[sacw] SACW | 28 Nov. 02

Harsh Kapoor aiindex@mnet.fr
Thu, 28 Nov 2002 02:42:32 +0100


South Asia Citizens Wire | 28 November 2002

CRIME AGAINST HUMANITY -- GUJARAT 2002: A report on the=20
investigations, findings and recommendations of the 8-member=20
Concerned Citizens' Tribunal, headed by Justice VR Krishna Iyer,=20
Justice PB Sawant and Justice Hosbet Suresh.=A0=A0
Is posted on: www.sabrang.com
the above report is also available at: www.outlookindia.org

o o o

'THE FOREIGN EXCHANGE OF HATE: IDRF AND THE AMERICAN FUNDING OF HINDUTVA'.
by Sabrang Communications (India) and South Asia Citizens Web (France)
20 November 2002
A detailed investigative report on the use of American corporate=20
funds by the US based India Development and Relief Fund to promote=20
the projects of Hindu supremacist groups in India.

The online report is available at:
Sabrang Communications (India) www.sabrang.com
South Asia Citizens Web (France) www.mnet.fr/aiindex/

The full report is also being hosted by a growing number of web sites=20
worldwide.
The current list is:
Isis Creations (Australia): www.isis.aust.com/sacw/
Insaf (Canada): www.insaf.net
Outlook (India): www.outlookindia.com
India Committee of the the Netherlands: www.indianet.nl
(UK): azadee.users.btopenworld.com/
Z Mag South Asia (USA): www.zmag.org/southasia/southasia1.htm
Alliance for Secular and Democratic South Asia (USA):=20
www.alliancesouthasia.org
Proxsa (USA) www.proxsa.org/newsflash/
SikhSpectrum.com Monthly (USA) www.sikhspectrum.com/112002/Report/hdv.htm
Stop Funding Hate (USA) : www.stopfundinghate.org/resources/FEH.htm
Dissident Voice (USA): www.dissidentvoice.org
Coalition Against Communalism (USA):=20
www.ektaonline.org/cac/resources/reports/sacw/index.html

__________________________

#1. Stop the lunacy in Kashmir (Brian Cloughley)
#2. Bangladesh: Citizens must unite to meet the challenge of the=20
prevailing situation (Kamal Hossain)
#3. The fundamentalist dimension in the Pakistan Movement (Ishtiaq Ahmed)
#4. The human face of Kashmir's sad and dangerous conflict (Catherine Philp=
)
#5. Islamists Take Office in Province of Pakistan (Carlotta Gall)
#6. Redefining Democracy As A Positive Alternative To Communalism=20
(Rohini Hensman)
#7. Justice above all (Mukul Dube)
#8. Sarva dharma...if only
Things could change if the silent majority can find its voice (Mukul Dube)
#9. Funding religious extremism and the diaspora (M V Ramana)
#10. Amritsar to Lahore - Crossing the Border Between India and Pakistan
Author: Stephen Alter (reviewed by Yoginder Sikand)

__________________________

#1.

The Daily Times (Lahore)
November 27, 2002
OP-ED:
Stop the lunacy in Kashmir

Brian Cloughley
I refuse to accept that shooting or blowing up children is a=20
reasonable concomitant of fighting, no matter how monstrous the=20
regime being combated. Chechen rebels do it, and so do Russian=20
soldiers. Palestinian suicide bombers do it and the Israeli army does=20
it
It does not matter whether you support Kashmiri independence or are a=20
proponent of any solution to the mayhem in that unhappy region, you=20
cannot, unless you are a psychopath, condone last week=B9s murder of=20
three women and two children in Indian-administered Kashmir. The=20
report came in the usual, accurate, matter-of-fact Reuters item with=20
the by-line of the urbane Sheikh Mushtaq in Srinagar: =B3A landmine=20
blast and clashes left 22 dead... on Saturday, the bloodiest day=20
since a new state government took office earlier this month calling=20
for an end to the violence.=B2
The outrage came a day after a suicide attack on a Srinagar hotel=20
being used as a security forces=B9 base in which six soldiers and two=20
militants died. The Lashkar-e-Taiba terrorist group said it was=20
responsible for the hotel raid, and the gallant guys who killed the=20
kids came from that band and also, apparently, from the=20
Harkat-e-Jihad Islami.
Let us put aside for a moment the rights and wrongs of the Kashmir=20
dispute and consider the people on the bus that was blown up while=20
taking soldiers and their families on leave. It might be claimed that=20
members of the armed forces take their chances freely and that if=20
they come to harm, then tough luck. I don=B9t buy this, and it is=20
certainly not the case when children are shot or blown to bits, be=20
that in conflicts in Kashmir, Israel, Chechnya, Colombia, Algeria,=20
Sudan, Nigeria, Nepal, Philippines, Rwanda, Sierra Leone, or....=20
Well, you get the message. Murdering children is wicked, no matter=20
the cause or the place. Try to imagine being one of those waiting in=20
Jammu for the bus carrying your daughter and grandchildren to arrive.=20
Then a soldier comes up and asks your name and looks sad and ticks=20
his list and tells you that, sorry, they won=B9t be coming and that for=20
you their lives have ended.
I refuse to accept that shooting or blowing up children is a=20
reasonable concomitant of fighting, no matter how monstrous the=20
regime being combated. Chechen rebels do it, and so do Russian=20
soldiers. Palestinian suicide bombers do it and the Israeli army does=20
it. But the races involved or the location or cause of the=20
insurrection and the counter-measures mounted against it are=20
irrelevant. People who kill children are demented terrorists and no=20
civilised nation should show mercy on those who perpetrate=20
atrocities. Those concerned should be found, brought to trial, and,=20
when guilt is proved in court, they should be hanged. And in=20
parenthesis I state that the Indian army doesn=B9t kill kids. Some of=20
the weird security forces, such as the evil (and unconstitutional)=20
Special Operations Group, have done so, but the army is still pretty=20
clean.
It is obvious what the terrorists want. And all people of goodwill=20
must hope they don=B9t achieve it: failure of the newly-elected=20
government in Indian-administered Kashmir. The kid-killers want=20
terror to continue, because without it they would forfeit their=20
reason for existence. They are not gallant freedom-fighters. They are=20
cowardly criminals. The latest pronouncement from Mr Rafiq Ahmed Dar=20
of the Al Umar Mujahideen called for a two day strike this week. If=20
it is not observed, said this self-appointed autocrat, there will be=20
terrible consequences: =B3Any vehicle found on the roads, and shop=20
found open anywhere shall be set ablaze=B2, he threatens. These are not=20
the words of a man who cares about his fellow human beings. He=20
obviously doesn=B9t have to worry about where his next rupee is coming=20
from =8B but, by God, the stall-holders and shopkeepers do. And so do=20
the drivers of scooters and taxis and buses. They have a living to=20
make, and don=B9t get paid unless they work. Why should they have their=20
livelihood destroyed just because some repulsive thug wants to make a=20
point?
Al Umar Mujahideen ostensibly wants union with Pakistan. Let me say=20
as emphatically as I can that the last thing Pakistan needs is=20
support by criminal bullies such as this bunch. There are problems=20
enough with extremists in Pakistan without Al Umar=B9s vicious=20
gangsters being tacked on to the list. Mr Dar has forbidden some=20
Muslims to worship at the Jamia Mosque in Srinagar, and threatens=20
death to any member of the All Parties Hurriyat Conference who does=20
so. =B3If any [Hurriyat] leader does not heed the warning and dares to=20
venture in the mosque he shall be shot dead,=B2 he declares.
This is not Islam. Members of the Hurriyat are perfectly good=20
Muslims. Better Muslims, indeed, than Mr Dar, because they seek=20
compromise in the name of religion, not killing for the sake of it.=20
Mr Dar wants to destroy the approaches being made to a peaceful=20
solution in Kashmir but has no constructive solution for the region=B9s=20
future. He believes in the bomb and the bullet, not the brain and the=20
ballot.
Chief Minister Mufti Mohammad Syed, the new leader in=20
Indian-administered Kashmir, seems a good enough person, even if=20
regrettably na=EFve. Good, because he wants to move towards compromise=20
and has been energetic in exploring ways of bringing opposing sides=20
together. Na=EFve because he announced that militancy in the region was=20
=B3on its last legs=B2, which was an unwise thing to say when psychotic=20
screwballs like Rafiq Ahmad Dar are able to let loose the filth that=20
murder children.
Islamabad=B9s Kashmir policy is identical with that of the UN Security=20
Council whose resolution 122 reinforces previous accord by stating=20
that =B3the final disposition of the State of Jammu and Kashmir will be=20
made in accordance with the will of the people expressed through the=20
democratic method of a free and impartial plebiscite conducted under=20
the auspices of the United Nations.=B2
We have seen that the UNSC is able to agree unanimously =8B if only in=20
circumstances in which a resolution has been blessed by America. If=20
Washington wants a resolution badly enough it will go to almost any=20
lengths to ensure that it is agreed. Its tactics are unpalatable =8B=20
fearsome economic pressure, plain outright bullying, devious=20
horse-dealing involving repudiation of human rights=B9 principles, and=20
threats of aid denial and trade strangulation =8B but if the US really=20
wants to solve the problem that, as Mr Bush himself has said, could=20
lead to nuclear war between India and Pakistan, then now is the time=20
to act. There is terrorism in Indian-administered Kashmir, and the=20
most effective way to combat it is by giving the people the=20
opportunity to speak. Let Mr Bush show some backbone, and encourage=20
the UNSC to act on its existing resolutions.
Colonel Cloughley writes extensively on military and international=20
affairs. He is also the author of the book, =B3A history of the=20
Pakistan Army: Wars and Insurrections.=B2 His website is=20
www.briancloughley.com

_____

#2.

The Daily Star (Dhaka)
28 November 2002
Op-Ed.

Citizens must unite to meet the challenge of the prevailing situation=20
[in Bangladesh]
Dr. Kamal Hossain
http://www.dailystarnews.com/200211/28/n2112802.htm#BODY3

_____

#3.

[ The Prof. Karrar Husain Memorial Lecture referred to in the below=20
article by Ishtiaq Ahmed is available at:=20
http://www.mnet.fr/aiindex/2002/HamzaAlaviNov02.html ]

o o o

The Friday Times
22 November 2002

The fundamentalist dimension in the Pakistan Movement

It is not sufficient to say that Pakistan succumbed to fundamentalist=20
ideology because the Quaid=B9s pledge was betrayed by his unworthy=20
followers. An analysis of the role of ideas and mass mobilising=20
campaigns laced with fundamentalist symbols and imagery in the run up=20
to partition provides a more sophisticated, reliable and=20
comprehensive explanation, argues Ishtiaq Ahmed

In the Prof. Karrar Husain Memorial Lecture entitled =8CSocial Forces=20
and Ideology in the Making of Pakistan=B9 delivered in Karachi on 2=20
November 2002 the veteran Pakistani sociologist and political=20
historian Hamza Alavi has argued that Pakistan was not meant to be a=20
fundamentalist Islamic state. He shows through a review of important=20
stages in the evolution of the Muslim League that the main=20
leadership, particularly Quaid-i-Azam Mohammad Ali Jinnah, was=20
opposed to Islamic ideology. Thus, for example, when at the All-India=20
Muslim League=B9s Secession in Delhi in 1943 one Abdul Hameed Kazi=20
tried to canvass support for a resolution that would commit the=20
Muslim League to Islamic ideology and the creation of an Islamic=20
state he was immediately pressured to withdraw the resolution.=20
Alavi=B9s concluding remarks are the following:

Whatever may be said about limitations of the ideology of the Western=20
educated Muslim Professionals and the salariat (and of the feudals in=20
the final round) who mobilised support for the creation of Pakistan,=20
religious ideology was never a part of it =8A Fundamentalist Islamic=20
ideology has played no part in the origins of Pakistan.

He blames the emergence of fundamentalism to the unworthy successors=20
of Jinnah who from 1952 began to use Islam to stifle the opposition=20
by raising the slogan =8CIslam is in danger=B9. I think Alavi is correct=20
in evaluating the ideological preferences of Jinnah and some of his=20
immediate disciples, though not of all. He makes a big point of the=20
role of Raja Sahib Mahmudabad in the Pakistan movement, but fails to=20
mention that Raja Sahib, a Shia, wrote in 1939 to the historian=20
Mohibul Hassan:

When we speak of democracy in Islam it is not democracy in the=20
government but in the cultural and social aspects of life. Islam is=20
totalitarian=8Bthere is no denying about it. It is the Koran that we=20
should turn to. It is the dictatorship of the Koranic laws that we=20
want=8Band that we will have=8Bbut not through non-violence and Gandhian=20
truth. (quoted in Hasan, 1997: 57-8)

Raja Sahib was severely reprimanded by Jinnah, but the point is that=20
such ideas were not altogether alien to Muslim League stalwarts. I=20
think an additional reason why the Muslim League could not have=20
allowed such ideas to be associated with its ideology and objective,=20
at least at the highest formal level, was that they would have=20
undermined its position as the moderate voice of Muslims vis-=E0-vis=20
the Indian National Congress and the British government. The great=20
skill of Jinnah was that until the last moment he did not explain=20
what his idea of Pakistan was. It is not surprising that his 11=20
August 1947 speech to the Pakistan Constituent Assembly in which he=20
spelt out the vision of a secular and democratic Pakistan surprised=20
many of his followers. His sympathetic biographer Stanley Wolpert has=20
recorded this point succinctly (Wolpert, 1993: 340).

The strategy not to discuss the ideology of Pakistan provided Jinnah=20
with considerable flexibility and room to manoeuvre his campaign for=20
Pakistan as and when the situation required. The task was formidable=20
and the adversaries strong and well organised. Thus in late January=20
1947 when the Muslim League launched its direct action campaign in=20
the Punjab against the government of Khizr Tiwana, the Punjab=20
governor, Sir Evan Jenkins, met the visiting all-India Muslim League=20
leader Khawaja Nazimuddin on 18 February and later wrote in his=20
fortnightly report to the viceroy:

In our first meeting Khawaja Nazim-ud-Din admitted candidly that he=20
did not know what Pakistan means, and that nobody in the ML knew, so=20
it was difficult for the League to carry on long term negotiations=20
with the minorities. (March 1947: L/P & J/5/250, p. 3/79).

The major flaw in Alavi=B9s analysis is that he does not attempt an=20
in-depth analysis of Muslim League politics after the 23 March 1940=20
Lahore Resolution in which the idea of Pakistan was publicly put=20
forth. Such a resolution shifted decisively the focus of Muslim=20
politics from the Muslim minority provinces to the Muslim majority=20
provinces of north-western India. In particular, the rapid changes=20
that took place in that key province of Punjab need to be analysed.=20
Under the rule of the Punjab Unionist Party, the Muslim proportion of=20
the government services had been rising sharply, although in the=20
1940s Hindus and Sikhs were still ahead of them. However, the=20
Unionist Party remained biased in favour of rural interests, whereas=20
it was the towns and cities of Punjab that produced most of the=20
Muslim intelligentsia and they flocked to the Muslim League. It is=20
true that the powerful landowning Muslim classes of Punjab and Sindh=20
began to shift their loyalties from regional parties to the Muslim=20
League mainly to protect their vested interests since Congress was=20
determined to abolish landlordism. The logical implication is that=20
the Muslim League did not pose a threat to such interests and that is=20
why they joined it.

However, the fundamentalist dimension in the Pakistan movement=20
developed most strongly only when the Sunni ulema and pirs were=20
mobilised to prove that the Muslim masses wanted a Muslim/Islamic=20
state. While the central leadership at Deoband indeed allied itself=20
to Congress, some prominent dissidents such as Maulana Ashraf Ali=20
Thanvi and Shabbir Ahmed Usmani and their factions rallied around the=20
Muslim League. Also, the fact that the central Deoband leadership was=20
allied to the Congress meant that the Muslim League was rendered=20
attractive to their much bigger and more influential rivals, the=20
Berelawis, who entertained their own ambitions of establishing an=20
Islamic state. The tables were turned when the Berelawi ulema and=20
pirs of Punjab, NWFP and Sindh joined the Muslim League. David=20
Gilmartin (1989) has documented the important role that some leading=20
pirs in Punjab played in popularising the idea of Pakistan.

The strength of the Muslim League in the Muslim-majority provinces=20
was going to be put to the test during the 1945-46 election campaign.=20
Consequently in the public meetings and mass contact campaigns the=20
Muslim League openly employed Islamic sentiments, slogans and heroic=20
themes to rouse the masses. This is clearly stated in the fortnightly=20
confidential report of 22 February 1946 sent to Viceroy Wavell by the=20
Punjab Governor Sir Bertrand Glancy:

The ML (Muslim League) orators are becoming increasingly fanatical in=20
their speeches. Maulvis (clerics) and Pirs (spiritual masters) and=20
students travel all round the Province and preach that those who fail=20
to vote for the League candidates will cease to be Muslims; their=20
marriages will no longer be valid and they will be entirely=20
excommunicated=8A It is not easy to foresee what the results of the=20
elections will be. But there seems little doubt the Muslim League,=20
thanks to the ruthless methods by which they have pursued their=20
campaign of *Islam in danger* will considerably increase the number=20
of their seats and unionist representatives will correspondingly=20
decline. (L/P & J/5/249, p. 155).

Similar practices were prevalent in the campaigns in NWFP and Sindh.=20
In his doctoral dissertation, India, Pakistan or Pakhtunistan? Erland=20
Jansson writes:

The Pir of Manki Sharif=8Afounded an organisation of his own, the=20
Anjuman-us-asfia. The organisation promised to support the Muslim=20
League on condition that Shariat would be enforced in Pakistan. To=20
this Jinnah agreed. As a result the Pir of Manki Sharif declared=20
jehad to achieve Pakistan and ordered the members of his anjuman to=20
support the League in the 1946 elections (p. 166).

Jinnah=B9s letter to to Pir Manki Sharif in which he promised that the=20
Shariah will be applied to the affairs of the Muslim community is=20
quoted in the Constituent Assembly of Pakistan Debates, Volume 5,=20
1947, p. 46. Thus from 1940 onwards, the distinction between a Muslim=20
national state and an Islamic state became increasingly blurred, and=20
in the popular mind such distinctions did not matter much. In any=20
case, while the non-Muslims viewed with great apprehension the=20
possibility of a Muslim state that would reduce them to a minority,=20
the minority Shia and Ahmadiyya communities were fearful that it=20
would result in Sunni domination. This is obvious from the=20
correspondence between the Shia leader, Syed Zaheer Ali and Jinnah in=20
July1944. Moreover, it is to be noted that the Council of Action of=20
the All-Parties Shia Conference passed a resolution on 25 December=20
1945 rejecting the idea of Pakistan. Similarly the Ahmadiyya were=20
also wary and reluctant to support the demand for a separate Muslim=20
state (Report of the Court of Inquiry, 1954: 196). It is only when=20
Sir Zafrulla was won over by Jinnah that the Ahmadis started=20
supporting the demand for Pakistan. To all doubters, Jinnah gave=20
assurances that Pakistan will be a modern Muslim state, neutral on=20
sectarian matters.

Whether the only reason why Pakistan succumbed to fundamentalist=20
ideology is that the Quaid=B9s pledge was betrayed by his unworthy=20
followers, or, an analysis which incorporates, besides the betrayal=20
of incompetent successors, the role of ideas and mass mobilising=20
campaigns laced with fundamentalist symbols and imagery, provides a=20
more sophisticated, reliable and comprehensive explanation is=20
something which we need to continue discussing.

[The author is Associate Professor Department of Political Science at=20
Stockholm University]

References

Mushirul Hasan, Legacy of a Divided Nation, London: Hurst & Company,=20
London, (1997).
David Gilmartin, Empire and Islam: Punjab and the Making of Pakistan,=20
Delhi: Oxford University Press, (1989).
Erland Jansson, India, Pakistan or Pakhtunistan?, Uppsala: Acta=20
UniversitatisUpsaliensis, (1981).
Political and Judicial Records L/P & J/5/249, p. 155, London: British=20
Library, (March 1946).
Political and Judicial Records L/P & J/5/250, p. 3/79, London:=20
British Library, (March 1947).
Report of the Court of Inquiry constituted under Punjab Act II of=20
1954 to enquire into the Punjab Disturbances of 1953 (also known as=20
Munir Report), Lahore: Government Printing Press, 1954.
=8CResolution adopted by Council of Action of the All-Parties Shaia=20
Conference=B9, held at Poona, 25 December 1945, in S.R. Bakshi, The=20
Making of India and Pakistan: Ideology of the Hindu Mahasabha and=20
other Political Parties, Vol. 3, New Delhi, Deep & Deep Publications,=20
1997.
Stanley Wopert, Jinnah of Pakistan, Oxford University Press London, (1993).
The Constituent Assembly of Pakistan Debates,Vol. 5, 1947, Karachi:=20
Government of Pakistan Press, (1947).
Syed Zaheer Ali , =8CLetter to Quaid-e-Azam by Syed Ali Zaheer,=20
July1944 and the Quaid=B9s reply=B9 in G. Allana, Pakistan Movement:=20
Historic Documents, Lahore: Islamic Book Service, (1977).

_____

#4.

The Times (London)
November 26, 2002
http://www.timesonline.co.uk/article/0,,3-492755,00.html

The human face of Kashmir's sad and dangerous conflict
>From Catherine Philp in Delhi

TOSSED by the river=B9s swollen waters, Shehnaz Parveen had just one=20
thought: =B3I said to the river: =8CPlease kill me, let me die.=B9 =B2

Hours before, the young bride had fled the home of her in-laws in=20
Pakistani Kashmir, her face stinging from blows delivered by her=20
husband of three months.

Married life had proved a disaster, with endless abuse from her=20
husband and his family about her inability to conceive a child.=20
Sobbing, she arrived at the river and threw herself in. But she did=20
not drown. As the current swept her downstream, three men on the far=20
bank spotted her and waded in to drag her out.

Despite her distress, she noticed that they were wearing unfamiliar=20
uniforms. The current had carried her across the invisible line=20
dividing disputed Kashmir between Pakistan and India.

Many times over the next seven years, Shehnaz had reason to wish she=20
had drowned that day. Time and again, she fell victim to the enmity=20
between India and Pakistan. Hers is the human face of that sad and=20
dangerous conflict.

At first, Shehnaz did not realise that her rescuers were Indian=20
soldiers. The only thing that she noticed was their guns. =B3I begged=20
them to shoot me because I had failed to kill myself,=B2 she said.=20
=B3Then they asked me what a Pakistani was doing on Indian soil.=B2 She=20
convinced the authorities that she was not a spy, but was sentenced=20
to a year=B9s imprisonment for entering India illegally. One morning a=20
male guard, Mohammed Din, entered her cell and raped her.

=B3I tried to resist, but I was too afraid to scream,=B2 she recalls.=20
=B3Then I realised no one would help me because I was a Pakistani and=20
an enemy.=B2

A month later she found that she was pregnant. Her first thought was=20
that she would never be accepted back into Pakistani society as the=20
mother of an illegitimate child.

Eight months later, as she was being driven to court to give evidence=20
against Din, she went into labour. The birth was hard and it was not=20
until three days later that she first saw her daughter. That moment=20
transformed her life.

=B3My in-laws had succeeded in making me believe I was infertile,=B2 she=20
said. =B3But here, out of the saddest moment in my life, came the=20
happiest thing I could possess.=B2 She named the child Mobin after a=20
character from the Koran.

By that time Shehnaz had served her sentence, and the Indian=20
authorities tried to deport her. But Pakistan refused to accept=20
Mobin, arguing that she was an Indian citizen.

Under Indian law, however, she was not. Mobin=B9s paternity had never=20
been legally proved, so technically she had no nationality. Mother=20
and daughter were returned to jail under the Enemies Ordinance Act,=20
whereby illegal entrants from enemy countries must be interned in the=20
interests of public safety.

Shehnaz=B9s next chance of freedom came on the eve of the=20
India-Pakistan summit in July last year. The two countries agreed to=20
exchange six prisoners each as a gesture of goodwill and Shehnaz and=20
Mobin were among those chosen. Shehnaz dressed her daughter in her=20
best clothes and set off for the border. But when they arrived, the=20
Pakistani Rangers once again refused to take the child. As the other=20
prisoners crossed over, mother and daughter returned to jail.

By this time, their case had attracted the attention of A. K.=20
Sawhney, an Indian civil rights lawyer. He brought a public interest=20
case questioning Mobin=B9s detention. The case came to court last July.=20
In a landmark judgment, the court awarded Mobin Indian citizenship=20
and ordered that her mother be allowed to stay in India. Mobin was=20
also awarded 300,000 rupees (=A34,000) in compensation for her illegal=20
detention, a vast sum by Indian standards. On August 2, Shehnaz and=20
Mobin were freed.

Four months later, they are still awaiting the compensation and are=20
due back in court to force the state government to pay up. Until that=20
happens, they are living with the Sawhney family in a cramped flat=20
above his practice.

=B3I would not have survived those years in prison if it hadn=B9t been=20
for Mobin,=B2 Shehnaz said. =B3She gave me hope.=B2 She is even willing to=
=20
marry Din to give her daughter a name, but he continues to deny=20
raping her and the case against him is still proceeding.

Shehnaz is uncertain whether she will ever be able return to=20
Pakistan. Her husband wants nothing to do with her, and their long=20
separation means that the marriage has been legally dissolved.=20
Letters from her own family dried up about a year ago.

Shehnaz is suffering from political, as well as cultural, forces far=20
beyond her control. She will live in limbo until her native and=20
adopted countries learn to co-exist.

_____

#5.

The New York Times
November 26, 2002=A0=A0

TALIBAN BACKERS: Islamists Take Office in Province of Pakistan
By CARLOTTA GALL

PESHAWAR, Pakistan, Nov. 25 =8B Pro-Taliban clerics and politicians=20
filled the old colonial hall of the provincial assembly here to take=20
their oath of office today, vowing to introduce strict Islamic law=20
and to end the American military presence in the province.

In Pakistan's recent elections, the alliance of militant Islamic=20
parties, the Muttahida Majlis-e-Amal, won a majority in the local=20
assembly in the North West Frontier Province, which borders=20
Afghanistan. Their success at the polls was an unwelcome surprise to=20
the government of President Pervez Musharraf and to the United=20
States, since the province has been a focus in the search for Al=20
Qaeda and Taliban members who were thought to have escaped to the=20
area from Afghanistan this year.

The religious alliance won great popularity in the border areas with=20
a strongly anti-American campaign. Its politicians opposed the=20
American military presence in Afghanistan and called for an end to=20
America's use of Pakistan's air bases and to the presence of F.B.I.=20
agents, who have taken part in police raids in the province.=20
Legislators continued to emphasize that agenda today as the local=20
assembly convened.

"There is no need for help from American forces or F.B.I. agents or=20
other U.S. agencies," Liaquat Baluch, deputy leader of the=20
Jamaat-e-Islami party, one of the dominant parties in the alliance,=20
told Reuters in Islamabad.

"If there is a need to control terrorism, then Pakistani forces are=20
in a position to control these people, and there is no need for=20
support from outside," he said.

The provincial assembly and its chief minister may in fact not have=20
the power to end the American presence. The nation's prime minister,=20
Zafarullah Khan Jamali, who was sworn in on Saturday together with=20
most of his cabinet, has said foreign policy would continue unchanged.

The provincial assembly will have nominal control over the local=20
police force, but not over army forces in the province. Under a law=20
passed last week, the federal government will be able to override=20
provincial orders in the interests of national security.

Yet the provincial legislators who took office today, many of them=20
for the first time, expressed their determination to bring change.

Akram Durrani, 48, a conservative politician from the tribal areas=20
bordering Afghanistan who is likely to be elected the province's=20
chief minister by legislators this week, described his agenda.=20
"Enforcement of an Islamic system is our top priority," he said after=20
taking his oath of office. "We will make laws according to Islam."

Legislators set the tone for future debates, pausing to offer prayers=20
for Mir Aimal Kasi, the Pakistani who was executed in Virginia last=20
week for killing two C.I.A. employees in 1993. In speeches made=20
before taking their oath several said they refused to recognize=20
constitutional amendments introduced by General Musharraf in the=20
three years since he seized power in a coup.

One legislator asked that members be allowed to take the oath in=20
Arabic, alongside the three national languages =8B Pashto, Urdu and=20
English =8B saying that Pakistan was an Islamic state and that Arabic=20
was God's language.

_____

#6.

South Asia Citizens Web
27 November 2002

REDEFINING DEMOCRACY AS A POSITIVE ALTERNATIVE TO COMMUNALISM

Rohini Hensman

Read full text at: http://www.mnet.fr/aiindex/2002/RohiniNov2002.html

_____

#7.

The Hindustan Times
Thursday, November 28, 2002

Justice above all
Mukul Dube

In the September 19 edition of We The People (Star News), former=20
bureaucrat and current director of Action Aid India, Harsh Mander,=20
steered clear of accusing those guilty of the Gujarat genocide. In=20
fact, he did not even speak of them.

It may be that he was altogether too weighed down by the sheer pain=20
of what he saw over so many months. All that Mander spoke of was the=20
compassion which the victims deserved and needed. There was no hint=20
that the guilty should be exonerated. Forgiveness, too, was not=20
spoken of.

Compassion is needed. But I would give equal weight to justice. The=20
first is needed because people have suffered; the second, for the=20
same reason and to ensure that others do not suffer in the same way=20
ever again. Compassion should be seen as no more than the people=B9s=20
right, their legitimate entitlement in the circumstances. But as with=20
any other right, this too will not come to people by itself. It must=20
be fought for. The fight for it must be part of the larger fight for=20
justice.

If someone has wronged me, I shall expect the State to punish that=20
person. If for some reason my home has been destroyed, I shall expect=20
the State to arrange for shelter for me. Why does the State exist,=20
after all, and for whom? Don=B9t the politicians say prior to elections=20
that they wish only to serve me? The employees of the State are,=20
after all, known as public servants. If these are empty words, then=20
my vote too is meaningless.

When some people have harmed other people, when there has been rape=20
and burning and hacking, when property has been destroyed, when means=20
of livelihood have been snatched away, then it becomes essential that=20
justice is done. When those who have suffered are reduced to a state=20
of perpetual fear, then it is vital that the justice done is seen to=20
be done. Only very visible justice can restore the confidence of=20
those who have lost so much.

Justice must be visible because a woman who can see her rapist=20
walking about openly, a man who can see a killer going scot-free,=20
cannot but be in terror of these criminals repeating their crimes. If=20
the State couldn=B9t protect the victims as it should have done,=20
clearly its duty now lies in apprehending and punishing the criminals=20
so that no citizens are made victims in future. This justice may even=20
be the most important part of the compassion that the victims need.

I speak of justice, not of vengeance. I speak of the neutral,=20
impersonal justice chosen by modern societies. A crime against an=20
individual is a crime against society, against the State, and it is=20
that larger entity which must decide on the punishment and enforce=20
it. Vengeance will lead only to blood feuds or to the far worse=20
variant that we have all seen.

The obvious first step is to allow victims and witnesses to say and=20
write down who the criminals were. Indeed, the lodging of an FIR is a=20
citizen=B9s right, and the recording of it is the bounden duty of the=20
law-enforcing arm of the State. What we have seen so far in Gujarat=20
is a State controlled by criminals and their accomplices,=20
systematically using the device of not recording FIRs to make very=20
real crimes invisible. If crimes are thus rendered =8Cnon-existent=B9,=20
naturally there can be no call for justice. The duty of the State has=20
been up-ended to mean the protection of criminals.

A natural reaction to the Gujarat genocide was a blind, maddened rage=20
in which one can only thrash about, in which one seeks to crush the=20
first throat that comes in one=B9s grasp. But this impulse, except in a=20
few, sooner or later has given way to more rational objectives. I=20
have seen in some people this rage transformed into a suppressed=20
fury, a cold determination to do what is right, come what may.

This is what we all must show: grim tenacity in seeing to it that=20
every rapist, every murderer, is brought to book so that every one of=20
the thousands of victims gets justice.

By the book.

_____

#8.

The Indian Express
Thursday, November 28, 2002

Sarva dharma...if only
Things could change if the silent majority can find its voice
Mukul Dube

Indians like to intone sarva dharma sambhava =8B =8Cequal value to all=20
religions=B9. But equal value to all is possible only in specific=20
circumstances: when each occupies its distinct =8Cspace=B9 without=20
intruding into the space of others; and when there is a hermetic=20
separation of the religious and the secular.

The adherents of different religions must keep strictly to their=20
separate selves in matters of religion, their only interaction with=20
others being in the secular realm.
Such a separation is near impossible, for no religion recognises the=20
religious-secular distinction. Each regards itself as the larger=20
construct called =8Ca way of life=B9. If we imagine religions placed in=20
separate bags, then we see that these bags bulge and split open,=20
their contents spilling out into the secular environment.

Religions can coexist only when the religious confine their faiths to=20
their homes and temples and mosques and churches. But if they are to=20
be faithful, they must also be unwilling to accept such a=20
confinement: for no religion recognises any space as not under its=20
control.

But, given the havoc that religions have begun again to wreak across=20
the world, we need to accept that the secular is infinitely greater=20
than the religious.

Nature itself, as seen in the evolution of the species and its social=20
arrangements, has created what we call the secular. The bedrock of=20
Nature is the secular.

Religions must be seen for the human creations they are, devices=20
forged at different times for different purposes. Ironically, these=20
purposes have been in defence of principles which fall squarely in=20
the area of the secular: one should not steal, one should not kill=20
one=B9s neighbour, and so on.

Think about it for a moment. The moralities of different religions=20
are only formal ways of stating the principles which go towards=20
maintaining social balance and preventing violence in society.

Such principles are purely secular =8B but, over time, the child has=20
become the parent. A thing created by humans is regarded as far=20
larger than humans themselves. The Sangh Parivar representatives have=20
the temerity to say that they speak for all Hindus, while they are=20
not themselves Hindus except in a purely nominal way. They never=20
speak of =8Csarva dharma sambhava=B9. In their construction of Hindu=20
rashtra, other religions simply do not have the right to exist. Those=20
who speak of it are the real Hindus, good people who are as tolerant=20
as their social circumstances permit them to be but who do not see=20
that any faith, when blind, inevitably closes the door to those who=20
are humans just like them but who follow other faiths.

It is this lack of clarity among most Hindus that has allowed the=20
Sangh Parivar to grow. They have not reacted yet, although to them a=20
life of peace is desirable and the rape and burning and killing of=20
other humans are unspeakably wrong.

The sane majority can yet exert its will on society, if only it does=20
not allow to a perversion of religious faith such an importance that=20
it tears asunder the very fabric of our society.

_____

#9.

The Daily Times (Lahore)
Thursday, November 28, 2002

Funding religious extremism and the diaspora
by M V Ramana
http://www.dailytimes.com.pk/default.asp?page=3Dstory_28-11-2002_pg3_2

_____

#10.

Book Review
Name of the Book: Amritsar to Lahore=97Crossing the Border Between=20
India and Pakistan
Author: Stephen Alter
Publisher: Penguin [India], New Delhi
Pages: 240
ISBN: 0-14-029664-6
Price: Rs. 250
Reviewed by: Yoginder Sikand

The blood-stained line that stretches for several thousand kilometers=20
separating India and Pakistan is one of the most dangerous frontiers=20
in the world, keeping apart two countries united by a common=20
civilization and yet divided by over half a century of unrelenting=20
war and conflict. Anyone who has had the opportunity of visiting that=20
border, as I have, would know the deepest emotions that one is=20
overcome with. The border evokes, to Indians and Pakistanis alike, a=20
range of powerful, conflicting sentiments: of fear and longing, of=20
familiarity and foreignness, of rage and sympathy; a longing for a=20
lost past and a sobering reflection on the present and the future. In=20
this sensitively crafted travelogue, Stephen Alter narrates his=20
journey across the India-Pakistan border undertaken in the summer of=20
1997, describing how the border is seen by people on both sides,=20
filling in the details with reflection on the cruel sufferings that=20
the politics of ultra-nationalism has caused, and is still causing,=20
to the lives of millions of people in both countries.
Altar starts his journey from Delhi, taking us through the=20
Indian Punjab to the border settlement of Attari, from where he=20
boards a train that brings him to Lahore. He remarks on how little=20
the two sides of the border in the Punjab seem to be from each other.=20
Much that he encounters seem to be almost the same: the language, the=20
foods, the countryside; and even the corrupt border guards, which=20
makes the border seem somehow unreal. His journey then takes him on=20
to the Frontier Province, home to the martial Pathans, where he=20
visits the house where his own parents lived, working there as=20
missionaries before 1947, after which they shifted to what is now=20
India. From the Afghan borderlands he travels back to Lahore after a=20
slight detour at Islamabad, and then crosses the border at Wagah,=20
returning to Delhi in time for the official celebrations of the=20
fiftieth year of Indian independence.
While narrating the story of his journey, Altar focuses on=20
precisely what the border means for the Indians and Pakistanis that=20
he meets. For some it represents a gruesome tragedy that has brought=20
unimaginable suffering in its wake, dividing a people who, despite=20
religious differences, shared a common culture and history. For=20
others it represents a salvation from what is perceived as the=20
tyranny of communities who are seen as threatening and menacing. Yet,=20
even for these, Altar shows, the divisions are porous and not=20
entirely inflexible, as in the case of the Pakistani taxi driver who=20
vehemently opposes the Indian army in Kashmir but avidly listens to=20
the latest Bollywood filmi music.
The political uses of the notion of the border, Altar=20
suggests, are a means through which political elites in both=20
countries have sought to bolster their own sagging legitimacy. He=20
describes the symbolism of the parade of Indian and Pakistani troops=20
at the Wagah-Attari border and reflects on how the notion of a=20
cultural border between the two countries, in addition to the=20
physical one, is employed to create the feeling of the two countries=20
being totally different from and opposed to each other. The border,=20
he illustrates with his reflections on the people he meets, the=20
poverty and social inequalities he witnesses, and the jingoistic=20
nationalism and religious chauvinism that he encounters, is thus a=20
central weapon in the armoury of the elites of both countries who=20
seem to have no regard for the actual welfare of their own peoples.=20
If the political elite, then, have a vested interest in staining the=20
border with blood, Altar suggests that the only way that bridges can=20
be built across that gory line is through increased interaction=20
between ordinary citizens of India and Pakistan. No one can deny=20
that, of course, but with fiery zealots in power in the two=20
countries, this is probably asking for the impossible.

_/_/_/_/_/_/_/_/_/_/_/_/_/_/_/_/_/_/_/_/_/_/_/_/_/_/_/_/_/

SACW is an informal, independent & non-profit citizens wire service run by
South Asia Citizens Web (www.mnet.fr/aiindex) since 1996.
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DISCLAIMER: Opinions expressed in materials carried in the posts do not
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