[sacw] SACW #1 | 22 Nov. 02

[Harsh Kapoor]

South Asia Citizens Wire #1 | 22 November 2002

'THE FOREIGN EXCHANGE OF HATE: IDRF AND THE AMERICAN FUNDING OF HINDUTVA'.
by Sabrang Communications (India) and South Asia Citizens Web (France)
20 November 2002
A detailed investigative report on the use of American corporate=20
funds by the US based India Development and Relief Fund to promote=20
the projects of Hindu supremacist groups in India.

The online report is available at:
Sabrang Communications (India) http://www.sabrang.com
South Asia Citizens Web (France) http://www.mnet.fr/aiindex/

The full report is also being hosted by a growing number of web sites=20
worldwide.
The current list is:
Isis Creations (Australia): http://www.isis.aust.com/sacw/
Outlook (India): http://www.outlookindia.org
India Committee of the the Netherlands: http://www.indianet.nl
(UK) http://azadee.users.btopenworld.com/
Z Mag South Asia (USA): http://www.zmag.org/southasia/southasia1.htm
Alliance for Secular and Democratic South Asia (USA):=20
<http://www.alliancesouthasia.org/>http://www.alliancesouthasia.org/
Proxa (USA) http://www.proxsa.org/newsflash/
SikhSpectrum.com Monthly (USA)=20
http://www.sikhspectrum.com/112002/Report/hdv.htm

Follow Up Campaign:

The Campaign to Stop Funding Hate
P.O. Box 20136 Stanford CA 94309
http://www.stopfundinghate.org

__________________________

#1. India: "Crime Against Humanity" Gujarat 2002 two volume report by=20
The Concerned Citizens Tribunal
#2. India: Report of Concerned Citizens indicts Modi govt for riots
#3. Limits of Tolerance Prospects of Secularism in India after=20
Gujarat (Dipankar Gupta)

__________________________

#1.

The [Gujarat] Tribunal Report release on

November 21, 2002 Ahmedabad
November 22, 2002 New Delhi

The full report is available at: http://www.sabrang.com/tribunal/index.html

Concerned Citizens Tribunal - Gujarat 2002
November 20, 2002

Press Invite

The Concerned Citizens Tribunal -Gujarat 2002 will be releasing it's=20
two volume report, "Crime Against Humanity" on November 22, 2002 at=20
the Press Club [New Delhi] at 11. 30 a.m. We request you to send a=20
representative to cover the event.

The eight-member panel, headed by Justice V.R. Krishna Iyer and led=20
by Justices P.B. Sawant, Justice Hosbet Suresh, Senior Advocate=20
K.G.Kannabiran will address the press on the occasion. Other panel=20
members include Ms Aruna Roy, Mazdoor Kisan Sanghatan, Professor=20
Ghanshyam Shah and Professor Tanika Sarkar and Mr K.S. Subramaniam,=20
former DIG Assam.

The Tribunal spent a fortnight in Gujarat in May 2002 recording=20
evidence. In all 2,094 statements, written and oral were processed by=20
the Tribunal. These were from the affected areas, from over 16=20
districts of the state. Apart from Ahmedabad, the Tribunal had made a=20
field visit to Godhra and the sight of the arson, and Vadodara,=20
Ankleshwar where victim survivors from different areas came. The=20
testimony of two members of the government and several bureaucrats=20
and policemen were also taken on record. The findings and=20
recommendations of the Tribunal will have far-reaching consequences=20
for the struggle for justice for the victim survivors of the carnage.

Anil Dharker

Concerned Citizens Tribunal

_____

#2.

The Times of India
November 22, 2002
Report of Concerned Citizens indicts Modi govt for riots
TIMES NEWS NETWORK [ THURSDAY, NOVEMBER 21, 2002 09:54:55 PM ]

AHMEDABAD: In the worst-ever indictment of the BJP government in=20
Gujarat after the communal riots, the Concerned Citizens' Tribunal,=20
headed by retired Supreme Court judge Justice Krishna Iyer, released=20
a comprehensive report on the "genocide" in which over 1,000 people=20
were killed.
Talking of the state's complicity in the violence, the report,=20
released on Thursday, said: "The post-Godhra carnage in Gujarat was=20
an organised crime perpetrated by the chief minister and his=20
government."
It also names the state's chief secretary, home secretary and=20
director general of police as "accused" in the eyes of the victims.=20
The report is expected to be submitted to President A P J Abdul Kalam=20
on Friday.
Titled 'Crime Against Humanity' the report runs into two huge=20
volumes, and is based on as many as 2,094 statements.
The report has not spared anybody. The media, the secular outfits or=20
the Central government. But it specially mentions Modi in the chapter=20
on 'state complicity'.
He is described as "the chief author and architect of all that=20
happened in Gujarat after February 27". The report has also accused=20
him of refusing relief and rehabilitation to the victims.
Senior advocate, K G Kannabiran, a member of the tribunal, told=20
reporters: "The report is comprehensive enough for any Central agency=20
to file charge-sheets against everybody, from Narendra Modi=20
downwards."
There, however, is still an element of mystery about how the=20
Sabarmati Express compartment had caught fire, the Tribunal admitted.=20
"It is clear that the fire was set from the inside. But who did it is=20
still not clear," said Justice Suresh.
The report also alleged that cadres of the VHP and the Bajrang Dal=20
were trained to target Muslims "and the Godhra incident provided an=20
opportunity". "The uniform pattern of violence in Gujarat, the day=20
after the Godhra incident, showed that the killings were=20
pre-planned," it said.
The report mentions the shifting of the bodies of the Godhra victims=20
to Ahmedabad the same night, Modi's conclusion the same day that the=20
attack on the train was pre-planned by the ISI and the bandh call=20
given by the VHP and supported by the BJP the next day as "evidence=20
of a well thought-out scheme to extract maximum political capital out=20
of Godhra".
Our Comment: Modi stands indicted =E2=A4" by the National Human Rights=20
Commission, the Minorities Commission and now the citizens' tribunal.=20
Certainly not a matter of gaurav for the 'chhote sardar.'

_____

#3.

EPW
November 16, 2002
Perspectives

Limits of Tolerance
Prospects of Secularism in India after Gujarat

A modern democracy cannot tolerate matters of faith trumping over=20
matters of citizenship rights. There can be no question of tolerance=20
when citizens are denied their status as equal citizens. With an=20
intolerant secularism that insists on the inalienable rights of=20
citizens and on the due process of the law, it is easier to mount=20
public pressure against minority hunters and sectarian killers. Here=20
we cannot make exemptions, or look for mitigating circumstances, on=20
grounds of being a minority or impoverished and unemployed.
Dipankar Gupta

Once again Gujarat burnt ferociously. Once again it was Ahmedabad=20
that hurt the most. Along with Ahmedabad, the districts of Baroda and=20
Mehsana went up in flames as well. Was this just another riot?=20
Undoubtedly, more, much more intense in scale than most others, but=20
was it remarkable only in terms of its quantitative excess? Or are=20
there lessons to be learnt from this riot?

First, what did this riot confirm? Like most other riots, this=20
sectarian carnage too was primarily an urban phenomenon. From Godhra,=20
within hours, the violence leap frogged straight into the heart of=20
Ahmedabad city before fanning out elsewhere. If one takes a look at=20
the sites which were worst hit by the current spate of violence in=20
Gujarat, the riot's urban character becomes immediately apparent

Godhra, Ahmedabad and Vadodara form a triangle of dense conurbation,=20
and it is here that the riots were at their bloodiest. Though a=20
larger proportion of Muslims live in urban areas in Gujarat than in=20
most other places in India, yet Mehsana district which has only 6.6=20
per cent Muslims, of which only 34.5 per cent can be classified as=20
urban was badly hit this time. Muslims constitute a low 2.9 per cent=20
of Gandhinagar district's population [Census of India 1991] and yet=20
villages in this area were not spared. Por village, in Gandhinagar=20
taluka, even had a Muslim sarpanch but was attacked by mobs from at=20
least nine neighbouring villages [PUDR 2002:20]. Nor can we ignore=20
the fact that a district like Kachch, which has a high Muslim=20
population of almost 20 per cent, faced no violence in these riots.=20
All of this should make us re-examine: (1) the urban thesis behind=20
the riots, and (2) that a high Muslim presence is necessary to=20
provoke riots. Both these positions need to be finessed a great deal=20
more.

Ideologically Gujarat is a fairly volatile mix of urban anxieties and=20
primordial loyalties. Ahmedabad is probably the only industrial=20
centre of its size and eminence without a history of left wing=20
mobilisations [Shah 1970:13, Breman 1999:25]. Kanpur, or Mumbai, or=20
Kolkata, have all known left wing radicalism, but not Ahmedabad. The=20
Textile Labour Association, which is a federation of a variety of=20
unions, was formed in 1920, largely with the help of Mahatma Gandhi,=20
with the intention of providing arbitration as an alternative to=20
class war. Radical trade unions of the left never really took root in=20
Ahmedabad for a variety of reasons which are too complex to go into=20
at this point. Suffice, however, to say that alternative working=20
class identities which could combat primordial networks did not=20
emerge with any degree of vigour in Ahmedabad.

State Support and Soft Targets

The recent Gujarat riots again confirmed that like other riots there=20
was clear evidence of administrative connivance, if not outright=20
support to the rampaging mobs. It was also clear that rioters are=20
more than willing to kill for a cause but far from willing to die for=20
one [Gupta and Thapar 2002]. The many tales of horror when fleeing=20
Muslims sought police protection but were spurned, or when important=20
political functionaries were in the forefront of the killing mobs, or=20
the manner in which certain political personalities made their=20
reputation as ardent Hindu chauvinists during these riots, are too=20
well known to bear repetition. The fact that Gujarat rioters received=20
from the authorities support [see for graphic details Communalism=20
Combat 2002: 114-122, see also PUDR 2002: 9,14 and passim] is sadly=20
not a new phenomenon either. The killings of Sikhs in Delhi and=20
elsewhere in 1984 clearly demonstrated a similar case of high level=20
support to the violence [PUDR and PUCL 1984; see also Horowitz 2001:=20
348-49; Ray and Chakravarti 1968].

As rioters are generally recipients of official sanction, it is to be=20
expected that they are not specialists but generalists who are more=20
than ready to kill but not die for a cause. This is why they are on=20
the lookout for safe targets. The targets are usually poor people who=20
are doubly vulnerable. Vulnerable first because they are numerically=20
outnumbered, and vulnerable again because of their poverty. Strangely=20
enough, the killers and the victims seem to share in large measure=20
similar economic profiles. This is a point that has analytical=20
consequences to which we shall return later.

Thirdly, what happened to Gujarat after the Godhra incident on=20
February 27 also confirms that riots are not spontaneous. It is not=20
just anger boiling over, but there is a great deal of planning that=20
goes behind riots. Targets are carefully selected - and rarely, if=20
ever, are mistakes made even in densely mixed population areas [see=20
also Breman 1999:267-68]. Naroda Petia and Gomtipur in Ahmedabad saw=20
the same pattern repeat itself. Occasionally, there are lapses, but=20
given the scale of rioting it is not possible that such accuracy in=20
attacking the minority communities could have been possible without=20
deliberate planning. Both 1984 Delhi and 2002 Ahmedabad may give the=20
feeling that the killings were spontaneous, but it would be a mistake=20
to yield to this superficial and popular impression.

The urban underclasses have been the foot soldiers of Hindu=20
organisations in urban India for the longest time. However, even when=20
guaranteed support from the political bosses of the day, they still=20
fear to go to areas where Muslims are strong. Bharuch city for=20
instance was not attacked, but on the highway linking Vadodara to=20
Bharuch many Muslim establishments were burnt to cinders in these=20
riots. Even in Ahmedabad's infamous Naroda Petia killings, Muslim=20
targets were chosen carefully. It is important to note that this area=20
is home to both Praveen Togadia, the VHP leader, and Gordhan=20
Zadaphia, the BJP home minister in Gujarat. There was therefore no=20
dearth of official encouragement to the attackers of Muslims in=20
Naroda Petia, and even so more Muslims died in the slums on the east=20
side of Highway Number 8, than on the west side. East Naroda Petia is=20
largely populated by Karnataka Muslim migrants who are not that well=20
organised.

Quantity to Quality

The Gujarat riots brought out a few things in clearer focus, even=20
though the issues involved, as we saw with authoritative support, may=20
not be entirely novel in themselves. All riots entail economic=20
hardship - jobs are lost, property destroyed, and capital either=20
flees or stays idle. Sectarian riots are largely unmindful of=20
economic calculations and this is true of Ahmedabad where repeated=20
riotings gave a clear indication that those involved in the killings=20
were not inhibited by economic considerations. This was apparent in=20
the first week of the riot itself and yet it continued for months.=20
Between February 28 and March 7, 2002, Gujarat lost to the tune of Rs=20
179 crore [SEWA Relief Team 2002: 65, see also Guzder 2002].

That ethnic activists do not take economic considerations into=20
account should not mean that in the actual process of rioting=20
economic scores and rivalries are not settled. Of course they are!=20
Economic jealousies, including real estate speculations, can help=20
fund the coffers of ethnic parties, but the rhetoric that=20
sponsors ethnic riots, and the justification that most rioters use to=20
satisfy themselves that they are killing for a cause, are not=20
significantly informed by economic calculations. Khalistani activists=20
were surely not being energised by economic motives when they went=20
about capturing gurudwaras and threatening everyday life in Punjab.=20
That there are economic problems everywhere does not always mean that=20
they are significant factors in all forms of social mobilisations.

What also comes through loud and clear is that religion has little to=20
do with ethnic strife. This may sound contradictory, but a little=20
attention to the details of rioting will demonstrate that most of the=20
activists are not religious people themselves, and neither are their=20
leaders. It is not as if religious faith is the primary mover,=20
regardless of what the activists may say of their own convictions.=20
Very few of them have anything more than a working knowledge of their=20
respective sacerdotal texts. They are not the type that would go to=20
religious classes, to religious services, or attend rituals with any=20
degree of regularity. While a few swayamsewaks may have some=20
familiarity with Sanskrit slokas, ethnic activists are in the main=20
religiously unmusical.

Gujarat also forces us to accept that the poor are not necessarily=20
pure. The urban rootless, the jobless, the ill fed and the underpaid=20
have been the foot soldiers and the torch bearers of many a riot. But=20
in Gujarat, this time around it was not just scheduled castes or some=20
backward communities (many of whom have often been labelled as=20
members of criminal communities) who were involved in the killing and=20
looting, but so too were the scheduled tribes in a large number of=20
cases. The last shred of romantic make-believe according to which the=20
people of the forests who are far away from the depraved ways of life=20
of class and caste stratified societies are somehow better endowed=20
with humane properties has also been laid to rest. Romantic or=20
realist, everyone was saddened by the fact that now the tribals too=20
can become like the worst among us.

Social Forensics or Social Science?

The other aspect riots in Gujarat demonstrate is that there are times=20
when we have to pay more attention to social forensics and not be=20
overwhelmed by social science considerations. In a way one might say=20
that this is an extension of our earlier point of not looking for=20
economic calculations behind ethnic riots. All too often, perhaps=20
because we cannot accept the horrendous characteristics of riots -=20
the mindless brutalities, the cries of fear, and the reckless=20
abandonment of all traces of any civilised virtue - scholars look for=20
clues in migration, urbanisation and relative deprivation to explain=20
what could have prompted such rapid free falls into bestiality.

Social forensics brings out in detail who the killers are, who their=20
supporters are, how they go about the business of targeting and=20
killing their victims, why they choose a particular occasion and not=20
any other, and, most importantly, what real advantage interested=20
political parties hope to gain from such mayhem. Social science has=20
very little to contribute to any of these questions, but social=20
forensics can. One of the most important modalities of winning back=20
the confidence of the victims of riots is to actually punish those=20
who are guilty of fomenting and participating in the violence.=20
Whether it be on the actual modalities of a riot, or how to restore=20
confidence in the political system, in both cases social forensics=20
can be of greater help than the social sciences.

If urban areas are particularly riot prone then, according to=20
received sociological literature, it is because people in towns and=20
cities are rootless and do not have a firm sense of belonging. It is=20
as if they are always in each other's faces [Horowitz 2002: 220,=20
381-83]. It needs however to be clarified that villages can also be=20
heterogeneous. But hitherto in villages, the power structure was=20
relatively stable and nobody dared rock the boat. This is what gave=20
villages their much vaunted (and sometimes romanticised)=20
tranquillity. But in the urban world people can no longer depend on=20
the certitude of village identities, and the life they see around=20
them in towns and cities is replete with anonymity and unconcern. In=20
search of some kind of social tie that might be reminiscent of the=20
unarguable fixity of rural relations, the new urban entrant falls=20
straight into the scheme of ethnicists who guarantee a community bond=20
and a glorious sense of belonging which even the vicissitudes of city=20
life cannot alter.

What puts this very attractive thesis under some pressure is the fact=20
that even long-term urban residents, who should have adjusted over=20
generations to the pace and tone of city life, participate quite=20
energetically in ethnic riots everywhere. Thus urban generational=20
depth does not always mean a lessening of ethnic sympathy or=20
activism. In my own studies on the Shiv Sena in Mumbai I found a=20
large number of committed Sainiks who were several generation urban.=20
Bal Thackeray, the Sena Pramukh, is one such person. His father,=20
Prabodhankar Thackeray, was in fact an activist in the non-brahmin=20
movement in Maharashtra in the 1930s. Incidentally, Thackeray belongs=20
to the Chandraseni Kayastha Prabhu, which is primarily an urban caste=20
with a scanty rural presence.

But Gujarat 2002 has forced us to pay attention to the fact that=20
villages are also getting increasingly ethnicised. This must=20
radically alter the frame of many sociological analyses of riots.=20
What we find in Gujarat is that villagers have turned upon villagers=20
with a ferocity that was till recently reserved for the urban people.=20
It is also true that this is not the first time that such incidents=20
have occurred in rural Gujarat. In 1987 during the Ram-Janki Shobha=20
Yatra villages in Kheda, Sabarkantha and Himmatnagar districts were=20
affected. This time however the scale was so much greater that there=20
is no doubt that villages can no longer claim to be riot proof. In=20
village after village in Gujarat, in Ahmedabad district or in=20
Panchmahals, the countryside saw rioting of a kind that cannot be=20
overlooked [see for example PUDR 2002].

Yes, there was the Nellie massacre in Assam in 1983, but in that case=20
the mobs came from other villages and towns which were at some=20
distance. But Gujarat 2002 gives us ample evidence of ethnic hatred=20
born, bred and expressed in villages. We may have overlooked this=20
fact earlier, but the sheer scale of the recent riots in rural=20
Gujarat forces us to take this phenomenon into account. Once again=20
the sheer quantity of excess demands a qualitative distinction. On=20
many occasions I was told that the attackers were from families whom=20
the victims knew very well and for a long time. In some cases, the=20
victims say, they were even invited to attend marriage feasts in the=20
homes of those who later came in mobs to brutalise them.

There are some informed hypotheses as to why villages get involved in=20
the way they do. One point of view is that there is a spillover=20
effect from the urban centres to the rural countryside. That is=20
possibly true, but the focus of attention is still the cities and=20
towns. We have to be now quite explicit in our examination of the=20
fact that villages may also be intended sites of sectarian violence.=20
According to Achyut Yagnik, a long time scholar-activist of Gujarat,=20
this is not the first time that rural Muslims are being attacked. "In=20
fact in 1987 we have the first reports of Bhil tribals killing=20
Muslims for a Hindu cause in Virpur. Later in the 1990 Advani 'rath=20
yatra' Muslims were attacked in 32 villages of Surat and Bharuch=20
[personal interview; see also Yagnik 1995: 122].

Patidars, Dalits and Tribals

What are the structural features that are emerging today that make=20
villages good hunting grounds for rioters? Structural changes have=20
taken place in rural India as a whole over the last several decades,=20
and Gujarat is no exception to this process [see also Yagnik 1995:=20
101]. It is becoming fairly obvious that a large number of villagers=20
all across the country are finding jobs in urban areas even while=20
they continue to live in the villages. This applies with particular=20
force to the rural poor as more than half the scheduled caste=20
population of our country are urban dwellers compared to the national=20
figure where only 30 per cent of India live in town and cities.

The BJP and VHP saw possibilities for their growth in this=20
development. From around 1985 onwards the BJP began to support=20
reservations for OBCs (as late as 1981 the BJP and VHP even opposed=20
reservations for scheduled castes), under the leadership of=20
Shankersinh Vaghela. The BJP was sending a clear signal that it was=20
no longer content to be a brahmin-baniya party and that it was keen=20
to take within its fold other castes as well. In 1981 it was not=20
uncommon to hear the slogan 'Dalit-Muslim bhai, bhai' [Yagnik 1995:=20
105], but all that was now rapidly fading into the past. In fact from=20
1983 onwards the BJP systematically began to include dalits in their=20
campaigns, beginning with the 'Ekatmata yatras' [Yagnik 1995:106].

In order to appreciate the extent of BJP support in rural Gujarat it=20
is necessary to have a measure of understanding regarding the patidar=20
caste. Though the orthodoxy may consider the patidars to be shudras,=20
it is without doubt that they are now the ascendant community in=20
rural Gujarat. They constitute approximately 65 per cent of all=20
landowning castes in Gujarat [Census of India 1931], and are=20
numerically very strong in precisely those areas which were hit by=20
the current riots in Gujarat. Though the patidars were with the=20
Congress during the national movement, a large number of them=20
gradually withdrew their allegiance to it after India became=20
independent. When the Congress government introduced land reforms in=20
the 1950s it hurt the well-to-do landed patidars of central Gujarat=20
who withdrew their support from this party.

The patidars of Saurashtra, to the north, however continued to=20
support the Congress as their main enemy at that point were the rich=20
rajputs. In pre-independence India, rajput feudals were the dominant=20
community by far, and they considered the patidars, who were then=20
primarily their tenants, to be no better than mere 'kunbis', or=20
cultivators. Gradually, the Saurashtra patidars too gained in=20
prominence as the erstwhile powerful rajputs declined in prominence=20
on account of the abolition of landlordism brought about by the=20
government of independent India. Soon, however, even these Saurashtra=20
patidars deserted the Congress when it implemented the land ceilings=20
act in the 1970s. This hurt the new land rich patidars of Saurashtra=20
who quickly forgot that it was because of the Congress that they were=20
able to come to the top by dismantling the feudal rajputs. Initially,=20
a large number of patidars in central and north Gujarat joined the=20
Swatantra Party to register their unhappiness with the Congress, but=20
from the early 1980s many of them moved closer to the BJP.

It was also around this time that Indira Gandhi introduced her KHAM=20
strategy to weld together the kshatriyas, harijans, adivasis and=20
Muslims into a horizontal political bloc. This further alienated the=20
patidars from the Congress but this is not always discernible if one=20
looks at the number of patidar ministers over time in the many=20
Gujarat cabinets. Except for the brief period 1980-85 when Madhavsinh=20
Solanki was in power when the number of patidar ministers registgered=20
a decline, patidars have been fairly dominant at all other times.=20
This just goes to show the power that the patidars exercise in=20
Gujarat, and that no political formation can really afford to ignore=20
them altogether. Therefore, though one cannot draw the=20
straightforward conclusion that patidars as a community are outside=20
the Congress and with the BJP, it is however true that a large number=20
of them have championed the BJP cause from 1980 onwards.

There is another aspect of the patidars that needs to be brought out=20
here as it is relevant to our appreciation of the ethnic situation in=20
Gujarat today. In contrast to other landowning castes such as the=20
jats, gujars, bhoomiyars, and yadavas (to name a few) of north India,=20
the patidars were not entirely rural bound. They went to cities for=20
technical education and as entrepreneurs while keeping one foot=20
firmly grounded in the village. In fact, the impetus for education=20
among the patidars also came from the Gaekwad rulers of Baroda. The=20
patidars used their exposure to the outside world adroitly and with a=20
great degree of success. But they did not forsake the village=20
entirely. Finally, patidars are exceptional in yet another sense.=20
Nowhere else in India does a dominant landed caste aspire to call=20
itself a baniya the way the patidar community does in Gujarat [Shah=20
and Shroff 1975: 63].1

So the contact between the rural and the urban is strong both among=20
the scheduled castes and the patidars. But what about the bhils? The=20
bhils, over the last decade, have become particularly susceptible to=20
BJP persuasions for reasons that are still not fully clear to me.=20
These 'Ramayana bhils'. as they are sometimes sarcastically called,=20
have been with the Hindutva forces from the 1987 onwards when they=20
attacked Muslims in Virpur. If one takes a look at the map of bhil=20
settlements in Gujarat it becomes almost immediately apparent that=20
Hindutva's tribal allies are almost entirely concentrated in the bhil=20
areas. The tribals in the Vadodara belt are not with the BJP the way=20
the bhils appear to be. Most of the tribals of south Gujarat belong=20
to the chaudhuri, gamit, and dhodiya communities. Bhil partisanship=20
with the BJP/VHP combine may have an economic dimension after all. In=20
bhil areas such as Panchmahals and Sabarkantha, for example, bohras=20
and memons are not only traders but double up as 'sahukars'=20
(moneylenders) as well. As most of the baniyas have apparently left=20
the villages for the cities, the only moneylenders around are the=20
Muslim traders and it is, therefore, not surprising that this=20
community should attract the hostility of tribals who are often in=20
debt to these informal rural bankers and creditors. While this is=20
true in part, the overwhelming majority of Muslims killed in villages=20
come from poor homes. They were farm labourers, small cultivators,=20
petty shopkeepers, and the like. That some well to do Muslims were=20
killed in rural Gujarat should not give this riot a class character.=20
There is just no excuse!

Village as 'Hindu Rashtra'

The picture, in other words, is far from being neat. Villages are no=20
longer tranquil as urban-rural interactions have become much more=20
intense in recent years. With the subdivision of landholdings there=20
are few jobs left in the villages for agricultural labourers. They=20
too are looking outside the village and getting involved with issues=20
and ideas that have a reach beyond rural confines. When the=20
'shilanayas' bound for Ayodhya were passing through rural Uttar=20
Pradesh, I noticed several instances of heated arguments between=20
young jats and their parents on the viability of the Ramajanmabhoomi=20
movement. While the older jats thought the whole issue to be quite=20
frivolous, if not actually objectionable, their children who had been=20
to colleges in the neighbourhood, and who looked at cities as escape=20
hatches from village scrutiny and traditions, were of the opposite=20
view.

All of this, with differing degrees of valency, has drawn the village=20
to the larger project of Hindutva nationalism. As one drives from=20
Vadodara to Bharuch one comes across signs as, for example, in=20
Bamangaon, which declares that this is a village 'of the Hindu=20
Rashtra'. In some predominantly Hindu villages, as in Nidral (Taluka=20
Sanand, near Ahmedabad), you may also be asked to give proof of your=20
religious identity before you are allowed to enter.

So what we can no longer ignore, post Gujarat 2002, is that villages=20
can also become sites for ethnic riots. We need to integrate this=20
with all the known and tested earlier observations on riots. If the=20
bhils and dalits are involved in riots today it is because such=20
participation links them with a wider supra-local community which=20
they find extremely appealing. This is especially so now when the=20
crumbling natural economy of the village can no longer determine=20
their horizons as it could in the past. Into this breach the BJP and=20
VHP have stepped in, and, in the absence of a better alternative, the=20
dalits and tribals have joined them in order to get a sense of=20
collective purpose and a project for the future.

For an Intolerant Secularism

In my view this should lead us to come to two significant=20
conclusions: The first is that the rhetoric of tolerant secularism=20
just does not work. The second is that unless one has alternative=20
political formulations which provide some kind of hope for the=20
future, a vision with an aura, Hindu parties will always have an=20
edge. Politics, like nature, abhors a vacuum.

Jawaharlal Nehru presided over this country's tense early years=20
rather successfully in spite of the many pressures that were mounted=20
on him by Hindu sectarians who had the added legitimacy of having the=20
partition memories on their side. Nehru took them on, time and again,=20
even on such testy matters as the Hindu Code Bill, and won. It was=20
not as if all those who voted for Nehru voted for secularism. They=20
voted for a regenerated and economically strong India. This is what=20
enabled the Congress Party to trounce the Bharatiya Jana Sangh in=20
Delhi in election after election from 1952 to 1967. This, mind you,=20
after Delhi's population increased dramatically with the arrival of=20
partition refugees who were brimming with hatred and anger.

A secular ideology by itself is not enough. It works best on the=20
ground when accompanied by realisable economic and social policies=20
that make primordial identities irrelevant. Just discoursing on the=20
ideology of secularism and hoping for a change of heart to come along=20
is as good as whistling for the moon. But, post Nehru, this is about=20
the best that most secularist parties have come up with. They have=20
failed to shift the terrain of political contestations away from=20
dogma and 'traditional' identities to economic and social development=20
within a distinctive super narrative, or meta paradigm. But unless=20
our secular parties can come up with another vision, which is grand=20
and compelling, to light a fire in the popular imagination, they will=20
be forced to bicker with sectarians on petty details, and will=20
constantly miss out on the bigger picture.

What can citizens do? No doubt we are not nearly as privileged as=20
political parties are. It is also true that we are a disorganised=20
majority pulling in a hundred different voices, in a thousand=20
directions. But we can still be effective if we were to learn lessons=20
from the quantitative magnitude of what happened recently in Gujarat.

We are now absolutely certain that riots are created. In the case of=20
the recent Gujarat riots, is it a pure coincidence that they occurred=20
with maniacal ferocity in Kheda and Panchmahals districts of Gujarat=20
which were precisely the areas where the Congress had won huge=20
support in the 1998 assembly elections and in the subsequent=20
panchayati elections as well? We are also forced to accept the truth=20
that villagers, dalits, tribals, everyone can be swayed by religious=20
sectarianism. We have no illusions left. Our past naivete seems so=20
unbelievable today. So what are we going to do with all this=20
clarified knowledge?

First, we must rethink the notion of tolerance as the hallmark of=20
secularism. It is time the understanding of secularism is recast in=20
the language of intolerance instead. As citizens, regardless of which=20
community we may belong to, there are certain things we will just not=20
tolerate. No longer is it our prime task to hold meetings of the=20
virtuosos of different communities, or preach about universal=20
brotherhood. Secularism must be hard nosed. It has been identified=20
for too long with soft shoulders and warm hearts. To some extent this=20
persuasion gained legitimacy from the belief that deep down=20
people are inherently good just like those dalits and tribals. So if=20
urban people and upper castes are all wrong, we can look to humbler=20
quarters for inspiration and goodwill. For all those who still hold=20
on to this outdated notion, let them come to Gujarat.

The need of the hour is to insist that the law apply to everybody=20
equally and that even the political high and mighty should be=20
answerable for crimes against citizens. We have a whole clutch of=20
laws such as in Sections 153, 153(A), 153(B), 155, 295, and so on=20
regarding inciting communal hatred. There are also the known laws=20
against murder, mayhem and arson. These constitute our secular=20
foundations, not sentimental goodwill, nor the pious formulations of=20
religious liberals. Faith can never be allowed to undermine the=20
Constitution, nor should the bigness of heart substitute for the=20
letter of the law.

The separation of church and state does not mean that the church is=20
free to do what it wills. A correct reading of the state and church=20
separation, from the time of King Henry VIII onwards, has been that=20
the church is always subservient to the state. While the state can=20
intervene in matters of the church, the church cannot do likewise. A=20
modern democracy cannot tolerate matters of faith trumping over=20
matters of citizenship rights. There can be no question of tolerance=20
when citizens are denied their status as equal citizens.

Very often, we as intellectuals get drawn into debates whose=20
referents have already been set by sectarians. When M F Husain's=20
paintings were slashed, many of us discussed the existence and=20
aesthetics of nude paintings and sculptures in Indian tradition. This=20
was done in the fond hope that after we win the debate the other side=20
will see the truth and there will be a change of heart. That did not=20
happen, instead we made the sectarians look like intellectuals.=20
Likewise, with the making of the film 'Water'. There again we=20
discussed the veracity of the treatment meted out to widows in Hindu=20
India.

Secular ethic can be strengthened only if we insist on certain=20
inflexible principles and these relate to matters of law. Instead of=20
arguing about whether or not nude paintings were indeed common in the=20
past, our insistence should be that an act of vandalism has been=20
committed and the guilty should pay for it. Some Muslim organisations=20
which have set up camps in Ahmedabad are very incensed by the fact=20
that the punishment of the guilty is not upper most in the real=20
agenda of political parties in the opposition. According to a member=20
of one such Muslim association: "If we can make these criminals run=20
back and forth from the court on a number of grievous charges then=20
that would teach them a lesson. Some of them might even be sentenced.=20
This would also give us Muslims greater faith in the law" (personal=20
interview, July 2002).

With an intolerant secularism that insists on the inalienable rights=20
of citizens and on the due process of the law, it is easier to mount=20
public pressure against minority hunters and sectarian killers. Here=20
we cannot make exemptions, or look for mitigating circumstances, on=20
grounds of being a minority, or impoverished and unemployed, or even=20
on account of a very personal bereavement. Unfortunately, several=20
members of major secular parties have already compromised themselves=20
on one, or all, of these counts, which is why they are half-hearted=20
about pushing for an intolerant secularism.

Triadic Framework

What good is a democracy if a large number of minorities feel that it=20
does not belong to them? While these communities can be kept=20
terrified by majoritarianism for a period of time we must realise=20
that this damages the polity irrevocably over the medium term.=20
Terrorism breeds when minority aspirations are thwarted by=20
undemocratic means. In Punjab, if truth be told, secessionism did not=20
happen because of economic reasons, but because ethnic power=20
calculations were steadily displacing democratic politics. This is=20
also true of Kashmir - in fact Kashmir is perhaps the most obvious=20
case one can make in this connection today.

Some years ago when I was working on Sikh extremism in the Punjab I=20
realised that to a large extent the voice of terrorism was being=20
deciphered only by those who felt that the state was no longer the=20
fount of the law and an impartial arbiter. To the rest of us what=20
certain secessionists said was largely incomprehensible. I had then=20
used Jacques Lacan's notion of the triad to explain this phenomenon,=20
and I will recall it here again in a bare bones fashion. When=20
conflict between two parties cannot be restrained by a third, which=20
is the fount of the law (Lacan initially called it the "name of the=20
Father"), then such disputes cannot arrive at a reasonable=20
conclusion. They go on and on in limitless jouissance, or play, with=20
'no-holds-barred'. In the Punjab case, many Sikhs felt that the=20
Indian state had ceased to be the fount of law, the impartial triadic=20
node, and hence the dyadic relationship between Hindus and Sikhs was=20
without a shared language. Pure dyads are always dangerous, which is=20
why when the state collapses in the minds of some as an impartial=20
triad and joins in, or merges with, the other community, in this case=20
the Hindus, then the language of democracy is no longer possible.=20
>From then on you only have the inarticulate 'cry' of the terrorist=20
[Gupta 1997: 92ff]. According to Lacan, a self image comes into being=20
in a healthy fashion only when there is a triadic setting for it. In=20
a pure dyadic situation one has instead an imago that is restlessly=20
in jouissance with its constructed primordial 'other'. Today we see=20
this quite vividly in Kashmir. And if Gujarat tends to get repeated=20
it will happen elsewhere too.

The importance of an intolerant secularism cannot be overemphasised=20
especially when we are faced with the issue of minority attacks and=20
ethnic cleansing. I make a distinction in this regard between=20
communal movements and ethnic movements. In my view, and I have said=20
this before [Gupta 1997], if we cannot distinguish between what is=20
communal and what is ethnic then these terms lose analytical=20
relevance.2 I believe the two can be separated for greater conceptual=20
advantage. A communal movement is one where the activists grant that=20
their opponents are legitimate citizens of the country. In other=20
words, nobody is accused of not being an Indian, or of being=20
anti-India. No upper caste would say, in a situation of caste=20
conflict, that the dalits are not Indians and they should go to=20
Pakistan, or Nepal, or wherever. Likewise, the Maharashtrians would=20
not say that south Indians are not Indians even if many of them=20
believe with the Shiv Sena that the migrants from the south are=20
taking away jobs in Mumbai from 'sons of the soil' [Gupta 1982].=20
Consequently, in all communal movements it is the government that is=20
thematised, and not the state [Gupta 1997: 20-47].

In an ethnic movement, however, the 'other' is cast as an enemy of=20
the nation-state. Unlike communal mobilisations, in an ethnic=20
situation there is clearly a majority and a minority, and the latter=20
is always portrayed in anti-national colours.

While it is true that behind many ethnic disturbances there are clear=20
economic motivations of political elites and real estate mafias, the=20
masses that lend support to these movements are not motivated by=20
economic concerns. They do not want the jobs of the minorities, nor=20
are they motivated by the belief that by displacing these minorities=20
they will be economically better off. Such calculations are paramount=20
in communal movements such as in the various sons of the soil=20
agitations in different parts of the country, from Assam to Mumbai;=20
in various caste mobilisations; as well as in language disputes.=20
Ethnicity functions on a different principle. If ethnic mobs band=20
together to kill, maim and loot it is because they believe that by=20
hurting minorities they can reassert their national identity. It is=20
status not wealth that they are striving for.

Ernest Gellner once said that people often think nationally rather=20
than rationally, and this is truest of all in ethnic movements. This=20
is another reason why it is all the more important not to give ethnic=20
sectarians any room for manoeuvre by rationalising their appeal in=20
economic, class, or historical terms. This is why it is so essential=20
to separate communal movements from ethnic ones. In a communal=20
movement, no matter how hateful the enemy might be, the state retains=20
its authenticity, though the government of the day can be criticised=20
roundly by both sides. In this situation one can talk of social=20
imbalances and emphasise how important it is to right them in order=20
to bring about greater equity on the civil plane. In ethnic=20
movements, the attempt all the while is to deny the other the status=20
of belonging to the same country as a legitimate citizen, as an equal=20
status holder. When successful, an ethnic movement robs the=20
minorities of any confidence in the state and in the Constitution.=20
This is always the aim of the majority community in an ethnic face=20
off. The triad loses its sanctity and authority as the source of the=20
law, allowing jouissance to slowly take over. If this is allowed to=20
continue, then before long we will hear the 'cry' of the terrorist.

Given all this how can secularism still hope to achieve anything by=20
being tolerant? It is about time that intolerant secularism takes=20
over and defines our activism as citizens.

Address for correspondence:
dipankargupta@h...

Notes

[This is a slightly revised version of the author's Prem Bhatia=20
Memorial Lecture delivered on August 11, 2002, in New Delhi.=20
Discussions with Ghanshyam Shah were very useful. I am deeply=20
grateful to Pramod Kumar Singh and Surinder Koul for their help in=20
writing this paper. Discussions with Achyut Yagnik gave me an=20
interesting perspective. All of them contributed to rid this paper of=20
several inaccuracies of fact and judgment.]

1 Not just patidars, but compared to areas like Kacch, Junagadh,=20
Porbandar and Rajkot, the bania presence is almost three to four=20
times higher in the Baroda region [see Census of India 1931, Vols 19=20
and 10].
2 Horowitz, for example, does not believe in making any distinction=20
between communalism, ethnicity, primordialism, and so on [Horowitz=20
2002: 53].

References

Breman, Jan (1999): 'Ghettoisation and Communal Politics: The=20
Dynamics of Inclusion and Exclusion in the Hindutva Landscape' in=20
Ramchandra Guha and Jonathan Parry (eds), Institutions and=20
Inequalities: Essays in Honour of Andre Beteille, Oxford, Delhi.
Census of India (1991): Gujarat Atlas, District Wise Religious Census.
- (1931): Vol 19, The Government Central Press, Bombay, Part I=20
Additional Subsidiary Table, Subsidiary Table II.
- (1931): Vol 10, The Government Central Press, Bombay, 1932;=20
Imperial Table 17- Caste, Tribe, Race or Nationality.
Communalism Combat (2002): Mumbai, Nos 77-78.
Gupta, Dipankar (1982): Nativism in a Metropolis: The Shiv Sena in=20
Bombay, Manohar Books, Delhi.
- (1997): The Context of Ethnicity: Sikh Identity in a Comparative=20
Perspective, Oxford University Press, Delhi.
Gupta, Dipankar and Romila Thapar (2002): 'Who Are the Guilty?' The=20
Hindu, April 2.
Guzder, Cyrus (2002): 'Is Secularism Good for Business'? Seminar, No=20
513, pp 68-72.
Horowitz, Donald I (2002): The Deadly Ethnic Riot, Oxford University=20
Press, Delhi.
Peoples' Union for Democratic Rights (PUDR) (1984): Maaro, Kaapo,=20
Baalo: State, Society and Communalism, New Delhi.
PUDR and Peoples' Union for Civil Liberties (PUCL) (1984): Who Are=20
the Guilty? New Delhi.
Ray, Aswini K and Suhash Chakravarti (1968): Meerut Riots: A Case=20
Study, Sampradayikta Virodhi Committee, New Delhi.
SEWA Relief Team (2002): 'Re-building our Lives', Seminar, No 513, pp 64-67=
.
Shah, Ghanshyam (1970): 'Communal Riots in Gujarat: Report of a=20
Preliminary Investigation' in Economic and Political Weekly, Vol 5,=20
pp 1-21.
Shah, A M and G Shroff (1975): 'The Vahivanca Barots of Gujarat: A=20
Caste of Genealogists and Mythographers', Milton Singer (ed),=20
Traditional India: Structure and Change, Rawat, Jaipur.
Yagnik, Achyut (1995): 'Hindutva as a Savarna Purana' in Ashis Nandy,=20
Shikha Trivedy, Shail Mayaram, Achyut Yagnik (eds), Creating a=20
Nationality: The Ramajanmabhumi Movement and the Fear of the Self,=20
Oxford University Press, Delhi.

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