[sacw] SACW #1 | 12 Mar. 02

Harsh Kapoor aiindex@mnet.fr
Tue, 12 Mar 2002 00:56:14 +0100


South Asia Citizens Wire - Dispatch #1 | 12 March 2002

* For daily news updates & citizens initiatives in post riots=20
Gujarat Check: http://www.sabrang.com
** Also see new information & analysis section on the recent Communal=20
Riots in Gujarat on the SACW web site: http://www.mnet.fr/aiindex/

__________________________

#1. Pakistan: There's Much More To Daniel Pearl's Murder Than Meets=20
the Eye (Nafisa Hoodbhoy)
#2 Crackdown on Pakistani Press : A radio interview with Shaheen Sehbai
#3. One of the biggest problems of Pakistan is sectarianism. (M.B. Naqvi)
#4. BJP's Information Minister on Pakistan TV: Swaggering Sushma and=20
anguished citizens (Beena Sarwar)
#5. Sri Lanka: Tamil-Rights announces a content update of its=20
webspace, www.tamil-rights.org
#6. Appeal to U N High Commissioner for Human Rights to request South=20
Asian governments to stop restrictive practices that prevent human=20
rights organizations from working together for human rights and peace.

__________________________

# 1.

The Washington Post
Sunday, March 10, 2002; Page B01
Section: Outlook
Missing Links : There's Much More To Daniel Pearl's Murder Than Meets the E=
ye

By Nafisa Hoodbhoy

AMHERST, Mass.--Nine days ago there was an alarming indication of=20
upheaval in Pakistan -- a crackdown on the press. According to the=20
Committee to Protect Journalists, the government pressured the owner=20
of an influential English language newspaper, the News, to fire four=20
journalists. One of them, the paper's editor, Shaheen Sehbai, said=20
the trouble started after his newspaper reported a link between the=20
prime suspect in the killing of Wall Street Journal reporter Daniel=20
Pearl, and recent attacks on the Indian parliament in Delhi and in=20
the Kashmiri capital, Srinagar. When Sehbai asked the paper's owner=20
to identify who wanted to sack them, Sehbai said he was told to see=20
officials at the ISI, Pakistan's Inter-Services Intelligence agency.=20
Instead he resigned and left for the United States.

I suspected that the crackdown on the media was associated with=20
Pearl's kidnapping and murder. Even from the United States, where I=20
am right now, I could tell that Pearl's slaying was more than an=20
indication of a new level of political violence. It was also a stark=20
reminder of the tenuous position of journalists in Pakistan --=20
especially when they tread on the delicate topic of the country's=20
mysterious intelligence service, its link to Islamic groups and its=20
power over the government of Pakistan.

For the past month, as a former reporter for Pakistan's Dawn=20
newspaper, I have been sifting through the evidence trying to figure=20
out what Pearl's murder was really about. It was not just a matter of=20
his being an American and a Jew, though that was certainly part of=20
it. In setting out to investigate the possible connection between=20
alleged shoe-bomber Richard Reid and the Islamist groups in the=20
region, Pearl had entered dangerous ground.

It was ground that few Pakistani journalists would even attempt to=20
cover: exploring the complex ties between the militant Islamist=20
groups and the many intelligence agencies. Local news organizations=20
are so infiltrated by intelligence agents that they can do little=20
independent reporting on this subject. Moreover, as the latest=20
crackdown on the press illustrates, Pakistani governments, past and=20
present, have been using intelligence agencies to twist the arms of=20
publishers, editors and journalists who dare to expose their dirty=20
secrets.

I don't know how much Pearl found out. But I know full well how=20
likely journalists are to become the targets of the intelligence=20
agencies. I found out the hard way in September 1991. It had been=20
only two years since the country had returned to democracy and a free=20
press was only barely tolerated by then-Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif.=20
I began writing about the tactics his government was using to coerce=20
opposition politicians to change their loyalties and indict their=20
leader, former prime minister Benazir Bhutto.

My investigative reports led me into a maze of competing intelligence=20
agencies. One day in late September, we journalists in Karachi=20
rallied against the stabbing of Kamran Khan, one of the reporters=20
under fire at the News, who is known for using sources among the=20
intelligence agencies and who also works as a special correspondent=20
for The Washington Post. That night, as I reached home, I saw two men=20
-- knives glinting in their hands -- approaching my car. Sensing=20
danger, I raced back to the office. Coming after a spate of attacks=20
on journalists, the incident generated new protests -- with rallies=20
and demonstrations by media organizations throughout the country=20
culminating in newspapers suspending publication for one day.

The latest crackdown suggests that the Pakistani government may be=20
hiding some of the facts on the Pearl case. For Pakistan, the Sept.=20
11 terrorist attacks have forced the military government to begin the=20
very difficult process of disassociating itself from the Islamic=20
militants with which it has traditionally kept close ties. These=20
linkages were strengthened during the Cold War when the Reagan=20
administration and the Saudi government used Pakistan's military=20
dictator, Gen. Mohammed Zia ul-Haq, to funnel billions of dollars'=20
worth of arms and ammunition to the Afghan resistance through=20
Pakistan's Islamic parties. At home President Zia promoted=20
conservative Islamic officers to generals in the army. As a result,=20
the ISI grew powerful enough to sideline the subsequent civilian=20
governments of Sharif and Bhutto and become the chief architect of=20
the Taliban government in Afghanistan.

Even after Pakistan got on board with the U.S. anti-terrorist=20
coalition, the intelligence agencies did not sever ties with the=20
Islamic parties. Then, as the United States stepped up pressure, the=20
agencies began reducing their support for these parties. In December,=20
I saw a pro-Taliban demonstration in Islamabad that attracted fewer=20
than 100 people. Only a month ago earlier, thousands of violent=20
pro-Taliban demonstrators had rampaged through the streets, even=20
though they failed to find support from the masses. In fact,=20
Pakistan's Islamist parties have never won more than 2 percent of the=20
vote in any democratic election -- and have therefore looked to the=20
military to capture power. In turn, the military -- and their=20
multiple intelligence agencies -- have found the parties useful for=20
reining in opponents.

As Pearl's kidnapping and murder show, Musharraf's task of quelling=20
Islamic militancy is a daunting one. To recognize that challenge=20
requires not only understanding the anti-Western, anti-Semitic=20
rhetoric of the Islamic extremists, but also the flash point of=20
Kashmir. That is a grievance that can unite Muslims who believe the=20
disputed territory should be freed from Indian control, and it=20
provides a battleground for fundamentalists. It is clear that Pearl's=20
suspected kidnappers have taken that cause to heart.

Remember the Indian passenger airline that was hijacked from=20
Kathmandu, Nepal, in December 1999 and made a series of stops in=20
Pakistan and Dubai before finally landing in Kandahar? There, the=20
Taliban surrounded the plane and gave safe passage to the hijackers.=20
They were demanding that India release three members of a=20
Pakistan-based Islamist group, which was launching attacks against=20
the Indian military in Kashmir. The Indian foreign minister traveled=20
to Kandahar and handed over the political prisoners, who included=20
Masood Azhar and Saeed himself.

Once freed from jail in India, Azhar and his entourage returned to=20
Pakistan and remained untroubled by government security forces. I=20
well remember how, with their long beards and turbans, they swaggered=20
into the Karachi Press Club in March 2000 for a news conference. They=20
told the assembled journalists how they had been carrying out jihad=20
against the Indian military in Kashmir. Azhar announced that they=20
were changing the name of the group from Harkat ul-Ansar to=20
Jaish-i-Mohammed -- which literally means "Army of Mohammed." Harkat=20
ul-Ansar had by then been declared a terrorist organization by the=20
United States.

We journalists were curious why Azhar -- the newly appointed chief of=20
Jaish-i-Mohammed -- had chosen this moment to make a public=20
appearance. President Clinton was about to visit Pakistan on a=20
stopover from India. Three months beforehand, Musharraf had taken=20
over Pakistan's government in a military coup -- and this had not sat=20
well with the U.S. administration. Hinting at a rift in Pakistan's=20
intelligence agencies, one reporter asked Azhar if his appearance was=20
intended to embarrass Musharraf before Clinton's visit. I asked the=20
same question more bluntly: "Are you being supported by Pakistan's=20
Inter-Services Intelligence?" Azhar answered both questions with a=20
curt "No." It was the answer we expected, but it did little to allay=20
our suspicions.

Since their release from Indian jails, Azhar, Saeed and their=20
supporters have moved freely in and out of Afghanistan and Pakistan.=20
Azhar was put under house arrest last fall only after the United=20
States put pressure on Pakistan to curb jihadi groups. Pakistan=20
turned down a U.S. request to extradite Saeed, despite his known role=20
in kidnapping Western tourists in New Dehli in 1994. Soon after he=20
turned himself in in January, Saeed confessed to his role in Pearl's=20
abduction -- though he later denied it. Many other Kashmiri and Sunni=20
militant groups are still operating freely in Pakistan, and the=20
latter have intensified sectarian killings inside the country.

The U.S. war on the al Qaeda network has signaled a new phase for the=20
reorganization of militant Islamic groups in Pakistan. As the United=20
States bombed Taliban targets, the Pakistan-based Kashmir militants=20
began slipping home through the porous Afghan borders. Among them=20
were the Harkat ul-Mujaheddin, some of whose members were killed by=20
the U.S. bombing in Kabul last October while holding a meeting. When=20
the bodies of the "martyrs" were brought to a mosque in Karachi,=20
thousands of people attended the funeral processions -- and promised=20
revenge against the United States.

That revenge came in the form of an innocent victim, Pearl, whom the=20
shifting militant forces saw primarily as an American and a Jew. The=20
militant groups now identify Western journalists with the enemy.=20
Traveling with a group of Western journalists to the Afghan border in=20
December, I witnessed firsthand the anger of the defeated Pakistan=20
supporters of the Taliban as the U.S. troops bombed Kandahar. Our=20
convoy was making its way from the winding hills of Chaman in=20
Pakistan (about two hours from Kandahar) when our vehicle was pelted=20
with stones from angry Pashtuns. A BBC film crew traveling with us=20
was also attacked. But the worst hit was British print journalist=20
Robert Fisk, who appeared the next morning at our Quetta hotel with=20
his head swathed in bandages.

As Saeed's ties with intelligence agencies become exposed, there are=20
growing concerns among Pakistani analysts that he could be killed in=20
custody in order to destroy evidence of his linkages. In fact, Saeed=20
is being moved from one place to another -- reportedly to prevent him=20
from being killed. Another cause for concern is the widespread=20
corruption in Pakistan -- where police alternately fabricate and=20
destroy evidence, depending on pressure from above. The net result is=20
that even prominent murder cases have dragged on for years in the=20
courts without leading to any convictions.

A decade ago, it was the unity of journalists that enabled me to put=20
the frightening knife attack behind me and to focus on getting out=20
the truth. At that stage, I'd been predicting that unless we=20
maintained unity, journalists could be killed for investigative=20
reporting. Pearl's murder came as a blow to independent reporting in=20
Pakistan. His brave wife, Mariane, has spoken about how his case=20
highlights the importance of joining hands to fight terrorism.=20
Whether this is achieved through the extradition of Saeed and his=20
accomplices to the United States or through monitoring the court=20
process in Pakistan, it is imperative that the culprits be punished.=20
The frightening fact is that Pearl's murder has uncovered the tip of=20
an iceberg. The challenge now is to continue the work he began -- and=20
investigate how terrorist forces are realigning in the region to=20
threaten civil society.

Nafisa Hoodbhoy, who worked for 16 years for Dawn newspaper in=20
Karachi, Pakistan, teaches at the University of Massachusetts with a=20
focus on women, politics and the media in Pakistan, Afghanistan and=20
Iran.

_____

#2.

NPR's OnTheMedia.org
Crackdown on Pakistani Press
Last week Pakistani president Pervez Musharraf said that murdered=20
Wall Street Journal reporter Daniel Pearl had been "too intrusive" in=20
his investigation of government corruption. The president has also=20
been threatening the domestic press. Intimidation by government=20
agencies led Shaheen Sebhai to quit his job as editor of Pakistan's=20
News last week. Host Bob Garfield talks to Sebhai about the worsening=20
situation for journalists in Pakistan.

You can hear the audio right now worldwide at http://www.onthemedia.org

_______

#3.

One of the biggest problems of Pakistan is sectarianism.
by M.B. Naqvi

Karachi March 11:

The steady killings of Shia medical doctors in Karachi and a few other
places goes on unabated. Quite a large number of successful Shia doctors
are thinking of winding up their practices and going abroad; many have
indeed done so. As the Secretary of the Pakistan Medical Association has
said in a BBC interview a heavy brain drain is continuing with medical
doctors and other professionals emigrating out of Pakistan. The domestic
potential for growing political troubles is clearly seen by all. The
politically aware citizens are afraid that if these targetted killings
are not arrested, there may be vigilante action on the part of the Shia
community which can cause a mayhem. That has the potential of putting
the integrity of the whole country at risk.

One of the biggest problems of Pakistan is sectarianism. In its present
form it is quite a recent development and a date can be put on it.
Except for sporadic scuffles and minor clashes once in a decade or so,
there was never a clear-cut division of society along the sectarian
lines. The rise of sectarian consciousness began in the later 1980s as a
result of the ministrations of Gen. Ziaul Haq=92s Martial Law.

The origins of the problem are well over a thousand years old, with the
first major Schism in Islam taking place among the successors to the
Prophet Muhammad in the Saudi Arabia after his death. Since then Shias
are the supporters of one of the four Caliphs of earliest Islam and
regard others as unlawful rulers. The vast majority of Muslims, however,
do not agree and they think that succession that did take place was
quite right. These are the Sunnis. In the Subcontinent the vast majority
of Muslims comprise the Sunnis. In Pakistan also the vast majority is
Sunni, though Sunnis are themselves divided into two denominations: the
Deobandi and Bralevis, the main seminaries of both are located in UP,
India.

The proportion of Shias in Pakistan=92s population is not accurately
known, though the Shias claim that they are 25 per cent whereas others
say they are only 17 per cent. Nevertheless the society in various areas
of Pakistan, characterised by linguistic divisions roughly corresponding
with the current four provinces, is still characterised by tribalism,
with a land tenure system that is in effect feudal, though not in form.
The two sects have lived more or less happily side by side for all these
centuries. The separate consciousness of the sect, with political
significance attached to it, is recent and the discredit for it goes to
the wily General who, in order to counter and contain the popularity of
Pakistan Peoples Party in 1980s, encouraged every form of divisiveness,
especially in Sindh.

Sectarian groups were actually sprang up during Zia=92s Martial Law regime
in 1980s soon after he had suppressed the agitation initiated by
Movement for Restoration of Democracy. In fact his regime, through its
secret agencies, encouraged both sects to have their own organisations
and a lot of knowledgeable people believe that the regime helped arm
them and gave them initial financial aid, though later they grew and
grew with much foreign aid. Other circumstances also arose that favoured
sectarianism in Pakistan.

Pakistan=92s was the only relatively free arena available for Saudi Arabia
and revolutionary Iran to fight their cold war on. It is commonly
believed, though there can never be hard evidence, that the Saudi
Arabians have been funding the Sunni sectarian organisations while the
Iranians have given funds to various or successive Shia bodies.

Over times the top religious leaders have acquired control over some of
these organisations while the Afghanistan Jihad made Saudi Arabia far
more important and more or less enabled it to play a strong hand inside
Pakistan --- a role in which the Iranians could not be denied or
prevented from a similar role. The regime=92s various ideas and good
relations with both Iran and Saudi Arabia, perhaps the better to
concentrate on Afghanistan war at that time, also meant no check on
sectarian bodies. But the net result for Pakistan was a constant
intensification of the respective sectarian consciousness.

Pakistan has the unique record of Muslims killing other Muslims inside
the mosques while the victims were praying. This has happened to both
sects. It was the most unheard of thing that no one could have imagined.
Throughout history, the mosque has been a sanctuary for anyone who
entered there (took asylum) or happened to be there. Only the more
unscrupulous Muslim rulers did not respect this rule. But in Pakistan
from the end of 1980s and to this day such events have taken place form
time to time.

But a relatively new sectarianism grew strong after the rise of Taliban
in Afghanistan i.e. in the later 1990s. This has been engaged in the
steady selective killing of prominent individuals from among the Shias.
The organisation known as Anjuman Sipah-e-Sahaba and its splinter
Lashkar-e-Jhangvi specialises in this gory game, probably under Taliban
influence with whom they had close relations.

Indeed many ASSP leaders and activists, after having been named by the
police in certain crimes, took refuge in Afghanistan with Taliban.
Pakistan government gave a list of several scores of people to the
Taliban government wanting their extradition. The Taliban stoutly
refused.

This campaign of ASSP was initially imitated by its opposite members
among Shias. But that soon petered out. For one thing, the main Shia
political organisation became factionalised and split. Also, because of
the strained relations in Pakistan-Iran relations after 1996, Iranian
aid more or less ended. With that ended Shia militants=92 ability to mount
sectarian operations. But the Sunni outfits remained in possession of
more resources and had better organisation, set up with the help of
Taliban.

ASSP=92s and LJ=92s campaign of killing selected Shias, particularly medica=
l
doctors, is continuing. There was a dip in it in recent months after the
October war. But it has been renewed again and almost every day a
prominent Shia doctor is being killed. Needless to say, assailants,
usually two in a car or on motor bike, get away safely and the police
have almost never been able to trace or nab them. They are too powerful
and well organised for that. They remain several jumps ahead of the
government agencies. There is a great deal of consternation among the
Shias throughout the country, particularly in Karachi and certain areas
of the north where the local balance of power is evenly matched such as
Parachinar in NWFP and Gilgit and Skardu in Northern Areas. In such
places both sides are armed and pitched battles have taken place from
time to time. In each flare up have scores died.

In the 1990s Punjab was gripped by sectarian prejudice and selected
killings were taking place during the later part of the Nawaz Sharif
regime in 1997 and 1998. But coordinated administrative action by the
Punjab and central governments have more or less curbed that explosion
of violence in the Punjab. No so in either NWFP=92s vulnerable areas or in
Karachi. Fortunately the countryside of Sindh is relatively less
affected --- thanks to its more relaxed Sufistic culture where
orthodoxies were never very rigid or extreme. In Baluchistan Quetta and
its environs are said to be more vulnerable because of the presence of
the Hazara tribe (Shias).

All thinking people in Pakistan have been alarmed by the persistence of
the sectarian violence. The way this violence was curbed in Punjab ---
though not entirely eliminated --- is a reminder that the government can
do if it really wants to. Whether it really wants is often questioned
because of a certain usefulness of the sectarian fanatics. Many of the
latter double as Jihadis who are fighting in Indian-controlled Kashmir.
Their links with the government are known but what is their precise
nature is a matter for speculation.

When it is said that the sectarian terrorists double as Jihadis, no one
is claiming that exactly the same persons who operate in Sindh, NWFP or
other areas of Pakistan are the individuals who are also taking part in
Kashmir Jihad. The point is that their respective organisations have the
same mother organisation. They all have their spiritual guides in the
various factions of the Jamiat-e-Ulema Islam (JUI), which was also the
spiritual springhead of the Taliban. There is an ineluctable linkage,
mostly ideological and not necessarily organisational, with the JUI
leadership.

There is also the involvement of the government agencies with all these
Jihadi outfits and their mentors; Taliban, the sectarian ASSP and LK and
the Kashmiri Jihadis had the same origins. The state policies at
different times have created various links at various levels between the
government and the various Jihadis. One is told that once such links are
established, they are not deliberately sundered with every change of
state policy, though they may be put in some sort of a freeze. Whatever
the truth, and much of it can only be a speculation, the aware citizens
believe that the government can, if it is really single minded, curb the
sectarian menace.

But the structure of the Pakistani establishment and of the
decision-making is such that despite the all powerful nature of the
military regime, even the Chief Executive could be prevented from
visiting Mulla Omar in Kandhar by his own administration. Although the
Home Minister, whose brother was brutally killed in Karachi, says that
he has paid with blood for his strong line against sectarian terrorists.
He says he means business. The knowledgeable simply smile.

_______

#4.

Endpiece, The News Opinion
March 10, 2002

Swaggering Sushma and anguished citizens

Beena Sarwar

If the belligerence of BJP's Information Minister were to be taken as an
indication of the mood in New Delhi vis a vis Islamabad, hostilities would
continue indefinitely. In Islamabad -- via Dubai, because of the overland
flights ban between India and Pakistan for each other's carriers -- for the
SAARC Information Ministers' Conference, she was interviewed live on
Pakistan Television on March 8. The interview provided a study in
contrast -- a restrained Newsnight host Talat Hussain vs. the aggressive,
smug, articulate and supremely arrogant Sushma Swaraj who summarily
dismissed each and every one of Mr Hussain's questions as false,
misinformed, or mal-intentioned.

Ms Swaraj's modus operandi is well illustrated by her response to the
hundreds of lives lost in Gujarat: incredibly, she took the moral high
ground by baldly stating that she would not get into counting bodies, since
even one death in a riot was a smear on India. Well said, and well avoided.
No question of touching upon why the carnage took place, or the collusion o=
f
the state authorities with the rioters. Talat Hussain's comment on Gujarat
Chief Minister Modi was similarly dismissed: India, she said, has seen
violence and carnage before but, came the stunning assertion, Mr Modi has
done a wonderful job in controlling the situation with unprecedented speed.

She asserted that the Agra Summit had failed because of Pakistan's refusal
to discuss cross-border terrorism and insistence on including Kashmir as th=
e
'core dispute' in the agenda. Mr Hussain produced an unsigned draft which h=
e
said included both contentious points, but an angry Ms Swaraj refused to
even consider that the document could be authentic.

On whether the Agra Summit was sabotaged by Indian hawks, she audaciously
retorted that there was no division. Hawks and moderates alike, she said,
were in agreement - a statement that flies in the face of observations by
independent Indian analysts and reporters at the time. Her insistence on th=
e
homogeneity of views in India is far from the truth, as is evident to anyon=
e
with independent access to views that are not given much space in the
mainstream media.

Nor do Ms Swaraj's belligerence and her insistence on arguing from a
'position of strength' reflect the mood in India as much as she would have
people believe. For all the Indian hawks who since September 11, and
particularly since December 13 have been wanting to attack Pakistan, there
are many more who want peace. As always, those fired by hate and bigotry ar=
e
more forceful in pushing their views, but this does not mean that they
should be allowed to prevail.

Sushma Swaraj's insistence that only those with proven strength can talk
peace echoes Ariel Sharon's recent outrageous statement that heavier
casualties should be inflicted on the Palestinians before they can be
allowed at the negotiating table. The similarity of course goes deeper.
Sharon has used post September-11 events to step up on his aggression
against the Palestinians - which has triggered off further violence by
Palestinians (although CNN would say it the other way round). Led by the
right-wing BJP government, India too has seized the opportunity afforded by
the world's only superpower's insistence on might is right, to up the ante
with Pakistan.

To hear Ms Swaraj tell it, New Delhi has only ever taken the first step
towards peace - she countered a query about India's initiating a nuclear
race in South Asia with Atal-ji's 'bus yatra' to Lahore, and his visit to
the Minar-e-Pakistan. For this, she rightly reminded us, he was repaid with
Kargil. What steps can Pakistan take to mend fences? Ms Swaraj literally
smirked as she replied that Pakistan knows the answer very well. And if the=
y
do take these steps, what then? The venerable information minister refused
to say. In other words, bow or be broken. With this attitude, her contentio=
n
that every peace initiative in the region has emanated from the BJP
stretches the truth.

If that is the case, one wonders, why does Atal-ji not accept the offer of
the Pakistani president (even if he is a self-appointed one as Ms Swaraj
reminded us, like we need reminding) to withdraw troops from the border and
remove the restrictions on overland flights? Perhaps some kind of softening
is in the air though. Saturday's newspapers reported that India has reduced
the number of troops on its border, and that its airforce has stepped down
from the ready-to-strike position. If so, this is welcome news.

In stark contrast to Sushmita Swaraj's swaggering stand, is the attitude of
ordinary people, activists, people of all faiths who are struggling with
what has happened in Gujarat. A recent letter to Indian President K.R.
Narayan by the Citizens' Initiative for Justice & Peace (March 5) demands
compensation not just for victims of the Godhra tragedy, but also to victim=
s
of the violence that followed. It also demands that the President himself,
as the Constitutional Head of the Indian State, make a generous
contribution.

The hard-hitting, anguished letter is signed by MP Shabana Azmi and her
writer/poet husband Javed Akhtar, senior jurist Girishbhai Patel,
journalists Teesta Setalvad, Javed Anand of the magazine Communalism Combat=
,
and activists like Rajendra Prasad,Vivan Sundaram and Shabnam Hashmi of the
Safdar Hashmi Memorial Trust (SAHMAT). Several other human rights and civic
rights organisations have also endorsed the letter, including Centre for
Dialogue and Reconciliation, National Bank Employees Federation, Movement
for Secular Democracy, and others.

They accuse the state of first indulging "in direct and systematic acts of
murder, terror and targeting of economic properties of the minority
community in Gujarat". It is now, they say, "actively preventing relief and
rehabilitation from reaching the affected areas; relief camps in the city
that are being treated like concentration camps". The signatories, who have
visited affected areas at risk to their own lives, estimate that the number
of casualties "may touch a staggering figure of 2,000". Fifteen make-shift
camps in different parts of Ahmedabad house at least 35,000 internally
displaced persons, and it is feared that this figure may touch 50,000 in
Ahmedabad alone, once a complete survey is carried out. Many of the
survivors are in a desperate situation, suffering from burns and other
serious injuries; even the bodies of the deceased "lie in the most
de-humanised state and the State is refusing to look into this."

Meanwhile, we in Pakistan can hardly afford to be complacent about the
strife in India. Our own citizens are not safe from sectarian violence. Our
mosques have to be protected by armed guards. Our doctors are picked off an=
d
killed for no reason other than their faith. If only the pain that is
routinely expressed here for the 'oppressed' Indian Muslims was also visibl=
e
for Pakistani citizens - Muslims and non-Muslims - we might be head towards
some kind of progress and peace.

(ends)

_____

#5

>
>Tamil-Rights announces a content update of its webspace, www.tamil-rights.=
org:
>
> ---The full text and complete signatories of the recent "Peace and=20
>Democratization" statement
>
>---New Section: "Opinions on Tamil Rights" - is inaugurated by
>Rohini Hensman's PEACE IN SOUTH ASIA: PIPE-DREAM OR REAL POSSIBILITY?
>
>-- The Tamil Feminists Forum marks March 8th- International Women's Day.
>
>www.tamil-rights.org

______

#6.

Date: Mon, 11 Mar 2002 12:25:52 +0530

To
Mrs Mary Robinson,
UN High Commissioner for Human Rights

Appeal to U N High Commissioner for Human Rights to request South=20
Asian governments to stop restrictive practices that prevent human=20
rights organizations from working together for peace.

Dear Mrs Mary Robinson,

This is to bring to your attention an Appeal (Posted below)=20
by leading civil society activists of India, Pakistan and Canada=20
expressing concern at the increasing restrictions being imposed by=20
the governments of South Asia on human rights defenders and=20
democratic movements to network regionally in support of peace.
The signatories to the Appeal urge that in your interaction=20
with South Asian governments, you request the region's political=20
leaders to stop restrictive practices on travel and meetings that=20
prevent civil society organisations and human rights defenders=20
from working together in support of peace and the promotion of human=20
rights and democracy.

Yours Sincerely,
Rita Manchanda
Programme Executive SAFHR
South Asia Forum for Human Rights
G. P. O. Box 12855 Kathmandu, Nepal

o o o

Appeal to U N High Commissioner for Human Rights to request South=20
Asian governments to stop restrictive practices that prevent human=20
rights organizations from working together for human rights and peace.

The South Asia Forum for Human Rights (SAFHR) attempted twice to hold=20
a consultation of civil society actors on peace and justice in Jammu=20
and Kashmir. This consultation was to review the progress of the=20
ongoing peace building initiatives in Jammu and Kashmir through=20
"seeding community activism and strengthening grass-roots democracy".=20
In the first instance, SAFHR was forced to cancel the consultation on=20
December 15, 2001, just three days before it was to begin, under=20
pressure of the government of Nepal. In the second instance the=20
consultation had to be cancelled on February 14, on the instructions=20
of the Home Ministry of Nepal, just four days before it was scheduled=20
to begin on February 18, 2002. We have learnt that on both occasions,=20
the Government of Nepal ordered the cancellations at the behest of=20
the Government of India.
This is only the last instance in a long line of interventions by the=20
governments of South Asia to stop civil society initiatives and=20
impose serious restrictions on the legitimate work of human rights=20
defenders and democratic movements in the countries of the region.
- In India, educational institutions are effectively debarred from=20
holding meetings and seminars for exchange of views on human rights=20
and peace if foreign academics are invited, in the name of the=20
provision to secure prior government permissions.
- In Bangladesh, severe visa restrictions are imposed on foreign=20
intellectuals invited to academic and deliberative gatherings.
- In Sri Lanka, human rights organizations have to secure permission=20
from the Ministry of Defence before inviting guests to meetings on=20
peace and human rights.
- In Pakistan, the government refuses to issue visas and withholds=20
permission for peace rallies and public meetings of trade unions and=20
political parties.
- In Nepal, the government has started discouraging, restricting and=20
prohibiting civil society representatives from meeting on regional=20
issues of peace, while its capital hosts the head quarter of SAARC.
- In South Asia no regional body can be registered
In such a pervasive atmosphere of restrictions on travel and exchange=20
of views in the region, it is in the interest of democracy and human=20
rights that the human rights community and the UN Human Rights High=20
Commissioner draw the attention of respective governments to these=20
undesirable restrictions and prohibition practices.
The human rights community of South Asia appeals to the United=20
Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights to request the governments=20
of the region to stop their restrictive practices which prevent the=20
human rights organizations in the South Asian countries from=20
exercising their moral and political function of extending democratic=20
rights.
Signatories:
Mr. I A Rehman, Executive Director, Human Rights Commission of Pakistan,
Dr. Mubashir Hasan, former Finance Minister of Pakistan and an=20
eminent peace activist,
Ms. Asma Jehangir, eminent Human Rights lawyer of Pakistan and UN=20
Special Rapporteur on Enforced Disappearances,
Mr. Ved Bhasin, Editor and Publisher of "Kashmir Times" the largest=20
circulation English daily newspaper of Jammu and Kashmir,
Dr. Siddiq Wahid, a leading academic from Ladakh region of Jammu and Kashmi=
r,
Mr. Murray Thompson, Director, Peace Fund Canada,
Dr. Shree Mulay, (McGill University) Board member, CERAS- diaspora NGO,
Mr. Augusthy Thomas, Friedrich Naumann Stiftung
Mr. Tapan Kumar Bose, Secretary General SAFHR and leading human=20
rights and peace activist Dr. Ranabir Samaddar, Director, SAFHR=20
Peace Studies Programme and an eminent academic=20
Ms. Rita Manchanda, Programme Executive, SAFHR=20=20

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