[sacw] SACW #1 | 12 June 02

[Harsh Kapoor]

South Asia Citizens Wire Dispatch #1 | 12 June 2002

South Asia Citizens Web:
http://www.mnet.fr/aiindex

South Asians Against Nukes:
http://www.mnet.fr/aiindex/NoNukes.html

__________________________

#1. A thought for the morrow (M B Naqvi)
#2. Thanks to the foreign mediation (M B Naqvi)
#3. Official reason for Kashmiri journalist's arrest is challenged=20
(Reporters Without Borders)
#4. Submission to US Commission on International religious Freedoms=20
(Kamal Mitra Chenoy)
#5. Which way now for India? (Luke Harding)
#6. INSAF Bulletin [2] June 1, 2002

__________________________

#1.

The News (Pakistan)
Wednesday June 12, 2002

A thought for the morrow

M B Naqvi

Amidst the unsettling fears of war -- possibly a nuclear one -- are=20
abating but the confusion continues to be confounded by hectic=20
international diplomacy, with an unending stream of the high level=20
emissaries descending on Islamabad, not to mention the effect of=20
unabated hostility in the Indian media and government, it is still=20
necessary to keep elementary truths in mind: What is the highest=20
priority and where do the people want to go.

There is no doubt that a BJP-led India loves to keep a relentless=20
pressure on Pakistan to browbeat it into totally abjuring its support=20
for insurgency in Kashmir. That is its bottomline. That Pakistan had=20
called it a Jihad and a freedom fight made India madder still. While=20
Pakistan's new assurances to Armitage has relieved India of its worst=20
worry, Pakistanis should remember that the circumstance had enabled=20
it to receive more sympathy and support from the international=20
Coalition against Terrorism. The Coalition's favourable viewing of=20
the Kashmir situation was at Pakistan's expense. In India's pressure=20
there appeared to be a certain international, if not purely American,=20
input.

As it is Pakistan happens to be even more hobbled by the circumstance=20
of having a military government that has a divisive political agenda.=20
For Musharraf regime, Indian military threats -- the penultimate=20
result of the hubris produced by Pakistan's nuclear capability much=20
before May 1998 -- are not the only ones to worry about.=20
Simultaneously there is an American, indeed global, pressure that=20
focuses today on the fugitive Taliban and Al-Qaeda men hiding in=20
Pakistan. But looked at more closely, the American objectives look=20
set to grow into wanting to contain the mindsets that produce Islamic=20
zealots. There is no reason to suppose that reluctant and partial=20
acceptance of today's US demands will get Pakistan more than a=20
temporary relief. This pressure, in combination with America's=20
strategic alliance with India, is likely to grow.

There will be another in the days to come: it will come from inside.=20
Indeed this will comprise many strands. One will be the net=20
intellectual outcome of the ongoing anguished ferment in the minds of=20
the Islamic ideologues -- what with the collapse of Taliban regime=20
and the world-wide campaign against mainly Islamic Terrorism,=20
powerfully assisted by Israel's own expansionist and aggressive=20
actions. Mr Pervez Musharraf can be sure to hear more from the=20
religious lobby, now that he has allowed it the perception that his=20
modernism of Jan 12 can be diluted under pressure.

More streams of opposition are sure to be produced by what President=20
Musharraf does in pursuit of his political restructuring. He would=20
soon be announcing his own Constitutional amendments. Now, these=20
would be highly controversial, both for their content and the=20
methodology he adopts for their enactment. Then, there are the=20
eminently justified demands of opposition parties about the=20
permission to freely engage in political activity, a firm election=20
schedule for National and Provincial Assemblies under a new and=20
demonstrably fair Election Commission, and there has to be a=20
transparently fair political framework for the polls, free from silly=20
conditions that are ambiguous and arbitrary. The demand for an=20
all-party caretaker government to supervise the elections cannot but=20
generate more contention because of questions being asked about the=20
legality and legitimacy of the Army Chief, CE and President becoming=20
an elected head of the Republic. Thus a divided people are to face=20
tough external pressures.

As a combined result of Russian, British and American mediation --=20
yes, it was mediation except in name -- a process of slow incremental=20
de-escalation has begun between India and Pakistan, though slips and=20
setbacks are still possible. Messrs Richard Armitage has earned and=20
Donald Rumsfeld will earn a few thanks. But peace is still a long way=20
off. Apart from the large question of what is meant by peace and how=20
it is to be achieved, it is clear that foreigners cannot really help.=20
Peace has to be achieved only by Indian and Pakistani governments --=20
and the people beyond them. But these governments have political=20
agendas for which the tension on the borders has proved helpful.

It is necessary therefore that all concerned should keep their=20
perspectives level-headed and constantly informed with humanistic and=20
democratic values. Purpose of all politics and governments is to=20
ensure all human rights to all the people without exception. That is=20
what is to be desired. In other words, both countries should have=20
truly democratic governments in form as well as content about what=20
they do. There is no other purpose of public policy than to keep=20
peace -- which is the constant endeavour of all to attain maximum=20
good to the maximum number of people without any discrimination. All=20
formulations of national purpose or ultimate aim of public policy=20
that are not people-centred are dangerous delusions.

Insofar as Pakistanis are concerned, it is high time to review the=20
assumptions, objectives and methodology of the Kashmir policy,=20
especially the methodology adopted in 1990. It has proved to be=20
counterproductive in all respects: Kashmiris, ie the Muslim ones, are=20
not an inch closer to Azadi after sacrificing some 50,000 to 70,000=20
young men. India's military hold on IHK is as firm today as it was in=20
1990. In addition India began to threaten Pakistan with an all-out=20
war that can escalate into a nuclear one. Apparently both Vajpayee-=20
and Musharraf-led governments are prepared to see large parts of=20
respective countries, with people and flora and fauna on them,=20
incinerated rather than make compromises, though a moving away from=20
the brink has recently become visible. To both, ordinary people's=20
safety is not the top priority, it should be.

It must be clearly asserted that this policy of supporting the Jihad=20
in Kashmir has not worked; it imperils Pakistan without any benefit=20
to either Kashmiris or Pakistanis. And it has been largely at the=20
expense of Kashmiris. It is time Islamabad actually got back to the=20
policy it proclaims: (only) political and moral support to the=20
Kashmiris' freedom fight. For the rest, we need an India policy that=20
looks beyond today's quarrels and is aimed at longer-term friendship=20
and cooperation. Yes, friendship and cooperation with India should be=20
the aim of Pakistan's public policy so that Pakistan's basic=20
deficiencies and weaknesses can be removed as a preliminary to=20
engaging in the urgent but hitherto neglected Jihad against=20
unemployment and social and economic backwardness throughout South=20
Asia. These have to be achieved in conditions of full freedoms for=20
all without discrimination or needlessly divisive and combative=20
foreign policies in the region, especially by Pakistan.

Minds that remain mired in ideological or religious conflicts -- that=20
clearly are at the expense of economic and social progress of the=20
people, not to say their freedoms -- do not value the progress of the=20
people of Pakistan. Let us remember there are many Indians out there=20
who see through the ideological hocus-pocus of Hindutva and want=20
their public policy to similarly aim at the progress and uplift of=20
the down-trodden Indians and not simply to enrich their fairly=20
well-to-do middle classes further. Pakistanis should aim at=20
befriending and strengthening these democratic forces in India -- who=20
are truly secular and committed to the democracy that goes beyond=20
merely regular polls every five years which would transform the lives=20
of the under-privileged Indians amidst all civil liberties. Their=20
success in India will be helpful to similar democracy in Pakistan=20
also.

The backdrop of recent political developments is ominous. A fascism,=20
properly so-called, is trying to entrench itself in India. It was=20
powerfully reinforced by Islamic extremism in this country. The Hindu=20
ideologues saw the ease with which the Pakistani Mullahs become rich,=20
powerful and politically influential by appealing to religious=20
chauvinism and out of envy, they followed suit with redoubled energy.=20
Elsewhere in the world, the typical ideas that define fascism are=20
also resurfacing in so many European countries: Austria, Germany,=20
France, Britain, Benelux countries and above all in Israel. American=20
influence somehow favours them in many cases -- as in Israel and=20
India. Democracy's survival demands that these trends should be=20
fought against internationally. All democrats have stakes in the=20
survival of democracy everywhere. More so in the case of apopulous=20
and diverse country like India where fascist trends are a radical=20
threat to democracy. Threat to Indian democracy also comes from=20
complacency: a careless repetition of the platitude that India is too=20
big and varied a country to be run by a dictator, can become a=20
lullaby.

_____

#2.

Thanks to the foreign mediation
M.B. Naqvi
Karachi June 11:

Thanks to the foreign mediation --- yes, it was mediation except in=20
name --- clouds of war and fears of nuclear escalation have more or=20
less cleared from South Asia's horizon. Most Pakistanis will heave a=20
big sigh of relief, though not all. There are those in the religious=20
lobbies --- the true extremists even among the more radical=20
religiously-oriented groups --- who are beside themselves with anger=20
at Gen. Musharraf's perceived chicken-heartedness in first buckling=20
under American pressure to ditch the Taliban regime and has now=20
betrayed Kashmiri Jihad under the combined pressure of India and the=20
other foreign powers. The world looks fated to hear more from these=20
groups in days to come.

Whatever the truth about the origins or inspiration behind the new=20
Hizb-i-Alami, or whatever is the correct name of this shadowy outfit,=20
it is supposed to be committed to overthrowing the Musharraf regime.=20
It is said to have owned up several terrorist acts. Among these is=20
the bombing of a Protestant Church in Islamabad, the May 14 act in=20
the Jammu area and the earlier suicide bombing attack on a bus of=20
Pakistan Navy that was carrying 12 French engineers engaged in=20
building new submarines. Not only this particular Hizb but many other=20
extremist (read terrorist) organisations want nothing so much as a=20
war between Pakistan and India, including its graduation into the=20
nuclear stage. They apparently find the prospect acceptable. Their=20
minimum expectation from the war is the downfall and disgrace of Gen.=20
Musharraf. But is there more to it? who knows.

Meantime, the lifting of the war clouds has suddenly brought the=20
political agenda of the military regime into sharp focus. Time is=20
running out on it. Gen. Musharraf had only three years. He was=20
'mandated' to enable the country to get back on to the democratic=20
rails by Oct. 12, 2002. Then on the Constitution will have to be=20
followed. But in the meantime the general has left no one in doubt=20
that he has a long agenda of reforms --- all kinds of reforms: in the=20
economy and in the political system. He has also put all the 140=20
million Pakistanis on notice that he has decided to remain the=20
President of Pakistan so that no PM, Parliament or anyone else can=20
tamper with his reforms. He has thus put a questionmark on both=20
democracy and his reforms. Yes, he will restore a democracy but it=20
will not be able to harm or hurt his reforms that will have to=20
continue.

The question arises what are the reforms he is so worried about?=20
Insofar as the economy is concerned, his reforms can accurately be=20
summed up and described: they are the same as the conditionalities=20
that the IMF has spelled out in its Poverty Reduction and Growth=20
Facility loan for $ 1.5 billion for three years --- in which minor=20
changes in the agreed targets are negotiated and approved from time=20
to time. They are, in critics' view, simple dictation by IMF of what=20
economic policies to follow, leaving little leeway for Pakistan's own=20
authorities to depart from the straight and narrow as laid down by=20
IMF. Most Pakistanis are sceptical about what the IMF prescription=20
will do to Pakistan. They fear that already poverty's growth has been=20
rapid under IMF conditionalities --- that are at least 22 years old=20
--- as a result of growing unemployment. Social services have been=20
grossly neglected, despite so much rhetoric of social sectors'=20
priority. Military expenditures and debt servicing preempt all social=20
sector spending; except to maintain the bureaucracies little net=20
development has taken place.

As for political reforms, they are most controversial. The central=20
proposition of the proposed political restructuring is that the Army=20
must have a role, indeed share, in power. With disarming candour=20
General Musharraf has made it plain that supposedly to ensure the=20
continuity of his reforms he must remain in power --- who will not=20
let elected politicians change his policies. That is to say he will=20
serve as the check on the new Parliament and the Cabinet responsible=20
to it. That means his fiat will override what the elected=20
government(s) and the Assemblies decide. How can that be done? By=20
amending the Constitution of course. That opens up a Pandora'x box.

Who will change the Constitution? Why? Musharraf himself will do so,=20
of course. Hasn't other Martial Law dictators amended the=20
Constitution of the day as they willed? And hasn't the apex court, in=20
its inscrutable wisdom, given him an unasked for authority to amend=20
the Constitution. True, there are so many who feel outraged at the=20
idea that a man emerges on a white charger from the shadows and grabs=20
the whole political system and starts changing laws and mangles the=20
Constitution to suit his expediencies. These people refuse to=20
recognise that Mr. Musharraf has any authority to change the basic=20
law of the land. And the changes that subordinate the Parliament and=20
its representatives to the politics of one man (may be his whims)=20
will not be acceptable.

At any rate, some presume that no matter what amendments he makes,=20
their enactment will have to conform to the procedure laid down in=20
the Constitution which Musharraf recognises (in theory that it=20
exists). Moreover, if there is a Constitution, the legitimacy of the=20
Musharraf Presidentship will have to come from that supreme law. In=20
other words, he will have either to get himself elected by the=20
constitutional college that is similar to India's or will have to be=20
ratified by the Constitution(al amendments). The same thing will=20
apply to all Constitutional amendments. They will have to be=20
'enacted' in the standard way any amendment to the organic law is=20
enacted.

That puts all the significance and importance on the quality,=20
character and composition of the new National and Provincial=20
Assemblies that are to be elected on 7th and 11th of October next. If=20
they comprise Musharraf supporters by any chance or contrivance,=20
Musharraf has nothing to worry about; they will rubberstamp all his=20
actions. But if they comprise a majority of PML (Nawaz) and PPP=20
(Benazir), he will face a major Crisis of his life --- bigger than=20
any he has faced so far. He will be on a dilemma: either he refuses=20
to accept the results of the elections as Gen. Yahya did in 1971; or=20
he may have to submit to what a rebellious Parliament and other=20
Assemblies may say or do. That may include any action in pursuit of=20
Article Six of the Constitution that lays down punishment of death=20
for anyone who abrogates or otherwise subverts the Constitution.=20
Which of these two situations comes to pass will depend on how free=20
the October polls will be.

If the polls were gerrymandered the way April Referendum was, no one=20
will give any respect to the new Parliament and its government; they=20
will all be seen as stooges of the Army and nobody --- Parliament,=20
elected governments or the President or his Amendments --- will have=20
any legitimacy or command people's respect. But if the polls are free=20
and the new Parliament refuses to be stagemanaged the country might=20
then embark on a democratic destination, strengthened, though the=20
Army will have to get ready for being no more than a subordinate=20
department of the government.

A lot rides on the nature of the polls. The outside world is=20
irrelevant. Pakistan's own future will be at stake. The Army, through=20
Musharraf's amendments wants to perpetuate its control, stranglehold=20
as some would say, over the whole political system: these amendments=20
will comprise additional and extraordinary powers of the President to=20
oversee all the governance processes and shall have the ability to=20
dismiss the Parliament (and Assemblies) and the governments=20
responsible to them either off his own pen or on the recommendation=20
of a National Security Council, with a majority of generals, which=20
Musharraf wants to be empowered to recommend the suspension of the=20
Constitution and dismissal of the normal elected governments and a=20
few other measures.

The biggest worry of all aware citizens is whether the polls will=20
actually take place; they can be postponed with the willing and=20
cooperative permission of the apex court. It has throughout history=20
given judgements in sensitive cases that pleased the dictator of the=20
day. That postponement will create a crisis that Musharraf will be=20
able to handle for sometime. But if the polls are held and they are=20
not free, a bigger crisis will ensue that may beget an unending=20
division in the political life. It may inaugurate an era of popular=20
struggle against the military's overlordship and the controlled=20
democracy that is thus likely to be inaugurated later in October will=20
fare no better than Ayub Khan's Basic Democracy even at its start.=20
But if the elections are free and fair, the military might be=20
presented with a terrible choice: accept their results and receive a=20
setback perhaps permanent, to its pretensions and frustration of its=20
desires; or it rejects the poll results, as Yahya Khan did, and get=20
ready to face similar consequences. So would the polls be held in=20
October next? is the question.

____

#3.

Reporters Without Borders [ Reporters San Frontiers]
5, rue Geoffroy-Marie
75009 Paris - France
Paris

India 06.11.2002

Official reason for Kashmiri journalist's arrest is challenged

Reporters Without Borders (Reporters Sans Fronti=E8res) called today=20
for the release of Kashmiri journalist Iftikhar Ali Geelani and=20
suggested his arrest was an attempt to restrict coverage of events in=20
Kashmir.

"Charging a Kashmiri journalist under the Official Secrets Act in=20
present circumstances would seem an effort to intimidate any media=20
which tries to report independently on the conflict in the province,"=20
said Reporters Without Borders secretary-general Robert M=E9nard in a=20
letter to Indian interior minister Lal Krishna Advani.

Calling on him to explain the arrest and charging of Geelani, who is=20
New Delhi bureau chief of the Indian daily Kashmir Times and also=20
correspondent for the Pakistani daily The Nation, he said the case=20
against the journalist was "weak."

He also asked the minister to make a speedy inquiry into the=20
beating-up of another Kashmiri journalist by Indian police who, he=20
said, "seem incapable of putting a stop to a wave of physical attacks=20
and attempts to kill journalists in Kashmir. It would be regrettable=20
if the government allowed the climate of impunity enjoyed by these=20
attackers to increase," he added.

Geelani was charged today under the secrets act and police were=20
granted a further five days to hold him for questioning. He was=20
arrested on 9 June at his New Delhi home by tax department officers=20
and police but was then accused of storing information in his laptop=20
computer about India's military presence in Kashmir. He pointed out=20
that this material was from a 1997 US State Department report and had=20
already been published in the Indian daily The Hindu.=20

The daily Hindustan Times said the journalist had admitted to his=20
interrogators that he worked for Pakistani intelligence but this has=20
not been confirmed by other sources. Many Kashmiri journalists, as=20
well as the New Delhi journalists' union, have condemned his arrest,=20
which came soon after the detention of his father-in-law, Kashmiri=20
leader Syed Ali Shah Geelani, who has been charged under an=20
anti-terrorist law and accused of being in the pay of Pakistani=20
intelligence.

Another Kashmiri journalist, Mohammad Yusuf Dar, a reporter for the=20
Daily Excelsior in Jammu (Kashmir), was beaten and insulted by police=20
and detained for two hours on 10 June. The independent=20
English-language daily Kashmir Images said he was arrested on his way=20
home.

Police have still not made any serious investigation into the attempt=20
to kill Zafar Iqbal, of Kashmir Images, who was shot and seriously=20
wounded by masked men at his office in Srinagar on 29 May. His=20
colleagues told Reporters Without Borders that police had made no=20
effort to guard the paper's offices and made no inquiry into the=20
shooting.

____

#4.

URL: http://www.mnet.fr/aiindex/KChenoy2002USCIRF.html

Submission to US Commission on International religious Freedoms

by Kamal Mitra Chenoy

June 10, 2002 [ Washington, D.C.]

1. The events in Gujarat from 27 February 2002 mark a turning point=20
in contemporary Indian politics. These have profound consequences for=20
the continuation of India as a multi-cultural, secular society, for=20
survival of democracy, and for the unity and integrity of the=20
country. There have been riots and pogroms in India before but the=20
Gujarat carnage is exceptional in the extent of state sponsorship,=20
official justification and cover-up, the suborning of the state=20
apparatus, and the legitimation of genocide as an instrument of=20
electoral politics.

2. Gujarat has a history of sectarian [communal] violence, going back=20
to decades before Indian independence in 1947. The small town of=20
Godhra is no exception. There was communal tension in the town and=20
the State because of proposed Hindu rites at a disputed site in the=20
town of Ayodhya in Uttar Pradesh. Hindu volunteers travelling in the=20
Sabarmati Express train to Ayodhya or back to Ahmedabad in Gujarat,=20
had reportedly been misbehaving with Muslim passengers, both men and=20
women, for days without any police intervention. Around 7.45AM on=20
27th February some incidents at Godhra station, including the=20
attempted abduction of a teenaged Muslim girl by a Hindu volunteer=20
travelling on the train, led to stone throwing, followed by an attack=20
by a Muslim mob of 2,000 from nearby slums when the train was stopped=20
half a mile away. 1,500 Hindu volunteers on the train countered with=20
stone throwing. Fire bombs were used by the Muslim mob, and one=20
railway coach was burnt leading to the deaths of 59 Hindu passengers,=20
mainly women and children. This incident, which was a communal riot=20
in a town with a long history of communal outbreaks, became the=20
trigger and justification for the carnage that followed.

3. The Chief Minister of Gujarat Narendra Modi, who is also a senior=20
RSS [Rashtriya Swayamsevak Sanghathan: National Volunteer=20
Organization--a Hindu fundamentalist organization] leader, arrived in=20
Godhra and alleged that the attack on the train was planned by=20
Pakistani intelligence [the Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI)]. This=20
charge was repeated a couple of days later by federal Home Minister=20
L.K. Advani, also a Member of Parliament from Gandhinagar, the=20
capitol of Gujarat. Ministers alleged that the same terrorist groups=20
who had attacked the American Center in Kolkata were behind the=20
Godhra attack, and promised to teach them a lesson. Consequently an=20
impression was created with official sanction, that the Godhra=20
Muslims were agents of Pakistan, a traditional enemy. The Chief=20
Minister insisted that the badly charred bodies of the victims be=20
sent for post mortem to Ahmedabad the same night. The time of arrival=20
of the bodies was announced over the government radio and frenzied=20
mobs came to the railway station to receive the bodies. Ram dhuns=20
[religious rites] were performed that night and the next day all over=20
Ahmedabad. The same day, the Vishva Hindu Parishad [World Hindu=20
Council] called for a 'bandh' [a total strike including stoppage of=20
traffic] on February 28th in protest against Godhra. The ruling=20
Bhartiya Janata Party [BJP] supported the bandh, and the Chief=20
Minister reportedly told top officials, including from the police, to=20
refrain from interfering with the bandh supporters.

4. On 28th February organized Hindu mobs, sometimes as large as=20
20,000 controlled Ahmedabad, while the police stood by. VHP-Bajrang=20
Dal [an RSS affiliate]-BJP workers organized the mobs and led them.=20
The Minister of State for Home Affairs Gordhan Zadaphia flashed the=20
'V' for victory sign while passing rampaging mobs. Zadaphia and=20
another Minister sat in the police control rooms in Ahmedabad and=20
Gandhinagar for hours, reportedly immobilizing the police and fire=20
brigade but directing the mobs. Mobs were transported by trucks and=20
buses. They had detailed lists of Muslim institutions, commercial=20
establishments, residences and shrines. These were looted and burnt.=20
The information was so detailed that even shops with minority Muslim=20
ownership were identified and attacked. The mobs carried thousands of=20
liquefied petroleum gas [(LPG) cooking gas] cylinders which were used=20
to blow up the properties they attacked. Significantly, these LPG=20
cylinders had been in short supply for weeks. There were widespread=20
attacks on Muslim men, women and children who were hacked with knives=20
and swords, and in many cases, later burnt. There were many cases of=20
rape and gang rape, even of minor girls, and a large number of the=20
victims were then brutally killed. To cite just a couple of=20
instances: a former Congress Member of Parliament Ehsan Jafri who had=20
campaigned against the Chief Minister in an Assembly election weeks=20
earlier, called for help for hours but no help came, instead a huge=20
mob attacked his residential colony in Chamanpura. He was hacked into=20
three pieces and the rioters reportedly urinated on his body. Ten=20
women were stripped, raped, hacked and thrown into fires. Only one=20
survived. In Naroda-Patia where more than 90 people were killed and=20
many women and girls raped, an eight month pregnant women Kausar=20
Bano's belly was slit open, the fetus extracted and both were killed.=20
The police, in most cases, not only did not intervene to protect the=20
Muslims, but in many cases connived with the rioters. In=20
Naroda-Patia, the Special Reserve Police refused shelter to the=20
Muslims and forced them in the direction of waiting mobs. More=20
Muslims than Hindus were killed in police firing. Curfew was imposed=20
more in Muslim localities than in Hindu ones.

5. Unlike in earlier episodes, anti-Muslim violence spread later even=20
to rural areas, including tribal areas, apart from other urban=20
centers. According to official estimates, less than 1,000 people have=20
died, overwhelmingly Muslim. Informed unofficial figures are much=20
higher around 2,500 but the death toll may be even higher when the=20
list of the missing, particularly in the rural areas, is checked. The=20
property and business losses are colossal and official compensation=20
is selective and niggardly. Very large numbers of Muslims have no=20
viable shelter to return to. Many like those from Naroda-Patia are=20
scared to go back. Hundreds of Muslim shrines have been destroyed and=20
desecrated. The shrine of the medieval saint-poet Wali Gujarati was=20
razed to the ground and a round built over it. More than 100,000=20
Muslims live in NGO-run relief camps throughout Gujarat. The State=20
does not run these camps and provides insufficient uncooked food and=20
other essentials for them. For example, the largest camp in Shah Alam=20
in Ahmedabad has 12,000 inmates but only 22 toilets.

6. The official machinery has been obstructive in registering cases=20
against the allegedly guilty. In most cases, the police have not=20
filed charge sheets. In the relatively few cases in which these have=20
been filed, in most cases the names of the accused are not mentioned=20
and only an anonymous mob is cited, making the cases legally very=20
weak. In the few cases charge sheets have been filed, key BJP=20
operatives have been excluded. And in most of these cases the Muslims=20
are shown as having incited the violence. For example, in the Ehsan=20
Jafri case it is recorded that he fired first on the mob, whereas=20
there is no evidence that Jafri fired at all.=20=20

7. Police officers and civil service officers who controlled violence=20
in various parts of Gujarat were summarily transferred to other=20
areas, and other, more pliable officers posted in their stead.=20
Officers sympathetic to the BJP were posted to investigate crucial=20
cases like Naroda-Patia and Chamanpura. This is a pattern throughout=20
the State.

8. All official propaganda referred to the Godhra incident as a=20
'carnage' and the subsequent violence as 'disturbances.' This was=20
true not only of the Chief Minister but also of the Prime Minister in=20
the initial stages. This was intended to explain away the genocide=20
against Muslims as a 'natural' reaction to the killings in Godhra. So=20
some 2,500 killings were a 'disturbance' while 59 were a 'carnage.'

9. In April, well before the violence ceased, the Chief Minister=20
advocated elections to the State Assembly. Clearly the attempt was to=20
cash in on the communal polarization and the antipathy of Hindus=20
towards the minority communities [Muslims, Christians] to bolster the=20
BJP's electoral prospects. A number of political commentators have=20
alleged that the basic reason for the communal violence in Gujarat=20
was electoral, an attempt to consolidate the Hindu votes. The public=20
outcry against elections in a disturbed and disrupted State, forced=20
the federal government to rule out immediate elections.=20

10. On the basis of such information and analysis, the National Human=20
Rights Commission [NHRC] and various non-official inquiries have=20
exposed the state-complicity and according to some, state-sponsorship=20
of the anti-Muslim violence. It appears that this pogrom and genocide=20
was organized some months prior to February. The preparation of the=20
detailed lists of Muslim properties, institutions and residences=20
would have taken months of prior planning. Similarly, the stocking of=20
LPG cylinders, weapons, organization of transport, deployment of=20
forces, would have taken time and considerable organization.

11. Despite such reports, the BJP State government is contemptuous=20
of such criticism. It dismissed the NHRC report as insulting the=20
sentiments of millions of Gujaratis. Police intelligence has reported=20
that the Chief Minister in recent weeks has campaigned in rural areas=20
implicitly castigating the Muslims on the basis of a Hindu=20
fundamentalist agenda. Just a couple of days ago the Governor of=20
Gujarat, a RSS leader, stated that Assembly elections were now=20
possible. So the cynical game plan of the State government to make=20
electoral gains at the cost of a section of its own electorate has=20
been exposed once again.

12. The Gujarat genocide has very serious implications for Indian=20
democracy. India is the most variegated and diverse society in the=20
world. It has some 3,000 communities speaking some 150 languages and=20
dialects. Any attempt to impose a rigid Hindu fundamentalist agenda=20
on such a diverse people is bound to lead to vigorous resistance,=20
possibly Balkanization. If a State government, like in Gujarat, is=20
able to carry out genocide with impunity, it means that the secular=20
edifice that guarantees multicultural democracy in India has been=20
gravely eroded. This is bound to have a demonstration effect all over=20
the country. Muslims are around 14 % of the population. When a=20
section of the Sikhs who totaled just 2% of the population revolted=20
against Indian rule with Pakistani support, in the 1980's there was a=20
bloodbath. In the case of Muslims, given the Pakistan-backed=20
insurgency in Muslim-majority Kashmir which has brought India and=20
Pakistan to the brink of war, the threat is even greater. If the=20
Muslims of Gujarat feel that they will not receive justice, as seems=20
very likely, some of them and other co-religionists may be drawn to=20
terrorism to seek revenge. In view of Pakistan's support to=20
anti-Indian terrorists, there is every possibility of such embittered=20
individuals obtaining foreign support. If rumors about Al- Qaeda=20
presence in Indian Kashmir are correct, then such elements may well=20
link up with Al-Qaeda. After the Mumbai riots in December=20
1992-January 1993, the Mafia don Dawood Ibrahim linked up with=20
Pakistani intelligence and unleashed terrorism in India. So a similar=20
linkage with the addition of Islamic fundamentalists like Al-Qaeda is=20
perfectly conceivable.
13. The just resolution of the Gujarat genocide is thus vital not=20
only for the survival of a multi-cultural, secular, democratic India=20
but also for the stability and peace of the sub-continent. It has=20
possible implications for the global fight against terrorism.

____

#5.

The Observer (UK)
Sunday June 9, 2002

Which way now for India?

The Kashmir conflict is not just between two nations, it is a battle=20
for the soul of one of them. The world's largest democracy is a=20
hi-tech economic power - but it is also a stronghold of zealots and=20
fundamentalism. The secular dream is under threat...

Luke Harding in New Delhi
http://www.guardian.co.uk/kashmir/Story/0,2763,729846,00.html

____

#6.

INSAF Bulletin [2] June 1, 2002
International South Asia Forum
Secretarial office: 2520 Lionel Groulx #13, Montreal, QC, Canada H3J=20
1J8 (Tel. 514 939-2522)
e-mail: <insaf@i...> ; visit our website http//www.insaf.net)
Edited by Daya Varma [Produced by CERAS, the Montreal Affiliate of INSAF]
This issue of INSAF Bulletin is dedicated to the memory of Kaifi=20
Azmi (1915-2002)

{The complete issue of the Insaf bulletin can be downloaded at :
http://www.mnet.fr/aiindex/insafBull2jun2002.html }