunity that allows=20
politicians to commit crimes in the name of religion and get away=20
with it.

_____

#8.

Hindutva at Work Weblog!
by Khakhi Shorts
http://www.mnet.fr/aiindex/haw.html