[sacw] SACW | 22 Sept. 02

[Harsh Kapoor]

South Asia Citizens Wire | 22 September 2002

_______________________

#1. Review : Pakistan on the Edge (Ahmed Rashid)
#2. India: Faizabad/ Ayodhaya district administration BANS NAPM Meeting

_______________________

#1.

The New York Review of Books
Volume XLIX, Number 15 | October 10, 2002

Review

Pakistan on the Edge

By Ahmed Rashid

Pakistan: The Eye of the Storm
by Owen Bennett Jones
Yale University Press, 352 pp., $29.95
Pakistan: In the Shadow of Jihad and Afghanistan
by Mary Anne Weaver
Farrar, Straus and Giroux, 304 pp., $24.00 (to be published in late October=
)

1.

September 11 was a defining moment throughout the world, but all the=20
more so in South and Central Asia. While the US and its allies can=20
claim success in their quick military victory against the Taliban and=20
al-Qaeda forces in Afghanistan and in the creation of a new=20
government in Kabul, the Western coalition has been much less=20
successful in dealing with the problems that afflict the region today.

Afghanistan is still a dangerous place. On September 5, there was an=20
attempt to assassinate President Hamid Karzai in Kandahar a few hours=20
after an explosion in Kabul that killed at least twenty-five people.=20
The Taliban and al-Qaeda were among the suspects in both cases.=20
Sporadic terrorist attacks on US forces in the country continue. Nine=20
months after he took office last December, President Karzai is still=20
unable to extend his authority across the country; and he has not=20
been able to control the warlords outside the capital, who grow=20
stronger and more defiant of central authority day by day. Donald=20
Rumsfeld reflected the strangely disconnected attitude of the Bush=20
administration when he described the situation as getting better but=20
admitted that it is still "untidy," and that it "will take time and=20
effort for the government to find its sea legs." That Afghanistan is=20
landlocked and most Afghans have never seen the sea does not seem to=20
have occurred to him.

But Rumsfeld was right in one respect. In a region where dictatorship=20
is the norm, Hamid Karzai is now the most legitimate ruler among most=20
of Afghan- istan's neighbors. In June he was overwhelmingly elected=20
as president for the next two years by the Loya Jirga, or traditional=20
tribal assembly. None of the rulers of Afghanistan's neighbors can=20
claim to have achieved a legitimate government through open and fair=20
elections, or even through a process resembling a tribal assembly.=20
Only Iran=8B one of Washington's b=EAtes noires=8Bhas anything=20
approximating a legitimately elected parliament, and its government=20
is paralyzed by conflict between moderates and authoritarian=20
religious leaders who are blocking free expression.

It is in Afghanistan's neighborhood that the political fallout of US=20
policy is getting worse and more unpredictable. In the five Central=20
Asian Republics, the question of legitimacy has never been more=20
pertinent. The leaders still hold Soviet-style elections in which=20
there is only one candidate=8Bthe leader himself. Even then the vote is=20
heavily rigged. Since September 11, Uzbekistan, Kyrgyzstan, and=20
Tajikistan have allowed the US and some European countries to set up=20
military bases for use in the war against terrorism. Local leaders,=20
such as President Islam Karimov of Uzbekistan, have used their=20
importance to the West as a convenient excuse to step up repression=20
of their political opponents, not only Islamic fundamentalists but=20
moderates who advocate democracy. They continue to reject domestic=20
and international pressures to carry out political and economic=20
reforms. Turkmenistan and Kazakhstan do not have Western military=20
bases, but they have provided facilities to Western forces; they have=20
not hesitated to use brutal measures against political groups that=20
demand more democracy. (The president of Turkmenistan recently=20
announced that young men between the ages of fifteen and thirty-five=20
would be conscripted to do nonmilitary labor.)

Yet the Western presence=8Bthe first in the region since the fourth=20
century BC, when Alexander the Great's Greek armies conquered Central=20
Asia=8Bhas inadvertently had surprising results. For the first time=20
since the breakup of the Soviet Union a decade ago we find political=20
opposition to dictatorship, and support of democracy is asserting=20
itself. All the Central Asian leaders are now threatened by the first=20
significant public political movements ever to appear, as well as by=20
underground Islamic movements which are supported by al-Qaeda. Yet=20
the Bush administration, obsessed with its single-track policy of=20
hunting down al-Qaeda, hardly seems aware of this domestic ferment.=20
The Pentagon dominates policymaking in Washington, and its strategy=20
and tactics have changed little since December 2001 when the Taliban=20
were defeated.

Essentially the same small group of US policymakers who conducted the=20
war last October are still making all the critical decisions. The=20
State Department, which is better informed about the region, appears=20
to take no effective part in making policy; nor do other agencies=20
such as USAID, the Treasury, the Justice Department, and Congress,=20
all of which should be pushing for political and economic reform in=20
these states. In recent weeks Congress has been trying to make future=20
US aid to Uzbekistan conditional on political and economic reforms,=20
but there is little support for such a move from the Bush=20
administration.
------------------------------------------------------------------------

Such involvement is all the more needed in Pakistan, where the=20
domestic political crisis is now reaching a boiling point but is=20
conveniently ignored by Washington as long as President Pervez=20
Musharraf continues to support the war against terrorism. Musharraf=20
is coming to the end of his three- year military rule and has=20
promised elections on October 10. But if the referendum Musharraf=20
held on April 30 to confirm himself as president for the next five=20
years is anything to go by, then the October elections will be rigged.

In the referendum Musharraf was the only candidate. The government=20
claimed a 50 percent turnout in which 97 percent of voters approved=20
his remaining as president. But all of the major political parties as=20
well as human rights and monitoring groups said this claim was false.=20
In fact, they said, no more than 10 to 20 percent of the electorate=20
voted, while civil servants and soldiers were under heavy government=20
pressure to go to the polls.

The controversy over the referendum and the dramatic slide in=20
Musharraf's popularity have not diverted him from consolidating his=20
rule and powers. On August 21 he added twenty-nine new amendments to=20
the 1973 constitution by presidential ordinance. No future parliament=20
will be able to repeal them. One effect is to install the army as the=20
dominant member of the new National Security Council, which will have=20
the power to oversee the elected government. Musharraf's amendments=20
also allow him to dismiss whatever parliament is elected on October=20
10. He can appoint whomever he chooses to be Supreme Court judges and=20
military commanders.

Even if Musharraf had not imposed by fiat what amounts to an=20
authoritarian military regime, the election would have been rigged in=20
his favor. Benazir Bhutto and Nawaz Sharif, the leaders of the two=20
largest and probably the most popular parties in the country=8B the=20
Pakistan People's Party and the Pakistan Muslim League, respectively=20
=8Bare both in exile and have been kept from running. In early=20
September, after election officials in Larkana, Ms. Bhutto's home=20
town, rejected her nomination, Sharif withdrew as a candidate in=20
protest, raising the possibility that the two parties, which had been=20
bitterly opposed, were cooperating in their opposition to Musharraf.=20
The two parties have been coordinating their allocation of seats to=20
candidates in the elections. But they still face daunting obstacles.=20
Since June, military officers from the Inter-Services Intelligence=20
(ISI) have been harassing politicians and trying to form a "king's=20
party," whose parliamentary candidates will be loyal to Musharraf; in=20
return the ISI promised to ensure their election. Numerous recently=20
announced laws allow the army to keep the candidates it dislikes from=20
standing for election.
------------------------------------------------------------------------

However, there is enormous opposition to almost everything that=20
Musharraf is trying to do; it comes not just from alliances of=20
secular and Islamic parties, but, for the first time, from nonparty=20
groups=8Borganizations of lawyers, women, businessmen, human rights=20
activists, and student and trade unions. While the mainstream Islamic=20
parties have united in their opposition to Musharraf in protest=20
against his alliance with the US, secular parties are opposing him on=20
grounds that his new system will relegate politicians and civic=20
groups to the margins of society for a very long time and give the=20
army a permanent veto over the government.

Musharraf has said that politicians have proved corrupt and=20
incompetent in the past and cannot be given power again without=20
restrictions imposed by the army. The history of corruption is all=20
too true. Politicians notoriously dip into public funds and demand=20
money in return for favors to businessmen. But for the past three=20
years the army has, in effect, suppressed independent political=20
activity, ensuring that no new generation of politicians can arise=20
except those willing to work under the army's shadow. Moreover,=20
ordinary people, politicians, and the press have been asking the army=20
exactly the question it does not want to hear: Why, at the beginning=20
of the twenty-first century, should there not be democracy and=20
civilian control over the armed forces in order to put an end to=20
decades of political instability and military coups?

A crisis is clearly impending: it may occur just before the=20
elections, when Musharraf will have to allow limited campaigning and=20
party rallies in order to give at least the appearance of normal=20
political life. That may well galvanize the opposition to mount=20
street protests. Or the crisis may come after the elections. This is=20
more likely; even the army's hand-picked parliament is likely to balk=20
at endorsing the supreme powers that Musharraf gave himself on August=20
21. The politicians who are being excluded from parliament may also=20
mount protests.

Both the army and Washington appear to have forgotten the historical=20
record. In 1984 an earlier military dictator, President Zia ul-Haq,=20
made himself president for a five-year term by holding a referendum=20
endorsed by Washington. He then held elections on a nonparty=20
basis=8Bonly hand-picked supporters of the military were allowed to=20
run. But the carefully selected parliamentary leader, Prime Minister=20
Mohammad Khan Junejo, who was presumed by the army to be a political=20
nonentity, declined to do the army's bidding. Zia fired him and=20
dismissed the parliament in May 1988, setting off a crisis that ended=20
abruptly in August when Zia was killed in an airplane crash.

Before Zia, General Yahya Khan, the military dictator in the early=20
1970s, managed to lose a war with India, with the result that=20
Bangladesh was created in what had been East Pakistan. And before=20
that, General Ayub Khan, who ruled for a decade, was forced to resign=20
in 1969 after widespread street protests. These military dictators at=20
least tried to seek some limited support from civilians. Ayub made=20
alliances with the bureaucracy and with industrialists. Zia sought=20
the support of right-wing Islamic leaders and intellectuals while he=20
pursued the war against the Soviets in Afghanistan on behalf of the=20
CIA.

Musharraf is unique in that he has sought no allies among civilians;=20
he apparently holds them all in virtual contempt. He has managed to=20
alienate every section of civil society including top bureaucrats and=20
politicians and the press, as well as businessmen, lawyers, and=20
social workers. Even after September 11 when his support for the war=20
against terrorism brought him praise from Pakistan's secular parties=20
and from the middle class, Musharraf refused to seek their=20
cooperation. After the rigged referendum of last April his isolation=20
is virtually complete, and the ISI has therefore been having a hard=20
time forming a king's party. Indeed, the ISI's difficulties in=20
mustering visible support for Musharraf does much to explain his=20
imposition of personal and military power through the constitutional=20
amendments he announced on August 21.
------------------------------------------------------------------------

With four military dictatorships that have ruled Pakistan for half=20
its political life, the Pakistani military has certainly proved one=20
large historical fact. After each coup the army leaders have tried to=20
reinvent the political system to their advantage rather than return=20
the country to democracy. In each case they failed to get the support=20
of the population. Their attempts to micromanage the political system=20
and elections have always backfired and led to a larger crisis. Yet=20
Musharraf is following his predecessors in carrying out the same=20
sequence of events, refusing to learn from the country's grim=20
historical experience.

This time, however, if the army faces rising domestic political=20
protest and finds its power is undermined, the international and=20
regional repercussions will be huge. Few Westerners seem to realize=20
how grave Pakistan's situation has become. India has become=20
increasingly bellicose. Al-Qaeda cells are firmly planted inside the=20
country. Law and order has broken down as militant groups kill=20
foreigners and Pakistani Christians. The country's economy is in an=20
acute recession, with widespread unemployment. Some 40 percent of the=20
population, or about 56 million Pakistanis, live below the poverty=20
line; their numbers have increased by 15 million since Musharraf took=20
power. There is a deep polarization between the secular democratic=20
parties and the Islamic right wing. The country and the army's future=20
are now at stake, as well as Pakistan's involvement in the war=20
against terrorism.

Musharraf seized power in 1999 by overthrowing the elected government=20
of Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif after Sharif had tried to fire him as=20
army chief. Pakistan was considered a pariah by most nations until=20
September 11. On taking power Musharraf promised revolutionary reform=20
of the economy and the social system and pledged he would quickly=20
relinquish power to an elected government once corrupt politicians=20
had been dealt with. He proceeded to break each of his promises, not=20
least in failing to improve relations with India and failing to curb=20
the power of the Islamic extremist groups, who had succeeded in=20
penetrating all of the state bureaucracies. The Pakistani army's=20
fifty-year-long relationship with the US reached rock bottom.

September 11 brought Musharraf and Pakistan back into international=20
respectability after he made a U-turn in national policy. He stopped=20
Pakistan's support for the Taliban, offered Washington military bases=20
to pursue its war in Afghanistan, and began a half-hearted campaign=20
to control Pakistan's own Islamic extremists, many of whom had spent=20
the past two decades fighting for Islamic causes throughout the world.

A few days after September 11, when Musharraf informed Pakistanis of=20
his switch in policy, he tried, in his televised speech, to impress=20
upon them the benefits it would bring Pakistan. He said that the=20
alliance with the US would preserve Pakistan's nuclear program, and=20
allow it to pursue its long-standing desire to secure the Indian-held=20
part of Kashmir and develop the economy with Western aid. In fact=20
Washington had given Musharraf an ultimatum=8B"You are either with us=20
or against us." The army was not about to undertake collective=20
suicide by going the way of Saddam Hussein, and it was naturally keen=20
to benefit from the credits Washington was now willing to extend to=20
Pakistan.
------------------------------------------------------------------------

Musharraf's real obsession, like that of all three military dictators=20
before him, has been been his desire to take over Kashmir. Since 1989=20
an indigenous insurgency in Kashmir has been partially backed by=20
Pakistan; more than 60,000 people have died in attacks by resistance=20
groups and in fighting with the Indian army and police. Musharraf=20
already made one reckless foray into Kashmir in 1999 when, as army=20
chief, he sent Pakistani troops to capture the mountainous border=20
territory of Kargil inside Indian Kashmir, which led to a small-scale=20
war with India. That crisis, made more dangerous by the fact that=20
both countries were armed with nuclear weapons, was only defused when=20
then Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif, in response to an ultimatum from=20
Bill Clinton, ordered the Pakistani army to back down. The retreat=20
led to an irreversible break in relations between Sharif and=20
Musharraf, who still thinks the conflict over Kargil could have been=20
won by Pakistani troops.

Last spring India and Pakistan nearly went to war again as a total of=20
one million troops from both sides mobilized on their long common=20
border=8Ba situation that has only been partially defused by US and=20
European diplomacy. Further acute tensions can be expected in late=20
September when India will hold elections in Indian Kashmir, which=20
already have been denounced by Kashmiri moderates as rigged in=20
advance. Pakistan and the Kashmiri militants have every intention of=20
disrupting the elections.

By now, after three and a half wars with India (counting the fighting=20
in Kargil), most Pakistanis are fed up with the Kashmir issue and=20
would much prefer that the money spent on the 500,000-strong=20
Pakistani army be spent on roads, schools, and hospitals. But even=20
today, voicing such opinions in Pakistan is considered treasonable by=20
the army, which views Kashmir as a sacred Islamic cause.

However, even if the Bush administration shows no concern about the=20
coming domestic crisis, it should be aware of impending danger. With=20
the military set to rule and dominate Pakistan's security and foreign=20
policies under the veneer of an elected government after October, the=20
army will continue to pursue its dream of securing Kashmir. This will=20
ensure a permanent state of tension with India. The Pakistani army=20
will never wholly curb the militant Islamic groups who have acted as=20
proxies in fighting the army's wars in Kashmir and Afghanistan.=20
Clearly all this has implications for the war on terrorism.

Musharraf's much-publicized crackdown on Islamic militants has really=20
been a crackdown on Arabs and other foreigners belonging to al-Qaeda=20
and on the small Pakistani extremist groups who provide al-Qaeda with=20
sanctuary and safe houses in Pakistan. To the army's credit, 328 of=20
the more than 600 suspected al-Qaeda militants being held in=20
Guant=E1namo were captured by Pakistani security forces inside=20
Pakistan, although very little is known about who they are and just=20
what they were arrested for. And Musharraf now has to face efforts by=20
the forces both of al-Qaeda and of Pakistani militants to terrorize=20
the pro-Western and Christian population in Pakistan and to=20
assassinate him and other government leaders. These militants want to=20
provoke a war between India and Pakistan and create enough anarchy in=20
Pakistan to enable their supporters in the military to mount a coup.

Yet even these threats have not been sufficient to convince Musharraf=20
of the dangers from within the army. The larger Islamic parties that=20
have been most involved in the fighting in Kashmir, and have large=20
networks there, have barely been touched by the army's crackdown.=20
Their leaders are being held in comfortable house arrest and their=20
armed militants have been told to lie low for the time being.=20
Moreover, since June the ISI has been quietly making deals with these=20
same leaders in order to seek their support in the October elections.=20
Their militant followers know they will be needed to help disrupt the=20
elections in Kashmir.
------------------------------------------------------------------------

As in Central Asia, the Bush administration has so far turned a blind=20
eye to the domestic crisis in Pakistan and the permissive approach=20
the military has adopted toward the Islamic parties. Donald Rumsfeld=20
cannot praise Musharraf enough, so long as he continues to capture=20
al-Qaeda militants and provide US forces with bases in Pakistan. In a=20
throwback to the 1950s and the cold war, Washington's policymakers=20
appear to prefer working with one-man dictatorships in the region to=20
facing the prospect of divided authority, multiple leaders, and=20
parliaments.

US officials say that, because there is no alternative to Musharraf,=20
they are not criticizing his assertion of dictatorial powers or the=20
army's plans to control the October election. Any other military=20
general would, in their view, probably be more sympathetic to the=20
Islamic fundamentalists. The Bush administration believes that, with=20
no charismatic and trustworthy civilian waiting in the wings, an=20
elected government with full powers would be weak, under constant=20
pressure from fundamentalists, and unable to make good on Pakistan's=20
commitments to oppose terrorism.

Here the administration fails to see that there is no satisfactory=20
alternative to free and fair elections. At the very least, the US=20
should be leaning on Musharraf and the army to persuade them to=20
withdraw some of their more outrageous claims to permanent power.=20
Unfortunately, Washington has neither the perception nor the strategy=20
to carry out such a task. If what clearly seems to be an impending=20
crisis erupts in Pakistan, Washington will be caught unprepared and=20
will merely try to undertake day-to-day "crisis management."

2.

These issues make the two books under review all the more important,=20
especially in view of the current lack of perceptive commentary on=20
Pakistan. Owen Bennett Jones, the BBC correspondent in Pakistan=20
during the 1999 coup, has written a concise and highly readable=20
history of the country, which deals with many of the contradictions=20
and problems Musharraf faced after his coup, among them the influence=20
of radical fundamentalists and the dominance of the Taliban in=20
Afghanistan. He intersperses this history with his own carefully=20
detailed reports on critical moments such as the day of the Musharraf=20
coup.

Mary Anne Weaver, a South Asia and Middle East correspondent for The=20
New Yorker, has drawn on her superb skills as an evocative journalist=20
to write a very different kind of book=8B one that, by telling stories=20
and describing scenes, gives a sense of Pakistani life that no amount=20
of dry analysis could convey. She is literally a fireside=20
storyteller, quite capable of entertaining a gathering of Pashtun and=20
Baluchi nomadic tribesmen (with whom she has spent much time). Those=20
who are even remotely interested in Pakistan's coming crisis should=20
read both of these quite different books.

Jones presents the history of the country not through a chronology of=20
events, but through a division of specific issues such as Kashmir,=20
Islamic fundamentalism, and the army. In one of his most revealing=20
chapters, he shows how, faced with US pressure to give up the Taliban=20
after September 11, several army generals told Musharraf he should=20
wait and see before deciding what to do. It took a six-hour meeting=20
with the army's corps commanders for Musharraf to convince them that=20
the overwhelming US pressure and the consequences for Pakistan of=20
saying no or delaying a decision were too great. These divisions in=20
the army are now greater than they were nine months ago, and=20
Musharraf's growing unpopularity is causing much distress in the=20
officer corps, among both neo-fundamentalist officers and=20
nonpolitical professionals who fear the army's prestige is being=20
undermined by their chief's bid to secure more power for himself.
------------------------------------------------------------------------

One of Jones's central points is that the complex debates over=20
whether Pakistan should have an Islamic or a secular identity have=20
soured the political scene since Pakistan was created in 1947, and=20
they remain unresolved. He describes well both the various sects=20
within the Sunni Muslim majority and the differences between the=20
Sunni and the minority Shia, who make up less than 20 percent of the=20
population. He makes the important point that the members of the=20
hard-line Deobandi Sunni sect, which is strongly in favor of an=20
anti-American jihad and was the main backer of the Taliban, makes up=20
only 15 percent of the country's Muslims. Most Pakistani Sunnis=20
belong to more moderate sects.

This analysis goes a long way toward explaining why the jihadi groups=20
have never managed to get mass support, and also how some frustrated=20
Deobandis have become sectarian extremists, quite willing to kill=20
Shias and Christians. Jones rightly blames both Sharif and Benazir=20
Bhutto, each serving as prime minister twice in the 1990s, for=20
failing to take on the extremists and describes how each of them=20
pandered to the mullahs for short-term political gains. Bhutto, Jones=20
writes, "consistently failed to confront" the jihadists, while Sharif=20
was "an appalling administrator who consistently favored making grand=20
announcements rather than seriously attempting to implement=20
policies." Jones also gives a perceptive account of Musharraf's=20
double dealing with the fundamentalists after September 11: he tried=20
to crack down on some opinions while appeasing others.

In his chapter on the Kashmir dispute, based on extensive interviews,=20
Jones gives a particularly strong account of the invasion of Kargil.=20
"To this day," he writes,

General Musharraf refuses to admit that one of his first acts as army=20
chief was to order his men into Indian-held territory in Kashmir and=20
thereby launch the Kargil campaign.

Jones reveals that Pakistani troops entered Indian territory as early=20
as October 1998, six months before the conflict blew up. Both Sharif=20
and Indian Prime Minister Atal Bihari Vajpayee had already=20
established diplomatic back channels that they used to try to defuse=20
the conflict after it erupted. In fact, before Musharraf launched his=20
Kargil adventure, both leaders had been secretly and seriously=20
involved in trying to resolve the Kashmir dispute.

Jones describes how Pakistan made the decision to respond to India's=20
nuclear tests in May 1998 by carrying out its own. This provoked=20
Western sanctions and international isolation. President Clinton=20
futilely tried to stop Sharif from nuclear testing by offering to=20
write off Pakistan's $3 billion debt to the United States. Sharif and=20
the army's decision to test was made less out of conviction than from=20
the pressure being exerted by Islamic groups.

However, Jones is inaccurate about China's role in providing Pakistan=20
with nuclear technology in the 1980s. He believes that Pakistan=20
shared its nuclear secrets with China when it was clearly the other=20
way around. Jones also makes no mention of China's huge contribution=20
to Pakistan's missile program, which is reckoned by Western analysts=20
to be ahead of India's since Pakistani missiles are now considered=20
capable of carrying miniaturized nuclear warheads.

Jones is generally dismissive of both Pakistani politicians and the=20
aspirations of Pakistanis for democracy. Clearly Pakistan's leading=20
politicians have been a dismal bunch for the past two decades, but=20
there is an equally strong argument to be made that the constant=20
undermining of the democratic process by the army and the ISI has not=20
allowed a single elected government to complete its term in office=20
and then be removed from power by the voters rather than by the army.=20
Jones reminds us of what Musharraf told the Pakistani public in a=20
speech in January 2000: "I am not going to perpetuate myself...I=20
can't give any certificate on it but my word of honor. I will not=20
perpetuate myself." As his recent constitutional amendments show, he=20
is bent not only on perpetuating himself but perpetuating military=20
rule.

Jones fails to discuss some critical issues, hardly mentioning the=20
national economy, whose lack of growth is central to the country's=20
present predicament. (Pakistan's growth rate of 3.2 percent is=20
significantly lower than that of other countries in the region and=20
its rate of investment relative to GDP is at the lowest it has been=20
since 1966.) Nor does he deal with Islamabad's failed policies in=20
Afghanistan, which since the 1980s have detrimentally shaped=20
Pakistan's politics even more than its interventions in Kashmir.=20
Pakistan's involvement in Afghanistan, and especially its support of=20
the Taliban, have had an effect on every aspect of the present=20
political crisis, including the rise of extremism and the faltering=20
economy. A flood of drugs has entered Pakistan from Afghanistan,=20
while both countries are awash with arms. An intelligence estimate=20
three years ago stated that there were one million weapons in Karachi=20
alone.
------------------------------------------------------------------------

Mary Ann Weaver, for her part, concentrates on the consequences of=20
Pakistan's Afghan policy for Pakistan itself. She shows how=20
Pakistan's support for the Taliban and the events since September 11=20
have mirrored the 1980s, when the Zia regime was the conduit for the=20
CIA's aid to the Afghan Mujahideen in their war against the Soviet=20
Union. The US, she writes, is as guilty as anyone else for the rise=20
of the Taliban. It walked away from both Afghanistan and Pakistan=20
after the Soviet withdrawal in 1989, leaving behind, Weaver writes,=20
"tens of thousands of well-trained and well-armed Arab, Asian and=20
Afghan fighters available for new jihads."

This has become a much-discussed theme in the US press, but mostly=20
since September 11. Weaver is able to draw on her reporting in the=20
region during the past two decades to show how Pakistan became=20
entangled with the Taliban regime. She concentrates on Baluchistan=20
and the North West Frontier Province, the Pakistani provinces on the=20
Afghan border most affected by the Taliban, and juxtaposes the story=20
of the 1980s with recent events.

What is most useful is her comparison of the two principal military=20
leaders of the last two decades, Zia ul-Haq and Musharraf. Zia, she=20
writes, helped create the jihadi groups in Pakistan which Musharraf=20
inherited. Both leaders disdained civilians and politicians; both=20
carried out dubious referendums to legitimize their rule, and both=20
had US support in doing so. While Zia had two passions, the army and=20
victory in Afghanistan, Musharraf, Weaver writes, has two passions,=20
the army and victory in Kashmir.

And while Zia, with the help of the CIA, transformed a nationalist=20
Afghan struggle against the Soviets into a holy war by providing US=20
military aid almost entirely to the extremist Afghan Mujahideen=20
factions, Musharraf did the same in Kashmir by rejecting the secular=20
Kashmiri nationalists and backing the Pakistani and Kashmiri=20
fundamentalists. Zia refused to acknowledge publicly Pakistan's help=20
to the Afghan Mujahideen, with the result that the country's foreign=20
policy was enveloped in lies. Musharraf has been equally secretive=20
about Pakistan's support of the Taliban and the Kashmiri extremists.
------------------------------------------------------------------------

Weaver repeatedly makes the valid point that while the jihadi groups=20
in Afghanistan and Pakistan are determined to create a theocratic=20
Islamic state, the very idea is alien to the basic Islamic sentiment=20
of most people in both countries, who have always believed in more=20
moderate interpretations of Islam. Weaver is also perceptive about=20
Musharraf's ability to mislead the public and his American sponsors,=20
whether about his 1999 coup or the Kargil invasion. Each time Weaver=20
meets with Musharraf he looks and acts differently, and what he wears=20
becomes important for the message he wants to deliver. He appears one=20
day as the stern officer in military uniform; on another, he wears=20
sporty slacks and an open-necked shirt. "He's a cipher," an army=20
officer tells her. "He can be anything...."

Early in her book Weaver quotes General Anthony Zinni, the former US=20
Marine Corps chief and head of the American Central Command, as=20
saying that "my worry is that Musharraf may be the last hope for=20
Pakistan." By the end of the book she leaves no doubt that Musharraf=20
himself stands in the way of his country's progress. Zinni told=20
Weaver that Pakistan's three worst prospects are that military=20
hard-liners would take over, that the mullahs would take over, or=20
that the country would enter a period of chaos and fall apart,=20
creating another failed state in the region like Afghanistan. He=20
acknowledged that Clinton's policy of isolating Pakistan in the 1990s=20
and ending cooperation with the army was detrimental to the officer=20
corps, in which anti-Americanism increased along with fundamentalism.

Weaver's chapter on Baluchistan, a region of Pakistan little known in=20
the West, brings the reader into a culture of feuds and brutal=20
traditions in which powerful tribal chiefs try criminals by forcing=20
them to walk across burning coals, claiming that only the feet of the=20
guilty will blister. Weaver is one of the few Western journalists to=20
write about the desolate Makran coast of Baluchistan, which is=20
adjacent to the Iranian border where US forces now have military=20
bases. From such accounts, one understands better why the al-Qaeda=20
leaders are still at large.

Much of Weaver's material has appeared in The New Yorker over the=20
years and at times the stitching used to make a book of her articles=20
shows. A trip she took in Baluchistan with some Saudi sheikhs hardly=20
seems relevant to her broader story. At times the reader is confused=20
about whether she is writing about the 1980s or the 1990s, or about=20
Benazir Bhutto's first or second government. To make many of her=20
reports on the 1980s relevant today, she would have had to do much=20
more reporting on the recent past. In describing Pakistan, moreover,=20
she constantly uses words such as "anarchy," "breakdown," and "state=20
failure" without defining what she means. She says Pakistan has "lost=20
its way" and could be the next Yugoslavia, without explaining clearly=20
why.

But Weaver tells a story about Musharraf that should be of interest=20
in Washington today. At a dinner he gave for Pakistani CEOs and bank=20
executives to reassure them about his good intentions, a guest asked=20
him about the worsening violence and the lack of law and order in the=20
country. Musharraf did not bother to reassure him. Instead he took=20
out his silver-plated pistol and waved it in the air. "This is how I=20
protect myself," he told his guests. Unless the Bush administration=20
is capable of a more perceptive political strategy in the region, the=20
US may be left with few options except to wave its pistol in the air=20
and fly B-52 bombers around the clock.

=8BSeptember 11, 2002

_____

Date: Sat, 21 Sep 2002 18:25:37 +0100 (BST)
From: Bobby Ramakant

Faizabad/ Ayodhaya district administration BANS National Allaince of=20
Peoples Movements Meeting

NAPM was going to organize a two days workshop on communal harmony on=20
25th and 26th of September 2002, at Press Club Faizabad. This was=20
part of NAPM ongoing campaign against communalism and for communal=20
harmony. Workshop was going to be attended by 100 activists from NAPM=20
member organizations, and was supposed to be a close door affair with=20
only invited participants and NOT a public program. Therefore no=20
permission was sought from the district administration. The district=20
administration has BANNED this workshop and issued orders NOT TO=20
ALLOW Sandeep Pandey and Swami Agnivesh to hold any event in Faizabad=20
district. District administration, by BANNING this workshop, has=20
violated the basic democratic values and freedom of expression of=20
volunteers belonging to different organizations as well as of NAPM.=20
Distinguished citizens of this country like Dr.Nirmala Deshpande=20
former Rajya Sabha MP, senior activist Medha Patkar of Narmada Bachao=20
Andolan, Swami Agnivesh, senior journalists like Praful Bidwai and=20
Achin Vinayak, Prof. Kamal Mitra Chenoy and Prof. Anuradha Chenoy of=20
JNU, Prof. Roop Rekha Verma of Lucknow University, Siddhraj Dhadhdha,=20
Kishen Patnaik, and Ramon Magsaysay Awardee Sandeep Pandey, are the=20
key note speakers at this workshop. NAPM's national convenor Sandeep=20
Pandey has asured the district magistrate of Faizabad that the event=20
will be entirely peaceful and that NAPM would cooperate with the=20
district administration in maintaining law and order situation. In=20
the face of the confrontation with Hindu fundamentalist=20
organizations, NAPM is even willing to withdraw it's program to=20
maintain law and order. But district administration is not agreeing=20
and has banned the event instead.

So we do feel that we should atleast be allowed to organize a=20
peaceful meeting in Faizabad. We have also requested security from=20
the administration.

We feel that Ayodhaya, which has been made the focus of Hindutva=20
group and allows them to carry on their communal politics in this=20
country during last ten years, it is very important that the message=20
of communal harmony goes out from Ayodhaya,

Ayodhaya has a long history of communal harmony. IT is sad that in=20
the name of Ayodhaya which has NOT witnessed any communal violence in=20
it's history except in 1992 when miscreants from outside created=20
trouble for the local muslim population, communal politics and hatred=20
is being spread, and even violence.

The only objective of NAPM is to strengthen the voice of peace and=20
harmony and to counter the communal politics, which has started=20
taking dangerous dimensions now.

_/_/_/_/_/_/_/_/_/_/_/_/_/_/_/_/_/_/_/_/_/_/_/_/_/_/_/_/_/

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