[sacw] SACW #1 | 28 May 02

[Harsh Kapoor]

South Asia Citizens Wire Dispatch #1 | 28 May 2002
http://www.mnet.fr

__________________________

#1. The evil they are (M. B. Naqvi)
#2. Lighting The Nuclear Fire (Pervez Hoodbhoy)
#3. Limited war: unlimited folly (Praful Bidwai)
#4. Going nowhere (Ardeshir Cowasjee)
#5. Kashmir dispute and =C5land model (Ishtiaq Ahmed)
#6. Do not start a war - Letter to the Editor Hindustan Times by=20
Sonia Jabber, Achin Vanaik and others
#7. Public Meeting & Vigil to oppose the war mongering
& war preparations of India and Pakistan. (June 1, 2002 in New Delhi)
#8. India Pakistan Arms Race & Militarisation Watch (IPARMW) # 79
27 May 2002

__________________________

#1.

27 May 2002

The evil they are

By M. B. Naqvi

Nuclear weapons in South Asia are at least four years old. Both India=20
and Pakistan provided the world with audio-visual aid by detonating=20
11 nuclear devices in Rajasthan and Balochistan deserts in May 1998 -=20
without consulting their people, of course. It is time to review what=20
the two countries have achieved thereby.

Insofar as India is concerned, its motives remain a mystery. Some=20
think atomic weapons are the currency of power and a status symbol.=20
Others saw it as the pursuit of national greatness, conceived as=20
amassing overwhelming military strength. Since atomic weapons seemed=20
to fulfil this quest for power, it chose to go nuclear. Others had=20
laid emphasis on its desire for a big league membership, with an=20
application for the permanent membership of the UN Security Council=20
pending. These theories are valid, though it leaves some=20
dissatisfaction. Although Indian publicists claim Pakistan was not in=20
the rickety BJP government's mind in April 1998, a suspicion survives=20
that the immediate context was Pakistan's Kashmir policy. New Delhi=20
perhaps wanted to demonstrate overwhelming strength to overawe=20
Islamabad. Anyway, has India achieved the aims it had thereby?

Before examining India's achievements, Pakistan's motivation has a=20
relevance. Pakistan's sole objective was to deter India. Pakistan=20
Army had assessed that India was a radical threat to its national=20
security. Given half a chance, India will somehow swallow Pakistan.=20
It felt nuclear weapons would help in defying India's power vis-=E0-vis=20
Kashmir. Some in Pakistan's military might be credited with an=20
unavowed desire for eventually getting even with India; the defeat in=20
1971 war rankled. Anyway, the raison d'etre of Pakistan's=20
nuclearisation is deterring India from possible aggression. Nukes are=20
seen as a shield behind which Pakistan can safely keep India on the=20
hop in Kashmir and were an insurance policy for Pakistan's national=20
security. Four years on, a similar question arises: have the atomic=20
weapons, with their Shaheen and Ghauri vehicles, done the job of=20
safeguarding national security?

For India, the first result of Pakistan's counter explosions was that=20
India degraded itself to Pakistan's level; both have stayed equated=20
ever since. Despite much international massaging of Indian ego=20
verbally, it is still not in the big league. The permanent seat in=20
the UN SC is still up in the air and depends almost solely on a=20
problematical consensus among the Big Five. Pakistanis were not=20
overawed by India demonstrating its nuclear muscle; Pakistan could=20
counter it. Pakistan's policy did not change one whit vis-=E0-vis=20
Kashmir and India. Indeed Jihad in Kashmir was promoted with gusto,=20
despite India's superiority in conventional armaments and in its=20
larger nuclear capability. There was no noticeable increase in=20
India's stature abroad because of its nuclear status, while the rest=20
of the world habitually brackets India with Pakistan despite all=20
inequalities.

Giving a hard look at Pakistan shows its stature too have actually=20
deteriorated; nobody was impressed with Pakistan's new-found=20
greatness. It invited horror at the combination of nuclear muscle=20
with mass poverty, political instability and economic backwardness.=20
Pakistan defaulted in its external debt liabilities in the year it=20
gate-crashed into the nuclear club. Its economy remains precarious=20
with IMF and World Bank administering help. Later 9/11bestowed on it=20
considerable largesse. The economy however remains in doldrums and=20
the debt burden is still too high. Relief through rescheduling of=20
debt payments has been a shot in the arm --- but only for the next=20
few years. Pakistan was a pariah nation before that event. It is only=20
marginally better; even the Chinese, their staunchest ally, are now=20
wary of Pakistan's resumed special relationship with the US. The=20
value of US friendship remains to be realistically assessed.

One aspect of Subcontinent's nuclear weapons is clear. Except for the=20
brief interval of bus diplomacy and Lahore Process, India and=20
Pakistan have gone from one Crisis to another ever since. Military=20
tensions have continuously been rising. Kargil operations and their=20
sequel have said it all. While initially the Kargil operations=20
underlined Pakistan's insouciance, its sequel demonstrated a dramatic=20
and humbling climbdown, literally and figuratively. While Pakistan=20
remains perky behind the atomic shield, the going has gotten too=20
rough as India massed its entire armed forces in an attacking mode on=20
Pakistan's borders, though happily, it has not had the courage to=20
clinch the issue. Pakistan, despite membership of anti-Terror=20
Coalition and resumed friendship with the US, remains in a qul de=20
sac, with no options.

Atomic capability has failed to sustain four key Pakistan policies:=20
(i) the Taliban regime had to be left in the lurch; (ii) Islamabad=20
has 'to do more' to stop infiltration into Indian-held Kashmir; (iii)=20
it is strongly discouraging Islamic zealots domestically; and (iv)=20
regime is going further in letting Americans pursue Al-Qaeda and=20
Taliban inside Pakistan's FATA. Nuclear weapons have not saved these=20
policies that were largely predicated on them. If India seems to have=20
done relatively better, the reasons for that is not the panapoly of=20
its nuclear deterrent but India's own size, importance and others'=20
needs. When, what or whom will the Bomb help?

The conclusion is irresistible that the nuclear weapons are=20
inherently destabilising. Exposing the myths that surround these mass=20
destruction weapons is now a necessity. There were many Bomb lovers=20
in India and Pakistan --- otherwise hardliners and quite=20
anti-Pakistan or anti-India in domestic contexts --- who promoted the=20
fib that nuclear weapons, by their sheer destructiveness, would=20
guarantee peace; neither side will dare go to war and both will stay=20
deterred. All the two needed was to negotiate a nuclear d=E9tente.=20
Peace will reign. Well, nothing of the kind has happened.

Amidst near-total sundering of relations, the two countries remain=20
engaged in a ruinous arms race --- in both nuclear and conventional=20
fields. Look at the latest Pakistani missile tests; they cost a=20
pretty penny. Whatever may happen to India's economy Pakistan economy=20
cannot sustain such a growing burden, because nuclear weapons too=20
need to be up-dated and increased in number along with their delivery=20
mechanisms, whenever the adversary does so. Who can ignore that this=20
armament race is relentless and unavoidable so long as the two=20
believe in deterrence. Moreover, a new conventional arms build up is=20
unavoidable after some nuclear deterrence has been achieved. This is=20
the experience of all nuclear powers.

This huge delusion of deterrence has boxed both India and Pakistan in=20
a no go situation. Neither can go forward and nor can any go back.=20
For six months the armies forces of the two are confronting each=20
other, eyeball-to-eyeball. No one knows what to do next, while the=20
sane common advice by all foreigners is somehow not accepted. The=20
point emerges: so long as Indians and Pakistanis do not break out of=20
the present vicious cycle of chauvinistic politics and stop relying=20
on nuclear weapons, there may be no future for the Subcontinent.

New Delhi and Islamabad are unlikely to be rid of their fascination=20
for the bogus doctrine of deterrence --- that has never worked for=20
anyone at anytime. As Praful Bidwai maintains, both have to break out=20
of the thrall of catchy slogans like Minimum Nuclear Deterrent. The=20
fact is that it is neither minimum nor has it deterred anyone in both=20
cases, such illusions make nuclear arms race unstoppable. Even the=20
talk of a nuclear detente is nonsense. With four minutes flying time=20
of missiles between the two countries, what CBMs and what=20
understandings can work? In short, no one can be trusted with a mass=20
destruction weapons. Period.

To escape from this stultification it is vital to reorient politics.=20
It would seem politics is too serious a business to be left to=20
governments alone or to the political classes that plays musical=20
chairs. The common people have to stand up for their rights and=20
assert the need for their desires' fulfilment --- that require peace=20
and a radically reoriented economic effort. Only then will=20
Subcontinent have a future. The master formula is a people-to-people=20
reconciliation between India and Pakistan by way of a start. It has=20
to be a region-wide people-to-people reconciliation, friendship and=20
cooperation. Peace comprises these things and it is not simply the=20
absence of war.

_____

#2.

LIGHTING THE NUCLEAR FIRE
by Pervez Hoodbhoy

A nuclear war is said to have no winners, but Indian Prime Minister Atal
Bihari Vajpayee seems to think otherwise. His exhortations to Indian
troops in Kashmir to prepare for sacrifices and "decisive victory" have
set off widespread alarm. It seems plausible that India is preparing for a
"limited war" to flush out Islamic militant camps in Pakistan administered
Kashmir. But with swift reaction and counter-reaction, it is far from
clear whether the combat can remain confined. Meanwhile, as cross-border
artillery shelling intensifies, five Indian naval vessels are rapidly
moving towards the Arabian Sea. On Thursday, Pakistan's stock market
suspended trading for the day and, as fighter aircraft circle the skies
over Islamabad, foreign diplomats start their exodus from the capital.

Events shall take their course in the days and weeks ahead, but there is
much to reflect upon as we cross the fourth anniversary of the Pokhran and
Chaghai nuclear tests. With free debate on sensitive issues largely
proscribed in both countries - particularly on national television - the
only voices to be heard are those of militarists and establishment
strategic analysts. Not surprisingly, nuclear affairs are now being guided
by wishful, delusional, thinking.

The most frightening delusion is India's trivialization of Pakistan's
nuclear capability. This relatively new phenomenon has gained
astonishingly wide currency in Indian ruling circles. Although Pakistan's
nuclear tests had dispelled earlier scepticism, senior Indian military and
political leaders continue to express doubts on the operational capability
and usability of the Pakistani arsenal. Still more seriously, many Indians
believe that, as a client state of the US, Pakistan's nuclear weapons are
under the control of the US. The assumption is that, in case of extreme
crisis, the US would either restrain their use by Pakistan or, if need be,
destroy them. At a recent meeting, I heard senior Indian analysts say that
they are "bored" by Pakistan's nuclear threats and no longer believe them.
Should one laugh or cry?

Wishes are being confused here with facts, and expediency with truth. Four
years ago, to their chagrin, Indian militarists realized that they had
shot themselves in the foot by forcing Pakistan's nuclear weapons out of
the closet. This had been subsequently rationalized by claiming that a
stable peace based upon a "balance of mutual terror" was now imminent. But
after the upsurge of Kashmir militancy, denying the potency of Pakistan's
nuclear weapons has become more convenient because it clears the road to a
limited war.

One notes another massive change in the attitude of Indian militarists.
For years they had insisted that all matters, including nuclear issues, be
settled only bilaterally. Suggestions that nuclear weapons in the
possession of India and Pakistan were more dangerous than those possessed
by the West, Russia, and China had been angrily rejected. How dare anyone
suggest that India and Pakistan are in any way less responsible,
reasonable, and rational?

Bilateralism has now bit the dust. Having cut off direct communications
with each other, both adversaries have thrust disaster prevention into the
hands of diplomats and third-tier leaders of western countries. A
continuous stream of officials from America and Britain has passed, or is
due to pass, through Islamabad and Delhi. These include Christina Rocca,
Chris Patten, Jack Straw, and Richard Armitage The subcontinent's fate now
hangs in their hands.

Pakistani nuclear misperceptions and miscalculations have been no less
severe than India's.

Pushed into the nuclear arena first by India's tests in 1974, and then
again in 1998, Pakistan soon became addicted to nuclear weapons.
Countering India's nukes became secondary. Instead, Pakistani nukes became
tools for achieving foreign policy objectives. They created euphoric
hyper-confidence and a spirit of machoism that led to breath-taking
adventurism in Kashmir. The subsequent Kargil war of 1999 will be recorded
by historians as the first actually caused by nuclear weapons. Believing
that a nuclear shield made Indian retaliation impossible, Pakistan coyly
disclaimed any connection with the attackers who were extracting heavy
Indian casualties from their high mountain posts in Kargil.

These illusions were soon to be dispelled. As India counter-attacked, a
deeply worried Nawaz Sharif flew to Washington on 4 July 1999, where he
was bluntly told to withdraw Pakistani forces or be prepared for
full-scale war with India. In an article published last month, Bruce
Reidel, Special Assistant to President Clinton, writes that he was present
in person when Clinton informed Nawaz Sharif that the Pakistan Army had
mobilized its nuclear-tipped missile fleet. Unnerved by this revelation
and the closeness to disaster, Nawaz Sharif agreed to immediate
withdrawal, shedding all earlier pretensions that Pakistan had no control
over the attackers.

Other pretensions continued. Today, in spite of General Musharraf's
soothing statements, there is little doubt that militant camps shelter
under Pakistan's nuclear umbrella. Having operated openly for over a
decade in full public view, and with obvious state backing, only magic -
or massive military action - can eliminate them. Whatever Pakistanis might
choose to think, the rest of the world remains incredulous of the
continuing official Pakistani position that it provides "only diplomatic
and moral support" to the people of Kashmir. Earlier denials of military
involvement in Kargil, or of providing military support to the Taliban
regime, have hugely diminished Pakistan's international credibility.

It is now a matter of survival for Pakistan to visibly demonstrate that it
has severed all links with the militant groups it had formerly supported,
to be firm about providing "only diplomatic and moral support", and to
implement what General Musharraf promised in his Jan 12 speech. To run
with the hares and hunt with the hounds - and imagine that the world will
not know - has become impossible. War is around the corner.

Difficult though this course of action is, it is also essential if the
people of Kashmir are to be spared from the brutal rapaciousness of Indian
occupying forces. Although our generals have yet to swallow this bitter
pill, the fact is that Kashmir cannot be liberated by force. The "bleed
India" policy, an apparently cheap option for Pakistan, was vociferously
advocated for over a decade. This has totally collapsed - Pakistan has
bled no less than India.

Even more important than the fate of a few million Kashmiris is that of
India's huge Muslim minority, which equals or exceeds the population of
Pakistan. Without Pakistan's decisive action on cross-border insurgency,
the Muslims of India will become the target of state-sponsored pogroms and
ethnic cleansing. The massacres of Gujarat provide a chilling preview of
what may lie ahead at the hands of a fundamentalist Hindu government.

Terrible dangers lie ahead. Lacking any desire for political settlement or
accommodation, or even a strategy for achieving victory, jihadists in
Kashmir now operate as a third force independent of the Pakistani state.
Their goal is to provoke full-scale war between India and Pakistan,
destabilize Musharraf, and settle scores with America. Hence the
possibility that they will soon commit some huge atrocity - such as a mass
murder of Indian civilians - which would turn India into a mad bull
dashing blindly into a nuclear-armed Pakistan.

Many observers have noted that the Srinagar, Delhi, and Jammu attacks on
Indian civilians coincided with the visits of high officials from Western
countries. Could the forthcoming visit by Richard Armitage provide a
trigger for the next atrocity and a nuclear war? -----------------

Dr. Pervez Hoodbhoy is professor of physics at Quaid-e-Azam University,
Islamabad.

_____

#3.

"The News International", Pakistan, May 23, 2002

Limited war: unlimited folly

Praful Bidwai

When it comes to the enunciation and elaborate fabrication of=20
dubious, woolly or altogether spurious strategic doctrines, otherwise=20
impoverished South Asia must be the world's most productive region.=20
It is certainly hard to beat as regards the practical pursuit of such=20
doctrines through military strategies and ground-level operations --=20
at an enormous cost to the public.

Take a few examples: "strategic depth", "minimum nuclear deterrent",=20
"striking terror in the heart of the enemy" (as a method of winning=20
war), "search for parity", "stability through nuclear deterrence",=20
and now, "limited war" between two de facto nuclear powers.

This latest is the rationalisation which many of India's self-styled=20
strategic "experts" proffer in support of military attacks on=20
Pakistan to avenge the revolting butchery of 30 people, at Kaluchak=20
near Jammu, on May 14. The Vajpayee government claims to have=20
identified the terrorists involved in Kaluchak as Pakistani citizens.=20
But it has produced no significant evidence that they acted as=20
Islamabad's agents.

Put simply, the Kaluchak incident does not on present evidence=20
constitute a casus belli, or reason for war. Responsible states do=20
not start wars without establishing serious causal connections=20
between real threats and military action.

As with other kindred doctrines, the notions of "limited strikes",=20
"targeted attacks", or "limited war" mask a devious intent -- in this=20
instance to "teach Pakistan a lesson", like the US did to the=20
Taliban/Al-Qaeda, or the Israelis to the Palestinians.

Such conceptually bogus doctrines have always served the South Asian=20
public badly. "Strategic depth" -- an archaic notion of refuge in the=20
event of a hostile pursuit -- was used for eight long years to=20
support Pakistan's disastrous Afghanistan policy of recruiting,=20
arming and supporting the Taliban. The result was Afghanistan's=20
devastation, the growing Talibanisation of Pakistan, the=20
strengthening of Islamic-fundamentalist forces (and of=20
Hindu-extremist reaction to them), and the eventual entry of the US=20
into this region.

Logically, it is ludicrous to equate "limited strikes" and "limited=20
war", as many Indian strategists seem to do. The first only denotes=20
the action taken by a state; the second one of many possible=20
outcomes. These outcomes depend on the adversary's response and the=20
initiator's counter-reaction too.

You might launch a limited, small-scale, strike. That you use, say,=20
20 guns or six warplanes, instead of the hundreds you have, is no=20
guarantee that the conflict will remain limited, localised or small=20
in magnitude.

Barring situations of great asymmetry, where one state is simply=20
overwhelmed and collapses, there are no reliable in-built mechanisms=20
which can limit military engagement once it is initiated. In the=20
India-Pakistan case, there are certainly none. Despite India's=20
conventional 2:1 or 3:1 superiority -- and nuclear superiority=20
doesn't matter given the mass-destruction potential of these weapons=20
-- the disparity between the two isn't so large as to inhibit a=20
retaliatory attack that escalates the conflict.

Thus, India is vulnerable on many points on the Line of Control in=20
Jammu and Kashmir because of the terrain. Pakistan would be tempted=20
to exploit that weakness by crossing the LoC at some of those. India=20
could then take counter-measures where Pakistan's vulnerability is=20
high. Full-scale war would follow.

Pakistan is not the equivalent of the Palestinian Authority in the=20
Middle East analogy. The PA has essentially municipal powers, with no=20
regular army or sovereign territory. Pakistan has an army half of=20
India's size, although it is a proportionately smaller country.=20
India's conventional superiority will of course matter in the long=20
term. In the short term, it won't get easily translated into=20
battlefield supremacy.

Pakistan and India have a rich history of strategic miscalculations.=20
In 1965, Ayub Khan thought that parachuting soldiers into the Kashmir=20
Valley would instantly ignite a popular revolution. He started a war=20
which he did not win.

Even routine military exercises by either state can spin out of=20
control, as happened in 1986-87 and 1990. Misperceptions about each=20
other's capabilities, strategies or intentions can enormously=20
complicate matters by fuelling suspicions and hostility.

Even our stated nuclear doctrines are not exempt from misperception.=20
Thus, India presents No-First-Use to signal strategic restraint and=20
sobriety. But many Pakistani strategists see it as a menacing,=20
confident assertion of India's capacity to absorb a Pakistani first=20
strike AND then visit devastation upon Pakistan with a second strike.

Contrariwise, Indian strategists see Pakistan's refusal of a=20
No-First-Use pledge as indicating a willingness to use nuclear=20
weapons to pre-empt defeat in a conventional conflict. To add to=20
this, there is fundamental confusion about the circumstances in which=20
either state might use nuclear weapons to deter "unacceptable"=20
damage, or how each state defines how much damage is "unacceptable".

There are few worthwhile confidence-building or crisis-defusion=20
measures in place between the two strategic rivals. The "hot line"=20
between their two Directors-General of Military Operations is often=20
not activated, as it is supposed to be at a fixed hour every week.=20
The failure is especially pronounced during crises.

There has never been a stable deterrent equation between India and=20
Pakistan at the nuclear or even conventional level. We know from the=20
history of the Cold War that there never was a viable, long-term=20
nuclear deterrent equation between East and West, or the US and the=20
USSR. That deterrence was always fraught with mishaps, accidents,=20
misperceptions, panic responses -- and above all, an arms race, which=20
altered the balance of power, and hence the original deterrent=20
equation.

The India-Pakistan situation is much, much worse. The two hostile=20
neighbours have fought three and a half wars, without resolving any=20
of the issues that fuel their mutual rivalry. As the last Column=20
argued, this is the only region of the world which has witnessed a=20
continuous hot-cold war between the same two adversaries for over=20
half-a-century.

In India-Pakistan, a crisis with a potential for escalation can be=20
triggered off by any number of causes or factors: suspicious military=20
movements, territorial incursions (or fear of these), extra-regional=20
events (Pakistan joining a Western alliance in the 1950s), or purely=20
internal developments (eg the Sindh agitation of the 1980s, or the=20
Babri mosque demolition).

Today, a "limited strike" will probably precipitate a full-scale war,=20
with a significant possibility of escalation to the nuclear level.=20
Yet, there is some desperately wishful thinking in India that the US=20
would somehow prevent such escalation by restraining Pakistan.

This seriously underestimates Islamabad's bargaining power vis-a-vis=20
Washington. In today's circumstances, the US priority is to secure=20
Musharraf's participation, whether through coaxing or bullying, in=20
its war against Al-Qaeda in the tribal "agency" areas. It also=20
grossly overestimates Washington's capacity to enforce restraint and=20
cap hostilities -- at the eleventh hour.

"Limited war" was overblown by Defence Minister George Fernandes, one=20
of India's most reckless politicians, into a strategic principle or=20
doctrine. In February 2000, he declared that Kargil's main lesson is=20
that nuclear weapons can only deter nuclear weapons. Two nuclear=20
weapons-states can "safely" fight a limited conventional war.=20
Fernandes then promptly challenged Pakistan to such a war at a place=20
and time of its choosing -- and be defeated!

These ideas are insane and dangerous. Those who want peace must=20
oppose them. The way out lies in decent diplomacy and, yes, joint=20
patrolling of the LoC by India and Pakistan to prevent militant=20
infiltration.--end--

_____

#4.

Dawn (Karachi)
26 May 2002

Going nowhere
By Ardeshir Cowasjee

Leaders of nations? Leaders of two of the world's most enlightened=20
civilizations? One leader talks of clouds and skies and lightning.=20
The other leader talks of resisting the thunder and lightning with=20
military might.
Where were they both in 1946, when Albert Einstein watched a film=20
recording the destruction and death caused in Hiroshima and Nagasaki=20
by atomic bombs, and holding his head in his hand and weeping he=20
said: "Had I known what I helped make could destroy, I would have=20
chosen to have remained a shoemaker."
On May 24, researchers at Princeton University, where Einstein once=20
worked, came out with statistics on the deaths and injuries that=20
would ensue were India and Pakistan to unleash their nuclear weapons=20
upon each other. The scenario visualized was that were India to bomb=20
Karachi, Lahore, Rawalpindi- Islamabad, and Faisalabad, and in turn=20
Pakistan were to bomb Delhi, Mumbai, Kolkata, Bangalore and Chennai,=20
the estimated number of deaths in India would be 1.7 million with=20
900,000 wounded, and in Pakistan 1.2 million deaths and 600,000=20
injured.
These figures are grossly underestimated as they only represent=20
immediate casualties from blasts, fire and radiation. An unknown=20
number of deaths would occur over the future years from cancer. Those=20
immediately killed would be blessed, for the injured and affected=20
would linger on in pain and suffer horribly.
Lions and tigers from both sides of the divide have roared and=20
bragged of the damage each is able to inflict upon the other. These=20
fierce and ferocious beasts have no thought, though, for what each of=20
their countries and their peoples have lost through the years of=20
acrimony and rancour and the constant readiness of each to take on=20
the 'traditional enemy' at any moment and vanquish it. India, the=20
larger, the more powerful, the better off, can perhaps stand and=20
exist on its own, but Pakistan, down and out, almost on its knees,=20
with its fickle and feckless allies has little chance of going it=20
alone.
Take our great patriot and two-times failed prime minister, once the=20
toast of the towns around the world, who is now writing in the Indian=20
press, drawing parallels, and inciting the Pakistan army to rid=20
itself of General Pervez Musharraf, in the same manner as the=20
Pakistan army, at the closing of 1971, rid itself of General Agha=20
Mohammad Yahya Khan, thus enabling her illustrious father, democrat=20
and patriot Zulfikar Ali Bhutto, to take over the reins of=20
government, save what was left of the country, and lead it on to=20
glory. Daughter Benazir is now ready, more than ready, to do for and=20
unto us as did her father upon whose name she continues to trade.
What does go in Pakistan's favour is that our President General is=20
willing to talk and talk, and go on talking, whereas the man on the=20
other side, without making any allowances for the constraints and=20
restraints our general faces, wishes no more talking and demands only=20
action in the form of the delivery of promises made.
At this stage it may be a bit late to say so, but the sane can only=20
repeat and repeat that the Kashmir issue, as far as this broken=20
country is concerned, must be put on the backburner. The leaders,=20
political and military, surely realize (though they dare not publicly=20
and openly admit it) that Pakistan is not capable of fighting a war=20
and winning both it and Kashmir. Before more harm comes upon us, this=20
issue must be relegated to its rightful place in the Pakistani scheme=20
of things. Let it simmer, let it not boil. Let it wait for=20
circumstances to change and perhaps one day improve in our favour.
Long, long ago the subcontinent had other types of men such as=20
Mohandas Karamchand Gandhi and Mohammad Ali Jinnah, who, after the=20
immediate horrors of partition, were able to impose some sort of=20
sanity upon the relationship between the two new-born countries. We=20
who were in Karachi in 1948, whilst Jinnah was still with us, well=20
remember the incident concerning the large bronze statue of Gandhi=20
which since 1931 had stood on the roundabout in front of the High=20
Court of Sindh.
In January of that year, Karachi, unusually, experienced a round of=20
Hindu-Muslim riots resulting in a heavy exodus of Hindus from the=20
city and much grabbing of abandoned properties. One day, during the=20
course of the riots, whilst Jinnah was driving by the High Court, he=20
noticed Gandhi's statue and fearing for its safety asked his=20
secretary, S.M. Yusuf, to see to it that the statue was removed to=20
some safe place until the situation reverted to normal.
Yusuf, in the inflamed situation, thought it best to bring in a=20
neutral and contacted Jamshed Nusserwanjee, a Parsi, and sought his=20
help. Jamshed rounded up and organized the old boys of the BVS Parsi=20
school, and provided them with tools and a lorry. In the hours of=20
darkness, we went off and removed Gandhi from his plinth and took him=20
to my father's house on Belgrave Terrace and installed him=20
temporarily in one of the garages whilst we contacted the Indian high=20
commissioner to ask him to come to Gandhi's rescue. Discretion being=20
his better part of valour in those disturbed days, he would have=20
nothing to do with it all. The statue was then taken to the BVS and=20
hidden behind a heap of logs in the carpentry class.
Much later, after things had calmed down and the Indians had built=20
their high commission on Bonus Road (renamed Fatima Jinnah Road), the=20
then Indian high commissioner gladly took the statue and Gandhi was=20
installed in the foyer of his chancery. Gandhi remained in the=20
building when it was converted into a consulate, the high commission=20
having moved to Islamabad, and he was finally taken to the capital in=20
1988 where he now stands in the foyer of the Indian high commission,=20
designed to accommodate the bronzed MKG.
This present madness cannot continue for ever. Neighbours we are and=20
neighbours we will remain. We have to learn somehow to coexist. The=20
French and the Germans, diverse as they are, traditional enemies as=20
they were, since 1945 have decided to march together after having=20
fought each other for well over half a century.
Are we two nations not civilized enough to follow suit? Must both=20
sides behave as if the leaders and the led have just slid down from=20
their respective trees?

_____

#5.

The Daily Times (Lahore)
May 27, 2002 Main News

Op-ed: Kashmir dispute and =C5land model

Ishtiaq Ahmed

The =C5land model could succeed because the two main contenders, Sweden=20
and Finland, showed signs of maturity
Leaving all else aside, the basic dispute between India and Pakistan=20
remains the issue of Kashmir. While Pakistan has traditionally asked=20
for third party mediation to settle it, and in doing so also invoked=20
the UN Resolutions on Kashmir, India has equally vehemently rejected=20
such mediation. There is need, therefore, to take a fresh approach to=20
the issue, one that moves away from the stated positions of India and=20
Pakistan and offers new possibilities.
Given the intractable nature of the dispute and the inability of both=20
sides to force any solutions along the lines of 'winner-takes-all', a=20
new approach must follow the 'no-losers' formula. What could that be?
This article proposes to look at the =C5land (pronounced Oland) Islands=20
model, which refers to the settlement between Sweden, Finland and the=20
people of the group of islands known as the =C5land Islands. These=20
islands, with a current population of 25,000, lie between Sweden and=20
Finland in the Gulf of Bothnia.
Historically, these islands were always inhabited by=20
Swedish-speakers. The =C5land Islands and Finland were part of the=20
Swedish empire until 1808-1809 when Sweden lost them to Russia in=20
war. Under the Russian dispensation, the =C5land Islands became part of=20
the Grand Duchy of Finland. When the Russian Empire started=20
disintegrating, a meeting was held at the =C5land Folk High School in=20
August 1917, with secret discussions between representatives of all=20
the =C5land districts. The meeting resolved to work towards a reunion=20
with Sweden, the old mother country. This wish was conveyed to the=20
King and the government of Sweden. A mass petition signed by an=20
overwhelming majority of the resident adult population wanted their=20
islands to be joined with Sweden.
Meanwhile, the Bolshevik Revolution in 1917 made it possible for=20
Finland to proclaim itself an independent republic. This was so=20
because in his early years Lenin was strongly committed to the right=20
of national self-determination. However, the Finns were not prepared=20
to comply with the =C5landers' demand for reunion with Sweden. They=20
were instead willing to give the =C5landers internal self-government.=20
In 1920, the Parliament of Finland passed an autonomy act, but the=20
=C5landers were unwilling to accept it at that stage.
Because the dispute had an international character and could easily=20
erupt into a war between Sweden and Finland, the =C5land Islands=20
question was referred to the newly formed League of Nations. In June=20
1921, the Council of the League confirmed Finland's sovereignty over=20
the =C5land Islands. In return, Finland undertook to guarantee the=20
inhabitants of the =C5land Islands their Swedish language, culture and=20
customs. The decision was supplemented by a treaty between Finland=20
and Sweden on how the guarantees were to be effected. In order to=20
avoid any recurrence of conflict the League of Nations decided that a=20
treaty should be drawn up on =C5land's demilitarization and=20
neutralization. This meant that none of the three parties in the=20
conflict, Finland, Sweden and the =C5land Islands, was left without any=20
benefits. Finland received sovereignty over the =C5land Islands, the=20
=C5land Islands received their autonomy combined with guarantees for=20
the Swedish language and culture, and Sweden received guarantees that=20
=C5land would not constitute a military threat to Sweden.
Since then the Autonomy Act has been completely revised twice, in=20
1951 and 1993, but the basic structure remains unchanged. Only those=20
possessing regional =C5land citizenship can vote in elections and=20
contest public office. Anybody who goes away from the islands for=20
more than five years loses his/her citizenship. Citizenship can be=20
applied for by aliens who may have lived there for five or more=20
years. The =C5landers can freely go and work in Sweden and in Finland=20
but the treaty does not ordinarily allow non-=C5landers to buy property=20
on the islands.
The =C5land model could succeed because the two main contenders, Sweden=20
and Finland, showed signs of maturity and agreed on a formula that=20
could preserve the peace and deliver advantages on all sides. There=20
is nothing which says that Pakistan and India cannot agree to=20
something similar. Of course the situation in Kashmir is quite=20
different - most notably that this former princely State is now=20
divided between Pakistan and India. That only means that a solution=20
will have to be found with this situation in mind.
As a start, both Pakistan and India could be persuaded that a=20
rationalised Line of Control be converted into an international=20
border. Later, both states could withdraw or at least drastically=20
reduce their armed personnel from their respective parts and make=20
travelling between them relatively free for bona fide Kashmiris,=20
though without the automatic right to settle on the other side. Such=20
a course could then begin a process which will finally enable both=20
sides to exorcise the ghost of Partition from their midst. This is=20
also essential because South Asia needs a cooperative framework both=20
for progressive and survival.
The author is an associate professor of Political Science at=20
Stockholm University. He has authored two books and written=20
extensively for various newspapers and journals

_____

#6.

The Hindustan Times
May 27, 2002
=09=20
Do not start a war

We condemn the terrorist attack at Kaluchak. However, such attacks=20
cannot become an excuse for the NDA government to start a war against=20
Pakistan. The murder of innocent people cannot be avenged with acts=20
of war that will cause suffering to innocent Indians and Pakistanis=20
on a large scale.

Let us not be lulled by the rhetoric 'limited war'. With both=20
countries possessing nuclear weapons, the spiralling tensions could=20
result in a nuclear holocaust. The only winners of this final war=20
against terrorism will be the religious fundamentalists on both sides=20
of the border. We appeal to all citizens to oppose this suicidal=20
misadventure.
Sonia Jabber, Achin Vanaik and others, Delhi

______

#7.

Public Meeting & open and public discussion to oppose the war mongering
and war preparations of India and Pakistan. This meeting is to be followed
by a one-and-a-half to two hour vigil at India Gate. Both are to take place
on June 1, Saturday 2002 in New Delhi.

The venue of the Public Meeting:
Deputy Speakers Hall, V.P. Bhavan, Rafi Marg, New Delhi

The vigil will begin from 7.30pm at the usual place near the India Gate
monument and will include posters, banners, placards against war, nuclear
war, for peace, etc., music, singing, street theatre, candles and silence.

All are requested to attend and to please bring your posters, placards, etc=
.
and for those so willing, to bring your musical instruments, theatre groups=
,
etc.

Organised and Sponsored by: The Coalition for Nuclear Disarmament and=20
Peace, Aman Ekta Manch, Pakistan-India Peoples, Forum for Peace and=20
Democracy, Women's Initiative for Peace in South Asia

______

#8.

India Pakistan Arms Race & Militarisation Watch (IPARMW) # 79
27 May 2002
http://groups.yahoo.com/group/IPARMW/message/90
--=20
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