[sacw] SACW #2 | 31 August 02

[Harsh Kapoor]

South Asia Citizens Wire #2 | 31 August 2002

__________________________

#1. Religious Extremism and Nationalism In Bangladesh (Bertil Lintner)
#2. India: Ordeal by fire (Prem Shankar Jha)
#3. India: Two reports from Frontline
- [BJP's] Multiple Woes (Sukumar Muralidharan)
- UP - Ayodhya Demolishers and a dilemma (Purnima S. Tripathi)
#4. India: Religion off Bengal education forms

__________________________

#1.

RELIGIOUS EXTREMISM AND NATIONALISM IN BANGLADESH *

By Bertil Lintner

INTRODUCTION

When East Pakistan broke away from the main Western part of the country to
form Bangladesh in 1971, it was in opposition to the notion that all Muslim
areas of former British India should unite in one state. The Awami League,
which led the struggle for independence, grew out of the Bangla language
movement, and was based on Bengali
nationalism, not religion. At the same time, independent, secular Banglades=
h
became the only country in the subcontinent with one dominant language grou=
p
and very few ethnic and religious minorities.

It is important to remember that a Muslim element has always been present;
otherwise what was East Pakistan could have merged with the predominantly
Hindu Indian state of West Bengal, where the same language is spoken. The
importance of Islam grew as the Awami League fell out with the country's
powerful military, which began to use religion as a counterweight to the
League's secular, vaguely socialist
policies (many hardline socialists, however, were opposed to the idea of a
separate Bengali state in Bangladesh, which they branded as "bourgeois
nationalism.") The late Bangladeshi scholar Muhammad Ghulam Kabir argued
that Maj.-Gen. Zia ur- Rahman, who seized power in the mid-1970s,
"successfully changed the image of Bangladesh from a liberal Muslim country
to an Islamic country."1 M.G. Kabir also
points out that "secularism" is a hazy and often misunderstood concept in
Bangladesh. The Bengali term for it is dharma mirapekshata, which literally
translates to "religious neutrality." Thus the word "secularism" in a
Bangladeshi context has a subtle difference in meaning from its use in the
West.2

In 1977, Zia dropped secularism as one of the four cornerstones of
Bangladesh's constitution (the other three were democracy, nationalism, and
socialism, although no socialist economic system was ever introduced) and
made the recitation of verses from the Qur'an a regular practice as meeting=
s
with his newlyformed political organization, the Bangladesh Nationalist
Party (BNP), which became
the second biggest party in the country after the Awami League. The marriag=
e
of convenience between the military - which needed popular appeal and an
ideological platform to justify its opposition to the Awami League - and th=
e
country's Islamic forces survived Zia's assassination in 1981.

In some respects, it grew even stronger under the rule of Lt.-Gen. Hossain
Muhammad Ershad (1982-90). In 1988, Ershad made Islam the state religion of
Bangladesh, thus institutionalizing the new brand of nationalism with an
Islamic flavor introduced by Zia. Ershad also changed the weekly holiday
from Sunday to Friday, and revived the Jamaat-e-Islami to counter secular
opposition. The Jamaat had
supported Pakistan against the Bengali nationalists during the liberation
war, and most of its leaders had fled to (West) Pakistan after 1971. Under
Zia, they came back and brought with them new, fundamentalist ideas. Under
Ershad, Islam became a political factor to be reckoned with.

Ershad was deposed in December 1990 following anti-government protests, and
was later convicted of a number of offences and jailed. But this did not
lead to a return to old secular practices. Zia's widow and the new leader o=
f
the BNP, Khaleda Zia, became prime minister after a general election in
February 1991. This was a time
when the Islamic forces consolidated their influence in Bangladesh, but it
came to a halt when the Awami Legaue, led by Sheikh Hasina Wajed, the
daughter of Bangladesh's founding father, Sheikh Mujib ur-Rahman, won the
1996 election. Five years later, an electoral 4-party alliance led by
Khaleda Zia's BNP came to power - and the new coalition that took over
included for the first time two ministers from the Jamaat, which had emerge=
d
as the third largest party, capturing 17 seats in the 300- strong
parliament.

The BNP rode on a wave of dissatisfaction with the Awami League, which
many perceived as corrupt, but the the 4-party alliance was able to win a
massive majority - 191 seats for the BNP and 23 seats for its three allies =
-
only because of the British-style system with one winner per constituency,
and the alliance members all voted for each other. The Awami League remains
the single biggest political party
in Bangladesh with 40% of the popular vote, but it secured only 62 seats (o=
r
20.66% of the MPs) in the election (it now has 58 seats because four were
relinquished due to election of MPs from more than one seat).3

Expectations were high on the new government, which many hoped would be
"cleaner" than the previous one. In June 2001, the Berlin-based organizatio=
n
Transparency International had in its annual report ranked Bangladesh the
world's most corrupt country.4 But since the new government took over in
October 2001, very little has changed in that regard. Further, violence has
become widespread and much of it appears to be religiously and politically
motivated. The Society for Environment and Human Development (SEHD), a
well-respected Bangladeshi NGO, quotes a local report that says that
non-Muslim minorities have suffered as a result: "The intimidation of the
minorities which had begun before the election, became worse afterwards."5
Amnesty International reported in December 2001 that Hindus - who now make
up less than 10% of Bangladesh's population of 130 million - in
particular have come under attack. Hindu places of worship have been
ransacked, villages destroyed and scores of Hindu women are reported to hav=
e
been raped.6

While the Jamaat may not be directly behind these attacks, its inclusion in
the government has meant that more radical groups feel they now enjoy
protection from the authorities and can act with impunity. The most militan=
t
group, the Harkat-ul- Jihad-al-Islami (HUJI, or the Movement of Islamic Hol=
y
War), is reported to have
15,000 members. Bangladeshi Hindus and moderate Muslims hold them
responsible for many of the recent attacks against religious minorities,
secular intellectuals and journalists. In a statement released by the US
State Department on May 21, 2002, HUJI is described as a terrorist
organization with ties to Islamic militants in Pakistan.7 While Bangladesh
is yet far from becoming another Pakistan, Islamic forces are no doubt on
the rise, and extremist influence is growing, especially in the countryside=
.
According to a foreign diplomat in Dhaka: "In the 1960s and 1970s, it was
the leftists who were seen as incorruptible purists. Today, the role model
for
many young men in rural areas is the dedicated Islamic cleric with his skul=
l
cap, flowing robes and beard."8

1. THE RETURN OF THE JAMAAT-E-ISLAMI

The idea that the Muslim-dominated parts of British India should become a
separate country was articulated for the first time in a short essay writte=
n
in 1933 by an Indian Muslim student at Cambridge, Rahmat Ali. He even
proposed a name for the new state - Pakistan - which was an acronym based o=
n
the nations that would compose it: the Punjab, Afghan (the Northwest
Frontier), Kashmir, Indus (or Sindh) and
BaluchiSTAN. The new name also meant "the Land of the Pure."

However, the acronym did not include India's most populous Muslim province,
East Bengal, and, at first, most Islamic groups opposed the idea of
religious nationalism. The most prestigious Islamic university in the
subcontinent, the Darul Uloom, was located at Deoband in Saharanpur distric=
t
of what now is Uttar Pradesh in India, and its leaders strongly supported
the Indian nationalist movement led by the
Congress. The Jamaat-e-Islami, which was founded in 1941 by Maulana Abul Al=
a
Mauddudi and had grown out of the Deoband Madrassa (as the university becam=
e
known) went to the extent of "alleging that the demand for a separate state
based on modern selfish nationalism amounted to rebelling against the tenet=
s
of Islam."9

But gradually, the Muslim League, led by Muhammad Ali Jinnah, won support
for the Pakistan idea, and when India became independent in August 1947, tw=
o
states were born: the secular but Hindu-dominated Union of India - and the
Islamic state of Pakistan, which consisted of two parts, one to the west of
India and the other to the east. The Jamaat became one of the strongest
supporters of the Pakistan idea, and, somewhat ironically, the Deobandi
movement through its network of religious schools, or madrassas, developed
into a breeding ground for Pakistan-centered Islamic fundamentalism. Over
the years, the Deobandi brand of Islam has become almost synonymous with
religious extremism and fanaticism.

The Deobandis had actually arisen in British India not as a reactionary
force but as a forward-looking movement to unite and reform Muslim society
in the wake of oppression the community faced after the 1857 revolt, or
"Mutiny" as the British called it.10 But in independent Pakistan - East and
West - new Deobandi madrassas
were set up everywhere, and they were run by semi-educated mullahs who,
according to Pakistani journalist Ahmed Rashid, "were far removed from the
original reformist agenda of the Deobandi school."11 Much later, it was fro=
m
these madrassas Afghanistan's dreaded Talibans ("Islamic Students") were to
emerge.

The Jamaat was from the beginning inspired by the Ikhwan ul-Muslimeen, or
the Muslim Brotherhood, which was set up in Egypt in 1928 with the aim of
bringing about an Islamic revolution and creating an Islamic state.12 When
they had come to accept Pakistan as that Islamic state, Bengali nationalism
was totally unacceptable. The Jamaat's militants fought alongside the
Pakistan army against the Bengali nationalists. Among the most notorious of
the Jamaat leaders was Abdul Kader Molla,
who became known as "the Butcher of Mirpur," a Dhaka suburb which in 1971
was populated mainly by non-Bengali Muslim immigrants.13 Today, he is the
publicity secretary of Bangladeshi Jamaat, and, despite his background, was
granted a US visa to visit New York in the last week of June, 2002. In 1971=
,
he and other Jamaat leaders were considered war criminals by the first
government of independent Bangladesh,
but they were never prosecuted as they had fled to Pakistan.

The leaders of the Jamaat returned to Bangladesh during the rule of Zia and
Ershad because they were invited to come back, and they also saw Ershad
especially as a champion of their cause. This was somewhat ironic as Ershad
was - and still is - known as a playboy and hardly a religiously-minded
person. But he had introduced a string of Islamic reforms - and he needed
the Jamaat to counter the Awami League, and, like his predecessor Zia, he
had to find ideological underpinnings for
what was basically a military dictatorship. The problem was that the Jamaat
had been discredited by its role in the liberation war - but, as a new
generation emerged, that could be "corrected." Jamaat's Islamic ideals were
taught in Bangladesh's madrassas, which multiplied at a tremendous pace.

The madrassas fill an important function in an impoverished country such as
Bangladesh, where basic education is available only to a few. Today, there
are an estimated 64,000 madrassas in Bangladesh, divided into two kinds. Th=
e
Aliya madrassas are run with government support and control, while the
Dars-e-Nizami or Deoband-style madrassas are totally independent. Aliya
students study for 15-16 years and are taught Arabic, religious theory and
other Islamic subjects as well as
English, mathematics, science and history. They prepare themselves for
employment in government service, or for jobs in the private sector like an=
y
other college or university student. In 1999, there were 7,122 such
registered madrassas in Bangladesh.14

The much more numerous Deobandi madrassas are more "traditional"; Islamic
studies dominate, and the students are taught Urdu (the national language o=
f
Pakistan), Persian and Arabic. After finishing their education, the student=
s
are incapable of taking up any mainstream profession, and the mosques and
the madrassas are their main sources of employment. As Bangladeshi
journalist Salahuddin Babar points out: "Passing out from the madrassas,
poorly equipped to
enter mainstream life and professions, the students are easily lured by
motivated quarters who capitalize on religious sentiment to crate fanatics,
rather than modern Muslims."15

The consequences of this kind of madrassa education can be seen in the
growth of the Jamaat. It did not fare well in the 1996 election, capturing
only three seats in the parliament and 8.61% of the votes.16 Its election
manifesto was also quite carefully worded, perhaps taking into consideratio=
n
the party's reputation and the fact that the
vast majority of Bangladeshis remain opposed to Sharia law and other extrem=
e
Islamic practices. The 23-page document devoted 18 pages to lofty election
promises, and only five to explaining Jamaat's political stand. The party
tried to reassure the public that it would not advocate chopping off
thieves' hands, stoning of people committing adultery, or banning interest =
-
at least not immediately. According to the NGO SEHD: "The priority focus
would be alleviation of poverty, stopping free mixing of sexes and thus
awakening the people to the spirit of Islam and then eventually step by ste=
p
the Islamic laws would be introduced."17
It is impossible to determine how much support the Jamaat actually had in
the 2001 election as it was part of an alliance whose various members voted
for each other against the Awami League, but its 17 seats in the new
parliament - and two ministers in the government - suggest a dramatic
increase. Its youth organization, Islami Chhatra Shibir (ICS), is especiall=
y
active. It is a member of the International Islamic Federation of Student
Organizations as well as the World Assembly of Muslim Youth and has close
contacts with other radical Muslim groups in Pakistan, the Middle East,
Malaysia and Indonesia. One of its main strongholds is at the university in
Chittagong, and it dominates the Deobandi madrassas all over the
country, from where it draws most of its new members. It has been implicate=
d
in a number of bombings and politically and religiously motivated
assassinations.

On April 7, 2001, two leaders of the Awami League's youth and student front
were killed by ICS activists and on June 15, an estimated 21 people were
killed and over 100 injured in a bomb blast at the Awami League party offic=
e
in the town of Narayanganj. Two weeks later, the police arrested an ICS
activist for his alleged involvement in the blast.18 A youngish Islamic
militant, Nurul Islam Bulbul, is the
ICS's current president, and Muhammad Nazrul Islam its general secretary.

For many years the mother party, the Jamaat, was led by Gholam Azam, who ha=
d
returned from Pakistan when Zia was still alive and in power. He resigned i=
n
December 2000, and Motiur Rahman Nizami took over as the new amir of the
party amid wide protests and demands that he be put on trial for war crimes
he committed during the liberation war as the head of a notorious
paramilitary force, the Al-Badar. In one particular incident on December 3,
1971, some members of that force seized the village of Bishalikkha at night
in search of freedom fighters, beating many and killing eight people. When
Nizami's appointment was made public, veterans of the liberation war burnt
an effigy of him during a public rally.19 In October 2001, Nizami
was appointed minister for agriculture, an important post in a mainly
agricultural country such as Bangladesh. His deputy, Ali Ahsan Muhammad
Mujahid, became minister for social welfare.

The terrorist attacks in New York on September 11, 2001, occurred during th=
e
election campaign in Bangladesh, when the country was ruled by a caretaker
government. But the outgoing prime minister, the Awami League's Sheikh
Hasina, and then opposition leader Khaleda Zia of the BNP, condemned the
attacks and both, if they were elected, offered the United States use of
Bangladesh's air space, ports and other facilities to launch military
attacks against the Taliban and Al-Qaeda in Afghanstan. Many Bangladeshis
were moved by the loss of as many as 50 of their countrymen in the attacks
on the World Trade Center. While some of them were immigrants working as
computer analysts and engineers, most seem to have been waiters at the
Window on the World restaurant who were working hard to send money back to
poor relatives in Bangladesh. A Bangladeshi embassy official in Washington
branded the attacks "an affront to Islam=85an attack on humanity."20

Jamaat's stand on the "war against terrorism," however, contrasts sharply t=
o
that of the more established parties. Shortly after the US attacks on
Afghanistan began in October 2001, the Jamaat created a fund purportedly fo=
r
"helping the innocent victims of America's war." According to the Jamaat's
own announcements, 12 million Bangladeshi taka ($210,000) was raised before
the effort was discontinued in
March 2002. Any remaining funds, the Jamaat then said, would go to Afghan
refugees in camps in Pakistan.21

2. THE RISE OF THE HARKAT-UL-JIHAD-AL-ISLAMI (HUJI) AND OTHER
EXTREMIST GROUPS

The growth of the Jamaat during the Ershad regime paved the way for the
establishment of even more radical groups when the BNP returned to power in
1991. According to Bangladeshi journalists, in the early 1990s Bangladeshi
diplomats in Saudi-Arabia issued passports to Pakistani militants in the
kingdom to enable them to escape to Bangladesh.22 Other extremists from
Pakistan - and perhaps also
Afghanistan - appear to have been able to enter Bangladesh in the same way
during that period.

These men were instrumental in building up HUJI, which was first formed in
1992, reportedly with funds from Osama bin Laden.23 The existence of firm
links between the new Bangladeshi militants and Al-Qaeda was proven when
Fazlul Rahman, leader of the "Jihad Movement in Bangladesh" (to which HUJI
belongs), signed the official declaration of "holy war" against the United
States on February 23,
1998. Other signatories included bin Laden, Ayman al-Zawahiri (leader of th=
e
Jihad Group in Egypt), Rifa'i Ahmad Taha aka Abu-Yasir (Egyptian Islamic
Group), and Sheikh Mir Hamzah (secretary of the
Jamiat-ul-Ulema-e-Pakistan).24

HUJI is headed by Shawkat Osman aka Maulana or Sheikh Farid in
Chittagong and, according to the US State Department, has "at least six
camps" in Bangladesh.25 Like the ICS it draws most of its members from the
country's Deobandi madrassas, and, also like the ICS, the group has shown
that it is capable of extreme violence. Bangladesh's Islamic radicals first
came to international attention in 1993, when author Taslima Nasrin was
forced to flee the country after receiving
death threats. The fundamentalists objected to her critical writings about
what she termed outdated religious beliefs. Extremist groups offered a
$5,000 reward for her death. She now lives in exile in France.

While Nasrin's outspoken, feminist writings caused controversy even among
moderate Bangladeshi Muslims, the entire state was shocked when, in early
1999, three men attempted to kill Shams ur-Rahman, a well-known poet and a
symbol of Bangladesh's secular nationhood. During the ensuing arrests, the
police said they seized a list of several intellectuals and writers,
including Nasrin, whom Bangladeshi
religious extremists branded "enemies of Islam."26

Bangladeshi human rights organizations openly accuse HUJI of being behind
both the death threats against Nasrin and the attempt to kill Rahman. The U=
S
State Department notes that HUJI has been accused of stabbing a senior
Bangladeshi journalist in November 2000 for making a documentary on the
plight of Hindus in Bangladesh, and the July 2000 assassination attempt of
then prime minister Sheikh Hasina.27

As with the Jamaat and the ICS, HUJI's main stronghold is in the lawless
southeast, which includes the border with Burma. With its fluid population
and weak law enforcement, the region has long been a haven for smugglers,
gun runners, pirates, and ethnic insurgents from across the Burmese border.
The past decade has seen a massive influx of weapons, especially small arms=
,
through the fishing port of
Cox's Bazaar, which has made the situation in the southeast even more
dangerous and volatile.28

Typically, the winner in the 2001 election in one of the constituencies in
Cox's Bazaar, BNP candidate Shahjahan Chowdhury, was said to be supported b=
y
"the man allegedly leading smuggling operations in [the border town of]
Teknaf." Instead of the regular army, the paramilitary Bangladesh Rifles wa=
s
deployed in this
constituency to help the police in their electoral peacekeeping. This was,
according to the NGO SEHD, "criticised by the local people who alleged that
the Bangladesh Rifles were well connected with the smuggling activities and
thus could take partisan roles."29

In one of the most recent high-profile attacks in the area, Gopal Krishna
Muhuri, the 60-year-old principal of Nazirhat College in Chittagong and a
leading secular humanist, was gunned down in November 2001 in his home by
four hired assassins, who belonged to a gang patronized by the Jamaat.30
India, which is viewing the growth of Bangladesh's Islamic movements with
deep concern, has linked HUJI
militants to the attack on the American Center in Kolkata (Calcutta) in
January 2002, and a series of bomb blasts in the state of Assam in
mid-1999.31

On May 10-11, 2002, nine Islamic fundamentalist groups, including HUJI, met
at a camp near the small town of Ukhia south of Cox's Bazaar and formed the
Bangladesh Islamic Manch (Association). The new umbrella organization also
includes one purporting to represent the Rohingyas, a Muslim minority in
Burma, and the Muslim Liberation Tigers of Assam, a small group operating i=
n
India's northeast.
By June, Bangladeshi veterans of the anti-Soviet war in Afghanistan in the
1980s were reported to be training members of the new alliance in at least
two camps in southern Bangladesh.32

3. THE PLIGHT OF THE ROHINGYAS

The Arakan area of Burma was separated from the rest of the country by a
densely forested mountain range, which made it possible for the Arakanese -
most of whom are Buddhist - to maintain their independence until the late
18th century. Contacts with the outside world had until then been mostly to
the west, which, in turn, had brought Islam to the region. The first Muslim=
s
on the Arakan coast were Moorish, Arab and Persian traders who arrived
between the 9th and the 15th centuries. Some of them stayed and married
local women. Their offspring became the forefathers of yet another hybrid
race, which much later was to become known as the Rohingyas. Like the peopl=
e
in the Chittagong area, they speak a Bengali dialect interspersed with word=
s
borrowed from Persian, Urdu and Arakanese.33

There is no evidence of friction between them and their Buddhist neighbors
in the earlier days. Indeed, after 1430 the Arakanese kings, though
Buddhists, even used Muslim titles in addition to their own names and issue=
d
medallions bearing the kalima, or Muslim confession of faith.34 Persian was
the court language until the Burmese invasion in 1784. Burmese rule lasted
until the first Anglo-Burmese war of
1824-26, when Arakan was taken over by the British along with the Tenasseri=
m
region of southeastern Burma.

When Burma was a part of British India, the rich ricelands of Arakan
attracted thousands of seasonal laborers, especially from the Chittagong
area of adjacent East Bengal. Many of them found it convenient to stay sinc=
e
there was already a large Muslim population who spoke the same language,
and, at that time, no ill feeling
towards immigrants from India proper - unlike the situation in other parts
of Burma, where people of subcontinental origin were despised. At the same
time, Buddhist Arakanese migrated to East Bengal and settled along the coas=
t
between Chittagong and Cox's Bazaar. The official border, the Naf river,
united rather than separated the two British territories.

But the presence of a Muslim minority in Arakan became an issue after
Burma's independence in 1948. The Buddhist and Muslim communities had becom=
e
divided during World War Two; the Buddhists had rallied behind the Japanese
while the Muslims had remained loyal to the British. Some Muslims, fearing
reprisals from the Buddhists once the British were gone, rose up in arms,
demanding an independent state, and the Burmese army was sent in to quell
the rebellion. Predominantly Buddhist Burma never really recognized the
Arakanese Muslims - who in the 1960s
began to refer to themselves as "Rohingya," a term of disputed origin - as
one of the country's "indigenous" ethnic groups. As such, and because of
their different religion and physical appearance, they have often become
convenient scapegoats for Burma's military government to rally the public
against whenever that country has been hit by an economic or political
crisis.

In March 1978, the Burmese government launched a campaign code-named
Naga Min (Dragon King) in Arakan, ostensibly to "check illegal immigrants."
Hundreds of heavily armed troops raided Muslim neighborhoods in Sittwe
(Akyab) and some 5,000 people were arrested. As the operation was extended
to other parts of Arakan, tens of thousands of Rohingyas crossed the border
to Bangladesh. By the end
of June, an approximately 200,000 Rohingyas had fled, causing an
international outcry.35 Eventually, most of the refugees were allowed to
return, but thousands found it safer to remain on the Bangladesh side of th=
e
border. Entire communities of "illegal immigrants" from Burma sprung up
along the border south of Cox's Bazaar, and a
steady trickle of refugees from Burma continued to cross into Bangladesh
throughout the 1980s.

The immensely wealthy Saudi-Arabian charity Rabitat al Alam al Islami
began sending aid to the Rohingya refugees during the 1978 crisis, and it
also built a hospital and a madrassa at Ukhia south of Cox's Bazaar. Prior
to these events, there was only one political organization among the
Rohingyas on the Bangladesh-Burma border, the Rohingya Patriotic Front
(RPF), which was set up in 1974 by Muhammad
Jafar Habib, a native of Buthidaung in Arakan and a graduate of Rangoon
University. He made several appeals - most of them unsuccessful - to the
international Islamic community for help, and maintained a camp for his
small guerrilla army, which operated from the Bangladeshi side of the
border.

In the early 1980s, more radical elements among the Rohingyas broke away
from the RPF to set up the Rohingya Solidarity Organization (RSO). Led by a
medical doctor from Arakan, Muhammad Yunus, it soon became the main and mos=
t
militant faction among the Rohingyas in Bangladesh and on the border. Given
its more rigid religious stand, the RSO soon enjoyed support from
like-minded groups in the Muslim world. These included Jamaat-e-Islami in
Bangladesh and Pakistan,
Gulbuddin Hekmatyar's Hizb-e-Islami in Afghanistan, Hizbe-ul Mujahideen in
Kashmir and Angkatan Belia Islam sa-Malaysia (ABIM), the Islamic Youth
Organization of Malaysia. Afghan instructors were seen in some of the RSO
camps along the Bangladesh-Burma border, while nearly 100 RSO rebels were
reported to be undergoing training in the Afghan province of Khost with
Hizb-e-Islami Mujahideen.36

( * The paper was presented in an international workshop on Religion and
Security in South Asia at the Asia Pacific Center for Security Studies in
Honolulu, Hawaii. August 19-22, 2002.)

____

#2.

The Hindustan Times
Saturday, August 31, 2002=20=20
=09=20
Ordeal by fire

Prem Shankar Jha

Most people regard the Gujarat government's determination to hold an=20
early election in the state despite the passions that grip the Hindus=20
and the fear that stalks the Muslims as one more manifestation of the=20
lack of scruples that characterises Indian politics.

In reality, it is the beginning of India's ordeal by fire. Either=20
Indian democracy will emerge stronger than ever before, or it will be=20
the beginning of the end of the Indian State.

Only a handful of people have realised that the Modi government's=20
attempt to capitalise on the carnage and his insolent attack on the=20
'un-Indianness' of CEC J.M. Lyngdoh and Sonia Gandhi are products of=20
a growing crisis within the BJP itself. The crisis has grown out of=20
the remorseless erosion of the BJP's popular support.

In 1998, when it first came to power at the Centre, the BJP ruled=20
eight major states - Maharashtra, Gujarat, Rajasthan, Delhi, Himachal=20
Pradesh, Madhya Pradesh, Uttar Pradesh, and Orissa. In addition, it=20
was part of the ruling coalition in Karnataka. These states accounted=20
for three-fifth of the population of the country. On the eve of=20
Godhra, it ruled only three states - Orissa, Himachal and Gujarat.=20
By-elections had shown that it was on the way out in Orissa and=20
Gujarat and could easily be overturned in Himachal.

The erosion of support first came to light in the November 1998=20
defeat of the BJP in elections to the state assemblies of Delhi,=20
Rajasthan and Madhya Pradesh. It gained momentum with the party's=20
defeat in the state assembly elections in Maharashtra in 2000 and=20
attained crisis proportions when the party suffered heavy losses in=20
UP that pushed it into a humiliating power-sharing arrangement with=20
the BSP.

The seemingly unending reverses have revived a battle between the=20
Hindutva hardliners and the pluralist moderates in the party over the=20
correct strategy to adopt to retain power. Between 1993 and mid-2000,=20
the moderates dominated the party. Today, they are in eclipse and the=20
Hindutva brigade is in full control.

The rise of the moderates can be traced to two perceptions. First,=20
the BJP's power base was - and remains - narrow in geographical=20
terms. The overwhelming majority of its supporters were concentrated=20
in Gujarat, Rajasthan, MP, Delhi and Himachal Pradesh. Between 1991=20
and 1995, it had been able to add UP and Maharashtra to the list, but=20
its hold on both was shaky. Even with these states, its support base=20
consisted of less than half the country.

This narrow base not only made it extremely difficult for it to=20
attain the 40 per cent of the national vote needed to capture power=20
at the Centre on its own, but also made it hard to convert additional=20
votes into seats. For instance, the BJP's vote rose steadily in Tamil=20
Nadu and West Bengal till it was not far short of 10 per cent in=20
both. But this did not get it any more seats. By the same token=20
increases of the vote in constituencies that were already 'safe' -=20
for instance in Gujarat - also did not translate into additional=20
seats.

Entering into coalitions, therefore, became unavoidable, and that=20
meant that the BJP would have to dilute its ideological plank. The=20
party's defeat in the four mid-term state elections that followed the=20
demolition of the Babri masjid hammered home this lesson. In the=20
November 1993 elections, the party lost power in MP, UP and HP, and=20
lost its outright majority in Rajasthan. Clearly the demolition of=20
the mosque had not go down well with the people - or had not gone=20
down well enough to reverse the anti-incumbent swing of the political=20
pendulum.

The period from 1993 to 2000 saw the ascendancy of the=20
'Vajpayee-Advani' line. Contentious measures, on which the Hindutva=20
brigade had set its heart - like the revocation of Article 370=20
granting Kashmir a special status; the enactment of a uniform civil=20
code and the construction of the Ram temple in Ayodhya - took a back=20
seat. The economic nationalism of the Swadeshi Jagran Manch was=20
allowed to dictate the content of one budget and then given short=20
shrift. A disproportionate number of cabinet berths, governorships=20
and chairmanships of regulatory bodies went to non-BJP coalition=20
partners.

The party welcomed intellectuals of the political middle ground into=20
its fold and rewarded many with positions of power and influence.=20
Pluralism had progressed so far within the BJP that the NDA began to=20
look more and more like a new dominant party in the making.

But the conflict within the BJP was not by any means over. The rank=20
and file of the BJP sulked and the VHP and Bajrang Dal - which=20
believed that they were the real architects of the BJP's rise to=20
power - seethed with barely suppressed anger. This broke its bounds=20
with the attacks on Christians - a move designed palpably to=20
embarrass Vajpayee and remind him of their power. Initially this had=20
the opposite of the desired effect.

Visibly alarmed partners within the NDA promised to cease their=20
public criticism of the BJP's policies, only if Vajpayee promised in=20
return to curb the hardliners within the Sangh parivar. Vajpayee did=20
so with considerable skill till roughly the middle of 2000. But the=20
unending succession of electoral reverses sapped the foundations of=20
pluralism within the party.

Today, the hardliners within the BJP are riding high. Advani has=20
quietly trimmed his sails to the prevailing wind, and Vajpayee has=20
been rendered largely ineffectual. And the BJP is on the verge of=20
returning to the Muslim-baiting policies of 1985-91.

By doing so the BJP is digging its own grave. Modi's strategy may=20
just succeed in Gujarat, but it will fail everywhere else. All the=20
reports emanating from that state speak of a new, totally alien and=20
unforgiving variety of Hindu fanaticism having taken root in it. A=20
moment's reflection shows that this is in fact a brand of fascism=20
masquerading as Hindu revivalism. Gujarat has the lowest poverty=20
rating in India, the highest level of industrialisation and the=20
maximum number of self-employed owner-managers of business.

In short, it is in precisely that early-middle stage of capitalism in=20
which fascism had struck Europe. The Muslims have become scapegoats=20
not just because they too have their fanatics but because this was=20
one of the few states in which they had a competing middle-class.

But none of these conditions prevails in the rest of the country. In=20
the rest of India the narrowing of the BJP's poll platform to one=20
issue, and the reemergence of an ideology that promises only strife=20
and fear, and threatens to take the country back into the middle ages=20
will narrow its appeal and cause intellectuals like L.M. Singhvi and=20
M.G.K. Menon to leave in droves. In 1991, narrow Hindutva gave BJP 21=20
per cent of the national vote. In 2004, it will have difficulty in=20
retaining even 15 per cent.

The threat that India faces, therefore, is not one of a sudden=20
conversion to fascism but of the outbreak of uncontrollable civil war=20
if the BJP persists with its anti-Muslim agenda. If Modi wins in=20
Gujarat, Advani's days as the real head of the party will be=20
numbered. If there are more Gujarats, Kashmir will be irrevocably=20
lost, and a thousand Lashkar and Jaish-e-Mohammad cells will sprout=20
all over the country. India will become ungovernable. FDI will shun=20
the country. Political isolation will follow. From there to a failed=20
State will be but a short step.

_____

#3.

Frontline
Volume 19 - Issue 18, August 31 - September 13, 2002

[BJP's] MULTIPLE WOES

SUKUMAR MURALIDHARAN
in New Delhi
http://www.flonnet.com/fl1918/19180040.htm

o o o

Frontline
Volume 19 - Issue 18, August 31 - September 13, 2002

Demolishers and a dilemma

The recent Supreme Court directive to the Uttar Pradesh government to=20
make its stand clear on the prosecution of some of the key accused in=20
the Babri Masjid demolition case has put the BSP-BJP coalition in a=20
tricky position.

PURNIMA S. TRIPATHI
http://www.flonnet.com/fl1918/19180280.htm

_____

#4.

The Telegraph (Calcutta)
Saturday, August 31, 2002

Religion off Bengal education forms

OUR LEGAL REPORTER
Calcutta, Aug. 30: Taking note of the public outrage over the Tehmina=20
Khatoon issue, the government has decreed that no education=20
institution in the state will ask applicants to declare their=20
religion.

Nine years ago, Tehmina, now 36, was asked to name her religion in a=20
college admission form. But she chose to seek legal redress against=20
the "unjust demand".

Chief minister Buddhadeb Bhattacharjee, after reading newspaper=20
reports on the nine-year legal battle and the public debate that=20
followed, reportedly got in touch with lawyers close to the CPM to=20
find out if the religion column was "legally necessary".

After getting to know that it was redundant - that people could leave=20
it blank if they wanted to - he ordered that the column be scrapped.

The relevant departments then got down to work. It ended in an order,=20
issued on Thursday, that the column would henceforth be absent from=20
admission forms of all state-run education institutions.

A circular to this effect has been sent to all institutions under the=20
West Bengal Primary Education Board, the West Bengal Board of=20
Secondary Education, the West Bengal Council for Higher Secondary=20
Education and the West Bengal Madarsa Education Board.

Academic heads have welcomed the order. Calcutta University=20
pro-vice-chancellor (academic) Suranjan Das said religion could not=20
be anyone's primary identity. "It may end up as a source of=20
discrimination," he added. The university, in fact, did away with the=20
column five years ago, informed former controller of examinations=20
Arun Kiran Pal.

Jyotiprakash Mukherjee, president of the higher secondary council,=20
agreed that the order was long overdue. "In today's=20
communally-charged atmosphere, such identification on the basis of=20
one's religion may lead to more harm than good," he said, adding that=20
the council would ask all affiliated institutions to take note of the=20
order. The head of the secondary board, Haraprasad Samaddar, also=20
welcomed the idea.

"There was a time when surveys used to be conducted on the basis of=20
one's religion," he said. "But such things are frowned upon now."

So far, so good. But what about the "offensive" column that still=20
exists in hospital forms, Tehmina has asked. Or forms that people=20
have to fill up at hotels and lodges. The tenacious woman, who set=20
the ball rolling by going to Calcutta High Court after the Gandhi=20
Memorial College, Habra, asked her to denote her religion, recounted=20
"equally bitter" experiences at places other than academic=20
institutions.

In 1994, she was treated at Nil Ratan Sircar Medical College and=20
Hospital as a "nastik (non-believer)" after Tehmina refused to fill=20
up the column earmarked for religion.

But the worst of her travails - that ranks after the college=20
imbroglio - came when she travelled to Sandeshkhali, in the=20
Sunderbans, a year later. "We kept our luggage at Panthanibas before=20
going out," Tehmina said, recounting her July 29 ordeal. "We came=20
back in the evening and proceeded to fill up the check-in forms."

The problems began when she and her husband, Sukumar Mitra, wrote=20
down their names. "We were turned out of the hotel that night and had=20
to spend it outdoors as our surnames did not match," Tehmina said.

That case, however, ended in a victory for them when the hotel owner,=20
Prasad Mandal, paid a token fine of Re 1 and apologised.

_/_/_/_/_/_/_/_/_/_/_/_/_/_/_/_/_/_/_/_/_/_/_/_/_/_/_/_/_/

SACW is an informal, independent & non-profit citizens wire service run by
South Asia Citizens Web (http://www.mnet.fr/aiindex) since 1996.
To subscribe send a blank message to:
<act-subscribe@yahoogroups.com> / To unsubscribe send a blank
message to: <act-unsubscribe@yahoogroups.com>
________________________________________
DISCLAIMER: Opinions expressed in materials carried in the posts do not
necessarily reflect the views of SACW compilers.
\\|//\\|//\\|//\\|//\\|//\\|//\\|//\\|//\\|//\\|//|//\\|//|//\\|//|//\\|//|=
//\\|//|