[sacw] SACW #2 | 10 April. 02

Harsh Kapoor aiindex@mnet.fr
Wed, 10 Apr 2002 10:58:10 +0100


South Asia Citizens Wire #2 | 10 April 2002
http://www.mnet.fr

__________________________

#1. Holy lies (Pankaj Mishra)
#2. Dangerous Experiments in Hindutva Lab: The Frankensteins of=20
tomorrow (Swami Agnivesh & Rev Valson Thampu)

__________________________

#1.

http://www.guardian.co.uk/weekend/story/0,3605,678320,00.html

The Guardian, Saturday April 6, 2002

Holy lies

A holy site in the small Indian town of Ayodhya has become the focus=20
of communal strife between Hindu nationalists and Muslims - hundreds=20
have been killed in the past two months. At stake is the plan, backed=20
by rabble-rousing politicians, to build a temple in place of a ruined=20
mosque. Behind it, Pankaj Mishra uncovers a saga of falsified=20
history, opportunistic abbots and a spurious legacy of the British Raj

Ayodhya is the city of Ram, the most virtuous and austere of Hindu=20
gods. To travel there from Benares - across a wintry north Indian=20
landscape of mustard-bright fields, hectic roadside bazaars and=20
lonely columns of smoke - is to move between two very different Hindu=20
myths, or visions of life. Shiva, the god of perpetual destruction=20
and creation, rules Benares, where temple compounds conceal internet=20
cafes and children fly kites next to open funeral pyres by the river.=20
But the city's aggressive affluence and chaos feel far away in=20
Ayodhya, which is small and drab, its alleys full of the dust of the=20
surrounding fields. The peasants carrying unwieldy bundles bring to=20
mind the pilgrims of medieval Indian miniature paintings; and,=20
sitting by the Saryu river at dusk, as the devout tenderly set afloat=20
tiny lamps in the slow-moving water, one feels the endurance and=20
continuity of Hindu India.

After this vision of eternal Hinduism, the mosques and Moghul=20
buildings of Ayodhya come as a surprise. Most are in ruins -=20
especially the older ones built during the 16th and 17th centuries,=20
when Ayodhya was the administrative centre of one of the Moghul=20
empire's major provinces, Awadh. All but two were destroyed as=20
recently as December 6 1992, the day, epochal now in India's history,=20
when a crowd led by politicians from the Bharatiya Janata party=20
(BJP), or Indian People's Party, demolished a mosque they claimed the=20
16th-century Moghul emperor Babur had built as an act of contempt on=20
the site of the god Ram's birthplace.

Memories of that demolition, and the subsequent anti-Muslim pogroms,=20
have been reawakened in the past two months after a Muslim crowd in=20
Gujarat burned alive 58 Hindu activists on a train. The activists=20
were returning from Ayodhya, where they had participated in=20
preliminary rituals for building a new Ram temple, which BJP leaders,=20
who now run the government in Delhi, had vowed to build on the site=20
of Babur's mosque. Hindu militants in Gujarat retaliated by killing=20
more than 600 Muslims. With Hindu passions so aroused, the=20
construction of the new temple seems more, not less, likely. As for=20
the mosques destroyed in 1992, they are unlikely ever to be restored.=20
The Muslim presence in the town seems at an end for the first time in=20
eight centuries.

That was the impression I got even in January, a full month before=20
the anti-Muslim rage exploded, when I visited Digambar Akhara, the=20
straw-littered compound of the militant Sadhu sect presided over by=20
Ramchandra Paramhans, who in 1949 initiated the legal battle to=20
reclaim Babur's mosque, or Babri Masjid, for the Hindu community. The=20
sect, Paramhans told me, was established four centuries ago to fight=20
Muslim invaders who had ravaged India since the 10th century, and=20
erected mosques over temples in the holy cities of Ayodhya, Benares=20
and Mathura. It had been involved, he said, in 76 wars for possession=20
of the site of the Ayodhya mosque, during which more than 200,000=20
Hindus had been martyred.

Paramhans, who is now more than 90 years old, exuberantly directed=20
the demolition squad in 1992, and now heads the trust in charge of=20
the temple's construction. When we spoke, he expected up to a million=20
Hindu volunteers to reach Ayodhya by March 15, defy a Supreme Court=20
ban on construction at the site, and present a fait accompli to the=20
world in the form of a semi-constructed temple.

Two bodyguards watched nervously as he told me of his plans; other=20
armed men stood around the wall of the compound. The security seemed=20
excessive in this exclusively Hindu environment but, as Paramhans=20
said, caressing the tufts of white hair on the tip of his nose, the=20
year before he'd been attacked by home-made bombs delivered by what=20
he called "Muslim terrorists". "Before we take on Pakistani=20
terrorists," he added, "we have to take care of the offspring Babur=20
left behind in India - these 130 million Muslims of India have to be=20
shown their place."

This message was briskly conveyed to the Muslims of Gujarat by=20
Paramhans' associates, leaders of the Vishwa Hindu Parishad (VHP), or=20
World Hindu Council, a sister organisation of the BJP. According to=20
reports from Gujarat, Hindu militants incited, and in some cases=20
organised, the killing of more than 600 Muslims during four hectic=20
days in late February and early March. The chief minister of Gujarat,=20
a hardline BJP leader, quoted the English scientist Newton while=20
defending his government's inability or unwillingness to stop the=20
massacres: "Every action," he said, "has an equal and opposite=20
reaction."

The reaction wasn't equal, though - the final tally of Muslim dead=20
may exceed 1,000 - but it did display a high degree of administrative=20
efficiency, as was also evident during the anti-Muslim pogroms in=20
Bombay in 1992-93, when members of the Hindu extremist group, the=20
Shiv Sena, went around mixed localities with electoral lists of=20
Muslim homes. In Gujarat's cities last month, middle-class Hindu men=20
drove up in new Japanese cars - the emblems of India's globalised=20
economy - to cart off the loot from Muslim shops and businesses.=20
These rich young Hindus in Benetton T-shirts and Nike sneakers seemed=20
unlikely combatants in what Paramhans told me was a holy war against=20
the traitorous 12% of India's population - both wealth and education=20
separated them from the unemployed, listless young small-town Hindus=20
I met in Ayodhya, one of whom is a local convenor of the Bajrang Dal,=20
the stormtroopers of the Hindu nationalists.

What they shared, however, was a particular worldview, outlined most=20
clearly by students at Saraswati Shishu Mandir, a primary school in=20
Benares, one of 15,000 such institutions run by the Rashtriya=20
Swyamsevak Sangh (RSS), or Association of National Volunteers, the=20
parent group of Hindu nationalism from which have emerged almost all=20
the leaders of the BJP, the VHP and the Bajrang Dal. The themes of=20
morning assembly were manliness and patriotism. In the gloomy hall,=20
portraits of militant Hindu freedom fighters mingled with such=20
signboarded exhortations as, "Give me blood and I'll give you=20
freedom", and "Say with pride that you are a Hindu". For an hour,=20
boys and girls marched in front of a stage, where a plaster of Paris=20
statue of Mother India stood astride a map of south Asia, chanting=20
about the perfidy of Pakistan, of Muslim invaders and of the=20
gloriousness of India's past.

Most of the students came from middle-class areas of Benares. Their=20
bare, thin limbs shook with their passion and efforts to memorise=20
arcane Sanskrit words. The principal watched serenely. He told me=20
that Joshi-ji, the education minister, was making sure that new=20
history textbooks carried to every school in the country the message=20
of Hindu pride and Muslim cruelty. It is a message that resonates at=20
a level of caste and class privilege, flourishing in a society where=20
deprivation is always close at hand. An out of work upper-caste=20
advertising executive I met in Benares seemed to be speaking of his=20
own insecurities when he said, after some talk of the latest iMac,=20
"Man, I am scared of these Mozzies. We are a secular, modern nation,=20
but we let them run these madrasas [religious schools], we let them=20
breed like rabbits and one day they are going to outstrip the Hindu=20
population, and will they then treat us as well as we treat them?"

The Muslims, of course, have a different view of how they've been=20
treated. In Madanpura, Benares's Muslim district, I met Najam, a=20
scholar of Urdu and Persian literature. He is in his 30s, and grew up=20
during some of the worst anti-Muslim violence of post-independence=20
India - in the 1992 slaughter, he saw Hindu policemen beat his doctor=20
to death with rifle butts. "I don't think the Muslims are angry any=20
more," he said. "There is no point. The people who demolished the=20
mosque at Ayodhya are now senior ministers. We know we will always be=20
suspected of disloyalty, no matter what we say or do. Our madrasas=20
will always be seen as producing fanatics and terrorists. There is no=20
one ready to listen to us, and so we keep silent. We expect nothing=20
from the government and political parties. We now depend on the=20
goodwill of the Hindus we live with, and all that we hope for is=20
survival with a bit of dignity."

Hindu devotees throng the Viswanath temple in Benares, but few, if=20
any, Muslims dare negotiate a way through the armed police and=20
sandbagged positions to the adjacent Gyanvapi mosque, one of two that=20
the Hindu nationalists have threatened to destroy. It is not easy for=20
an outsider to grasp the Muslim's sense of isolation here. There was=20
little in my own background that could have prepared me to understand=20
the complicated history behind it - being Brahmins with little money,=20
we saw the Muslims as another threat to our aspirations for security=20
and dignity. My sisters attended a RSS-run primary school, where=20
pupils were indoctrinated into disfiguring images of Muslim rulers in=20
their textbooks. At my English medium school, we were encouraged to=20
think of ourselves as secular, modern citizens of India, and regard=20
religion as something one outgrew. So when, in the 1970s and 1980s, I=20
heard about Hindu-Muslim riots, or the insurgencies in Punjab and=20
Kashmir, it seemed to me that religion-based identities were the=20
cause of most conflict and violence in India. The word used in=20
newspapers and academic analyses was "communalism", which was=20
described as the antithesis of the kind of secularism advocated by=20
the founding fathers of India, Gandhi and Nehru, and also of Hinduism=20
itself, which was held to be innately tolerant and secular.

I spent several months in Benares in the late 1980s, unaware that=20
this ancient pilgrimage centre of Hindus was also a holy city for=20
Muslims - unaware, too, of the 17th-century Sufi shrine just behind=20
the tea shack where I often spent my mornings. It was one of many in=20
the city that both Hindus and Muslims visited, a legacy of the=20
flowering of Sufi culture in medieval north India. Only this year I=20
discovered from Najam that one of the great Shia philosophers of=20
Persia had sought refuge at the court of a Hindu ruler of Benares in=20
the 18th century. And it was after returning from my trip to Ayodhya=20
that I read that Ram's primacy in this pilgrimage centre was=20
relatively recent - for much of the medieval period, Ayodhya was the=20
home of the much older sect of Shaivites, or Shiva-worshippers (Ram=20
is one of many incarnations of Vishnu, one of the gods in the Hindu=20
trinity, in which Shiva is the most important); that many of=20
Ayodhya's temples and sects devoted to Ram had actually emerged under=20
the patronage of the Shia Muslims who ruled Awadh in the early 18th=20
century.

Paramhans had been quick to offer me a history full of=20
temple-destroying Muslims and brave Hindu nationalists. But his own=20
militant sect had been originally formed to fight not Muslims but=20
Shiva-worshipping Hindus; and it had been favoured in that long and=20
bloody conflict by the Muslim Nawabs. The Nawabs, whose=20
administration and army were staffed by Hindus, kept a careful=20
distance from Hindu-Muslim conflicts. One of the first such conflicts=20
in Ayodhya came in 1855, when some Muslims accused Hindus of=20
illegally constructing a temple over a mosque and militant Hindu=20
sadhus (mendicants) massacred 75 Muslims. The then Nawab of Awadh,=20
Wajid Ali Shah, a distinguished poet and composer, refused to support=20
the Muslim claim, explaining, "We are devoted to love; do not know of=20
religion. So what if it is Kaaba or a house of idols?"

Wajid Ali Shah, who was denounced as effeminate and inept and deposed=20
a year later by British imperialists, was the last great exponent of=20
the Indo-Persian culture that emerged in Awadh towards the end of the=20
Moghul empire. India was then one of the great centres of the Islamic=20
world, along with the Ottoman and Safavid empires. In India, Islam=20
had lost some of its Arabian and Persian distinctiveness, and had=20
blended with older cultures. Its legacy is still preserved - amid the=20
squalor of a hundred small Indian towns, in the grace and elegance of=20
Najam's Urdu, in numerous songs and dances that accompany festivals,=20
in the subtle cuisines of north India - but one could continue to=20
think of it, as I did, as something without a history or tradition.=20
The Indo-Islamic is an embarrassment to the idea of India maintained=20
by the modernising Hindu elite for the past 50 years.

That idea first emerged in the early 19th century, as the British=20
consolidated their hold over India and found new allies among=20
upper-caste Hindus. As elsewhere in their empire, the British=20
encountered the stiffest resistance from Muslim rulers. So they=20
tended to demonise the Muslims as fanatics and tyrants, and presented=20
the British conquest as at least partly a humanitarian intervention=20
on behalf of a once-great Hindu nation. Most of these British views=20
of India were useful fictions at best - the Turks, Afghans, central=20
Asians and Persians, who together with upper-caste Hindu elites had=20
ruled a variety of Indian states for more than eight centuries, were=20
more than plunderers and zealots. The bewildering diversity of people=20
who inhabited India before the arrival of the Muslims in the 11th=20
century hardly formed a community, much less a nation; and the word=20
"Hinduism" barely hinted at the almost infinite number of folk and=20
elite cultures, religious sects and philosophical traditions found in=20
India.

But these novel British ideas were received well by upper-caste=20
Hindus, who had previously worked with Muslim rulers and began to see=20
opportunities in the new imperial order. British discoveries of=20
India's classical sculpture, painting and literature had given them a=20
fresh, invigorating sense of the pre-Islamic past; they found=20
flattering and useful British Orientalist notions of India that=20
identified Brahmanical scriptures and principles of tolerance as the=20
core of Hinduism. In this view, practices such as widow-burning=20
became proof of the degradation Hinduism had suffered under Muslim=20
rule, and the cruelties of caste became an unfortunate consequence of=20
their tyranny.

A wide range of Hindu thinkers, social reformers and politicians=20
began to see imperial rule, with all its social reforms and=20
scientific advances, as a preparation for self-rule. Some denounced=20
British imperialism as exploitative, but even they welcomed the=20
redeeming modernity it brought and, above all, the European idea of=20
nation - of a cohesive community with a common history, culture,=20
values and sense of purpose - that for many other colonised peoples=20
appeared a way of duplicating the success of the all-conquering west.=20
Muslim leaders, on the other hand, were slow to participate in the=20
civilising mission of imperialism; they saw little place for=20
themselves in the nation envisaged by the Hindu elite. British=20
imperialists followed their own strategies of divide and rule: the=20
decision to partition Bengal in 1905 and to have separate electorates=20
for Muslims reinforced the sense among upwardly mobile Indians that=20
they belonged to distinct communities defined by religion.

It is true that Gandhi and Nehru worked hard to attract low-caste=20
Hindus and Muslims - they wanted to give a mass base and wider=20
legitimacy to the political movement for self-rule under the=20
leadership of the Congress party - but Gandhi's use of popular Hindu=20
symbols, which made him a Mahatma, or sage, among Hindu masses,=20
caused many Muslims to distrust him. Also, many Congress leaders=20
shared the views of such upper-caste ideologues as Veer Savarkar and=20
Guru Golwalkar. These men saw India as essentially the sacred=20
indigenous nation of Hindus which had been divided and emasculated by=20
Muslim invaders, and that could only be revived by uniting its=20
diverse population, recovering ancient Hindu traditions, and weeding=20
out corrupting influences from central Asia and Arabia. This meant=20
forcing Muslims to give up their traditional allegiances and embrace=20
the so-called "Hindu ethos", or Hindutva, of India - an ethos that=20
was, ironically, imagined into being with the help of British=20
Orientalist discoveries of India's past.

The idea of Hindutva included an admiration for Mussolini's fascism=20
and Hitler's Germany, which, as Guru Golwalkar wrote in the Hindu=20
nationalist bible, We or Our Nationhood Defined (1938), expressed=20
"race pride at its highest" by purging the Jews. It inspired the=20
Brahmin founders of the RSS in 1925, and comforted many upper-caste=20
Hindus who felt threatened by Gandhi's emphasis on a federal,=20
socially egalitarian India. It was the rise of the Hindu dominated=20
nation that Gandhi was accused of obstructing by his assassin, a=20
Brahmin member of the RSS.

By the 1940s, the feudal and professional Muslim elite had grown=20
extremely wary of the Hindu nationalist strain within the Congress.=20
After many failed attempts at political rapprochement, they finally=20
arrived at the demand for a separate homeland for Indian Muslims. The=20
demand expressed the Muslim fear of being reduced to a perpetual=20
minority in a Hindu majority state, and was, initially, a desire for=20
a more federal polity for post-colonial India. But the Congress=20
leaders chose to partition off the Muslim-majority provinces in the=20
west and east, rather than share the centralised power of the=20
colonial state that was their great inheritance from the British.

This led to the violent transfer of millions of Hindus, Sikhs and=20
Muslims across hastily-drawn, artificial borders. Massacres, rapes=20
and kidnappings further hardened sectarian feelings: the RSS, which=20
was temporarily banned after Gandhi's assassination, found its most=20
dedicated workers among middle-class Hindu refugees from Pakistan,=20
among them the current home minister, Lal Krishna Advani, who was=20
born in Karachi and joined the RSS as early as 1942. The RSS floated=20
a new party and entered electoral politics in independent India in=20
1951 with the renewed promise of a Hindu nation; and although it=20
worked for much of the next three decades under the gigantic shadow=20
of the Congress party, its sudden popularity in the 1980s now seems=20
part of the great disaster of the Partition, which locked the new=20
nation states of India and Pakistan into stances of mutual hostility.

In Pakistan, a shared faith failed to reconfigure the diverse=20
regional and linguistic communities into a new nation. This was=20
proved when the Bengali-speaking population of East Pakistan seceded,=20
with Indian help, to form Bangladesh in 1971. The ideology of=20
secularism, backed by the prestige and example of Nehru, seems to=20
have had a more successful run in India, which after Partition had,=20
among its vast population, almost as many Muslims as Pakistan. In=20
reality, India's Muslims lost much of their educated elite to=20
Pakistan, and since 1947 they have been a depressed minority. They=20
continue to lack effective spokespersons, despite, or perhaps because=20
of, a tokenist presence at the highest levels of government.=20
Politically, they are significant only at election time, when they=20
form a solid vote for Hindu politicians who promise to protect them=20
from discrimination and violence. Urdu, the language the Muslim=20
presence in India had created - which is barely distinguishable from=20
spoken Hindi - was an early victim of attempts to institute a=20
Sanskritised Hindi as the national language.

Secularism, the separation of religion from politics, was always=20
going to be difficult to impose on a country where religion has long=20
shaped political and cultural identities. But it was a useful basis=20
upon which the Delhi government could, in the name of modernity and=20
progress, establish its authority over a poor, chaotically fractious=20
country. However, when Sikh and Muslim minorities in Punjab and=20
Kashmir challenged the great arbitrary power of the government,=20
Nehru's heirs - his daughter, Indira, and grandson, Rajiv - were=20
quick to discard even the rhetoric of secularism and to turn Hindu=20
majoritarianism into the official ideology of the Congress-run=20
administration.

The uprisings in Punjab and then in Kashmir were represented by the=20
government and the middle-class media as fundamentalist and terrorist=20
assaults on a secular, democratic state. In fact, although tainted by=20
association with Pakistan and religious fanaticism, the Sikhs and=20
Kashmiri Muslims were expressing a long-simmering discontent with an=20
anti-federalist state: a state that had retained most of the power of=20
the old colonial dispensation, and often used it more brutally than=20
the British ever had. The uprisings were part of a larger crisis=20
common in post-colonial states: the failure of a corrupt,=20
self-serving political and bureaucratic elite to ensure social and=20
economic justice for those it had claimed to represent in its=20
anti-colonial battles.

By the 1980s, the Congress party was in decline. It kept raising the=20
bogey of national unity and external enemies, but the disturbances in=20
Kashmir and Punjab only gave more substance to the Hindu nationalist=20
allegation that the Congress had turned India into a "soft state"=20
where Kashmiri Muslims could blithely conspire with Pakistan against=20
Mother India. And, with the pseudo-socialist economy close to=20
bankruptcy, the nationalists saw a chance to find new voters among=20
upper-caste Hindus. Like the National Socialists in Germany in the=20
early 1930s, they offered not so much clear economic policies as=20
fantasies of national rebirth and power. In 1984, the VHP announced a=20
national campaign to rebuild the grand temple at Ayodhya that they=20
claimed the first Moghul emperor Babur had destroyed. The mosque that=20
replaced it, they said, was a symbol of national shame; removing it=20
and rebuilding the temple was a matter of national honour.

Both history and archaeology were travestied in this account of the=20
fall and rise of the eternal Hindu nation. There was no evidence that=20
Babur had ever been to Ayodhya, or that this restless, melancholic=20
conqueror from Samarkand, a connoisseur of architecture, could have=20
built an ugly mosque over an existing Ram temple. Ram himself isn't=20
known to recorded history - the cult of Ram-worship arrived in north=20
India as late as the 10th century AD, and no persuasive evidence=20
exists that a Ram temple ever stood on the site. But the myths were=20
useful in shoring up the narrative of Muslim cruelty and contempt.=20
They found their keenest audience at first among wealthy expatriate=20
Hindus in the UK and US, who bankrolled a movement that, in upholding=20
a strong, self-assertive Hinduism, seemed to allay their sense of=20
inferiority induced by western images of India as miserably poor. In=20
India itself, deeper anxieties made many upper-caste Hindus turn to=20
the BJP.

In 1990, the government, which was then headed by defectors from the=20
Congress party, decided to implement a longstanding proposal to=20
reserve government jobs for poor, "backward-caste" Hindus.=20
Upper-caste Hindus were enraged. The BJP saw the plan for affirmative=20
action as potentially destructive of its old plan of persuading=20
lower-caste groups to accept a paternalistic, upper-caste leadership=20
in a united Hindu front against Muslims. Later that year, the leader=20
of the BJP, LK Advani, decided to lead a ritual procession on a=20
faux-chariot - actually a Chevrolet - from Gujarat to Ayodhya, where=20
he intended to start the construction of the Ram temple.

The previous year, the BJP had passed an official resolution=20
demanding that the temple be built on the exact spot where Babur's=20
mosque now stood. Advani had then said, "I am sure it will translate=20
into votes." Appropriately, he began his journey to Ayodhya from the=20
temple in Somnath, Gujarat, which was looted by a Turk conqueror in=20
the 11th century AD and which had been lavishly rebuilt in the early=20
1950s. Rapturous Hindu activists waited by the roadside to apply=20
ritual marks of blood on his forehead. This was not just play-acting:=20
more than 500 people, most of them Muslims, were killed in the=20
rioting that accompanied Advani's progress across India. Hindu=20
policemen were indifferent, as they were last month in Gujarat, and=20
sometimes even joined in.

It is strange to look back now and see how little known the=20
controversy in Ayodhya was only two decades ago. Local Hindus first=20
staked a claim on the mosque in the mid-19th century, and were=20
allowed by British officials to worship on a platform outside the=20
building. In 1949, two years after independence, a Hindu civil=20
servant working together with local abbots surreptitiously placed=20
idols of Ram inside the mosque. The story that Lord Ram himself had=20
appeared to install the idols inside the mosque quickly spread. Local=20
Muslims protested. Nehru sensed that nothing less than India's=20
secular identity was threatened. He ordered the mosque to be locked=20
and sacked the district official, who promptly joined the Hindu=20
nationalists. But the idols were not removed, and Muslims gradually=20
gave up offering namaz, or prayers, at the mosque. In the following=20
three decades, the courts were clogged with Hindu and Muslim claims=20
on the site. In 1984, the VHP began a campaign to unlock the mosque.=20
In 1986, a local judge allowed the Hindus to worship inside. A year=20
later, Muslims held their largest protest demonstration since=20
independence in Delhi.

Before then, Babur's mosque had primarily been of concern to a small=20
circle of litigious, property-hungry abbots in Ayodhya. Religion was=20
always a fiercely competitive business here: the abbots fought hard=20
for a share of the donations from the millions of poor pilgrims, and,=20
more recently, from wealthy Indians in the US and UK; they were also=20
notorious for murder and pillage - the bomb attack on Paramhans,=20
which he blamed on Muslim terrorists, was probably the work of rival=20
abbots. But as the movement to build the temple intensified,=20
entrepreneurs of religiosity such as Paramhans were repackaged by=20
nationalist politicians as sages and saints, while Ram himself=20
evolved from the benign, almost feminine, calendar-art divinity of my=20
childhood to the vengeful Rambo of Hindu nationalist posters.

The myths multiplied when, in October 1990, Advani's procession was=20
stopped and police in Ayodhya fired upon a crowd of Hindus attempting=20
to assault the mosque. The largest circulation Hindi paper in north=20
India spoke of "indiscriminate police firing" and "hundreds of dead=20
devotees", and then reduced the death toll the next day to 32. These=20
rumours and exaggerations, part of a slick propaganda campaign,=20
helped the BJP win the elections in four north Indian states in 1991.=20
The mosque seemed doomed - then, in December 1992, a crowd of mostly=20
upper-caste Hindus armed with shovels, crowbars, pickaxes, sometimes=20
only bare hands, demolished Babur's mosque, and the police simply=20
watched from a distance. One of the more vocal Hindu nationalist=20
politicians, Uma Bharati, who is now a senior minister in the central=20
Indian government, urged on the crowd, shouting, "Give one more push=20
and break the Babri Masjid." The president of the VHP announced the=20
dawn of a "Hindu rebellion".

That evening, a crowd rampaged through the town, killing 13 Muslims,=20
including children, and destroying scores of mosques, shrines and=20
Muslim-owned shops and homes. Protests and riots erupted across=20
India. Altogether 2,000 people, most of them Muslim, were killed.=20
Three months after the massacres, Muslim gangsters retaliated with=20
bomb attacks that killed more than 300 civilians.

In Delhi, the elderly Congress prime minister, Narasimha Rao, napped=20
through the demolition. The next day he dismissed the BJP=20
governments, banned the RSS and its sister organisations, and=20
promised to rebuild the mosque. The leaders of the BJP tried to=20
distance themselves from the demolition, saying it was a spontaneous=20
act of frustration, provoked by the government's anti-Hindu policies.=20
But the Central Bureau of Investigation concluded that senior BJP=20
leaders had planned the demolition well in advance. As for the=20
anti-Muslim violence, Advani claimed in an article in The Times of=20
India that it would not have taken place had Muslims identified=20
themselves with Hindutva: a sentiment echoed after the recent riots=20
in Gujarat.

Six years after the demolition, the BJP, benefiting from India's=20
first-past-the-post electoral system, became the dominant party in=20
the ruling National Democratic Alliance in Delhi. Despite being=20
forced to share power with more secular parties, BJP's ideological=20
fervour seems undiminished, if as yet unfulfilled. Responding to a=20
question about the Ram temple two years ago, Prime Minister Atal=20
Bihari Vajpayee told expatriate Indians in New York that he needed a=20
clear two-thirds majority in parliament in order to "build the India=20
of our dreams". Certainly, the Hindu nationalists have tried hard to=20
whip up Hindu passions. In their first few months in power, they=20
conducted nuclear tests, explicitly aiming them against Pakistan,=20
which responded with its own tests.

The VHP and Bajrang Dal, which distributed radioactive earth from the=20
nuclear tests site as sacred offerings, were responsible for an=20
unprecedented series of mob attacks on Christians across India. About=20
half of these occurred in Gujarat, but Advani claimed that there was=20
"no law and order problem in Gujarat", and shared the dais at a=20
meeting of Hindu nationalists with the new chief of the RSS, KS=20
Sudarshan, who asked Christians and Muslims to return to their "Hindu=20
roots". Sudarshan also attacked secular intellectuals as "that class=20
of bastards which tries to implant an alien culture in their land"=20
and spoke of "an epic war between Hindus and anti-Hindus". Barely a=20
week after the VHP's plans to start construction of the Ram temple=20
caused some of the worst violence in India since independence, the=20
BJP-led government asked the Supreme Court to allow VHP leaders to=20
perform rituals at the site of the mosque on March 15 - an appeal=20
wisely rejected.

Even so, the temple in Ayodhya seems inevitable. You reach=20
Ramjanmabhoomi (Ram's birthplace), as it is now called, through a=20
maze of narrow, barricaded paths. Armed men loom up abruptly with=20
metal detectors and perform brisk body-searches. These are members of=20
the Provincial Armed Constabulary (PAC), notorious for its pogroms of=20
Muslims in north Indian towns. The men look mean for the cameras.=20
Pictures of the site have not been allowed by the government for the=20
past decade.

A canvas canopy protects a platform built above the rubble of the=20
mosque, on which stand the idols draped in garlands and sequinned=20
cloth. A priest sits below the platform, briskly dispensing prasad -=20
tiny sugary balls - and squirreling away the soiled and wrinkled=20
rupee notes tentatively offered by peasant pilgrims.

As I groped for small change, a PAC inspector wandered over, asked if=20
I was a journalist from Delhi, and attempted a little history. He=20
told me that Lord Ram had placed the idols inside the mosque in 1949;=20
it was his wish that a temple be built on his birthplace. My=20
companion, a resident of Benares, challenged this account, saying=20
that the idols had been placed there by the then district official.=20
The inspector did not defend his story; he only smiled and replied=20
that this proved that the official was a true Hindu.

Many such "true Hindus" looked the other way while the temple was=20
slowly prefabricated. In a vast shed near the Ramjanmabhoomi lie=20
stacks of carved stone pillars. Here, you can buy promotional=20
liter-ature - The Blood-Soaked History Of Ayodhya and Ayodhya: An=20
Answer To Terrorism And Fundamentalism are the bestselling titles -=20
and admire a miniature glass-cased model of the temple.

The labour is cheap - =A32 a day for craftsmen - but the temple, whose=20
architect previously designed the Swaminarayan temple in Neasden,=20
north London, seems to have come out of a garish fantasy of marble=20
and gold.

The impatience of abbots such as Paramhans is understandable.=20
Offerings at the temple are likely to run into millions of dollars=20
annually; much has already arrived from donors in India and abroad.=20
No one knows where most of it has gone - rumours point to new=20
buildings in Ayodhya and elsewhere, including some owned by=20
Paramhans, who is moved to rage if you raise the possibility of=20
Muslim opposition to the temple. "There are only two places Muslims=20
can go to," he shouted, echoing a popular slogan of the early 1990s,=20
"Pakistan or Kabristan [graveyard]."

As for the mosque - which appears now in memory as a melancholy=20
symbol of a besieged secularism - there seems little doubt that it=20
will never be rebuilt. It has fallen victim not just to the=20
ideologues but to less perceptible changes in India's general mood in=20
the past decade. The talk of social justice, the official culture of=20
frugality, the appeal, however rhetorical, to traditions of tolerance=20
and dialogue - all these seem to belong to the past, to the early=20
decades of idealism and delusion. A decade of pro-globalisation=20
policies has created a new, aggressive middle class whose concerns=20
now dominate public life. This aspiring class replaced expatriate=20
Indians as the BJP's primary constituency - referring to them in a=20
recent cover story, India Today spoke of the "return of the militant=20
Hindu".

This powerful Hindu minority supports the insidious campaign against=20
madrasas, and the more brutal assertion of state power in Kashmir. It=20
demands a nuclear attack on Pakistan; aspires to superpower status,=20
and fervently courts the US as a political, economic and military=20
ally. It is of this new India that Gujarat provided a glimpse last=20
month, as young Hindus carted off looted digital cameras and DVD=20
players in their new Japanese cars. It is of this India that Ayodhya=20
presents both a miniature image and a sinister portent, with its=20
syncretic past now irrevocably falsified, its mosques destroyed, its=20
minorities suppressed: an Ayodhya where well-placed local abbots=20
helped by politicians wait for lucrative connections to the global=20
economy, and prove, along with much else, the profound modernity of=20
religious nationalism.

=B7 Pankaj Mishra is author of The Romantics (Picador).

____

#2.

http://www.deccanherald.com/deccanherald/apr10/top.htm
DECCAN HERALD, Wednesday, April 10, 2002
DANGEROUS EXPERIMENTS IN HINDUTVA LAB
The Frankensteins of tomorrow

By SWAMI AGNIVESH & REV VALSON THAMPU

All through the days that we have been travelling through the=20
riot-crippled state of Gujarat, listening to the victims, their=20
sympathisers as well as their detractors, a single question haunted=20
us. Why are most of us, barring mostly our bold brethren in the=20
English media, chillingly indifferent to the ongoing tragedy of the=20
Muslims in Gujarat? Our thoughts went back, again and again, to the=20
commendable national solidarity witnessed in the wake of the quake=20
last year. Expressions of concern and commitment, moral and material,=20
surged into Gujarat from all parts of the country and overseas. NGOs,=20
including various religious groups, sects and denominations,=20
virtually vied with each other in providing relief and=20
rehabilitation. From schools to State administrations, everybody dug=20
deep into their pockets and gave their best.
Gujarat today is a tragedy, if anything, worse than it was last year.=20
The killer quake came and went. But this man-made and Modi-managed=20
disaster refuses to die out. It may be Modi's morbid humour that=20
makes him claim that the situation has been brought under control in=20
72 hours. Into the 6th week, many parts of Ahmedabad and other=20
affected areas are still under curfew, for varying periods of time.=20
People continue to be killed and their homes torched. Nearly a=20
hundred thousand people languish in camps. Palpable mistrust chokes=20
the state.

Harrowing experience
We found the emotional situation in the relief camps almost at a=20
flash-point. As we entered a camp for the Muslims in Ahmedabad, we=20
were greeted by angry women screaming, "Where were you for more than=20
a month? Why doesn't anyone care that we are starving?" Deep inside=20
the camp, we had women and men cling to us in terror, compulsively=20
narrating their tales of horror, many through their torrential tears.
So many among them pleaded that they should not be forced to leave=20
the camp, for fear of being wiped out on their return to what once=20
were their homes. In a harrowing few hours, we were overwhelmed by=20
many an account of unprecedented cruelty, the details of which are=20
too crude and cruel to chronicle. We found Muslim youth extremely=20
restive and we came away worrying for the future.

Dawood and Modi
It is incredibly sad, how the Muslim community is almost wholly=20
abandoned by the rest of the country. And we are worried at the=20
foolishness that makes the rest of us think that it is "their"=20
problem and not "our" problem as well. It is this, much more than the=20
outbreak of orchestrated violence against the Muslims that worries=20
us; for it shows that the Sangh Parivar calumny against the Muslim=20
has infected us to an extent that we do not realise. Far too many=20
people seem to have, however unwittingly, internalised the Parivar=20
outlook in respect of the Muslims.=20
A community abandoned by the rest of society, discriminated against=20
by the State in blatant ways and targeted week after week by mobs=20
under patronage, will find it too difficult to ward off desperation=20
for long. The prospect of a 150 million strong community acting in=20
desperation is an unthinkable prospect for the future. Surely, it=20
cannot be the best prospect for this country.
It is unlikely that the Gujarat pogrom would have happened but for=20
two reasons. The first is the systematic elimination of the Muslim=20
underworld, especially of Bombay. It is not wholly unlikely that the=20
Bombay serial blasts have had a preventive effect on further=20
atrocities against Muslims since early 1993. For the Constitutional=20
and constituted authority of the land to let down a community so=20
badly is to drive them into the lap of criminal and anti-social=20
elements. Modi's Gujarat threatens to invest the mafia dons with a=20
new legitimacy and credibility; and that is unspeakably unfortunate.=20
Can we really blame the Muslims of Gujarat if they come to prefer=20
Dawood Ibrahim to Narendra Modi sooner or later?
Secondly, it is doubtful if the kind and scale of pogrom unleashed=20
against the Muslims in Gujarat, Godhra notwithstanding, would have=20
happened but for the US-manipulated global antipathy towards Muslims.=20
The so-called "war on terrorism" has made Muslim-bashing a popular=20
sport, much like bear-baiting in Elizabethan England or=20
Christian-baiting in Nero's Rome. It is incredible how the global=20
sentiments towards the Muslim community have changed, and so much for=20
the worse, almost overnight.
But there is a lesson in this that we must note. If macro perceptions=20
and sentiments are so vulnerable to manipulation from a distance, it=20
can work to the disadvantage of those who prosper by the current=20
climate of opinion. It would be a colossal foolishness to assume that=20
this manipulated malice will stay the same forever. The direction of=20
this foul wind can be changed any moment, and it might happen sooner=20
than we expect. "Those who are married to the present age," as Dean=20
Inge said, "will become widowers in the next".=20

Suicidal mistake
It is a suicidal mistake to set up the edifice of our society on the=20
shifting foundations of American foreign policy perceptions and=20
priorities. We have an enduring heritage of fellow-feeling, tolerance=20
and unity-in-diversity and it is utterly irresponsible to squander=20
this, being carried away by the new thrill in the air. We left=20
Gujarat mulling over one of the close shaves our group had in the=20
course of our two-day visit. We were in one of the riot-devastated=20
villages. All on a sudden a group of some 70-80 young men=20
materialised as if from nowhere. They looked carved out of one of the=20
rioting crowds we have seen in the pictures from Gujarat since=20
February 28.=20
They belonged to the age-group of 17- 30 years: None from the upper=20
castes, but all drilled to speak and act in a certain way. They=20
revelled in their right to rule the streets and defy the rule of law.=20
They objected to our peace march, our messages of love, of religious=20
harmony and of the need for unity. They asked us to get lost. The=20
police officer present merely endorsed their sentiments and=20
instructed us to move out before we got into serious trouble.

Possible backlash
This may be music to the ears of their communal warlords. But neither=20
they nor the rest of us can afford to be in any illusion about this.=20
To improvise and use such tools and agents in a power game is also to=20
awaken in them a lust for power the scope of which might go far=20
beyond what their ring-leaders reckon today. The unemployed and=20
frustrated youth, mainly from the OBC segment, is being humoured by=20
allowing them to rule the nights and the streets. What excites them=20
is the destructive and reckless exercise of power. But is there any=20
guarantee that they would remain perpetually pleased with this=20
limited turf currently allotted to them? History reminds us that the=20
kittens that we nurture to keep the rats out of the parlours of power=20
will grow, in due season, into the tigers of terror springing from=20
the seats of power itself.=20
It may seem expedient to some to turn Gujarat into a political=20
laboratory for the rest of India. But they must take heed, lest the=20
by-products of these experiments turn into the Frankensteins of=20
tomorrow. The rule in history has so far been: "He who takes the=20
sword will perish by it." And there is no reason to believe that=20
Gujarat will prove an exception.=20